The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

the degree displayed in Samuels' work, there are still quite a few examples of firmindependence and therefore of pluralistic processes in other realms. Figure 4contains relevant examples of state pluralism drawn from Samuels' and other works.Recent scholarship on Japan's political economy also demonstrates thatmultiple rationales guide policy debates. Policies are not based solely on a singlesimple formula for economic growth employed by state ministries to support winners.Instead, both ministries and private interests approach economic policy choices withmultiple goals in regard to any issue as well as having a variety of concerns atdifferent times. Political parties, local government and trade unions also have multipleconcerns which reflect their own goals and operating rationales.As Figure 5 illustrates, individual economic policies address in every instancecombinations of multiple rationales. On the government ministry side, some policieswere designed mainly to increase production, others to stimulate productivity, othersto provide a stable domestic supply so as to conserve foreign exchange and othersto relieve burdens on fiscal resources. Specific ministries also proposed economicpolicy formulae which would expand their own control, usually because of anideological commitment to state intervention and a mistrust of free markets.Depending on the issue, business firms' main policy goals have includedavoidance of direct government control, profit maximization, survival by avoidance ofbankruptcy, and a acquisition of a stable or growing market share. These and otherconcerns have led businesses to make subsidiary demands for various kinds ofactions such as production subsidies, regulations which limit market entry orgovernment-supported price mechanisms. Other political actors have had similarlydiverse concerns depending on the time and setting. Trade unions were concernedwith continued employment, unemployment benefits, retraining programs,participation in management and/or, in some periods, nationalization of particularindustries (30). Local governments themselves wanted to avoid footing the bill forindustrial development or adjustments, while maximizing local employment andprosperity. Politicians made demands based on the rationales advocated by theirgroups or localities. Policies were made in what Norton Long has called an ecologyof games (31). Policies are the outcome of a negotiated intersection of variouseconomic rationales, not the imposition of a single dimensional economic growthrationale on a variety of actors with varying and not always mutually consistent (oreven simply defined) interests. These complexities indicate there is much more togovernment policymaking and its acceptance than solely a bureaucratic ideology ofgrowth.Qualifying the Japanese Government Economic Role: The Scope andPriorities of Government Investments. Before discussing the implications ofgovernment programs in specific economic sectors, two general misconceptions