The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

More documents

Recommendations

Info

policy promoting inter-firm mergers is well known, and symbolizes the general independence ofoutlook among some industry firms. Some successful automobile companies such as Hondaconsistently distance themselves from the government. KAPLAN.: op. cit., p. 120-128. JOHNSON.Ch.: op. cit., p. 24 and conversation with Soichiro Honda.(51) MUTOH, H.: op. cit. in KOMIYA, R. et. al.: op. cit., p. 323-324.(52) KAPLAN : op. cit., p. 116-120. However, YOKOKURA, Takashi: Small and Medium Enterprisesin KOMIYA, R. et. al.: op. cit., p. 531-534 discounts much medium and small industry policy asbeing generally unselective, so it is possible that the auto parts efforts were less successful thanKaplan states.(53) KAPLAN : op. cit., p. 83-86.(54) ANCHORDOGUY, M.: op. cit. 59-91.(55) SHINJO, Koji: "The Computer Industry" in KOMIYA R. et. al.: op. cit., especially p. 354-356.Gary Saxenhouse believes that cooperative R and D projects play a role something like inter-firmjob mobility in the United States, i. e. diffusion of knowledge across firms. See "Tampering withComparative Advantage in Japan", Testimony to the United States International Trade Commission,July 13/1983, p. 4.(56) SAMUELS, R.: op. cit., especially p. 116-134.(57) Several factors favored the success of the Japanese shipbuilding industry in the early postwarera, in addition to government subsidies to shipowners and later lending for export of ships. Laborcost were low in the Japanese shipbuilding industry in the early postwar era. The cost of steelinputs were also lower than those for European and American competitors in the latter part of the1950s and later. Capacity and production know-how also existed as the result of pre-war andwartime policies. See, for example, YONEZAWA, Yoshie: "The shipbuilding Industry" in KOMIYA,R. et. al.: op. cit., p. 443.(58) YONEZAWA, Y.: op. cit., p. 433ff.(59) GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE: Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Comittee, UnitedStates Congress, Industrial Policy: Case Studies in the Japanese Experience. Washington, DC,1982, p. 58-68.(60) According to the Economic Planning Agency, electricity rates are 24 percent higher in Tokyothan in New York, 15 percent higher than in London and nine percent higher than in Paris. SeeKEIZAI KOHO CENTER : Japan 1992, An International Comparison. p. 74. High costs of importedoil are a major factor in high electric power rates. See SAMUELS, R.: op. cit., p. 183.(61) HALL, Peter: Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France.New York, Oxford University Press, 1986, especially p. 17-20 and 229-283.(62) However, given considerable complexity and the need for carefully designed counter-factuals,assessment of the role of these institutional patterns in Japanese economic development mustremain tentative.(63) BRONFENBRENNER, Martin and YASUBA, Yasukichi: "Economic Welfare" in YAMAMURA, K.and YASUBA , Y. (ed): op. cit., p. 138(64) DENISON, Edward and CHUNG, Willian "Economic Growth and Its Sources" in PATRICK H.And ROSOVSKY, H. (ed) op. cit., p. 116-119.(65) SATO, K.: op. cit., p. 142.(66) One well known case, Toyota, had no bank indebtedness by the late 1980s. See KEIZAL, Toyo:Kigyo Keiretsu Soran. Tokyo. Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1987, p. 362.
(67) LINCOLN, E.J.: op. cit., p. 11.(68) PECHMAN, Joseph and KAIZUKA, Keimei: "Taxation" in PATRICK. H. and ROSOVSKY, H.(ed): op. cit., p. 317-382.(69) HAMADA; Koichi and HORIUCHI, Akiyoshi: "The Political Economy of the Financial Market" inYAMAMURA, K. and YASUBA, T.: op. cit., p. 232-235 and 249-250. The Japanese postwarcorporate practice of heavy dependence on bank loans declined somewhat after the 1970s.(70) JOHNSON, Ch.: op. cit., p. 211.(71) As Edward LINCOLN states regarding the indicative role of the JDB. "This statement could betrue....but it remains a piece of unexamined mythology about Japan.... the market for commercialloans is not more than marginally under the control of the Japan Development Bank". Op. cit., p. 41.(72) NAKAMURA. Takafusa: The Postwar Japanese Economy. Its Development and Structure.Tokyo. University of Tokyo Press. 1981, p. 66.(73) HADLEY, Eleanor: U.S. Trade Problems with Particular Reference to Japan in HOLLERMAN;Leon (ed.) : Japan and the United States Economic and Political Adversaries. Boulder, CO,Westview, 1980, p. 71; KOMIYA, R. et al.: op. cit., p. 14 NAKAMURA, T.: op. cit., p. 63-74.(74) FRIEDMAN, D.: op. cit., p. 97-99.(75) See comments by KOMIYA, Ryutaro and KOSAI, Yukata respectively, in KOMIYA, R. et, al.: op.cit., p. 14 and 26.(76) The concern for creating market order and higher levels of concentration was the main theme ofthe "New Industrial Order" policy of the 1960s. This policy has been discussed in many of thesources cited in this chapter. See, for example TSURUTA, Toshimasa: "The Rapid Growth Era" inKOMIYA, R. et. al.: op. cit., p. 63ff.(77) GALENSON, Walter and ODAKA, Konosuke: "The Japanese Labor Market" in PATRICK, H.ROSOVSKY, H.: op. cit., p. 589ff.(78) LEVINE, Solomon B: "Labor Conflict" in RICHARDSON , Bradley and UEDA, Taizo (ed): op. cit.,p. 48. Lifetime employment is found more in large firms than in Japan's medium and small businesssector, and is believed to foster high levels of company loyalty. See GALENSON, W. and ODAKA,K.: op. cit., p. 613-627.(79) However, growth was to some degree also an essential component of support for Japaneselabor practices, as both employment re-structuring during the 1970s recessions and more recentwork force curtailment testifies. Maintenance of a permanent labor force was in part dependent oneconomic growth, or at least maintenance of economic stability.(80) CALDER, K.: op. cit., p. 314. In some parts of the Japanese economy there are twice as manyemployees per unit of output or sales as in the United States.(81) FRIEDMAN, D.: op. cit., chapters 4-6. See also PATRICK. Hugh and ROHLEN, Thomas: "SmallScale Family Enterprises" in YAMAMURA; K, and YASUBA, Y.: op. cit. p. 346-347.(82) CAVES, Richard and UEKUSA, Masu : "Industrial Organization" in PATRICK H. AndROSOVSKY, H (ed) op. cit., p. 511-513.(83) KRAUSE and SEKIGUCHI: op. cit., p. 398 state unequivocally the now well accepted view thatthe domestic economy was the main driver of high growth in the 1950s and 1960s.(84) MURAKAMI, Yasusuke: "The Japanese Model of Political Economy" in YAMAMURA, K. andYASUBA, Y. (ed) op, cit., p. 74-75.
Page 2 and 3:
Japan's economy is one of the succe
Page 4 and 5:
West Germany. By 1990 both Japan an
Page 6 and 7: today although the plans are given
Page 8 and 9: percent of the Japanese government
Page 10 and 11: MCI and MITI policy development ass
Page 12 and 13: about the nature of Japanese govern
Page 14 and 15: amounts at a time when the future o
Page 16 and 17: Support for the Japanese computer i
Page 18 and 19: while most persons grant the import
Page 20 and 21: toward medium and small businesses.
Page 22 and 23: played a prominent and to some obse
Page 24 and 25: Textile makers kept obsolete machin
Page 26 and 27: 20 percent increases in the size of
Page 28 and 29: needed less from government banks a
Page 30 and 31: farm. Many persons moved to city ap
Page 32 and 33: Maintenence of adequate levels of e
Page 34 and 35: Japanese economic and industrial pe
Page 36 and 37: manipulation. Some policies also fa
Page 38 and 39: Table2
Page 46 and 47: Figure1
Page 52 and 53: NOTES(1) JOHNSON, Chalmers: MITI an
Page 54 and 55: (26) SAMUELS, R.: op. cit., p. 95-1
Page 58 and 59: (85) SAMUELS, R.: op. cit., chapter
Page 60: (113) Diminishment of Calder's cont
show all

The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?