The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

needed less from government banks as they became more successful and efficient(108). In contrast, in troubled industries such as iron and steel and non-ferrousmetals, the patterns of dependence on government borrowing were actuallyreversed. Over time borrowing from the JDB increased as a share of all borrowing;dependence on JDB loans also increased in relationship to output and value added.Since we lacked data on the 1950s, we could not analyze periods when JDB lendinghad different implications. But with this exception, the figures tell a remarkable storyof government responsiveness to industry difficulties relative to industry successes.Japan as a Politically Clientelistic State. The idea of seeing Japan as aneconomic welfare state is very appealing. The degree of attention paid to sustainingemployment during hard times in industries affected by oil price "shocks," cyclicaldownturns, high yen influenced declines in export sales, removal of protective tariffsand quotas and other factors is impressive. But Japan under Liberal Democratic ruleis also a "clientelistic state". Many programs targeted at weak economic sectors aremotivated by a political concern for aiding conservative party supporters as much asfor other reasons. Quite a few scholars would even say that clientelism supersedeswelfare in importance as a motivation. Interest groups, individual Dietmembers andintra-LDP policy "families" actively seek help from the government on behalf oftraditional LDP clients such as farmers and small business. Representatives ofconstituencies where recessed industries are located also ask for help, often in theform of public works outlays which favor another LDP client, the constructionindustry. Much of Japan's domestic policy agenda is affected by their actions (109).Japanese farmers are another major LDP client and have done unusuallywell compared with large industry throughout the postwar era (see Table 6). Ifsupport for farm programs is added to the amounts provided medium and smallbusiness, the enormous size of Japan's role as some combination of "economicwelfare" and "clientelistic" state becomes clear. Outlays to clients or "welfare" sectorshave always exceeded amounts provided for economic growth by a ratio of from 3:1to 6:1. The popular image of Japan as a developmental state obviously needs somequalification.Recent research has modified earlier images which ignored or failed to givedetailed attention to the clientelistic and welfare oriented aspects of the Japanesepolitical economy. Kent Calder, in particular, has pointed to the importance of LDPclientelism and developed a challenging thesis as to its timing (110). Calder's generalthesis that clientelism is an important driving force in the Japanese political economyis well supported by data on government support for different economic sectors, aswas shown.Calder has also proposed a "crisis and compensation" hypothesis thatsuggests LDP electoral losses and internal party conflict were a driving force in