The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

(85) SAMUELS, R.: op. cit., chapter 2, and KING, Anthony: "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies ofGovernments: A Comparative Analyses: Parts 1 and 2" in British Journal of Political Science 3, p.292-302.(86) While Chalmers Johnson has emphasized that Japan's over 100 special public and semi-publiccorporations serving transportation, communications and other mostly infra-structural needs makeher case unusual, others argue that the American national and state government's direct role in theeconomy exceeds that of Japan in exactly these areas. See LINCOLN, E.: op. cit., p. 47- 48In addition, while the Japanese government has promoted substantial investment in the economythrough the FILP-linked system of government financial institutions (see Table 7.6) FILP-basedloans were not outright subsidies. Government bank loans still had to be repaid. Japanesegovernment orchestrated investment is not the same thing as budget based investments orsubsidies for this reason. According to Lincoln, FILP investments are best compared withgovernment general obligation bonds in American practice.(87) Seventeen percent of Japan's total R and D expenditures were publicly financed in 1989, asharp contras with the U.S. figure of 46 percent and expenditures of 33%, 49% and 38%respectively for Germany, France and Britain. In the case of the U.S., and perhaps the Europeancountries as well , a major factor in the comparative differences is the inclusion in the general R andD category of figures for defense research, a sector where public outlays were proportionatelymuch greater outside Japan than within that country. KEIZAI KOHO CENTER : Japan 1992, anInternational Comparison, p. 25.(88) Even though policymaking affecting business concerns was often pluralistic and pitted somebusiness interests against others, business could still count on the presence of governments which(a) respected private ownership, (b) were committed to economic growth and (c) adopted neomercantilistpolicies in some periods.(89) CALDER, K. op. cit., p. 197-202.(90) FLANAGAN, Scott and RICHARSON, Bradley: Japanese Electoral Behavior: Social Cleavages,Social Networks and Partisanship. London, Sage Contemporary Political Sociology Series, 1977, p.15-18 and WATANUKI, Joji: "Social Structure and Voting Behavior" in FLANAGAN, Scott ; KOKEI,Shinsaku; MIYAKE, Ichiro; RICHARDSON, Bradley and WATANUKI, Joji: The Japanese Voter.New Haven. Yale University Press, 1991, chapter 2.(91) Obviously, not all countries had the same conflicts or even the same degree of cleavagegenerated conflict. At the same time, postwar Japan was a much more stable society than inter-warGermany or Italy, and free of the paralyzing labor conflict seen in Britain (and also in NorthernIreland) in the 1970s or the distractions of ethno-linguistic divisions such as exist in Belgium. Thesedifferences need to be considered although I would also suggest that social stability is more adesirable than a sufficient factor in economic growth.(92) DENISON, E. and CHUNG, W.: op. cit., p. 109-111.(93) See, inter alia. SAMUELS, R.: op.cit., especially p. 111-112 and p. 117 and FRIEDMAN, D.: op.cit., p. 81-84.(94) SAMUELS, R. op, cit., p. 92 and 102.(95) Although this may have promoted efficiency in the long run, it is hardly an example of successfulindustrial policy in the usual sense of the term. See SAMUELS, R.: op. cit., p. 103.(96) SAMUELS, R.: op, cit. p. 108-112.(97) SAMUELS, R.: op, cit., p. 103.(98) YAMAZAWA, Ippei op. cit., 410.