ISSUE 152 : Jan/Feb - 2002 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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58AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 152 JANUARY / FEBRUARY 2002environment for the evaluation, and refinesthe aims and objectives of activities. From theanalysis viewpoint, the outputs of theproblem definition phase are a cleardescription of what the military operationssystem has to achieve, its identified orperceived potential weaknesses and theimportant questions to be answered to bothvalidate assumptions and to “optimise” thesystem. A conceptual model is developed andthe military system is typically described by aconcept of operations, mission essential tasksand capability requirements, the weaknessesby critical areas and issues, and questions tobe answered by objectives.There are three key differences between themilitary experimentation process and OTE.First is the use of scientific inquiry andanalytical techniques to support the problemdefinition phase in military experimentation,second is our approach to the systematicrefinement of the problem through a matrix ofcomplimentary analytical tools, and finallyusing every analytical activity as the basis foran “After Action Review”.Scientific inquiry is used in support ofmilitary judgement to select tasks andscenarios during the problem definition phasein a military experimentation program. Criticalissues (those issues defining the performanceof the system) usually drive OTE, and dataelements are collected on these issues. Early inFigure 4. Selection of Tasksthe problem definition phase of RTA it wasidentified that the problem space was too illdefined,and the range of critical issues toogreat, for an OTE approach to be useful.Consequently the method of driving theprogram through identified required, orfundamental, tasks was devised. Thisexperience can now be generalised and wenote that where a problem is ill-defined theanalysis is best driven by observing and“measuring” against identified tasks, toprovide information against the critical issues.Where the problem is better defined,resolution of critical issues drives theevaluation program and tasks and scenariosare selected to answer particular questions.This again emphasises the critical difference;that of recognising the unexpected andmeasuring the expected.During the RTA “Phase 1” study, thisapproach was applied by focussing the initialrefinement process on those tasks that must beevaluated in order to provide a basis fromwhich military judgement could be used to“optimise” the Task Force. These tasks wereselected on the basis of the impact they wouldhave on the effectiveness of the Task Force(Land Command 1997). The method ofselecting tasks to be analysed from the conceptof operations, Figure 4, was developed fromthe analytic framework used in the LAV-25Trials conducted by 2nd Cavalry Regiment inCritical AreasContextProblemDefinitionConceptObjectivesDoctrineOrganisationEquipmentActivitiesandScenarios
1990/91. In this trial, evaluation resources werevery limited and, to gather as muchinformation as possible, key tasks wereconducted by an M113 troop and by a LAV-25troop. Teams of experts observed the conductof these tasks. These observations and themilitary judgement (opinions) of theparticipants formed the basis of the reports.An important aspect was that, despite alarge number of questions to be answered inRTA (of the order of 200), there were relativelyfew OTE style tests focussed on singlequestions. The vast majority of the informationwas from observations of tasks.A second key innovation is the systematicrefinement of the problem space throughmultiple iterations and layers of analytic andtraining tools, Figure 5. The pivotal tool was awar gaming environment of sufficient fidelityto challenge existing organisational anddoctrinal paradigms — in effect the building ofa synthetic experience base, supported bycarefully selected field experiments and realworld operational experience as validation forthe synthetic experience. Each level of analysisprovided three outputs: answers to specificquestions, the context for the next level ofanalysis and confirmation of the results ofprevious layers.As we have suggested earlier, the choice oftest scenarios is of critical importance to properrefinement of the problem and indeedresolution of the issues. Arguably threeprimary aspects must be considered in thechoice of test scenario. The most important isthat the test scenario produces circumstancesin which the identified and required tasks arein fact tested. That is, the required experiencebase is established. In addition, the testscenario chosen must have sufficient credibilityand detail to engage the participants in a“challenging problem”. Throughout the RTAPhase 1 work and in HE99 and HE00, the testscenarios were deliberately chosen to engage“stress” the force elements nominated againstrequired tasks. The choice of “stress” as a basisINNOVATION AND EXPLORATION 59for test reflects the OTE genesis of the RTAprocess (OTE methods require tests againstmost stressful, least stressful and most likelycomponents of the performance envelope) anda limit on the resources and time forconducting the study. The approach explicitlyassumed that a Task Force “optimised” forwarfighting against a basket of stressfulscenarios could adapt across the performanceenvelope. 7The AEF framework accordingly places asignificant emphasis on problem definition andthe choice of so called “stressful scenarios”.The experiments that have been conducted todate have received some criticism that thechoice of scenarios was unrealistic - inparticular the notion that Australia mightcommit as a lead nation in a mechanised waragainst a large army with a powerful armouredcapability (modelled as T80 tanks in the wargames). While this is indeed unrealistic andunlikely, the experiments were designed tostress the concepts and the ORBATs in order toinvestigate the limits of applicability toimprove the concepts and capabilities. Toachieve this analytic requirement the conceptsproposed were examined out of the “normal”contexts in which they were conceived. This isan acknowledged weakness of the experimentdesign, and caused some difficulty in assessingthe concepts against the BOS requirements, butin principle provided a powerful analyticconstruct. Because of the criticism, scenariodesigns are now tailored to provide “stresswithin context” for the concepts andcapabilities under consideration. This is likelyto be a design feature for the experimentsconducted under the evolving DefenceExperimental Framework.Figure 5, and the “stressful scenarios” inwhich to test the concepts, was developed fromthe build-up training conducted by 1st Brigadein preparation for Exercise Predators Advance90. In preparation for this exercise thecommander trained the brigade staffs firstlywith a TEWT; the “best” solution to the TEWT
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ISSUE 152 : Jan/Feb - 2002 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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