Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critique of Postmodernism

xxvisimplistic, words like oppression, exploitation, and domination” (1990, pp. 51–52).Kathleen Barry also criticizes the academic marketplace, the de-funding of analysesof racism, sexism and class oppression, and the “defeminism of women’s studies”(1991, p. 83). “Immense political energy is devoted to seeing that alternatives arenipped in the bud, rendered ridiculous, and never adequately funded,” charges MaryO’Brien with reference to women and health care (1989, p. 213).In her introduction to Feminism/Postmodernism, Nicholson definespostmodernists as critical of objectivity and neutrality and this is, she claims, “evenmore radical” (1990, p. 3) than the work of scholars involved in “other” politicalmovements, including feminism, Marxism, Black and gay liberation. It ispostmodernists, not feminists, who “have extended the field where power hastraditionally been viewed as operating, for example, from the state and the economyto such domains as sexuality and mental health” (1990, p. 4). Thus, at least onecentury of diverse feminist scholarship and practice is unrecognized, ignored,rewritten, trivialized. It appears that a certain authoritative consensus is beingpromoted and recirculated, a somewhat totalizing postmodern feminist metanarrativeabout the history and the potential of feminism. Curious how the critical practice isnot situated in a study of the culture or the epistemology of postmodernism.Nicholson believes that postmodernism deconstructs the “God’s eye view” (1990,p. 2, 3) bias of an Enlightenment methodology. I believe that Nicholson has readDerrida, but did not recognize him. Yet Nicholson’s book has been well-received byEnlightenment misogynists; as Modleski points out, “postmodern feminists mightwell wish to ponder how they wound up in this new ‘alliance’ with anti-feministhumanism” (1991, p. 14).Gender and Knowledge, Elements of a Postmodern Feminism goes one stepbeyond the presentation of feminism as an aspect of postmodernism, and portrayspostmodernism as the ultimate (post) feminism. But then, “Consent”, as MaryO’Brien ironizes, “relies on a perception by the public that, imperfect though asystem may be, it is the only game in town” (1989, p. 213). And the game here is theabsorption of all critical space by postmodernism. Hekman’s project is topostmodernize feminism; hers is not a feminist critique of postmodernism, but a“postmodern approach to feminism” (1990, p. 3). It is no longer a question ofextending postmodernism by adding gender; it is feminism which must be purged bypostmodernism of Enlightenment, essentialist, absolutist and foundationalisttendencies. Cartesian epistemology, not class or heterosexuality, is the main enemyhere, and Foucault, Derrida and Gadamer are brought forward to critique feminism.Indeed, Hekman’s major target is not the sexism of social and political thought, butthe “women’s way of knowing” literature. Daly, Ruddick, Gilligan, Chodorow,Lorde, feminist standpoint theory, the “Marxist feminist camp” (1990, p. 40), the“contradictory” (1990, p. 30) radical feminists, the maternal thinkers, all aredistinctly less perfect than Derrida and Foucault: “The strongest case for apostmodern feminism can be made through an examination of the work of Derridaand Foucault” (1990, p. 155). Hekman proposes a “conversation of mankind”[sic] (1990, p. 9) between feminism and postmodernism (1990, p. 123). In thisTaming of the Shrew it seems that only man may speak of woman and not be a