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The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

The Political Economy of Japan Bradley M. RICHARDSON

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policy to encourage growth and new industry development is a thing <strong>of</strong> the past.Conclusion<strong>The</strong> <strong>Japan</strong>ese economy grew dramatically between the 1950s and thepresent. During the first two decades <strong>of</strong> this growth, the <strong>Japan</strong>ese governmentproduced batteries <strong>of</strong> industrial policies with the goal <strong>of</strong> developing infrastructure andachieving productivity gains in particular industries. In the 1970s and later,government aid was provided the computer industry and "high" technologydevelopment. Indicative economic plans which called for growth <strong>of</strong> the total economywere also formulated. Because <strong>of</strong> the coincidence between government support andeconomic success, <strong>Japan</strong> became known abroad as a successful example <strong>of</strong>government-led high growth.Evaluations <strong>of</strong> the direct role <strong>of</strong> indicative planning and so-called industrialtargeting have varied depending on scholarly biases and methodology choices.Understanding government policy impact is difficult in the face <strong>of</strong> these divergences.Assessing the separate contributions <strong>of</strong> government policy frameworks, commercialbank decisions, general demand draw and other factors adds to the difficulties, asdoes also the absence <strong>of</strong> satisfactory counter-factuals. However, it can be said withconfidence that:(a) tax incentives, lending and some other instruments required bykey-industry development plans likely helped facilitate growth by creating favorableconditions for investment in long-term capital improvements, iron and steel ad to alesser degree in other industries;(b) the amounts <strong>of</strong> government investment in most industries were too smallrelative to private bank funding to have the indicative effects <strong>of</strong>ten attributed to them;(c) since commercial bank lending decisions depended on many differentfactors, government lending likely played only a limited role after the early 1950s,with the exception <strong>of</strong> the shipping, coal and electric power industries, wheregovernment lending <strong>of</strong>ten matched private bank participation;(d) government priorities also favored declining or problem industries in thecase <strong>of</strong> coal and shipping with the result that considerable amounts <strong>of</strong> governmentfunds were mis-allocated from an economic point <strong>of</strong> view (118);(e) when the extensive supports given recessed industries, medium andsmall industries and farmers are considered, <strong>Japan</strong> appears to be as much aneconomic welfare and clientelist state as a developmental state.

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