CHANGES IN HUMANDEVELOPMENT SINCE 2001THE REGIONAL ANDINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTWork on the first AHDR (2002) started at thebeginning of 2001; as such its analysis stoppedat the end of the twentieth century. On theother hand, since the first draft of this second<strong>report</strong> was initiated at the beginning of <strong>2003</strong>,the timeframe under review in this section islimited to just two calendar years. This is, ofcourse, a very short period in <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>terms. Basic <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> indicatorsdo not change significantly over shortperiods. Moreover, updating such indicatorsrequires up-to-date databases, resources thatare all-too-scarce in the Arab world, as wassharply underlined in the first <strong>report</strong>.In an attempt to maximise informationbased on weak or incomplete data, this sectionadopts a qualitative analysis. It focuses on deducingtrends inherent in events considered tohave an important bearing on various dimensionsof <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in the regionaland international context of Arab countries.At the time of writing, trends portend momentousalterations that may change not only thestatus of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, but the veryface and pattern of life in the region for someconsiderable time.Certain events may take place over a veryshort period of time, yet leave a profound impressionon <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. Such is thecase with changes in <strong>human</strong> rights and otherforms of legislation affecting people’s civil liberties.This section records several recentevents that have had negative impacts in Arabcountries, notably in the two areas of freedomand good governance and the advancement ofwomen.Furthermore, qualitative analysis also requiressound and comprehensive data. Mostof the databases available to support suchanalysis reflect the viewpoints, if not the prejudices,of the party gathering the data. To minimisethis problem, especially in relation toArab-related events, the authors have resortedto more than one source besides diligentlymonitoring the mass media during the periodunder study, including bulletins and <strong>report</strong>sprepared by the Arab Organisation forHuman Rights, and electronic mail lists of<strong>human</strong> rights violations in Arab countries.ON THE INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONAL DIMENSIONS OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIESThe first AHDR (2002) may not havegiven sufficient attention to the regional andinternational dimensions of the <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>impasse in Arab countries – at least,this is what a majority of the Arab critics of the<strong>report</strong> have felt. The publication of the <strong>report</strong>after the tragic events of September 11, 2001,and their extremely serious aftermath, amplifiedthis feeling, although work on the <strong>report</strong>had started well before those events.The authors believe that exaggerating theimpediments to Arab <strong>development</strong> imposedby regional and international challenges is futileand self-defeating. This all-too-frequentresort may provide a comforting escape, yet itis still highly counterproductive. Takingrefuge in externalities weakens the resolve andundermines the capabilities required for selfreliant<strong>development</strong>. It also leads to underestimatingthe task of self-improvement uponwhich Arab dignity and the national, regionaland international prospects of the region mustbe constructed. Hence, the strategic choice ofthe first <strong>report</strong> was to focus on the reform requiredwithin the Arab world.The decisive factor in soundly confrontingthe regional and international challenges facingthe Arab world will be the quality of Arabcapabilities in various spheres; knowledge,production and politics. Such capabilities andcreative energies, in turn, cannot be unleashedwithout widening the range of people’s freedomsand guaranteeing good governance inpractice. History and logic further indicatethat a strong system of Arab co-ordinationleading to regional integration will be an indispensablesource of strength and a conditionfor success in these endeavours. This systemcan be seen as "an Arab Free CitizenshipZone", where every Arab would enjoy the fullrights of a national in each and every Arabcountry. Such a system would undoubtedlyThe decisive factor insoundly confrontingthe regional andinternationalchallenges facing theArab world will be thequality of Arabcapabilities inknowledge,production andpolitics.PART I: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 21
Governments, statingconsiderations ofsecurity and stability,have found a newjustification for theirongoing warningsabout the perils offreedom.strengthen the negotiating capacities of Arabcountries in highly competitive global arenas,and position Arab countries on firmer andhigher ground in the third millennium.It is now clear that the <strong>human</strong> impact ofSeptember 11 and its political and securityconsequences have decisively altered internationalpublic opinion and sentiment, and thusthe parameters of the external challenges to<strong>development</strong> in the Arab region. A new historicalera is rapidly unfolding; not only becauseof the high <strong>human</strong> toll, which was a greattragedy, but also because of the political andsecurity consequences of that cataclysm. Thefateful events of that horrific day woke theworld, especially its rich and powerful countries,from a dream of comprehensive securityand invulnerability. The need to rebuild globalsecurity has become all the more urgent now,yet the proposed means to reach this end vary.Without question, the killing of innocent<strong>human</strong> beings violated all <strong>human</strong> and heavenlylaws.Worldwide anti-terrorism policies havebeen largely military and security-oriented innature. The long-term goal of draining theeconomic and political sources of terrorismhas almost faded away.In the current war against terror, the securitypolicies and restrictive procedures introducedby some advanced countries andadopted in several parts of the developingworld, including the Arab region, have createda situation inimical to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.Governments, stating considerations of securityand stability, have found a new justificationfor their ongoing warnings about theperils of freedom. A flawed yet highly influentialrationale has gained ground: if the world’sleading democracies find it necessary to backpedalon <strong>human</strong> rights and civil liberties, otherstates much further behind on the road to reformmay be well advised to pause. After all,in the narrow logic of security, governmentswith the most to lose by granting freedom arethus most justified in ruling with an iron grip.The expedience of that logic has not been loston regressive elements in Arab and other developingcountries.Events befalling Arabs abroad and widelybroadcast in the media intensified popular disaffectionin the region. The US Administrationresorted to establishing and enforcing proceduresthat at times contravened the most basic<strong>human</strong> rights, according to the (American)Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights (NewYork, 2002), which found that "over the lastyear the US government has taken a series ofactions that have gradually eroded basic<strong>human</strong> rights protections in the United States,fundamental guarantees that have been centralto the US constitutional system for more thantwo hundred years...too often, the US government’smode of operations since September 11has been at odds with core American and international<strong>human</strong> rights principles." 4 Thoseprocedures, which included ethnic profilingand secret evidence, violated civil and politicalliberties, particularly those of Arabs andMuslims. They revoked the right to a just trialbefore civil courts, thus legalising detentionwithout charge and administrative arrestswithout due process.The US introduced ethnic profiling ofArabs and Muslims, whether they were naturalisedcitizens, legal residents, students or visitors.Contrary to a long-established principleunder the law, these people became guiltyuntil proven innocent. Many ordinary peoplewere arrested for no reason except their affiliationto Arabs or to Islam. The US requiredfingerprint records of visiting nationals from25 Arab states and also instituted registrationwith security forces, which led to administrativedetentions in some cases.These measures resulted in reducing thenumber of Arab students in the United States,quite markedly in the cases of some countries(Table 1). Important knowledge acquisitionopportunities for young Arabs were thus cur-4The American Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights <strong>report</strong> (New York, 2002) documents details of the erosion of civil liberties. Among them:• "The FBI may now be privy to what books an individual checks out at the public library or purchases at the local bookstore.• The USA Patriot Act could result in long-term detention of non-citizens who have never been charged with a crime.• The Justice Department’s list of the young men targeted for government questioning was compiled strictly on the basis of national origin.• The Administration has in fact been using the term "unlawful enemy combatant" - a term not found in international law - as a kind of magicwand, waving it to avoid well-established standards of the US and international law.• Even if suspected terrorists are eventually tried and then acquitted by military commissions the Administration reserves the right to continue todetain them indefinitely.• In too many cases, opportunistic governments expressed support for the fight against terrorism, while presenting their own domestic insurgencies as conflicts perpetrated by terrorist groups analogous to at least Al-Qaeda."22 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>
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TABLE 3.3Number of scientific resea
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Restricting intellectualfreedom is
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Figure 3.3Number of publications -
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when economic crises and security c
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The main threat to freeliterature a
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CHAPTER 4Measuring knowledge capita
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noted, the current attempt to measu
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esearch and development and arts pr
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velopment. Does the disparity in hu
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ple)7. Book titles (per million peo
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Despite the methodological and othe
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Figure 5.1:Actors and linkages in t
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Industrial R&Dinstitutions are weak
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Until Arab countriesdevelop andseam
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Governments havelarge responsibilit
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sibilities of information and commu
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Joint Euro-Arab R&Dactivities in th
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PART IISection three: the cultural,
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The issue of Arabintellectual herit
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The Arab mentality (is)a system tha
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Heritage has been adynamic contribu
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BOX 6.3Al Kawakibi (1854-1902) Desp
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The Arabic language isthe distincti
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BOX 6.8Arab North Africa - Language
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The re-birth of theArabic language
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Traditionaloccupations and craftsar
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Arab contemporaryculture is general
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CHAPTER 7Socio-economic structureTh
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tivities.The first consequence of t
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also narrowed markets. Yet it is wo
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The volume of Arab capital invested
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BOX 7.1Patriarchal Society in Arab
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amid the contraction of domestic ec
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knowledge societies in Arab countri
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The isolation ofcultural elites has
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The goal should be toinstitutionali
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BOX 8.3Imam Muhammad Abduh(1849-190
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Penalties meted out tojournalists,
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Disregard forintellectual propertyp
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Concerns that theworld economicsyst
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BOX 8.6Trade and Development: Prebi
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CHAPTER 9A strategic vision: the fi
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1. UNLEASHING ANDGUARANTEEING THE K
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certed efforts of the state, civil
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programmes of higher education inst
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also initiate innovation: it could
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BOX 9.4Imams (religious leaders) ad
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cially useful in the production of
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just one external point of referenc
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ReferencesEnglish ReferencesAmnesty
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Egyptian Sociology". National Centr
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Maalouf, Amin, 2001.In the Name of
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Fasl Al-Makal fi Taqrir ma bain Al-
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Clovis Maksoud, Introduction to the
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Elements of opinion survey of Arab
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Table A-1NET ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) I
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Table A-5PUPILS PER TEACHER RATIO B
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Table A-9RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF T
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Table A-10VALUES OF INDICATORS ON K
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Table A-13VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE OUTCO