Editorial Board Contents - Bureau of Police Research and ...

and systems will increasingly come under publicscrutiny. Demands for parliamentary oversight,intervention in internal administrative matters,resistance to legal empowerment, like in the caseof National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC),etc. are indicative of the changing environment.It will be desirable for the Indian intelligenceagencies to start revisiting their systems andmaking preparations for change, compatible withthe future realities, without undermining vitalnational interest.The Intelligence agencies should startdeliberating on a public interface mechanismwhich, in the long run, may even include amedia and public relations exercise. The wayIndian democracy is evolving, it will be in thenational interest to educate the media and haveworking relation with it, rather than allow it togo haywire for want of knowledge and authenticinformation. A well thought out action plan, onthis count, may take two to three years before itis made operational.Secondly, it will be desirable to have a group ofexperienced officers examine the entire workingof the lB and R&AW and re-visit its security needs,through VED-analysis. Through a calibratedstrategy, it can secure vital secrets that may impingeon national security, while allowing controlledoversight by parliamentary or other bodies,where it will not hurt the vitals. Besides changesin tradecraft doctrines and practices, the changeswill involve, a whole new regimen of securityre-classification, changes in documentation andfiling systems, communications, maintenanceof records, weeding out of files etc. Intelligenceagencies should be able to bring about thischange in the next three to four years.Technology will have to be another focus areafor transformational change. This has twodistinct dimensions in intelligence. First isneutralizing efforts of the adversaries to acquireand operationalise technologies to undermineour national security. The second, pertainsto up-gradation and integration of state of arttechnologies by us to enhance our own defensiveand offensive capacities.The rate at which terrorists, spies, saboteursand hostile intelligence agencies are acquiringnew technologies, poses a serious threat. Theseinclude a whole ambit of weapon systems,explosives, communication equipments, defeatsystems against conventional intelligencetradecraft etc. Recently, the use of social mediafor creating lawlessness and inciting people toviolence has underlined the scope of technologydriven threats. Incessant efforts being madeby the jehadi terrorists to acquire radioactiveexplosive devices (dirty bombs), is a matterof serious concern. With the conditions ofinstability in Af-Pak region getting accentuatedafter 2014 drawdown, ideologically motivatedIslamists taking charge of senior positions inPakistan Army and intelligence setups, deepeningcollaborative linkages of ISI with home grownradical groups like Indian Mujahedeen, in India,the intelligence challenges will get compoundedmanifold. Terrorist groups are also fast acquiringcapabilities of safe communication which willrender the task of interception quite difficult.In the area of defence, fast technological upgradationthrough heavy investments beingmade by hostile intelligence agencies like ISI ofPakistan, MSS of China etc. in electronic warfare,offensive cyber capabilities, space surveillance,maritime encirclement of India etc. will have to befactored in for developing counter capabilities.Another aspect of technology in intelligencework relates to acquisition, improvisation andintegration of new technologies. Though itsnecessity is disputed by none, the intricacies areunderstood by few. India’s strategic partnershipwith the US and greater security cooperationwith the West notwithstanding, no developedcountry will share real state of the art intelligencetechnologies with India, particularly as a totalsystem. Even where the second rung technologiesare made available, they are fraught with danger,as the suppliers will insist on not transferring thecodes or allowing us to change them withouttheir involvement. Secrecy of our systems in thisdispensation is seriously undermined. India willdo well to take advantage of the offset clause inacquisition of defence equipment and use partof it for indigenous production of intelligenceequipment. With India purchasing over $100billion worth of defence equipments in thenext seven to eight years, 30% of it under theoffset clause, provides us a huge investmentopportunity for this. Development of internalResearch and Development capabilities areThe Indian Police Journal, October - December, 2012, Special Issue 35