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arab human development report 2003 - Palestine Remembered

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United Nations Development ProgrammeArab Fund for Economic and Social DevelopmentTHE ARAB HUMANDEVELOPMENTREPORT <strong>2003</strong>Building a knowledge societySPONSORED BY THE REGIONAL BUREAUFOR ARAB STATESARAB FUND FOR ECONOMIC ANDSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT


Copyright © <strong>2003</strong>By the United Nations Development Programme,Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS),1 UN Plaza, New York, New York, 10017, USAImage on cover of cast copper statue head from Nineveh, copyright Hirmer Fotoarchiv MünchenAll rights reserved. No part of this publication maybe reproduced,stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,without prior permission of UNDP / RBASAvailable through:United Nations PublicationsRoom DC2-853New York, NY 10017USATelephone: 212 963 8302 and 800 253 9646 (From the United States)Email: Publications@un.orgWeb: www.un.org/PublicationsWeb: www.undp.org/rbasCover design: Mamoun SakkalLayout and Production: SYNTAX, Amman, JordanPrinted at: National Press, Amman, JordanISBN: 92-1-126157-0Printed in the Hashemite Kingdom of JordanThe analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of the UnitedNations Development Programme, its Executive Board or its Member States. The Report is the work of anindependent team of authors sponsored by the Regional Bureau for Arab States.


Immersion, yes, but swamped or drowned, no,is their message in providing a comprehensiveassessment of the state of knowledge in Arabsocieties today, the impediments to its acquisitionand diffusion, and the prospects of makinglearning and research a dynamic driver ofsocial and economic innovation in the future.The Report argues that the potential fordeveloping the knowledge capabilities of Arabcountries is enormous – not only because oftheir untapped <strong>human</strong> capital, but also becauseof their rich cultural, linguistic and intellectualheritage. It acknowledges thatoverhauling the region’s antiquated andunder-resourced education systems will not beeasy, but insists that it is critical if knowledgeand economic output are to feed off eachother, creating a virtuous cycle conducive to<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. However, the authorsalso underline once again that if these objectivesare to be met, Arabs need to drive theprocess themselves: promoting local innovationas a necessary complement to harnessingknowledge and technology from abroad. Thestark choice facing Arab countries is: constructivelyengage with the new world or beleft behind. For those who fear that their culturemay be compromised by outside influences,this message of openness may be ascontroversial as the original <strong>report</strong>.AHDR <strong>2003</strong> is merely the second step in along journey. Over the next two years, further<strong>report</strong>s will follow on freedom and women’sempowerment, the other two main challengesfacing the region. I hope and believe this latestissue will attract as much attention andprovoke as much debate as its predecessor.Even if many of the views taken in this <strong>report</strong>do not necessarily reflect UNDP or UnitedNations policy, we are pleased to be associatedwith a process that is helping stimulate a dynamicnew policy discourse across the Arabregion and the wider world. I would also particularlylike to thank Rima Khalaf-Hunaidi,my colleague and Assistant Administrator,who as Bureau Director for the Arab Stateshas been the driving inspiration behind thisimportant project.Mark Malloch Brown.Administrator, UNDPUNDP is the UN's global <strong>development</strong> network. It advocates for change andconnects countries to knowledge, experience and resources to help peoplebuild a better life.II


Foreword by the Regional Director, UNDPRegional Bureau for Arab StatesOur first Report in this series, published inJuly 2002, looked closely at Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>at the beginning of the new millennium.It probed its present state, diagnosed itsmost disabling flaws, and advanced concreteproposals for achieving levels of <strong>development</strong>commensurate with the potential of the Arabregion and the aspirations of new generationsof Arabs. The Report concluded that promoting<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in the Arab worldrests on three great tasks: building, using andliberating the capabilities of the Arab peopleby advancing knowledge, freedom andwomen’s empowerment.Public, media and policy attention to thefirst Report has been gratifyingly wide and vigorous,prompting a keen debate, both in theregion and abroad, on the central dilemmas ofArab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> Such attention wasnot confined to public discussion circles.Some Arab governments and institutions tookup the Report in their proceedings, criticisingsome findings and assenting to others.Subsequently, and in line with the recommendationsof the first Report, several Arabcountries crossed new thresholds, particularlyin terms of empowering women and enhancingtheir political participation. This secondReport has recorded such accomplishments. Italso documents failures and underscores newchallenges. The region has recently encounteredgrave threats, and the dignity and rightsof Arabs, especially the right to self-determination,have been grossly violated. Soon afterthe first Report was completed, Israel re-occupiedthe Palestinian Territories. Barely oneyear later, Iraq fell under Anglo-American invasionand occupation. In these circumstances,the challenge of building Arab <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> has undoubtedly become moreperilous, certainly more arduous and possiblymore tenuous.At this precarious juncture, some observersquestioned the wisdom of issuing furtherReports, while others worried that specialinterest groups might exploit their outspokenapproach, to the detriment of Arabs. Indeed,the authors are well aware that their workmight be misused or misinterpreted to servethe purposes of parties - outside as well as inside- the Arab world whose interests runcounter to an Arab awakening.The majority, however, argued forcefullythat to leave the initiative to others would bethe more ominous choice. Self-reform stemmingfrom open, scrupulous and balancedself-criticism is the right, if not the only alternativeto plans that are apparently beingdrawn up outside the Arab world for restructuringthe area and for reshaping the Arabidentity. Turning a blind eye to the weaknessesand shortfalls of the region, instead of decisivelyidentifying and overcoming them, canonly increase its vulnerability and leave it moreexposed.It is in this spirit that the second Report isnow issued. Its goal is to activate a dialogueamong Arabs on ways to change the course ofArab history and afford the Arab people thedecent lives to which they aspire and to whichthey are entitled. Written into every line is theunwavering conviction that reform efforts,which genuinely serve the region’s interests,must be initiated and launched from within.The theme chosen this year is the buildingof an Arab knowledge society, not only becauseknowledge is the first of the three corecomponents of the original strategy, but alsobecause it is the most instrumental.Knowledge increasingly defines the line betweenwealth and poverty, between capabilityand powerlessness and between <strong>human</strong> fulfillmentand frustration. A country able to mobilizeand diffuse knowledge can rapidly raise itsIII


level of <strong>development</strong>, help all its citizens togrow and flourish and take its proper place onthe 21st century global stage.The Report examines the status of Arabknowledge today in terms of demand, productionand dissemination, and concludes that allthree are ineffectual notwithstanding theabundance of Arab <strong>human</strong> capital. It contraststhis state with the origins and outcomes of theregion’s rich, enquiring and pluralistic culturaland intellectual heritage, confirming that thelatter provide robust foundations on which tobuild a knowledge society. It however observesthat the positive models found in Arabculture lack effective economic social, and politicalequivalents. The missing links are eitherburied in dust or smothered by ideologies, societalstructures and values that inhibit criticalthinking, cut Arabs off from their knowledgerichheritage and block the free flow of ideasand learning.There is therefore a pressing need fordeep-seated reform in the organisational, socialand political context of knowledge. TheReport identifies several key priorities forchange. An important set of findings is that, increating an Arab knowledge society, the reformof governance would represent a turningpoint, the renewal of education and the Arabiclanguage a rallying point and the pursuit ofcultural interaction an international meetingpoint.The Report proposes a strategic visionthat could support a creative Arab renaissancebuttressed by five essential pillars:• Providing and guaranteeing the key freedomsof opinion, expression and associationthrough good governance.• Broadening quality education and makingit available to all.• Embedding science in Arab society,broadening the capacity for research and <strong>development</strong>and joining the information revolutiondecisively.• Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-basedand higher value-added production.• Developing an enlightened Arab knowledgemodel that encourages cognitive learning,critical thinking, problem solving andcreativity while promoting the Arabic language,cultural diversity and openness to othercultures.Undoubtedly, certain arguments in theReport might seem controversial and may beappreciated only after a conscientious reappraisal.Yet the Report claims neither infallibilitynor a monopoly of the truth. Its authorswill be satisfied if it prompts open dialogue,constructive criticism, disagreement supportedby evidence and consent strengthenedby proof. Such responses would expedite thequest for common goals and the Arab journeyto knowledge and freedom.AHDR <strong>2003</strong> represents a substantial intellectualendeavour in the region to which manypeople have contributed. I am deeply thankfulto all who participated in its preparation,review and editing. I am especially grateful tothe core team, particularly the lead author, Dr.Nader Fergany, for his resourceful involvementat all stages. My sincere thanks also go tothe Advisory Board without whose counselthis Report would not have been possible.Finally, I am indebted to Mark MallochBrown, Administrator of UNDP, for his continuedbrave support to this series, and to ourco-sponsors, the Arab Fund for Economic andSocial Development, for their sustained collaboration.Rima Khalaf HunaidiAssistant Secretary General and Assistant Administrator, Regional Director,Regional Bureau for Arab States, United Nations Development ProgrammeIV


Foreword by the Director General and ChairmanThe Arab Fund for Economic and SocialDevelopmentI have the pleasure to collaborate once againwith UNDP in co-sponsoring this secondArab Human Development Report, which ispart of an annual series that aims to sustain adiscussion of specific <strong>development</strong> challengesfacing Arab countries individually and as agroup.Undoubtedly, the first Arab HumanDevelopment Report (2002) was an exceptionaleffort in all respects. Its distinctiveanalysis of the current state of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in the Arab world, the obstacles to itsachievement and the opportunities for transcendingthose challenges attracted great interestand generated an extensive debate anddiscussion. It was the first Arab <strong>report</strong> to attempta comprehensive understanding of theArabs today, as seen through the eyes of Arabscholars, and to explore what Arab societiesthemselves can do to promote their advancement.Its significant conclusions received widemedia and policy attention in the Arab worldand in international circles, prompting a spiriteddebate among Arab intellectuals and <strong>development</strong>specialists. The Report broughtabout a lively and vigorous discussion. Itspoints of view, whether endorsed or criticised,were seen as bold initiatives for much-neededreform in the Arab sphere, and a manifestationof the Arabs' ability to exercise constructiveself-criticism.The first Report stressed that <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>centres on the comprehensive andintegrated <strong>development</strong> of societal institutionsand people who are indeed the real wealth ofnations. It also emphasised that <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>involves enhancing people's optionsfor achieving those <strong>human</strong> goals that support adignified life, both in the material and moralsense. It further underlined the importance offreedom in the concept of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,stressing the instrumental role of political,economic and social freedoms.The authors of AHDR <strong>2003</strong> have chosenfor their theme one of the three main challengesidentified by the first Report, theknowledge gap in the Arab world, because ofits organic relationship with <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,its pivotal role in promoting it and itssignificance as one of the essential pursuits of<strong>human</strong>ity. They underline the large deficiencyin knowledge capacity in the Arab countries,both in the acquisition and production ofknowledge, and point out that only by overcomingthis shortcoming in all societal activitiescan Arab countries succeed and prosper inthe modern age.The second Report identifies several measuresfor overcoming the underlying obstructionsto knowledge and for employing Arab<strong>human</strong> capabilities effectively in establishingthe knowledge society. The knowledge systemis an expansive and complex one. It entailstransforming knowledge wealth into knowledgecapital in order to generate new knowledgein the physical and social sciences,<strong>human</strong>ities, arts and popular culture. TheReport also monitors <strong>development</strong>s in <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> in Arab countries since 2002 andshows that, at the regional and internationallevels, the Arab world has been experiencingsignificant challenges and events which willgreatly reflect on the evolution of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.The Report underlines recent <strong>development</strong>sin the occupied PalestinianTerritories and Iraq in particular, and underscoresthat building intrinsic Arab capabilitiesis the only sound course for coping with suchmomentous challenges.The Report addresses a large number ofV


interrelated issues in some depth. Some ofthese pertain to education, the media, the infrastructureof communication and informationnetworks, the production andmeasurement of knowledge and the organisationalcontext for its acquisition in Arabcountries. The societal and political contextimpacting on knowledge and the reciprocallinks between the knowledge society andeconomic and societal structures are alsodiscussed.The Report points out that deficientknowledge capabilities represent a formidableimpediment for Arab countries in theirattempts to face the challenges of the 21stcentury. These countries cannot make anytangible progress in the long term withoutacquiring the knowledge and the technologicalcapacities that are indispensable forprosperity in the new millennium. Indeed,the absence of such prerequisites could wellinvite unforeseen disasters. Ingraining andembedding knowledge in Arab societies isthe crux of any attempt to resolve the<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> crisis in the region.Knowledge is one of the key instruments of<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, be it in institutinggood governance, guaranteeing health, producingthe ingredients of material and moralwelfare, or promoting economic growth. Assuch, knowledge is a vital factor of modernproduction and an essential determinant ofproductivity and competitive capacity.The Report presents a vision for instituting<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> and unleashing societalcreativity; a vision that aims atreforming the societal context of knowledgeacquisition and consolidating the knowledgeacquisition system in order to move theregion towards a knowledge-based society.It argues that Arab countries have tremendouspotential for developing their knowledgecapacity in view of their – stillunutilised - <strong>human</strong> capital, and their culturaland linguistic heritage. Its vision forliberating this <strong>human</strong> capital and institutinga <strong>human</strong> renaissance across the Arab worldrests on five crucial pillars elaborated in itsconcluding chapter.In co-sponsoring this Report, the ArabFund for Economic and SocialDevelopment and UNDP seek to promote adebate on key questions of knowledge, tohelp diagnose some of the major challengesfacing the Arab states in this area, and to putforward suggestions on ways to achieve anArab renaissance and consolidate the acquisitionand employment of knowledge acrossthe Arab world. It is hoped that Arab countrieswill pay close attention to the methodsfor improving and accelerating the diffusion,production and application of knowledgein all economic, social and politicalfields; and for raising the level of Arab<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. We are confident thatArab countries have all the means requiredto achieve this end.In closing, I wish to extend my sincerethanks to all those who have contributed to,and taken part in the preparation of thisReport, and to our partner, UNDP, for commissioningit and overseeing its publicationin this distinguished form.Abdel Latif Youseff El HamedDirector General / Chairman of the Board of DirectorsArab Fund for Economic and Social DevelopmentVI


Advisory groupRima Khalaf Hunaidi (Chair), Ahmad Kamal Aboulmagd,Abdul Muniem Abu-Nuwar (United Nations Fund forPopulation Activities), Farida Al-Allaghi, Sami Al-Banna,Turki Al-Hamad, Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri , Abdalla A.Alnajjar, Nabil Alnawwab (Economic and Social Commissionfor Western Asia), Mervat Badawi (Arab Fund for Economicand Social Development), Ziad Fariz, Nader Fergany (Ex officio),Burhan Ghalioun, Rafia Obaid Ghubash,Milad M. Hanna, Taher H. Kanaan, Atif Kubursi,Clovis Maksoud, Gamil Mattar, Roshdi Rashed,Abdelouahab Rezig, Adnan Shihab-Eldin, El Sayed Yassin.Core teamFarida Bennani, Hoda Elsadda, Nader Fergany (Leader),Fahmi Jadaane, Atif Kubursi .Editorial teamArabic Version: Fayiz SuyyaghEnglish Version: Kristin Helmore, Zahir JamalContributing authorsLaila Abdel Majid, Fowziyah Abdullah Abu-Khalid,Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin, Aziz Al-Azmeh, Sami Al-Banna,Tarek Al-Bishry, Hayder Ibrahim Ali, Nabil Ali,Sa'adallah Agha Al Kala'a, Muna Al-Khalidi, Mohamed Al-MiliBaqer Alnajjar, Siham A. Al-Sawaigh, Amr Najeeb Armanazi,Report teamMunir Bashshur, Mohammed Berrada, Hichem Djait,Mohamed Mahmoud El-Imam, Dina El Khawaga,Rukia El Mossadeq, Shawki Galal, Burhan Ghalioun,Abd El Hameed Hawwas, Taoufik Jebali,Taher Hamdi Kanaan, Atif Kubursi, Al-Taher Labib,Clovis Maksoud, Mohammad Malas, Imad Moustapha ,Fadle M. Naqib, Khalida Said, Adnan Shihab-Eldin,A. B. Zahlan, Mari Rose Zalzal .UNDP RBAS team-UNOPSDena Assaf, Ali Al-Zatari, Shafiqa Darani, Abdalla Dardari,Moez Doraid, Ghaith Fariz, Jacqueline Ghazal, Randa Jamal,Zahir Jamal, Hussein Kermalli, Mahwish Nasir, Madi Musa,Maen Nsour (Report Coordinator), Win Min Nu, FlaviaPansieri, Gillman Rebello, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco.Readers groupIsmail Sabry Abdalla, Abdulkhaleq Abdulla,Abdul Karim Al-Eryani, Ali A. Attiga, Chedly Ayari,Mahmoud Amin El-Alem, Nawal Faouri, Ziad Hafez,Hassan Hanafi, Michael C. Hudson, Benjamin Ladner,Manfred Max-Neef, Richard W. Murphy, Omar Noman,John Page, Eric Rouleau .Translation teamKhalid Abdalla, Rania Al-Hariri, Marie-Helen Avril, Doa’aImbaby, Mahmud Suqi .VII


ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSAFTAAHDIAHDRASEANCNNDMCESCWAEUFDIGCCGDPGNPHDIHDRIBHRICTIDFIPRsMBCMEDAMNCMYSNAFTANGOPPPPRCSQAMYSR&DRBASTAITIMSSTRIPSUNCTADUNDPUNESCOUNICEFUSAIDVATWHOWIPOWTOArab Free Trade AreaArab Human Development IndexArab Human Development ReportAssociation of South East Asian NationsCable News NetworkDubai Media CityEconomic and Social Commission for Western AsiaEuropean Unionforeign direct investmentGulf Cooperation Councilgross domestic productgross national product<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> indexHuman Development ReportInternational Bill of Human Rightsinformation and communication technologyIsraeli Defense Forcesintellectual property rightsMajor Broadcasting Cable NetworkEuro-Mediterranean Partnership (financial instrument)multinational corporationmean years of schoolingNorth American Free Trade Agreementnon-governmental organisationpurchasing power parityPalestinian Red Crescent Societyquality adjusted mean years of schoolingresearch and technological <strong>development</strong>Regional Bureau for Arab Statestechnology achievement indexTrends in International Mathematics and Science StudyAgreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property RightsUnited Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUnited Nations Development ProgrammeUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural OrganisationUnited Nations Children’s FundUnited States Agency for International Developmentvalue added taxWorld Health OrganisationWorld Intellectual Property OrganisationWorld Trade OrganisationVIII


ContentsForeword by the Administrator, UNDPForeword by the Regional Director, UNDP/Regional Bureau for Arab StatesForeword by the Director General and Chairman, Board of Directors, Arab Fund for Economic and Social DevelopmentEXECUTIVE SUMMARY1PART I17CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIESThe content of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>The challenge of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in the Arab regionChanges in <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> since 2001The regional and international environmentOn the international and regional dimensions of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in Arab countriesThe impact of the Israeli occupation of <strong>Palestine</strong> on <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in Arab countriesThe <strong>human</strong> costs of Israeli occupationThe occupation of IraqArab integrationDevelopments in freedom and good governance as reflected in international databasesLevel of civil and political liberties (1990-2000)Indicators of voice and accountabilityPerceptions of corruption in business transactionsEvents influencing <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in Arab countriesExpanding the scope of freedom and establishing good governanceCivil societyThe empowerment of women17171718212121232426272828282828293131Part II- Section one: the concept of an Arab knowledge society33CHAPTER 1CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARABCOUNTRIESWhy focus on knowledge?The acquisition of knowledge and <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>KnowledgeKnowledge and <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>Social determinants of knowledge acquisitionStrong links between the knowledge acquisition system and societal activityA vigorous role for the state and all its institutionsThe knowledge societyKnowledge acquisition systemsArabs and knowledgeA long, mixed history leading to challenges todayX353536363738383839404242


The Arab knowledge civilisation: some significant featuresThe Arab knowledge model todayThe demand for knowledgeSources of the demand for knowledgeDeterminants of the demand for knowledge4244454546PART II- Section two: the state of knowledge in Arab countries49CHAPTER 2KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIESKnowledge dissemination and knowledge capitalSocialisationEducationThe quality of educationThe quality of pre-school educationCurricula and education methodologiesEducation policiesMeasuring the quality of educationThe quality of higher educationThe quality of computer science education in Arab universitiesArab mass media: characteristics, constraints and new formsAccess to mediaResources available to the mediaTypical contentNews coverageFeatures of media messagesThe environment surrounding the mass mediaModern mass mediaTelephone networksCommunication technologiesAccess to modern mediaChallenges facing the Arab mediaThe beginnings of free mediaTranslationThe state of translation in Arab countries5151515252525354545656585960616161626263636464656667CHAPTER 3KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIESScientific production: natural sciences and technological <strong>development</strong>Scientific research and technological <strong>development</strong> – outputsScientific researchPatentsTechnological research and <strong>development</strong> – inputsProducing knowledge workersWorkers in scientific research and <strong>development</strong>ExpenditureInstitutionsProduction in the <strong>human</strong>ities and social sciencesLiterary and arts productionThe short story and the novelThe cinemaTheatreMusicFreedom of research and expression as a condition for knowledge production6970707070717172727374767679808181XI


CHAPTER 4MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIESIntroductionThe adequate measurement of knowledge capitalTowards the better measurement of knowledge capital in Arab countriesA survey of Arab intellectuals on the state of knowledgeInitial approximation of the measurement of knowledge capitalThe stock of <strong>human</strong> capital at the beginning of the 21st centuryHistorical comparison: Arab countries and the Asian Tigers in the second half of the 20th centuryThe quality of education: findings of international studiesTowards a composite index of knowledge capital85858686878990909292CHAPTER 5THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITIONInnovation systems and technologyTechnology transfer, management and adoption in the Arab worldTechnology policies in Arab countriesOrganisational issues of knowledge production in Arab countriesLinks between research institutions and productive sectorsPromotion of R&D ResultsIntermediate institutions supporting technological R&D productionThe role of the creative entrepreneur and technological and business incubatorsForeign direct investmentFDI and its role in technology transfer and adaptation in Arab countriesThe role of the state and science and technology policiesMissing Partners: National and Pan-Arab Funds for financing R&DNetworking of R&D institutions at the pan-Arab and international levelsAt the Arab levelAt the international levelPART II- Section three: the cultural, socioeconomic and political context97979799100100100100101102102104105106106107111CHAPTER 6CULTUREIntellectual heritageHeritage: a tussle between knowledge building and ideological exploitation"The Arab mentality"The foundations of Arab intellectual heritageArab historical knowledge outcomesHeritage and the knowledge societyReligionReligion, the material world and knowledgeLanguageLanguage and the knowledge societyThe crisis of the Arabic languageAdvancement of the Arabic languageFolk cultureFolk culture: between creativity and imitationCraftsThe revival of an awareness of folk culture113113114115116117118118119121122122123126127128128128XII


Cultural interaction129CHAPTER 7SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTUREIntroductionEconomic structureModes of productionDependence on the extraction of raw materials in "rentier" economiesCommodity-based production and franchisingPrevalence of low-skill micro-enterprises and informal sector production activitiesScarcity of medium-sized and large companies based in the Arab regionLack of competitionGrowth, productivity and distributionEconomic growthProductivity in Arab countriesIncome distributionClass structureSocietal incentivesPromoting an Arab renaissance through democratic valuesMigrationThe brain drain131133134134134135136136136137137137138140140143144144CHAPTER 8THE POLITICAL CONTEXTGovernance and lawThe political context for knowledge acquisitionPolitical systems and the cultural elitePatterns of knowledge production and dissemination in the Arab worldThe diversion of knowledge production: separating politics from knowledgeThe role of institutional independence in stimulating the knowledge societyCodifying political power and democracy: a fundamental stage in the establishment of the knowledge societyTowards political systems that serve the knowledge societyThe legal context for knowledge acquisition, production and disseminationIrregularity of the legal structureInactive and nominal lawsDeclining efficiency of the judiciaryFreedom of thought, opinion and expression in the structure of the legal systemThe legal protection of freedomGeneral rules for the exercise of freedomViolation of political and legal guarantees for the protection of freedomRepression of freedoms in emergenciesProtecting creativity and intellectual freedom: copyright lawsThe regional and global environmentPART II- Section four: a strategic vision- the five pillars of the knowledge society147147147147149149150151151151151152152153153153154154155156161CHAPTER 9A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYThe state of knowledge in Arab countries and the consequences of perpetuating the status quoThe five pillars of the knowledge society1. Unleashing and guaranteeing the key freedoms of opinion, speech and assembly through good governance2. Disseminating high quality education targeted on educational outcomes and life-long learningImproving learning in early childhoodUniversal basic education for all, extended to grade ten at least163163164165167167167XIII


Creating an efficient system for life-long learningRaising the quality of education at all levelsSpecial attention to improving higher education3. Indigenising science, universalising research and <strong>development</strong> (R&D) in societal activities and keeping up with the information ageKeeping abreast of the Information Age4. Shifting rapidly towards knowledge-based production5. Establishing an authentic, broadminded and enlightened Arab general knowledge modelDelivering pure religion from political exploitation and honouring ijtihad (scholarship)Advancing the Arabic languageRenovating the Arab general knowledge model: the past as inspiration for the futureEnriching, supporting and celebrating cultural diversity in the regionOpening up to other cultures168168168169171172172172174175175176ReferencesBibliographyAnnex1: List of background papersAnnex 2: Designing a questionnaire to sample the opinions of faculty members in higher education institutions179182186188Statistical Tables on Knowledge in Arab CountriesList of boxes1 The Sheikh of Al-Rabwah, Muhammad ibn Abi Taleb al-Ansari al-Demashqi – The Human Being2 How Do Arabs Feel About the Three Deficits?3 Mohammad Hassanein HeikalThe first Arab Human Development Report: for whom did the bell toll?4 AHDR1 Web Site Statistics5 UNHCHR: War on terror infringing on <strong>human</strong> rights6 Human Rights Watch Report 2002, Middle East and North Africa: Jenin7 Human Losses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Sept 2001- April <strong>2003</strong>)8 Material Losses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 19 months (until April <strong>2003</strong>)1.1 Edward W. Said - What knowledge?1.2 Collective learning: a means for developing knowledge capital or reinforcing the status quo?1.3 Economic characteristics of knowledge1.4 A Cauldron of Cultures1.5 Ahmad Kamal Aboulmagd: Towards a New Language of Faith2.1 Abdul Aziz Al-Muqaleh – Illiteracy: An Obstacle to Knowledge and Modernisation2.2 Morocco: Conflicting signals on knowledge acquisition2.3 The “Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)”2.4 Use of the creative teaching method in Arab medical schools2.5 The Arab Organisation for Translation3.1 Muhamad Ali’s Experience in Scientific Modernisation3.2 Ali Mustafa Mosharrifah - On the importance of the history of science for a knowledge renaissance3.3 Kuwait: Profile of University Graduates3.4 The Ambition of Creativity in the Arab World3.5 Arab Books: a Threatened Species5.1 Pioneering Successful Non-governmental Initiatives - The Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research5.2 The Arab Fund for Science and Technology Development: The Bold Venture That Almost Succeeded5.3 The Arab Science and Technology Foundation, a non-governmental initiative to support researchand <strong>development</strong> in the Arab world5.4 The Arab Academy for Science & Technology and Maritime Transport6.1 Ibn Khaldoun - On the fact that scientific education is a skill and a profession6.2 Milad Hanna - Religious Harmony and Knowledge in the Arab World.6.3 Al Kawakibi - Despots and Knowledge6.4 Erudition in the Qur’an and the Sunna (prophetic tradition)6.5 Learning and knowledge in the Holy Bible, Old Testament6.6 Technology in the Arab Islamic Civilisation6.7 About Language6.8 Arab North Africa – Language Duality6.9 Amin Maalouf: Protecting Diversity1819202023242525353637424552535657676969727779105106107107114119120120120121122124130XIV


7.1 Patriarchal Society in Arab Countries7.2 Al Kawakibi: The Inversion of Values Under Despotism8.1 Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani: The Nation and the Authority of a Tyrant8.2 Knowledge and Governance in the Arab World8.3 Imam Muhammad Abduh: Justice and Science8.4 Integrating intellectual property rights and <strong>development</strong> policy8.5 The effects of globalisation on growth and distribution throughout the world – UNCTAD8.6 Trade and Development: Prebisch’s demands still stand9.1 Mustafa Al-Barghouthi – The Road to the Future9.2 Judge Al-Djorjani: The Dues of Science9.3 Lebanon: A Bright Future for Information and Communication Technology?9.4 Imams (religious leaders) advocate ijtihad (scholarship)9.5 Al Kawakibi, on the need for religious reform9.6 Teaching medicine in Arabic is possible!9.7 Paul Alvarus : Mother Tongues9.8 Ibn Rushd (Averroes): The Need to Learn from the Efforts of Previous Nations9.9 Al-Kindi: Appreciating the truth regardless of the source9.10 Ibn Miskawieh: On lauding cultural cross-fertilisation141142148149152158159160164166171173173174175176177177List of Figures1 Democracy is the best form of government2 Rejection of authoritarian rule3 Gender equality in higher education4 Gender equality in employment5 Freedom scores, weighted by population size: the Arab region and other world regions, 1990-2000 (average values)6 Voice and accountability: the Arab region and other world regions7 Perceptions of corruption, Transparency International: position of Arab countries in the sample, 1998 and 20001.1 Bridging the knowledge gap through exponential growth in knowledge acquisition1.2 The knowledge system: a schematic representation1.3 Correlation between Internet penetration and Internet costs -- Arab countries and comparators1.4 PC availability and Internet costs and penetration: Arab countries, OECD and East Asia, 20012.1 Distribution of universities participating in the evaluation according to the overall quality indicator2.2 Detailed evaluation criteria: average values2.3 Number of daily newspapers per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions in the world, 19982.4 Number of radio receivers per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions in the world, 20002.5 Number of television sets per 1000 people in Arab countries and other regions of the world, 20002.6 Number of main phone lines per 1,000 persons2.7 Personal computers: Arab world and other regions2.8 Internet penetration in Arab countries, users as % of population, 20012.9 Number of books translated in Arab countries (per 1 million people) compared to selected countries, 1981-19853.1 Ratio of students enrolled in scientific disciplines in higher education in selected Arab countries and Korea 1990-19953.2 Number of scientists and engineers working in research and <strong>development</strong> (per one million people)3.3 Number of publications – original writing and translation – per million people in the Arab world and other regions, 19913.4 Relative distribution of published books by field, ten Arab countries and the world, 19963.5 Number of cinema seats per 1000 persons in selected Arab countries and Korea in the second half of the 1990s4.1 Assessment of key features of knowledge acquisition in Arab countries by gender of respondent (%)4.2 Assessment of the knowledge acquisition process in Arab countries by academic level of respondent (%)4.3 Freedom to pursue knowledge and incentives for knowledge acquisition4.4 Mean years of schooling (MYS), population 15 years of age or older, Arab countries compared to selectedcountries, 1990 and 20004.5 Mean years of schooling (population 25 years of age or older) by gender, Arab countries and three Asian Tigers, 1960-20004.6 Quality adjusted mean years of schooling (QAMYS), population 15 years of age or older, Arab countriesand selected countries, 1990 and 20004.7 Ranking of Arab countries compared to other countries and regions on the composite indicator of knowledge capital, 20004.8 Correlation coefficient between knowledge capital indicators, knowledge outcomes and other <strong>development</strong> indicators5.1 Actors and linkages in the innovation system5.2 The Environment for Investment: 14 Arab countries rated, 19995.3 Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects in research and <strong>development</strong> among Arab countries5.4 Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects among R&D fields7.1 Share of extractive industries in commodity production7.2 Export structure, selected regions.7.3 Annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (%) Middle East and NorthAfrica and other selected regions, 1970-200019191919282929404146475858595960636464687272787880888889909192939498103108109135135137XV


7.4 Annual growth rate of GDP per worker (%) Middle East and North Africa Region, 1965-19937.5 Gross national product (per worker) in Arab countries compared to South Korea and Argentina, 19977.6 Estimates of poverty in Arab countries in the 1990s7.7 Development of workers’ share of GDP (%), Egypt 1974-1993138138139140List of tablesIn the text1 Number of students from some Arab countries in the United States before and after the September 2001 events3.1 Number of patents registered in the United States from Arab and non-Arab countries during the period 1980-1999/20003.2 Rate of expenditure as a percentage of GNP and sources of R&D funding: Arab states compared with selectedcountries, 1990-19953.3 Number of scientific research centres (outside of universities) in Arab countries3.4 Number of scientific and technological research centres (outside universities) in Arab countries, by field ofspecialisation and number of countries of location4.1 Percentage of real Arab GDP per capita (1970 and 2001), compared to Asian Tigers5.1 Estimated Net FDI flows, by host country 2000-2001 (millions of dollars)237173747491102In the Statistical Annex(Tables 1-13 listed separately in statistical annex)XVI


EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe first Arab Human Development Report(AHDR 2002) addressed the most important<strong>development</strong> challenges facing the Arab worldat the beginning of the third millennium. Thissecond Report continues the process by examiningin depth one of these challenges: thebuilding of a knowledge society in Arab countries.The AHDR series aims at building <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> in the Arab world. As part of acontinuing watch on <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> inthe region, this Report therefore opens by surveyingsome of the most salient trends andevents at the global, regional and national levelsthat influenced the process of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in the Arab world in 2002-<strong>2003</strong>. The remainderof the Report is a close study of one ofthe three cardinal challenges facing the region:its growing knowledge gap. It starts by outliningthe conceptual basis of an Arab knowledgesociety and moves on to evaluate the status ofthe demand for, and the diffusion and productionof knowledge in Arab countries at the beginningof the 21st century. It next analyses thecultural, economic, societal and political contextinfluencing knowledge acquisition in theregion at this critical junction in its history. Thelast section of this analysis culminates in astrategic vision that delineates the landmarks ofa deep social reform process for establishing aknowledge-based society in the Arab countries.A Year of Loss, Re-examining CivilLiberties since September 11“..over the last year the US government has taken aseries of actions that have gradually eroded basic<strong>human</strong> rights protections in the United States, fundamentalguarantees that have been central to theUS constitutional system for more than two hundredyears.”(American) Lawyers for Human Rights.Mohammad Hassanein HeikalThe bell rung by the AHDR and heard by Arabs andother people the world over carried echoes of all thebells ringing through our lives. It was a call to knowledgeand learning, an announcement of the last chanceto join the trip to the future, an appeal for cleansing, aninjunction to make way for an urgent priority, and finallya forewarning of imminent danger – urging us tohasten to douse the flames of a still-small fire waiting toengulf the region in a formidable blazeA ONE-YEAR OVERVIEW OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT:TWO SETBACKS AND THE STARTOF REFORMA review of global and regional <strong>development</strong>ssince the publication of AHDR 2002 underlinesthat the <strong>development</strong> challenges representedby the three deficits in knowledge,freedom and women’s empowerment remainserious. Those challenges may have becomeeven graver in the area of freedoms, as a resultof these <strong>development</strong>s.United Nations High Commissionerfor Human RightsThe late UN <strong>human</strong> rights chief, Sergio Vieira deMello, emphasised that the ‘war on terror’ was exacerbatingprejudices around the world, increasingdiscrimination against Arabs and damaging <strong>human</strong>rights in industrialised and developing countries.Following the bloody events of September11 and the loss of innocent lives in violation ofall man-made and divine laws, a number ofcountries have adopted extreme security measuresand policies as part of the “war on terrorism”.These measures and policies, however,exceeded their original goals and led to the erosionof civil and political liberties in manycountries in the world, notably the UnitedStates, often diminishing the welfare of Arabsand Muslims living, studying or travellingabroad, interrupting cultural exchanges betweenthe Arab world and the West and cut-Developmentchallengesrepresented by thethree deficits inknowledge, freedomand women’sempowerment remainserious.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1


One of the worstconsequences offreedom-constrainingmeasures indeveloped countrieswas that they gavesome Arab authoritiesanother excuse toenact new lawslimiting civil andpolitical freedoms.In contrast to effortsto restructure theregion from outside,the AHDR series aimsto crystallise astrategic vision thatenvisages therestructuring of theregion from within.ting off knowledge acquisition opportunitiesfor young Arabs.Among the first effects of these measureswas the significant drop in the number ofArab students studying in the United States.Figures available from a number of Arab missionsindicate that Arab student numbers inAmerica dropped between 1999 and 2002 byan average of 30 per cent.One of the worst consequences of freedom-constrainingmeasures in developedcountries is that they gave authorities in someArab countries another excuse to enact newlaws limiting civil and political freedoms. TheArab countries as a group adopted an expandeddefinition of terrorism, which assumedinstitutional expression at the regionallevel in “The Arab Charter againstTerrorism”. This charter was criticised inArab and international <strong>human</strong> rights circles,because its expanded definition opens thedoor to abuse. It allows censorship, restrictsaccess to the Internet, and restricts printingand publication. Moreover, the Charter neitherexplicitly prohibits detention or torture,nor provides for questioning the legality of detentions.Furthermore, it does not protect personalfreedom, since it does not require a priorjudicial order authorising the wire-tapping ofindividuals or groups (AmnestyInternational).Israel reoccupied Palestinian territories,inflicting horrifying <strong>human</strong> casualties and materialdestruction, thereby committing whatone well-respected <strong>human</strong> rights organizationcalled “war crimes” (Human Rights Watch,2002). From September 2000 to April <strong>2003</strong>,Israeli occupation forces killed 2,405Palestinian citizens and injured 41,000 others.Most of those killed (85%) were civilians. Alarge proportion (20%) of them were children.UNICEF estimates that 7,000 children wereinjured and that 2,500 persons, of whom 500were children, suffered permanent handicaps.Report of Human Rights Watch 2002,Jenin: IDF Operations“There is strong prima facie evidence that insome of the cases documented grave breaches ofthe Geneva Conventions, or war crimes, werecommitted.”A coalition led by the United States andBritain invaded and occupied Iraq, introducinga new challenge to the people of Iraq andthe region. The only way to meet that challengeis to enable the Iraqi people to exercisetheir basic rights in accordance with internationallaw, free themselves from occupation,recover their wealth, under a system of goodgovernance representing the Iraqi people andtake charge of rebuilding their country from a<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> perspective.In contrast to efforts to restructure the regionfrom outside, the AHDR series aims tocrystallise a strategic vision by Arab elitesthrough a societal innovation process that envisagesthe restructuring of the region fromwithin, and in service to Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.Such reform from within, based on rigorousself-criticism, is a far more proper andsustainable alternative.On the level of internal <strong>development</strong> inthe Arab countries, progress was achieved inthe advancement of women and in some aspectsof popular participation. Women’s representationin some parliaments and in seniorpositions in Executive Authorities increased.A number of Arab countries witnessed parliamentaryelections, some of them for the firsttime in decades. Yet these bright spots, accompaniedbriefly by dawning awareness ofthe need for reform, were partly eclipsed bynew setbacks in the areas of freedom of opinion,expression and association.Assessing the present state of regional cooperation,the Report finds that Arab integrationcontinues to fall far behind in achievingwhat the first Arab Human DevelopmentReport called “An Arab Free CitizenshipZone”.BUILDING THE KNOWLEDGESOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIESTHE STATUS OF KNOWLEDGE INTHE ARAB WORLDA knowledge-based society is one whereknowledge diffusion, production and applicationbecome the organising principle in all aspectsof <strong>human</strong> activity: culture, society, theeconomy, politics, and private life. Knowledge2 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


nowadays can provide the means to expandthe scope of <strong>human</strong> freedoms, enhance the capacityto guarantee those freedoms throughgood governance and achieve the higher moral<strong>human</strong> goals of justice and <strong>human</strong> dignityContrasting this type of society with thestate of knowledge in Arab countries, theReport looks carefully at the characteristics ofthe two main components of the knowledgeacquisition system: diffusion and production.KNOWLEDGE DIFFUSION: BLOCKSIN EDUCATION, BRIGHT SPOTS INTHE MEDIAKey knowledge dissemination processes inArab countries, (socialisation and upbringing,education, the media and translation), facedeep-seated social, institutional, economicand political impediments. Notable amongthese are the meagre resources available to individuals,families and institutions and the restrictionsimposed upon them. As a result,these processes often falter and fall short ofpreparing the epistemological and societal environmentnecessary for knowledge production.Studies indicate that the most widespreadstyle of child rearing in Arab families is the authoritarianmode accompanied by the overprotective.This reduces children’sindependence, self-confidence and social efficiency,and fosters passive attitudes and hesitantdecision-making skills. Most of all, itaffects how the child thinks by suppressingquestioning, exploration and initiative.Impressive gains in the quantitative expansionof education in Arab countries in the lasthalf of the 20 th century are still modest in comparisonwith other developing countries orwith the requirements of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.High rates of illiteracy among women persist,particularly in some of the less developedArab countries. Many children still do nothave access to basic education. Higher educationis characterized by decreasing enrolment,and public spending on education has actuallydeclined since 1985.In all cases, nevertheless, the most importantchallenge facing Arab education is its decliningquality.The mass media are the most importantagents for the public diffusion of knowledgeyet Arab countries have lower informationmedia to population ratios (number of newspapers,radio and televisions per 1000 people)compared to the world average. There are lessthan 53 newspapers per 1000 Arab citizens,compared to 285 papers per 1000 people indeveloped countries.In most Arab countries, the media operatein an environment that sharply restricts freedomof the press and freedom of expressionand opinion. Journalists face illegal harassment,intimidation and even physical threats,censorship is rife and newspapers and televisionchannels are sometimes arbitrarily closeddown. Most media institutions are stateowned,particularly radio and television.The last two years, however, have seensome improvements in the Arab informationenvironment, brought about by dawning competition.More independent-minded newspapershave appeared, challenging the iron gripof the older, state-supported press on politicalopinion, news and information. With basesabroad, these papers can escape state censorship.Some private satellite channels havestarted to contest the monopoly of state channelsover the broadcast media. The most importantcharacteristic of this new informationmovement is that it broadcasts in Arabic,thereby addressing the largest segment of theArab audience.In terms of infrastructure, the newer informationchannels benefit from the considerablegroundwork that a number of Arab countrieshave laid. However, the general trend gravitatestowards the lowest indicators in worldstandards. The number of telephone lines inthe Arab countries is barely one fifth of that indeveloped countries. Access to digital media isalso among the lowest in the world. There arejust 18 computers per 1000 people in the region,compared to the global average of 78.3percent per 1000 persons and only 1.6 per centof the population has Internet access. Theseindicators scarcely reflect a sufficient level ofpreparedness for applying information technologyfor knowledge diffusion.Translation is one of the important channelsfor the dissemination of information andcommunication with the rest of the world. Thetranslation movement in the Arab world, however,remains static and chaotic. On average,The most importantchallenge facing Arabeducation is itsdeclining quality.The last two yearshave seenimprovements in theArab informationenvironment broughtabout by dawningcompetition.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3


The region’s corps ofqualified knowledgeworkers is relativelysmall.The number of bookspublished in the Arabworld does not exceed1.1% of worldproduction.only 4.4 translated books per million peoplewere published in the first five years of the1980s (less than one book per million peopleper year), while the corresponding rate inHungary was 519 books per one million peopleand in Spain 920 books.KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION:MEAGRE OUTPUT, GLIMMERS OFCREATIVITYTurning knowledge assets into knowledgecapital requires the production of new knowledgein all areas: in the physical and social sciences,arts, <strong>human</strong>ities and all other forms ofsocial activity.Data in the Report tell a story of stagnationin certain areas of knowledge production, especiallyin the field of scientific research. Inaddition to thin production, scientific researchin Arab countries is held back by weak basicresearch and the almost total absence of advancedresearch in fields such as informationtechnology and molecular biology. It also suffersfrom miserly R&D expenditure (currentlystate spending on R&D does not exceed 0.2percent of GNP, most of which pays only forsalaries), poor institutional support and a politicaland social context inimical to the <strong>development</strong>and promotion of science. Theregion’s corps of qualified knowledge workersis relatively small. The number of scientistsand engineers working in R&D in Arab countriesis not more than 371 per million citizens.This is much lower that the global rate of 979per million. The number of students enrollingin scientific disciplines in higher education inall Arab countries is also generally low, incomparison to countries that have used knowledgeto take off, such as Korea, althoughamong Arab countries, Jordan, followed byAlgeria have distinguished themselves in thisfield.In contrast to their weak production in scienceand technology, and beleaguered outputin the <strong>human</strong>ities, Arab societies can boast awealth of distinguished literary and artisticwork that stands up to the highest standards ofevaluation. One reason is that while scienceand technology require substantial social andeconomic investment, Arab artists can, andusually do, produce high-quality work withoutsignificant institutional or material support.Innovation in literature and art works underdifferent conditions from those that foster creativityin research and <strong>development</strong> An Arabscientist would be highly unlikely to win aNobel Prize in physics without societal and institutionalsupport whereas an Arab novelistmight achieve that distinction in literature inthe absence of such support. There does notseem to be a conditional correlation betweenliterary creativity and affluence, although financialindependence can strengthen an author’sintellectual freedom. Difficultconditions may sometimes provide incentivesand intellectual and political stimuli for creativeliterature. Yet while artistic creativity itselfdefies societal restrictions, the absence offreedoms blocks public access to books andother forms of artistic expression.The Knowledge Block: CensorshipThe author and the publisher are forced tosubmit to the moods and instructions of 22 Arabcensors and this prevents a book from movingfreely and easily between its natural markets.Fathi Khalil el-Biss,Vice President of the Arab Publishers UnionLiterary production faces other majorchallenges. These include the small number ofreaders owing to high rates of illiteracy insome Arab countries and the weak purchasingpower of the Arab reader. This limited readershipis clearly reflected in the number of bookspublished in the Arab world, which does notexceed 1.1% of world production, althoughArabs constitute 5% of the world population.The production of literary and artistic booksin Arab countries is lower than the generallevel. In 1996 it did not exceed 1,945 books,representing only 0.8% of world production,i.e., less than the production of a country suchas Turkey, with a population one quarter ofthat of Arab countries. An abundance of religiousbooks and a relative paucity of books inother fields characterize the Arab book market.Religious books account for 17% of thetotal number of books published in Arabcountries, compared to 5% of the total numberof books produced in other parts of theworld.The Report’s analysis of the status ofknowledge in Arab countries indicates the4 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


presence of significant <strong>human</strong> capital thatfinds refuge in creativity from a restrictive societaland political environment and thatcould, under favourable circumstances, providea solid structural foundation for a knowledgerenaissance.CUMULATIVE KNOWLEDGEOUTCOMES: ENDS AND MEANSThe Report Team polled a sample of Arab universityfaculty members about knowledge acquisitionin the region. Respondents expresseddissatisfaction in general with the status ofknowledge acquisition in their countries (theaverage degree of satisfaction was 38%). Theirsatisfaction with the extent to which Arabknowledge serves <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> wasslightly less (the average rating was 35%). Thesurvey confirmed that incentives for knowledgeacquisition in Arab countries need to bemuch stronger, while freedom to acquireknowledge is subject to many constraints.Rating the various aspects of the knowledgesystem, respondents argued that the lackof a reasonable measure of freedom in radioand television (30%) was one of the largest disincentivesto knowledge acquisition. The sameassessment applied to research and <strong>development</strong>in the public sector although, in the viewof respondents, the latter area enjoys a higherlevel of freedom, thus suggesting that its problemshave more to do with matters of organisationand financing.In order to compare the knowledge capitalof Arab countries with that of other countries,the Report explores a new composite indexconstructed from 10 indicators relating to differentdimensions of knowledge capital. Thisattempt at measurement faced several limitationsin data and methodology yet indicatedthat the Arab countries are far behind theleading developing countries, let alone the advancedindustrialised countries, in the qualityand quantity of their knowledge capital.Struck by inconsistent or counterintuitiveresults from applying this index, the ReportTeam also considered seven cumulativeknowledge outcomes or end results (such asexports with a high technological content andother outcomes), and their relationship toother knowledge indicators. The analysisshowed no correlation between the twogroups.The analysis concludes that the key challengefacing Arab countries does not consistonly of catching up with other countries interms of knowledge indicators; rather, it goesbeyond that to include working hard toachieve similar knowledge outcomes by developingsolid institutional structures and bycrystallising the requisite political will, supportedby sufficient resources, especially at thepan-Arab level.IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY:CONSUMPTION VERSUSADOPTIONArab countries’ experiments with the transferand adoption of technology have neitherachieved the desired technological advancementnor yielded attractive returns on investments.Importing technology has not led to itsadoption and internalisation in the host country,let alone to its diffusion and production.The two biggest gaps accounting for thisfailure have been the absence of effective innovationand knowledge production systemsin Arab countries, and the lack of rational policiesthat ingrain those essential values and institutionalframeworks that support aknowledge society. These problems have beenaggravated by the mistaken belief that aknowledge society can be built through theimportation of scientific products without investingin the local production of knowledge,and through depending on cooperation withuniversities and research centres in advancedcountries for training Arab scientific cadreswithout creating the local scientific traditionsconducive to knowledge acquisition in the region.The lack of national innovation systems inArab countries represented, in effect, a wasteof investment in industrial infrastructure andAli Mustafa Musharrifah: On the Importance of the History ofScience for the Advancement of Knowledge“Civilised nations must have a cultureassociated with their history of scientificthought. … Our scientific life in Egyptneeds to catch up with our past in orderto acquire the necessary strength, lifeand controls. We in Egypt transfer theIncentives forknowledge acquisitionin Arab countries needto be much stronger.Importing technologyhas not led to itsadoption andinternalisation in thehost country, let aloneto its diffusion andproduction.knowledge of others then leave it floatingwithout any relationship to our pastor any communication with our land. Itis a foreign commodity that is strange inits looks, strange in its words and strangein its concepts.”EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5


Arab countries, withtheir agingtechnologies, arestuck at the wrongend of the technologyladder.Religion urges peopleto seek knowledge.This co-existence between Christianityand Islam in the Arab world presents amodel of unity in diversity. It is one offixed capital (buildings, factories, machineryand equipment). Such investments did notbring the wealth that Arab societies hadsought through means other than the depletionof raw materials, nor expected social returns.Investment in the means of productiondoes not lead to the real transfer and ownershipof technology but rather to an increase inproduction capacity. Moreover, this is a timeboundgain, one that starts to erode as the acquiredtechnology becomes obsolete. Theproducts and services generated by importedtechnology become economically unfeasibleand uncompetitive in local markets, while atthe same time technology and production inthe advanced countries are perpetually renewedby their own renovation and innovationsystems. This does not take place in Arabcountries which, with their aging technologies,are stuck at the wrong end of the technologyladder. They must keep purchasing new productioncapabilities as and when the technologiesof the capabilities they own becomeoutmoded.At the same time, Arab countries have notsucceeded in becoming important poles of attractionfor foreign direct investment (FDI).None of them figures among the top ten FDIattractingcountries in the developing world.The transfer, embedding and productionof knowledge that can generate new technologiesrequire an organisational context thatprovides incentives for knowledge production.Such a context would consolidate linkagesbetween R&D institutions and theproduction and service sectors and promotenational capabilities for innovation.Ahmad Kamal AboulmajdThe eternity of Islam does not mean the“rigidity of its law”. It rather means theability of this law to renew itself andmake innovations in response to themovement of life and the changes of itsforms. The originality and distinction ofMuslims do not mean their isolationfrom the rest of mankind, inward-lookingin a closed circuit, surrounded by awall without doors. They rather meancommunication with people, living withthem and – through that – providingthem with the loftier values and grandprinciples, which are based on theIslamic doctrine, law and moral structure.Milad Hanna: Harmony of Religions and Knowledgein the Arab Worldthe reasons for progress, which haspushed <strong>human</strong>ity to advance throughknowledge acquisition.THE SOCIETAL CONTEXT FORKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION INARAB COUNTRIESPILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOCIETY: CULTUREThe knowledge system is influenced by societal,cultural, economic and political determinants.Among the most important of thesedeterminants is culture in both of its aspects:the scholarly culture and the popular culture.Within Arabic culture, intellectual heritageconstitutes an essential component. Languageis the instrumental carrier of this culture andreligion is the main and comprehensive beliefsystem that guides its life. Moral, social andpolitical values govern and direct action in theArabic cultural system.Religion urges people to seek knowledge,despite some anti-<strong>development</strong> interpretations:Undoubtedly, the relationshipbetween religion and knowledge and its productionis organically associated with conceptsdetermined by the nature of religion and itsoverall position towards worldly life. Islamicreligious texts uphold a balance between religionand worldly life, or between temporal lifeand the hereafter. The predominant tendencyin Arab-Islamic civilization is a robust interestin worldly life and its sciences and in encouragingknowledge and sciences of variousforms.Developments in the contemporary Arabworld and the national political, social andeconomic problems that appeared followingthe years of independence did, however, leavedeep impacts on the intellectual, scholarly andcultural life of Arab countries. Religion - andits associated concepts and teleology – wereamong the basic aspects influenced by these<strong>development</strong>s. An alliance between some oppressiveregimes and certain types of conservativereligious scholars led to interpretationsof Islam, which serve the government, but areinimical to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, particularlywith respect to freedom of thought, the interpretationof judgements, the accountability ofregimes to the people and women’s participationin public life. Constraints on political actionin many Arab countries pushed some6 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


movements with an Islamic mark undergroundwhile causing others to don Islamicgarb. Without peaceful and effective politicalchannels for dealing with injustices in theArab world, at the country, regional andglobal levels, some political movements identifyingthemselves as Islamic have resorted to restrictiveinterpretations and violence as meansof political activism. They have fanned the embersof animosity towards both opposing politicalforces in Arab countries and “theothers”, accusing them of being enemies ofIslam itself. This has heightened the tempo ofconflict and friction with society, the state and“the others”. This state of “opposition” to and“confrontation” with the West, in particular,reached its peak following the events ofSeptember 11, 2001. In this context, theIslamic religion itself was exposed to a harshwave of libel, slander, provocation and criticism,which at times betrayed total ignoranceand at other times, explicit fabrication.Far from being opposed to knowledge,pure religion unquestionably urges people toseek knowledge and to establish knowledgesocieties. Perhaps the best evidence of that isthe era when Arab science flowered and prospered,a time that was characterised by astrong synergy between religion, representedby Islam, on the one hand and science, on theother.The Arabic language: a heritage, a resourceand a crisis: The role of language in aknowledge society is seminal, because languageis an essential basis of culture and becauseculture is the key axis around which theprocess of <strong>development</strong> revolves. Languagehas a central position in the cultural system becauseof its association with a number of itscomponents: intellect, creativity, education,information, heritage, values and beliefs.Today, at the gates of the knowledge societyand the future, the Arabic language is, however,facing severe challenges and a real crisisin theorization, grammar, vocabulary, usage,documentation, creativity and criticism. Tothese aspects of the crisis, one must add thenew challenges raised by information technologies,which relate to the computerised automationof the language.The relation between the Arabic languageand the transfer and absorption of technologyinvolves many issues. Chief among them aretwo central and closely inter-related matters,namely, the <strong>arab</strong>icisation of university educationand the teaching of the Arabic language.The <strong>arab</strong>icisation of university education hasbecome vital in order to enable young mindsto develop firm critical and creative faculties intheir own language and to assimilate the risingvolume of scientific knowledge. In addition,failure to <strong>arab</strong>icise science creates obstacles tocommunication between different scientificdisciplines and slows knowledge exchange.The authors underline that language is one ofthe cornerstones in the <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>system while emphasising that <strong>arab</strong>icisation effortsshould be accompanied by greater effortsto teach foreign languages to all.The teaching of Arabic is also undergoinga severe crisis in terms of both methodologyand curricula. The most apparent aspect ofthis crisis is the growing neglect of the functionalaspects of (Arabic) language use. Arabiclanguage skills in everyday life have deterioratedand Arabic language classes are often restrictedto writing at the expense of reading.The situation of Arabic language teachingcannot be separated from that of classicalArabic in general, which has in effect ceasedto be a spoken language. It is only the languageof reading and writing; the formal languageof intellectuals and academics, oftenused to display knowledge in lectures.Classical Arabic is not the language of cordial,spontaneous expression, emotions, daily encountersand ordinary communication. It isnot a vehicle for discovering one’s inner self orouter surroundings.The Report thus underlines that it has becomenecessary to work determinedly onstrengthening the linguistic shields of Arabicand on sharpening its practical attributes,which emphasise its universal character andits ability to assimilate new informational andtechnological <strong>development</strong>s. This is in additionto consolidating its relationship withworld languages and providing the necessaryeconomic, social and technical conditions forenhancing the language and its creative products.Popular culture, between conformityand creativity: Communal and oral folk cultureis a vast repository of experiences and cre-Language has acentral position in thecultural system.At the gates of theknowledge societyand the future, theArabic language isfacing severechallenges.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7


Historically, Arabculture did notconstitute a closedsystem, but ratherdisplayed a profoundability to open up,develop and transcenditself.Arab culture has nochoice but to engageagain in a new globalexperiment.ative efforts that have enriched, and continueto enrich, the intellectual, emotional and behaviourallife of people in all societies. Folkculture is generally very rich in its constructions,encompassing knowledge, beliefs, arts,morals, law, customs and early industrialknowledge.Arab folk culture shares all these qualities.Its particular feature is that it expresses twovoices: one, a conformist voice, which urgesadherence to familiar patterns, the other a creativevoice, which questions received wisdomand urges the pursuit of knowledge. Arabpopular culture is however not devoid ofknowledge. Biographies, a common form ofstory telling, are often full of historical and geographicalknowledge, as well as <strong>human</strong> insight.Romantic tales depicting imaginary idealworlds express popular yearnings, dreams andambitions. These and other forms of oral cultureare recurrently recited at group eveninggatherings and meetings, and are a means ofsharing historical knowledge and rules relatedto customs. Many popular stories extol thevalue of information, showing it to be morevaluable than wealth. The high respect commonlyshown for a written text by folk communitiesindicates the value they accord tolearning and knowledge.Cultural openness, from imitation tocreative interaction: Historically, Arab culturedid not constitute a closed system, butrather displayed, at major historical junctures,a profound ability to open up, develop andtranscend itself. It welcomed the experiencesof other nations and incorporated them in itsknowledge systems and way of life, regardlessof the differences and variations that distinguishedArab societies from those nations andtheir experiences.The first of the two major external influenceswhich this culture embraced dates backto the age of scientific codification and the encounterwith Greek civilization and sciences –indeed the demand for and importation ofthese sciences – in the third and fourth centuriesA. H. (on the Islamic calendar) – 9thand 10th centuries A.D.The second major experience came whenthe modern Arab world encountered Westerncivilization and opened up to science, literatureand other aspects of Western culture atthe beginning of the 19th century. The outcomeof this encounter was a renovation andmodernization of the Arab cultural heritage,descending from the past, opening wide to thefuture and drawing abundantly on the sinewsof modernization and the rich crop of Westernproduction in all fields of knowledge, science,the arts, literature and technology.Arabic culture, however, like other cultures,finds itself facing the challenges of anemerging global cultural homogeneity and relatedquestions about cultural multiplicity,cultural personalities, the issue of the “self”and the “other”, and its own cultural character.These and similar questions raise apprehensions,fears and risks in the minds of itspeople. Concerns about the extinction of thelanguage and culture and the diminution anddissipation of identity have become omnipresentin Arab thought and culture.The truth is that Arab culture has nochoice but to engage again in a new global experiment.It cannot enclose itself, contentedwith living on history, the past and inheritedculture alone in a world whose victorious powersreach into all corners of the earth, dominatingall forms of knowledge, behaviour, life,manufactured goods and innovation.Undoubtedly, some currents embedded in thisculture would prefer a policy of withdrawal, ofrejection and hostility to all values, ideas, andpractices brought about by this global culture.This may appear justified in some ways, but anegative policy of “non-interaction” can onlylead to the weakening and diminution of Arabcultural structures rather than their reinforcementand <strong>development</strong>.Moreover, the global culture has its owndimensions of knowledge, science, and technology,which countries neglect at their ownrisk. Openness, interaction, assimilation, absorption,revision, criticism and examinationcannot but stimulate creative knowledge productionin Arab societies. This is already noticeablein many sectors of contemporaryArabic culture where various creative <strong>development</strong>sreveal the beneficial role played byglobal and <strong>human</strong> cultural interaction. Thisprocess continues to take place despite alllocal deterrents and external obstacles andnotwithstanding the difficulties of nationaland international politics, where some powers8 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Arab citizens areincreasingly pushedaway from effectingchanges in theircountries.We have become accustomed to regardingabject submission as polite deference;obsequiousness as courtesy;sycophancy as oratory; bombast as substance;the acceptance of humiliation asmodesty; the acceptance of injustice asobedience; and the pursuit of <strong>human</strong> entitlementsas arrogance. Our invertedpower, which sometimes coincided with thedistribution of wealth, has had an effect on themorals of societies and individuals. The pursuitof personal gain, the preference for theprivate over the public good, social and moralcorruption, the absence of honesty and accountabilityand many other illnesses, were allrelated in one way or another to a skewed distributionof power and the resulting social disparities.Justice, before all else, has been thevictim of this state of affairs.Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi: The Character of Despotism.The emigration ofqualified Arabsconstitutes a form ofreverse <strong>development</strong>aid.system portrays the pursuit of the simplestknowledge as presumption; aspirationsfor the future as impossibledreams; courage as overreaching audacity;inspiration as folly; chivalry as aggression;free speech as insolence andfree thinking as heresy.The oil boom also played its role in erodinga number of values and societal incentivesthat would have been helpful in enhancingcreativity and the acquisition and diffusion ofknowledge. With the spread of negative valuesduring that period, creative abilities were neglected,and knowledge lost its significance for<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. The social standing ofscientists, educated people and intellectualsfell. Social value was measured by the criteriaof money and fortune, regardless of how thosefortunes were gained. Proprietorship and possessionreplaced knowledge and intellectualism.Perhaps worst of all, the values ofindependence, freedom and the importance ofa critical mind were also buried.Repression and marginalisation contributedto blunt the desire for achievement,happiness and commitment. As a result, indifference,political apathy and a sense of futilityare becoming dangerously common amongbroad segments of the populace. Arab citizensare increasingly pushed away from effectingchanges in their countries.The Report calls on the state, civil society,cultural and mass media institutions, enlightenedintellectuals and the public at large toplant those values that encourage action andinnovation in the political, social and economicspheres. 'Reforming the mind' is indeeda significant requirement for Arab culture, yet'reforming action' is equally urgent.A centrifugal economic, social and politicalenvironment in the region, coupled withcentripetal factors in other countries led tothe growing phenomenon of an Arab braindrain. The emigration of qualified Arabs constitutesa form of reverse <strong>development</strong> aidsince receiving countries evidently benefitfrom Arab investments in training and educatingtheir citizens. More significant, however, isthe opportunity cost of high levels of skilledoutflows: the lost potential contribution ofemigrants to knowledge and <strong>development</strong> intheir countries of origin. This double loss callsfor serious action to minimise its dangers:firstly by tapping the expertise and knowledgeof the Arab Diaspora abroad, and secondly byproviding Arab expatriates with incentives toreturn, either on temporary assignments or forgood, to their countries of origin, carrying a<strong>human</strong> capital much larger than that they hadmigrated with. This can be achieved only bylaunching a serious project for <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>that would attract highly qualified migrantsback temporarily or permanently onproductive and personally fulfilling assignmentsto serve their countries.The Arab Brain DrainRoughly 25% of 300,000 first degree graduatesfrom Arab universities in 1995/96 emigrated.Between 1998 and 2000 more than 15,000 Arabdoctors migrated.Data provided by A.B. Zahlan.Unlike the case of Arab culture, theanalysis of Arab social and economic structuresreveals ingrained obstacles to knowledgeacquisition in the Arab world. Only by overcomingthose obstacles through reform can aknowledge society be developed.THE POLITICAL CONTEXT:Oppression, Knowledge and DevelopmentPolitical obstacles to knowledge acquisition,as the Report argues, are even more severe inArab countries than those posed by theirsocio-economic structures, which are in turnseen to be more obstructive than any featuresof culture.Political power plays a key role in directingknowledge and influencing its <strong>development</strong>. It10 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


fosters knowledge that is favourable to itsgoals and suppresses opposing patterns.Political instability and fierce struggles for accessto political positions in the absence of anestablished rule for the peaceful rotation ofpower – in short, democracy – impede thegrowth of knowledge in Arab soil. One of themain results of that unstable political situationhas been the subjection of scientific institutionsto political strategies and power conflicts.In managing these institutions, politicalloyalties take precedence over efficiency andknowledge. Power shackles active minds, extinguishesthe flame of learning and kills thedrive for innovation.The Report calls for the establishment ofan independent knowledge sphere that producesand promotes knowledge free from politicalcoercion. This is possible only bydemocratising political life and knowledgeand ensuring that knowledge can be freely acquiredand produced.Laws are needed to guarantee Arab citizensthe essential rights of knowledge - thefreedom of thought and expression that are aprecondition for knowledge to flourish. Theinternational <strong>human</strong> rights conventions havebeen signed by most Arab states, but they haveneither entered the legal culture nor been incorporatedinto substantive domestic legislation.Yet the problem of freedom in the Arabworld is not related to the implementation oflaws as much as to the violation of these laws.Oppression, the arbitrary application of laws,selective censorship and other politically motivatedrestrictions are widespread. They oftentake the form of legal constraints on publications,associations, general assemblies andelectronic media, which prevent these fromcarrying out their communication and culturalroles. Such restrictions also obstruct the diffusionof knowledge and the education of publicopinion.Yet the more dangerous restrictions arethose imposed by security authorities whenthey confiscate publications or ban peoplefrom entering a country or prevent the sale ofcertain books during fairs while promotingother kinds of books. In committing theseacts, these authorities reach above the constitutionalinstitutions and the law, citing thepretext of 'national security' or public order.Other forms of restriction come from narrowminded,self-appointed custodians of publicmorality, and from the censorship of books,articles and media events. Creativity, innovationand knowledge are the first victims of thesuppression or denial of freedoms.A global context that poses a challenge:Globalisation in its current form and existinginstitutions is often weighted towards securingthe interests of the rich and powerful nationsand their dominance over the world economy,knowledge flows and, by extension, opportunitiesfor <strong>development</strong>. Without changes thattip the balance of global governance more towardsthe needs and aspirations of developingcountries, including Arab countries, globalisationcannot help these nations to achieve<strong>human</strong> progress.“If we are not careful, the intellectual propertyrights system may introduce distortions thatwould be detrimental to the interests of developingcountries.”Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (London, Sept 2002).Perhaps the most important example froma knowledge perspective is the insistence byindustrialised countries, the main producersof knowledge at the global level, that knowledgeshould be converted from a public goodto a private commodity through the instrumentof intellectual property rights, which arelargely owned by the industrialised West. Thisis now happening even in cases where theknowledge originated in developing countriesand was later acquired by institutions in the industrialisedworld. This trend threatens to cutdown developing country opportunities to acquirenew knowledge and it especially jeopardisesproductive sectors such as medicine andpharmacology.In the case of Arab countries in particular,a qualitative jump in the effectiveness of theknowledge acquisition system requires closerand more efficient forms of cooperation at thePan-Arab level.“It is quite clear that the dilemma of Arab <strong>development</strong>will not be solved without focusingfully on <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> – the <strong>development</strong> ofthe citizen and his/her role in economic, social andpolitical life.”Mustafa Al-BarghouthiPower shackles activeminds, extinguishesthe flame of learningand kills the drive forinnovation.Without changes thattip the balance ofglobal governancemore towards theneeds and aspirationsof developingcountries, includingArab countries,globalisation cannothelp these nationsachieve <strong>human</strong>progress.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 11


Constitutions, lawsand administrativeprocedures need to berefined to remove allrestrictions onessential freedoms.A STRATEGIC VISION FORESTABLISHING A KNOWLEDGESOCIETY IN THE ARAB WORLDThe Report pulls together the various threadsof its analysis of the status of Arab knowledgein a concluding strategic vision of the Arabknowledge society, supported by five pillars:1. Guaranteeing the key freedoms of opinion,speech and assembly through goodgovernance bounded by the law: A climate offreedom is an essential prerequisite for theknowledge society. These freedoms are thethresholds to knowledge production, to creativityand innovation, and to invigorating scientificresearch, technical <strong>development</strong> andartistic and literary expression. Constitutions,laws and administrative procedures need to berefined to remove all restrictions on essentialfreedoms, particularly administrative censorship,and regulatory restrictions by securityapparatuses on the production and diffusionof knowledge and all kinds of creative expression.2. Disseminating high quality education forall: The detailed proposals for reform in educationinclude: giving priority to early childhoodlearning; ensuring universal basiceducation for all and extending it to at least10th grade; developing an adult education systemfor lifelong learning; improving the qualityof education at all stages; giving particularattention to promoting higher education, andinstituting independent periodic evaluationsof quality at all stages of education.3. Embedding and ingraining science, andbuilding and broadening the capacity for researchand <strong>development</strong> in all societal activities.This can be achieved through promotingbasic research, and establishing a centrally coordinatedregional creativity and innovationnetwork that permeates the entire fabric of societyand enjoys supportive and complementarylinkages in the regional and internationalspheres.4. Shifting rapidly towards knowledgebasedproduction in Arab socioeconomicstructures: This calls for a decisive move towardsdeveloping renewable resourcesthrough knowledge and technological capabilitiesand towards diversifying economic structuresand markets. It also requires upgradingthe Arab presence in the 'new economy' andthe consolidation of a societal incentives systemthat upholds the acquisition and applicationof knowledge for <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> incontrast to the current mode in which valuesare centred on material possessions and inseeking access and favour from the twosources of power: money and authority.5. Developing an authentic, broadmindedand enlightened Arab knowledge model.This would entail:• Delivering true religion from political exploitationand respecting critical scholarship.The components of this reform include returningto the civilised, moral and <strong>human</strong>itarianvision of pure religion; restoring toreligious institutions their independence frompolitical authorities, governments, states andradical religious-political movements; recognisingintellectual freedom; activating interpretativejurisprudence, preserving the rightto differ in doctrines, religious schools and interpretations.• Advancing the Arabic language by undertakingserious research and linguistic reformfor translating scientific terms and coiningsimple linguistic usages. This also includescompiling specialised, functional dictionariesand other reference works that monitor commonclassical-colloquial words for use in children'sprogrammes and written and audiopublications. This must be matched by otherpersistent efforts to facilitate the acquisition ofArabic through formal and informal learningchannels, and to produce creative and innovativewriting for young children.• Reclaiming some of the myriad brightspots in the Arab cultural heritage. Thesemust be incorporated in the core of the Arabknowledge model in a manner far above andbeyond the self-centred singing of one's ownpraises. This legacy must be assimilated andunderstood as part of the structure of motivationfor developing and nurturing an Arabknowledge system in Arab minds and institutions.• Enriching, promoting and celebrating culturaldiversity within Arab countries. Thiscalls for providing safeguards for the protectionof all sub-cultures and for encouragingthem to interact, intermingle, grow and flourish.12 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


• Opening up to other cultures. Such interactionwould be strengthened by translationinto other languages; promoting an intelligentand generous exchange with non-Arab culturesand civilisations; maximising benefitsfrom regional and international organisationsand initiating reform in the world orderthrough stronger inter-Arab cooperation.Al-Kindy: Welcoming the truthregardless of its source“We should not shyaway from welcomingand acquiring the truthregardless of where itcame from, even if itcame from distant racesand nations that aredifferent from us.Nothing is more importantthan seeking thetruth except the truthitself. We should notbelittle the truth, orthose who utter it orbring it.”The pursuit ofknowledge isprompted by religion,culture, history andthe <strong>human</strong> will tosucceed.As the Report affirms in closing, knowledgeclosely approaches a religious obligationthat Arabs ought to honour and exercise. Itpoints out the way on the Arab journey to adignified and prosperous future. The pursuitof knowledge is prompted by religion, culture,history and the <strong>human</strong> will to succeed.Obstructions on the road are the work of mortals:the defective structures of the past andpresent – social, economic and, above all, political.Arabs must remove or reform thesestructures in order to take the place they deservein the world of knowledge at the beginningof the knowledge millennium.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13


PART IChanges in <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> inArab countries during 2001-2002This section looks at the period in review (2002-<strong>2003</strong>) and traces changes in,and impacts on Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> arising from trends and <strong>development</strong>sat the national, regional and international levels. In doing so it revisits the statusof the “three deficits” identified in the first Arab Human Development Report(in freedom, knowledge and women’s empowerment) and highlights progressand continuing shortfalls since that <strong>report</strong> was issued in July 2002.PART ONE: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 15


PART IChanges in <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in Arabcountries during 2001-2002Starting with this second issue, the ArabHuman Development Report (AHDR) seriesinitiates a new practice of including an openingsection devoted to assessing recent trendsand events that have influenced <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in the Arab region. The assessment includesevents that took place on both theexternal (regional and international) and theinternal (Arab country) levels, and covers theperiod since work began on the previous <strong>report</strong>in the series.INTRODUCTION: THE STATE OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIESTHE CONTENT OF HUMANDEVELOPMENTThe concept of "<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>" hasgained popularity since 1990 when the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP)adopted the term with a specific connotation,advanced a new index (the HDI) to measureit 1 , and started publishing an annual <strong>report</strong> onthe subject.The <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> concept, as it hasevolved over the years, is based on an intellectualheritage that places people at the centre of<strong>development</strong> and which culminated in the firstHuman Development Report (UNDP, 1990).The concept maintains that "people are thetrue wealth of nations" 2 and that <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>is a "process of expanding people’schoices". Since freedom is essential for the exerciseof choice, freedom is a fundamental requirementof <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. "Choices"is an expression of the more sophisticated conceptof "entitlements" introduced by AmartyaSen 3 , as an expression of people’s basic rightto these "choices". The concept stipulates that<strong>human</strong> beings, simply by being <strong>human</strong>, havean inalienable right to a decent living in bodyand soul.Two important implications flow from thisconcept: first, <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> rejects outrightany form of discrimination among<strong>human</strong> beings on whatever basis: gender, originor belief. Second, <strong>human</strong> well being is notlimited to material dimensions but extends tothe individual’s moral participation in societyand to all aspects of a decent life, such asbeauty, <strong>human</strong> dignity and self-fulfillment.People’s entitlements are, in principle, unlimitedand grow rapidly with <strong>human</strong>progress. Yet at any level of <strong>development</strong>, thethree main entitlements, in the opinion of theHuman Development Report, are "to live along and healthy life, to acquire knowledgeand to possess resources necessary for a decentlife". Human <strong>development</strong>, however, does notstop at that minimum but goes beyond it to includeother entitlements such as "political,economic and social freedoms, opportunitiesfor production and creativity, the enjoymentof liberty, self-fulfillment, and respect for<strong>human</strong> rights".Thus, <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> is much morethan the <strong>development</strong> of <strong>human</strong> resources. Itis a genuinely <strong>human</strong>e approach to the comprehensiveand integrated <strong>development</strong> of<strong>human</strong> beings and societal institutions aimedat achieving the higher goals of <strong>human</strong> existence:freedom, justice and <strong>human</strong> dignity.The <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> process rests on twoessential foundations: the first is the buildingof <strong>human</strong> capacities that allow for access to anHuman <strong>development</strong>is a genuinely <strong>human</strong>eapproach to thecomprehensive andintegrated<strong>development</strong> of<strong>human</strong> beings andsocietal institutionsaimed at achievingthe higher goals of<strong>human</strong> existence:freedom, justice and<strong>human</strong> dignity.1The HDI has undoubtedly been a major improvement over GDP per capita as a measure of <strong>development</strong>.2The phrase was first used in Frederick Harbison’s famous book, Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations (1973)31998 Nobel Prize winner in economics in recognition of his work on poverty and famines.PART I: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 17


The challenge ofbuilding <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> remainsa very serious one forthe vast majority ofArabs.advanced level of <strong>human</strong> well-being.Foremost among these are the capacity to livea long and healthy life, to acquire knowledgeand for all people to enjoy freedom withoutdiscrimination of any kind. The second foundationis the efficient utilisation of <strong>human</strong> capabilitiesin all areas of <strong>human</strong> activity as wellas in economic production, civil society organisationand political life.THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANDEVELOPMENT IN THE ARABREGIONArab countries have made significant stridesin more than one area of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in the last three decades. Nevertheless, thepredominant characteristic of Arab realitytoday seems to be the existence of deeplyrooted shortcomings that stand as obstacles tobuilding <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. As noted earlier,the first AHDR summarised these shortcomingsas the three deficits of freedom,women’s empowerment and knowledge.Taking these shortcomings into consideration,as the first AHDR did by exploring an alternative<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> index, shows that itmay be premature to celebrate the achievementsof Arab countries on the traditionalBOX 1The Sheikh of Al-Rabwah, Muhammad ibn Abi Taleb al-Ansari al-Demashqi – The Human Being"Since MAN (insân in Arabic) is thecream of the world, the essence of theuniverse, the radiating centre in theoceans and the encirclements, the collectorof the dispersed contents of the earthand heavens, the descendent, the outcome,the elite and the fruit of existenceand its raison d'etre, it was imperativethat we conclude this book by noting hisapparent characteristics and the wondersof his creation and his manners. We havegiven in it (i.e., the book) a description ofthe three generated ones, the seven regions,the seas and their contents, as wellas their characteristics and those of thecountries. Nothing remained except man,who is the goal of all this and to whom belongsa collection of characteristics, not asingle self. He is the empowered successoron earth and the one charged withcarrying out God's prescriptions. He is acreated being, charged and empowered.Among his characteristics is that GodAlmighty combined in him the powers ofthe two worlds and qualified him to inhabitthe two houses (i.e., the world andthe hereafter). He is just like an animal inhis lust and hunger to develop the earth;and he is like angels in knowledge, worshipand guidance. Therefore, in returnfor man's worship and devotion to developingHis earth, God nominated him tobe His successor on earth. He preparedhim to sojourn next to Him in HisParadise and the House of his Throne.This man is composed of two oppositethings and two separate substances far removedfrom each other: one of them isgentle, a heavenly soul, enlightened, allencompassing,live and perceiving. Theother one is dense, an earthly body, inferior,dark, dead and insensitive. That iswhy he was called "insan", which is thedual of ins (<strong>human</strong>)."HDI. Indeed, the challenge of building genuine<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> remains a very seriousone for the vast majority of Arabs. From apositive perspective, the realisation of <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> in the Arab world requires transcendingthese deficits and transforming theminto their opposites: advantages enjoyed by allArabs and assets they can be proud of beforethe rest of the world.In order to build <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,Arab countries need to embark on reconstructingtheir societies along three clear principles:• Full respect for <strong>human</strong> rights and freedomsas the cornerstone of good governanceleading to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.• Full empowerment of Arab women, recognisingtheir right to equal participation in politics,society and the economy as well as toeducation and other means of building capabilities.• Active knowledge acquisition and its effectiveutilisation in building <strong>human</strong> capabilities.As a key driver of economic progress, knowledgemust be brought to bear efficiently andproductively in all aspects of society, with thegoal of enhancing <strong>human</strong> well-being acrossthe region.This, in essence, is what it will take to transcendthe crisis of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in theArab region. It is, however, by no means theultimate target for Arabs. Meeting the challengesof the future requires building Arabproductive capabilities in the face of the rentiernature of Arab economies and societies. Itdemands the reform of governance at the nationaland pan-Arab levels on a solid foundationof freedom. It calls for strengtheningArab co-operation and it entails maximisingthe benefits and minimising the risks of globalisation.Source: "The Choice of Time in the Wonders of the Land and the Sea”, quoted in: Ahmad Sedqui ad-Dajani, 1994.18 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


BOX 2How Do Arabs Feel About the Three Deficits?A large-scale international study (World Values Survey) presents an opportunityto compare Arab attitudes towards knowledge, good governanceand gender equality with those expressed in other regions.The following results are based on field surveys in a large numberof countries throughout the world, including four Arab countries(Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco) that comprise about half theArab people.In addition to the Arab region, the surveys provide enough data tocompare the Arab region to eight other country groupings: other (non-Arab) Islamic countries, sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, SouthAsia, USA/ Canada, Australia and New Zealand, Latin America, EastAsia, and Western Europe.According to this survey, Arabs value knowledge and good governancestrongly but take an ambivalent stand on gender equality.Among the nine regions, Arabs expressed the highest preferencefor the role of science in the service of <strong>human</strong>ity. Arabs also topped thelist of those supporting the statement that "democracy is better thanany other form of government" and expressed the highest level of rejectionof authoritarian rule (a strong leader who does not have tobother with parliament and elections).On the empowerment of women, the Arabs came third in rejectingthat "a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl"while expressing the highest approval that "when jobs are scarce, menshould have more right to a job than women". In other words, Arabsstood for gender equality in education but not in employment. In<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> terms, Arabs expressed support for building the<strong>human</strong> capabilities of women but not for their utilisation.Evidently, Arab public opinion strongly supports the focus ofAHDR1 on the two deficits of freedom/good governance, and knowledge.But AHDR1 might have been ahead of Arab public opinion instressing women’s full empowerment in both education and employmentaccording to the paradigm of building <strong>human</strong> capabilities andutilising them effectively.Figure 1Democracy is the best form of governmentFigure 2Rejection of authoritarian ruleFigure 3Gender equality in higher educationFigure 4Gender equality in employmentSource of WVS data: Inglehart, R., Background Paper for AHDR2.PART I: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 19


The AHDR was a bellthat rang at the lastminute of the lasthour in thecontemporary Arabage.BOX 3Mohammad Hassanein HeikalThe First Arab Human Development Report: For Whom Did the Bell Toll?In our daily lives, we are accustomed to the sound ofthe bell as a last call. The first ring to reach our earswas that of the school bell calling us to knowledge andlearning. It was followed by other summonses: thetrain bell announcing our last chance to start a journey;the bells of places of worship beckoning us toprayer; the ambulance or fire engine siren telling usthat the usual right of way had changed, and that anew urgency took precedence; the alarms in buildingsalerting us to the danger of fire or attempted burglary.- The bell rung by the AHDR and heard by Arabsand others the world over carried echoes of all thebells ringing through our lives. It was a call to knowledgeand learning, an announcement of the lastchance to join the trip to the future, an appeal forcleansing, an injunction to make way for an urgent priority,and finally a forewarning of imminent danger –urging us to hasten to douse the flames of a still-smallfire waiting to engulf the region in a formidable blaze.- The truth is that the AHDR was a bell that rangat the last minute of the last hour in the contemporaryArab age – ringing within the framework of a historyradically different from anything <strong>human</strong>kind had experiencedbefore. Indeed, that experience can befairly summarised (despite the precautions imposedon simplification) by noting that the world has passeda number of milestones:- The first was the French Revolution, late in theeighteenth century, that arrived after aeons duringwhich <strong>human</strong> beings lived as subjects of emperors,kings, sultans, and princes. It crystallised the conceptof nationhood: a particular people living on territorieswith set borders. This concept gave rise, among otheroutcomes, to the idea of one market that guaranteesthe interest of the group and, as such, the state marketappeared.- The second milestone was the attempt atGerman Unification, at the end of the nineteenth century,which redefined the concept of the nation as aunifier of a people connected by kinship, neighbourhood,language and culture, and the experience of acontinuous history. In this concept, the nation has tiesmore extensive than the borders of territories belongingto one people and to a national state. The notionof a wider market materialised to fulfill these more extensiveinterests, one that might be called "the nation’smarket" and which, by extension, wassometimes called "the region’s market".- The third milestone was the shedding by theUnited States of its oceanic isolation in the early twentiethcentury. This was a significant indication that theUS, largely self-sufficient though it was, realised that ittoo needed the world as much as the world needed theUS. With this transcontinental meeting – accompaniedby great strides in energy generation, aviationand communication – the features of one world appeared,pointing towards a "world market’.- The fourth and final milestone was passed afterWorld War II and after the revolution in electronics,space and satellite technology emerged and developed.The crisis of political doctrines that climaxedwith the end of the Cold War in the last decade of the20th century led to a profound shift -- in effect, aglobal transformation. Its thrust has been to convertthe "world market" into a "market world" transcendingall national, regional and continental borders.- The danger and the significance of presenttrends is that the current transcontinental "worldmarket" will indeed turn into a dominant "marketworld", one that will accommodate, absorb, usurp,and dominate without stopping at any physical or politicalobstacles. This would ultimately lead to a doubleimpasse:On the one hand, local and regional identitieswould be incapable of resistance, and would surrender,leaving the market to govern peoples and nationsand manage world affairs.On the other hand, the power of law would giveway to that of the market. As such, international rightssymbolised by the United Nations in New Yorkwould cede to the authority of the New York StockExchange. The strongholds of this authority, theInternational Monetary Fund, the World Bank andmultinational firms, would dominate world affairs.The market would become the plotter of intelligenceoperations, the order-giver to armies and fleets, andthe director of missile payloads.The AHDR probably came out at the last minuteof the last hour to pose a fateful question to the Arabpeople:- If we want a world owning "the market", thenwhere are we in that world conceptually and actually,in terms of our capabilities and contributions?- If we accept a market owning "the world", whatwill be our position and role in that circumstance?What will be our orientation and what impacts willfollow?In short, where are we?BOX 4AHDR1 Web Site Statisticshttp://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/Year2002<strong>2003</strong>TotalNo. ofdownloads978,000346,0001,324,000No. ofcomplete downloads792,000303,0001,095,00020 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


CHANGES IN HUMANDEVELOPMENT SINCE 2001THE REGIONAL ANDINTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTWork on the first AHDR (2002) started at thebeginning of 2001; as such its analysis stoppedat the end of the twentieth century. On theother hand, since the first draft of this second<strong>report</strong> was initiated at the beginning of <strong>2003</strong>,the timeframe under review in this section islimited to just two calendar years. This is, ofcourse, a very short period in <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>terms. Basic <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> indicatorsdo not change significantly over shortperiods. Moreover, updating such indicatorsrequires up-to-date databases, resources thatare all-too-scarce in the Arab world, as wassharply underlined in the first <strong>report</strong>.In an attempt to maximise informationbased on weak or incomplete data, this sectionadopts a qualitative analysis. It focuses on deducingtrends inherent in events considered tohave an important bearing on various dimensionsof <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in the regionaland international context of Arab countries.At the time of writing, trends portend momentousalterations that may change not only thestatus of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, but the veryface and pattern of life in the region for someconsiderable time.Certain events may take place over a veryshort period of time, yet leave a profound impressionon <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. Such is thecase with changes in <strong>human</strong> rights and otherforms of legislation affecting people’s civil liberties.This section records several recentevents that have had negative impacts in Arabcountries, notably in the two areas of freedomand good governance and the advancement ofwomen.Furthermore, qualitative analysis also requiressound and comprehensive data. Mostof the databases available to support suchanalysis reflect the viewpoints, if not the prejudices,of the party gathering the data. To minimisethis problem, especially in relation toArab-related events, the authors have resortedto more than one source besides diligentlymonitoring the mass media during the periodunder study, including bulletins and <strong>report</strong>sprepared by the Arab Organisation forHuman Rights, and electronic mail lists of<strong>human</strong> rights violations in Arab countries.ON THE INTERNATIONAL ANDREGIONAL DIMENSIONS OFHUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIESThe first AHDR (2002) may not havegiven sufficient attention to the regional andinternational dimensions of the <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>impasse in Arab countries – at least,this is what a majority of the Arab critics of the<strong>report</strong> have felt. The publication of the <strong>report</strong>after the tragic events of September 11, 2001,and their extremely serious aftermath, amplifiedthis feeling, although work on the <strong>report</strong>had started well before those events.The authors believe that exaggerating theimpediments to Arab <strong>development</strong> imposedby regional and international challenges is futileand self-defeating. This all-too-frequentresort may provide a comforting escape, yet itis still highly counterproductive. Takingrefuge in externalities weakens the resolve andundermines the capabilities required for selfreliant<strong>development</strong>. It also leads to underestimatingthe task of self-improvement uponwhich Arab dignity and the national, regionaland international prospects of the region mustbe constructed. Hence, the strategic choice ofthe first <strong>report</strong> was to focus on the reform requiredwithin the Arab world.The decisive factor in soundly confrontingthe regional and international challenges facingthe Arab world will be the quality of Arabcapabilities in various spheres; knowledge,production and politics. Such capabilities andcreative energies, in turn, cannot be unleashedwithout widening the range of people’s freedomsand guaranteeing good governance inpractice. History and logic further indicatethat a strong system of Arab co-ordinationleading to regional integration will be an indispensablesource of strength and a conditionfor success in these endeavours. This systemcan be seen as "an Arab Free CitizenshipZone", where every Arab would enjoy the fullrights of a national in each and every Arabcountry. Such a system would undoubtedlyThe decisive factor insoundly confrontingthe regional andinternationalchallenges facing theArab world will be thequality of Arabcapabilities inknowledge,production andpolitics.PART I: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 21


Governments, statingconsiderations ofsecurity and stability,have found a newjustification for theirongoing warningsabout the perils offreedom.strengthen the negotiating capacities of Arabcountries in highly competitive global arenas,and position Arab countries on firmer andhigher ground in the third millennium.It is now clear that the <strong>human</strong> impact ofSeptember 11 and its political and securityconsequences have decisively altered internationalpublic opinion and sentiment, and thusthe parameters of the external challenges to<strong>development</strong> in the Arab region. A new historicalera is rapidly unfolding; not only becauseof the high <strong>human</strong> toll, which was a greattragedy, but also because of the political andsecurity consequences of that cataclysm. Thefateful events of that horrific day woke theworld, especially its rich and powerful countries,from a dream of comprehensive securityand invulnerability. The need to rebuild globalsecurity has become all the more urgent now,yet the proposed means to reach this end vary.Without question, the killing of innocent<strong>human</strong> beings violated all <strong>human</strong> and heavenlylaws.Worldwide anti-terrorism policies havebeen largely military and security-oriented innature. The long-term goal of draining theeconomic and political sources of terrorismhas almost faded away.In the current war against terror, the securitypolicies and restrictive procedures introducedby some advanced countries andadopted in several parts of the developingworld, including the Arab region, have createda situation inimical to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.Governments, stating considerations of securityand stability, have found a new justificationfor their ongoing warnings about theperils of freedom. A flawed yet highly influentialrationale has gained ground: if the world’sleading democracies find it necessary to backpedalon <strong>human</strong> rights and civil liberties, otherstates much further behind on the road to reformmay be well advised to pause. After all,in the narrow logic of security, governmentswith the most to lose by granting freedom arethus most justified in ruling with an iron grip.The expedience of that logic has not been loston regressive elements in Arab and other developingcountries.Events befalling Arabs abroad and widelybroadcast in the media intensified popular disaffectionin the region. The US Administrationresorted to establishing and enforcing proceduresthat at times contravened the most basic<strong>human</strong> rights, according to the (American)Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights (NewYork, 2002), which found that "over the lastyear the US government has taken a series ofactions that have gradually eroded basic<strong>human</strong> rights protections in the United States,fundamental guarantees that have been centralto the US constitutional system for more thantwo hundred years...too often, the US government’smode of operations since September 11has been at odds with core American and international<strong>human</strong> rights principles." 4 Thoseprocedures, which included ethnic profilingand secret evidence, violated civil and politicalliberties, particularly those of Arabs andMuslims. They revoked the right to a just trialbefore civil courts, thus legalising detentionwithout charge and administrative arrestswithout due process.The US introduced ethnic profiling ofArabs and Muslims, whether they were naturalisedcitizens, legal residents, students or visitors.Contrary to a long-established principleunder the law, these people became guiltyuntil proven innocent. Many ordinary peoplewere arrested for no reason except their affiliationto Arabs or to Islam. The US requiredfingerprint records of visiting nationals from25 Arab states and also instituted registrationwith security forces, which led to administrativedetentions in some cases.These measures resulted in reducing thenumber of Arab students in the United States,quite markedly in the cases of some countries(Table 1). Important knowledge acquisitionopportunities for young Arabs were thus cur-4The American Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights <strong>report</strong> (New York, 2002) documents details of the erosion of civil liberties. Among them:• "The FBI may now be privy to what books an individual checks out at the public library or purchases at the local bookstore.• The USA Patriot Act could result in long-term detention of non-citizens who have never been charged with a crime.• The Justice Department’s list of the young men targeted for government questioning was compiled strictly on the basis of national origin.• The Administration has in fact been using the term "unlawful enemy combatant" - a term not found in international law - as a kind of magicwand, waving it to avoid well-established standards of the US and international law.• Even if suspected terrorists are eventually tried and then acquitted by military commissions the Administration reserves the right to continue todetain them indefinitely.• In too many cases, opportunistic governments expressed support for the fight against terrorism, while presenting their own domestic insurgencies as conflicts perpetrated by terrorist groups analogous to at least Al-Qaeda."22 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


tailed. The harassment of Arabs living abroad,furthermore, created a climate that underminedthe welfare of Arab expatriate communities,damaged the vital process of culturalinteraction between them and host societiesand interrupted valuable scientific, technicaland cultural exchanges between Arab countriesand the West.Perhaps the gravest repercussion of thewar on terror is that it gave ruling regimes insome Arab countries spurious justification forcurbing freedoms through an expanded definitionof terrorism, which found institutionalexpression on the pan-Arab level in the "ArabCharter for Anti-Terrorism". This documenthas been widely criticised in Arab and international<strong>human</strong> rights circles, since an expandeddefinition opens the door to abuses such ascensorship, restricting access to the Internetand suppressing the printing and publicationof any material construed as "encouraging terrorism".Moreover, the Charter neither explicitlyprohibits detention or torture, norprovides for questioning the legality of detentions.Furthermore, it does not protect personalfreedom, since it does not require a priorjudicial order authorising the wire-tapping ofindividuals or groups (Amnesty International).THE IMPACT OF THE ISRAELIOCCUPATION OF PALESTINE ONHUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIESThe first AHDR concluded that the Israelioccupation of <strong>Palestine</strong> constitutes a severeimpediment to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. This occupationdistorts policy priorities, retards<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> and freezes opportunitiesfor growth, prosperity and freedom across theregion, and not in the Occupied PalestinianTerritories alone. The harsh indignities arisingfrom occupation extend to all the Arab people,yet the worst repercussions are borne bythe Palestinian people themselves.Occupation denies Palestinians freedomand <strong>human</strong> dignity and aborts their internationallyrecognised right to self-determination.Occupation squanders Palestinian resources,BOX 5UNHCHR: War on terror infringing on <strong>human</strong> rightsSource: Reuters Web Site (www.reuters.com), visited on 24/12/200.undermines Palestinian <strong>human</strong> capabilitiesand destroys individual and communal securityand <strong>human</strong> lives.The occupation of Palestinian and otherArab lands exerts a direct and continuous burdenon the economies of affected countriesand diverts resources from <strong>development</strong> tomilitary and security objectives. The threat ofIsraeli domination also creates a pretext fordeferring political and economic reforms inArab countries in the name of national solidarityagainst a formidably armed externalaggressor 5 .Israel’s believed possession of a large arsenalof weapons of mass destruction (WMD),which Arabs consider represents a doublestandard because it is not subjected to an internationalwatch or a regional or internationaldeterrent, drives the Arab region and surroundingcountries into an intense arms racethat diminishes resources that could otherwisebe applied to <strong>development</strong>.In 2002, Israel’s government, under theguise of the international war on terror, attackedalmost all Palestinian territories, de-The late UN High Commissioner for<strong>human</strong> rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello,noted publicly that the US-led "war onterror" was hurting <strong>human</strong> rights and exacerbatingprejudices around the world.Governments across the globe haveinvoked the "war on terror", announcedby President Bush after the September11,2001 attacks in the United States, to justifyactivities that Sergio Vieira de Mello saidare "damaging <strong>human</strong> rights in the industrialisedand developing worlds."Arabs and Muslims at large are experiencingincreasing incidents of racialdiscrimination … singling out, fingerpointing and…in some instances (violence),"he said."We must at any cost prevent civiliansfrom becoming what some irresponsiblepeople call ‘collateral damage’," he continued,nothing that "In Iraq … civilianshave suffered enough."TABLE 1Number of students from some Arab countries in the United Statesbefore and after the September 2001 eventsCountrySaudi ArabiaQatarOmanYemenNumber of students in the United States19995,1563384591882002/<strong>2003</strong>3,581250345181% Reduction31%26%25%4%Source: Data collected from Arab Missions by the Permanent Observer Mission of the Arab League to theUnited Nations.Occupation distortspolicy priorities,retards <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> andfreezes opportunitiesfor growth, prosperityand freedom acrossthe region.5Israel’s might in the region is not to be underestimated. For example, Israel is among the few countries that very likely own nuclear weapons, evenif this is not usually acknowledged (US State Department, from infoplease.com). Israel has refrained from ratifying the Treaty on Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons. The Centre for Non-proliferation Studies affiliated with the "Monterey Centre for International Studies" categorises Israel’s ownershipof chemical weapons as "probable", and its ownership of biological weapons as "possible", given that Israel has not ratified treaties on banningchemical and biological weapons.PART ONE: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 23


BOX 6Human Rights Watch Report 2002, Middle East and North Africa:Jenin"Israeli security forces were responsiblefor extensive abuses, including indiscriminateand excessive use of lethal forceagainst unarmed Palestinian demonstrators;unlawful killings by Israel DefenseForces (IDF) soldiers; disproportionateIDF gunfire in response to Palestinian attacks;inadequate IDF response to abusesby Israeli settlers against Palestinian civilians;and "closure" measures onPalestinian communities that amounted tocollective punishment."Source: Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Middle East & North Africa.The number ofPalestinian deathsresulting from Israeliaction in the past twoyears is, inproportional terms,comp<strong>arab</strong>le to thedeath of about aquarter of a millionpeople in the US."During its investigation [of IDF operationsin Jenin], however, Human RightsWatch documented unlawful and deliberatekillings, and the killing or wounding ofunprotected individuals as a result of excessiveor disproportionate use of force.Such cases are in violation of the international<strong>human</strong>itarian law prohibitionsagainst ‘wilful killing’ of non-combatants.The organisation also found instances ofIDF soldiers deliberately impeding thework of medical personnel and preventingmedical assistance to the wounded withno apparent or obvious justification ofmilitary necessity… There is strong primafacie evidence that in some of the casesdocumented grave breaches of theGeneva Conventions, or war crimes, werecommitted."stroyed farms and homes, disrupted thePalestinian Authority, used unarmed civiliansas <strong>human</strong> shields, and committed, mostmarkedly in Jenin and Nablus, atrocities andwhat a highly reputed NGO, Human RightsWatch, called ‘war crimes’. (Human RightsWatch, 2002).In April <strong>2003</strong> the UN Commission onHuman Rights, with a majority of 33 out of 53votes, strongly condemned "the violations bythe Israeli occupation authorities of <strong>human</strong>rights in the occupied Palestinian territory, includingEast Jerusalem", including "the practiceof ‘liquidation’ or ‘extrajudicialexecutions’", and expressed its grave concern"at acts of mass killing perpetrated by theIsraeli occupying authorities against thePalestinian people" (Commission on HumanRights, Resolution <strong>2003</strong>/6, Geneva). The resolution"reaffirms the legitimate right of thePalestinian people to resist the Israeli occupation."Occupation forces opened fire on ambulancesthat month.The <strong>human</strong> costs of Israeli occupationIsraeli occupation has wrought death and destructionin the West Bank and Gaza. By April<strong>2003</strong>, 2,405 Palestinians had been killed, and41,000 injured as a result of Israeli actionssince September 2000. These are not mere statisticsbut people whose lives have been destroyed,their hopes dashed, their futuresaborted and their families bereaved. Most ofthose killed were civilians (85%) and a significantproportion were children (20%).UNICEF estimates that 7,000 children havebeen injured.The conflict has also claimed Israeli casualties.Over the period (September 2000 –May <strong>2003</strong>), the Israeli defense forces <strong>report</strong>eda total of 781 Israelis dead and 5,468 injured(http://www.idf.il) including soldiers, settlersand civilians. The loss of innocent lives is alwaysan unacceptable <strong>human</strong> tragedy. 6Given that the population of the WestBank and Gaza is about one hundredth thepopulation of the US, the number ofPalestinian deaths resulting from Israeli actionin the past two years is, in proportional terms,comp<strong>arab</strong>le to the death of about a quarter ofa million people in the US. The number of injuriesis comp<strong>arab</strong>le to four million in the US.In addition to considerable casualties,Palestinian <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> has sufferedfrom the loss of freedom, livelihoods, destructionof basic infrastructure and an alarmingdecline in health conditions. Palestinians weresubject to blatant violations of basic <strong>human</strong>rights, including the right to life, freedom,food, education and employment.It is very difficult to find a historical equivalentto the division of the occupied territoriesinto clusters. While it shares a few similaritieswith past segregation policies in the US, it resemblesmost the Bantustan policies enforcedby the former apartheid regime in SouthAfrica.Collective punishment through closuresand curfews affects nearly three millionPalestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.Israeli checkpoints and roadblocks dividethese territories into 300 separate clusters.Most occupied towns, villages and refugeecamps have suffered from extended curfewsand closures. Nablus, for example, has beenvirtually under continuous curfew during thepast two years. About 15,000 Palestinians havebeen denied freedom of movement throughdetention with 6,000 still in prison, including350 children.Closures and curfews have also deprivedpeople of basic services and supplies, creating6Other nations also suffered casualties in the conflict: the crushing of the young American peace activist, Rachel Corrie, by an Israeli bulldozer is justone example.24 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


a major <strong>human</strong>itarian crisis. They prevent accessto medical care and restrict the movementof medical personnel and supplies. Heart, cancerand renal patients cannot obtain treatmentor cannot afford it. Pregnant women are cutoff from antenatal care and are forced to givebirth at home or even at checkpoints. Fortythreewomen delivered babies at checkpoints,nine of whom were stillborn. 7 Parents cannothave their children immunised just as healthrisks are multiplying. Children and teacherscannot go to school. Malnutrition is rampantwith 30% of children under 5 suffering fromchronic malnutrition and 21% from acute malnutrition.8 Psychological trauma is widespread,particularly among children. Families,friends and communities find themselvesphysically isolated, unable to meet and supporteach other.While Israeli construction of settlementsand a separation barrier, "the wall", furthertightens Israel’s stranglehold on thePalestinian people, Israeli destruction ofPalestinian property and infrastructure undermineshope for a viable Palestinian economy.Between October 2000 and April 2002, physicaldamage amounted to US $ 305 million. Inmid-May 2002, after Israeli incursions intoseveral West Bank towns that left almost 260Palestinians dead, an international donor surveyassessed physical damage at more than US$361 million. 9 It was one of these incursions(into Jenin) that Terje Rød Larsen, UN SpecialCoordinator in the Occupied Territories describedas "horrific beyond belief" and"morally repugnant." His outcry and that ofthe international community did not restrainthe destruction. By September 2002 the damagehad nearly doubled to US $728 million.Israeli actions have deprived large segmentsof the population of job opportunitiesand income. GNP has been more than halvedand total income losses to the Palestinianeconomy are estimated to be between US $3.2and US $10 billion (in addition to the cost ofdestroyed public and private property). Aboutthree fourths of Palestinians are now living inpoverty (measured at under US $2 a day). TheBOX 7Human Losses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories(Sept 2001- April <strong>2003</strong>)• 2,405 dead, including 451 children and 265 students:- deaths by live ammunition: 1,455- by heavy weapons: 496- by assassination: 219• 41,000 wounded, including 7,000 children and 2,981 students.• 2,500 permanent disabilities, with 500 children affected.• 9 journalists killed, including 7 Palestinians. 75 journalists wounded167 journalists assaultedSources:- The <strong>Palestine</strong> Monitor: 28 September 2002 – 17 April <strong>2003</strong>)- Health, Development, Information, and Policy Institute- B’Tselem <strong>report</strong>: Illusions of restraint: Human Rights Violations During the Events in the Occupied Territories 29thSeptember - 2ndDecember, 2000- Palestinian Ministry of Health- UN Special Rapporteur of Commission on Human Rights, March 2002- Ministry of Education, 17 January 2002- General Union of Disabled Palestinians- UN Special Rapperteur of Communication Human Rights, March 2002- Information from the Palestinian Journalists SyndicateBOX 8Material Losses in the Occupied PalestinianTerritories in 19 months(until April <strong>2003</strong>)• Houses damaged: 11,553• Houses destroyed: 4,985• Schools destroyed: 323• Mosques destroyed: 30• Churches destroyed: 12• Wells destroyed: 134• Trees uprooted: 34,606• Land sequestrated: 1,162 donums*• Land Destroyed: 17,162 donumsSource: The <strong>Palestine</strong> Monitor- Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 3rd June, 2002- Palestinian Humanitarian Disaster, U.S. Agency for International Development, July 10, 2002- Ministry of Education, 17 Jan 2002, Information for Ministry of Education schools- Palestinian Council for Justice and Peace- Al-Mezan 2001- LAW Society, 29th Nov 2001 (figure from beginning of 2000)*A donum is 1,000 sq. m. of land.number of poor people has tripled sinceSeptember 2000. Two thirds of the workforcein Gaza, and half of the workforce in the WestBank, are unemployed. Palestinians are nowmore dependent on food aid than ever before.The World Bank estimates that if the conflictis resolved and the closure lifted, it will stilltake at least two years for the Palestinian economyto restore pre-September 2000 per capitaincome.Current unemployment rates in the WestBank and Gaza are more than double thoseAbout three fourths ofPalestinians are nowliving in povertymeasured at under US$2 a day.7The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS)8Report by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Johns Hopkins University, 20029Physical and Institutional Damage Assessment – West Bank Governorates, March-May, 2002 by the Donor Support Group, Local Aid CoordinationCommittee, May 2002PART ONE: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 25


Occupation posed toIraqis a new challengeof a different order,one which they willonly be able to meet ifthey are empoweredto determine theirown future.that prevailed in the US during the GreatDepression. The decline in GNP in thePalestinian territories is also significantlygreater than the GNP decline during that period.Insecurity and desperation are among theunquantifiable, yet profound, <strong>human</strong> costs ofoccupation. Through affinity, empathy and intensemedia coverage, the Arab public identifieswith the suffering. Furthermore, itwitnesses, daily, the dwindling credibility ofIsraeli claims to respect for democracy and<strong>human</strong> rights.THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQAt the first draft stage of this <strong>report</strong>, a coalitionled by the USA was preparing to wagewar on Iraq ostensibly aimed at ridding thecountry of weapons of mass destruction thatthe coalition claimed Iraq possessed, as well asreplacing a totalitarian regime by a democraticone. As the <strong>report</strong> was being completed, Iraqfell under Anglo-American occupation, followinga war led by the United States, GreatBritain and other partners.This war against Iraq was waged without amandate from the Security Council of theUnited Nations. Answering questions at apress conference in the Hague on March 11,<strong>2003</strong> the UN Secretary-General observed that:"If the US and others were to go outside theCouncil and take military action, it would notbe in conformity with the Charter". In theevent, the war was conducted in the face ofstrong popular opposition not only in Arabcountries but also across the world, includingin member countries of the coalition.Although the full impacts of this war werenot clear at the time of writing, the initialphase of military operations and the entry ofoccupation forces into Iraqi cities, includingBaghdad, had had severe adverse effects onIraq and its people.Undoubtedly, the heaviest losses sustainedby Iraq were the killing, injury and displacementof its citizens. Attack strategies and ammunition,including cluster bombs that didnot distinguish between civilian and militarytargets, led to the killing, mutilation and dismembermentof a large number of Iraqis, includingmany children, who will carry disabilitiesand disfigurements for life. Shrapnel coveredlarge areas; parts of some bombs have notyet exploded and continue to threaten Iraqicivilians, particularly children. On 19 March<strong>2003</strong>, Human Rights Watch urged the UnitedStates Secretary of State and the BritishForeign Secretary to refrain from deployingcluster bombs in civilian areas, because of theunexploded ordnance they leave behind,which continues to threaten civilians well afterhostilities cease. 10While the physical destruction has beenenormous, it is the cultural destruction thathas been particularly dismaying. The pillageand plunder of the Iraqi museum, the libraryand the Centre for Iraqi Arts under the gaze ofoccupying forces is a violation of the firstGeneva protocol which stipulates the responsibilityof occupying forces for the protectionof cultural objects and religious places in orderto preserve the cultural heritage of people whoare subjects of occupation. Also the persecutionof Iraqi scientists raises fears about its impacton scientific research and technological<strong>development</strong> in Iraq and more widely in theArab region. These fears are underlined by theunprecedented restrictions imposed on someArab scientists and students in Western universities.This war has overthrown a totalitarianregime that oppressed the Iraqi people and deprivedthem of a wide spectrum of rights andfreedoms. This regime had inflicted on Iraqisall manner of persecution and torture news ofwhich was only whispered about before, whilethe aftermath of such acts is now revealeddaily. The excesses of the previous regime didnot stop at Iraq’s borders; the attack onKuwait in 1990 threatened Arab national securityand caused harm to Arab collective action.The invasion and occupation of Iraq and theconsequent destruction were not restricted tophysical structures but also extended to the institutionalinfrastructure of services and security.Chaos spread and large numbers of Iraqislost both livelihoods and security. This has,posed to Iraqis a new challenge of a differentorder, one which they will only be able to meetif they are empowered to determine their ownfuture in accordance with international law; if10Human Rights Watch, A letter to the United States and its allies on compliance with the laws of war, 19 March <strong>2003</strong>26 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


they are freed from occupation, and if they areallowed to recover their wealth and helped tobuild a system of good governance fully representativeof the Iraqi people. These are the essentialcircumstances that would enable thepeople of Iraq to carry out quickly the reconstructionof their country from a <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>perspective.The repercussions of the occupation ofIraq do not stop at Iraq’s borders.Developments in Iraq are bound to have significantconsequences on <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>throughout the region. For most Arabs, thewar has been seen as an attempt at restructuringof the region by outside forces pursuingtheir own objectives.In contrast, this series of <strong>report</strong>s on <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> in Arab countries aims at stimulatingthe formulation of a strategic vision byArab elites through a process of social innovationaimed at restructuring the region fromwithin, with the ultimate objective of building<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in the Arab world. Thatvision of self-determined change is at the centreof the current <strong>report</strong> on building a knowledgesociety in Arab countries. There can beno doubt that, from a <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>perspective, internal societal reforms based onscrupulous self-criticism are the most desirableand sustainable alternative to mappingthe region’s future from outside.ARAB INTEGRATIONSix successive decades have witnessed someaccomplishments in Arab integration, but thefailures were larger, whether in terms of raisingthe level of integration and bringing itnearer to its final goals or of building Arab<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.Looking at accomplishments, the 18 Arabstates signatories to the Arab Free Trade Areatreaty (AFTA) have been active in implementingits provisions. Trade was liberalized in60% of products traded between states partiesby January <strong>2003</strong>. It is expected that all tradebetween states parties will be liberalized byJanuary 2005.At the level of global integration, elevenArab states acceded to the World TradeOrganization Agreement and five others are inthe process of acceding to it. It is not clear,however, whether the current or future Arabmember states will be diligent in taking advantageof the GATT provisions, which allow accessionto regional trade arrangements. Doingso would mean that the membership of Arabstates in WTO and AFTA would complementeach other, which would enhance the ability ofArab countries to attract foreign investmentfrom various sources to the whole Arab region.11There is also a rush to adopt integrationmethods invented to suit the situations of developedsocieties although these have provedto be a failure in many developing countrygroupings. AFTA, for instance, is limited totrade in goods, which does not lead to the establishmentof an Arab common market forservices, capital and labour; nor does it implythe establishment of institutional infrastructuresto regulate and control the flow of goodsand services and factors of production.In view of limited popular participation indecision-making processes at the countrylevel, the Arab integration pattern has beenmarred by the weakness of such participation,namely neglect of the process by which Arabcitizens are made aware of the measures anddecisions which affect them and of which theyare supposed to be the key beneficiaries.Thinking on trade has been limited to discussingthe requirements of inter-trade liberalizationand the resulting damage to existinginterest groups and the struggle over exceptionsfrom the liberalization process. Littlethought has been given to the role of integrationin enhancing productive efficiency andcompetitiveness at the pan-Arab and globallevels.In sum, the situation of Arab integrationstill falls short of the "Arab Free CitizenshipZone" called for by the first Arab HumanDevelopment Report.For most Arabs, thewar has been seen asan attempt atrestructuring theregion by outsideforces pursuing theirown objectives.A vision of selfdeterminedchange isat the centre of thecurrent <strong>report</strong>.11This cannot be guaranteed in the cases of individual accession to global arrangements or association agreements with the European Union, for instance,without an Arab regional arrangement in the form of a customs union or a common market, because in the case of individual associationthere will be little incentive for foreign firms to locate their industries in the associated Arab country in view of the abolition of trade restrictions betweenthat country and the associated industrial countries.PART ONE: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 27


Arab countries, onaverage, continued toevince the lowestlevels of freedomamong the worldregions compared.DEVELOPMENTS IN FREEDOMAND GOOD GOVERNANCE ASREFLECTED IN INTERNATIONALDATABASESThis section is based on freedom and goodgovernance indicators as accessed through internationaldatabases. 12 The authors recognisethe disadvantages of relying on such internationalsources, yet are obliged to turn to themfor lack of better alternatives from the regionon this crucial dimension of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.It is to be hoped that such Arabic alternativeswill develop in the future, possiblyinspired by this series of Arab HumanDevelopment Reports.LEVEL OF CIVIL AND POLITICALLIBERTIES (1990-2000)The first AHDR (2002) measured freedom byusing values of the indicator developed byFreedom House, which at that time stopped at1998. At the time of writing this <strong>report</strong>, the indicatorwas available only up to 2000/2001(Freedom House, 2002). It should be notedthat freedom scores, as developed by FreedomFigure 5Freedom scores, weighted by population size:the Arab region and other world regions, 1990-2000 (average values)House, are far from perfect measures and mayreflect certain biases inherent in their source.Yet they constitute the only database currentlyavailable for measuring essential freedomsover time.Figure 5 shows that while the generaltrend saw freedom rise worldwide, in mostArab countries it fell, with an apparent declineduring the early 1990s. Arab countries, on average,continued to evince the lowest levels offreedom among the world regions compared.In fact, according to this indicator, fiveArab countries were among the ten least freecountries in the world during 2000/2001.INDICATORS OF VOICE ANDACCOUNTABILITYInternational databases also provide indicatorsof voice and accountability (Kaufmann etal., 2002), which are among the essential requirementsof good governance and which thefirst AHDR used to illuminate its case. Figure6 illustrates that, despite a slight improvementin Arab countries between the two years considered,when it comes to voice and accountability,the Arab region still ranks lowest in theworld.PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION INBUSINESS TRANSACTIONSFigure 7 presents the latest evaluations of perceptionsof corruption in business transactionsworldwide according to TransparencyInternational (2002). The lowest values of thisindicator are the worst (i.e., the most corrupt).The figure does not indicate a noticeableimprovement in the position of Arab countriesin comparison to other world regionsevaluated between the years 1998 and 2002.However, the position of one country, Egypt,improved slightly.EVENTS INFLUENCING HUMANDEVELOPMENT IN ARABCOUNTRIESThis section documents important events influencingArab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> on the12Specifically, the ‘Freedom Score’ published by the US-based "Freedom House". For technical and practical reasons, the first Report made use of thisindicator, despite some important reservations. These reasons include a long time series and a detailed database on various political and civil freedoms.In the absence of other comp<strong>arab</strong>le sources, the score is maintained here.28 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


national level and examines their effects, bothpositive and negative. It focuses on two areas:widening freedoms and establishing good governance,and the empowerment of women.(Improvements in the field of knowledge acquisition,while also crucial, require a longertime horizon for assessment).Probably the most far-reaching changethat could have significantly improvedprospects for <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in mostArab countries -- had it been adopted andlaunched effectively -- is the wide-ranging reforminitiative declared by Saudi CrownPrince Abdullah at the beginning of <strong>2003</strong>. Theinitiative covers the following dimensions:"Self-reform and the <strong>development</strong> of politicalparticipation as two basic spring-boardsfor building Arab capabilities and makingavailable all the conditions conducive to comprehensiveArab revitalisation; the strengtheningof Arab co-operation and joint Arabcapabilities; attaining the requirements forpositive involvement in the arena of worldcompetition; and the achievement of sustainable<strong>development</strong>." (Documents of the ArabSummit, March <strong>2003</strong>, Al-Ahram, Cairo, inArabic).This initiative was to be presented to theArab Summit during its March <strong>2003</strong> ordinarysession in Bahrain. However, an urgent summit(held in Sharm El-Sheikh) took place beforethe Bahrain meeting and its communiquélacked any reference to this initiative.Evidently the extraordinary circumstancesunder which the Sharm El-Sheikh summit washeld, namely the looming invasion of Iraq, resultedin an agreement to postpone this initiative,at least for the time. As a result, theinitiative was deferred to the next ordinarySummit, to be held in Tunisia.Figure 6Voice and accountability:the Arab region and other world regions1997/98-2000/2001 (average values)Figure 7Perceptions of corruption, Transparency International: position of Arab countriesin the sample, 1998 and 2000EXPANDING THE SCOPE OFFREEDOM AND ESTABLISHINGGOOD GOVERNANCEWhile underlining the generally low rating ofArab countries on freedoms and the virtualabsence of good governance, the first AHDR(2002) celebrated positive improvements inthese key areas in two Arab countries:Morocco and Bahrain.Encouraging <strong>development</strong>s in Bahrainseem to have continued. The State SecurityAct, a statute and symbol of coercion in thecountry, was repealed. It was also announcedthat the country will guarantee the freedom toform non-governmental scientific, culturalPART ONE: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 29


In most Arab countriesthe march of freedomcontinued toencounter obstacles.and professional societies as well labourunions, and that strikes are a legitimatemeans of defending the rights of workers.Moreover, the establishment of "politicalsocieties" was permitted. The scope of freedomof speech was widened with the assistanceof the judiciary. The Prince of Bahraindeclared that the country had been transformedinto a constitutional monarchy. Thefirst legislative elections in more than 20years were held, despite boycotts by somepolitical movements. The government resignedafter the announcement of the electionresults, and the legislative council,comprising elected and appointed members,held its first session on 24 December2002. Less encouraging was the issuance of adecree (47 of 2002) allowing the confiscationor banning of any publication consideredto hold the official religion incontempt, or criticising the king or the policiesof the government. (Human RightsWatch, 2001).In Morocco legislative elections, judgedto have been honest, were held. They werenotable for a quota reserved for women onnational lists, which contributed to a largenumber of women winning seats. The governmentchanged afterwards.Positive <strong>development</strong>s in the field offreedom and good governance included theissuance by the Sudanese President of a decreepermitting opposition parties to engagein political activity, provided that they keepto peaceful approaches.In a <strong>development</strong> that protects the rightsof the Berber minorities in Algeria, the"Amazig" language was classified as a nationallanguage and will be taught in the educationalcurriculum.Djibouti permitted the establishment ofopposition parties and political pluralism. Anumber of opposition newspapers were allowedin Syria and Tunis while Egypt andSyria moved to authorise private (non-governmental)broadcasting stations to operate.Parliamentary elections were also held inYemen in April <strong>2003</strong> – the third such electionssince unification in 1990. About 1400candidates competed in 301 electoral constituenciesunder relatively peaceful conditionsand with a 70% voter turn-out. At theend of the month, results were declared in280 constituencies. One woman won.A number of detainees in Syria, Tunisia,Libya, Yemen, and Morocco were releasedand several Government officials in Libyaand Egypt were tried and convicted uponcharges of corruption and profiteering.Qatar held a referendum in April <strong>2003</strong>on a permanent constitution that allows fora consultative council composed of 45 members,two-thirds of whom are elected, withthe right to question ministers and expelthem with a two-thirds majority. This preliminaryconstitution did not allow the establishmentof political parties. The Princepreserved the authority to appoint the primeminister and cabinet.Yet in most Arab countries the march offreedom continued to encounter obstacles.In one Arab country the deaths of detaineesas a result of suspected torture persisted;11 cases in total were recordedduring 2001, all of whom had been detainedfor public law offences (The ArabOrganisation for Human Rights, in Arabic,2002). The extraction of confessions undertorture and the trial of opposition membersaffiliated with Islamic movements before exceptionalcourts were also documented occurrences(ibid). The harassment of Islamicactivists accelerated with the aim of restrictingtheir participation in legislative elections.In addition, demonstrations weresuppressed (including those protesting economicdecisions made by the government).In another Arab country, laws and procedurescurtailing freedom, notably pressfreedom and Internet access, were enacted.A law stipulating the addition of furtherfirm restrictions on freedom of assemblywas issued; and the arrest of activists againstnormalisation of relations with Israel continued.Legislative elections were postponed.However, towards the end of 2002 promiseswere made to conduct elections in thespring of <strong>2003</strong>, to allocate a quota forwomen in the legislative council and to"raise the ceiling" of freedom for the mediaand unions.In a third Arab country, the prince madea statement prohibiting the existence of politicalparties.30 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


In yet another country, the President ofthe Republic reduced the mandate of membersof parliament, and the level of participationin elections (May 2002) decreased to lessthan 20%. In two provinces with minority constituents,it fell to just 2%. Freedom of speechand expression remained under severe restriction,while a presidential statement characterisedthose criticising their country’s policiesas "traitors" punishable under the law. Thepersecution of <strong>human</strong> rights activists persistedand <strong>report</strong>edly more than 1,000 political prisonerswent on a hunger strike to demand theirrelease (Arab Organisation for Human Rights,in Arabic, 2002). The Constitution wasamended to allow the current President to remainin office for a fourth term: (the formerConstitution stipulated only three terms).The Al-Jazeera satellite channel was subjectedto a number of injunctions restrainingits activities in several Arab countries on a varietyof claims.Emergency laws were extended in a numberof Arab countries, in one instance for threeconsecutive years. Moreover, the trial of civiliansbefore military tribunals and exceptionalState Security Courts persisted in six Arabcountries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia,Lebanon, and <strong>Palestine</strong>).Some Arab countries opted to impose constraintson popular expressions of support forthe Palestinian resistance by harassing its activists,and even confronted popular demonstrationswith violence. Security forces’suppression of demonstrations against the occupationof <strong>Palestine</strong> in an Arab countrycaused the killing of one university studentand the serious wounding of ten others.The issue of freedom in Arab countries hasbecome a casualty of the overspill from theAnglo-American invasion of Iraq. The conflictbetween popular sentiments and officialpositions has led to security forces respondingwith force, tear-gas bombs and rubber bulletsto quell popular demonstrations against thewar on Iraq in more than one Arab country.Five men were killed in two Arab countries;two members of a people’s assembly were arrestedin a third country despite their parliamentaryimmunity.CIVIL SOCIETYCivil society organisations in many Arab countriessuffered more legal and practical constraints.In one Arab country, a law on NGOs waspassed which was widely regarded as restrictingtheir activities. It came after the SupremeConstitutional Court had ruled the previouslaw unconstitutional, for formal reasons.In another country, an association for citizenrights was closed by an order from theMinister of the Interior, after it allegedly committedfinancial and administrative violations.A number of activists in professional unionswere arrested, apparently for being involved inresisting normalisation with Israel.In a third country, the President of theAssociation for Human Rights and some<strong>human</strong> rights activists were tried under thecharges of introducing and distributing publicationswithout permission, as well as spreadingfalse news abroad.THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMENThe cause of women’s empowerment, and thatof freedom in general, was dealt a strong blowwhen the elected legislative council in an Arabcountry rejected a government proposal aimedat allowing women to exercise their politicalrights. Moreover, the constitutional court inthis country refused two challenges filed bytwo women activists demanding politicalrights for women.In Bahrain, women won the right to voteand to stand for election to municipal and legislativeassemblies. This important constitutionalvictory, however, was dampened by thefailure of women candidates in both elections– seemingly for reasons of a societal nature.On a more positive note, in a historicalprecedent resulting from the allocation ofquotas for women on national lists, Morocco’srecently elected Parliament convened withthirty-three women members, the largest numberever.Other affirmative action for women includedDjibouti’s decision to allocate quotasfor women in legislative councils (a minimum10% share for both men and women in partyelectoral lists was established) and similarThe issue of freedomin Arab countries hasbecome a casualty ofthe overspill from theAnglo-Americaninvasion of Iraq.PART ONE: CHANGES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES DURING 2001-2002 31


The core challenges to<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in Arab countries, asepitomised in the"three deficits", arestill criticallypertinent.steps in Jordan allocating a minimum of sixseats for women.More broadly, the ruler of the UnitedArab Emirates affirmed the right of womento engage in political activity. In Qatar, awoman won, for the first time, a seat in alocal council and, at the beginning of <strong>2003</strong>, awoman was appointed minister of education.The Kuwaiti government adopted adraft law allowing women to join the securityforces. In the Sultanate of Oman,women were allowed to drive taxis and tocarry passengers of both sexes. In Yemen awoman was appointed as a State Ministerfor Human Rights and one woman enteredParliament in a <strong>2003</strong> election. And in a sudden<strong>development</strong> early in <strong>2003</strong>, Egyptjoined other Arab countries in allowingwomen to serve on the Judiciary by appointinga female attorney-at-law as the firstwoman judge on the SupremeConstitutional Court and appointing twowomen as commissioners before that court.The political emancipation of Arabwomen called for in the first AHDR evidentlystill has a long way to go; yet the newprogress made in this period is evidence of agreater receptivity to women’s empowermentat the executive levels of governmentsand state institutions.Evidently, the core challenges to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in Arab countries, as epitomised inthe "three deficits" identified by the first AHDR, are still critically pertinent. Arguably, thosechallenges are even graver than before, especially with respect to freedom. World and regional<strong>development</strong>s unfavourable to Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> have exacerbated these negativetrends.The second part of this <strong>report</strong> aims to make a continuing contribution to Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>through a detailed study of one of the three cardinal deficits – knowledge. Thisstudy culminates in a strategic vision for building the knowledge society in Arab countries.32 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


PART IISection one: the concept of an Arabknowledge societyThe Report starts, in Chapter 1, with a conceptual discussion of knowledge as itrelates to Arab countries. It defines what is meant by knowledge and sets out ananalytical framework for examining the current status and cultural, social,economic and political context of knowledge acquisition, the main subjects ofthis Report. The chapter contrasts the requirements of a knowledge society withthe characteristics of Arab societies, historically and at the present time. Thediscussion identifies the key challenges that later chapters take up in detail.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 33


CHAPTER 1Conceptual framework: knowledge, <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> and the knowledge society inArab countriesThis series of Arab Human DevelopmentReports (AHDR) was designed so that the firstissue, published in June 2002, offered a comprehensivetreatment of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in Arab countries according to the definitionadopted by the series and recapitulated in PartI of this issue. Subsequent issues were to examine,in depth, specific challenges that are of essentialimportance to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> inthose countries. This practice starts with thissecond issue of the series, dedicated to thetopic of "knowledge".This chapter lays out the conceptual basisfor exploring issues of knowledge and defineswhat is meant by the "knowledge society".Subsequently, it discusses briefly some questionsraised as a result of contrasting the characteristicsof the "knowledge society" withthose of present-day Arab societies. Thesequestions, and the challenges they pose, will befurther tackled in subsequent chapters of thisReport. It ends by highlighting a major challengeto knowledge in Arab countries, namelythe need to create strong, effective and increasingsocietal demand for knowledge supportedby adequate purchasing power.WHY FOCUS ON KNOWLEDGE?Knowledge is recognised as a cornerstone of<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, a means of expandingpeople’s capabilities and choices and a tool forovercoming <strong>human</strong> poverty. In the 21st century,knowledge is also increasingly a dynamicfactor of production and a powerful driver ofproductivity and <strong>human</strong> capital. The firstAHDR identified a serious shortfall in knowledgeacquisition, absorption and use as one ofthree cardinal deficits undermining <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in Arab countries. This secondReport starts where the first left off and takesan in-depth look at the causes and consequencesof the relative backwardness of theArab region in this vital arena.The first AHDR highlighted how weakknowledge bases and stagnant knowledge <strong>development</strong>condemn many Arab countries tofragile productive power and reduced <strong>development</strong>opportunities. It is now a commonplacethat the knowledge gap, rather than the incomegap, determines the prospects of countries intoday’s world economy. In addition, a consensusis emerging that the gap between developingand developed countries in the capacity toproduce knowledge is wider than the knowledgegap itself. This calls for serious efforts toregenerate knowledge production in the developingworld.The Report assumes that countries with deficientknowledge capabilities have much togain by moving towards the "knowledge society"since the <strong>development</strong>al returns on knowledgeacquisition increase in societies suffering aknowledge deficit. Such societies can take advantageof the abundant stock of knowledge,experience and best practice available worldwide.They can learn from the mistakes andprofit from the achievements of early knowledgeleaders. In a comparative perspective, forArab countries, the need to invest in knowledgeis great and the dividends that can be realizedare proportionately large.BOX 1.1Edward W. Said - What knowledge?It isn’t knowledge as a product or commoditythat we need; nor is it a matter ofremedying the situation by having biggerlibraries, a greater number of terminals,computers and so forth, but aqualitatively different knowledge basedon understanding rather than on authority,uncritical repetition, mechanicalreproduction. It is not facts, but howFor Arab countries, theneed to invest inknowledge is greatand the dividends thatcan be realized areproportionately large.facts are connected to other facts, howthey are constructed, whether they relateto hypothesis or theory, how one isto judge the relationship between truthand interest, how to understand realityas history. These are only some of thecritical issues we face, which can besummed up in the phrase/question, howto think?CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 35


Knowledge is one ofthe few <strong>human</strong>resources that doesnot perish, but ratherproliferates throughconsumption.In all societies there is a number, large orsmall, of people who possess some knowledge.The challenge of building knowledgecapital within a <strong>human</strong> system,however, resides in converting individualknowledge to collective knowledge.A large amount of knowledge exists inthe minds of individuals in the form of answersto the questions: how and why?This constitutes a knowledge model on theindividual level. A higher order type ofknowledge is acquired through conceptuallearning, which can change knowledgeframeworks and thus the world-view of individuals.Conceptual learning can be distinguishedfrom lower order procedurallearning, which simply leads to changes inactions. A change in the knowledge modeloccurs when new actions, embedded innew knowledge frameworks, are established.Generally speaking, it can be saidthat individual knowledge models arisefrom a world-view (Weltenschaung) of thesystem embedded in the general knowledgemodel internalised by system members.This discussion raises questions as tothe content of the dominant knowledgemodel in the Arab world and whether it reinforcesor hinders <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.THE ACQUISITION OFKNOWLEDGE AND HUMANDEVELOPMENTKNOWLEDGEKnowledge consists of data, information 1 , instructions,and ideas, or the sum total of symbolicstructures possessed by individual <strong>human</strong>beings or by society at large. These symbolicstructures guide individual and institutional<strong>human</strong> behaviour in all walks of life and in allspheres of public and private activity.Knowledge includes, for instance, the symbolicstructures which are acquired throughformal education and experiences learnedfrom work and life. It also encompasses facts,BOX 1.2Collective learning: a means for developing knowledge capital orreinforcing the status quo?Most <strong>human</strong> systems possess commonknowledge models that aim to protect thestatus quo and to entrench it in the form ofconservative societal institutions, knowledgetransmission mechanisms, and rewardsystems. Such models determembers of these societies from challengingthe status quo and deprive them of opportunitiesfor learning. From a<strong>development</strong>al point of view, such learningis not useful and could be harmful. Anexample of this type of learning in Arabcountries is the widespread culture ofmyths and the supernatural.Controversy often springs up aroundwhat could be deemed useful versus harmfullearning. The controversy, in fact, reflectsthe differing social interests behindthese viewpoints. The only way out of thisimpasse is to adopt a decisive criterion.In this case, it is suggested that the criterionbe the extent of contribution tobuilding <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, accordingto the definition adopted by this Report inPart I. This is the measure by which the elementsof the Arab knowledge model mustbe judged, so that those features enhancing<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> may be identifiedand fostered.stories, pictures and any mental construct informing<strong>human</strong> behaviour, whether documented,oral or implicit. The institutionalknowledge of a society includes history, culture,strategic orientations and organisationalforms.Consequently, knowledge can be explicit(recorded in one form or another) or implicit(in the form of spontaneous behavioural prescriptions,for example). Moreover, the productionof knowledge is not limited to thestandard forms of science and scientific research,it also spans knowledge embodied inthe various forms of artistic and literary expressionand in both popular and formal cultures2 .Knowledge transcends the mere acquisitionof information. Indeed, information overloadin the age of the Internet, mediasaturation and fast communication can sometimessmother true knowledge. The explosionof readily available data, opinions, articles,documents and other types of content triggeredby the digital revolution can be overwhelmingand requires a process of selection,extraction and judgment in order to retrieveuseful and usable knowledge. Moreover, whileknowledge ranks higher than information onthe scale of <strong>human</strong> values, it is one step lowerthan wisdom, which entails a commitment tohigh <strong>human</strong> ideals such as freedom, justice and<strong>human</strong> dignity.In all <strong>human</strong> systems, only a small amountof total organised knowledge is recorded. In<strong>human</strong> systems where the acquisition ofknowledge is weak, the extent of unrecordedand implicit knowledge residing in individualand collective knowledge models, in the cultureand in spontaneous prescriptions for<strong>human</strong> conduct, is still often substantial.One of the quintessential, and seeminglycontradictory, characteristics of knowledge isthat it grows with use. Knowledge is one of thefew <strong>human</strong> resources that does not perish, butrather proliferates through consumption.It is useful to draw a distinction, on the1The conversion of data to information requires processing such as evaluation and analysis.2It is accepted that many technologies embedded in popular knowledge provide brilliant solutions to local problems. Consider, for example, the useof palm-tree stems in reinforcing buildings and roofs in Arab desert environments, which surpasses "modern" technologies in combating the harshnessof the tough desert climate. This is also evident in the case of popular medicine in developing countries, especially in Latin America, where indigenouscures can have real commercial value. Several multinationals have rushed to possess this popular ‘know-how’, and convert it intomonopolised knowledge through patents.3The term "capital" is not limited to financial assets. The term in English means "man-made means of production" (Oxford Dictionary of EconomicTerms, 1997).36 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


level of society, between knowledge wealth andknowledge capital 3 . Knowledge wealth is thesum total of knowledge assets, or symbolicstructures in society; knowledge capital is thatpart of knowledge wealth used in producingnew knowledge, which in turn leads to the furthergrowth of knowledge wealth.The knowledge wealth of a given societyextends, at least in principle, to the general,and ever-renewable, stock of <strong>human</strong> knowledge.However, two types of impedimentshamper the free use of this stock. First, aspectsof the institutional structure and the societalcontext of the knowledge system in the societyitself can present internal obstacles. Second,features of the international context of knowledgeacquisition can interpose barriers, as willbe outlined in a later section.Effective knowledge is knowledge that iswidely disseminated, absorbed and used. Themost fundamental driver of that process, on theindividual or the societal levels, is learning.Individual and collective learning are two ofthe most important capabilities for buildingknowledge capital.KNOWLEDGE AND HUMANDEVELOPMENTlearning, research and technological <strong>development</strong>,and literary and artistic forms in bothpopular and formal cultures -- together withthe effective use of such knowledge in societalactivities - will not only increasingly expand thefrontiers of <strong>human</strong> potential. It will also be themeans to enlarge the scope of <strong>human</strong> freedomsand to guarantee those freedoms through goodgovernance and the promotion of equity and<strong>human</strong> fulfilment. Knowledge will thus servethe loftier goals of freedom, justice and <strong>human</strong>dignity.As noted previously, knowledge has becomean essential factor of production, and abasic determinant of productivity. There is astrong connection between knowledge acquisitionand the productive capacity of a society.This connection figures prominently in highvalue-added production activities, which areincreasingly based on knowledge intensity, andwhich lead to the rapid obsolescence of knowledge,technology and skills. Such activities arethe mainstay of competitiveness worldwide,they will create the wealth of the future andthey therefore constitute a major gateway to <strong>development</strong>for developing countries.Yet in most developing countries, theknowledge system faces a dual crisis. On theone hand, the system itself suffers from theKnowledge ismulti-dimensional:an inherent <strong>human</strong>faculty, a <strong>human</strong>product and thatwhich enhances whatit means to be<strong>human</strong>.In the broad concept of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,acquiring knowledge is a fundamental <strong>human</strong>entitlement. People, simply by virtue of being<strong>human</strong>, have a right to knowledge as a publicgood. At the same time, knowledge acquisitionis also a means of achieving <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,since it enables people to enlarge theircapabilities and widen their horizon of choice.Moreover, in the present phase of <strong>human</strong>progress, the acquisition, absorption and productionof knowledge drive social and economictransformation. Knowledge can liberateindividuals and societies from <strong>human</strong> povertyin a given cultural context and elevate them tohigher planes of <strong>human</strong> existence. Thus, in<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> terms, knowledge ismulti-dimensional: an inherent <strong>human</strong> facultyand a basic <strong>human</strong> right, a <strong>human</strong> product andthat which enhances what it means to be<strong>human</strong> in the first place.In the developing world, knowledge acquiredand expressed through education andBOX 1.3Economic characteristics of knowledgeKnowledge has special features that determineits economic character.Knowledge is non-spatial. It can traversedistances and borders at highspeed, especially when digitised.Knowledge is also durable. It does notperish by being transferred from itsowner to whoever demands it. Thismeans that it can exist endlessly withoutany need for further production.Some types of demand stimulate thereproduction of knowledge itself, at anadditional cost to meet particular needsor preferences. Such preferences includereducing the cost of knowledge, or thetime taken for its production, or itscloser adaptation to the particular circumstancesand resources of a society orits environmental requirements.Developing countries have a particularstake in expressing this latter preference,or taking adaptation into their ownhands.Source: Mohammed Mahmud Al-Imam, background paper for AHDR2.In practice, much knowledge istransferred to developing countries informs originally developed for rich countries.This can reduce the value of knowledgetransfers, and waste scarceresources. Such arrangements often burdenpoorer countries with additional andsometimes unjustified requirements, asin the case of conditions governing franchises.They can also impose requirementsfor expertise or capital assets notavailable locally. This reduces the benefitsto developing countries of technologytransfers owing to high transactioncosts and the absence of domestic systemsthat would allow such countries toderive the maximum benefits from importedtechnology.Hence the value of knowledge doesnot necessarily lie in its abstract contentbut rather in how much it can contributeto finding solutions to problems affectinga society at a particular time.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 37


In most developingcountries, theknowledge systemfaces a dual crisis.A society that doesnot clearly incentiviseknowledgeacquisition and usetraps itself on thelowest rungs oflearning.backwardness of the society of which it is aninsep<strong>arab</strong>le part, and its efficiency and impactare limited by restrictions emanating from itssocietal context. In some less developed societies,rooted constructs, concepts and preceptsmay actively hinder <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong>. Those symbolic structures needto be challenged by other knowledge structuresthat stimulate or enhance <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.Moreover, the elements of theknowledge system in developing countries aretypically dispersed in various individual andnon-formal forms. Dispersion makes it difficultto assess and manage knowledge wealth,let alone amalgamate scattered assets into aneffective knowledge system built on firmknowledge capital.On the other hand, the principal hope forovercoming under<strong>development</strong> and achievingcompetitiveness in developing countries isprecisely a mobilised, well-organised and wellfunctioning knowledge system. No other <strong>development</strong>investment promises greater exponentialreturns in an era of knowledgeintensity and knowledge-driven competition.Cutting this Gordian knot is one of the mostformidable challenges facing developing countriestoday.SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OFKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITIONThe global stock of knowledge is renewableand grows ceaselessly. Yet its <strong>human</strong>, culturaland economic potential will not blossom inany country where the social climate does notactively encourage knowledge acquisition, dissemination,production and use. A system ofknowledge can be sustained or stunted by thesocial soil in which it grows and by the surroundingregional and global environment.These conditions influence whether education,learning, R&D and literary and artisticexpression flourish or fail and thereforewhether productivity and <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>prosper or not.Regional issues take on special significancefor Arab countries, whose small markets logicallypoint towards greater regional integration.The dominance of the global economyposes different challenges. Experience suggeststhat attempts by each Arab country tobelong to the world on its own usually result inthat country assuming a marginal and dependentposition.A society that does not clearly incentiviseknowledge acquisition and use through education,technical research and <strong>development</strong> andall kinds of literary and artistic expressiontraps itself on the lowest rungs of learning. Asociety that does not value knowledge highlydoes not provide for the knowledge acquisitionsystem the necessary resources and socialenvironment for its effective activity. The outcomeis lower productivity and lagging <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong>.The four most significant aspects of the societalcontext affecting Arab knowledge systemsare: links with societal activities,especially production; the role of the state; theregional context; and the international environment.The first and second aspects are discussednext; the regional and internationalcontexts are taken up in chapter 8.Strong links between the knowledgeacquisition system and societal activityIn a well functioning knowledge system, theenterprise sector (both public and private) andgovernment and civil society organisations aredynamically connected. Such linkages energisethe system and maximise its role in advancingproductivity. For example, the modern conceptionof technological <strong>development</strong> demandsa symbiotic link between societalactivity sites and research institutions. Thiscontrasts with the older, one-way view thattechnology is an application to society of scientificdiscoveries in research institutions. As asecond example, the best education, especiallyin technical fields, cannot play a vigorous societalrole without a strong connection to labourmarkets, firms, factories and enterprises.A vigorous role for the state and all itsinstitutionsThis second aspect is particularly important indeveloping countries, where the "knowledgemarket" is traditionally notorious for failure.Knowledge, in the language of economics, is apublic good whose producer does not necessarilycapture all the returns on the initial investment.It is also non-rivalrous: its use byone party does not prevent others from using38 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


it. As such, the returns to knowledge productionaccrue to society as a whole rather thanexclusively to its producer.Where knowledge is concerned, the relativeweakness of the profit motive discouragesprofit-oriented enterprises from investing inknowledge production, especially in developingcountries. Leaving knowledge acquisitionentirely to the for-profit sector in less developedcountries thereby risks reducing the supplyof knowledge and depriving weaker socialgroups of its benefits. At the global level, thismarket failure can actively retard knowledgeacquisition by developing countries and, ashappens at the national level, leave the weakersocial categories in those countries facing thegreatest knowledge deprivation. The WorldBank Report on Knowledge for Development(1998) emphasises these matters in more thanone respect and concludes by stressing the decisiverole of the state in developing countriesin fostering efficient knowledge acquisition.It is true that the for-profit sector plays amajor role in the knowledge acquisition systemin developed economies. However, therole played by the state remains pivotal, particularlyin fostering basic research and education,areas that do not yield quick, tangibleprofits in developing countries yet which areindispensable to any vital knowledge acquisitionsystem in the long run. In most developedcountries, the role of the state was strongestduring periods of nation building, a phase stillin progress in most developing, particularlyArab, countries.The role of the state is especially decisivein developing countries undergoing economicadjustments that excessively curtail the state’ssocietal functions and services. At the sametime, newer approaches to economic growthand <strong>development</strong> recognise that state activismdoes not stop at merely overcoming "marketfailure" but extends to taking initiatives in thepublic interest and becoming actively involvedin knowledge acquisition and public innovation.Ultimately, how dynamically a society participatesin knowledge acquisition and how effectivelysuch knowledge serves <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> depends on societal structures:cultural, social, economic, and political. Thepresence and efficiency of key societal institutionsare also key factors, as will be discussedlater.THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETYIt is now understood that the cognitive assetsof society -- knowledge and expertise -- andnot its material assets -- raw materials or financialand physical capital -- increasingly determineits productivity and competitiveness.The term "knowledge society" refers tothis current phase in the evolution of <strong>human</strong>progress, as it is unfolding in advanced societies.Specifically, the knowledge society is organisedaround the dissemination and productionof knowledge and its efficient utilisationin all societal activities: the economy, civil society,politics, and private life, in a continuousquest to advance <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.In such a society, knowledge plays a paramountrole in shaping social structures; in influencingthe performance of the economy,society and polity; and in changing the occupationsand life-styles of its citizens as theknowledge content of their daily lives intensifiessteadily. In a knowledge society, the numberof workers in the knowledge system, aswell as their share of the total work force, rises.In addition, the ratio of work time devoted toknowledge-intensive activities increases for allworkers.In economic terms, building the knowledgesociety in Arab countries means shiftingtowards a knowledge mode of production inplace of the rentier mode of production 4 thatcurrently dominates most parts of the region.In a knowledge society, societal institutionsbelonging to the knowledge system, eitheras producers or disseminators, are many,varied and interconnected. The knowledge societyguarantees a social context conducive tothe vitality of the knowledge system.Eventually, a "knowledge culture" evolves,embodying values motivating the acquisitionand use of knowledge. This culture is supportedby effective societal incentives for disseminatingand producing knowledge. InState activism doesnot stop at merelyovercoming "marketfailure" but extendsto taking initiatives inthe public interest .The cognitive assetsof a society, and notits material assets,increasinglydetermine itsproductivity andcompetitiveness.4This applies to countries where economic value is basically derived from depleting raw materials, either directly in oil-producing countries, or indirectlyin others through dependence on aid and expatriate workers’ remittances from the former.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 39


The knowledge societymeans institutingknowledge as theorganising principle of<strong>human</strong> life.short, a virtuous circle develops between theeffectiveness of the knowledge system and theextent of support it receives from the societalcontext.In other words, the challenge of knowledgeacquisition consists of transforming societyfrom a system that comprises someknowledgeable individuals to a societal systemfully anchored in the production and disseminationof knowledge and its efficient utilisationin advancing <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>As noted earlier, societies possess a hugeamount of knowledge scattered in individualreservoirs in institutions, in people’s mindsand in a variety of media. Less formalisedknowledge assets are implicit in the spontaneousactivity of individuals and the popularculture of the society. Nevertheless, a rationalsocietal leadership can mobilise uncoordinatedinstitutions and dispersed knowledgethrough a deliberate societal programme. Thepotential dividends are handsome and willserve the strategic purpose of building <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong>.To put this challenge in one sentence, theknowledge society means instituting knowledgeas the organising principle of <strong>human</strong> life.Figure 1.1Bridging the knowledge gap through exponential growth in knowledge acquisitionTo put it in a regional context, it can be said,without prevarication, that Arab countries arefar removed from such a society.Indeed, the divide between developingcountries, including Arab countries, andknowledge societies is large and wideningrapidly. Chapter 4, on the measurement ofknowledge, reveals this gap clearly as reflectedin the different performances of Arab countriesand the East Asian "Tigers" in accumulating<strong>human</strong> capital.Some analysts (e.g., Az-Zayyat, in Arabic,<strong>2003</strong>) go so far as to maintain that if developingcountries are to catch up with agile knowledgesocieties, they will have to pursue a pathof exponential growth, (Figure 1-1). Adoptingsuch a path is a tall order: it requires acceleratingthe dissemination, production and utilisationof knowledge in developing countries atrates faster than those which historically prevailedin today’s knowledge societies. Thissteep gradient should be taken to indicate theseriousness of the challenges developing countriesface if they seek to build the knowledgesociety starting from initial conditions today.KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITIONSYSTEMSThe conversion of knowledge wealth toknowledge capital and the efficient use ofknowledge capital in producing new forms ofknowledge requires two connected societalprocesses. The first is the dissemination ofavailable knowledge, whereas the second is theproduction of new forms of knowledge in allfields: natural sciences, social sciences, the <strong>human</strong>ities,arts, literature, and all other societalactivities. The efficiency of both activities restson vigorous and efficient societal institutionsand social processes.These are complex systems reflecting thespecificity of society, history, culture, and institutions.The success of these systems dependson the fluent exchange of knowledgeamong all units that produce and utiliseknowledge such that the productivity of eachunit, and of the societal system as a whole, isoptimised.The societal processes and institutionsused in building and utilising knowledge capitalin the dissemination and production of40 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


knowledge vary and interact, especially inprofit-seeking enterprises, which are expectedto contribute effectively to knowledge acquisition,and in particular to technological <strong>development</strong>in a free market economy.As a result of this multiplicity, the efficiencyof knowledge dissemination and productiondepends on the organisational contextthat surrounds such processes and institutionsand supports the relationships among them.The coherence of this organisational context isan important factor in building the knowledgesociety.In less advanced societies, the organisationalcontext surrounding the disseminationand production of knowledge is inefficient.Yet such organisation is the key to knowledgemanagement, transfer, indigenisation and production.Both the state and the enterprise sectorhave a high stake in the efficiency of theseorganisational relationships.Even so, the organisational context is onlyone component among the complex societaldeterminants of a successful knowledge system.It is the closest component to the functioningof the system itself. But it depends, inturn, on other important structures, whichmight seem farther away from the system butwhich have a stronger impact, positive or negative,on the formation of knowledge capitaland knowledge wealth. The crucial structuresgoverning the societal context of the knowledgesystem, particularly from the perspectiveof the Arab world, include the prevalent culture,socio-economic structure, and politicaland legal context. All of these exist in an influentialregional and global environment.Culture embraces several components,such as intellectual heritage, religion, and language.The socio-economic structure pertainsto modes of production, growth and wealthdistribution and to the societal incentive systemassociated with that structure. The politicaland legal context governs the processesand institutions of knowledge disseminationand production; especially important in thisrespect is the status of the key freedoms ofspeech, opinion and assembly.All of these components are surroundedby, and subject to the regional and global environmentof knowledge acquisition. This twotierenvironment is especially relevant whereArab countries are concerned in light of escalatingregional challenges and acceleratingglobalisation.Figure (1-2) illustrates the elements of theknowledge system and the societal contextthat affects it as discussed in this Report. Thenumbered elements correspond to theReport’s chapters.The diagram shows three rings that surroundthe heart of the knowledge system, Organisation is theknowledge capital, which is discussed inkey to knowledgeChapter Four. All elements of the system aresubject to two environments – the regional management,and the international – that influence them.transfer,Knowledge capital is circled by the two ringsof knowledge acquisition - dissemination indigenisation and(Chapter Two) and production (Chapterproduction.Three). This knowledge acquisition subsystemis in turn surrounded by the organisationalcontext for knowledge (Chapter Five). All theforegoing elements are surrounded by the culturalcontext (Chapter Six) and the socio-economicstructure for knowledge (ChapterSeven). The last ring, the political context,and the regional and international environment,are discussed in Chapter Eight.The establishment of a knowledge societyin the Arab world, in the conceptual setting il-Figure 1.2:The knowledge system: a schematic representationCONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 41


Building theknowledge society inArab countriesreclaims one of thebrightest treasures ofArab history.BOX 1.4"The rich legacy of Islamic civilizations,historians argue, is due in part to its exceptionalabsorptive quality and relativetolerance for different cultures and ethnictraditions of civilizations from southernEurope to Central Asia.""Not merely translators, theAbbasids collected, synthesized and advancedknowledge, building their owncivilization from intellectual gifts frommany cultures, including the Chinese,Indian, Iranian, Egyptian, NorthAfrican, Greek, Spanish, Sicilian andByzantine. This Islamic period was indeeda cauldron of cultures, religions,learning and knowledge—one that createdgreat civilizations and influencedothers from Africa to China. ThisVartan Gregorian, Islam: A Mosaic Not a MonolithPresident’s Essay, 2001 Annual Report, Carnegie Corporation.lustrated here, poses considerable challenges,which are taken up in the Report.ARABS AND KNOWLEDGEA LONG, MIXED HISTORYLEADING TO CHALLENGES TODAYThe Arab world has a long and mixed historyof knowledge acquisition. The first AHDR(2002) concluded that Arab countries havefallen far behind in acquiring knowledge, thisnow being one of the three main deficits impedingtheir <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> at the beginningof the 21 st century. Nevertheless, historytells us that Arabs, in previous epochs, contributedsubstantially to the production ofknowledge and by extension to enriching theglobal stock of <strong>human</strong> knowledge. From thisperspective, building the knowledge society inArab countries reclaims one of the brightesttreasures of Arab history.This historical paradox raises an essentialquestion: how can the Arab world truly internalizeknowledge acquisition? How can the regionmove beyond merely importing scientificand technological products in the form ofgoods and services from companies and institutionsabroad?This question has preoccupied manyscholars, intellectuals, politicians and othersover the last two centuries. It represents thelargest challenge facing the contemporaryA Cauldron of CulturesGolden Age has been hailed for its openembrace of a universal science, no matterthe source—believing that there was nota "Christian science," "Jewish science,""Muslim science," "Zoroastrian science"or "Hindu science." There was just onescience for the Abbasids, who were apparentlyinfluenced by numerousQur’anic references to learning aboutthe wonders of the universe as a way tohonor God. Thus, reason and faith, bothbeing God-given, were combined, mutuallyinclusive and supportive. Islam wasanything but isolationist, and Abbasidsconnected to all cultural traditions, believingas they did that learning was universal,and not confined to their owndomain."Arab world, which has not succeeded yet in indigenisingknowledge as a social institutionand an authentic cultural dimension.The question is actually a cognitive challengethat concerns most developing countries.But in order to avoid over-generalisationit is useful to clarify some distinctive featuresof the Arab world, both inherited and acquired.Some of these features could help,while others could impede the successful indigenisationof modern knowledge.THE ARAB KNOWLEDGECIVILISATION: SOMESIGNIFICANT FEATURESIslamic culture cannot be properly understoodwithout investigating its scholarly character.History shows that, with the beginning ofthe Abbasid state, a scholarly renaissance commenced,one hardly less important than thatwhich transformed Europe during the 17 thcentury. To understand this scholarly renaissance,some factors must be kept in mind.The first is the role of the political and socialauthorities of the day in encouraginglearning and providing the material requirementsand the <strong>human</strong> capital for knowledge<strong>development</strong>. The reputations of the AbbasidCaliphs, who established libraries and observatories,were built precisely on this role. Thisstate of affairs continued even after the disintegrationof the caliphate and the division ofthe Islamic world into competing states, eachwith its own centres of scholarship. These new<strong>development</strong>s led to the creation of the "scholarlycity" with its various and rival colleges.Looking at Baghdad during the mid-third centuryof the Islamic era reveals a city of thrivingscholarship, with scholarly institutions representingvarious groups.The second factor stemmed from the materialand cultural needs of the new community.The vast new state, teeming with multiplecultures and systems, called out for <strong>development</strong>and unification. These two challengesprompted the resort to scientific scholarship.The extraction of groundwater, the digging ofcanals, the establishment of cities, the extensionof roads, the organisation of ministries(diwans), the levying of taxes, the survey oflands and other activities led to the unification42 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


of calculation systems and the utilisation of algebraand geometry. Sciences were applied tosolving practical problems. Moreover, religiousduties, such as fasting, praying, and Hajj(the holy pilgrimage to Mecca) were accompaniedby astrological research, which had agreat impact on the progress of astronomy.The science of timing and the new social occupationof the "timer" led to the assimilation ofscientific research in traditional culture. The<strong>development</strong> of mathematics and algebra wasspurred by the appearance of new ministriesand another new social occupation -- that ofthe scribe. Other examples of applied studycan be cited in medicine, chemistry and mechanicalengineering. Indeed, science and itsapplications became a part of social practice,through teaching and research. Scholarshipwas never marginal in the Islamic-Arab city, orin the popular culture. It was one of the mainattributes of Arab culture even at the time ofdecline.The third factor contributing to the scientificrenaissance was that it was preceded by arenaissance in the <strong>human</strong>ities and the socialsciences: specifically, in scholastic theology,linguistics, history, jurisprudence, religious exegesisand other disciplines. The rise of thesescholarly fields paved the way for the <strong>development</strong>of mathematical and other sciences. Tocite one example, Kitab al-‘Ain, by al-Khalilbin-Ahmad, was the first lexicographic workin history. This work required scrupulousknowledge of phonetics as well as of the principlesof combinatorial mathematics in orderto draw up tables of words. In fact, severalstudies in the <strong>human</strong>ities raised questions thatrequired drawing on or developing scientificanswers. The rise of the <strong>human</strong>ities provided alarge audience to those concerned with scienceand with language tools and it preparedthe Arabic language to receive new forms ofknowledge.This explosion of learning included allbranches of knowledge at the time; it did notfavour some to the exclusion of others. Thus,it included theoretical branches and the applicationsrelated to the needs of the new community.In this way, learning became anessential component of the popular culture,and was not confined to matters of religion,language and literature. An appetite forknowledge became one of the hallmarks ofArab culture. It was evidenced by several anthologiesexhaustively classifying old and newforms of scholarship, and it permeated popularculture as well.The establishment of this new scholarlyculture began with the transfer of the scholarshipof the ancients, especially the Greeks. Buton examining the scientific translation movement,particularly in astronomy and mathematics,another profound attribute becomesclear. Translation is closely connected to scientificresearch and creativity. The objective ofthe translation movement was not to establisha scientific library to enrich the palaces ofcaliphs and princes, but to fulfil the needs ofscientific research. Without fully understandingthis phenomenon, none of the outcomes ofthis movement, which undertook the most expansivetranslation of practical texts in history,can be appreciated.The translators themselves were leaders ofthe scholarly movement; indeed, some of themwere among its universal authorities, such asal-Hajjaj bin-Mattar, Thabit bin Qurrah, andQusta bin Luqa. Moreover, the choice ofbooks and the timing of this choice wereclosely related to what was being researched.To take just one example, when Thabit binQurrah translated several books fromApollonius – the finest and most difficult writingin Greek geometry – he needed them in hisnew mathematical research, especially that relatedto calculating areas and sizes. The connectionbetween scientific translation andadvanced scientific research is not only an historicalfact, but also explains why researchersactive in astronomy and mathematics undertookso much translation in those fields. Italso illustrates some of the attributes of linguistictranslation.A far-reaching result of this meeting betweentwo currents of study -- one in the <strong>human</strong>itiesand languages, the other in scientificresearch -- was the rise of the scientific Arabiclanguage. This new medium took two simultaneouspaths, translation and creativity, reflectedin the invention of new sciencesunknown to the ancients. Perhaps the mostimportant attributes of the new knowledgeproduced by Arab culture at this time were: 1)A new mathematical rationality; 2)Scholarship was nevermarginal in theIslamic-Arab city, or inthe popular culture.Translation is closelyconnected to scientificresearch andcreativity.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 43


The Arab scientificrenaissance produced,in its own time, aknowledge society inthe full sense.The modern Arabworld is the scene ofmyriad intellectualcurrents each with itsown social, politicaland ideologicaldirection and sources.Experimentation as a pattern of proof.The new rationality may be described intwo words, algebraic and analytic, while theintroduction of experimentation, by al-Hassan bin al-Haitham as a criterion of proofin physics research, profoundly influencedboth the material and <strong>human</strong> sciences. Takentogether, these historical currents illustratethat the Arab scientific renaissance produced,in its own time, a knowledge society in the fullsense of the term.Oddly, lessons learned from this history ofindigenous and acquired knowledge duringthe early Arab scientific and linguistic renaissancewere not enlisted when the modernizationof science became a central question inthe Arab world. Attempts at scientific modernisationby Muhamad Ali and Gamal AbdelNasser during the 19th and 20th centuries respectivelyneither drew nor built upon thislegacy. Instead, leaders turned to imitatingwhat the West offered. Neglecting this heritageand settling for the pragmatic importationof science and technology from 19thcentury Europe – an approach that still dominatesthe minds of officials and reformist intellectualstoday -- was a missed opportunity,historically, and likely created a significant impedimentto establishing a knowledge societyin the modern Arab worldTHE ARAB KNOWLEDGE MODELTODAYThe modern Arab world is the scene of myriadintellectual currents each with its own social,political and ideological direction andsources. As in all other societies, these currentsmay meet intermittently without beingsubsumed into a single primordial frame ofreference. There are Islamic fundamentalistsand Islamic reformists. There are progressive,leftist, nationalist, liberal, technocratic andother intellectual movements. These movementsare all variously reflected in writings onpolitics, history, society, economics, philosophyand science.Such diversity of thought, though ostensiblya strength, also reflects a continuing crisisof identity and often results in conflict. This isthe case despite the fact that Arab writers andintellectuals tackle common core issues --backwardness and advancement, authenticityand modernity, the self and the other, theArabs (Muslims) and the West. Such topicshave persisted in writings and studies on Arabhistory, society and politics for more than acentury. Indeed, to many, it appears that intellectuallife in the Arab world has revolvedaround itself for several centuries withoutgoing beyond the self towards more productiveand valuable fields of knowledge. Whenintrospection succumbs to introversion, thewellsprings of creativity begin to run dry. Asignificant part of Arab intellectual endeavourseems to seek refuge in ideological headlinesthat either take the form of slogans to glorifyand effect a nostalgic revival or that encourageself-pity, blame others for adversity and donot do justice to Arab societies.These characteristics of intellectual outputdo not reflect any innate "inadequacy" in the"Arab mentality". Rather, they mirror a sociopoliticalfeature that is very common in contemporaryArab history, and which has aprofound impact on culture, namely: – thedominance of the polity over intellectualproducts and their public reception.The "self", the "other" and related conceptsare deep structures requiring a closestudy of Arab sociology, history, and economics.Their depths are not easily fathomed amida shifting reality. Yet it is clear that purveyinggeneral ideological statements, reducing complexreality and a rich past to a simple processionof glories and disgraces and veneratingthe heroic acts and struggles against humiliationof a few, do not yield accurate knowledge.One such (and all-too-common) example issimplifying the events of modern Arab historyinto a gallery of crude opposites: the authenticversus the inauthentic, local versus foreign,continuity versus rupture. Arab history in effectis narrated as though it had been solelyone of alienation and corruption at a timewhen the Arab world had, in fact, witnessedvaluable scientific, intellectual and culturalproduction, had experienced democracy, andhad undergone momentous socio-politicalshifts. Failing to see history and heritage as living,ongoing and self-renewing <strong>human</strong>processes, where the march of progress isnever complete, is misleading and thereforeharmful to present and future generations.44 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


BOX 1.5Ahmad Kamal Aboulmagd: Towards a New Language of FaithThe current language of faith separatestwo worlds, both of which have been createdby Allah, namely the World of theTexts (The Qur'an and the Sunnah) andthe World of Life, with all <strong>human</strong> andnon-<strong>human</strong> beings in it.The first key of the new language offaith is that Muslims should know that beliefin the metaphysical world does notnegate the role of the mind; that the applicationof Islamic law is not enough tomake one dispense with addressing<strong>human</strong> problems in all their social andeconomic dimensions; that Islam was notbuilt on the ruins of the heritage ofmankind; and does not strive to destroyand demolish the experience of peoples.Its basic function is to add to them the elementof guidance and rationality and orientthem towards what is good formankind. In this new language of faith,new readings of the ancient teachingsmust emerge.All the texts – at the top of which arethe verses of the Holy Qur'an – are notanother world to be added to this one.They are indeed witnesses to Allah's creationby Allah's own words. A Muslim isrequired to ponder on the Qur'an,, buthe/she is also required to walk on the surfaceof the earth and ponder on the signsof Allah in mankind and in the furthestregions of the earth.The law of Islam is not a systemwhich is separate from people's ambitionsand interests. It is – with all its sources –rather a means to realize those ambitionsIt is worth noting the considerable intellectualcontributions to social reform of the pioneersof the contemporary Arab renaissancethrough three schools in Egypt, Greater Syriaand Arab North Africa. The Religious Reformschool: Jamal ad-Din al Afghani, MohammadAbdou, Abdelrahman Al Kawakibi,Abdelhamid Bin Badiss, Chakib Erslan, AllalAl Fasi; the Liberal school: Refa’a al Tahtawi,Ahmad Lutfi Essayed, Qassem Amin, TahaHussein, Keireddin Al Tunisi, Al Yazigi andAl Bustani; and the Secular school: ShibliShmayyel, Farah Antoun and Salama Moussa.At this point in history, Arab countriesface societal obstacles to knowledge productionarising from ideological conflicts betweendifferent political currents. The conflict overthe Islamicisation of knowledge is an example.This is because few Arab intellectuals are willingto focus on substantive issues relating tohistory and reality at the same time. Yet substantialgains would accrue to knowledge productionfrom pursuing serious research onSharia’a sciences, adopting a reformist scientificview. In fact, none of the characteristicsor historical <strong>development</strong>s of Arab countriesshould be exempt from rational study.Undoubtedly, there are certain structuralimpediments that constrict knowledge productionin Arab countries. The cultural conflictbetween political currents over theIslamicisation of knowledge is one example.This conflict is tied to intellectual reluctanceto discuss history and present-day reality together.Yet no essential characteristic or aspectof Arab society should be excluded froma scientific perspective. The question of researchinto history and heritage and the applicationof scientific and reformist approachesto that work, hold one of the keys to the productionof knowledge and, therefore, to theknowledge society itself. Such questionsshould be the subject of collaborative thinkingand study, not dissension or rancour.In the final analysis, the Arab knowledgemodel, or the "Arab mentality", is a project,not a fixed construct. It is a model in theprocess of formation and, as such, it offers anhistoric opportunity that should not bemissed. Arab countries will do well to indigenisescience and knowledge as foundationsof the Arab knowledge model in the continuingprocess of its formation.THE DEMAND FOR KNOWLEDGEThis chapter has previously considered someof the economic qualities of knowledge; thissection analyses in more detail the issue of thedemand for knowledge, the low level of whichin Arab countries is one of the most serious restrictionson the production and diffusion ofknowledge in society.Undeniably, knowledge supply can be areal constraint in developing countries, especiallythose where autocratic and absoluteregimes restrict freedom of expression and thecirculation of knowledge, ideas and informationthat are critical of authority. Yet there aregood reasons to believe that the lack of demandfor knowledge also curtails prospectsand protect those interests. All of it is justiceand all of it is mercy. "Any questionthat goes out of justice into injustice, fromfairness into inequity and from mercy toits opposite is not part of Islamic law,even if it was made part of it by interpretation".Muslims are not separate frommankind at all. They are carriers of a messageto mankind. As Muslims, they arewitnesses to nations, but they remain onthe same horizontal line with the rest ofnations and peoples. Nobody owes thema favour, nor should they be haughty orconceited in dealing with others.The comprehensive nature of Islamdoes not mean that the texts deal withevery question of life, large or small. Thatis not only impossible, but also unacceptable,considering the freedom whichIslam left to the <strong>human</strong> mind to move, interpretand decide.The fact that Islam is eternal does notmean a "rigidity of its law". It means thatit is able to renew itself and to innovate inresponse to the movement of life and itschanging modes. The originality ofMuslims and their excellence do notmean that they should be isolated fromthe rest of mankind, inward-looking in aclosed circuit surrounded by a wall withoutdoors. It means communication withpeople, living with them and, throughthat, conveying to them the loftier valuesand great principles upon which the doctrineof Islam, its law and ethical structurerest.The "Arab mentality",is a project, not afixed construct. It is amodel in the processof formation.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 45


The price ofknowledge rises withits transaction costs,which can be heavy.for building knowledge societies in thesecountriesIt may seem surprising that problems ofdemand are encountered in disseminating 5 acommodity whose main characteristics arethat it is non-rivalrous 6 and infinitely ‘expansionable’7 , as well as aspatial -- weightless 8 . Acloser examination of the characteristics ofknowledge demand in Arab countries revealswhy such problems remain widespread.SOURCES OF THE DEMAND FORKNOWLEDGESource: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2002.Sources of demand for knowledge vary inevery community. Families demand knowledgeas a way to invest in the <strong>human</strong> capital oftheir members, and to make social and economicdecisions within the family. The state,civil society, and business sectors, public aswell as private, demand knowledge in order toperform their respective functions. This de-Figure 1.3Correlation between Internet penetration and Internet costs -- Arabcountries and comparatorsmand grows stronger in proportion to the degreeof rationalism in decision-making and thevalue placed on learning. In general, themajor drivers of dissemination and demandare the institutional components of the knowledgesystem.DETERMINANTS OF THE DEMANDFOR KNOWLEDGEFrom a purely economic perspective, purchasingpower substantially influences the demandfor knowledge on the open market. Low incomesand the high price of knowledge, or thegoods and services that embody knowledge,tend to curtail demand. In the Arab world, themajority of people have low incomes, whilethe cost of knowledge acquisition is high, especiallyif the commodity is directly importedor is produced locally using imported components.The price of knowledge rises with itstransaction costs, which can be heavy. Rentspaid to the producers of knowledge, to thosewho incorporate knowledge into commoditiesand services and to those who operate localmonopolies 9 all bring up its cost.Figure 1.3 shows the effect of cost onInternet penetration, which is a major meansof spreading access to knowledge. It is quiteclear that, in the Arab region, as in the worldat large, the high cost of accessing the Internetis inversely linked to its diffusion.The restrictive impact of high Internet accesscosts on the extent of its availability is illustratedin figure 1.4. High costs and therelatively limited availability of personal computersin the Arab world are reflected in lowInternet usage compared to developed countriesand South East Asia.Generally speaking, demand for a commodityis shaped by the extent to which prevailingconsumption patterns and their pricesgenerate an appetite for particular goods andservices. Some Arab countries are noted fortheir conspicuous consumption while basicneeds often remain unsatisfied and costly tofulfil, because governments reduce the basic5Among the well-known examples is the limited dissemination of open-source software, such as "Linux", despite the fact that this operating systemis free, effective and easily available. The impression that the software is difficult or unstable is not necessarily correct.6Non-rivalrous means that the consumption of knowledge by one person does not reduce its availability to others.7Infinitely ‘expansionable’ means that, no matter how high the cost of initial production, the cost of subsequent use is low.8Aspatial or weightless refers to the ability of knowledge to cross borders, in particular if digitised.9Consider, for example, the high costs of cellular phone services.46 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Figure 1.4PC availability and Internet costs and penetration:Arab countries, OECD and East Asia, 2001Source: World Economic Forum, 2002.services they provide and the competition failsto provide better or more cost-effective alternatives.Not surprisingly, demand for knowledge,as embodied in goods and services, isdeclining. Imagine, for example, how publicdemand for Internet access competes with demandfor health care.In the case of knowledge, the characteristicsand preferences of its potential users (decision-makerswithin families, the productionsector, state and civil society institutions)largely determine the extent of demand. Arabfamilies have always put great value on educatingtheir children to the highest possible levelin an attempt to raise their social status.Families have often been prepared to bear thehigh costs of education even if this severelystrained their resources. This is evident whenone considers the rising trend towards privatetuition and private schooling in the region. Onthe other hand, in Arab countries, decisionmaking within community institutions is oftenin the hands of older, authoritarian generations.In taking decisions, these generationsmainly rely on traditional considerations thatreflect their narrow affiliations and loyaltiesmore than the broad scientific rationalism thatrequires decisions based on hard knowledge.In the last three decades, this problem hasbeen compounded by the ascendance ofmoney and power in the structure of societalincentives.Reference has been made previously tohow knowledge system institutions create demandfor knowledge simply by playing theirnatural role. A vicious spiral of deterioratingknowledge supply is set in motion in communitieswith a poor knowledge system, curbingthe direct demand for new knowledge. This isone of the most fundamental factors in the declineof knowledge in developing countries.The inadequacy of the knowledge system indirectlydecreases the demand for it. Developingcountry decision-makers frequently complain,and rightly so, of the feeble support they receivefrom knowledge institutions when theyturn to them for help.Another shortcoming in the societal contextin Arab countries that constrains knowledgedemand is the widespread assumptionthat knowledge is not as effective as power orinfluence in solving social, economic and politicalproblems -- or that it is simply beyondreach. Hence, decision-makers end up limitingthemselves to deploying "traditional" methodsand mechanisms. This is a further illustrationof the weakness of developing countryknowledge systems.Coercion may succeed in suppressing orcontaining demand for knowledge more thanany economic or social impediment. Certainly,when freedom is curtailed, knowledge is anearly casualty and those who seek it apply itsparingly or learn to live without it.Finally, another constraint is censorship ofthe Internet. This global media miracle, whichoriginally arose to transcend borders and overcomedistances, has fallen under the control ofthe censor in Arab countries. In Iraq for instance,it was not possible to access theInternet until mid-2000. Even after that, accessremained limited. In one rich Arab country,the government closed 400,000 web sitesafter initially allowing access to the Internet in1999. The increase in Arab Internet users in2001 saw both restrictions on access and censorshipof the Internet grow stronger oncemore (World Markets Research Centre, 2002).The brakes on knowledge demand thathave been cited here will be further discussedin Chapter 8, which addresses the political andlegal contexts of knowledge.There is a widespreadassumption thatknowledge is not aseffective as power orinfluence in solvingsocial, economic orpolitical problems.Coercion may succeedin suppressing orcontaining demandfor knowledge morethan any economic orsocial impediment.CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: KNOWLEDGE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY IN ARAB COUNTRIES 47


About the journey towards the knowledge societyThe following chapters of the <strong>report</strong> outline a cognitive journey that follows the contours of theconceptual framework briefly introduced in this chapter, a few of whose most important aspectswere highlighted in their relationship to history and the Arab reality. The destination of this journeyis a strategic vision for building the knowledge society in the region. This vision identifies thelandmarks of societal reform, which precede the establishment of the knowledge society in Arabcountries (Chapter Nine). The journey to this destination passes through two waypoints. The first(Chapters Two - Five) is an assessment of the present state of knowledge acquisition, disseminationand production, in Arab countries at the beginning of the 21st century. The second (ChaptersSix - Eight) is an analysis of the features of the societal context affecting knowledge acquisition inthe region at the present time, which considers culture, socio-economic structures and politics.Emphasis is placed on guaranteeing freedom under the rule of law, and the discussion culminatesin a survey of the regional and international environment for knowledge acquisition.48 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


PART IISection two: the state of knowledge inArab countriesChapters 2 – 5 constitute an evaluation of the state of knowledge in the Arabworld. Chapter 2 focuses on the dissemination of knowledge in Arab countrieswhile Chapter 3 investigates knowledge production. Chapter 4 represents anattempt to measure the status of Arab knowledge in a comparative perspectiveand Chapter 5 assesses the organizational setting for knowledge acquisition inthe region.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 49


CHAPTER 2Knowledge dissemination in Arab countriesThis chapter attempts to describe and analysethe process of knowledge dissemination inArab countries. It considers the role and stateof Arab education, and its most crucial challenge,quality. It reviews the main features ofprint and broadcast media forms, the extent ofpublic access to them and the impact of theirpolitical and societal surroundings on their independenceand effectiveness as conductorsand sources of knowledge. The chapter furtheranalyses the emergence and early achievementsof modern media forms based on ICT, newtechnology and new patterns of public expression.It concludes with an overview of the stateof translation in the region.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATIONAND KNOWLEDGE CAPITALKnowledge dissemination is about more thanthe mere transfer of information and data, althoughsuch transfer, through multiple channels,should be an integral part of the process.The real challenge is how to turn this informationinto a strong reserve of knowledge that willimpact the production of new knowledge andtransform it into knowledge capital that contributesto <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. Knowledge isdisseminated chiefly through socialisation, thedifferent stages of education and by the massmedia and the translation industry. This chapterlooks at the characteristics, achievementsand limitations of the main channels for disseminatingknowledge in the Arab world. Likeother investigations in this field, this attempt iscompromised by an acute lack of accurate andreliable data, and thus conclusions regardingthe situation in Arab countries are inevitablysubject to this limitation.SOCIALISATIONSocialisation is the process by which the individualacquires knowledge, skills, attitudes andvalues; and establishes motives, principles andpatterns that affect her or his adaptation to thenatural, social and cultural environment.Although socialisation is a learning process thatextends throughout the different stages of thelife of an individual, childhood is the most sensitiveand impressionable stage. Despite thefact that children are the core and crux of thisprocess, they are rarely regarded as effectiveand influential individuals. Nonetheless, thistraditional vision has been changing graduallysince the early 1980s as a result of social, psychologicaland anthropological studies thathave asserted the importance of the child’s experience,and the way (s) he learns and acquiresknowledge throughout the socialisationprocess.There are three styles of child rearing; authoritarian,permissive and firm. Researchshows that children who have been brought upby firm parents demonstrate greater psychologicaland social adaptation. Also, they achievebetter academic results and have higher self-esteem(Buri, 1998).Studies also indicate that the most commonstyle of child rearing within the Arab family isthe authoritarian accompanied by the overprotective.This adversely affects children’s independence,self-confidence and socialefficiency, and leads to an increase in passiveattitudes and the deterioration of decisionmakingskills, not only with respect to behaviour,but also to how the child thinks. For,starting in early childhood, the child becomesaccustomed to suppressing her or his inquisitiveand exploratory tendencies and sense ofinitiative. (al-Sweigh, in Arabic, backgroundpaper for the <strong>report</strong>)Studies indicate thatthe most commonstyle of child rearingwithin the Arab familyis the authoritarianaccompanied by theover-protective.Starting in earlychildhood, the childbecomes accustomedto suppressing her orhis inquisitive andexploratorytendencies.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 51


The most seriousproblem facing Arabeducation is itsdeteriorating quality.The quality ofeducation provided inmany kindergartens inthe region does notfulfil the requirementsfor advancing anddeveloping children’scapabilities.EDUCATIONThe first AHDR acknowledged that Arabcountries had made great strides in the quantitativeexpansion of education in the latter halfof the 20 th century. It however also observedthat the general condition of education is stillunfavourable compared to the achievementsof other countries, both developing and developed.The <strong>report</strong> concluded that Arab educationfalls far short of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>needs.It is a fact that the quantitative expansionof Arab education remains incomplete. Highrates of illiteracy, especially among women,persist. Children continue to be denied theirbasic right to elementary education. Highereducation is characterised by decreasing enrolmentrates compared to developed countries,and public expenditure on education hasdeclined since 1985.However, as the previous Report also emphasised,the most serious problem facingArab education is its deteriorating quality(AHDR, 2002, 47-51). The emphasis here,therefore, will be laid on that crucial aspect ofeducation and its impact on knowledge.BOX 2.1Abdul Aziz Al-Muqaleh – Illiteracy: An Obstacle to Knowledge andModernisationModern Arab history shows that illiteracyhas invariably helped to keep traditionalanti-<strong>development</strong> regimes in power. Forinstance, in Yemen during the 1940s a regressiveregime was able to make ignorantparents invite rulers to kill theirenlightened children who were accusedof sorcery and selling Islam to foreigners.I do not think that the situation haschanged a lot in the early 21 st century –and not only in Yemen, but in all Arabcountries, with one or two exceptions.Any extremist bigot can still set tens ofthousands of illiterate people against anyenlightened person, prevent the eradicationof illiteracy and make it a strong bulwarkagainst all projects to modernizeeducation and culture.There is no hope of bringing about ahealthy educational and democratic environmentconducive to knowledge incountries where illiteracy is allowed togain near-absolute control and to destroyevery serious attempt to escape from thetunnel of alienation in the modern age.The quality of educationThe most important challenge in the educationalarena is the decline in quality, which undercutsa basic goal of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,namely to enhance the quality of people’s livesand enrich the capabilities of societies.Allocating insufficient resources to educationcan certainly reduce its quality. Yet there areother elements that also affect educationalquality, chief among which are education policies,teachers’ and educators’ working conditions,curricula and educational methodologies.The quality of pre-school educationEarly education, centred on the child and thefamily, is an investment that has long-termeconomic and social returns. The child’s brainin early childhood is known to be flexible andmuch more sensitive to its surroundings thanthat of older children. This brain develops accordingto the experiences it encounters in itsexternal environment. The sensuous parts ofthe brain reach the peak of their growth whenthe surrounding environment is rich in stimulants,notably for the senses of touch, sight,hearing, smell and taste. Developing the capabilitiesand improving the intellectual capacitiesof the child requires close attention to thepedagogic methods adopted within the familyand inside nurseries and kindergartens.Naturally, this should go hand in hand withproper health care and decent livelihoods in asociety where the values of freedom and justiceprevail.Despite major efforts to improve preschooleducation in some Arab countries, thequality of education provided in many kindergartensin the region does not fulfil the requirementsfor advancing and developingchildren’s capabilities in order to help socialisea creative and innovative generation. Inmost cases, these kindergartens focus mainlyon teaching children reading and writing,without paying enough attention to their integratedgrowth. This can be achieved by providingsufficient and effective educationalmaterials and instruments, qualified teachersand educators, as well as an environment conduciveto sharpening the child’s senses andimproving his or her physical, emotional, socialand intellectual abilities. A positive preschoolenvironment is characterised by someessential qualities for children’s healthygrowth, such as opportunities for play and accessto a free space that allows them to move,express themselves, choose, take decisionsand enhance their self-respect, which leads toself-confidence. A healthy environment is alsocharacterised by an approach to learning thatis interactive, not didactic, i.e., the childshould interact with his or her surroundings,and with other children and adults as well.52 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


In order to evaluate the level of education,it is necessary to assess teachers’ abilities to interactwith, motivate, and encourage studentsto innovate and think critically and creatively.Information published on these qualificationsand abilities is scarce and limited to personalobservations and general impressions.Undoubtedly, there are a large number of experiencedand highly qualified teachers whoplay a vital role in making the educationalprocess succeed.However, there are some factors in manyArab countries that adversely affect teachers’capabilities, such as low salaries, which forceeducators to take on other jobs that consumetheir energy and cut into the time they can devoteto caring for their students. Other constraintsare also significant, particularly a lackof facilities; poorly designed curricula; and theindifferent quality of teacher training. Mostpresent-day educators have graduated frominstitutions that follow an approach to teachingbased on rote learning, which is not especiallyconducive to critical thinking. Finally,many Arab countries face the problem of overcrowdedclasses. These factors limit the abilitiesand curtail the desire of teachers tointeract creatively with their students.BOX 2.2Morocco: conflicting signals on knowledge acquisitionMost Moroccan families cannot afford tosend their children to kindergarten. Someof these families enroll their children atlow-cost mosque schools, where they aretaught reading, writing and religion byteachers who are not qualified to educateyoung children and to take care of them.Families, which cannot afford even thislow-cost alternative, entrust their youngchildren to the care of a family member,often an uneducated older brother, orleave them to play in the street if they areover 6 years old.In 2000, school enrolment of girlswas low, reaching an average rate of just45% in the three educational stages.Schools need much improvement,particularly in certain rural areas ofMorocco. In the northern region ofTangiers-Tatouan, for instance, there aremore than 45 students in each classroomon average. In respect of higher education,it is estimated that 40% of graduatesremain unemployed. Moreover, 50% ofuniversity students drop out of universitybefore completing their studies.More encouraging statistics can befound in the rapid spread of “cybercafes”,which increased from 500 in 1999to 2500 in 2001, a 500% jump. WebsitesCurricula and education methodologiesTypically, educational material is contained inthe curriculum, which comprises a body oflessons that is ideally a synthesis of the best ofwhat decision-makers and authors agree to beworthwhile and necessary for the learningprocess. In purely formal terms, curricula inmost Arab countries do not appear to begreatly different from what many countriesaround the world are adopting.During the last decade several Arab countrieshave embarked on educational reformprogrammes that concentrate particularly onrevising and making modifications to the contentof curricula and syllabi. When it comes tothe sciences, content is not usually a controversialmatter, save for some themes that areperceived to touch on religious beliefs such asthe theory of evolution or on social taboos,such as sex education. But the <strong>human</strong>ities andsocial sciences that have a direct relevance topeople’s ideas and convictions are supervisedor protected by the authorities in charge of designingcurricula and issuing schoolbooks.Consequently, such subjects usually laud pastachievements and generally indulge in bothself-praise and blame of others, with the aim ofinstilling loyalty, obedience and support forthe regime in power. It is not unusual to findschoolbooks in many Arab countries with apicture of the ruler on the front page, even inthe case of textbooks in neutral subjects suchas science and mathematics.Some researchers argue that the curriculataught in Arab countries seem to encouragesubmission, obedience, subordination andcompliance, rather than free critical thinking.In many cases, the contents of these curriculado not stimulate students to criticise politicalor social axioms. Instead, they smother theirindependent tendencies and creativity (MunirBashour, background paper for AHDR 2).Generally speaking, the assigned curricula,starting from preliminary school or evenbefore, embody a concept that views educationas an industrial production process,where curricula and their content serve asalso recorded a dramatic increase of700% during the same period. Revenuefrom the services of communication companiestripled between 1997 and 2001,from 6 to 16 billion dirhams.In order to deal with the problems ofeducation, the 2000-2009 decade was declaredas “The Education and TrainingDecade in Morocco”. The state is calledupon to give education at all levels its fullsupport and attention. The plan for thedecade requires the government toachieve set targets, e.g.:• By September 2002, all children aged6 years or more were to be enrolled in thenearest school.• By September 2004, all children ofage should be enrolled in the first year ofkindergarten.• By 2005, 80% of children enrolled inkindergartens should continue in schooluntil they complete elementary education.As a result, the rate of enrolment for6 year olds increased from 37% in 1997-1998 to 91% in 2001-2002. The rate ofenrolment of children aged 6-11 increasedfrom 69% to 90 % during thesame period.Source: Country <strong>report</strong> prepared for the Second Arab Human Development Report (AHDR2).Researchers arguethat the curriculataught in Arabcountries seem toencouragesubmission,obedience,subordination andcompliance, ratherthan free criticalthinking.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 53


Communication ineducation is didactic,supported by setbooks containingindisputable texts andby an examinationprocess that only testsmemorisation.The state of foreignlanguage teaching inArab countries is anexample of theabsence of clear-cuteducation policies.moulds into which fresh minds are supposedto be poured.There are various means for conveying information:lectures, seminars, workshops, collaborativework, laboratory work and manyothers. In Arab countries, however, lecturesseem to dominate. Students can do little butmemorise, recite and perfect rote learning.The most widely used instruments are schoolbooks,notes, sheets or summaries.Communication in education is didactic, supportedby set books containing indisputabletexts in which knowledge is objectified so as tohold incontestable facts, and by an examinationprocess that only tests memorisation andfactual recall.Education policiesEducation policies in many Arab countrieslack an integrated vision of the educationprocess and its objectives. Furthermore, thesepolicies are characterised by inconsistency anda lack of direction. Problems, such as those relatingto the content of the curricula, forms ofexamination, evaluation of students, and foreignlanguages cannot be settled without formulatinga well-defined vision of educationalgoals and necessities.The policies governing foreign languageeducation in Arab countries illustrate the absenceof a well-defined vision for institutingmechanisms that would encourage masteryand dissemination of knowledge and science.Indeed, promoting and enhancing the Arabiclanguage as the medium for acquiring and indigenisingmodern sciences is the surest way toachieve this goal. Giving importance to Arabicdoes not however entail neglecting foreign languageacquisition: on the contrary it requiresthe pursuit of both tracks at the same time.The state of foreign language teaching inArab countries is an example of the absence ofclear-cut education policies and reveals a complicatedand confused situation. In reality,only one Arab country (Lebanon) has maintained,since its independence, the teaching ofa foreign language starting from the firstgrade. In 1995, Lebanon permitted the teachingof mathematics and science in foreign languagesin government schools. In thegovernment schools of Arab North Africancountries, the foreign language (French) maintainedits place despite many attempts atArabisation. But French is not taught in publicschools before the third grade in eitherMorocco or Tunisia, and not before the fourthin Algeria. Some other countries postponedlearning a foreign language to the last two orthree grades of primary education, as in thecases of Iraq and some Gulf countries.Recently, other countries, such as Egypt, Syria,Libya and Yemen have realized the importanceof providing foreign language teachingas early as possible and are increasingly implementingthis trend, where foreign languagesare being integrated in the later stages of primaryeducation instead of secondary education.In Jordan government schools haverecently started teaching English commencingin the first grade.Noteworthy in this context is a trend thatemerged in Egypt: the establishment of publicand private “multi-language schools” thatcharge relatively high tuition fees. The syllabiimplemented incorporate two foreign languagesinstead of one, together with mathematicsand science in a foreign language. Thenumber of these schools has increased duringrecent years from 195 to 575. In addition,since 1980, a new type of foreign school hasemerged, one under foreign supervision thatteaches curricula not administered by ArabMinistries of Education. The result has beenchaos in terms of the types of certificates receivedby students in the same country.Measuring the quality of educationEvaluating the quality of education in theArab world is extremely difficult owing to insufficientinformation and data. These difficultiesare compounded by the completeabsence of any standardised measurements forcomparison among Arab countries on the onehand, and with the rest of the world on theother, particularly over time. The followingare some features identified from studies conductedin this field of analysis.Indicators of the quality of achievement inelementary education are available based onspecialised studies conducted in some Arabcountries including Oman, Egypt andBahrain. These studies are of limited value asthey have been neither designed nor conductedon a comp<strong>arab</strong>le basis and do not sup-54 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


port comparative conclusions. However, theirfindings offer significant insights into the qualityof elementary education in the Arab countrieswhere the studies were conducted.In Oman, so far, four studies have beenconducted to evaluate educational achievementin the fourth, sixth, eighth, and ninthgrades in Arabic, mathematics, science and lifeskills. Two findings about these grades standout: (Nader Fergany, in Arabic, 2002)• Grade averages in all subjects are below excellence,or the so-called 90/90 rule (whichstipulates that at least 90% of the studentsshould obtain at least 90% in a standard examinationthat measures how far the skills taughtare acquired).• Girls outperform boys in all subjects.In Egypt, a wide field survey revealed thatmastery of the basic skills of reading and writing,and mathematics, which is supposed to beacquired through elementary education, islow, about 40% and 30% respectively.In Bahrain, an evaluation of educationaloutcomes at the end of the first stage of primaryeducation (Ministry of Education,Bahrain and Almishkat Centre for Research, inArabic, 2001), showed a low level of studentachievement reflected in a lack of mastery ofessential skills. The grade average in Arabic hit43.7%, with a standard deviation of 24.2 on ascale of 0-100. In mathematics, the grade averagewas 44.9% with a 22.8 standard deviationon the same scale. In neither subject does studentperformance remotely approach mastery.Student scores in the two subjects coverthe whole range of grades, which indicatesthat examinations could indeed distinguishthe different achievement levels on the onehand. On the other hand, frequency distributionsof the scores established the commonbell curve of examination grades in a largesample (the further away from the average thegrade is, the smaller the percentage of studentsbecomes).However, grade frequency distributionthat deviates from the standard distribution isalso important. For example, compared to thedistribution of mathematics grades, the distributionin Arabic shows a higher frequency inthe lower grades, and less frequency in themiddle. These findings demonstrate that thestudents’ grades in Arabic tend to be lowerthan in mathematics.When it comes to comparative studieswith other countries of the world, only oneArab country, Kuwait, participated in the“Third International Mathematics andScience Study, 1995” (Trends in InternationalMathematics and Science Study, 1996). It includedstudents who were at the end of elementaryeducation from 41 countries in theworld (class 8). Kuwait’s participation ishighly commendable and a good example forother Arab countries to follow, especially sinceit took place a few years after the invasion ofthe country and the consequent physical andemotional impact on its education system.Yet Kuwait is an exception for other reasons.It has sufficient financial resources as Ultimately, the qualitywell as a small population. It spends generouslyon education and has made outstandingof education does notprogress in its quantitative expansion. depend on theNevertheless, Kuwaiti students came at theavailability ofbottom of the list and ranked 39 th in terms ofachievement in mathematics and science, with resources or ongrade averages of 392 and 430 respectively.quantitative factors,This is 121 points in mathematics and 86 inscience below the world averages (513 and but on characteristics516). Compared to Singapore, which wasrelated to theranked first, with a grade average of 643 and607 respectively, Kuwaiti students’ achievementfell below this average by 251 points inorganisation of theeducational processmathematics and 177 in science.Noticeably, unlike those countries topping and the means ofthe list, Kuwaiti student achievement in mathematicswas lower than in science, and more sodelivery andcompared to the world average. It is a well-establishedfact that mathematics is a crucialevaluation.basis of knowledge for the sciences of the future.It is worth noting that, in this evaluation,countries such as Bulgaria, Thailand, Spainand Iran ranked above Kuwait. The examplepoints to an important conclusion: ultimately,the quality of education does not depend onthe availability of resources or on quantitativefactors but rather on other characteristicsclosely related to the organisation of the educationalprocess and the means of delivery andevaluation.Three Arab countries (Jordan, Tunisia andMorocco) took part in the Trends inMathematics, and Science Study (TIMSS,1999). In mathematics, Tunisia was ranked29 th with 448 points. Jordan was ranked 32 ndKNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 55


One of the mainfeatures of manyuniversities in theArab world is theirlack of autonomy.University libraries arein a sorry state,laboratories are oldand cannotaccommodateincreasing numbers ofstudents, and classesare over-crowded.with 428 points. Morocco came 37 th with 337points. It should be noted that Singapore wasranked first with 604 points while SouthAfrica was last with 275 points. In Science,Jordan was ranked 30 th with 450 points,Tunisia 34 th with 430 points and Morocco 37 thwith 323 points. Taiwan topped the sciencelist with 564 points while South Africa wasranked last with 243 points.BOX 2.3The “Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)”In order to address deficiencies in measuringthe quality of education, theUNDP Regional Bureau for Arab Statesis conducting a project for “EvaluatingEducational Quality in the Basic andMiddle Stages in Mathematics andScience in the Arab World”. The projectsponsors the participation of five Arabcountries in TIMSS <strong>2003</strong>, in which 54other countries are taking part, includingfive other Arab countries. TheInternational Association for theEvaluation of Educational Achievementconducts this study impartially. Thestudy was previously conducted in 1995and 1999. The project will collect generaldata on curricula, classroom instruction,student achievement and teachers’ performancein a manner that allows forcomparisons of findings with internationalstandards. It will set a standardisedscale for ranking countries based on internationalcriteria. The study is expectedto give the participating countries the opportunityto measure achievement inmathematics and science through the examinationof prevailing trends in primaryschools (fourth grade) and middleschools (eighth grade). By the end of theproject, participating countries will receivea <strong>report</strong> benchmarking the performanceof their national plans andpedagogical policies, as well as of theschools taking part, against internationalstandards. They will also receive internationallycomp<strong>arab</strong>le results on students’performance in mathematics and science,and general reference data.The quality of higher educationAlthough higher education institutions haveexisted in the Arab world for more than tencenturies (most of which were established in amajor mosque such as Al-Azhar, Al-Qairawanand Al-Zaitonah, or with funding from charitiesor waqf), modern Arab colleges and universitiesare young. Three quarters of Arabuniversities were established in the last 25years of the 20 th century. Fifty-seven per centof them are no more than 15 years old. Thisobservation is important: higher education institutions,universities in particular, take a longtime to consolidate their institutional structure,and to perfect their role in the disseminationand production of knowledge (NaderFergany, in Arabic, 1998b, 18-19).The quality of education provided inhigher education institutions in Arab countriesis affected by many factors, chief amongwhich is the lack of a clear vision, and, asnoted earlier, the absence of well-designedpolicies regulating the educational process.Higher education, particularly in its inception,faced resistance from several quarters. The pioneermodern universities were establishedthrough the efforts of civil society and the supportof nationalist forces with dreams ofprogress and prosperity. These endeavourswere affected from the very beginning by thecolonial presence in most Arab countries atthe time. This period witnessed conflicting intentionsand competing interests that led to arupture in the original course taken. The generationof the renaissance strived to institutionalisethe basis for academic research inArab countries. Some of their attempts succeeded,but were not sustained.One of the main features of many universitiesin the Arab world is their lack of autonomy,i.e., they fall under the direct control ofthe ruling regime. Nevertheless, universitiesare often the arenas for political and ideologicalconflict, the more so because of restrictionsimposed on political participation in generaland the promotion of political currents thatowe allegiance to the regime. These contextualfeatures have adverse effects on the degree offreedom allowed for education and research.This lack of autonomy has resulted in a situationwhere universities are run according tothe requirements of the governing politicallogic, and not a plan or a wise educational policy.Some universities, for example, are overcrowdedon account of the uncalculatedincrease in enrolment rates, simply becausethe announcement of enrolment numbers inuniversities has become a political gesture toappease society.The quality of higher education is also influencedby an ongoing decline in expenditure,reflected in inadequate facilities forstudents and faculty. Quantitative expansionin higher education came at the expense ofquality. University libraries are in a sorry state,laboratories are old and cannot accommodatethe increasing numbers of students, andclasses are over-crowded, thus creating a widedistance between students and teachers.Moreover, faculty members in many Arab universitiesearn meagre salaries, and thereforecannot devote themselves fully to teaching orresearch.The quality of computer science educationin Arab universitiesThe UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States is56 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


sponsoring a project to improve the quality ofuniversity education in Arab countries, whichincludes a component concerned with evaluatingthe quality of education in some vitallyimportant scientific disciplines. The projecthas completed an evaluation of the quality ofcomputer science education in Arab universitiesSixteen universities - 12 public and 4 private- in 12 Arab states, namely: Algeria,Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,Morocco, <strong>Palestine</strong>, Sudan, Syria, the UnitedArab Emirates and Yemen participated.The evaluation of computer science educationhas been completed for all participatinguniversities except Kuwait University whichwithdrew just before the external assessmentstarted.The evaluation (which is conducted inthree stages: training, self-evaluation and externalevaluation by Arab and internationalevaluators) is based on 5 major criteria formeasuring performance, namely: academicstandards; teaching and learning; student progression;learning resources; and quality assuranceand enhancement 1 , in addition to 11other detailed criteria.The project revealed important resultsconcerning the academic standards of programmes.While all participating programmes– except one – achieved “approval”, i.e., confidencein the academic level of the programme,that approval was in the category of“approved/satisfactory” and no programmehad an academic level high enough to earn“approved with commendation”, i.e., the levelof distinction by international standards.Reports pointed to a number of issues thatrequire redress with respect to all the componentsof academic standards, i.e., curriculaand prescribed materials, methods of studentevaluation and the students' level of achievement.For instance, a comparison of the contentof the curricula evaluated with that of theBOX 2.4Use of the creative teaching method in Arab medical schoolsSource: Arabian Gulf University, Bahrain.international test in computer science, as determinedby the American ETS 2 , indicated anoverall compatibility exceeding 70% in onlyeight universities. In terms of complete compatibilitywith each one of the five main partsof the international test, the majority of theuniversities’ curricula reflected over 70% compatibilityonly in the two traditional subjectareas of programming fundamentals and softwaresystems. Just one-third of the participatinguniversities had curricula judgedcompatible with the other three subject areas(computer organization and architecture, theoryof computer science and computationalmathematics, and special subjects).The creative teaching method (teachingthrough problem-solving) is one of themost important methods of teachingmedicine of the past 25 years. It started atthe School of Medicine of McMasterUniversity of Canada in 1976 and has,since then, been adopted by many medicalschools throughout the world as ateaching strategy and school curriculum.The creative method is basically ateaching strategy characterized by the useof medical problems as a framework forteaching students problem-solving skillsand proactive learning. In this method,the teaching process revolves around thestudent, not the teacher, as is the case inthe traditional method. The student himselfis responsible for his/her learning,which –it is believed- is a preparation forlifelong learning and self-<strong>development</strong>.Proactive self-learning removes the studentfrom teaching methods based onrote learning and the passive reception ofknowledge, thereby increasing his/herability to understand and absorb indepthlearning. This teaching methodalso leads to the student's acquisition ofimportant skills, such as the ability tocommunicate well and to work as a teammember in addition to the ability to analyzeand use the scientific method in solvinghealth problems in their different organic,social and psychological perspectives.In this method, both student andteacher find the teaching process interesting.The student's role is to analyze, researchand derive information andsolutions, while the teacher's role differsfrom the traditional role of merely dispensinginformation. The teacher’s newrole is to stimulate the learning processby motivating students and pushing themto think by posing questions and generalconcepts.There are three medical schools inthe Arab world, which play a pioneeringrole in using this teaching strategy,namely: Al-Jazeerah University in WadMadani, Sudan; The Suez CanalUniversity in Ismaeliyah, Egypt; and TheArabian Gulf University in Bahrain. Allthree started at approximately the sametime (1979-1982) and continue to adoptthis teaching philosophy with continuous<strong>development</strong> of curricula. These threeschools act as a stimulus to the <strong>development</strong>of medical education in the Arab regionthrough their Centres for theDevelopment of Medical Education,which have trained many faculty membersin various Arab countries.1Academic Standards. This major criterion reflects the confidence of evaluators in three areas: curriculum design and the level of prescribed material;accuracy and effectiveness of student evaluation methods; and actual student achievements.Methods of teaching and learning. This represents the result of evaluation of the methods used in teaching and learning, in terms of diversity,efficiency and relevance to the programme goals.Student Progression. This depends on the efficiency of the systems and the arrangements used to guide and support student advancementthrough the school years.Learning Resources. This depends on the availability and efficiency of <strong>human</strong> and financial resources needed for learning, such as the faculty, libraries,laboratories and communications. The latter 3 criteria come under a more comprehensive criterion, namely, "learning opportunities available",although each one is evaluated separately.Quality assurance and enhancement. This depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of the internal arrangements and systems regularly availableto supervise the performance of the programme through the stages of its implementation and the ability of these systems to take the necessarymeasures for its correction and improvement.2Educational Testing Services.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 57


The evaluation indicates that private universities,generally, did better than publicones. At the university level, the overall qualityindicator value varied from 42% to 91%, an averageof nearly 60%. A majority of the participating15 universities (eight out of 15) werePrivate universities,generally, did better below average (Figure 2-1).than public ones.According to the applicable criteria, theevaluation concludes that the overall qualityindicator is below the "pass" level for eightuniversities and close to the "good" level forthree. Results indicate that the academic levelof faculty members is a strong point in the region,while the sufficiency of available facultyFigure 2.1Distribution of universities participating in the evaluationaccording to the overall quality indicatorFigure 2.2Detailed evaluation criteria: average valuesCategories members of and Quality the mathematics component inmembers and the mathematics component inthe curriculum represent weak points, whichdeserve attention, figure 2-2. It is not surprising,therefore, that well-qualified faculty membersare nonetheless unable to diffuse andproduce knowledge efficiently on account oftheir small numbers, compared to students,and the meagre resources available to them.The evaluation concludes by proposing sixareas as strategic priorities for the <strong>development</strong>of computer science programmes in theregion, through the concerted efforts of universitiesand with support from regional initiatives,projects and forums. These areas are:methodologies for the design and <strong>development</strong>of programmes and curricula; the role ofofficial accreditation organisations; the <strong>development</strong>of the size and capabilities of faculties;the <strong>development</strong> of the capabilities of librariesand communication systems, quality assuranceand enhancement; and cooperation in the provisionof traditional and electronic librarysources, both Arabic and Arabicized. (The latterare needed for programmes that are taughtin Arabic, which currently represent one-thirdof all programmes). The evaluation stronglyrecommends that the latter measure be takenup in parallel with enhancing the English languageskills of students. The evaluation alsocalls for an expanded stage of investment andexpenditure on higher education linked directlyto goals and indicators of quality.ARAB MASS MEDIA:CHARACTERISTICS,CONSTRAINTS AND NEW FORMSPrint and broadcast media are a vital means oftransferring, and sometimes producing,knowledge. Since their inception, they haveplayed a central role in knowledge dissemination,one that has undergone many changes asa result of scientific and technical <strong>development</strong>.In early times, printed materials werethe most common medium, but had limited influenceamong communities with high rates ofilliteracy. The advent of radio opened newhorizons for knowledge dissemination, dispensingas it did with literacy as a requirement.Ultimately, television surpassed all conventionalmass media in terms of impact.What is more important, from the per-58 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


spective of building <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> andthe knowledge society, is the relationship betweenthe mass media, freedom and progresson the one side and increased demand andsupply of knowledge on the other. The morefreedom enjoyed by the media and the deepertheir involvement in <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> issuessuch as good governance, knowledge andwomen’s empowerment, the stronger the societalincentives for creating a knowledge societybecome.The global revolution in communicationthat is rapidly changing the world into aknowledge-based economy is transforming themeans of knowledge dissemination. A contemporarysociety that does not rely on digitalelectronic networks to exchange informationis unimaginable. For most major corporations,the information and communication industryhas become an essential strategic support inensuring dominance in international markets.In addition, satellite channels, especially in theArab world, are now a source for the productionand creation of values, symbols and taste.Access to MediaArab media forms and the means of accessingthem, as well as their structure and content,exhibit several shortcomings that reduce theireffectiveness in building a knowledge society.Among these, poor public access to informationis a serious disability. This can be illustratedby comparing the ratio of the Arabpopulation to the volume of information availableto citizens, and the comp<strong>arab</strong>le ratio inother regions of the world.In general, Arab countries have lower informationmedia to population ratios (numberof newspapers, radio and television sets per1000 people) compared to the world averageand the average of middle-income countries.Indeed, in this respect, the Arab world is notmuch better off than low-income countries insome areas.The low number of newspapers per 1000people, 53 newspapers in the Arab countriesversus 285 in the developed countries, indicatestwo significant gaps. First, Arab citizensdo not generate a large demand for newspapersdue to low literacy rates and the high costof newspapers compared to income. Second,the decline in the quality, independence, andprofessionalism of Arab journalism make itsproducts unattractive to broad categories ofArab readers.In audio and visual media, the availabilityof radio and television sets in Arab countriesas a whole is also below the average in middleincomecountries and the world as a whole.Access to information media varies fromone Arab country to another. The number ofnewspapers per 1,000 people in Arab countriesvaries from one newspaper in Somalia toFigure 2.3Number of daily newspapers per 1000 peoplein Arab countries and other regions in the world, 1998Source: World Bank, 2002.Figure 2.4Number of radio receivers per 1000 peoplein Arab countries and other regions in the world, 2000Source: World Bank, 2002.Arab countries havelower informationmedia to populationratios compared to theworld average.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 59


Official Arab satellitechannels dominatethe microwaves.Media in most Arabcountries lackmultiple,independent sourcesof information.374 newspapers in Kuwait, which exceeds theaverage in high-income countries. In contrastwith the ratios of newspapers, Lebanon, whichhas the highest ratio when it comes to radio receivers(678 radio receivers per 1,000 people),is still well below the average of the high-incomecountries, which boast 1,280 radio receiversper 1,000 people. However, the ratiosof television sets in Arab countries are closerto the ratios of newspapers. Oman, which hasthe highest ratio among Arab countries (563television sets per 1,000 people), is close to theaverage of high-income countries (641 televisionsets per 1,000 people). But middle-incomeArab countries have far fewer televisionsthan other middle-income countries in theworld, where the average number is 275 televisionsets per 1,000 people. For instance, thenumber of televisions per 1,000 people doesnot exceed 67 sets in Syria, 198 in Tunisia, and189 in Egypt.The number of Arab satellite channels hasalso increased. There are now about 120 channelstransmitted through Arabsat and Egypt’sNilesat. More than 70% of these channels arestate enterprises and broadcast in Arabic. Feware in foreign languages. A handful of privatesector satellite channels (about 15% of allchannels) broadcast in Arabic from outsidethe region. A smaller number of private sectorchannels (10%) broadcast in Arabic from insidethe region. In short, official Arab satelliteFigure 2.5Number of television sets per 1000 peoplein Arab countries and other regions of the world, 2000Source: World Bank, 2002.channels dominate the microwaves.Resources available to the mediaIn varying degrees, Arab media personnel inmost Arab countries encounter serious difficultiesin gaining access to information, documents,data and official and unofficial newssources. Authorities often hinder their effortsciting official secrecy or national security.Many countries have a list of prohibited topics,such as the publication of court hearings,decrees or other matters that are said to touchon state security.The media in most Arab countries lackmultiple, independent sources of information.They principally depend on foreign informationsources, especially Western news agencies.Although all Arab countries have theirown news agencies, these agencies are stateownedand oriented to serve and promotestate policies. Most of them also suffer from alack of <strong>human</strong>, financial and technological resourcesand do not have correspondents outsidetheir own countries. However, it may beworth mentioning here the exceptions thatstand out among Arab news satellite channels.Some news satellites have succeeded in securingexclusive coverage of major events. TheUS-based CNN, for example, broadcast bulletinsincorporating some of Al-Jazeera’s coverageof the events of the war in Afghanistan.Other satellite channels have started buildinga network of correspondents outside the region,as in the cases of Abu Dhabi, MBC andAl-Arabia.In general, Arab news channels lack specialisedagencies that are able to cover thematicnews topics, such as economics, sports,the environment, health, women and science,despite the significance and popularity ofthese topics amid the current information explosion.Many Arab media institutions do not haveinformation centres housing libraries orarchives. The few archives that exist are oldfashionedand far behind the tremendousboom in information technology. Elsewhere inthe world, such centres have become the backboneof in-depth media services, incorporatingthe flow of events and news within ageneral context, in order to help the audienceunderstand <strong>development</strong>s and take an in-60 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


formed stand on them.A few capable information centres affiliatedto some Arab media institutions continueto lead the field. For example, Egypt’s al-Ahram Information Centre and other suchcentres, namely Annahar, Al Bayan, AlKhaleej, Al Hayat and Al Sharq Al Awsatkeep up with successive <strong>development</strong>s in informationtechnologies.Typical contentThe role played by the media in different Arabcountries is very similar, albeit in varying degrees.A review of media programmes and researchindicates that light entertainment is themost common offering, and is predominantlysuperficial, repetitive in content, and promotesvalues that encourage consumerism anda depreciation of work. This is particularly evidentduring Ramadan, which sees an increasein game shows feeding popular dreams of easyriches.The Arab world has two cultural satellitechannels (Nileculture & Tanweer -- Egypt)and two religious channels (Almajd and Iqra’-- Saudi Arabia), in addition to several educationalchannels in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, aswell as a special information channel, the NileInformation Channel. The region also receivesinformation services from some land-basedtelevision stations. Nonetheless, Arab televisionat large is not a vibrant force for knowledgeor culture.Some Arab news satellite channels, notablyAl-Arabia, Al-Jazeera, and Al Manarhave brought new content and form to thescreen by airing free debates. They have thusspurred many Arab ground and satellite channelsto provide more space for a diversity ofvoices and viewpoints and to allow more freedomof expression on political, social and culturalissues usually hidden behind a curtain ofsilence. These new talk shows, though at timessensational and vociferous, have neverthelessraised audience awareness, and could effect aradical change in the Arab public scene in thelong run, opening it up to a culture of pluralismand dialogue.News coverageThe Arab citizen’s trust in media is affected –to a great extent – by the level of news coveragein different mass media. Despite attemptsto improve news services – due to competitionbetween news satellite channels and to theextraordinary <strong>development</strong>s in communicationtechnology that have turned the worldinto an electronic global village – a number oftrends continue to hamper effective news coveragein Arab countries.The main focus is still on official news andon senior political officials. Certain news valuespredominate, notably those favouringcelebrities, idiosyncratic behaviour, humourand conflict. These values control the newsthat makes the front pages of newspapers, andoccupy prime time on radio and television.More space and time is allocated to news ofthis kind than to other content. News of interestto the majority of the population, andwhich relates to their daily concerns or whichcould enrich their scientific and culturalknowledge, is scarce. Despite more opennessthat allows the media to address certainevents, some news items are suppressed ordealt with in a manner not equal to their importance.News stories can sometimes be overstatedor understated and on occasion presentvery different accounts of the same event, asthe case of Arab media coverage of the fall ofBaghdad shows.News <strong>report</strong>s themselves tend to be narrativeand descriptive, rather than investigativeor analytic, with a concentration on immediateand partial events and facts. This is generallytrue of newspapers, radio bulletins and televisednews. The news is often presented as asuccession of isolated events, without in-depthexplanatory coverage or any effort to placeevents in the general, social, economic and culturalcontext.Needless to say, this type of news coveragedoes not help the ordinary citizen to comprehendevents, increase his or her awareness andknowledge or develop a considered and informedpoint of view on national, regional andinternational issues.Features of media messagesAn analysis conducted on samples of contentfrom Arab media in many Arab countries (AliAl-Qarni, Arab Media Discourse, 1997), anddozens of studies conducted at country levels,Some Arab newssatellite channels,have brought newcontent and form tothe screen by airingfree debates.News <strong>report</strong>sthemselves tend tobe narrative anddescriptive, ratherthan investigative oranalytic.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 61


The harassment ofthe press under thelaw is an all-toofrequentviolation offreedom ofexpression.characterise the common features of Arabmedia messages, with some exceptions, as follows:Authoritarian: Authority heavily controlsthe media discourse, imposing its own topics,directives, values, details, preferences, andtiming.Unidimensional: The discourse mostly excludesthe other point of view, keeping it awayfrom the public mind.Official: The majority of Arab media institutionsare incapable of taking action or <strong>report</strong>ingon events until they receive officialdirection, even if this entails ignoring an importantevent for a certain period of time. Thisof course discredits the media in the eyes of itsaudience.Sacred: In many cases, a sacred aura is bestowedon the discourse, one that might notexist in other regions. This aura is not necessarilyreligious, but reflects the determinationwith which the objective of a particular discourseis being pushed.One of the dilemmas facing Arab media isa continuous conflict between the impulse to“seek more freedoms and independence” andto “preserve the national interest”. This deliberatelyexaggerated conflict should not obscurethe fact that the search for morefreedoms is an indigenous, national and positiveeffort that ultimately helps achieve the nationalinterest.THE ENVIRONMENTSURROUNDING THE MASS MEDIALegalised restrictions on freedom of the pressand freedom of expression in Arab countriescurtail the independence and vitality of themass media. In practice, the harassment of thepress under the law is an all-too-frequent violationof freedom of expression, with newspaperssometimes facing closure, seizure,confiscation and sequestration. Furthermore,journalists are not given sufficient guaranteesto perform their job and are liable to arrest,compulsory detention and severe penalties oncharges related to publishing and the expressionof critical opinions. Some journalists havebeen threatened with assassination, physicalassault and intimidation. Reports issued bythe Arab Journalists Federation as well as internationaland national <strong>human</strong> rights organisationsprovide plentiful examples of such persecution.Governments also impose restrictions onissuing newspapers and establishing new televisionchannels. These restrictions sometimestake the form of impractical requirements,such as requiring large capital deposits as acondition for establishing a corporation, orrestricting ownership of television channels tosatellite (as opposed to terrestrial) stations.At the same time, it must be acknowledgedthat some newspapers and journalists pursueirresponsible practices and disregard theethics of their profession. Tabloid journalismpurveying sex, crime and sensation in pursuitof advertising profits and sales has becomewidespread in some Arab countries.Violations of citizens’ right to privacy have increased,and many people are subjected toslander, libel, defamation and abuse.The momentous events facing the Arab regionundoubtedly pose large challenges to themedia, particularly since they have now becomeimportant tools in conflicts and wars.This was evident in the case of the occupationof Iraq. Some media, including a number ofArab ones, have risen to these new challenges,displaying new levels of objectivity andcourage. Others have dropped in public estimationfor providing biased or one-sided accounts.Reporting on modern theaters ofconflict often, incurs harassment and dangersfor journalists, who sometimes suffer casualties,especially when the aggressor has somethingto hide from the public eye. Eightjournalists, seven <strong>Palestine</strong>an and one British,have been killed under Israeli occupation inless than 2 years. During the invasion of Iraq,Al-Jazeera correspondent, Tareq Ayoub, waskilled in an attack on the network’s offices inBaghdad.MODERN MASS MEDIAThe core platform on which a modern informationsystem rests is built around its associatedtechnologies, equipment, computernetworks, software, databases and communicationsystems. In most societies, this infrastructureserves to educate and enlighten thepublic, improve the management and co-ordi-62 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


nation of research and <strong>development</strong>, promotethe increased effectiveness and efficiency ofpublic and private institutions, and supportinformed and streamlined decision-making.The communications infrastructure in anycountry is the backbone of attempts to benefitfrom the broad applications of the communicationrevolution, especially multimedia services.This infrastructure includes telephonelines, television cables, satellite installations,fibre optic lines, computers and peripherals,information networks and media and culturebasedindustries.Telephone networksTelephone networks are access roads leadingto the information highway. They are one ofthe most important indicators of informationavailability. Some Arab countries have succeededin improving their infrastructure inthis regard, while still lagging behind internationallevels. The number of lines in Arabcountries is about 109/1,000 persons, while itamounts to 561 in developed countries. Thereis only one telephone for every 10 Arab citizens,while in developed countries the ratio is1/1.7 persons. (See Figure 2.6 for a worldcomparison).The Arab Joint Economic Report indicatesthat some tangible improvements in communicationservices have taken place in Arabcountries. Phone density increased in the1990s, and some countries have convertedtheir networks into digital systems.There are four international and regionalprojects in communication and informationtechnology of particular importance in theArab world. Most Arab countries are takingpart in these projects with the goal of developingthe information and communication sector.They are:• The Cable Project: 300,000 km long, andconnecting more than 100 countries including14 Arab states;• The Fibre Optic Cable project: 27,000 kmlong, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, andJordan are participating;• The Simoueh III Project: started operationin 1999 with Egypt, Morocco, andDjibouti participating;• The Africa Project: This involves allAfrican Arab countries and Saudi Arabia.Figure 2.6Number of main phone lines per 1,000 persons(*)(*) The average is taken as the country-specific likely average (based on population size in 2000) of basic phone dataextracted from UNDP HDR 2002. Data on 173 countries (out of a total 179) includes 19 Arab countries.Yet despite some advances in telephony,overall, public demand for telephone lines inthe region outstrips supply, while connectionsare unreliable and service remains generallypoor when compared to developed countries.Communication technologiesArab countries have made considerable stridesin communication technology, and a numberof networks have been digitised. With the creationof Dubai Internet City in 1999, an integratedelectronic business, research and<strong>development</strong> society, UAE demonstrated thatit had made rapid progress in ICT. The creationof Dubai Media City (DMC) marks anothermilestone on the road towards providinga modern infrastructure for an advanced Arabmedia. DMC has already attracted some majorTV channels, including Al-Arabia, MBC,CNN and Reuters TV.In satellite communication, the modernArabsat network delivers content from varioussources across the Arab world. The system deliversa large portfolio of media and informationproducts and services to all Arabcountries and parts of Europe as well.Computer availability is one of the basicstandards against which to measure access toinformation technologies through new technologicalmedia. Here, the figures indicate a severeshortage in all Arab countries. There areThere are less than18 computers per1,000 persons in theregion, compared tothe global average of78.3.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 63


Figure 2.7Personal computers: Arab world and other regionsSource: World Bank, 2002.Cost, political cultureand societal contextmilitate againstknowledge diffusionthrough newtechnologies.less than 18 computers per 1,000 persons inthe region, compared to the global average of78.3 computers per 1,000 persons. This ishardly an appropriate base for using informaticsto spread knowledge and increase demandfor it, or for accessing the vast array of scientificresearch networks, universities and otherknowledge sources that throng the Internet.Figure 2-8Internet penetration in Arab countries, users as % of population, 2001Source: World Markets Research Centre, 2002.Access to Modern MediaStatistics indicate that the number of Internetusers in Arab countries in 2001 reached 4.2million, i.e., 1.6% of the Arab population comparedto just 1% in 2000, a considerable increaseeven though Internet penetration in theArab region is still limited in a comparativecontext.The low number of Internet users in Arabcountries is due to a number of factors, themost important of which are: computer andInternet illiteracy, the high cost of the linesused and high personal computer prices andaccess fees. Several initiatives have been takento deal with these problems, including measuresto increase competition among serviceproviders, reduce subscription fees and lowertelephone line costs. Other initiatives focus onteaching computer skills on a large scale, as isnow the case in many schools and universities.CHALLENGES FACING THE ARABMEDIAEvidently, the Arab mass media faces rootedexternal and internal constraints on its role intransmitting knowledge and encouraging itsacquisition. These challenges are intensifiedby the rapid <strong>development</strong> in communicationand information technologies and the globalknowledge explosion that have given themedia in other parts of the world a central rolein building knowledge societies. To sum up, inArab countries:• People do not have sufficient access to themedia and information technologies, comparedto world rates and to other countries inthe region, and in proportion to the populationof the Arab world.• The social and intellectual benefits of massmedia and communication are diluted by governmentrestrictions on content and by superficialmarket preferences.• The public relates to the media as a passiverecipient, rather than an active participant.In other words, cost, political culture andsocietal context militate against knowledgediffusion through new technologies.The information and communication policiesof most Arab countries are similar, inasmuchas they place the media under thedominant political authorities and institutions64 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


and employ media channels for political propagandaand entertainment, at the expense ofother functions and services.Within the Arab media establishment itself,deficiencies such as lack of planning, lackof information, documents and research and ahigh degree of centralisation impair the organisation,relevance and flexibility of media services.In-depth awareness of audience habitsand preferences with respect to information,especially outside the capital and major cities,is also lacking.State ownership of the media is the norm,particularly in the case of radio and television.(Lebanon, where these mass media servicesare run by private organisations, is the exception.)Newspapers in the region can be stateownedor jointly owned. Some countries, suchas Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Lebanon,allow parties to issue newspapers. Yet thesepublications are subject to specific controlsand limitations, particularly for individuals.For these reasons, many individuals andgroups have resorted to issuing newspapersfrom foreign countries such as the UnitedKingdom, Cyprus and France.The revolution in communication technologyhas made it possible for some individualsand corporations to launch private satellitechannels in Arabic from foreign countries.Egypt recently permitted the broadcasting ofprivate Egyptian satellite channels from withinthe country. The conditions governing mediaownership in Arab countries raise many questionsabout the real opportunities available toArab citizens for exercising their right to issuenewspapers, attain information, expressthoughts and opinions and monitor governmentinstitutions. Another point of concern isthe selective homogeneity of Arab media content,considering that diversity of informationis an important prerequisite for the attainmentof knowledge.Globalisation has led to an intense debateabout the viability of state-owned media, andthe ability of governments to sustain their monopolyin an age of free information. This directionof change could potentially supportmedia freedom and people’s right to communicate.Some Arabs fear that reducing the roleof the state may, however, favour the expansionof the role of multinational corporations(MNCs). This question goes to the heart of theindependence of the Arab media, since one ofthe main obstacles facing Arab attempts toown communication technologies is the monopolyof major MNCs in the production andmarketing of these very technologies.Arab countries, therefore, need to co-operateclosely to raise the performance and independenceof the media as a vital conduit ofknowledge transfer and as a means of increasingthe transparency of government and publicservices.The Beginnings of Free MediaThe last two years have, however, seen someimprovements in the Arab information environment,compared to dominant trends inpast decades. While there is still some way togo towards creating an informed, open andknowledgeable public, observers discern anew, more enquiring and therefore morehopeful spirit in the media.Despite the continuing dominance ofmonolithic official media channels marked bya single political point of view, the Arabicpress has entered a new stage characterised bydawning competition. Newspapers and informationmedia that have enjoyed a monopolyover Arab readers for a long time are encounteringnew challenges. Arabic newspapers –some published abroad, such as “Al-Hayat”,“Asharq Al-Awsat” and “Al-Quds Al-Arabi”– and some published at home, such as“Annahar”, “Assafeer”, “Al-Khaleej”, and“Al-Bayan” are producing highly professionaljournalism and enjoy a margin of freedommuch larger than that of the official press.With their political and intellectual advantagesand their greater financial resources, thesenewspapers attract a large number of the bestArab writers.The official press can no longer ignore itsnew competitors. The challengers have managedto cross borders and overcome censorshipbarriers, using the Internet to reachfarther than paper-based media. Newspapers,such as “Tishreen” of Syria and “Al-Ittihad”of the United Arab Emirates, have gone as faras to open public dialogue forums throughtheir web sites.These changes have not been limited tothe press. Television has also undergone re-The conditionsgoverning mediaownership in Arabcountries raise manyquestions about thereal opportunitiesavailable to Arabcitizens for exercisingtheir right toknowledge.The Arabic press hasentered a new stagecharacterised bydawningcompetition.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 65


There is clearly alarger role for theArab camera to playin presenting theworld through itslens.The new media usethe Arabic language,and are thereforestarting to reach thelargest segment ofthe Arab public.markable changes during the past two years.Private Arabic channels are able to competefor news items and pictures with the strongestinternational television establishments, as wasdemonstrated clearly during the Anglo-American war on Iraq. These private channelshave instilled a new spirit in Arabic television,helping to change thinking and proceduresamong some Arabic satellite stations, many ofthem government-run, such as the “AbuDhabi Television Station”, the “Nile NewsChannel” and other official channels in NorthAfrican Arab countries. There is no doubt thatindependent Arabic channels have managedto break the monopoly of the big channelsover images and news. Some analysts haveventured to conclude that although the internationalcoalition won the military battle inIraq, the Arabs may have won the informationbattle. Whether this is speculation or fact,there is clearly a larger role for the Arab camerato play in presenting the world through itslens.Although the political environment surroundingthe Arab media is not the mostfavourable to knowledge <strong>development</strong>, someactors have succeeded in creating informationand documentation centres, such as those establishedby “Al-Ahram”, “Al-Bayan”, “Al-Hayat” and “Asharq Al-Awsat”. These offerArab researchers opportunities previously notavailable to reap the benefits of the informationand digital revolutions.The creation of Arabic Internet newspapersmarks an important further step towardsa more inclusive and pluralistic media open toyoung talent. Several of these newspapers playa positive role in publicising Arab issues in theinternational arena, through their networkswith newspapers managed by internationalnon-governmental organisations. Some, however,still lack credibility with the Arab publicand need time to mature: their content oftensuggests an inability to distinguish betweenchaff and grain.The hope is that these beginnings willwiden the margins of political freedom in theArab world, raise the quality of its media andstrengthen the important relationship betweengood governance and the knowledge society.The most important characteristic of these recent<strong>development</strong>s is that the new media usethe Arabic language, and are therefore startingto reach the largest segment of the Arab public.This contrasts with the prevailing situationwhere Arabic newspapers, which are publishedin foreign languages, still enjoy a widerreadership than those published in Arabic.Some of the former, such as the “Al-AhramWeekly” in Cairo, “The Daily Star” and“L’Orient Le Jour” in Beirut, and “GulfNews” in UAE have achieved a high degree ofexcellence.TRANSLATIONTranslation is a means of seeking knowledge.It represents an interaction among civilisationsthrough the transfer from one language intoanother, by <strong>human</strong>s or machines, written ororal, with the goal of achieving scientific andcultural objectives. The question facing Arabcountries is: how can translation become anasset in building knowledge? How can it bemobilised to enhance the frame of mind of individualsand increase the intellectual and culturalreference of society? How can itcontribute new values, new ways of thinkingand new forms of empowerment? Certainly,translation creates opportunities for the acquisitionand transfer of knowledge within theframework of global communication networksbuilt up by communication culture. It opensup spaces for mutual interaction and influence,and protects societies from becomingpassive recipients of imported knowledge, especiallywhen those societies cease to be producersof knowledge themselves.Developed and developing countries alikeare moving fast to acquire the ever-increasingquantity of knowledge in its original language.Today, English represents around 85% of thetotal world knowledge balance. Thus, moreand more knowledge-hungry countries arepaying attention to translation from sourcesother than English. Efforts in this regard arenot restricted to recent or contemporaryknowledge, but extend to heritage, history,classical literature and other extant knowledge.Countries mastering these sources arebecoming encyclopaedic global knowledgebanks and authoritative centres of referenceon world information and terminology. Newcorporations specialised in translation have66 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


een established and there have been significantinitiatives by official institutions, such asthe UK WORDBANK, which employs 550professional translators. According toNewsweek, translation costs in 1989amounted to $20 billion. There are more than100,000 translated titles published in theworld every year. The total number of publications,authored or translated, exceeds 830,000titles annually, and the market for translationcontinues to boom.Consider the case of Japan: at the outset ofits phase of advancement (the Meiji era), Japanset about transferring all scientific and culturalknowledge into Japanese, in addition to sendingoutstanding students to learn advancedsciences from the West. Japan has also concludedagreements with major internationalpublishing houses to publish a Japanese editionof each scientific publication immediatelyafter its publication in its original language. Itis estimated that 1,700 titles are translated annually.Now, Japan translates 30 million pagesa year.The United States has set its sights onbeing the global reference point and data bankof the world. Despite the fact that almost 85%of the world’s scientific production is inEnglish, the US makes it a point to translate allscientific publications, as well as the culturallegacy of world civilizations.BOX 2.5The Arab Organisation for TranslationThe Arab Organisation for Translationwas established in Beirut, Lebanon inDecember 1999 as an international, nongovernmental,independent and specializedagency.The Organisation aspires to accomplisha qualitative and quantitative advancein translation activity to and fromthe Arabic language in various branchesof knowledge, to introduce science intocontemporary Arab culture, to stimulatedemand for translated books and to developa plan for promoting translation inthe Arab world.The Organisation adopts the conceptof "translation-research", whichaims to transmit knowledge rigorouslyand accurately and to support translationwith research on technical terms, introductorymaterial and annotation in orderto create a better understanding of theSource: General Director, Arab Organisation for Translation.The state of translation in Arab countriesFor Arab societies, translation is a formidablechallenge and a vital requirement that necessitatesthe organisation and planning of effortswithin the framework of an ambitious and integratedArab strategy.The history of translation in the modernperiod began in both Egypt and Lebanon fordifferent reasons, and thus it followed differentcourses. In Lebanon, translation started asan attempt to protect the Arabic languagefrom Ottoman “Turkisation”. In Egypt itstarted during the era of Muhamad Ali andtook the form of an active social movement.Sheikh Rifaa Al-Tahtawi managed to maketranslation a social institution, which contributedto the achievement of a national project,and which aimed at bringing about anoverall revival of science and industry. This activity,though, was obstructed and eventuallyfailed.Most Arab countries have not learnedfrom the lessons of the past and the field oftranslation remains chaotic. In terms of quantity,and notwithstanding the increase in thenumber of translated books from 175 per yearduring 1970-1975 to 330, the number of bookstranslated in the Arab world is one fifth of thenumber translated in Greece. The aggregatetotal of translated books from the Al-Ma’moon era to the present day amounts to10,000 books - equivalent to what Spain translatesin a single year (Shawki Galal, in Arabic,1999, 87) 3 .This disparity was revealed in the first halfof the 1980s when the average number ofbooks translated per 1 million people in theArab world during the 5-year period was 4.4(less than one book for every million Arabs),while in Hungary it was 519, and in Spain 920.(Figure 2.9.)There are no accurate statistical data regardingthe academic level of these translations.But a marked shortage of translations ofbasic books on philosophy, literature, sociologyand the natural sciences is quite evident.Meanwhile, translations of some titles of muchlesser importance exist. A crucial policy forthe future will be to organise the selection oftext. In this manner, it strives to build anenvironment of trust which encouragesresearchers and students to accept translations,thus overcoming widespread andjustifiable reservations about many currenttranslations, especially those drivenby commercial motives.The Organisation is guided in what itselects for translation by what it deemsnecessary for scientific and intellectualadvancement. The selection results froma wide and thorough process of consultation,surveys and proposals tabled at thepan-Arab level, which pass through sevenspecialized committees dealing with respectively:Foundations of ScientificKnowledge; Contemporary ScientificCulture; Philosophy; Social and HumanSciences; Applied Sciences andTechniques; Arts and Literature; andLanguages and Lexicons.The aggregate totalof translated booksfrom the Al-Ma’moon era to thepresent day amountsto 10,000 books -equivalent to whatSpain translates in asingle year.3This number was erroneously stated as 100,000 in AHDR1.KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 67


ooks for translation in order to fulfil Arabacademic research needs. Such a policy is requiredto make translation an effective force inadvancing research and knowledge in the region.Figure 2.9Number of books translated in Arab countries(per 1 million people) compared to selected countries, 1981-1985Source: Unesco, 1995.This chapter shows that the dissemination of knowledge in Arab countries is beset by many difficulties.Chief among these is the absence of a strategic vision and societal incentives that providea solid foundation for knowledge dissemination through education, media, publishing and translation.These channels have the potential to be major shapers of a cultural and scientific climateconducive to knowledge adaptation and production. Yet in all three, quality, excellence and independence,which remain the most important dimensions of a knowledge society, have suffered.This trend has to be reversed through conscious policy-making. The following chapter discussesknowledge acquisition on higher levels of society, focusing on the production of knowledge.68 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


CHAPTER 3Knowledge production in Arab countriesThe production of knowledge, the focus of thischapter, takes place at an advanced stage ofknowledge acquisition in any society and is thewidest, if not the only, gateway to the worldknowledge society. The quantity and quality ofknowledge produced by a society is evidence ofits ability to add to the world reserve of <strong>human</strong>knowledge and to renew the wellsprings of itsown creativity.What is the status of Arab scientific, technological,literary and artistic productiontoday? What are the factors that have shapedthe current situation? This line of enquiryholds the essential keys to the <strong>development</strong> ofknowledge producing societies in the region.This chapter seeks to evaluate the amountof knowledge produced in the Arab world. Italso analyses how far the conditions requiredby a knowledge society (qualified researchworkers, innovative institutions, supportivepolicies) are present in the region. In doing so,it investigates the quality of scientific researchand technological <strong>development</strong>, and the productsof creativity in the <strong>human</strong>ities, social sciencesand the arts. The two central questionsthat all Arab countries must answer are: whatin the past and present points to a brighter futurefor the advancement of knowledge productionin Arab countries, and what are themeans that will enable countries to own science,rather than merely importing some of itsapplications and results?The history of scientific <strong>development</strong>shows that science cannot be developed withoutinstitutions dedicated to this purpose andwithout promoting the vocation of scientistsand scientific applications. Moreover, scientificculture can only pass from one society to another,whether by means of translation or thetransfer of scientists and know-how, if the requisiteinfrastructure and institutions for embracingscience and owning it are in place.Europe would not have been able to utilise scientificknowledge at the beginning of the industrialrevolution had not scientific education,on the one hand, and scientific culture, on theother, permeated society through many channels.BOX 3.1Muhamad Ali’s Experience in Scientific ModernisationThe first attempt at scientific modernisationin the Arab world was made byMuhamad Ali in the first half of the 19 thcentury. This attempt, as well as othersthat followed it, encountered severalstumbling blocks.Two illusions thwarted the attemptand they continue to trap many developingcountries. The first was the beliefSource: Roshdi Rashed, in Arabic, background paper for AHDR2.that scientific production could be transferredwithout planning and building astrong infrastructure for research, andwithout laying the foundation of a scientificand technological culture in societyat large. The second, an outcome of thefirst, was the erroneous belief that basicresearch is dispensable for financial reasons.BOX 3.2Ali Mustafa Mosharrifah* - On the importance of the history ofscience for a knowledge renaissanceCivilised nations must have a culture associatedwith the history of their scientificthought… Our scientific life inEgypt needs to be attached to our past inorder to acquire the necessary strength,vitality and controls. We in Egypt transferthe knowledge of others and leave itfloating without any relationship to ourpast or any contact with our land. It is acommodity that is foreign in its features,foreign in its words and foreign in itsconcepts. If we mention theories, we associatethem with faceless names that wehardly know. If we talk about concepts,we use intimidating words that driveaway thoughts and unsettle the mind.Source: Roshdi Rashed, background paper for AHDR 2.We have first to publish the scientificbooks authored by Arabs and translatedby Europeans, like the books of al-Khwarizmi and Abu Kamel in algebraand arithmetic, those of Ibn al-Haythamin physics, of al-Buzjani, al-Bayroni, al-Battani and other leaders of scientificthought and talented researchers… Wemust pay attention to honouring our ancientscientists and researchers. This willprompt us to imitate them and follow intheir footsteps.*The first professor of mathematical physics and thefirst Arab Dean of the Faculty of Science, CairoUniversity.KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 69


Arabic research activitycontinues to be farfrom innovative.Research in advancedfields, such asinformation technologyand molecular biology,is almost non-existent.SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTION:NATURAL SCIENCES ANDTECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTSCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ANDTECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT– OUTPUTSUp-to-date and accurate information aboutthe outcomes of research and <strong>development</strong>(R&D) in the Arab region is hard to come byin the absence of comprehensive statistics onspecialised sectors or research topics. Yet certainoutputs can be measured through scientificpublications, patents and inventions.Scientific researchBased on the number of scientific publicationsper million people (26 research papers in1995), Arab countries fall within the advancedgroup of developing countries, which includeBrazil (42), China (11) and India (19), althoughthey are still far removed from the productionlevels of developed countries, such asFrance (840), the Netherlands (1,252) andSwitzerland (1,878).The scientific publication movement inthe Arab world experienced a substantial increasein the last three decades of the 20th century.The number of papers published byArab scholars in specialised global periodicalsincreased from 465 papers in 1967 to nearly7,000 in 1995, i.e., by 10% annually. This increasewas, however, modest in comparisonwith some developing countries, such asBrazil, China and East Asian Tigers such asKorea. Calculating the rate of increase in publishedscientific papers per one million peoplemakes an instructive comparison with thesecountries. Based on that indicator, the numberof scientific papers per one million people inthe People's Republic of China in 1995 was 11times what it was in 1981. In South Korea, itwas 24 times greater. In Arab countries, however,it was only 2.4 times greater, increasingfrom 11 papers per one million people in 1981to 26 papers in 1995.At the institutional level, only 26 Arab scientificinstitutions published more than 50 researchpapers each in 1995, while only fivesuch institutions published more that 200 papers.Most of these publications were in appliedfields, such as medicine, health and agriculture.Medicine, health and life sciences accountedfor 32% of the total R&D productspublished by Arab countries in 1995 andchemistry accounted for 19% of total researchproducts for that year. When one adds tothese fields the papers published in agriculture,engineering and associated fields thetotal products of applied research represented90% of all publications. Publications in basicsciences, astronomy, chemistry, physics andmathematics did not exceed 10% of total research(Amr Armanazi, background paper forthis <strong>report</strong>).These rates have important implications.Despite the increase in the number of publishedArabic research papers in specialisedglobal periodicals, Arabic research activitycontinues to be far from innovative. Most of itis applied research and only a small portion isrelated to basic research. Research in advancedfields, such as information technologyand molecular biology, is almost non-existent.Among the indicators for measuring thequality of research in general is the number ofreferences made to it. The higher the level of aresearch paper and the more it adds to <strong>human</strong>knowledge the more references it attracts. Thefirst Arab Human Development Report indicatedthat only one paper each in Egypt, SaudiArabia, Kuwait and Algeria in 1987 wasquoted more than 40 times, while in theUnited States 10,481 papers were quotedmore than 40 times and in Switzerland 523 papers(First Arab Human Development Report,2002, p. 67).PatentsIndicators of the number of patents in Arabcountries confirm the weakness of R&D activity,which lags far behind that of developedcountries and other countries of the developingworld. Table 3-1 indicates the number ofpatents registered in the United States duringthe period 1980-2000 for some Arab countries,compared to patents registered from selectednon-Arab countries. It should be notedthat a large number of patents registered inArab countries are by foreigners. (AmrArmanazi, background paper for the Report).70 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Scientific publications and patents are usefulbut insufficient indicators of scientific researchand technological <strong>development</strong>activity. They do not indicate the full spectrumof innovation activity, which is more related to<strong>development</strong> support products. National innovation,in general, includes the <strong>development</strong>of new products, production processesand services and the <strong>development</strong> of moderntechnologies for sectors where technologyplays an important role in performance and increasesefficiency. Indicators related to innovationprocesses, such as the design andengineering of products, production processesand software, are not readily available.Innovative capabilities can, however, begauged by demonstrating the widespreadpresence of innovations in national and foreignmarkets that can be counted and evaluated.On that criterion, there are virtually noArab innovations on the market, a fact thatconfirms that Arab scientific research has notyet reached the innovation stage.TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCHAND DEVELOPMENT – INPUTSProducing knowledge workersHigher education fuels the knowledge societyand produces those who will work in it.National scientific research and <strong>development</strong>activities, as well as industries, need highlyqualified graduates and researchers with enquiringand trained minds and flexible skills.Statistics indicate a sustained increase inthe number of students in higher education institutionsin Arab countries over successiveyears, with a noticeable increase in the numberof female students. These statistics indicate,however, that only a small number of studentsand graduates have opted to specialise in basicsciences, engineering, medicine and other scientificsubjects. The low rate of graduates,both researchers and technicians, in scienceand technology disciplines undercuts effortsto build balanced <strong>human</strong> capacity in the fieldof science and technology. There is also a needfor larger numbers of graduates of intermediatetechnical institutes to enlarge the pool ofworkers with technical know-how and skills ofa practical nature.TABLE 3.1Number of patents registered in the United States from Araband non-Arab countries during the period 1980-1999/2000Arab CountriesOther CountriesCountryBahrainEgyptJordanKuwaitOmanSaudi ArabiaSyriaUAEYemenNo. of Patents6771552517110322CountryKoreaIsraelChileSource: Abdulkader Djeflat (March 1999) and Omar Bizri (April 2000).Training in Arab countries in general isdriven by supply rather than demand and thefocus is on quantity, not quality. With a fewexceptions, higher education systems respondweakly to labour market needs related to scienceand technology. This situation is not expectedto change noticeably, barring a strongpush on the demand side from industry, businessand national institutions and in the contextof coherent and comprehensive scienceand technology policies, which clearly emphasisethese urgent orientations. Upgrading thelevel and quality of training also depends onan increase in funding. Higher education institutionsgenerally underscore that they lack resources,a complaint borne out by statisticsrelated to per capita expenditure, with somevariations between Arab countries. Theunder-funding of higher education impactsnegatively on science and technology in particular,because these fields require the provisionand renovation of costly special facilities,equipment and materials. Meagre facilities inevitablylead to a marked decline in the level ofgraduates in science and technology fields,which in turn limits the ability of research centresand productive firms which employ thesegraduates to achieve advanced levels of scientificand technological performance and accomplishment.In general, the ratio of students enrolled inscientific disciplines in higher education inArab countries is small, compared to advancedcountries in the field of knowledge,such as Korea, although Jordan, followed byAlgeria, are distinguished among Arab countriesin this field. See Figure 3.1.No. of Patents16,3287,652147Training in Arabcountries is generallydriven by supply ratherthan demand and thefocus is on quantity,not quality.The under-funding ofhigher educationimpacts negatively onscience andtechnology inparticular.KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 71


Workers in scientific research and<strong>development</strong>The data available on the number of R&Dand technical workers in the region and by individualcountries is scarce and incomplete.Figure 3.1Ratio of students enrolled in scientific disciplines in higher educationin selected Arab countries and Korea, 1990-1995Source: Based on data from the World Bank, 1998.Figure 3.2Number of scientists and engineers working in research and <strong>development</strong>(per one million people)*Regions of the world, 1990-2000There are, however, a number of telling indicatorsof the present situation:• The total number of full-time researchersin Arab countries, including those pursuingthe equivalent of full-time research amongteaching staff, is around 35,000. Half of thisnumber works in Egypt.• There is an average of 3.3 researchersholding masters and doctoral degrees for every10,000 persons in the Arab work force (1996statistics). This is a very low percentage, representing3% to 10% of the rates of the same indicatorin developed countries.• There are only 50 technicians for every onemillion citizens, another very low figure whencompared to the 1000 technicians per millioncitizens in developed countries.• Women and their talents are significantlyunder-represented in scientific research institutionsin Arab countries. In Egypt the percentageis relatively higher than in other Arabcountries. Nevertheless, across the region,considerable potential exists for investingmuch more in women scientists, engineers,and technicians. (Amr Armanazi, in Arabic,background paper).Figure 3.2 indicates the low ratio of scientistsand engineers working on research and<strong>development</strong> in Arab countries compared toother regions of the world.The number of countries on which dataare available was 91 countries (out of 179), ofwhich only 5 were Arab countries.ExpenditureSource: UNDP, 2002.BOX 3.3In Kuwait, 44 per cent of university graduatesreceive their degrees in the <strong>human</strong>ities,18 per cent in public administrationand 12 per cent in Islamic law.Graduates in natural sciences, engineering,medicine, pharmacology, health andSource: Country Report prepared for AHDR 2.Kuwait: Profile of University Graduatesnursing represent just 26% of the totalnumber of graduates.Furthermore, 67 per cent of all graduatesin higher education are women.This is partly due to the fact that manymale students study abroad.Stimulating research and <strong>development</strong> requiresthe political will to indigenise scienceand establish the necessary infrastructure.This calls for greater R&D outlays than thefractional sums Arab countries currently invest,which do not exceed 0.2% of GNP, althoughthis ratio varies from one country toanother. For comparison purposes, the ratiosspent by developed countries vary from 2.5%to 5%. Furthermore, 89% of expenditure onR&D in Arab countries comes from governmentalsources, while productive and servicesectors spend only 3%, as against more than50% in developed countries. (See Table 3.2)The low level of investment in research by* The average number in the region is calculated as a weighted average (population number in 2000) for data on the number of scientists and engineersworking in research and <strong>development</strong> by country.72 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


the productive sector, both public and private,is a clear indication of the poor environmentfor, and weak level of innovative activity inArab countries, considering that governmentspending largely covers only salaries.As these figures illustrate, societal awarenessof the far-reaching importance of supportingscientists and science is extremelyweak. The enormous gains in knowledge thataccrue from a vital local R&D establishmentshould not be held hostage to social indifference.Leadership is required to motivate Arabsocieties to take responsibility for research andinnovation. In developed countries, enterprises,wealthy individuals, foundations andnon-profit organisations all finance such research.In the long run, boosting public and privateinvestment in R&D activity will raise theadded value of products, processes and servicesgenerated from such research, providedthat new research is translated through innovationactivities into commercially marketableresults. Successful commercialisation wouldmake it possible to invest a portion of the resultingprofits in financing future innovationactivities. This would generate a sustainable financingdynamic, which would continuouslyreplenish R&D. It would transform R&Dfrom a drain on state and private sector budgetsto a profitable investment, supporting thegross national product and driving the wheelof economic and social <strong>development</strong>.Encouraging the private sector to financeR&D does not, however, imply that the stateshould relinquish its important responsibilitiesin this field. Scientific research, especiallybasic research, cannot be a captive of the market.States play a large role in ensuring policyconditions conducive to institutional research,and in incentivising the private sector, throughtax and other instruments, to invest in researchand innovation.InstitutionsThere are essentially three categories of Arabinstitiutions that focus on research and knowledge<strong>development</strong>. The first are higher educationinstitutes and their affiliated researchcentres; the second are free-standing specialisedcentres of scientific research; and thethird are R&D units with links to industry.TABLE 3.2Rate of expenditure as a percentage of GNP and sources of R&Dfunding: Arab states compared with selected countries, 1990-1995Region or groupof countriesUnited States, Japanand SwedenGermany, France,United Kingdom,Italy, Australia andCanadaGreece, Portugaland SpainTurkey and MexicoArab statesSource: Subhi Al-Qasim, 1999.Average expenditure(% of GNP)3.12.40.70.40.2According to some estimates, there are atotal of 588 such entities in the region.There are 184 Arab universities, all withactivities associated with higher education andscientific research and promotion. Scientificresearch in higher educational institutions andsome associated centres is often academic incharacter, although there are visible moves insome Arab countries (Algeria, Iraq, Qatar,Libya, Egypt and Morocco) to link a portionof research projects to societal needs.The specialised scientific research centresassociated with some universities vary in size,means and productivity, but most of themfocus on agricultural, health and engineeringresearch. (The total number of centres specialisingin industry, energy and petrochemicalsdoes not exceed one-third of the number ofcentres specialising in agriculture). Accordingto available estimates, there are some 126 ofthese affiliated centres in all Arab countries.(Taha Tayeh Al-Nu’aimi, ScientificInstitutions in the Arab Homeland and theirImpact on Scientific Research Activity, 2000.)In the second category, there are approximately278 scientific research centres and organisationsoutside universities, includingcentral research organs (national research centresand institutes) and those connected withministries or industrial and agricultural firms.Table 3.3 indicates the distribution of thesecentres in the various Arab countries.The great majority of these centres specialisein agriculture, water resources, health,nutrition and the environment. Centres specialisingin biotechnology or electronics do notPercentage share of funding sourcesGovernment Industry Other20-30 55-70 4-10385465-7389523514-3131011Leadership is requiredto motivate Arabsocieties to takeresponsibility forresearch andinnovation.Scientific research,especially basicresearch, cannot be acaptive of the market.58KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 73


TABLE 3.3Number of scientific research centres (outside of universities) inArab countriesCountryAlgeriaBahrainDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoSource: Al-Nu’aimi, 2000.Research projectsoften lack clearobjectives, a firmresults orientationand a sense ofurgency.No. of centres3011732295918316CountryOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemenNo. of centres21337314152439Total 280exceed 3 percent of the total.The third category of R&D institutions isthe research and <strong>development</strong> units associatedwith productive enterprises or established asindependent units. These units are small innumber and their performance is below expectedlevels. There are no specific data abouttheir total number, but it is estimated thatthere are some 16 units belonging to the privatesector and concerned with industry. (AmrArmanazi, background paper for this <strong>report</strong>.)The amount of R&D activity in the organisationsand centres outside universities seems,in general, to be the same level as that carriedout in the universities and the centres associatedwith them. University-based research itselfis often either purely academic or narrowlyapplied in orientation, and is mainly driven bysupply. In both arenas, research projects oftenlack clear objectives, a firm results orientationand a sense of urgency linked to producinghigh-impact <strong>development</strong>al outcomes within atime-bound plan.TABLE 3.4Number of scientific and technological research centres (outsideuniversities) in Arab countries, by field of specialisation andnumber of countries of locationResearch fieldAgriculture and water resourcesIndustrialConstruction and <strong>development</strong>Health, nutrition and environmentSpace and remote sensingEnergyBasic and pure sciencesInformatics, computer and communicationsBiotechnologiesElectronicsOtherSource: calculated from data by Al-Nu’aimi et al., 1988.No. ofcentres763484317221154454Percentage271231668421120No. of Arabcountries oflocation15147111012644315Possibly the most telling sign of weaknessin Arab scientific R&D agencies is their inabilityto transform research results into investmentprojects. This vital orientation is usuallyeither missing in research plans in the firstplace, or is simply beyond the knowledge, expertise,and facilities these institutions canmuster.PRODUCTION IN THEHUMANITIES AND SOCIALSCIENCESThe <strong>human</strong> sciences have historical traditionsdating back to the time before the independenceof the Arab countries, as is the case withstudies of history and civilization, for instance.Social sciences as full-fledged disciplines,however, did not emerge and take hold inthese countries until after independence whenuniversities and research centres were establishedto teach and research these sciences. Inother words, social sciences did not exist in theArab world before the 1960s, with a few exceptions,mainly Egypt. In some countries,such as the Arabian Gulf countries, they didnot emerge until a decade later.The status of <strong>human</strong> and social sciencesdiffers from one Arab country to the next inthe level of their <strong>development</strong>, scholarshipand social and political returns. There is notenough accurate data to draw an Arab map oftheir distribution. There are, however, generaltrends, which can be monitored on the basis ofpartial indicators. While Iraqis and Syrians,for instance, made excellent contributions tothe study of history and civilisation, Egyptiansmade advanced contributions in the field ofeconomic and political sciences, compared toother Arabs. Research traditions in sociologyand anthropology seem stronger in the ArabMaghreb, in terms of both theory and methodology(Al-Taher Labib, background paper forthis <strong>report</strong>).The emergence of specialised research andtraining in these fields is tied to the rise of themodern nation-state, the national projects itproposed and the difficulties it faced in itsearly stages. From the outset, social sciencesand <strong>human</strong> sciences dealing with "nationalhistory" were subject to political and bureaucraticsteering. Directives to "find practical so-74 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


lutions" defined their mission. This pragmatictrend incurred for certain disciplines, particularlysociology, an unjust reputation for beingpurely empirical, with no theoretical structure.That prejudice continues today. It also led tothe emergence of certain "specialisations"with direct practical goals, such as "social service",a trend that spread throughout universitiesin countries of the Arab East, but whichdid not affect most of the Maghreb countries.Many Arab scholars in the <strong>human</strong> and socialsciences draw attention to a paradox intheir situation. They note that, for Arab academics,students and researchers in particular,higher barriers have, in the course of events,actually accompanied the globalisation ofknowledge, despite its promise of freer flowsof knowledge, ideas and people. Undeniably,strained relations between some Westerncountries and Arab countries at different timeshave had an impact on the <strong>development</strong> of the<strong>human</strong> and physical sciences. This obstaclepartly accounts for a regression in knowledgeof foreign languages among university studentsand graduates who have remained intheir own countries. A new kind of monolingualprofessor and researcher has started togradually replace the kind of bilingual academicwho in the past dominated most Arab universitiesand research centres. It has alsoaffected Arab participation at internationalscientific meetings and, consequently, theArab presence in international scientificgroups and networks. (Al-Taher Labib, backgroundpaper for this <strong>report</strong>.)A form of Arab self-containment hobblesco-operation with international partners inthe <strong>human</strong>ities and social sciences. The emphasison the "specificity" of Arab societies, acommon preoccupation in Arab countries, hasplayed a negative role in this respect, leadingto a neglect of anything that is not "related toour reality" and a narrow focus in research onlocal or purely Arab subjects. This tendencyhas sometimes deprived Arab scholars of acomparative perspective and the capacity tolink the particularities of their context to generalstructures and trends in the wider world.There is no accumulated tradition of Arabscholarship on the "Other". Institutions concernedwith the study of other societies are almostnon-existent. This is a strikingincongruity, given the external challengesfaced by Arab countries.Meanwhile, this form of insularity also affectsArab students pursuing research abroad,the majority of whom concentrate on researchtopics about their own countries or region.Few Arab PhD theses earned outside the regiondeal with the society in which the researchertemporarily resides. On the otherhand, students and researchers who come tothe Arab world, often do so to become moreclosely acquainted with the Arab world and tostudy it.As a result, there is no accumulation of anArab stock of scientific knowledge about "theOther". While Arab scholarship is becomingmore inward looking, this tendency is not relatedto the will of scholars as individuals, butrather to a whole tradition and set of politicalchoices.Difficulties in the cognitive relationshipwith the "Other", and those arising from communicationin Arabic, have thus limited howfar Arab research is integrated into internationalnetworks. This, in turn, places restrictionson the universal dimension of research inArabic. There are only a handful of Arabscholars and researchers who regularly writein foreign languages, whether English orFrench, and who commonly address issues ofglobal interest.It must, however, be said that Arab researchers,for all their concentration on Arabissues, have yet to establish a single dynamicArab network or scientific group. A few scientificsocieties and professional associationshave sprung up in disciplines such as economics,sociology, philosophy and history. But onthe whole, Arab production in the social and<strong>human</strong> sciences remains an essentially individualeffort and there are no circles or institutionsthat consistently work on bringing Arabresearchers together and supporting them inan organised manner.Thus, Arab researchers in the <strong>human</strong>itiesand social sciences frequently work in a vacuum.They are integrated with neither globalnor Pan-Arab groups. This isolation has led inseveral cases to observable frustration that hasbegun to turn into a general mood, reflected ina withdrawal into individual pursuits and akind of indifference, not only to public affairsThere is noaccumulated traditionof Arab scholarship onthe "Other".While Arabscholarship isbecoming moreinward looking, thistendency is not relatedto the will of scholarsas individuals, butrather to a wholetradition and set ofchoices.KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 75


Restricting intellectualfreedom is tantamountto depriving society ofits capacity to generatethe meaningful,innovative andproductive knowledgethat is a preconditionfor survival and successin the 21 st century.A work of imaginationis both mirror andlamp.but also to questions of knowledge per se.Freedom of intellectual expression may bea more central issue in <strong>human</strong> and social sciencesthan in natural science because of thevery nature of the study rather than the natureof the intellectual. In the Arab world, the formersciences are subject to many factors thatlimit freedom of thought. In addition to socialand cultural limitations inherited and internalised,there is the intervention of politics andlaws associated with politics, which directly orinvisibly draw red lines for research in the <strong>human</strong>itiesand social sciences.Freedom of thought and of expression,and the laws to guarantee them, are primaryenabling requirements for quality scholarshipand intellectual <strong>development</strong>. These requirementsought to be seen not only in a politicalperspective, but also from the standpoint ofknowledge. Serious work is needed to persuadeArab governments that restricting intellectualfreedom is tantamount to deprivingsociety of its capacity to generate the meaningful,innovative and productive knowledge thatis a precondition for survival and success inthe 21 st century.LITERARY AND ARTSPRODUCTIONLiterary production, as a field of knowledge,transcends material reality, yet a powerful intrinsicrelationship remains between the creativeimagination and reality. A work ofimagination is both mirror and lamp. It reflectsreality and illuminates it at the sametime. Literary knowledge is intricately tied tosocial dialectics. It is a form of knowledgeinasmuch as it draws on reality and is inspiredby it. It then transfigures that reality in a mannerthat surpasses what is and looks forward towhat can be.It is important to distinguish between thestatus of literature and the arts and the statusof scientific research and technological <strong>development</strong>.Compared to the extent of knowledgeproduction in the sciences, Arab societieshave produced a wealth of distinguished literaryand artistic work that stands up to highstandards of evaluation. The main reason forthis divergent performance lies in the essentialdifference between the prerequisites for literaryand scientific production. While it is impossiblefor an Arab scientist to win the NobelPrize in physics without having access to thebasic requirements of scientific research –such as a serious political commitment to supportingR&D and a social context that valuesscience and scientists and offers requisite facilities,including laboratories, qualified workteams and sufficient financing – it is possiblefor an Arab novelist to win the Nobel Prize forLiterature without institutional or materialsupport. There is no causal connection betweenprosperity and good literary production.In some instances, difficultcircumstances and intellectual and politicalchallenges can actually motivate artists andstimulate literary creativity. Yet while censorscannot defeat creativity itself, they canlengthen the gauntlet to be run in putting creativeproducts into the hands of the public. 1Nevertheless, Arab authors and artists facegreat difficulties of their own. While there maybe no conditional relationship between literarycreativity and prosperity, yet, for this creativityto flourish and grow and benefit thesurrounding environment, artistic expressionneeds a climate of freedom and cultural pluralism.It also benefits from strong financialand institutional support. These circumstancesare not available to most Arab creativeartists. In general, Arab artists in all fields (literature,plastic arts, music, theatre, and cinema)work without support from institutions.Success or failure, sustained or sporadic production,depend largely on the personal circumstancesof each artist.THE SHORT STORY AND THENOVELThe rise of the Arab novel and short story arelinked to the beginnings of the modern era.They have come to represent a new creativediscourse parallel to the movement of societyand expressive of its struggles and crises. Inthe second half of the 20th century, the Arab1A paradox of Arab censorship: the novel which won the prize for creativity in the Arab cultural capital in 2002 was banned from distribution in thatsame capital by the censor. In another case, the novels of the author who won the first prize in the largest book exhibition in the region in 2002 weresubsequentry banned.76 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


novel and short story achieved a qualitativeand quantitative presence as accepted artforms. All Arab societies now contribute toproducing both forms, with no substantial differencebetween countries at the centre andthose on the periphery.Poetry, on the other hand, which is the distinctiveliterary genre of the Arabs, has beentouched by the winds of change. The movementof modern Arab poetry testifies to this.Moreover, while poetry once dominated Arabculture the modern Arab literary tradition haswidened to accommodate the novel and shortstory as well.There are no accurate statistics on the actualamount of literary production in the Arabworld; and the conflicting figures that areavailable call for prudent treatment. For example,sources note that between 1990 and1995 in Lebanon, approximately 564 worksfor children were published, compared to 730in Egypt (Faisal Hajji, in Arabic, 1995).However, there are many books for both childrenand adults without registered numbers,as a visit to Egypt’s National Library wouldconfirm, which renders the process of trackingbooks very difficult. Turning to UNESCO statisticson the volume of world publicationsshows that, in 1991, Arab countries produced6,500 books compared to 102,000 books inNorth America, and 42,000 in Latin Americaand the Caribbean, (Figure 3-3.) Book production,including literary production, inArab countries is evidently far from vigorousin comparison to the size of the populationand with other countries.Book production in Arab countries wasjust 1.1 percent of world production, althoughArabs constitute 5% of the world's population.The publication of literary works waslower than the average level of book production.In 1996, Arab countries produced nomore than 1945 literary and artistic books,which represents 0.8% of international production.This is less than what a country suchas Turkey produces, with a population aboutone-quarter that of the Arab countries. Ingeneral, Arab book production centres mainlyon religious topics and less on other fieldssuch as literature, art and the social sciences(see figure 3-4). A look at book distribution oraccessibility shows that, despite the existenceBOX 3.4The Ambition of Creativity in the Arab WorldOur civilisation, with all its deep historicaland <strong>human</strong> roots, is a civilisation oftext par excellence. Other deep-rootedcivilisations are also civilisations of textsand codes, not only of images. Textualcreativity continues to be present in us asone of the inputs of the question of advancement,progress and <strong>development</strong> inour Arab societies, which are still goingthrough the labours of social liberation,as one of the presumed important outputsof the stages of political liberation,crowned with independence. Since weare in the knowledge era, where knowledgeand sciences are boundless and encompassall, we live by the group, asrepresented by civil society institutions,not by individualism. Our era is one ofinstitutions, not of the noble knight whocarries a magic wand, which turns dirtinto gold. Amid this huge explosion ofknowledge, the Arab world is required toreconsider what <strong>human</strong> advancementmeans today and to benefit from <strong>human</strong>kind’saccumulated achievements inknowledge, achievements which demonstratethat the world is a call for existence,not non-existence. How creativeare societies that continually recreatetheir own crises?Man in our current era cannot livelike Albert Camus’ “stranger” who leadshis own life in cold neutrality and totalindifference; or as Heidegger says, “asthough <strong>human</strong> beings were thrown intoexistence”, or like Shakespeare’s hero,Hamlet, equivocating without any actionon his part; or perhaps like Qais (themad man in love with Layla), satisfiedwith mentioning Layla without havingher with him. Which half of Kafka’s cupdo we want, while we look at the status ofcreativity in the Arab world: the full halfor the empty half? Perhaps Ibn Arabishowed us the way, when he said: "Youthink that you are a small planet, whilethe whole world is embodied in you.”Obstacles to creativity, or, let us say,the glow of creativity in Arab societiesare numerous. They are not isolated orindividual but are the outcome of extendedand multiple interactions withthe various issues and crises of Arab societies.Creativity and knowledge areeclipsed by more urgent issues, such asbread for the poor, literacy, unemploymentand the low status and marginalisationof women. Ignorance becomes a taxpaid by the poor, and creativity regressesto the backbenches. It is associated onlywith occasions on which we may needcreativity to beautify an ugly face fromamong life’s visages.Another obstacle to creativity in theArab world is its collision with the “prohibited”,which prevents a free discussionand debate on issues of politics, sexand religion. Yet talking about one of thetaboo issues of this “trinity” does notnecessarily imply hostility towards societyor irreverence. It is not a form of tactlessnessor impudence or blasphemy.When talking about women’s creativity,a question to ask is: Are womenabsent or “absented” from the intellectualand creative scene? Are they a totemstanding on the dividing line betweenwhat is sacred and what is tainted? Arethey viewed in the collective conscienceas ceremonial objects or, even worse, ashandicapped individuals whose subjectiveoutpourings call for society’s help?This often seems to be so, although studiesindicate that the first creative text inhistory was produced by a woman, i.e.,the text of Enheduana's Hymns toInanna in Ur, beseeching her and callingher the resplendent light and theGuardian of Heavenly and Earthly laws.We, therefore, welcome studies onthe feminine intellect that do not make itthe monopoly of women but expand thesubject in order to unleash society’s creativeenergies and establish <strong>human</strong>rights, democracy and <strong>human</strong> justice forboth women and men. We seek to befree from oppression in our social structures,which leads to negative attitudestowards life itself that find pleasure inharming the trees, the stones and theroads. Our involvement in creativity andwork and our attachment to <strong>human</strong>itariancauses are only one expression of ourneed for protection and safety, which wehad found in the mother’s womb, an intimateplace neither antagonistic norpainful. Our involvement carries the gladtidings of new births into life, bridgingthe gap between developed societies atthe “end of history” in creativity andknowledge acquisition and the globalisationof <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, which remainsa challenge for developingsocieties that are still trying to find theirfeet as the least advantaged in the worldarena. But we always raise hope.Refqa Muhammad DoudeenKNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 77


Figure 3.3Number of publications – original writing and translation – per million peoplein the Arab world and other regions, 1991Source: UNESCO Yearbook, 1999.Figure 3.4Relative distribution of published books by field,ten Arab countries and the world, 1996Arab writersoften feel remotefrom theirassumedaudience.Source: UNESCO Statistics Institute, March <strong>2003</strong>.of 270 million Arabic speaking Arabs in 22countries, the usual published number of anygiven novel or short story collection ranges between1,000 and 3,000 copies. A book thatsells 5,000 copies is considered a bestseller.Once again, there are no accurate statistics onthe market reality or on the actual scope of distribution,yet all indicators suggest that the literarybook market is modest, even foracclaimed writers such as Naguib Mahfouz orYoussef Idris.A small readership, generally only amongthe educated elite, is one of the most acutechallenges facing creative writers in the Arabworld. High illiteracy rates in some Arabcountries and the declining purchasing powerof today’s Arab readers are undeniably realfactors influencing the size of this readership.However, would literate Arab citizenswho can afford to buy some books for themselvesand their families purchase literature toread in their leisure time? There are no accuratestatistics on the types of books preferredby Arab readers, but according to many publishersand observers, the bestsellers at theCairo International Book Fair are religiousbooks, followed by books categorised as educational.This observation reflects on the educationalprocess itself. Issues such as thealmost total absence of reading classes inschools, apparently the result of "not havingenough time to teach the basic curricula", andneglect of the modern Arab literary heritageshould give knowledge advocates food forthought.Arab writers often feel remote from theirassumed audience. Moreover, the absence of adirect relationship with the readers’ marketundercuts their financial independence, an importantguarantee of that degree of freedom insociety that most creative writers require.Nonetheless, some Arab authors have beenable to reach a wide base of people throughfilms and the mass media (the press, the radio,and television). Many authors are also practisingjournalists, a profession which helps themto reach readers and to introduce their worksto them.Creating scripts for films is another popularresort for writers. The Egyptian cinema, forexample, contributed to introducing NaguibMahfouz’s works to the public during themid-20 th century. The author wrote or collaboratedin writing screenplays for many popularfilms. Radio and television have alsocontributed to the popularisation of literaryworks, especially those literary genres, such ascolloquial poetry, that do not lend themselvesto publishing. While such opportunities arenot equally available to all authors, their importanceas venues for making literary worksaccessible to the general public should not beunderestimated. (Jacquemond, <strong>2003</strong>).Faced with an anaemic local market, cre-78 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


ative writers cherish the translation of theirworks into foreign languages. Following theaward of the 1988 Nobel Prize for Literatureto Mahfouz, a great change occurred in the internationalstatus of contemporary Arab literature.Translations of Arabic literatureexperienced an unprecedented boom in thelast decade, and Arabic novels and short storieshave started to appear on the comparativeliterature syllabus in universities around theworld. Yet in spite of this widening distributionin new markets, Arabic literature stillneeds active support to achieve the internationalrenown it deserves.THE CINEMAThere are film-makers across the Arab world,there are qualified and skilled artists and techniciansin the cinema industry and there is adequateequipment for film production. Yet insome Arab countries cinema production doesnot exist or is very limited. Egypt is the onlyArab country that actually has a film industry.Film production started at the beginning ofthe 20th century, a few years after the inventionof the cinema. It had evolved into a full industryby 1919. Important institutions wereestablished, which had a great impact on thisnew art. Since then, the Egyptian cinema hasdeveloped an audience and a market in Egyptand in Arab countries alike.The first Syrian film came out in 1928, butby 1968 no more than 20 films had been produced.In Lebanon film production started in1929, but the country did not turn out morethan 100 films until 1978. In the 1960s, particularyafter the Arab defeat in 1967, a new culturaland critical movement evolved aimed atconnecting the cinema with national cultureand societal problems. New cinema productionappeared in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,Kuwait, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria andMauritania: the films of this new wave generallyrejected the commercialism of the mainstreamindustry.Some Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria,Algeria and Iraq took important initiatives inthe 1960s to support cinematic production.However, they lacked a well-defined culturalpolicy. As a result, film making receded considerablyin the 1980s, and all but disappearedBOX 3.5Arab book publishing is in crisis. Thenumber of new publications is fallingand the number of copies of each issueprinted is becoming smaller, reachingonly a few hundred readers in manycases. This trend threatens to make thebook industry economically unfeasible.Big publishing houses are avoiding thepublication of serious scientific and culturalbooks, which would contribute toin-depth knowledge.This may seem paradoxical, sincethe number of Arabic publishing housesspringing up in countries previouslywithout book industries is increasing.But most publishing houses actually confinetheir activities to small productionruns of university textbooks, often ofpoor quality, or to the production ofquick-circulating popular books onephemeral topics.The book crisis stems from several factors:Censorship and the recession ofdemocracy and freedom of expressionThe distribution of any book in Arabcountries requires a prior permit fromlocal censors. The strictness of censorshipvaries from one country to another.While the book industry flourishes insome countries, such as Lebanon andEgypt, strict laws are often being flouted,depending on the prevailing political situation.These laws are, however, appliedrandomly and strictly against certain titlesand authors classified as violating religion,public morals, the regime orfriendly countries. Censorship in Arabcountries adopts different standards.What the censor in one country considersbanned, another censor in the sameor a different country considers acceptable.In most cases the censor exerciseshis/her role based on state instructions.He/she reads the texts searching for certainwords.Authors and publishers are hard putto accommodate the whims and instructionsof 22 Arab censors. As a result,books do not move easily through theirnatural markets. Censorship in this wayadversely affects creativity and production.Arab Books- A Threatened SpeciesFathi Khalil al-Biss, Vice-President, Arab Publishers UnionLow readershipThe Arab Publishers Union notes thatreaderships in Arab countries are declining,despite the increasing number of educationalinstitutions of all forms. This isattributed to several factors:• The curtailment of active political lifeand the failure of major intellectual projects:The state often dictates what readersmay read and what authors maywrite.• Unimaginative educational systems:many schools and colleges rely on dictationrather than motivating students tosearch for information in books andother sources.• Purchasing power: economic stagnation,declining purchasing power and theincreasing cost of living, have left the averageArab citizen preoccupied withbasic issues of livelihood. Books are becomingluxury items for educated elitesand for under-funded scientific institutions,schools and universities. The smallnumber of public libraries, their meagreacquisitions and limited catalogues exacerbatethe problem.• The lack of cultural <strong>development</strong>plans that encourage reading and instilthis habit in individuals from childhoodwhatever their social background.• Competition from the mass media:given these other factors, Arab citizensrely more on other, less expensive andless knowledge-based information mediato acquire information or entertainment.The infrastructure for bookdistributionA lack of major specialised book distributorswith wide distribution networks,(as enjoyed by newspapers and magazines)further hampers book productionand circulation. Books are usually onlyavailable in a limited number of bookshopsin major cities, reflecting weak demand.These bookshops offset theirfinancial losses by selling popular periodicals,stationery, gifts and other items.Intellectual property rights violationsPlagiarism and violations of copyrightalso undercut book publication. In mostArab countries, deterrent laws, whichprotect the rights of the author and thepublisher, are either absent or are not enforced.KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 79


when economic crises and security challengesparalysed the region’s political economy. Onthe other hand, other Arab countries have leftthe film market entirely to the private sector,which became the sole player in production,importation, distribution, the construction ofcinema theatres, the setting of prices and thelevying of taxes. A few other countries do notencourage a film market at all and ban publicshows and halls. It may be noted parentheticallythat the new cinema in Arab NorthAfrican countries would not have flourishedhad it not been technically, artistically and financiallysupported by producers from theThe challenges toWest, particularly France and Belgium, andArab cinema are had some European countries not openedthose of the market. their cinema and television markets to thenewcomers.This trend has appeared recently in theeastern parts of the Arab world as well, andthere were at one time some important experimentsin Egypt, which relied on funding fromArab institutions.Arab films have won awards at internationalfestivals, particularly the Cannes FilmFestival in France. The Algerian film,"Chronicles of the Years of Fire" won theGolden Palm award at that Festival. ALebanese film, "Hors la Vie" by MarounBaghdadi, won the Jury award in 1991. TheEgyptian director, Yusuf Shahin, won theGolden Palm award for his work in the film industrywhen his film, "The Fate", was enteredin the 1997 competition. And the PalestinianFigure 3.5Number of cinema seats per 1000 persons in selected Arab countries and Koreain the second half of the 1990sSource: UNESCO Statistics Institute, March <strong>2003</strong>.film, "A Divine Hand", by director ElijahSuleiman, won the Jury award in 2002.Although Arab films are earning a distinguishedposition in the international arena, thesituation of the Arab cinema industry remainswell below its potential and depends on individualinitiatives.The challenges to Arab cinema are thoseof the market. The cinema is a popular artform with mass appeal, and the film market istied to several strata within the audience. Inthe absence of shrewd cultural policies, standardsof taste have been pegged to favourcommercial and light films. Distributors havecome to control the market for Arab films,with the aim of garnering quick profits. InEgypt, when the state withdrew its support forthe cinema industry, film production recededfrom 60 per year to between 15 and 20. As aresult of the general decline of the industry,many cinema theatres were closed down. At atime when the population of Egypt is nearing70 million, only 165 cinema theatres are still inbusiness, including those situated in "CulturalPalaces". The international rate, by contrast,is one theatre, seating 250 people, per every100,000 persons. Moreover, the difference inthe availability of cinema seats from one Arabcountry to another is considerable. See figure3.5.THEATREConditions surrounding the art and productionof theatre in different Arab countries varyenormously. Some countries have no theatricalmovement at all. Others have a history of theatrethat dates back to the beginnings of themodern state, especially Egypt, Syria andLebanon. In these countries, theatre haspassed through phases of recession and prosperity,depending on political, economic, andsocial conditions.During the 1960s in Egypt, for instance,government institutions supported theatricalactivities that reflected the state’s ideologicalorientation. With the transformation of politicaldirection in the 1970s, the NationalTheatre turned into a bureaucratic institution,with few exceptions. Lebanon was the centreof an active theatrical movement during the1950s, which produced some distinguished80 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


works, but this movement withered after theoutbreak of civil war in the 1970s. The 1980s,on the other hand, witnessed the rise of commercialtheatre in several Arab countries. Thistrend was profit-driven, and favoured audienceentertainment and distraction at the expenseof serious drama. Tunisia, however, hasa distinguished theatrical tradition, with fourindependent troupes, supported by the state,which have succeeded in establishing a highqualitytheatrical movement. Iraq had a verygood theatrical movement, which was destroyedat the beginning of the 1990s after theimposition of international sanctions.MUSICArabic music, as a creative knowledge product,is a branch of oriental music. The Arabiclanguage imparts to Arabic song a specialcharacter that makes the Arabic musicalphrase distinctive. In Arabic arts, music comessecond only to poetry. Its importance derivesfrom its association with poetry and songs.Singing was the rhythmical recitation of poetry,based on the unity of Arabic culture,which depended on shared features of Arabicart in all its forms, including improvisation,musical keys and rhythm.The 20 th century carried the winds of <strong>development</strong>to Arabic vocal music through contactwith the Western world and as a result ofthe upgrading of the linguistic structure of thesong. This in turn brought genuine contemporarymusic that gave a rhythmical expressionto the written Arabic image. Music was also influencedby the <strong>development</strong> of musical instrumentsand techniques, as well as bysurrounding educational, social and culturalconcepts. This changing environment is characterisedby new technology for realising variouscreative products, which mix <strong>human</strong> andtechnological instruments of expression.These new forms pave the way for techno-musicalproducts and reflect the impact of globaltrends on local cultural traditions and behaviour.In short, while knowledge production inthe arts shows signs of real vitality and quality,it is small and disproportionate to the size ofthe Arab world with its <strong>human</strong> and natural resources.Moreover, artistic production is stilllargely the outcome of individual initiatives, orconditions favourable to particular artists.Arab institutions and societal structures rarelyplay an effective role in supporting the artsand creative artists.FREEDOM OF RESEARCH ANDEXPRESSION AS A CONDITIONFOR KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTIONFreedom is a muscle which, when exercised,grows, and when neglected, atrophies. Nondemocraticpolitical systems which do not expressthe interests of the people, whichsuppress freedom and which ultimately let individualslose their ability to act and take initiatives,are weak hosts to creative ideas andknowledge production. 2Most laws governing higher education anduniversity scientific research institutes includestatutes and regulations that curb the independenceof these institutions and place themunder the direct control of the ruling regimes.This leads to the curtailment of academic freedoms,and encourages academics and researchersto avoid embarking on creative orinnovative endeavours that may lead to controversyor political problems. Such laws effectivelykill the spirit of enquiry and creativity inresearchers. But distinction still remains, andArab universities host many excellent researchers;however, their distinction is usuallythe consequence of individual efforts or personalcircumstances, rather than of institutionalsupport and, as such, this does notestablish an academic tradition or a researchorientationThe visual and performing arts have a directconnection to the public, and thereforehave a special status among other forms of art.If freedom of speech is vital to the health ofthe arts and creativity in general, it is an essentialprerequisite for these highly "public" arts,which are about communicating freely withpeople, activating awareness and developingfree critical thinking. The art of the theatre, forArab institutions andsocietal structuresrarely play an effectiverole in supporting thearts and creativeartists.Freedom is a musclewhich, whenexercised, grows, andwhen neglected,atrophies. Nondemocraticpoliticalsystems are weakhosts to creative ideasand knowledgeproduction.2Undoubtedly, significant scientific production has been achieved under oppressive regimes, particularly in the natural sciences and technology, mostspecifically those concerned with armaments, through strong support from national authorities. The benefits of such knowledge production, however,were not universal to all in these societies and production itself was not sustained. The most important example of that is the former Soviet Union.KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 81


The main threat to freeliterature and art inArab societies is thedead hand of the statecensor.Censorship regulationsvary from one art formto another: the morepopular the art, theharsher theserestrictions are.example, is a collective art practised in a publicplace. One of its basic requirements is theavailability of a space that allows a group ofpersons to practice this art freely and to communicatewith the audience directly. If restrictionsare placed on freedom of assembly orcommunication with people, the theatre losesa primary condition for its vitality. Wise culturalpolicies can prevent this loss.The cinema, though not a live medium,also speaks to the soul and mind of the audience.It projects feelings, ideas, and visionsthat can enrich the audience’s life experiencesand provide insight into its surrounding reality,history or inner worlds. However, not allArab countries pay due attention to the cinemaas an expression of culture and creativity.At the same time, cinematic production is notonly an artistic endeavour, but also an industry,investment and a market. That dimensionof the medium is also widely neglected by thestate and dominated by private distributors.Since the cinema is a wide-reaching popularart, the societal power structures in Arabcountries have formed an ambivalent relationshipwith the medium: they may prohibit orprevent its production, but have no qualmsabout its consumption for commercial profit.Arab film production is subject to commercialrules and regulations that treat the cinemaas a consumer commodity. There are nospecial tax incentives for the cinema thatrecognise it as an art form and a tool of knowledge.In fact, some Arab countries imposehigh taxes on the cinema, and treat it as an entertainmentcommodity on the same level asnight-clubs and cabarets. The same logic is appliedto theatrical performances: very hightaxes are imposed on theatre tickets, a costthat undermines the sustainability of privatetroupes.The degree of social freedom also affectsthe accessibility of literary works, and the extentof their circulation amongst Arab countries.Publishers face severe obstacles to thedistribution of books in the Arab world forseveral reasons, most important among whichare the laws and regulations governing themovement of books across Arab countries.The Arab book is often treated as a bannedcommodity, and is usually subject to censorshipand bureaucratic procedures that placeexorbitant costs on publishers. These laws inevitablyhinder book publishing and circulation.As a result, some Arab scholars resort toshopping in bookstores in France or theUnited Kingdom to gain access to Arab literaryworks, an option hardly available to mostunder-paid researchers.Censorship substantially hinders the creativeprocess. Though no society in the worldis completely free from some form of declaredor hidden censorship, the types of official censorshipin Arab countries exact a heavy toll onthe arts in general. Authorities that imposecensorship over the arts vary. Some socialgroups assume the role of the censor over literaryand artistic production by protesting inthe press over what they consider infringementsof socially appropriate standards. Thesegroups sometimes even resort to the courts tostop a film or confiscate a book. Members ofthe same profession may also practise a formof censorship over each other. But the mainthreat to free literature and art in Arab societiesis the dead hand of the state censor onideas that are not compatible with its politicaldirection, or that may stir social unrest, or mobilisepeople over a political or social issue.Regimes that do not permit political diversityor social plurality create fertile ground for therise of extremism and regressive thinking thatis hostile, not only to the arts and artists, but tosocial progress as a whole. Ironically, tighteningthe state’s grip on literature and the artsloosens the reins on regressive currents opposedto <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.Censorship regulations vary from one artform to another: the more popular the art andthe greater its ability to communicate directlywith the audience, the harsher these restrictionsare. In the theatre in Egypt, for instance,a script is subject to revision by the censor as acondition for receiving a permit to perform.Rules of censorship over the theatre are looselyphrased and permit various interpretations accordingto the leanings of the censor and theruling regime. Usually, the rejection of a text isjustified by claiming that it violates publicmorality and the supreme interests of the state(Sayyed Ali Isamail, in Arabic, 1997). In thisway, censorship effectively suppresses criticismor innovation, and thus contributes todeepening the current crisis of Arab theatre.82 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Cinema production, in Arab countries, isalso subject to censorship laws and regulationsthat place many obstacles before creativity andthe treatment of vital subjects. In addition, becausecinema producers cannot cover their expensesexclusively from the local market,many take into account the censorship lawsnot only of the producing country, but ofother Arab countries as well.Arab censorship bridles Arab artistic creativityand denies Arab artists their native inspiration.A fundamental social function of theartist is to challenge social, political, and ideologicalorthodoxies and expose the uncontestedreceived wisdom dominating a society.Innovation and critical questioning of the statusquo are the very sources of creativity. Arabartists are confronted with unbending social,political and ideological frameworks that areabove accountability, and that treat innovationand change as signs of disintegration and unrest.Moreover, some dominant intellectual elementsin the Arab world hold nostalgically tothe past, and are ambivalent about the presentand the future. These elements fear innovationand oppose it fiercely. Thus, the Arab artist issurrounded by ideological and social currentsthat view and treat art with suspicion and issubject to the control of political regimes thatsweep social challenges under the carpet inorder to maintain their dominance.Fear of innovation and change is also oneof the driving forces behind policies that stiflethe creative capabilities of school and universitystudents. A social culture that encouragesand appreciates art, creative writing and musicsees to it that these subjects are widely taught.There are entire generations of Arabs whohave not learnt how to play a musical instrument,and who have not read literary worksbecause they were not accustomed to do so inschool. Creative pursuits taken for granted indeveloped country schools have simply beenneglected in the Arab world, with damagingresults to the creative potential of its people.Finally, it is important to point out thatstrained international relations create certainobstacles to knowledge creation. The uneasein Arab relations with some Western countriesin modern times has negatively affectedknowledge production. When an Arab writercriticises his or her society, he or she is oftenaccused of promoting the interests of foreignpowers against the interests of the nation, because(so the argument goes) by exposing theweaknesses of society, the writer is supplyingthose powers with ammunition for attackingArab countries. At the same time, Arab writingscritical of Arab countries have been mobilisedto aid self-serving policies towards theArab world. The hijacking of Arab art, literatureor research to serve vested interests presentsits own problems for Arab scholars,scientists and creative artists and, ultimately,diminishes the impact of their work for <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> at home and abroad.In short, a new Arab renaissance requires anew policy environment that liberates <strong>human</strong>capabilities in the sciences and arts by activelypromoting freedom, creativity and innovation.Without that prerequisite, the Arab knowledgesociety will remain an elusive dream.When an Arab writercriticises his or hersociety, he or she isoften accused ofpromoting theinterests of foreignpowers.This chapter suggests that Arab countries possess significant <strong>human</strong> capital, which under newcircumstances, could serve to lead, support and sustain a knowledge renaissance centred onknowledge production. It observes that an unsupportive policy and institutional environment forscientific research, an archaic environment for developing and encouraging education and a hostileenvironment for scientific and artistic freedom and creativity could negate such progress.KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN ARAB COUNTRIES 83


CHAPTER 4Measuring knowledge capital in ArabcountriesThis chapter attempts a quantitative measurementof the state of knowledge in Arab countries,focusing on knowledge capital, the coreof the knowledge production process. Ideally,the chapter would provide the most accurateassessment possible of the state of knowledgein Arab countries at the beginning of the 21stcentury. Yet in practice this attempt faces manyserious difficulties. The first is the poor databaseon knowledge, particularly on the qualityof <strong>human</strong> capital accumulated through education.Another data gap relates to the quantityand quality of knowledge production in Arabcountries: the information base on these aspectsis woefully short on accurate and up-todatedata comp<strong>arab</strong>le across time and space.These gaps underscore that the establishmentof such databases is one of the most pressingpriorities in building the Arab knowledge society.INTRODUCTIONMeasuring knowledge is not easy - either conceptually,methodologically or practically.Knowledge consists of abstract, symbolic structuresin the <strong>human</strong> mind that are almost impossibleto grasp, even on an intellectual level, letalone when it comes to concrete measurement.Measurement becomes even more difficultwhen considering knowledge capital, the determinantsof its growth and its effectiveness onthe societal level. So a resort to approximatemeasurement becomes inevitable in order toarrive at a first approximation of knowledgecapital, its growth rate and characteristics andparticularly the infrastructure for its formationand <strong>development</strong>.Knowledge, whether looked at as a system,wealth or capital, is a multidimensional andcomplex phenomenon. As a result, the comprehensivemeasurement of knowledge mustinvolve a relatively large number of indicatorsthat would be difficult for the <strong>human</strong> mind todeal with simultaneously. To surmount thischallenge, known statistical methods for constructingcomposite indices can be adopted.However, simplicity comes at a cost. Suchmethods are sometimes criticised for reducingcomplex phenomena to a single compositeindex that over-simplifies its subject’s manifolddimensions and masks the information contentof constituent indicators.Consequently, this chapter adopts both approaches.It examines some basic indicators ofknowledge acquisition in Arab countries thatare especially relevant to building a knowledgesociety, as compared to other countries and regionsof the world. But it also explores the constructionof composite indices of knowledgeacquisition that depend on the availability, andcredibility, of various data.Knowledge capital contains elements thatare not readily quantifiable. Its measurementought, therefore, to combine quantitative withother qualitative and subjective elements, especiallywhen it comes to literary and artistic production.The Report team aimed to present apilot opinion poll on those issues conductedamong faculty staff members at Arab universities,as a sample of Arab intellectuals. Althoughthe survey was designed to minimize difficultiesto the extent possible, it still encounteredobstacles typically faced when conducting researchin Arab countries. Nevertheless, the attemptyielded useful information summarisedlater in this chapter.In principle, it is advisable to take the qualityof the elements of knowledge capital intoconsideration. The Mean Years of Schooling(MYS) indicator, for example, is a useful yet insufficientmeasure of <strong>human</strong> capital, the solidnucleus of knowledge capital. The MYS shouldrather be weighed by a measure of the qualityMeasuring knowledgeis not easy - eitherconceptually,methodologically orpractically.MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES 85


Economic outputbecomes increasinglysensitive toeducationalattainment when thequality of education istaken into account.Knowledge capital, itscharacteristics and<strong>development</strong>, are atthe core of knowledgeacquisition.of educational attainment (derived, for example,from international studies of educationalattainment). This balancing is important sinceeconometric analysis indicates that the quantityof educational attainment is not as stronglyassociated with economic output as its quality.Indeed, economic output becomes increasinglysensitive to educational attainment whenthe quality of education is taken into consideration(Fergany, 1998). In the case of scientificoutput, measured by the number of publishedarticles in peer-reviewed journals, for example,quantity could be weighed by the frequencyof citation, assuming multiple citationsof a certain article are an indicator of itsknowledge value.The following attempt at measurementalso compares Arab countries, individuallyand collectively, on the different criteria ofknowledge capital, to other relevant countriesand country groups in the world. The countriesand groups taken for comparison includecountries considered important from the comparativeknowledge perspective. Those countriesinclude, where the data permits, Chinaand India, large nations with ancient civilisations,and the principal ‘Asian Tigers’ i.e.Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. All thesecountries are known to have adopted a knowledge-basedapproach to <strong>development</strong>, withrecognised success.It is necessary to comment once again onthe paucity of data on most aspects of knowledgein Arab countries. This deficiency is amajor obstacle to the accurate and comprehensivemeasurement of Arab knowledge ingeneral and Arab knowledge capital in particular.Turning to international databases didnot resolve the problem since data on Arabcountries is generally scarce. For example, inthe most important international database oneducational attainment, indicators of MYS in1990 were available for only 11 Arab countries.The number fell to 9 countries in 2000.Measures of the quality of educational attainmentwere not available except for a singleArab country in each of the two years, (Jordanand Kuwait, respectively).Data on expenditure on R&D relative toGDP at the end of the 20 th century were availablefor only two Arab countries; the numberof scientists and engineers was available foronly five Arab countries. Except for six Arabcountries, the percentage of high-technologyexports of total manufactured exports was notavailable.THE ADEQUATE MEASUREMENTOF KNOWLEDGE CAPITALThe adequate measurement of knowledgecapital requires considering the followingthree main aspects of knowledge acquisitionwith their corresponding basic elements:a. Knowledge Dissemination: essentiallythrough education, translation of books, massmedia (press, radio and TV), cinema housesand theatres.b. Knowledge Production: in two dimensions:Inputs: knowledge workers, expenditureon R&D (quantity and structure), andR&D institutions. Output: including scientificpublishing (quantity/quality), patents, thepublication of books, literary (novels, storiesand poetry) and artistic expression (drama,cinema and music).c. Infrastructure for Knowledge Capital:includes ICT infrastructure, R&D support institutions,and professional organisations ofknowledge workers.Adequate measurement, naturally, requiresaccurate, up-to-date and comp<strong>arab</strong>leinformation on all these fields in Arab countriesas well as in the countries of comparison.The Report originally set out to explore howfar Arab and international databases wouldallow for sufficient measurement of all thesedimensions of knowledge capital. For reasonsalready stated, this initial ambition was setaside for more modest goals.TOWARDS THE BETTERMEASUREMENT OF KNOWLEDGECAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIESMeasuring knowledge capital and its characteristicsand following up on their <strong>development</strong>and limitations are of special importancein Arab countries. The elements of knowledgecapital are key in determining the ability to acquireknowledge and thus in building <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> itself. Knowledge capital, itscharacteristics and <strong>development</strong>, are at thecore of knowledge acquisition. For reasons86 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


noted, the current attempt to measure Arabknowledge capital is neither complete norcompletely adequate. Yet it is important tomake a serious start in this direction and to exploreapproaches and measures that, if takenfurther, would significantly strengthen themeasurement of this crucial phenomenon.The initial contours of some proposals areevident. To start, all periodic statistical operations(censuses and specialised surveys) shouldinclude elements for measuring <strong>human</strong> capital(i. e., educational attainment and experience 1 ).Efforts to quantify <strong>human</strong> capital should becomplemented by good measures of its quality.This is attainable either by expanding theparticipation of Arab countries in internationalstudies of the quality of educational attainmentor – even better – by conductingArab comparative studies on the quality of<strong>human</strong> capital. The latter, unlike internationalstudies, would benefit from proficiency in theArabic language assessed.Good measurement of <strong>human</strong> capital isimportant yet insufficient. To arrive at an adequatemeasurement of knowledge capital as abuilding block of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, considerationshould be given to conducting specialisedstudies, both quantitative andnon-quantitative, in various other departmentsof knowledge.The prospects for better data on knowledgeacquisition in the Arab countries wouldimprove if pan-Arab or international organisationsundertook to collect and evaluate suchdata, ensuring its maintenance, credibility andcomp<strong>arab</strong>ility.A SURVEY OF ARABINTELLECTUALS ON THE STATEOF KNOWLEDGEAs noted earlier, the Report team sought topoll a number of faculty members in Arab universities,representing a sample of Arab intellectualsacross the region, on knowledgeacquisition issues. Annex 2 includes a brief descriptionof the design of the questionnaireand survey. At the time of writing, however,the team was able to ascertain such views inonly seven Arab countries (Bahrain, Lebanon,Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco).In four countries, the number of intellectualswho responded to the questionnaires was lessthan the targeted 96, bringing the total numberof replies to only 383. This reduced thebenefits of the exercise.Thus, in presenting the results of this survey,it is emphasised that the sample used wasnot selected by a standard probability method,which would support generalised attributionsto the Arab intellectual community at large.This does not, however, negate the usefulnessof the responses. Each response is undeniablysubjective, but the value of a subjective viewon knowledge issues increases with the increaseof the knowledge capital of the individualconcerned. In the case of university facultymembers in particular, their views acquiremore importance because of their ability tocontribute to the formation of <strong>human</strong> capitalthrough their higher education functions.From a statistical point of view, subjectivitywas restricted by canvassing the views of hundredsof faculty members of Arab universities,thus increasing the objectivity level of thesample 1 .The sample responding to the questionnairewas almost equally divided between menand women (56% men). Most of them werePhD holders (63%), and one-third master'sdegree holders (33%). The majority of them(58%) were specialised in <strong>human</strong>ities and socialsciences.The respondents generally expressed dissatisfactionwith the status of knowledge acquisitionin their countries (the average ratioof satisfaction was 38%). Satisfaction with theextent to which knowledge acquisition serves<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> was even lower (35%).These assessments clearly reflect the urgentneed to stimulate knowledge acquisition inArab countries.In characterising the knowledge acquisitionprocess in their countries, the respondentscame up with low rates in theirevaluation, as indicated in figure 4.1.• On a scale from 0-100% respondents ratedfreedom to pursue knowledge in their variousfields at 41%.• Conditions for knowledge acquisition intheir fields of scholarship satisfied the right toknowledge at 33%.Prospects for betterdata on knowledgeacquisition in Arabcountries wouldimprove if pan-Arab orinternationalorganisationsundertook to collectand evaluate suchdata.Respondents generallyexpresseddissatisfaction withthe status ofknowledge acquisitionin their countries.1Research in some Arab countries indicates that experience takes precedence over educational attainment as a determinant of earnings. This impliesan indirect recognition of the poor quality of educational attainment in the region.MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES 87


Arab knowledgesystems are neithersufficiently free noradequatelyincentivised.• Incentives to acquire knowledge were consideredjust 30% satisfactory.• The extent to which knowledge acquisitionin their disciplines serves <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>was rated only 30%.• The degree to which knowledge acquisitionreflects cultural diversity scored 30%.• The extent to which Arab knowledge acquisitiontakes into account the global state of theart was judged 30%.• Improvements in knowledge acquisition intheir branches of learning during the past 10years were rated only 28%.In short, according to the majority of scholarsin this sample, and with the reservations indicated,Arab knowledge systems are neitherFigure 4.1Assessment of key features of knowledge acquisition in Arab countriesby gender of respondent (%)Figure 4.2Assessment of the knowledge acquisition process in Arab countriesby academic level of respondent (%)sufficiently free nor adequately incentivised.Arab knowledge pursuits do not serve <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> adequately, nor do they reflectthe cultural diversity of Arab society. Localknowledge <strong>development</strong> and acquisition donot capture or keep up with the global knowledgeexplosion. Finally, in the Arab world,knowledge acquisition rates compared tothose of other regions have improved relativelyslowly.The questionnaire included questionscomparing the status of different knowledgeareas in the Arab world to their equivalents incertain non-Arab countries, including India,China and the East Asian Tigers. Respondentsto the questionnaire clearly had difficulty answeringthese questions. Many answered with:"don’t know". Indeed, only one-third of all respondentsaddressed questions requiring comparisonswith non-Arab countries.Women respondents were more criticalthan men, attaching less value to ongoingknowledge activities and evincing more concernover the absence of adequate incentivesfor knowledge <strong>development</strong> and acquisitionacross the spectrum of Arab endeavours.Holders of a master's and PhD degree,were more critical of the status of currentknowledge acquisition than holders of lowerdegrees. PhD holders rated Arab knowledgeperformance lowest compared to India andthe East Asian tigers, see figure 4.2.Respondents from scientific disciplinesgenerally took a dimmer view of the state ofArab knowledge than those from the socialand <strong>human</strong> sciences. The latter group’s assessmenttended to be lower relative to the comparatorcountries. Many of the respondentslacked knowledge of translated books, reflectedin the number of "don’t know" responsesto this question across all categories ofthe survey.Figure 4.3 reflects the respondents’ evaluationsof the extent of freedom in key areas ofknowledge compared to their assessments ofincentives for its acquisition. The scale 0% –50% reflects the low overall estimate of bothfreedom and incentives.Respondents evidently judged that the extentof freedom, low as it is, is higher in generalthan levels of incentives to acquireknowledge, particularly in higher education,88 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


esearch and <strong>development</strong> and arts production.This suggests the existence of obstaclesto knowledge acquisition in Arab societies beyondquestions of freedom. Two areas ofknowledge activity, radio and television, wereclearly judged to be very circumscribed interms of freedom. Cinema and theatre production,on the other hand, did not appear as constrained.Thus, relatively low levels ofproduction in the latter two areas could be attributedto organisational and financial problems;the same observation applies to scientificresearch and technological <strong>development</strong> inpublic sector projects.Most respondents thought that Arabcountries are weak in technological researchand <strong>development</strong>, particularly compared tothe East Asian tigers, despite their opinionthat there is no restriction of freedom in thisarea: the discrepancy points to other (societal)obstacles. On improvements in knowledge acquisitionover the past ten years, the lowest assessmentwas given to basic and secondaryeducation, the two areas most consistentlyfaulted by Arab university faculties.Respondents considered that the most importantimpediment to knowledge acquisitionin Arab countries is the deficient knowledgesystem itself. They focused on a general lack ofresources and facilities and weak teaching systems,followed by poor governance and management,stressing restrictions on freedom andon civil society. They also evinced keen interestin seeing society provide better materialand moral rewards for contributions to knowledgeacquisition.INITIAL APPROXIMATION OF THEMEASUREMENT OF KNOWLEDGECAPITAL: HUMAN CAPITALThe paramount importance of education andlearning in the knowledge system has beenhighlighted in Chapter 1. This pivotal relationshipsuggests that <strong>human</strong> capital, which is thesum total of knowledge, capacities and skillsacquired by <strong>human</strong> beings through educationand practical experience, represents a relativelysolid nucleus of knowledge capital.Databases on <strong>human</strong> capital are wellstocked since educational statistics are relativelyaccessible and are regularly available.Figure 4.3Freedom to pursue knowledge and incentives for knowledge acquisitionYet those statistics have their weaknesses: theytend, on the one hand, to exclude knowledgeacquisition through practical experience onwhich acceptable measures are available onlythrough specialised field surveys. On the otherhand, readily available educational statisticsrelate generally to the quantitative aspects ofeducation, such as enrolment. Data related tothe quality of education, on the contrary, aremuch less plentiful and often less credible,since they normally relate to inputs to the educationalprocess (spending levels, number ofschools, classrooms or teachers), or to intermediateindicators (e.g., the proportion ofpupils to teachers, classrooms or laboratories).Capturing the real outcomes of the educationalprocess, reflected in the knowledge, capacitiesand skills students actually acquire,requires specialised field surveys, preferably ofa comparative nature. Such studies would helpascertain the relative position of educationaloutcomes in one society as compared to othersimilar or competitive cases.Efforts to measure the quality of Arab educationare still limited – in itself an indicationof a crisis in education in the Arab countries –and thus only a few, scattered measures of thequality of educational outcomes are available.They are found in international studies, whichare marred in turn by their own shortcomings.For example, they exclude language from theirtestable fields. Moreover, very few Arab coun-The most importantimpediment toknowledge acquisitionin Arab countries isthe deficientknowledge systemitself.MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES 89


In 1970 Arab GDP percapita was half that inEast Asia: by theopening stages of thiscentury it dropped toless than one seventhof GDP per capita inthat region.tries have participated in such studies (Jordanand Kuwait were the only Arab countries thattook part in one of two international studiesconducted at the beginning and in the middleof the 1990s, respectively).The stock of <strong>human</strong> capital at thebeginning of the 21 st centuryThe MYS (for populations older than a minimumage limit, usually 15 or 25 years 2 ) is themost common indicator for measuring thestock of <strong>human</strong> capital through education. It isnot, however, free of drawbacks. Apart fromthe shortcomings of averages – the most dangerousof which is neglecting the question ofdistribution within the society concerned – themost significant limitation of this indicator isits confinement to formal education It excludesnon-formal education and the acquisitionof knowledge through experience. Buteven in this confined domain, the MYS, as anindicator of <strong>human</strong> capital, neglects the qualitydimension. This at a time when evidence isaccumulating to the effect that quality, ratherthan quantity, is the more important determinantof productivity enhancement andprogress through knowledge acquisition andinnovation.Figure 4.4 illustrates the position of Arabcountries with available MYS data at the beginningand end of the 1990s, relative to sevenFigure 4.4Mean years of schooling (MYS), population 15 years of age or older,Arab countries compared to selected countries, 1990 and 2000Source: Barro and Lee, 2000.comparison countries with available MYSdata as well. It also shows averages for all Arabcountries and for sub-groups of the countriescompared.From the figure it is clear that:First: Arab countries fall far below thecountries in the comparison, the Asian Tigersin particular.Second: the MYS of all countries includedhave improved between 1990 and 2000. Theimprovement, on average, appears larger inthe Arab countries than in the comparatorcountries as a whole or even in the AsianTigers. The improvement, however, should beweighed against the fact that the lower the initialposition of a country’s MYS, the easier it isfor it to make gains on the scale. In otherwords, the countries compared preceded theArab countries in raising their MYS to a peaklevel at which point further improvement becomesharder.HISTORICAL COMPARISON: ARABCOUNTRIES AND THE ASIANTIGERS IN THE SECOND HALF OFTHE 20 th CENTURYThis next section traces the <strong>development</strong> ofeducational attainment in Arab countries inthe last four decades, focusing on a comparisonwith the Asian Tigers. For a more validcomparison, the criterion used here is theMYS for people 25 years of age or older.Literature on the "Asian Miracle" has accumulatedin recent years. From an Arab perspective,the "miracle" factor is quite intensesince in conventional economic <strong>development</strong>terms Arab countries used to fare better relativeto the Asian tigers. But in 1970 Arab GDPper capita was half that in East Asia: by theopening stages of this century it dropped toless than one seventh of GDP per capita inthat region. This is due to the significant improvementin economic performance in EastAsian countries since the 1970s when therewas a decline, albeit slight, in Arab countries(table 4.1).One of the most important <strong>development</strong>allessons of the Asian experience is the criticalrole that early and intensive investment in<strong>human</strong> capital played as the foundation of de-2The latter age limit (25 years) takes into consideration educational attainment levels among the older groups of the population. This age range tendsto "penalise" Arab countries, since education is widespread among younger Arabs whereas illiteracy is still rife among older age groups.90 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


velopment. Does the disparity in <strong>human</strong> capitalformation between Arab and East Asiancountries account for their divergent <strong>development</strong>fortunes?To try and answer this question, one of therichest international databases on educationalattainment (Barro and Lee, 2000) was used.Through it, the MYS in nine Arab countrieson which data was available throughout thecomparison period (and comprising about twothirds of the Arab population in the year 2000)was compared to the MYS for three pioneerAsian Tigers.Figure 4.5 illustrates the large gap in thelevel of <strong>human</strong> capital formation betweenboth groups (Arab countries and AsianTigers) since 1960, disaggregated by gender.Arab countries, obviously, did not manageto narrow the gap that separates them fromEast Asia in this respect. Rather, the gapwidened, as the difference in educational attainmentin general grew larger: from 3.02years in 1960 to 5.26 in 2000. The gap was relativelywider among females, increasing from1.87 to 5.42 years over the same period, despitethe fact that the distance between thetwo groups on the individual progress lines, asshown in the figure, is less in the case of females.This is because the Arab countries withhigh levels of educational attainment amongTABLE 4.1Percentage of real Arab GDP per capita (1970 and 2001),compared to Asian TigersYear Arab countries East Asian Tigers19702001Source: UNDP, Calculations by the Human Development Report Office.their female population were among the lesspopulated oil producing countries.The level of <strong>human</strong> capital formation inthe three Asian Tigers was substantially higherthan that in the Arab countries at the beginningof the comparison period (1960). In addition,improvement in educational attainmentin the first group was faster, noting that educationalexpansion becomes increasingly harderto achieve when higher levels of educationalattainment are reached.Moreover, the gap between the twogroups would have appeared even wider hadthe averages included values for the Arabcountries on which no data had been available.With the exception of a few low-populationcountries such as Lebanon, this category comprisesthe majority of less developed countriesin the region and other countries with relativelylow educational attainment. 3The comparison at hand reveals one of themost important "secrets" accounting for thesuccessful East Asian <strong>development</strong> experi-971852Does the disparity in<strong>human</strong> capitalformation betweenArab and East Asiancountries account fortheir divergent<strong>development</strong>fortunes?Figure 4.5Mean years of schooling (population 25 years of age or older) by gender, Arab countries and three Asian Tigers, 1960-20003Countries with no available data: Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Somalia, Mauritania, Yemen, Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,Oman, Qatar, Lebanon and <strong>Palestine</strong>.MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES 91


Taking the quality of<strong>human</strong> capital intoaccount accentuatesthe relativebackwardness of theArab countries.ence: early and intensive investment in education,accompanied by sustained and rapid improvementof its level.The quality of education: findings ofinternational studiesFigure 4.6Quality adjusted mean years of schooling (QAMYS), population 15 years of ageor older, Arab countries and selected countries, 1990 and 2000As mentioned earlier, the number of Arabcountries with comparative measurements ofthe quality of educational attainment dwindlesto only one in each of the two internationalstudies available. To benefit from this scant information,it was assumed that the average relativescore for both countries in the twostudies applied to all Arab countries at theend of the 20th century.However, before continuing with theanalysis on the basis of this assumption, it isworth noting that this average is attributed totwo countries where the quality of educationcan be expected to be better than the averagefor all Arab countries. Jordan, for example, isknown to have a relatively better educationalsystem and a high societal motivation for education.Kuwait, with its relatively generousspending on education, also stands out amongthe Arab countries.Thus, it can be said without exaggerationthat the average quality of educational attainmentin Jordan and Kuwait is expected to surpassthat in the majority of Arab countries,particularly the countries with limited educationbudgets and those with disadvantageouslegacies in education. This means that the relativeposition of the Arab countries, as a resultof applying the average quality indicator ofJordan and Kuwait to all Arab countries, is aprojection brighter than the present Arab reality.Figure 4.6 illustrates the relative positionof Arab countries between 1990 and 2000 ona <strong>human</strong> capital composite index. In additionto the MYS, the index takes into considerationthe quality of educational attainment (by multiplyingthe MYS by a coefficient for the qualityof educational attainment). Compared tofigure 4.4, the figure shows an increasing divergencebetween Arab countries on the onehand and the comparator countries in generalon the other hand. In other words, taking thequality of <strong>human</strong> capital into account accentuatesthe relative backwardness of the Arabcountries vis-à-vis the other countries in thiscomparison, notably the Asian Tigers.It is reiterated that the comparison at handand the inferences drawn are rather weakowing to the scarcity of data on the componentsof the composite index, especially on thequality of educational attainment.TOWARDS A COMPOSITE INDEXOF KNOWLEDGE CAPITALThis section seeks to characterise knowledgecapital in Arab countries within the comparativeframework adopted. Although the multiplefacets of knowledge enjoin the use ofmultiple indicators, data availability on any indicator,in Arab countries and the world atlarge, was a major criterion for including thatindicator in the analysis. Taking into accountthe earlier discussion about measuring knowledgecapital adequately, it was decided to considerten indicators relating to different facetsof knowledge capital.The following are the ten indicators onwhich data were available worldwide and forArab countries around the year 2000:1. The quality-adjusted MYS2. Daily newspapers (per 1000 people)3. Radios (per 100 people)4. TV sets (per 1000 people)5. Scientists and engineers (per million people)6. Patent applications filed (per million peo-92 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


ple)7. Book titles (per million people)8. Telephone mainlines (per 1000 people)9. Cellular mobile subscribers (per 1000 people)and10. Internet hosts (per 1000 people).Table A-10 in the statistical annex givesthe values of those ten indicators, which wereavailable on 109 countries, including eightArab countries and five of the countries chosenfor comparison. There were, however, nogood data available on all indicators for all thecountries. The percentage of the countrieswith non-available data varied from one indicatorto the other; all countries had data availableon information infrastructure whereasmore than a quarter of them had no data availableon some basic indicators, e.g., scientistsand engineers engaged in R&D, the number ofbook titles, and even on the core indicator, thequality-adjusted MYS.To overcome these limitations in the basicdata, statistical means for estimating the missingobservations, based on the values of thoseavailable, were resorted to. The result was acompleted array of data; Table A-11 of the statisticalannex shows the completed data set,with imputed values for missing observationsframed.The ‘Borda’ rule was applied to the completeddata array. The rule consists of assigningan overall rank to each country throughsumming its ranks on each of the ten indicators.This overall rank represents a valid "socialwelfare function". The result of thisprocedure is given in Figure 4.7, where thelowest rank is the best.In general, the figure indicates the relativelylow position of the Arab countries includedin the analysis (the average overall rankfor the eight Arab countries included is 69).Yet a striking disparity is evident in the relativepositions of individual Arab countries.Dividing the index into four groups, stagnant,intermediate, aspiring and leading, puts Koreaamong the leaders while only one Arab country,Kuwait, falls within the aspiring group.Other Arab countries for which data was availableoccupy intermediate or stagnant positions.(Several Arab countries without datawould undoubtedly have fallen into the lowerpositions on the knowledge capital continuum).More importantly, the conclusions impliedby the figure cast considerable doubt on boththe indicators used and the prototype compositeindex itself. For example, India, with its nuclearcapability, space programme andotherwise recognised technological capacity inmore than one sphere, occupies the tail of thecomposite index along with some Arab andother countries notwithstanding the fact thatthere is a significant gap between these countriesin terms of their scientific and technologicalcapabilities.This prompted an enquiry into the knowledgeoutcomes which signify the presence ofknowledge capabilities and a comparison betweenthem and the composite index just discussed.The knowledge outcomes considered includedthe following:• High technology exports (as a percentageof total commodity exports)• Nuclear facilities (ownership of a nuclearreactor)• Existence of a space programIn addition to:• Technology Achievement Index (TAI) values(UNDP), as well as some standard <strong>development</strong>indicators:• Arab Human Development Index (AHDI)rank• Human Development Index (HDI) valueDividing the index intofour groups, stagnant,intermediate, aspiringand leading, putsKorea among theleaders while only oneArab country, Kuwait,falls within theaspiring group.Figure 4.7Ranking of Arab countries compared to other countries and regions on the compositeindicator of knowledge capital, 2000MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES 93


Figure 4.8Correlation coefficient between knowledge capital indicators, knowledge outcomesand other <strong>development</strong> indicators around the year 2000Cumulativeknowledge outcomesoffer decisive insightsinto how knowledgeadvances areachieved.Motivated societiescan lift themselves bytheir bootstraps toachieve largeknowledge outcomesostensibly beyondtheir means.• Per capita GDP (in PPP, US dollars).Data on these indicators are given in TableA-13 of the statistical annex.Analysing the relationship between the tenknowledge capital indicators utilised in theprototype composite index and these knowledgeoutcome indicators, (Figure 4.8 andTable A-14 in the statistical annex), demonstratesa relatively weak correlation betweenboth groups of indicators, with the exceptionof <strong>human</strong> capital (quality and quantity) wherethe correlation with knowledge outcomes isrelatively strong.The question now is: what do we eventuallyconclude from this measurement attempt?A valid, simple yet perhaps overly simpleconclusion is that the indicators used are substantivelyinadequate and that data scarcity is amajor impediment to adequate measurement,aggravating the substantive deficiency of theindicators.The Report team’s preferred conclusion,however, is that cumulative knowledge outcomesoffer decisive insights into how knowledgeadvances are achieved. It is evidentlypossible for societies to make substantial advancesin knowledge even when their standardindicators of knowledge capital are modest –as in the cases of large countries such as Indiaand China. This suggests that valuable knowledgeachievements might depend crucially onmatters that involve: political will and leadership;the capacity to raise and mobilise material,technical and <strong>human</strong> resources; and thedrive to focus national efforts on attaining anindigenous societal renaissance that is bothpeople-centred and patriotic. Motivated societiescan lift themselves by their bootstraps toachieve large knowledge outcomes ostensiblybeyond their means.4ownership of a reactor94 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Despite the methodological and other challenges encountered in this attempt at measurement,it is quite evident that Arab countries lag behind the more advanced developing countriesin building knowledge capital. The comparison is even more disquieting relative to the performanceof the world’s front-runners in knowledge capital formation and knowledge production.Arab countries should, however, not take this as discouragement. Rather, these insights signpostanother way forward, one that may lie much less in catching up with others on standardknowledge indicators, and much more through concentrating on knowledge outcomes. With robustand intellectually distinguished institutional structures, and with political determination supportedby sufficient resources, particularly on the pan-Arab level, it may well be possible toemulate some of the striking knowledge outcomes of other developing countries whose conventionalknowledge indicators do not surpass those found in the Arab world.MEASURING KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN ARAB COUNTRIES 95


CHAPTER 5The organisational context of knowledgeacquisitionThis chapter discusses the organisational contextin which knowledge is acquired in Arabcountries through the transfer and adaptationof technology. The discussion considers issuessuch as: the importance of national innovationsystems; policy and institutional prerequisitesfor establishing a knowledge economy; and thevital role of entrepreneurs. It reviews the experienceof Arab countries in transferring andadapting technology in the past, and assessesthe role of foreign direct investment (FDI) andbusiness incubators in contemporary Arabmarket economies.INNOVATION SYSTEMS ANDTECHNOLOGY 1Innovation is the ability to manage knowledge,as embodied in technology, in a creative way inresponse to market requirements and the needsof society. Dynamic national innovation systemsare the key to the efficient management oftechnology transfer, absorption, adaptationand diffusion in knowledge economies. Thebasic concept behind such systems is that ittakes multiple actors to innovate and produceknowledge. Innovation does not depend solelyon how individual enterprises, universities andresearch institutions perform, but also on howthey interact with one another, and with thepublic sector. Effective innovation systems areflexible networks capable of using existingtechnologies and knowledge capital to createnew forms of technology that raise productivityand growth, increase competitiveness in worldmarkets and serve <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.As indicated in figure 5-1, an effective innovationsystem is a complex whole. Moreover,its success is heavily influenced by social valuesand culture and by prevailing economic, legaland political systems and structures. The stateplays a particularly important role in developingpublic policies and directions and in establishinginstitutions and systems capable ofdiffusing innovation in society. The state is responsiblefor establishing a favourable economicenvironment, an effective educationaland training system and an advanced communicationstructure. It provides critical supportsto the economy and industry by replenishingfactors of production and it encourages the <strong>development</strong>of markets that can absorb theproducts of firms and enterpriseWhere do Arab countries stand vis-à-vis innovationsystems of this kind?TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,MANAGEMENT AND ADOPTIONIN THE ARAB WORLDWith few exceptions, the experience of individualArab countries in technology transfer,management and adaptation has not met initialexpectations, although technology transfer hasalways been a top national priority. Arab countriesrecognised, at an early stage, that theirsocio-economic <strong>development</strong> required movingtowards industrial (including agricultural in-It takes multipleactors to innovate andproduce knowledge.With few exceptions,the experience ofindividual Arabcountries intechnology transfer,management andadaptation has notmet initialexpectations.1Technology has a life cycle which starts with its birth in research and <strong>development</strong> laboratories, and continues through its testing and empiricaladoption, at which point it is called emerging technology. It eventually reaches the stage of maturity with actual use and, over time with the emergenceof more modern technologies, it becomes “old” or obsolete technology.Technology management includes several processes starting with technology testing, followed by acquisition and use. The adaptation of technologyis the stage that follows the import of technology, when local <strong>human</strong> resources and institutional structures are able to control and fully understandtransferred technology, at which point it becomes possible to employ this technology effectively in realising the purposes of the society. Technology<strong>development</strong> is a more advanced stage that makes it possible to invent new technologies locally, by which new and globally competitive productscan be manufactured. This includes the unpacking of bundled technology, reverse engineering, local <strong>development</strong> and adapting technology to theenvironment and <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. An even more advanced stage in this chain is the generation of technology, which includes the activation oftechnological research and <strong>development</strong>, the management of the national innovation system, the adoption of patents and intellectual property rightsand the stimulation of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> through the application of new technologies.THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 97


Figure 5.1:Actors and linkages in the innovation systemSource: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, ManagingNational Innovation System, Paris, 1999, P.23.For the first time, adilemma that had longbeen intractable – thetransfer and adoptionof technology –seemed to have beenresolved.dustries) and export-based economies. Thisperception, in principle, was correct, yet it wasnot translated into effective policies.Industrialisation policies, in particular, centredmerely on the acquisition of factories andproduction technology (purchase contracts),and on the training of local labour to producegoods in acquired factories using acquiredmeans of production. The erroneous beliefwas that this step in itself would constitute atechnology transfer that would be a prelude tothe indigenisation of technology.Initially, such factories used technologiesand production processes that kept up with(or lagged only slightly behind) the internationalstate of the art at the time. This allowedfactories to meet all or some of the local market’sneeds for a period of time. But these simpleacquisition policies, which did notrecognise the importance of managing andadapting these technologies, left the productionsector highly vulnerable since the technologiesit depended on became obsolete overa short period of time. Once caught in thistrap, most Arab countries responded by passingand enforcing protection laws, which inevitably,and unrealistically, prolonged the lifeof those early production units. Spread out inthe economy, these industrial dinosaurs eventuallybecome a drain on national resourcesand a major impediment to socio-economic<strong>development</strong>.As the crisis of <strong>development</strong> in Arab countriesgrew worse, reflected in the severe deteriorationof national infrastructure and publicservices, and as the gap between them and theadvanced countries widened, many abandonedtheir failing industrial policies. Theyturned instead to liberalising the economy andtrade and enacting laws to encourage foreigndirect investment (FDI).Some countries, such as Tunisia andEgypt, espoused wide-ranging FDI-friendlypolicies. They created a host of legal and financialincentives to entice multinational companiesto open subsidiary branches on theirsoil so that Arab production systems could bepart of a vertical integration process reachingup to the international economy and openingup two-way flows of knowledge and technology.For the first time, a dilemma that had longbeen intractable – the transfer and adoption oftechnology – seemed to have been resolved.Arab governments that took this approachbet on the idea that open trade, economic andindustrial policies would encourage the advancedworld to invest in the growth of the region,strengthen national infrastructures andcreate an environment conducive to free flowsof technology. They believed this new coursewas superior to the previous acquisition-basedapproach and part of the logic of globalisation.Indeed, the new laws and investment opportunitiesdid stimulate a financial and economicrevival in most of the Arab countries that appliedthis approach. However, this revival wasuneven across the region and within countriesits benefits were not equally spread; moreover,it proved to be short-lived.The windfall that Arab countries experiencedfrom these policy changes was temporarybecause they were not actively andeffectively involved in the global productionand export movement. Growth quickly98 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


eached a stagnant point and then receded.More significantly, the open door policies thatwere implemented were not conducive to thereal transfer and adaptation of technology.Reflecting on their experiences with FDIand with vertical integration, Arab countrieshave come to realise that their expectationsmay have invited another disappointment.Whether the extended production chain involvesthe manufacture of spare parts, electronicscomponents or garments, the commonexperience is that multinational companies reservethe knowledge- and skills-intensive componentsof the production process forthemselves and leave developing country partnersto produce at the low end of the technologytree.In Tunisia, for example, the new policiesled to the establishment of companies verticallyintegrated with the European car industry,on the face of it a sound <strong>development</strong>.However, a closer look shows that the newcompanies specialise entirely in the low-technologystages of the car industry, such as theproduction of seats and electrical systems. Yetthis experience can also be judged from abroader perspective: integration on theseterms represents only an entry point to technologyacquisition and transfer, and to becomingan active part of the global productionsystem, one that avoids protectionist policiesthat are eventually harmful to the host economy.TECHNOLOGY POLICIES IN ARABCOUNTRIESExperts estimate that more than 45% of the increasein per capita income in the West in recentyears is attributable to technologicaladvancement. Investment in R&D brought inthe highest gross investment returns, comparedto investments in other sectors. (ImadMustapha, background paper)Some Arab researchers maintain that Arabindustrial and technology acquisition policiessince the mid-20 th century have been largelyineffectual (Antoine Zahlan, in Arabic, 1999).Although Arabs invested more than US $2.5trillion in gross fixed capital formation between1980 and 1997, chiefly in factories andinfrastructure, the average gross domesticproduct per capita actually declined duringthat period. 2 This indicates that those substantialinvestments did not promote real technologytransfers; what was transferred werethe means of production and not the technology.Agricultural production in the regionrepresents a striking example of a sharp declinein productivity and poor use of moderntechnologies: more than 50% of the Arablabour force work in this sector, yet valueadded from it accounts for just 10% of ArabGDP.Evidently, Arab countries have not attaineda level of <strong>development</strong> that would enablethem to adapt the technologies they haveimported at different times. In the absence ofnational science and technology policiesgeared to the creation of national innovationsystems, this is hardly surprising. Practicallyspeaking, the absence of such systems in Arabcountries means that past investments in industrialinfrastructure and fixed capital havebeen wasted. Those investments have yieldedneither gains in technology, nor increases inproductivity or social returns.Investment in the means of productiondoes not mean a real transfer and ownership oftechnology; it only means an increase in productioncapacities – a gain enjoyed for a limitedperiod of time and one which quicklystarts to vanish as the acquired technology becomesobsolete. Products and services generatedby this technology become economicallyunfeasible and uncompetitive in local markets,while at the same time technology and productionin the advanced countries renew themselvesand accelerate forward, thanks to thedynamism of their national innovation systems.The Arab world, which is obliged topurchase new production capabilities wheneverthe technologies it owns become obsolete,is currently – and expensively – stuck atthe wrong end of the technology ladder, a situationwhich drastically reduces Arab investmentreturns.The commonexperience is thatmultinationalcompanies reserve theknowledge- and skillsintensivecomponentsof the productionprocess forthemselves.The Arab world, whichis obliged to purchasenew productioncapabilities wheneverthe technologies itowns becomeobsolete, is currently –and expensively –stuck at the wrongend of the technologyladder.2It is only fair to point out that a large portion of gross investments in Arab countries went to infrastructure projects which, in most cases, were urgentlyneeded and which do not necessarily bring in quick economic returns.THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 99


Industrial R&Dinstitutions are weaklylinked to productionpriorities and theknowledge level ofbasic industrialtechnologies remainslow.Manyaccomplishments ofArab R&D institutionsremain incomplete,because they do notreach the stage ofinvestment.ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES OFKNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION INARAB COUNTRIESThe current state of knowledge institutionsand networks in the Arab world is far removedfrom what is required to establish an effectiveArab innovation system. While this state persists,major problems will recur in the transferand adaptation of technology and in knowledgeproduction. The following paragraphshighlight some salient differences between thecurrent and the ideal situation in innovationand knowledge production.LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCHINSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCTIVESECTORSPromotion of R&D ResultsThe vigorous promotion of scientific researchand the active utilisation of research results in<strong>development</strong> are among the most importantcriteria for measuring how far R&D institutionshave achieved their goals and succeededin diffusing new knowledge in society. Yet thepromotion of R&D results faces major difficultiesand obstacles in most Arab countries.Among the reasons are weak links betweenR&D institutions and the production and servicesectors and the absence of, or markedgaps in, vital innovation “brokers” such as researchinstitutes and think tanks that occupyan intermediary position between R&D andproduction and marketing.Industrial R&D institutions are weaklylinked to production priorities and the knowledgelevel of basic industrial technologies remainslow. Moreover, many R&D centres lackdesign and modelling abilities and demonstrationand experimentation units. These institutionsalso suffer from poor planning andorganisational capabilities and lack appropriatemethods for managing technology, innovationand diffusion. Academicism in research isanother significant flaw. There is a trend inmany R&D institutes to reward and promoteresearchers on the basis of academic researchand published scientific papers rather than forpurposeful applied research and its contributionto solving problems faced by the productionsectors. Research projects of interest to industry,firms, enterprises and services thathelp industry absorb and develop importedtechnologies and advance their innovation activitiesare few and far between.As a result, many accomplishments ofArab R&D institutions remain incomplete, becausethey do not reach the stage of investment.Some Arab countries have taken initialsteps to adopt effective mechanisms for theuse or promotion of R&D results. Chiefamong these is the introduction of “contractresearch” in universities and research centres,a modality that ties research more closely tomarket demand. This approach has increasedthe ratio of completed research projects in universitiesfor the benefit of recipient sectors,helped to identify appropriate local substitutes,penetrated the industrial secrets surroundingsome industrial components,enhanced the performance of some productionunits and overcome obstacles to manufacturing.The size of this experiment, however, isstill extremely limited. In Egypt, for instance,the number of research contracts the results ofwhich have been marketed in this way wasabout 142 during the period 1971-1997.Projects completed on demand from recipientfirms did not exceed 43 during the same period(Amr Armanazi, background paper forthe Report).Intermediate Institutions SupportingTechnological R&D ProductionIn addition to the direct links between R&Dcentres and universities on the one hand (supplyside), and production firms on the other(demand side), R&D efforts can gain forceand find their way to production firmsthrough various intermediary institutions andstructures, both governmental and private,which can offer key technical, professionaland support services in one or both directions(supply and demand), according to their specialisation.These structures include industrialR&D centres linked to specific production activities,design bureaux, contract research institutesand business incubators. In Arabcountries, industrial R&D centres are almostnon-existent, and design bureaux are limitedalmost entirely to the construction sector.In the absence of the sophisticated and100 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


value-adding services normally associated withintermediary institutions, such as design engineering,project engineering, production engineering,process engineering and qualityengineering, R&D remains largely decoupledfrom the process of technological change. Apromising change in this respect is the growthof business incubators, which are starting toplay an increasing role in Arab countries.No knowledge economy can take off withoutsubstantial, targeted and risk-tolerant investment.Such investment requires asupportive financial and banking system. Thisincludes the <strong>development</strong> of venture capitalsystems of all kinds to help kick-start new industriesbased on knowledge and moderntechnology. Investment banks, <strong>development</strong>capital banks, venture capital funds for innovationand grants for the employment of scientistsand researchers in industry and theprivate sector are much needed intermediaryinstitutions in Arab countries. These financingentities provide critical links between R& D,production and services.The Role of the Creative Entrepreneur andTechnological and Business IncubatorsMany Arab countries are moving quickly to establishfree market economies. Reaping the rewardsand efficiencies of the market, however,requires two basic conditions: competitivenessand the encouragement of a critical mass ofcreative entrepreneurs ready to accept risks inseeking new areas of technology generationand goods and services production. Neithercondition is a common feature of Arabeconomies. The realisation of both requireschanges throughout the entire fabric of society,from systems of upbringing and societalvalues to the public policy environment andthe supporting institutional infrastructure, includingeducational and financial institutions.The dominant value and educational systemsin Arab countries remain largely risk-averse.There is little recognition that entrepreneursare natural and necessary innovators in theeconomy. Moreover, financial institutions inArab countries are still not limber enough torespond quickly to new opportunities, particularlywhen it comes to providing funds forsmall and micro-enterprises. In the West,many new and value-adding projects startsmall, particularly in the field of informationand communication technology. Venture capitalplays a substantial role in catalysing technologicalchange by supporting start-up firmsand businesses.Business incubators are relatively newstructures for supporting innovation in smalland medium-sized enterprises and for encouragingpioneering creative developers who lackthe necessary means to develop and markettheir research and technological innovations.The basic concept behind incubators is thatthe authors of a new project or innovative ideaneed sponsorship and a learning environmentin which to grow and acquire the means forsuccess. Incubators provide a controlled environment,services, including skills and advice,and materials that fledgling enterprises needto take off. In short, incubators connect talent,technology, capital and know-how to leverageentrepreneurial talent, accelerate the <strong>development</strong>of new knowledge-based businesses andthus speed up the commercialisation of newtechnology.Arab countries have taken more and moreinterest in business incubators since initial attemptsand trials started in Jordan and Egyptin 1989 and 1994 respectively. Recently,Tunisia (1999) and the Emirates (Abu Dhabiin 2000) have started their own projects of thiskind. In other Arab countries incubators haveappeared in technological capacity-buildingplans or in various support programmes forsmall and medium sized enterprises.The experiments of Jordan and Egypt providefurther examples of the <strong>development</strong> ofincubators in Arab countries. The Social Fundfor Development in Egypt, originating in aUNDP initiative in 1992, established a majornetwork of incubators as part of its programmesfor the <strong>development</strong> of small enterprisesand income generation. The EgyptianIncubators Association, a non-governmentalorganisation established in 1995 for this purpose,implements the incubator programme.The Association has conducted feasibilitystudies for 37 business incubators and technologysupport and services centres in variousEgyptian governorates. Nine have alreadybeen implemented. In Jordan, the JordanianTechnology Group has established 17 independentcompanies in various technologicalNo knowledgeeconomy can take offwithout substantial,targeted and risktolerantinvestment.Financial institutionsin Arab countries arestill not limber enoughto respond quickly tonew opportunities.THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 101


Until Arab countriesdevelop andseamlessly connectthe elements of theirinnovation systems,technology transferthrough FDI willremain capped bycertain technologicallimits.fields.FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTIt was noted earlier that the traditional industrialisationpolicies of Arab countries did notlead to the transfer and adaptation of technology,nor did they push the wheel of <strong>development</strong>forward. New Arab policies forencouraging foreign direct investment (FDI)may not lead to this goal either unless theytake into account the basic conditions for thecreation of a knowledge-flow environmentthat would contribute to developing innovationsystems in Arab countries. The basic andmost important factor in the process of technologytransfer and adaptation remains theR&D sector, which drives the process fromthe initial stage of flawed transfers throughadaptation and then on to technology generationand effective participation in the worldtechnological system. Understanding thattoday R&D is the weakest link in Arab innovationsystems is the first step in overcoming present-dayimpediments to knowledgeproduction.Until Arab countries develop and seamlesslyconnect the elements of their innovationsystems, technology transfer and <strong>development</strong>through FDI will remain capped by certaintechnological limits. Countries will not be ableto transform their rentier economies into highvalue-adding economies, let alone knowledgeTABLE 5.1Estimated Net FDI flows, by host country 2000-2001(millions of dollars)*Country20002001AlgeriaBahrainEgyptJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMoroccoOmanQatarSaudi ArabiaSyriaSudanTunisiaUnited Arab EmiratesYemen43835812353916298-14220123252-1884270392779260-201119692510169-40249-10126584923720205574486-156-205*Net FDI flows in five cases (Kuwait in 2001, Libya in 2000 and 2001, Saudi Arabia in 2000, United Arab Emirates in2001, and Yemen in 2000 and 2001) were actually negative.Source: World Investment Report (2002) UNCTAD.economies that would allow <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>to take root in the Arab world.FDI and its role in technology transfer andadaptation in Arab countriesArab experts continue to debate the meritsand demerits of FDI as an international technologytransfer channel. Some point to thefailures of vertical integration with global industrialchains. Others argue that Arab countrieshave not done enough to take advantageof such chains, and the FDI they funnel, or tocreate local capacities and environments conduciveto the transfer and indigenisation oftechnology. They note, for example, that, aspartners, Arab countries have been incapableof negotiating effective management contractsor responsive technology licensing agreements.It remains a fact that Arab countries haveso far met with little success in attracting FDI.It would be optimistic to expect to see anyArab countries listed among the top ten recipientsof FDI worldwide, given that currentglobal patterns favour the wealthier countriesand East Asia; certainly none is. But not oneArab country appears in the top ten among developingcountries either. Table 5.1 illustratesthe anaemic level of FDI in some Arab countriesin the period 2000 - 2001.The table makes it clear that FDI levels inthe region are very low. Morocco comes highonly as a result of selling 35% of the shares ofthe Morocco Telecommunication Company toa foreign investor for US$ 2.7 billion, whichhelped to raise its inflow in 2001. Yet this isobviously neither a recurrent nor sustainabletrend.The investment environment in Arabcountries remains an obstacle to FDI inflows.Figure 5-2 shows that in 1999 this environmentwas well below the optimum level in allthe Arab countries in the sample.Tunisia and Egypt have tried to link FDIflows to technology transfer by adopting policiesthat promote that connection. For examplein Tunisia, all investments geared towardsenergy preservation, research <strong>development</strong>and marketing of new capacities are entitled toa 10% discount on import taxes. In addition,value-added tax (VAT) on imported goodsand materials that have no local substitute is102 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


suspended.Tunisia’s philosophy is to invest in <strong>human</strong>resources. The state’s active investment policyis guided at the highest governmental and nationallevels. Top priority has been given totraining Tunisia’s <strong>human</strong> resources and labourforce (one quarter of the country’s generalbudget is earmarked for education and training).The focus of training is on technologicalspecialisations, particularly information andcommunication technologies. As an Arabcountry which launched a national initiative toupgrade its technological level, and which establisheda special organisation for FDI promotion,Tunisia is a good example of what anArab state can accomplish in this field.FDI actually receded globally in 2001,with the bulk of its flows confined to channelsbetween the US, Western Europe, theNAFTA region and South East Asia. WhileArab policy makers and experts continue withtheir debate on the benefits and risks of FDI,the fact remains that Arab countries are fractionalplayers on the margins of this globaleconomic activity. Whether FDI leads to thetransfer and adaptation of technology, or simplystimulates job opportunities, new dynamicsin the economy and the movement oftechnology in the Arab region, any talk aboutexpanding Arab countries’ participation in thegeneral trend remains notional at this time.Arab policymakers often speak about attractinginternational investments by grantingfirms tax incentives and promoting their countries’comparative advantages, yet they frequentlyignore the fact that FDI flows are alsorelated to a number of other equally vital factorsthat are part of the national innovationsystem, as identified in Figure 5.1. That figureillustrates the various factors that positively oradversely affect FDI in the fields of technologyand industrialisation, particularly the availabilityof flexible, trained and highly skilled workforces.Very likely, economic growth based onR&D, rather than simply on FDI, holds outthe principal hope for accelerating <strong>development</strong>in the region and narrowing the gap betweenArab countries and the technologicallyadvanced world. The reason is that growthnever occurs merely as a result of the accumulationof resources (the conventional approachFigure 5.2The Environment for Investment: 14 Arab countries rated, 1999Source: the Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999.adopted in the past in Arab countries), but asa consequence of the enhancement of productivityand of increasing the value added in production.In this context it is worth noting that mostcommercial activities in Arab countries areconfined to trade between industries abroadand consumers (import agencies) inside the region.Notwithstanding calls in the WTO formore trade between the North and the Southbased on mutual benefit, this pattern of tradeonly benefits one party in the trade formula.The commercial relationships that give momentumto <strong>development</strong> and that play a majorrole in technology and knowledge transfer arethose that involve inter-industry trade. Sincethis kind of trade is much stronger amongstindustrial countries, and is almost non-existentbetween them and Arab states, the currenttrade patterns of Arab countries will nothave much effect on technology transfer.A further reality to be borne in mind isthat when multinational companies make directinvestments in developing countries, theynormally keep their core technology andknowledge within the company itself.Economic growthbased on R&D, ratherthan simply on FDI,holds out the principalhope for accelerating<strong>development</strong> in theregion.THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 103


Governments havelarge responsibilitiesfor promotingknowledge.Successive waves ofchange by-passed aninward-looking Arabscientific andtechnologicalestablishment, leavingit isolated from thedynamic globalmainstream.Knowledge and know-how transfers and technologydiffusion are seldom if ever part oftheir primary strategies. This simply underscoresonce again why Arab countries need tostrengthen their national innovation systems inorder to take more advantage of technologycarryingFDI and technology imports.THE ROLE OF THE STATE ANDSCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYPOLICIESArab countries need to realise that technologytransfer and adaptation entail re-thinking theirunderstanding of the role of their technologyearmarkedinvestments. This requires a shiftaway from their customary tendency to investin tangible assets (machinery, facilities and infrastructure)and towards investing in intangibleassets (knowledge and <strong>human</strong> resources).Without significantly increased investment inthe latter, Arab countries will not be able tocreate successful national innovation systemsor approach the achievements of other developingcountries that have put the ideas, skillsand abilities of their people first.R&D institutions and research activitiesare subject to many influences originating withgovernments that can either facilitate or obstructtheir healthy <strong>development</strong>, efficient performance,impact, and objectives.Government policies and legislation that bearon the financial, tax and legal environment forresearch are one set of important factors.Another set are national policies relating toconditions of employment, general infrastructure,education, health and social security.Policies related to <strong>development</strong> sectors, suchas industry, agriculture, communications, informationand energy comprise a third set;while import-export policies and state-sponsoredmeasures to raise public awareness ofthe importance of science and technology canalso be influential.Add to this the role of the state in buildingscientific and technological infrastructure, establishingand financing independent and university-affiliatedR&D centres and theirprogrammes, and supporting the education,training and skills <strong>development</strong> of researchpersonnel, and it is clear that governmentshave large responsibilities for promotingknowledge. Indeed, the role of the state takeson greater significance wherever local scientific,technological and innovation capacitiesare weak, as is the case in most Arab countries.Cogent and comprehensive national and regionalscience and technology policies aretherefore a top priority in the Arab world.Concentrated efforts have been made inthe past to formulate such science and technologypolicies, with varying degrees of completenessfrom one country to another. Theprime movers were generally government authorities,research centres and universities,and the resulting plans usually reflected the interestsand requirements of the supply side,rather than of those parties on the demandside (the business sector, the state and civil society).Most of these plans have therefore remainedvague, unpublicised andunder-utilised. Those Arab countries that didsucceed in formulating coherent science andtechnology policies were still held back forlack of strategic and operational plans. Egypt,Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates, all of which have taken steps tolaunch initiatives in science and technologywith specific and well-defined goals, havebeen exceptions to this pattern.Several Arab countries have establishedcentral organs to plan and design scientific researchpolicies. Some of them were chargedwith the task of coordinating the work of specialisedresearch institutions, while otherswere associated with their own research centres.In other cases, Ministries of HigherEducation and Scientific Research assumedthe task of designing scientific policies.However, these institutions rarely settleddown to a stable programme of work; somewere eventually abolished and others succumbedto structural weaknesses, which compromisedtheir results. Scientific concepts andpractices remained rigid, and were not influencedby the new thinking that took place indeveloped countries during the 1980s and1990s. Successive waves of change bypassedan inward-looking Arab scientific and technologicalestablishment, leaving it isolated fromthe dynamic global mainstream.104 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


MISSING PARTNERS: NATIONALAND PAN-ARAB FUNDS FORFINANCING R&DGovernments continue to bear the biggestburden of financing scientific and technologicalinstitutions in an environment where absolutespending on R&D is insufficient.While recent increases in government expenditureon the various levels of education inmany Arab countries are laudable, the volumeof expenditure on scientific and technologicalactivities also needs to be boosted significantly.Yet governments have difficulty meetingthese additional financing requirementsthemselves. The strongest justification for establishingspecialized financial institutions totake up the slack in funding is the importanceof stimulating qualitative changes in the scientificand technological policies and activities inArab countries and promoting demand for theoutputs of Arab scientific and technologicalinstitutions. These are tasks that dedicatedfunding agencies can best address.More than 25 years after the unsuccesfulattempt to create an Arab Fund for Scienceand Technology Development and followingseveral country and national efforts in thatvein, the region is still in need of specialized financialinstitutions for scientific and technological<strong>development</strong>. There are someexceptions, however, such as the Institute forScientific Research in Kuwait and KingAbdul-Aziz City in Saudi Arabia.Without underestimating what some institutions(such as the Arab Fund for Economicand Social Development and the Islamic Bankfor Development, for example) have been ableto provide in this area, their priorities and thestructure of their technical organs have not enabledthem to play an influential and decisiverole in bringing about the required qualitativeleap. At the same time, international specializedagencies, such as UNESCO, are not setup as funding agencies and moreover face constraintsin staffing that handicap their effortsto play such a role effectively.While regional and international assistance,both technical and financial, to someArab countries has grown in recent years, mostof this assistance has been directed towards reorientingeconomic policies, restructuring theeconomy and developing infrastructure, in additionto <strong>human</strong>itarian assistance and socialservices. In education, aid to the region hasconcentrated on reforming and developingbasic education, particularly increasing therate of enrolment at schools and the teachingof girls in rural areas. Only a very small part ofregional and international resources has beenallocated to scientific and technological <strong>development</strong>,and most of that has gone towardsprojects concerned with the preservation ofthe environment.Thus, the many justifications for an ArabFund for Science and TechnologyThe manyDevelopmen, put forward more than 25 yearsago, remain valid. Rapid changes in technologyas a driver of economic <strong>development</strong> havejustifications for anArab Fund for Sciencecreated additional justifications that make theestablishment of national and regional funds and Technologyeven more imperative to help Arab countriesDevelopment, puttake advantage of new opportunities and potentials.The Kuwait Institute for Scientific forward more than 25Research for instance, is a promising exampleyears ago, remainof what can be achieved.Among their purposes and priorities, these valid.proposed funds could help to:• Formulate policies and create machineryto encourage increased demand for the outputsof Arab science and technology institutions.• Encourage qualified Arab scientific andtechnological institutions to become regionalcentres of excellence and more competitive atthe global level.• Support studies, research and projects,which focus on finding scientific and practicalsolutions for enhancing the quality of institutionsin education, science and technology.• Enable general and university educationinstitutions to benefit from the enormous pos-BOX 5.1Pioneering Successful Non-governmental Initiatives - The KuwaitInstitute for Scientific ResearchThe Kuwait Institute for ScientificResearch is a pioneering example of an activeand successful non-governmentalfoundation established with support andencouragement from a government. TheFoundation was established in 1978 onthe initiative of the current Emir ofKuwait, when he was Prime Minister, andthe Kuwait Chamber of Commerce andIndustry. Under a Bill of the Emir, jointstockKuwaiti companies offer 5% (laterSource: Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Background Paper For AHDR2.reduced to 2% then 1%) of their annualnet profits to the cumulative resources ofthe Foundation, whose assets have nowreached around one billion dollars. TheFoundation spends money on scientificactivities in Kuwait and the Arab worldfrom the proceeds of these funds. Perhapsits most famous activities are the five annualKuwait Scientific Awards given toArab scientists every year.THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 105


sibilities of information and communicationtechnology and connect learning and scientificresearch activities and outcomes to economic<strong>development</strong>.BOX 5.2The Arab Fund for Science and Technology Development: The BoldVenture That Almost SucceededIn 1976, a serious attempt was made tocreate an Arab Fund for Science andTechnology, which almost succeeded.Several positive factors were in place atthe time, including the availability of relativelyadequate financial resources derivingfrom lucrative oil export proceeds andthe then-prevailing belief in the importanceof joint Arab action.The Conference of Arab StateMinisters in charge of the Application ofScience and Technology for Developmenthad recommended in its meeting held inRabat in 1976 the establishment of anArab Fund to provide assistance in the financingof scientific and technological activities.The Outstanding Ministerial FollowupCommittee established by theConference entrusted the Arab Fund forEconomic and Social Development, theKuwait Fund for Economic Developmentand the Kuwait Institute for ScientificResearch with the task of carrying out atechnical feasibility study and of preparinga draft agreement to establish an"Arab Fund for Scientific andTechnological Development".The document establishing the proposedfund set the main goal of the Fundas "the creation of an organ to help Arabstates in their efforts to overcome thebackwardness of their scientific and technologicalcapacities, their dependence andtheir marginal activity and to promote thededication of these capacities to the serviceof economic and social <strong>development</strong>."The project set out a plan to translatethis goal into a number of objectives,proposing that they include the provisionof financial and technical assistance to:• Develop appropriate policies in thefields of scientific and technological <strong>development</strong>• Exploit the scientific and technologicalcapacities, which are already available• Promote the consolidation and <strong>development</strong>of these capacities• Intensify the use of services that scienceand technology can offer to the variousbranches of productionSource: Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Background Paper For AHDR2• Encourage the appropriate transfer ofscientific and technological knowledgefrom abroad and set the terms and conditionsupon which such transfer will bebased• Support private initiatives on inter-Arab cooperation in the field of technology.The feasibility study indicated thenthat the range of purposes and functionswas very large. It was, therefore, necessaryto establish work priorities in light of thepriorities of member states. It was alsoproposed that, with regard to the methodschosen to support scientific and technologicalprojects, the Fund should adopt aflexible policy, including the provision ofscholarships and financial subsidies, technicalservices and loans.It was also proposed that the Fundshould focus its efforts on high-impactprojects under specific programmes andnot on financing institutional support. Itshould assume a complementary role inrelation to subsidies and loans providedby others. It was also proposed that theminimum capital required as a target forthe Fund should be 150 million Kuwaitidinars. The amount should be regarded asan endowment asset dedicated to theFund's purposes. The capital would notbe touched but instead invested in safe financialassets. The income accruing fromthis investment would constitute the actualresources placed at the disposal of theFund to carry out its activities.Despite the availability of relativelyadequate financing in some Arab countriesat the end of the 1970s and the declaredcommitment of these countries tocontribute to the Fund's capital, politicaldifferences over the management of theFund's operations and its headquartersprevented its establishment at that time.As the region’s <strong>development</strong> prospectsbegan to change at the beginning of the1980s, and with diminishing financial resourcesaccruing from oil exports and thefatigue that afflicted joint Arab action, enthusiasmfor the Fund diminished and itsestablishment was abandoned.NETWORKING OF R&DINSTITUTIONS AT THE PAN-ARABAND INTERNATIONAL LEVELSNetworking is key to the success of scientificand technological work because it enablesmany actors to contribute to raising theknowledge and value-added content of problem-solvingresearch. Studies reveal that inmany cases nearly half the inputs needed tosolve a scientific problem come from unexpectedsources. Productive scientists usuallybelong to several networks, which providethem with channels for enhancing their knowledgeand experience. Some Arab R&D institutionshave made efforts in the past twodecades to develop institutional networks toincrease performance and support product<strong>development</strong>, but achievements at the countryand pan-Arab levels have been limited, whileinitiatives at the international level haveproved stronger.At the Arab levelNetworking among R&D institutions at thepan-Arab level is generally limited and, whereit occurs, is often temporary and not sustainable.Significant indicators of collaboration includescientific publications. In 1995, for instance,the number of scientific publicationsby scientists from Morocco, Algeria andTunisia amounted to 1,205 papers. Of thisnumber, 769 papers included contributionsfrom outside the country, but only seven includedcontributions from a researcher in anotherMaghreb country. Out of those sevenpapers, only one publication did not include acontribution from a Western country. It is obviousthat scientists from the Maghreb countrieshave been deeply integrated into theinternational scientific community, but do notseem to be as integrated into their national orregional scientific environment. Scientific cooperationat this level has been infrequent,both through exchanges of experience and information.The situation in member states of the GulfCooperation Council is not materially different.In the same year, the ratio of publicationsthat included contributions from researchersin one or more members of the Gulf106 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Cooperation Council was 3% of the total numberof publications. Those including a jointcontribution from an Arabic source were only15% of the total. This chiefly reflects the factthat universities and research centres in theGCC countries employ large numbers of researchersfrom other Arab universities, whilethe larger part of joint contributions comesfrom outside the Arab countries altogether.In countries of the Arab East (other thanGCC member states) the ratio of joint contributions,including by scientists from developedcountries, was 25% of the total.Considering that the volume of R&D activitiesin any Arab country is limited to begin with, itis only logical to assume that networking withother Arab scientists would partially compensatefor a low overall level of activity.Moreover, since Arab countries face a largenumber of common technological and technicalchallenges that can be solved through effectivecooperation, the importance ofcollaborative research hardly needs to be underlined.In the vital area of water sciences, forinstance, there is a wide spectrum of problemsthat could be dealt with through joint research.Such activities are still weak, however,and can be substantially strengthened if fragmentedefforts in every Arab country arebrought together and lubricated by an exchangeof experiments and experience.On the international front, an opportunitycurrently neglected by Arab R&D institutionsis to network with Arab scientists and techniciansliving abroad and, through them, withthe R&D centres and universities in whichthey work or with which they have ties. Thereare currently several institutional frameworkssupporting this pattern of networking. One ofthem is "TOKTEN", a programme establishedby UNDP in the late 1970s and whichcontinues to operate.At the international levelHow far Arab R&D institutions benefit fromnetworking with the scientific and technologicalcommunity in developed countries ultimatelydepends on their capacity to plan,organise and manage such networks in waysthat meet Arab needs and goals. Failure to energisecommunication and international cooperationcan be attributed in most cases to theBOX 5.3The Arab Science and Technology Foundation, a non-governmentalinitiative to support research and <strong>development</strong> in the Arab worldOne recent promising initiative is the creationof the Arab Science and TechnologyFoundation, established in 2000, in theEmirate of Sharjah, with the aim of buildinga coalition of Arab scientists living inthe Arab world and those residing abroadwho occupy leading positions in overseasscience and technology institutions anduniversities. The Foundation aims to becomean all-embracing Arab foundation,providing scholarships within the frameworkof a full scientific review by scientists.The Foundation has secured fundingSource: Amr Armanazi, Background Paper For AHDR2.absence of institutions with clear objectives.Other factors are the lack of a critical mass ofresearchers on national levels in areas of priorityfor the international R&D community, insufficientresearch funding and poorThe Academy is a unique institute in theregion, one originally established to trainpeople in the field of maritime transportthat has now developed into a distinguisheduniversity for science and technology.The Academy was established in 1972in Alexandria, Egypt as a regional projectoffering maritime education and trainingto seamen in three disciplines: navigation,maritime engineering and business studies,in addition to the training of sailors. Inits first 12 years, its student body grewfrom 733 students in 1972 to over 2500 in1984.In subsequent years, the Academy diversifiedits syllabus to cover new fields,such as engineering and management, inorder to become self-financing. Its namewas changed to the Arab Academy forScience & Technology and MaritimeTransport, and it adopted a collegiatestructure which includes the College ofEngineering & Technology, the College ofManagement, Technology and MaritimeTransport and the College of Technology.These colleges grant a bachelor's degree intechnology.The College of Maritime Transportand Technology was provided with an integratedcomplex of simulators used forvarious maritime sciences and the protectionof the marine environment from oilpollution. It combines in one building theto meet recurrent and programme costsand launched its activities, which includedtwo expanded scientific meetings in 2000and 2002 that brought together a largenumber of Arab scientists and researchersfrom Arab countries and abroad.Foundation priorities include the establishmentof sustainable relationships withWestern laboratories and the funding ofjoint research projects by scientists fromthe Arab world and from abroad, aided byArab researchers living overseas.BOX 5.4The Arab Academy for Science & Technology and Maritime TransportSource: Arabian Gulf University.following simulators, laboratories andmajor equipment: a simulator for the managementof oil spills, oil pollution controlsystems, oil analysis laboratories, a simulatorfor the management and piloting ofships, and simulators for the transportationof liquefied gas. It also houses aCentre for Geographical InformationSystems and a Multi-media Centre.In addition to its three colleges, theAcademy includes other institutes, centresand programmes, which contribute to itsaccomplishments: the Institute ofAdvanced Administration, the Institutefor Productivity and Quality, the HigherInstitute for Professional and AppliedStudies, the Institute for EducationalResources, the Institute for InternationalTransport and the Centre for Logisticsand Community Service.The Academy's role transcends theboundaries of the Arab world. In the past30 years, the Academy provided trainingopportunities to 257,000 students from 58Arab, African, Asian and other states. Ithas thus moved beyond its regional identityto become an interregional universityof science & technology and marine transport,with recognized technological capabilitiesand facilities.In 1999, the Academy was awardedthe ISO 9001 Certificate, having developedand implemented a quality system inall its bachelor's degree programmes.THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 107


Joint Euro-Arab R&Dactivities in themodern sciences, suchas biotechnology andnew materials, arefew and far between.prioritisation of research objectives in terms ofnational goals.During the period 1992-1995, several cooperationprogrammes were instituted betweenscientific and technological institutionsin European countries and collaborating institutionsin Arab countries, supported by theEuropean Union. Arab-European scientificand technological cooperation received newmomentum following the BarcelonaConference on Euro-MediterraneanCooperation in 1995, which resulted in thelaunching and financing of new programmes,most importantly the activities carried outwithin the MEDA Programme, the financialinstrument of the Euro-MediterraneanPartnership. These programmes aimed to supporttechnological research and <strong>development</strong>,redress problems resulting from the wideningof the scientific achievement gap, activate exchangesof experience in scientific sectors andpolicies (to enable Mediterranean partners tonarrow the gap between them and theirEuropean neighbours), support technologytransfer and help build scientific and technologicalcapacities through increased contributionsto joint research projects.Figure 5.3Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects in researchand <strong>development</strong> among Arab countriesFigure 5.3 indicates the distribution of cooperationprojects among participating Arabcountries. The data shows that Morocco participatesin 28% of these projects, Tunisia in25% and Egypt in 17%.Figure 5.4 indicates the distribution of cooperationprojects by field. It illustrates thatmost cooperation projects relate to natural resources(51%), agriculture (21%) and health(14%). Projects related to modern technologyare limited in number: information and communicationtechnology (8%), materials andproduction technology (2%) and biotechnology(0.4%).Evidently, joint Euro-Arab R&D activitiesin the modern sciences, such as biotechnologyand new materials, are few and far between.Among the most prominent programmes ofscientific and technological cooperation betweenthe Arab region and the West are theprogrammes carried out within the frameworkof an agreement concluded between Egyptand the United States of America in 1995 for aperiod of five years. The framework was renewedfor another five-year period with effectfrom 2000. This agreement aims to enhancescientific and technological capacities, promotecooperation between scientific and technologicalcommunities in both countries andprovide opportunities for scientific contacts.Research has concentrated on biotechnology,industrial technology, environmentaltechnology, standards and measures, informationtechnology and energy. More than 70 researchprojects were funded in the latter fieldsin the period 1995-2000. Research institutionsin Egypt and more than 30 US research institutionscooperated in the implementation ofthese projects, some of which produced resultsthat aroused the interest of the industrialsector, paving the way for negotiations totransform the results of these research projectsinto products.Source: Al-Bizri, 2000.108 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Figure 5.4Distribution of Euro-Arab cooperation projects among R&D fieldsIt is not possible forArab countries tobenefit from the fruitsof global knowledgewithout investing inlocal production, localknowledge workersand local knowledgetraditions.Source: Al-Bizri, 2000.Chapter five observes that Arab countries’ experience with the transfer and adaptation of knowledgethrough technology, and their efforts to organise and make effective use of their own accumulated<strong>human</strong> and natural capital, have, on the whole, been disappointing. Weak nationalinnovation systems and institutional frameworks largely account for this outcome and for relativelymeagre technology returns on FDI. The general absence of coherent, action-oriented scientificand technological policies is a further constraint. The chapter concludes that it is not possiblefor Arab countries to benefit from the fruits of global knowledge production and technology withoutinvesting in local production, local knowledge workers and local knowledge traditions.Current indicators of research production and economic output tell this story plainly enough.This chapter completes the assessment of the status of knowledge in Arab countries. Starting withChapter Six, the Report takes up an analysis of the societal context affecting knowledge acquisitionin the Arab world.THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 109


PART IISection three: the cultural,socio-economic and political contextChapters 6-8 concentrate on impediments to knowledge in the Arab world. Thisanalysis takes in: a) culture, itself subdivided into heritage, religion andlanguage; b) the dominant socio-economic structure, including modes ofeconomic production, growth and income distribution; and class structure,attitudes and values; and c) politics, including political systems, the role of elites,the corruption of knowledge by politics; the importance of codifying knowledgefreedoms under the law; the relationship between good governance and freedomof thought and expression; and the regional and global environment forknowledge transfers and <strong>development</strong>.CULTURE 111


CHAPTER 6CultureThe production of knowledge is driven bystrong and increasing societal demand and thepolitical will to secure the resources necessaryfor stimulating a vital and capable knowledgesystem. This includes building high calibre<strong>human</strong> capital as a base, and ensuring an environmentof policies and institutional structuresconducive to the system’s effective functioning.Important as they are, these factors are in turnaffected by societal, cultural, economic and politicaldeterminants which also have a bearingon the knowledge system – for knowledge doesnot evolve in a social vacuum but rather in aparticular society that has a reality, a historyand a regional and global context. It is this lastelement that has a special significance for theArab world in this phase of its history.This next section of the Report, therefore, dealswith fundamental elements of the societal contextthat affect the knowledge system and thatare expected to play a significant role in the establishmentof the knowledge society in Arabcountries. Chapter 6 considers the relationshipbetween culture and knowledge acquisition,and delves into some of the issues that havebeen briefly touched upon earlier in the Report(in Chapter 1 in particular). The chapter analysesthe various components of the Arab intellectualheritage, religion and language, and folkculture.The term "culture" generally refers to all<strong>human</strong> contributions to ideas, perceptions,customs, socio-political systems and economicconstructs. It also encompasses literary, artisticand technological innovations throughout history.It almost overlaps with the term "civilisation",and has innumerably more specificdefinitions. The most common and useful definitionof culture refers to the status of intellectualprogress, of individuals and societies,reflected in intellectual, value-related, innovativeand artistic accomplishments that are correlatedwith progress in the thinking patternsand behaviours of a particular civil group.Arab culture can be perceived from two perspectives:formal culture and folk culture.Formal culture is construed to mean the completearray of intellectual tools, comprehensiveconcepts, systems and values that govern thesystem of thought and action, and the perceptionsand practices of the individual and society.In this definition, and in an Arab culturalcontext, intellectual heritage represents a basiccomponent of culture, language is said to bethe carrier of culture; religion is the major comprehensivebelief system that directs the life ofthis culture; and values (moral, social and political)are the judges of the actions directedwithin it. Those are the fundamental elementsof Arab culture for the purpose of this analysis.Of course, there are other cultural, knowledgebased,scientific or conceptual elements derivingfrom other sources that could also be addedto those three elements. But intellectual heritage,religion and values, and language standas the most decisive, determining and instructiveelements of formal Arab culture. It is thosethree that ought to be taken into account firstwhen looking at knowledge production as astep towards building a knowledge society inArab countries.INTELLECTUAL HERITAGEArab "intellectual heritage" is a major componentof Arab culture. An Arab knowledge societymust connect with the defining sources ofknowledge upon which this society is built.Arab intellectual heritage constitutes a livingmembrane in the cultural body of Arab society,yet it remains a "historical" phenomenon, i.e.,the entirety of its facts go back to objective historicalconditions. Change, <strong>development</strong> andtranscendence underlie the entire process ofIntellectual heritage,religion and values,and language stand asthe most decisive,determining andinstructive elements offormal Arab culture.CULTURE 113


The issue of Arabintellectual heritagehas never been purelya theoretical orscientific question.Rather, it has been, toa great extent, anideological issue.this heritage’s formation, movement and destiny.If it is assumed that the <strong>human</strong> being is thestarting point and the origin of this heritage, itcan also be assumed that the religious text,from the viewpoint of some, remains outsidethe scope of history, but is nonetheless identifiedas one of the fundamentals that interactswith historical realities and responds to theirneeds. As for the elements of the heritage itself,they are embodied in all forms of intellectual,scientific, spiritual, literary, materialistic,man-made and artistic life that the makers ofthis heritage have.All those forms of life are manifest in thehistorical Arab knowledge experience, datingfrom the pre-Islamic era, (traditionally designatedas the period of "Jahiliyya" by the ArabIslamic heritage), up to the age of Westernmodernity, beginning in the early 16th century.In the middle of the 19 th century, withthe advent of printing and communicationwith the West, modern Arabs re-discoveredtheir intellectual heritage in all its components:linguistic, literary, historical, scientificand philosophical.HERITAGE: A TUSSLE BETWEENKNOWLEDGE BUILDING ANDIDEOLOGICAL EXPLOITATIONConcurrent with the emergence of Arab"modernity" was the emergence, in reality andin consciousness, of the Arab heritage. Theconcept of Arab heritage became an importantdimension of the modern problematique ofculture and civilisation and the Arab past andfuture. It is with this concept that all of thebasic stances and questions concerning theBOX 6.1Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406), On the fact that scientific education is askill and a professionSource: Roshdi Rached , in Arabic, background paper for AHDR 2 .Dexterity in science, progress and masterycan only be attained through the facultyof knowing its principles and rules,examining its problems and deducing itsbranches from its main streams. Until thisfaculty is owned, no skill can be achieved.The Andalusians have lost interest in sciencebecause of the deterioration of theircivilization for hundreds of years. Of allsciences they have kept and preservedonly the art of the Arabic language and literature.Jurisprudence has completelydisappeared and no trace of it is leftamong them. Intellectual activity is evenworse off among them. And that is all aresult of the worsening condition of education,a consequence of the deteriorationof their civilization; and the fact that theirenemies dominate them. They have beenmore concerned with subsistence thanwith what is beyond it."historical personality" – the "Self", "the civilisationalSelf", cultural specificity, identity,tradition and modernity, and Islam andmodernity – were connected. These issues, inaddition to many other binary opposites, occupiedshifting positions that were at timesconflicting, harmonious or complementary.Indeed, they became related to the modern realityof Arabs, to the challenges of advancementand progress, and to attempts to dealwith "crisis", "backwardness", or "defeat" orother situations that call for inspiration fromideas or forces conducive to progress and revival.The result was that the issue of Arab intellectualheritage has never been purely a theoreticalor scientific question in the strictmeaning of the word. Rather, it has been, to agreat extent, an ideological issue. It relates notonly to religion, the sacred and the Arab pastbut also to new practical causes that requirepurposeful acts, political or national concessions,and interest-related aims that are distinctfrom the pure scientific view.In being connected with and at the sametime contradictory to knowledge, Arab intellectualheritage nowadays raises basic knowledgeproblems. Its link with knowledge comesfrom its connection with language, religion,sciences and culture. Its contradiction withknowledge arises because heritage is not usuallyviewed from a scientific standpoint but israther closely surrounded by emotion, passion,desire, wishes, glorification and sometimesa disregard of reality and discomfitingfacts. In other words, ideological leaningsoften permeate approaches to this heritage.It is therefore important to distinguish betweenawareness of cultural heritage on theone hand, and the <strong>human</strong>ities and history,with all their branches of study, on the other.The reason is that history is based on methodology,on an objective approach and on maintainingan intellectual distance from the past.The goal of any historian of a great civilisation,while sympathising with and understandingthe subject of research, should always be thequest for facts. The temptation to fall in lovewith the heritage must always be resisted.Nevertheless, the exploitation of Arab intellectualheritage for ideological reasonsshould not be exaggerated. Modern interest in114 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


the Arab heritage has not been motivated byideology alone; it has also taken the form of anextensive effort that started at the end of the19 th century to revive and publish this heritage.Orientalists first initiated this revival,which was then undertaken by Arabs themselveswho expanded it further into scientificand non-scientific spheres. There is also a substantialbody of cultural studies, which haveexamined this heritage in accordance with acceptedand rigorous research methodologies.There is a wealth of Arab scholarship in thesefields, in addition to scholarship carried out inthe West at institutes and universities specialisingin oriental, Arab and Islamic studies.Those studies cover all fields of Arab heritage– language, literature, religion, culture, scienceand art – and they genuinely contribute to theexploration of its intellectual, spiritual and<strong>human</strong> dimensions. Thanks to such studies,the relationship between Arab culture andArab heritage has been made accessible to intellectualand <strong>human</strong> understanding, ratherthan being left as a passionate ideological relationshipor a shallow expedient resorted tounder compelling historical circumstances.Indeed, this objective approach to knowledgederiving from Arab heritage is the mostuseful approach for Arab countries now andfor building the knowledge society in the future.Yet such knowledge also requires a comprehensivehistorical view of the substance ofthis heritage. First, it is necessary to addressthe issue of the "Arab mentality", an obstacleto understanding Arab heritage that has persistedfor a long time. Al-Jahiz, for example,believed that all Arab thought was gained onlythrough natural disposition, inspiration andintuition and never by affectation and dissimulation."The Arab mentality"Early Orientalists tended to claim that thementality guiding Arab heritage is characterisedby a simplistic analysis of particularsand is incapable of complex constructions andabstraction. Hence, it is the kind of mentalitythat lacks the competencies necessary for realinnovation (for a critique of such viewpointssee Abdul Razek, in Arabic, 1966). A wide debateensued recently about the nature of the"Arab mentality" and its knowledge mechanisms.An association was also made betweenthis mentality and an Arab "character" that isgoverned by instinctive desires, emotion, passionand an overwhelming individualism orthe destructive absence of rationalism.Contemporary Arabic literature is repletewith accounts of the "Arab self", the "Arabcharacter" or the "Arab identity". Those textsvary in approach and include harsh self-criticismor analysis, in some cases, or appreciation,commendation, glorification, andpresumption of superiority, efficacy, perfectionand homogeneity in others. Yet the featuresof any rich <strong>human</strong> portrait appearaccented or diminished depending on theangle of view. Contemporary accounts are fullof ostensible Arab cultural characteristics distortedby one interpretation or another. Theseaccounts are generalisations, and selectiveones at that. They are erroneously based onabstracting a fixed and formed Arab "mentality"from ever-changing cultural, intellectual,socio-economic and political contexts.In the course of its actual historical formationand advancement, the "Arab mentality"has never been restricted to what is purely"Arab", but has rather been open to global intellectual,psychological, social and <strong>human</strong> interactions.Thus, products of this mentalityhave been varied, rich, and developed; itsmethodologies have been multiple and diverse.Historical and ideological factors, moreover,have been decisive in directing thosemethodologies to various ends. The so-calledArab mentality has at different points in historybeen traditional and imitative, rationaland innovative, analogical (in jurisprudence)and figurative, rhetorical, scientific and experimental,intuitive and Sufi, or transcendentaland mystical.The question of the "Arab mentality",then, should be seen in the context of objectivereality and within the flow and flux oftime. This mentality is not a single constructwith a fixed "essence" and unchanging traitsoutside history. It is not a myth outside objectivereality. Rather, it is a dynamically evolvingsynthesis of the rich diversity of cultural andsocial influences that, under particular historicalconditions and at different times, havegone into forming this "mentality" in thecourse of a specific civilisation. As Arab his-Contemporaryaccounts are full ofostensible Arabcultural characteristicsdistorted by oneinterpretation oranother.The question of the"Arab mentality",then, should be seenin the context ofobjective reality andwithin the flow andflux of time.CULTURE 115


The Arab mentality (is)a system that isdeveloped and opento knowledge, actionand creativityThe "Revelation" wasaddressed to the<strong>human</strong> mind for it tocomprehend, andtherefore to <strong>human</strong>reason.tory advances, changes and varies, so too the"Arab mentality" encompasses and expresseschange. (For more on this issue see, Al-Jabri,[in Arabic, 1991]; Al-Aroui, [in Arabic; 1970],and T<strong>arab</strong>ishi, [in Arabic, 1996])Renewal, innovation and knowledge productioncertainly depend on the major elementsand values that are rooted andemployed in the cultural system. This wouldmake the Arab mentality a system that is developedand open to knowledge, action andcreativity; one that has acquired the competenciesfor production, progress and innovationutilising and expressing this knowledge.The foundations of Arab intellectualheritageArab intellectual heritage, embodied in theArab historical experience in its golden age,i.e., since the beginning of the Islamic perioduntil just after the era of Ibn Khaldoun (early1400s AD, early 800s AH), relies upon a set ofknowledge, scientific and cultural foundationsand formations. It is by those foundations andformations that the Arab intellectual heritageis defined in history. The Islamic "Revelation",undoubtedly, constituted a primary knowledgebase, one that guided the intellectual andspiritual proceedings and the worldly life ofthe Arabs who exemplified Islam and carriedit across geographical borders and among <strong>human</strong>kind.Likewise, the "Revelation" was thestarting point of the School that favoured theimitation of the tradition to which early religiousscholars, jurists, traditionalists andscholars, in addition to the masses of believers,adhered. Although the "Revelation" was infact addressed to the <strong>human</strong> mind for it tocomprehend, and therefore to <strong>human</strong> reason,Muslims in the first and second centuries ofHijra (the Prophet’s emigration from Mecca toMedina), with some notable exceptions, didnot give reason much attention. Its function,then, was confined to understanding, interpretingand attributing religious texts, ordrawing attention to their linguistic connotations.Yet interaction with other <strong>human</strong> civilisationsand the spread of Islam across other nationsand cultures, together with the transferof the old scientific and philosophical heritage,combined to elevate the position of "reason".Eventually, a new intellectual poweremerged and managed to make reason synonymouswith, or the twin brother of, the text, ifnot precedent to it in questions of theory ornature. Soon afterwards, the contradiction betweentext-thesis and reason-antithesisbrought about a third construction, basically asynthesis of both, which became highlyrenowned and widely disseminated.The deterioration of political, socio-economicand scientific life, and the decline of thecentral state and its social institutions after thecollapse of the Abbasid Caliphate, produced atendency towards asceticism, abandonment ofthe worldly life and immersion in the teachingsof Sufism and ecstatic communion. Thesetrends nurtured a tendency that sought to replacecommunication with the world, societyand <strong>human</strong> beings with communication withGod and the Absolute. And once the centralstate had fallen, in the middle of the 7 th centuryAH (the 13 th century AD), the Islamiccivilisation retreated and gave way to a newkind of <strong>human</strong> association, to use IbnKhaldoun’s term. "Arab reason" moved towardsmysticism and its supernatural, transcendentalsciences. It was released from thosepursuits only at the dawn of the 19 th centurydue to a number of historical factors includingcommunication with Western modernity.Evidently, this liberation was limited becausea sub-culture that encourages superstitionhas remained to the present day and willcertainly thrive in popular environments. Sucha subculture needs to be uprooted. One of themost effective means of doing so would be topopularise cultural values that respect scienceand scientific research.In the Arab historical experience, theRevelation, reason and their synthesis, as wellas inner consciousness, ecstatic communionand mysticism, were respectively the epistemologicalbasis of Arab thought until thedawn of the modern age. Each principle hasserved as the starting point for the <strong>development</strong>of one or more branch of Arab culturalexpression.116 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Arab historical knowledge outcomesRevelation, for example, has been the startingpoint for the sciences of theology and legislation,such as Qura’nic Sciences and Exegesis,the science of Hadith terminology, Islamic jurisprudence,and also, to some extent, Muslimtheology, Monotheism and ScholasticTheology. Each discipline in turn arose in responseto historical challenges and needs atdifferent times. Those needs of the time had todo with the understanding of religion and itsbeliefs, the practice of religious acts of devotion,the enforcement of religious dealings andthe application of religious provisions in allfields of life. It is thus not strange to find disparitiesand discrepancies in the understandings,perceptions and independent juridicaljudgements that eventually culminated in anumber of different schools of jurisprudencebased on elements deriving from differentprinciples.Moreover, the interpretation of the religioustext did not stop at one approach; on thecontrary it initiated diverse methods ofthought: the linguistic method; the rhetoricalmethod; the rational method; the traditionalistmethod; the school of ecstatic communion orSufism; and the Zahirite school (interpretingthe Qura’an according to its literal meaning).These diverse approaches to understandingthe religious text testify to its richness, varietyand depth. Similarly, the multiplicity ofschools of jurisprudence attests to the diversityof principles for arriving at independentjudgement. Some schools disclose the widelatitude, others the narrow boundaries laiddown before the believers. Most important ofall, what the varied nature of this legal heritageconfirms is that its contents are not ultimatelyfixed, but are closely tied to historical subjectiveconditions and to the living relationshipbetween the "text" and changing reality.As for Reason, it was the starting point forthe sciences of the Arabic language, the scienceof Scholastic Theology and the body ofphilosophical sciences that were called "the intellectualsciences". These include logic andphilosophy, as well as the natural, medical, engineeringand mathematical sciences passeddownto the Arabs from the "predecessors",i.e., the Greeks in particular. Few as theywere, the Arab intellectual sciences were notoriginally entrenched in ancient Arab culture;indeed, they were dubbed "intruding sciences"by the Arabs themselves. Yet they representa historical manifestation of this culturethat has been blurred with the passage of timeand with the renewal and advancement ofmodern knowledge. Their historical value inthe advancement of <strong>human</strong> civilisation is unquestionable.The synthetic method, which combinedthe two poles of Arab thought, the imitation oftradition and the exercise of innovative reason,and which characterised the scholastic perspectiveof the Ash’arite school, was the startingpoint of wide cultural activity. Themethod produced an eminent group of greatreligious intellectuals, who were active in theperiod from the third century AH (the ninthAD) to the current cycle of Arab Islamic civilisation.The impact of this method remainedevident in the intellectual thought which accompaniedthe age of modernity and the modernrenaissance.As noted earlier, with the fall of the centralstate and the eclipse of scientific rationalism,inner consciousness and ecstatic communionbecame the principles of a spiritual life that expressedthe yearnings of the self towards theSupreme Absolute. This movement was thebasis of all subjective and communal Sufi experiences,which filled Arab and Islamic culturallife. Whatever their individual features,the sciences of Ultimate Reality, whether spiritualor philosophical, rational or irrational, reflecteda rich intellectual life with a highspiritual value that echoed throughout theEast and West, touching upon <strong>human</strong> spiritualityin traditional and in modern times. This isnot surprising as those sciences are closely tiedto the metaphysical and existential dimensionsof <strong>human</strong>kind. Yet because they are intimatepersonal experiences, they could not becomethe founding principles of a collective knowledgesystem.On the other hand, the supernatural culture,which was related to astronomy, astrology,the science of Talismans and even to someforms of religiosity, and which held a distinctiveposition after the great age of IbnKhaldoun, belongs to the backward stages ofArab intellectual heritage. It is well knownthat modern enlightened movements haveThe interpretation ofthe religious text didnot stop at oneapproach; on thecontrary it initiateddiverse methods ofthought.The multiplicity ofschools ofjurisprudence atteststo the diversity ofprinciples for arrivingat independentjudgement.CULTURE 117


Heritage has been adynamic contributor tothought.There is some kind ofconsensus amongIslamic thinkers todefine religion (Islam)as a multidimensionalsystem of beliefs thatembraces the spiritualand the material, thedivine and the earthly,the heavenly soul andmortal worldly deeds.contributed decisively to the withdrawal andelimination of this culture in modern times.In summary, Arab consciousness arises atthe confluence of multiple historical currentsflowing through and from its cultural inheritance.That consciousness has displayed itselfin diverse forms and in different areas. It hasbeen traditional, bound by the limits of thetext and the traditional arbiter. It has alsobeen innovative and intellectual as in the caseof the scholastic theologians, jurists, philosophersand scholars of the "intellectual" andnatural sciences. It has been synthetic, combiningreason and the imitation of tradition;and it has been mystical, as in the deep Suficonsciousness open to the Absolute acrossspace and time, yet closed to society with itsworldly horizons. Finally, it has been cloakedin the supernatural, which in reality signifiedan absence of consciousness and an abandonmentof the scientific and intellectual basisthat underpinned the Arab classical culturalexperience (Jada’an, in Arabic, 1998).HERITAGE AND THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYWhat is that part of the Arab intellectual heritagethat remains steadfast and alive throughhistory? And what is that part that can, orought to be upheld, built upon and employedfor the sake of active involvement in theknowledge society and in knowledge production?Undoubtedly, Arab intellectual heritagehas undergone many changes and <strong>development</strong>sand quite a number of its componentshave been superseded by the progress ofknowledge and science. Yet some fields ofknowledge and sciences have progressed fartherthan others (Centre for Arab UnityStudies, in Arabic, 1985). The conventional religioussciences have remained unchanged andhave failed to produce results in the field of religion.Moreover, as these sciences by customassociated the notion of science with "religiousscience" or only with knowledge "useful"to religion, they also failed to contributeto advancing the fields of natural knowledge.On the other hand, the Arab intellectual sciences,i.e., the philosophical and natural scienceshave pioneered a number of valuableand solid methodological approaches at thecomprehensive <strong>human</strong> level. Amongst themost important are:• Increasing the tone of rationalism in religiousthought.• Fostering objective rationalism in philosophy.• Founding a new analytical mathematicalrationalism.• Establishing experimentation as a patternof proof in knowledge.• Introducing values as principles in thinking.Heritage, in the sense discussed here, hasbeen a dynamic contributor to thought. Theprofound and varied cultural influences,methods and values deriving from that heritageand living on in the present, which can bebuilt upon in creating the Arab knowledge society,are subsumed in language, religion andvalues (moral, social and political).These building blocks represent what canbe termed "formal culture" in contradistinctionto "popular culture". What is the status ofthese building blocks? And how would theycontribute to establishing a successful knowledgesociety in the Arab context?RELIGIONThe approaches of Islamic thinkers and thevarious intellectual currents underlyingIslamic religious experience vary greatly inboth their nature and objectives. This is evidentwhen one considers the different approachesof philosophers, theologians, Sufis orfundamentalist thinkers. But there is somekind of consensus among Islamic thinkers todefine religion (Islam) as a multidimensionalsystem of beliefs that embraces the spiritualand the material, the divine and the earthly,the heavenly soul and mortal worldly deeds.Therefore the definition advanced by Al-Tahanoui ("Terminology in Arts and Sciences,"1996) exactly reflects this multidimensionality:religion, according to him, is a divine dispensationthat inspires rational mortals tofocus at one and the same time on betteringtheir lives on earth while earning their place inthe afterlife. This definition confirms the vitalrelationship between religion as a belief linkedto the religious absolute and to reality, in all itsflux and flow, as governed by the religious ab-118 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


solute through a cognitive system and itsmethods of induction, deduction and judgementin relation to the primacy of the Qura’anand Sunna (traditions of the Prophet) and toother judgements as derived from the analogical,adjudicative, public interest and ratiocinativemethods.Yet this section is not aimed at consideringthe nature of religion, ideas, or subjective andhistorical facts. Rather, it considers how religionrelates to knowledge production in aknowledge society. Its focus on Islam as opposedto other religions is to be expected sinceIslam is the major religion in most Arab countries.Moreover, Islam was a major inspirationfor Arab civilisation. However, this focus impliesno detraction at all from the value andimportance of Arab communities that embracea religion other than Islam, especiallyChristians who have a recognised and dignifiedposition in modern and classical Arab culture.Indeed a multitude of religious groupshave played a very significant role in the formationof this culture and in the production ofscience and knowledge.RELIGION, THE MATERIALWORLD AND KNOWLEDGEThe relationship between religion and knowledgeis closely linked to the concept of theessence of religion and its comprehensive attitudetowards worldly life. Reading religiousIslamic texts reveals a balance between bothreligion and worldly life, and between life onearth and in the afterlife. The recurring focusis on the importance of enquiry, contemplation,science and sound reasoning, and whateverrelates to the continuity of <strong>human</strong>kind onearth. There is emphasis on contemplation ofboth the heavenly and earthly kingdoms andon subduing the universe for the good of <strong>human</strong>ity.Historically, some Muslims drifted fromthis innate balance by interpreting the principlesof science and reason in the light of"Religious Science" and forms of knowledgeuseful for religion. By limiting and narrowingthe concept of science in this way, they did notadvance the openness of the intellectual andnatural sciences. Other Muslim groups believedthat worldly life, being transient, had noBOX 6.2Milad Hanna - Religious Harmony and Knowledge in the ArabWorld.claim on their attention and so pursued the afterlifeon earth. They turned to the life of asceticismand Sufism, abandoning worldlypreoccupations. The nature of their choicesdiminished the influence of worldly sciencesand the pursuit of material and intellectualknowledge and science. Nevertheless, themajor tendency of early Arab civilisation expresseditself as a keen interest in the worldand in acquiring scientific knowledge and inthe encouragement of knowledge in all its aspects.Indeed, the production of knowledgewas prolific, as witnessed by the Islamic Arabheritage in linguistic, literary, intellectual,physical and other disciplines.In the modern age, the intellectuals of theArab Renaissance recognised the diminutionof science and knowledge as the main reasonfor the backwardness of the Arabs and thedegradation of their civilisation. Thus, theywere anxious to espouse the rational princi-All the Abrahamic religions arose andflourished in the Arab region. Judaismemerged with the Prophet Abraham in thecity of Or, in Iraq, then moved to<strong>Palestine</strong>, then Egypt and came back toSyria and Babylon in a long and wellknownhistorical journey. ThenChristianity emerged in <strong>Palestine</strong> and continuedin the Arab East up to the presentday. There are many Christian communitiesin the Arab world that represent allthree major branches of Christianity:Orthodox, Catholic and the group ofProtestant sects. The most famous amongthem are the Coptic community (most ofwhose members are Orthodox) in Egypt,the Maronites (Catholic) in Lebanon, theSyriac in Syria and the Assyrians in Iraq.There are also Armenian minorities, whomigrated from their original country andfound refuge in the Arab region.Most Arab communities of Christianfaith are generally on very good terms withMuslims. They have lived under Islamicrule for centuries and their relations withArab Muslims are excellent, althoughthere remain some problems that can beeasily solved.The point that is worth emphasisingin the context of this <strong>report</strong> is that theseArab Christian communities have beenpartners in the shaping of the Arab-Islamic civilization. It is an established historicalfact that they contributed, duringthe time of the Abbasid Caliphate, to awide-ranging movement of translationinto Arabic of literature that precededIslamic civilization, benefiting that movementwith their knowledge of the Greeklanguage, in addition to their originalAssyrian, Syriac and Coptic languages.Their contributions helped to transferpre-Arabic heritage and formed a culturalbridge to it, thus maintaining the continuityof knowledge from ancient to moderntimes.The knowledge available to <strong>human</strong>kindtoday is a cumulative knowledgetransferred and enhanced through thetranslation movement, which flourished atthe height of Islamic civilization and wasaugmented and enriched by the knowledgeprovided by that civilization itself.The Christianity that developed in theArab world co-existed with Islam throughsuccessive eras and produced knowledge.Indeed, whatever knowledge <strong>human</strong>kindachieves, in whatever field, is but an accumulationof knowledge through successivecivilizations and a tributary of world<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> as a whole.This Christian-Islamic co-existence inthe Arab world represents a model ofunity in diversity, which is one of thesources of <strong>human</strong> progress and advancementthrough knowledge acquisition.This Christian-Islamicco-existence in theArab world representsa model of unity indiversity.CULTURE 119


BOX 6.3Al Kawakibi (1854-1902) Despots and KnowledgeKnowledge is a firebrand from God’slight. God created light for enlightenmentand for generating strength. He madeknowledge as an example revealing goodand uncovering evil, generating warmth insouls and nobility in the mind.A tyrant never fears religious knowledgeor the After World, as he thinks suchmatters cannot harm him, but rather distractthe minds of people interested inthem. If any of those thus distractedSource: The Character of Despotism, pp 50-51.Islam is a system ofreligion and worldlylife at the same time.The Qur’an 1Allah witnesses that there is no deity exceptHim, and the angels and people ofknowledge know that He is the One andmaintains justice in all Creation. (Surah ¯ 3-Ali‘Imran, ¯ ¯ 18)Say, "Are those who know equal to thosewho do not know?" (Surah ¯ 39- az-Zumar,9)Allah will raise those who have believedamong you and those who were givenknowledge, by degrees.(Surah ¯ 58 - al-Mujadalah, ¯ 11)And say, "My Lord, increase me inknowledge." (Surah ¯ 20- Ta ¯Ha, ¯ 114)Nun. ¯ By the pen and what they inscribe.(Surah ¯ 68- al-Qalam,1)became knowledgeable and famousamong common people, the tyrant wouldalways find a way of using him for his supportby shutting up his mouth with scraps.But the tyrant would shiver in fear ofworldly knowledge such as theoreticalwisdom, intellectual philosophy, the rightsof nations, civil policy, history, literaryrhetoric and other knowledge that piercesthe veil of ignorance and enlightens people.ples behind the surge of global knowledge andscience and combine the values of Islamiccivilisation with those of modernity (Hourani,1967).Religious texts were a significant tool inthe process of justifying this new combinationand encouraging the advancement of knowledgeand science and their applications. TheBOX 6.4Erudition in the Qur’an and the Sunna (prophetic tradition)"And if anyone longs for wide experience,she knows of things of old, and infersthe things to come; she understandsturns of speech and the solutions of riddles;she has foreknowledge of signs andwonders and of the outcome of seasonsand times" (Wisdom of Solomon, 8:8)The Sunna“If anyone travels on a road in search ofknowledge, Allah will cause him to travelon one of the roads of Paradise. The angelswill lower their wings in their greatpleasure with one who seeks knowledge,the inhabitants of the heavens and theEarth and the fish in the deep waters willask forgiveness for the learned man. Thesuperiority of the learned man over thedevout is like that of the moon, on thenight when it is full, over the rest of thestars. The learned are the heirs of theProphets, and the Prophets leave neitherdinar nor dirham, leaving only knowledge,and he who takes it takes an abundantportion." (Sunan Abu Dawud, Book25, Number 3634)"Spread knowledge and you will congregateso that the un- knowledgeable willknow. Knowledge does not vanish savewhen it is hidden."BOX 6.5Learning and knowledge in the Holy Bible, Old Testament2"Apply thine heart unto instruction,and thine ears to the words of knowledge."(Proverbs, 23:12)"And by knowledge shall the chambersbe filled with all precious and pleasantriches." (Proverbs, 24:4)1The Qura’an, translated and revised by Saheeh International, Riyadh, 1997.latter, after all, are considered a major factor inthe comprehensive <strong>development</strong> of <strong>human</strong>ityand a form of worship of God on earth.However, the course of <strong>development</strong> inthe modern Arab world, and the national, political,social and economic problems that recurredfrom the years of independence untilthe end of the twentieth century, had a profoundimpact on the intellectual, scholarly andcultural life of Arab countries. Religion, andits attendant concepts and objectives, was especiallyaffected by these trends. A major phenomenonthat appeared in the religiousIslamic sphere in the last decades of the twentiethcentury gave political aims precedenceover any other objectives: social, economic ormaterial. This <strong>development</strong> resulted in the escalationof conflict and confrontation with thesociety, the State and "the other"."Opposition" and "confrontation" withthe West reached their climax especially afterthe tragic events of September 11, 2001. Intheir aftermath, Islam itself faced an onslaughtof defamation, slander and criticism in themedia, reflecting ignorance of Islam in mostinstances and in some cases the tendentiousnessof commentators.It is important to reiterate here that Islamis a system of religion and worldly life at thesame time. It is difficult to separate surgicallythe "political" from other transactions amongpeople in Islamic teaching. Moreover, the prevailingIslamic sect in Arab countries has neithera clergy nor a defined church or religiousauthority. Hence the separation of church andstate is not an issue. What qualifies an individualto have a say in religious affairs is his orher knowledge, and not an affiliation with a religiousinstitution. Authority in worldly affairsis civil, based on people’s selection of a rulerfrom among several candidates.Nevertheless, the collusion between somerepressive regimes and certain types of conservativereligious scholars has resulted in certaininterpretations of Islam that serve the interestsof those regimes. Such interpretations representserious impediments to <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,particularly when it comes to freedomof thought, accountability of the ruling authoritiesand women’s participation in publiclife. Furthermore, suppressing political action2Electronic Text Centre, University of Virginia Library, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin120 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


BOX 6.6It would seem unnecessary to discuss anobvious factor such as the role played bythe Islamic religion in the renaissance ofArabic civilisation, since without Islamprobably no such renaissance would havetaken place.The blossoming of science and culturein Islamic civilisations was the resultof the increasing quality of material life inMuslim cities. The urban life of thesecities, the material prosperity, the variedlocal industries, the local and internationaltrade, and the flourishing science and culture,were all linked together, while noneof the aspects of life in the cities wouldhave flourished without a developingtechnology. And if Islam was the force behindthe rise of cities, as is frequently asserted,then it was also the force behind allaspects of the prosperity of these cities,and hence the technological efforts associatedwith urban life.It is estimated that there exist at thepresent time, in spite of destruction andmany losses, nearly a quarter of a millionmanuscripts, mostly in Arabic, in the variouslibraries of the world. And this doesnot include unrecorded collections.in many Arab countries has driven some"Islamic" movements underground andpushed others to work under an Islamic cover.In the absence of peaceful and effective politicalchannels for dealing with injustices in theArab world, at the country, regional andglobal levels, some political movements identifyingthemselves as Islamic have adopted extremeinterpretations of Islam and violence asmeans of political activism. They have advocatedbelligerence towards both other politicalforces in Arab countries and "the Other", particularlythe West as relations have grownmore tense, accusing both of being the enemiesof Islam itself. Not only are such interpretationsinconsistent with pure religion; theyalso divide societies, taking them further awayfrom the requirements of the knowledge society.In summary, for religion to regain its rolein the <strong>development</strong> and production of knowledge,the time has come to proclaim those positivereligious texts that cope with currentrealities and the hoped-for future rather thanthose related to specific historical <strong>development</strong>sthat Islam underwent in one era or another.These positive texts focus on a numberof basic values that link the aims of religionwith the <strong>development</strong> and growth of life: thesuccession and continuity of <strong>human</strong>kind onearth, the creation of paradise on earth and theenjoyment of the earth’s bounties, respect for<strong>human</strong> beings and their cognitive faculties -curiosity, reason, science, the senses, visionand feelings; and building a good and respectablenation. Certainly, these are all valuesthat motivate the search for knowledge and itsproduction from a religious point of view.Religion urges people to seek knowledge andto work towards the realisation of its foundingprinciples firmly, effectively and with determination.Neither arrogance nor careless disregardof <strong>human</strong>ity has any place in obeying thatcall.Three fundamental conditions need to befulfilled so that religion can take its properplace in the Arab knowledge model and becomean effective force for knowledge. Thefirst is to return to the moral, civilised and <strong>human</strong>evision that stands behind the essentialobjectives of Islam. The second is to free religionfrom the sway of politics and to free religiousinstitutions from political authorities,governments and radical religious movements.The third is to acknowledge intellectual freedomby reviving scholarship (ijtihad) and theprotection of the right to differ.LANGUAGETechnology in the Arab Islamic CivilisationSource: Ahmad Y. Al-Hassan and Donald R. Hill, 1986,Islamic Technology; an Illustrated History, UNESCO, Paris – Cambridge University Press.Language is perhaps the most distinctive anddefining feature of any <strong>human</strong> society. The riseof all civilisations was always accompanied bya linguistic renaissance. Some cultural historiansalso believe that no <strong>human</strong> conflict existswithout an implicit linguistic clash. Languageis the living medium that expresses the realityof a society, and the basic tool that determinesthe relationship between <strong>human</strong> beings andthis reality. Language is the lens throughwhich <strong>human</strong> beings apprehend the world. Itis the decisive attribute that forms their identityand gives society its unique character.Identity is the outcome of meanings created byindividuals through language, and the characterof a society is the outcome of the interactionof internal linguistic discourses shaped byhistorical variables, and reflecting the facets ofThe admirable flexibility of theArabic language enabled the Muslims tocoin and extract scientific and technologicalvocabularies capable of expressing themost complicated scientific and technicalideas.The state enabled scientists and engineersto spend all their time on research,inventions and writing.As is natural in the history of civilisationin general, Muslim scientists and engineersreceived the heritage of theirpredecessors, but this grew into their ownscience and technology through a continuousprocess of invention, research and <strong>development</strong>.There can be no doubt that institutions– academies, libraries, observatories,etc. – played a major role in the continuingvitality of Islamic science. These, togetherwith the readiness of students to travelhundreds of miles to learn from acknowledgedscholars, ensured that the wholecorpus of knowledge was kept intact andtransmitted from one place to another,from one generation to the next, with continualexpansion and enrichment.The time has come toproclaim thosepositive religious textsthat cope with currentrealities.CULTURE 121


The Arabic language isthe distinctive featurethat distinguishes theArab identity.BOX 6.7Language is that which translates themeaning borne in our minds.Ibn Khaldun, ProlegomenaMost of the blemishes of our life canbe traced to linguistic failure that incitesdisunity, blurs the truth, wastes effort,and impedes sublimity of the soul, body,mind, and heart.Amin El-KhoulyIt seems that there will be no solutionto the dilemma of language neitheragreement and conflict of the societal system.Such statements on the importance of languagein <strong>human</strong> society are even more applicableto the knowledge society, whether theyconcern expectations of its promise or challengesto its creation. The Arabic language isundoubtedly the most prominent feature ofthe Arab culture. If the knowledge society, asdelineated in the current <strong>report</strong>, is the sourceof hope for Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>, theArabic language system is one of the decisiveunderpinnings for building that society andshaping its success.Language is the device by which the individualconceives the surrounding world andexpresses his or her individual and social identity.Accordingly language can be defined asthe vital player in reviving activity and embodyingnew genres of creation in the culturalsystem of knowledge-based communities.Language is pivotal in the realm of informationtechnology, the tool that all modern sectorsuse, and the foundation on which modern<strong>human</strong> communication is established. In addition,language articulates the worlds andworldviews of finance, trade, politics and themass media.The Arabic language precedes all manifestationsof Arab culture and its <strong>human</strong> artefacts.In the Arab historical experience, Arabicis also connected with two basic matters thatare closely associated with both the existenceand future of Arabs. The first connection iswith "identity"; the second is the question ofthe "sacred". The Arabic language is the distinctivefeature that distinguishes the Arabidentity. It is the language of the holy Qura’an.And it was the rallying point for the intellectual,spiritual, literary and social activities incarnatedin an entire <strong>human</strong> civilisation,About Languagein mathematics nor in logic, but the keyto the linguistic secret is in biology.Noam ChomskyIf language is truly a mirror of themind, it must reflect not just the algorithmsof syntax but the mind as a whole,the complete set of rules by which a<strong>human</strong> being, in Lakoff’s words, "givesform and sense to his universe, wherewithout them there would be none."Jeremy Campbell, Grammatical Mannamely the Arab Islamic civilisation.LANGUAGE AND THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYAs one of the fundamentals of culture, languageplays an essential role in the knowledgesociety, not least because culture is theseedbed from which the <strong>development</strong> processsprings. Language is instrumental in the culturalsystem, linking intellect, creation, pedagogy,media, tradition, values and beliefs.Language is instrumental in information technology,instructing the microprocessors thatdrive that technology and its artificial intelligence.Language is the tool used by all disciplinesof knowledge, including philosophy,the <strong>human</strong> and natural sciences and the arts.The knowledge society, in which educationand learning are lifelong endeavours, dependson language, whether natural <strong>human</strong> language,software and programming languages,or biological genetic language. Language isnecessary to build communication skills thatare essential to knowledge dissemination. It isthe instrument by which the powers of capital,trade, politics and ideology dominate the massmedia, the public and the culture industry ingeneral. Language and cognitive discourse occupya prominent position in all spheres thatserve regimes, organisations, institutions, andmarket interests.The crisis of the Arabic languageNotwithstanding the seminal importance oflanguage, Arabic today, on the threshold of anew knowledge society, faces severe challengesand a real crisis in terms of theorisation,teaching, grammar, lexicography, usage, documentation,creation, and criticism. The rise ofinformation technology presents another aspectof the challenges to the Arabic languagetoday.The central aspects and symptoms of thislinguistic crisis can be summarised as follows:First, there is a marked absence of linguisticpolicy at the national level, which diminishesthe authority of language centres, limits theirresources, and eventually results in poor co-ordinationamong them. Second, the Arabisationof the sciences and the various disciplines hasnot proceeded according to expectations.122 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Third, there is a chronic deficiency in translationefforts in the sciences and the <strong>human</strong>ities.Fourth, linguistic theory suffers from stagnation,isolation from modern philosophicalschools and methodologies, and a lack ofawareness of the role language plays in modernsociety. Fifth, the situation of the Arabiclanguage is further complicated by the dualityof standard and colloquial Arabic. Sixth,Arabic electronic publication is weakened bythe scarcity of advanced Arabic software.Finally, the Arabic language continues to sufferfrom the duplication of research and <strong>development</strong>projects and the absence ofco-ordination among them, conflicting diagnosesof the ills afflicting the language, and theconspicuous absence of a clear vision of linguisticreform.The crisis of the Arabic language is no lesscentral and no less dangerous or complicatedthan the other crises facing the Arab world,particularly on the verge of a radical shift inthe importance given to knowledge. Yet crisisis also opportunity. Moving towards theknowledge society will force countries to addressthe challenges facing the Arabic languagein order to harness its latent powers andaddress other challenges. The most significantopportunities include:• The revolution in modern linguistics,which has ushered in several scientificmethodologies 3 . These can help address manydifficulties besetting the Arabic language.• Massive technological <strong>development</strong> in"language engineering", in which the languagesystem, with its extreme complexity, constitutesa rich subject for new approaches to theart of manipulating sophisticated systems.• The Internet, which has become a resourcefor teaching and learning the Englishlanguage and could become a platform forpromoting the use of Arabic in multiple formats.• Increased awareness of the importance oflinguistic diversity. World awareness of thisproblem has reached new levels, so much sothat UNESCO has drawn attention to a crisisof linguistic diversity and the risk of extinctionthat threatens several languages.• New and viable initiatives in some Arabcountries in the theory of literature and lexicography;and recent successes in the digitalprocessing of Arabic, especially in the domainsof morphology and grammar, and theuse of computers to create a modern Arab thesaurus.Advancement of the Arabic languageBut these options on their own, or together,are not sufficient to resolve the crisis of Arabicand render it responsive to profound contemporary<strong>development</strong>s in culture, knowledgeand education, or to recent global challenges.There is another aspect of the problem; themany-faceted relations between Arabic andthe system of knowledge acquisition, notably:• The relation between the Arabic languageand thought.• Arabic and access to sources of knowledge.• Arabic and the communication and assimilationof knowledge.• Arabic and the utilisation of knowledge.• Arabic and the generation of new knowledge.Language and thought: understanding thenature of the relationship between systems oflanguage and thought requires exhaustiveanalysis on the psychological, pedagogical,and social levels. This aspect of language hasnot received due attention from Arab researchers;certainly, classical linguists did nottackle this problem and did not present anythingthat substantially contributes to the <strong>development</strong>of Arabic thought.A number of reasons account for the gap.First, Arabic thought has refrained from engagingwith multidisciplinary issues, which areof great importance within the knowledge society.For example, Arab philosophicalthought, especially in theology and philosophy,has been isolated from other disciplines,despite the marked attention paid by traditionalscholastic theology, philosophy, and traditionaljurisprudence to language, concepts,and terminology. Next, research efforts in psycho-,socio-, and especially neuro-linguisticshave been marginal. In reality, strengtheningthe relation between the Arabic language andthought needs a concerted institutional effortby specialists in psycho-linguistics in order toreveal the relations between the characteristicsThe crisis of the Arabiclanguage is no lesscentral and no lessdangerous than theother crises facing theArab world.3New methodologies cover statistical, anthropological, reproductive, textual, computerised, bio-neurological, hypothetical, mathematical and logical,functional, lexical, and empirical methodologies).CULTURE 123


BOX 6.8Arab North Africa – Language DualitySource: Country Report prepared for AHDR 2.Translation into Arabicis still extremelyscarce and is notkeeping pace with theglobal knowledgeexplosion.In the 1980s, Algeria intensified its effortsto substitute Arabic for French asthe dominant language of the country.Its Arabisation policy, which has been inplace for more than two decades, particularlyin education, communications andjustice and in many public administrationinstitutions, has been effective inseveral respects. Yet some consider thatthe conversion from French to Arabic ofan entire generation of mainly Frenchspeakingprofessionals has led to a loss ofknowledge and capability. Arabisationhas been less effective in economic, technologicaland administrative fields whereFrench continues to dominate. Books,newspapers, radio and TV programmesare published or broadcast either inFrench or in Arabic (some also in Berberlanguages) with relatively few translations.This language segmentation hasreduced communication among differentspheres of society.Tensions resulting from this languageduality appear to have relaxed inrecent years, paving the way towardsmultilingualism in different areas of educationand communications.of Arabic, its morphological, grammatical, lexical,and rhetorical resources, and the mainfunctions of the brain. Establishing a researchcentre specialised in the fields of Arabic languagein relation to information technology,neuro-technology, and genetic engineeringwould significantly advance the frontiers ofknowledge in this field.Language and access to sources of knowledge:The contemporary knowledge explosion,with its at times overwhelminginformation overload, poses a challenge toArab thought. It would be easy to succumb toa sense of defeat before the sweeping hurricaneof data and information blowing in fromthe global information society. A bold responserequires devising a new software toolkitto process texts and to make access toknowledge more efficient, whether in Arabicor other languages. The most important ofthese tools are: automatic tools for indexing,extraction and abridgement; and intelligenttools for research into the body of texts inorder to understand the depth of their inherentstructures and extract their intrinsic contents.The application of artificial intelligenceand electronic document management techniquesand developing an Arabic inferencetool would be key supports in this new research.Access to sources of knowledge in languagesother than Arabic is mainly connectedwith translation. Translation into Arabic is stillextremely scarce and is not keeping pace withthe global knowledge explosion. This lag emphasisesthe importance of developing electronictranslation. Of course, there are severallevels of translation: rough translation used toconvey impressions of a subject, which is currentlytaking place on the Internet in a verymodest way; and faithful translation of texts.The state of electronic translation globally is along way from the level of faithful and accuratetranslation.Language and the assimilation of knowledge:The relationship between Arabic andthe communication and assimilation of knowledgeinvolves two major considerations: theArabisation of university education and theteaching of Arabic.The Arabisation of university education isno longer simply a matter of nationalism; it hasbecome a prerequisite for developing the toolsof thinking and the creative faculties of youngminds and for assimilating the rising volume ofknowledge. For example, the failure toArabise the sciences is an obstacle to communicationamong different scientific disciplines.Despite the evident importance of the issue,efforts at Arabisation are still faltering underopposition from many academic quarters. Theprincipal objection to teaching sciences inArabic is that it would prevent Arab studentsfrom having access to the original sources ofscientific knowledge that are mostly in foreignlanguages. Yet modern students are increasinglyaccustomed to resorting to differentsources of knowledge and research anyway. IfArabisation efforts run parallel to efforts tostrengthen the teaching of foreign languages inall scientific disciplines, this objection recedes.It is relevant to observe here that facilitywith the English language is waning across theArab world. With the exception of a few universityprofessors and educated individuals,real proficiency in English has ebbed, preventingmany Arab researchers from publishingtheir research in international scientific journals.This trend also explains the wide reluctanceto make presentations at scientificgatherings in English, or to participate in seminarsor even Internet user groups.Paradoxically, this decline makes developingthe methodologies of teaching Arabic mandatory.For the dominant language acquisitiontheories now hold, contrary to past thinking,that a good command of one’s mother tongueis an essential tool for learning foreign languages.124 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Arabisation requires a fresh look at wordstructures and encouraging more productionin Arabic in different scientific disciplines aswell as supporting current efforts in the <strong>development</strong>of electronic translation. It also callsfor more use of what ICT can provide by wayof building databanks of terms and helping inthe conceptual decomposition of Arabicwords. When translating non-Arabic termsinto Arabic, the new term should convey accuratelyand completely the meaning and conceptof the original term.The teaching of Arabic also suffers froman acute crisis, both in curricula and methodology.The most apparent symptoms of thatcrisis include: concentration on the superficialaspects of teaching grammar and morphology,rather than on the core concepts of texts andtheir respective holistic structures; inattentionto semantics and meaning; neglecting thefunctional aspects of language use, such as improvinglinguistic skills in everyday use; limitinglanguage classes to writing rather thanreading; abstaining from using conventionallexicons, (which are admittedly difficult owingto the juxtaposition of new and old entries andexplanations without distinctions); and the inadequacyof pedagogical research in languageteaching.Indeed, the problem of teaching theArabic language is not detached from the stateof classical Arabic at large. This languagetoday is no longer the "language of conversation".It is rather the language of reading andwriting and their official manifestations (religioussermons and political, administrative orsocial addresses). Moreover, it is the languageof the educated and the intelligentsia, oftenused to display their knowledge in lectures. Inother words, classical Arabic is not the languageof cordial, spontaneous expression,emotions, feelings and everyday communication.It is not a vehicle for discovering one’sinner self or outer surroundings. It goes withoutsaying that the problems of classicalArabic start when one enters school, where itis taught as a concept or an independent subject.In other words it is taught in the firstplace as an object of thinking, analysis, classification,evaluation, and inference. All this flowsfrom the traditional school and its principlesof reading, reciting, narrating, rote learning,and the avoidance of creativity and initiative.This is a state of affairs that can only lead tothe production of knowledge that is stagnantand lifeless. True, since the modern Arab enlightenment,the Arabic school has been connectedwith the experimental rationalEuropean school, and is thus more open torich and accelerated knowledge and methodologies.Nevertheless, the prevailing methodologythat the Arabic school follows inteaching the language still emphasises memorisationrather than the acquisition of dynamic,renewable knowledge.Language becomes more vital, vivid, andcreative in its renewable, active, civilised and<strong>human</strong> domains inasmuch as it draws its depthand richness from the heritage it preserves. Itis hardly possible to distinguish, except inform, between the language of a society on theone hand and the cultural structures, scientificand practical intellectual concepts, and appliedmethods of that society on the other. There-birth of the Arabic language through themeasures discussed in this chapter is the coreand crux of a new Arab renaissance centred onknowledge and <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.This is why linguistic research is vital. It requiresestablishing language centres, new dictionariesincorporating words common toboth colloquial and classical Arabic, functionalscientific dictionaries (written andaudio-based) for basic education, specialisedfunctional dictionaries, the Arabisation of scientificterms, the gradual simplification andrationalisation of grammar leading to a medianlanguage that neither lapses into the colloquialnor replicates the rigid old structures that aredifficult to use. Again, ICT and the Internetcan contribute significantly to modernisingthe teaching and learning of Arabic in bothcontent and methodology. This entails movingforward with research into computer languagesand reading theory in addition to thepedagogical, psychological and social dimensionsof languages.Language and the utilisation of knowledge:the link between language and the use ofknowledge can best be seen from the perspectiveof problem solving. Problem solving encompassesthe ability to make an accuratediagnosis and compare available choices tofind solutions. In other words, it demands ra-Facility with theEnglish language iswaning across theArab world.The prevailingmethodology that theArabic school followsin teaching thelanguage stillemphasisesmemorisation ratherthan the acquisition ofdynamic, renewableknowledge.CULTURE 125


The re-birth of theArabic language is thecore and crux of anew Arab renaissancecentred on knowledgeand <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong>.Two distinctivefeatures of the Arabiclanguage are itsunique capacity toderive words andterms flexibly from itslexicon and itsprodigious vocabularyof synonyms andmeanings.tional analysis. To reinforce the definitionaland descriptive power of the Arabic language,it is essential to consolidate and enhance glossariesof terminology, thesauruses and specialisedlexicons in social and scientific fields.To improve its capacity to frame logical analysis,Arabic discourse needs to update its basicsof proof, methods of persuasion and argumentationand use of logic. Other measures for therenewal of Arabic include initiating a freshformulation of its grammatical rules, and enhancingits communication capabilities by expandingits functional use in every day life,which would make Arabic a more supplemedium for living social dialogue.Language and the generation of knowledge:The role of language in the generation ofmodern knowledge, especially in the <strong>human</strong>sciences, is also critical. These sciences contributeto the identification of new researchmethodologies distinct from those of the physicalsciences. If Arabic develops close relationswith modern and informational biochemistry,for example, the language can enhance scientificcreation. It can also contribute to literaryand artistic creation, and indeed to all of thearts of the Arabic language.Two distinctive features of the Arabic languageare its unique capacity to derive wordsand terms flexibly from its lexicon and itsprodigious vocabulary of synonyms and meanings.This flexibility and wealth play a real andeffective role in producing knowledge in dynamicand changing contexts requiring newanalysis, description and definition.Linguistic <strong>development</strong> and societal context:Yet linguistic <strong>development</strong> and reformare not only related to the internal elements ofthe knowledge acquisition system, as in theearlier discussion. They are also related to thesocial context, where language exercises itspublic functions and to the linguistic-social interactionbecomes significant on both the economicand political levels, regionally andglobally.The state has an important role in supportinglinguistic <strong>development</strong> on a number of keyfronts: formulating linguistic policies, providingfinancial resources by which the languageacademies can perform their duties, directingthe official mass media to confront languageissues, or supporting the <strong>development</strong> ofArabic educational and linguistic programmes.Such efforts, supplemented by thoseof non-governmental organisations, would advancethe protection and <strong>development</strong> of theArabic language. Moreover, the expected roleof Arabic within the regional context must betaken into account. The Arabic language –with its organic relation to the Qura’anic text –is a major entry point for the study and revivalof heritage. It is also the main pillar of Arabsolidarity, national unification and Arab culturalunity. Further still, Arabic is the bulwarkagainst fragmentation emanating from"Information Age Orientalists" who defendthe multiplicity of Arabic dialects. Finally, theArabic language has a significant role in linkingArabic culture to other Islamic countries’cultures. It also has another important role toplay in the international context in confrontingcultural globalisation and the movetowards rejecting linguistic and cultural specificities.In other words, the Arabic language isdisposed and able to be an effective party incultural dialogue. And, although there is noreason to believe that the Arabic language isthreatened by extinction, it is necessary towork determinedly on strengthening its linguisticshields and enhancing its practical andsubjective characteristics that confirm its internationalprofile and receptivity and its abilityto assimilate new informational andtechnological <strong>development</strong>s. It is also essentialto strengthen its relationship with otherlanguages.The renewal of Arabic will of course gainstrength if the conditions and resources necessaryto support Arab culture as a whole –moral, economic and technical - are put inplace.FOLK CULTUREUntil recently, folk culture did not receivemuch recognition in most contemporary Arabintellectual and cultural accounts. The tendencyhas been to view it as a blemish on culture,not an achievement, an historicalbackwater, a synonym of myth, or a defect informal thought.This prejudice has receded in recentdecades amid the rediscovery that folk culturehas a significant role in Arab cultural, social126 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


and economic life. The relationship betweenArab folk culture and formal culture has beenestablished as a profound reciprocity of influenceand effect. Holistic accounts of Arab culturesee the two forms as equally authenticcomponents of an integrated pattern.Folk culture is, in fact, a huge repository ofexperiences and creative efforts that have enrichedthe intellectual, emotional, and behaviourallife of all Arabs. It is rich in itscomponents, as it consists of knowledge, beliefs,art, ethics, law, conventions, industrialknowledge and the popular creations ofBedouins and rural and urban dwellers. Folkculture is the creation of shepherds, farmers,artisans, and craftsmen who produce that cultureoutside of formal educational establishmentsand institutions. This culture, however,has also expanded to reach other social, cultural,and scientific groups. It also permeatesold Arab history and has deep roots in the region.Varied as its forms and origins in differentArab societies are, folk culture nonethelesshas elements of similarity and unity.Folk culture is communal and oral andthese two attributes account for how knowledgeis produced and propagated in traditionalsocieties. Production springs from thedemands of the group. Transmission is by wayof social interaction and relationship.Surprisingly, such processes often take placeefficiently and do not run counter to the acquisitionof rational knowledge, as might beimagined.Folk culture comprises: concrete folk culture,folk knowledge and representations, folkconventions and traditions, and artistic folkexpression (music, performing arts, visual arts,drama and linguistic expression).Each category is blended with an artisticexperience that is intrinsically connected tothe style and practices of a particular communitylife. Therefore, some have no relation tothe process of acquiring knowledge directly;rather, they are forms of entertainment, suchas storytelling and the narration of biographies.FOLK CULTURE: BETWEENCREATIVITY AND IMITATIONYet these forms are not devoid of knowledge.Biographies, for example, are full of historical,geographical and <strong>human</strong>istic knowledge.Imaginary worlds appeal to the creative<strong>human</strong> instinct for empathy and personal extension.Both forms are popular means of exchanginghistorical knowledge or rules relatedto customs. Many folk tales commend thevalue of knowledge and place it in a positionsuperior to property. The high respect commonlyshown for a written script by folk communitiesindicates the degree of their respectfor knowledge, its value and importance.Commonly, the culture expresses twovoices: one, a conformist voice that calls forthe imitation of traditional practices; theother, forward looking that advocates creativity,curiosity rationality, and the pursuit ofknowledge. Some simple and even thoughtfulproverbs originating in the nomadic area ofNajd convey this latter outlook: "Ignorance isa lethal malady" and "Need provides thetool", not to mention others such as"Knowledge is illumination", "Be in quest forknowledge even in China". By the same token,the conformist elements of the culture havetheir own observations and stories. A wellknownexample concerns the individual whohas been allowed to open all the doors in a hallexcept one; driven by curiosity, he pushes thatdoor open and is punished with exile. Englishreaders are familiar with the popular saw,"Curiosity killed the cat", which expresses asimilar caution.Traditional community celebrations whena young boy graduates from the ‘Kuttab’ (thetraditional school for memorising and recitingthe Holy Qura’an and the basics of arithmeticand other disciplines) indicate the high standingof knowledge in popular culture. Theyoung graduate is treated to a great processionthrough his village accompanied by eulogiesand prayers. A banquet follows and inauguratesa new chapter of social esteem for the latestpossessor of knowledge. The communityfurther ensures that, until the age of twelve,the boy continues to be schooled in elementarysocial disciplines: manners, rules of societalrelations and ethics as well as in thefundamental skills for acquiring knowledge inwhatever craft he has learned.The relationshipbetween Arab folkculture and formalculture has beenestablished as aprofound reciprocity ofinfluence and effect.Many folk talescommend the value ofknowledge and placeit in a positionsuperior to property.CULTURE 127


Traditionaloccupations and craftsare highly prone todeterioration, decline,and withdrawal frompeople’s everydaylives.Behind the decline inArab folk crafts standsa change in modes,tools, and relations ofproduction.CRAFTSThis principle of learning also applies to craftsand jobs, which need physical stamina or anintensive specialised skill. Thus, a boy is motivatedto acquire the required learning andtechniques through a direct apprenticeshipwith his master. The "master" or tutor graduatesthe phases of practical work for the apprenticeaccording to the stages of his learningand actual progress. That is why it is not unusualto find boys in grazing communitiesherding flocks of cattle or, in agrarian communities,taking part in irrigation, running waterwheelsand so on. Of course, they also performa good part of the routine work required bythe crafts or industries they have embraced.Some crafts and jobs require more time, aswell as mental and physical maturity, to master.Other tasks that do not require physicalstrength, such as scouting <strong>human</strong> and animalstrails, tracking the positions of celestial bodies,and practicing folk medicine, still require dexterity,skill and knowledge to achieve proficiency.Occupations that require physicalstrength, such as masonry, blacksmithing, carpentry,weaving, and pottery also entail notonly practice but skills in using tools and instruments,some of which are mechanically sophisticated.Indeed, craftsmen often devisetheir own work tools.Significantly traditional occupations andcrafts are highly prone to deterioration, decline,and withdrawal from people’s everydaylives. This runs counter to the common assumptionthat the abstract and speech componentsof a folk culture disappear before itslivelihoods. Field inspections reveal the declineof these crafts and occupations togetherwith their associated knowledge and skills.Behind the decline in Arab folk craftsstands a change in modes, tools, and relationsof production. Demand for the products ofthose crafts and occupations, which called forexperience, dedication, specialised skills andmastery, has withered because inferior massproducedgoods have replaced them at lowercost. With the decline of returns on theirproducts, these craftsmen have given up theirtools and their apprentices; and the traditionalcycle of learning through the reproductionand communication of skills, expertise, andknowledge has been broken. What remainsare mainly those types of crafts that require nocommitment or specialisation, and that are notthe main source of a livelihood. The decline oftraditional crafts as a source of employment,income and skills <strong>development</strong>, in both developedand developing societies, is well documented.But it assumes special importance inthe Arab region, which suffers the highestrates of unemployment in the world and agrowing deficit of knowledge in both new andtraditional forms.THE REVIVAL OF AN AWARENESSOF FOLK CULTUREFolk culture provides artistic, musical and literaryinspiration for several modern Arab artforms. Contemporary artistic solutions, technicalmethods, and creative forms and imagesare sometimes found in folk legacies andblended with modern performances and taste.Certain musical composers who take a scholarlyapproach draw directly from traditionalmusical compositions following a scientificmethodology that results in innovative andcreative music. Acknowledgements and evidenceof folk influences can also be foundamong the plastic arts and in painting, sculpture,pottery, the cinema and other modern artforms.All this points to the fact that folk culturecan be a major element in the production ofartistic knowledge and a source of cultural creativity.For example, Egypt’s experience inmobilising folk culture as a stimulus for contemporarycreativity underlines two points:First: The adoption of a cultural strategypointing in two directions. In the first direction,folk culture moves out of its confinementand migrates towards the larger cultural structure,taking up new space there. An enrichingdialogue and hybrid relationship with othercultural components thus begins. In the seconddirection, the contemporary culturalstructure moves towards the space of folk cultureto bring the highest achievements andcultural creations to the broad mass of people.Second: This cross-fertilisation can paylarge dividends in building both cultural diversityand strength. Interaction, amalgamationand new syntheses will inevitably drive128 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


new and advanced Arab cultural products,rooted in social pluralism and national identity,and capable of offering a rich alternativeto cultural globalisation.The seeds of this future harvest have alreadybeen planted in a number of "festivals"held in Arab countries. Their host cities havebecome the centres of communication, interaction,synergy and new cultural energy:Salalah in Morocco, Sosa and Kartaj inTunisia, the Cairo International Book Fair,Ganadriya in Riyadh, Jarash in Jordan, Karienin Kuwait, Baalabak in Lebanon, and others.There are also cultural events and symposiasponsored by civil institutions, such asAbdelhameed Shoman in Amman, and thecultural gatherings in Beirut, Abu-Dhabi, andother cities. All these manifestations are vividevidence of an Arab cultural interaction,which holds folk culture in high esteem andplaces it in a visible position domestically andinternationally. The state, the private sector,and the civil society should make the continuationof this new fusion their first priority insupporting modern Arab cultural <strong>development</strong>.CULTURAL INTERACTIONHistorically, Arab culture was never a closedsystem. Through all historical turning points,it exhibited openness and growth. Going beyondthe cultural ego, it accepted the experienceof other nations and assimilated them inits knowledge systems, customs and dailypractices in spite of the differences and dissimilaritiesamong those nations and their experiences.The first of the two major experiences thattouched Arab culture goes back to the age ofscientific recording and the encounter withGreek civilisation and its disciplines of knowledge.This was the age of seeking out new disciplinesand importing them into the culture,especially in the third and fourth centuries ofHijra, the ninth and tenth centuries AD. Here,an outstanding process of translation of mostof the Greek scientific and philosophic heritagetook place (Ibn El-Nadeem, in Arabic,1964; Badawi, in French, 1968; Walzer, 1962).This heritage was profoundly assimilated andthen reproduced in new forms of creation.This interaction with the ancient heritage wasthe first step towards producing science,knowledge, and culture. The second major experienceoccurred in the 19 th century when themodern Arab world encountered Westerncivilisation and opened up to its sciences, arts,knowledge and technology. The outcome ofthis was the renovation and modernisation ofthe Arab cultural heritage. The Arab worldembraced the future and contributed its ownprolific production in all branches of knowledge,sciences, arts, literature, and technology.In both the east and west of the Arabworld, cultural production continues to showa profound interaction between Arab intellectualsand creative artists, and the global cultureand its different philosophies andintellectual movements. This interaction is revealedin the translation of literary, scientificand philosophical works from their source languagesinto Arabic. Of course, translation effortsinto Arabic are woefully insufficient,compared to those into other languages, sincethe total body of such translations, as noted ina previous chapter, amounts to about onebook per million Arabs according to UN-ESCO statistics. Arabs continue to translatethe works of other cultures, not as exercises intranslation, but to study, analyse and criticisethose works as knowledge, while seeking outtheir influence and inspiration.Regional, geographical and linguistic contextshave to a great extent influenced the interestsof Arab intellectuals. Arabic culture inthe western part of the Arab world reflects anexplicit interaction with French literature andculture owing to the proximity of the sub-regionto France and its historical experiencewith France and the French language. In theeastern part of the Arab world, interaction isgreater with the scientific, literary and culturalproduction of the Anglo-Saxon and Americanworlds. In addition, similarities and common<strong>human</strong> and political factors between Arabcountries and those of Latin America, as wellas other developing regions, have led someArab writers and intellectuals to welcome thecreative works produced by artists andthinkers in those countries.All prominent names in global culturehave found their place in the Arab contempo-Historically, Arabculture was never aclosed system.Cultural productionshows a profoundinteraction betweenArab intellectuals andcreative artists, andthe global culture andits differentphilosophies andintellectualmovements.CULTURE 129


Arab contemporaryculture is generallyexplicit in its opennessto <strong>human</strong> cultures...The single exception isthe imitative school oftradition, which isslavishly tied to thepast and its legacy.Arab culture cannotexile itself, feedingonly on its past, itshistory and itsintellectual heritage.BOX 6.9The formidable power lent to Man bymodern science and technology may beput to diametrically opposed uses, somebeneficial and some destructive. Naturehas never been so abused as it is today,yet we are in a much better position thanever before to protect it: not only becauseof our ability to influence environmentalproblems but also because ourawareness of them is greater than in thepast.This does not mean our power to dogood always gets the better of our abilityto do harm, as is shown by only too manyexamples: take the depletion of theozone layer, for instance, and the manyrary culture. All global ideologies and methodologiesthe <strong>human</strong> and social sciences, includinginter alia structuralism, functionalism,phenomenology, stylistics, deconstruction –the list is endless – have found both committedadherents and ardent critics in Arab culture.Hence, Arab contemporary culture isgenerally explicit in its openness to <strong>human</strong> culturesand the interaction with the contents,concepts and methodologies common in thosecultures. The single exception to such opennessis the imitative school of tradition, whichis slavishly tied to the past and its legacy.However, some representatives of even thatschool accept, in varying degrees and withincertain limits, some of the products of modernity.Yet despite all these marks of openness,Arab culture today finds itself deeply challengedby aspects of global culture: the unbridledpower of mass communication and thegigantic power of the global economy andglobal finance. It is, like many other cultures,confronting the problems of an emergingmonolith while also concerning itself with culturalmultiplicity, cultural personalities, theproblem of the "self" and the "other", and theproblem of its own cultural character. Theseand similar terms and concepts reveal the obsessionsand anxieties of Arabs. Fears aboutthe extinction of their language or their veryculture itself, or about the diminution and dispersalof their identity, have become overwhelmingobsessions that increasingly hauntthe Arabic intellect and Arab society.Amin Maalouf: Protecting Diversityspecies still threatened with extinction.I might have referred to other fieldsbesides that of the environment. I chosethat because some of the dangers we encounterare similar to those involved inglobalisation.In both cases there is a threat to diversity.Just as animal and plant speciesthat have lived for millions of years arenow dying out before our very eyes, inthe same way, if we are not careful, wemay witness the disappearance of manycultures that have hitherto managed tosurvive for hundreds or thousands ofyears.The way out will be the way through. Theonly historical possibility for Arab culture is togo through this new global experience. For itcannot exile itself, feeding only on its past, itshistory and its intellectual heritage in the newworld of overwhelming powers that dominateknowledge, products, technology and globalculture.There is nothing that can justify Arab culture,in light of its rich historical experienceand heritage, seeking to escape from the newconditions. Undoubtedly, some currents embeddedin this culture would prefer a policy ofrejection, indifference, isolation, and hostilityto all values, ideas, and practices from outside.This is an understandable response to a globalculture that is not impartial in most cases: understandable,but not acceptable. Withdrawal,even if it were feasible, would only lead to theweakening, decline, and fading away of thestructures of Arab culture, rather than theirflowering and further <strong>development</strong>.Moreover, as this chapter has argued, the mostauthentic values and ideas in current Arab culture,especially in the fields of language, religion,and values, are quite capable of holdingtheir own against the challenges of globalisationwithout retreating from, or rejecting thefuture.The global culture has its own dimensionsof knowledge, science, and technology, whichcountries neglect at their own risk. Openness,interaction, assimilation, absorption, revision,criticism and examination cannot but promptcreative knowledge production in Arab culture.It is time to give the most enlightened,the most rational, objective and balanced, themost productive and the most <strong>human</strong>e impulsesand currents of Arab culture their due,perhaps overdue, place in shaping and drivingthe next Arab encounter with the infinitely expandingworld of knowledge.Source: Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, 2001, pp 128-129.130 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


This chapter has indicated that there is no contradiction between the defining elements ofArab culture as analysed here and knowledge acquisition.It concludes that the soul of Arab culture, which has permeated three millennia, has what ittakes to build the Arab knowledge society in the third millennium, as effectively as it did at theend of the first millennium and the beginning of the second. Indeed this well-stocked and wellknitculture can be a source of strength in coping with the challenges of globalisation. The nexttwo chapters turn to other key dimensions of building the Arab knowledge society: the Arabsocio-economic structure and the political structure on the national, regional and global levels.CULTURE 131


CHAPTER 7Socio-economic structureThe process of knowledge acquisition interactswith, and is influenced by, the social and economicstructure of a society. Knowledge is firstand foremost a social product, yet in knowledgesocieties it is also a fundamental economicfactor. This chapter considers whether Arabsocio-economic structures are geared towardsencouraging or inhibiting knowledge acquisitionas a means of achieving <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.It is impossible in practice to separate the socialand economic structures of a society fromother societal dimensions that affect knowledgeacquisition, especially the political context,which is all-encompassing. The analysis inthis chapter intersects with the discussion ofpolitics and knowledge in the next chapter andmay be seen in the light of that discussion aswell.INTRODUCTIONThe economic and social infrastructure of a society,on the one hand, and its knowledge systemon the other influence each other througha number of linkages.The first linkage concerns the pattern ofproduction and the level of technology used bythe production sector, including the level ofskilled labour, entrepreneurship, equipmentand systems. Production patterns, workforcecharacteristics and technology levels are amongthe most important determinants of socialstructures, which, in turn, orient the attitudesand attributes of a social culture. It is no exaggerationto say, as Schumpeter did, that thework in which <strong>human</strong> beings spend most oftheir waking lives has a profound impact ontheir intellectual outlook; and that the placepeople occupy in the production process heavilyinfluences their worldviews and attitudes towardsdaily affairs. Work, after all, is whatdetermines the space within which one can actand influence matters and events (Schumpeter,1957, Part I).The second linkage runs in the opposite direction.It concerns how social and economicinstitutions influence the type and level ofknowledge and technology that the productionsector develops, which in turn shapes patternsof production, growth rates, living standardsand the capacity to sustain growth andprogress. The most influential institutions inthis respect are those that affect how sources ofincome are divided and how economic surplusesare allocated. Incomes can be generatedby salaries, wages and profits resulting fromwork in productive activities; or they can comefrom rent produced by properties and unearnedwealth. Depending on the source of income,economic surpluses can be allocatedeither to "futile investment", exemplified byprestigious properties and other assets whichhave little or no influence on the building ofproductive capacities and, thus, on economicgrowth, or to "productive investment" in thecreation of assets and enterprises that increaseproductivity and economic competitiveness. Bydefinition, the latter are the kinds of assets andenterprises that embody innovative ideas andcreate new productive assets and knowledgeintensivetechnologies. Such productive investmentsare those that most strongly impacteconomic growth and the building of a knowledgesociety.Investment in new productive assets is aprime mover of, and incentive for technologicalprogress, because it is through such investmentthat the sciences and scientific theory are convertedinto technological applications. Thisconversion also tests the extent to which scientificdiscoveries and inventions are economicallyuseful. The reverse is also true: advancesin scientific knowledge open up opportunitiesWork is whatdetermines the spacewithin which one canact and influencematters and events.Investment in newproductive assets is aprime mover of, andincentive fortechnologicalprogress.SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 133


All production systemsare characterised byan inner logic thatdetermines thedirection and natureof their <strong>development</strong>.In rentier modes ofproduction, economicreturns do notnecessarily accruefrom hard work andhigh productivity.for technological innovation, which attractsinvestment in the production of new goodsand services or enhances productivity and efficiencyin the production of existing goods andservices.A third factor is that all production systemsare characterised by an inner logic, whichdetermines the direction and nature of their<strong>development</strong>. The system represented by thehand mill, for instance, leads to an economicand social situation where the use of thesteam/mechanical mill is a necessity, whichneither the individual nor the community canchange. The widespread use of the mechanicalmill leads, in turn, to the creation of a new economicand social context, which creates newoccupations for new groups with new ideas.How agents of change function in a societyis, however, more difficult and complicatedthan suggested above. Social formations andstructures and the intellectual and psychologicalpatterns and orientations that reflect them,which are formed at a certain stage and whichreflect a specific production system, do notmelt away and disappear as quickly as thatstage of production itself. Some of these structuressolidify and remain in existence for generationsor centuries beyond the stage atwhich they were formed. It is notable in thisregard that the transfer of a production systemdeveloped in one society to a different onedoes not necessarily lead to the rapid changein the social and cultural context associatedwith that production system in the importingsociety.This is why the superstructure of Arab society(including general culture, values and behaviouralpatterns) is still influenced by theproduction patterns and relationships thatprevailed in the past (Muhammad Jaber al-Ansari, 1998).ECONOMIC STRUCTUREMODES OF PRODUCTIONIn knowledge societies, economic activitiescreate demand for knowledge and incentivesfor its dissemination and production. Theeconomy also represents one of the most importantsources of investment in knowledge. Ifintensive knowledge is not an essential determinantof economic output and its distributionamong factors of production, societaldemand for knowledge will not exist and itwill not be possible to build an effectiveknowledge system. In advanced economies,knowledge accounts for a significant part ofthe value added to production, and the constantgeneration of new knowledge drives aprocess of continuous improvement in knowledge-basedproducts and services, which helpsto sustain economic growth.It is possible to distinguish five main featuresof the dominant mode of production inArab countries that affect knowledge acquisition.Dependence on the extraction of rawmaterials in "rentier" economiesFirst is the overwhelming dependence on theextraction of raw materials, chiefly oil, in whatare often referred to as "rentier" economies:The GCC countries and Libya, Iraq andAlgeria are almost completely dependent onoil. Other Arab countries (Egypt, Syria, Sudanand Yemen) depend on crude oil as a primary,though not exclusive, source of gross economicproduct. In other Arab countries, oildependence is reflected in aid and workers’ remittancesfrom oil-producing countries. Insome cases, the rentier nature accrues from aidfrom industrialised countries.In rentier modes of production, economicreturns do not necessarily accrue from hardwork and high productivity, particularly in politicalsystems that constrain freedoms and donot encourage people to be industrious.Rather, the economy turns on the exploitationof raw materials and the use of foreign expertisein the absence of local knowledge capabilities.This, indeed, has been the historicalpattern in many Arab countries.Rentier economies rely heavily on foreignexpertise as this approach provides quick andeasy economic returns. By contrast, creatingindigenous knowledge requires considerablecommitment, effort, time and financial resources.Yet in the long run, such a hands-offapproach eventually weakens the demand forlocalised knowledge, retards the <strong>development</strong>of local production and postpones the effectiveutilisation of knowledge in economic ac-134 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


tivities.The first consequence of the rentier systemis that large and easy rents encourage a mindsetoriented towards spending and acquisition.Such a mindset is seldom interested in risktakingor in addressing the difficulties associatedwith stimulating or managing investmentand production in societies whose organisationaland economic structures are still fragileand inefficient.The extraction of raw materials in Arabcountries began in the colonial period, andwas undertaken by foreign companies with exportsto the industrialised West in mind. Thispattern of production was associated with relianceon foreign expertise. With a few majorexceptions in the oil industry and in water desalination,particularly in Saudi Arabia andKuwait, almost all Arab countries entrustedmost knowledge-intensive aspects of the extractionof oil and other natural wealth – andindeed of other economic activities as well – toforeign corporations, generally on a full contracting,or turn-key basis.The consequences of this abdication aresevere. Foreign experts are costly, their knowledgeis seldom transferred and absorbed locallyand at times their approaches mayconflict with national interests. Worse, overrelianceon foreign expertise in high-skill areasreduces the demand for locally producedknowledge and prevents the growth of skilledArab knowledge enterprises.Commodity-based production andfranchisingMost production in Arab countries is based ontraditional primary commodities in agricultureand other sectors and does not call for advancedskills or technology. Another area ofrelative concentration is the manufacture ofconsumer goods under franchising or licensingarrangements with foreign firms.Meanwhile, the share in manufacturing of capitalgoods with high knowledge content remainssmall. This industrial pattern limits thelocal demand for knowledge and perpetuatesreliance on knowledge imports under licensingarrangements. It could be said, in fact, thatcommodity-based production and franchisingstimulate knowledge <strong>development</strong> abroad andstifle it at home. As a result, knowledge systemsin Arab countries remain dysfunctionaland Arab economic activities remain knowledge-poor.Features of this production mode are apparentin the Arab commodity manufacturingstructure, dominated by extraction industries(Figure 7.1).The same production mode is evident inthe structure of Arab exports, compared withother regions of the world. (Figure 7.2).The same Figure shows that the MiddleEast and North Africa region, as classified bythe World Bank, occupies the lowest levelsamong world regions, even compared to theFigure 7.1Share of extractive industries in commodity productionSource: League of Arab States, 2002 (in Arabic).Figure 7.2Export structure, selected regionsSource: World Bank 2002.Commodity - basedproduction andfranchising stimulateknowledge<strong>development</strong> abroadand stifle it at home.SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 135


Many Arab micro- andsmall enterprises clingto traditional modesof production that arelow in knowledgecontent.Healthy competitionstill eludes Arabeconomies whereentrenchedmonopolies dominateseveral sectors.least developed countries, in both the percentageof manufactured exports and the share ofhigh technology exports as an indicator ofknowledge intensity in economic output.Prevalence of low-skill micro-enterprisesand informal sector production activitiesMany Arab micro- and small enterprises clingto traditional modes of production that arelow in knowledge content in the modernsense, and which do not contribute to the generationof new knowledge. In Egypt, for example,the 1996 census showed that practically allsuch enterprises (98%) employed two or fewerindividuals, while the percentage of enterprisesemploying more than 100 workers wasless than 0.1% (Nader Fergany, 1998). InJordan, the percentage of enterprises employingless than 50 workers was 94% (The WorldBank, 2002).It is important to stress that the absence ofknowledge-based production in these enterprisesis not related to their size or to the typeof economic activity in which they engage. It israther a consequence of the weakness of theknowledge system itself and of low knowledgeutilisation in the surrounding economy.Conventional economic activity, per se, is notan obstacle to knowledge acquisition and utilisation.The missing factor is an effective societalsystem for knowledge acquisition. In fact,there are examples in the region where intensiveknowledge production has taken place inconventional economic sectors, such as agriculture,and where such production has notonly increased value added but also contributedsignificantly to the knowledge acquisitionsystem in society at large. Elsewhere inthe world, some of the most intensive forms ofknowledge utilisation and production are carriedout in highly innovative micro- and smallenterprises (for instance, Silicon Valley in theUnited States and its fast-growing equivalentin Bangalore, India).Scarcity of medium-sized and largecompanies based in the Arab regionUnlike the case of south-east Asia, whereJapanese and global multinational corporationsestablished integrated bases for industrialproduction in those countries capable ofexporting to world markets, the investmentsof multinational corporations in Arab countrieswere limited to secondary activities withlittle effect on the creation of national skills orthe adoption of technology. Such foreign investmentwas characterised by a vertical relationshipbetween Western industrial centresand individual Arab countries, and was encouragedby very weak horizontal relationshipsbetween the Arab countries themselves.This so-called hub-and-spoke pattern reflectsin part the failure of economic cooperationand integration efforts in the Arab region.Lack of competitionHealthy competition still eludes Arabeconomies where entrenched monopoliesdominate several sectors. Uncompetitive firmsdo not seek out knowledge but instead concentrateon maintaining their traditional commercialfootholds. In addition, a lack oftransparency and accountability has created acertain overlap between political and businesselites. This further reduces the competitivepressure to enhance the use of knowledge ineconomic activities in Arab countries, sinceprofits are mostly derived from access topower rather than through economic efficiencyand performance.Lack of competition marginalises the roleof productivity, and consequently the need forknowledge in economic activity. In the recentpast, in many Arab countries, the public sectorloomed large in the economy with macro policiesrelating to employment, pricing and managementthat reduced the efficiency of bothpublic and private economic activity. Whensome Arab countries moved towards free marketeconomies, the legal frameworks and institutionsnecessary to prevent monopolies andprotect competition were seldom in place,with the result that private monopolies sometimesreplaced public ones.At the same time, limited inter-Arab cooperationhas led to the narrowing of marketsand to inward-looking economies vulnerableto monopolies. Vigorous inter-country economiccooperation, which could create incentivesfor innovation and excellence and ademand for knowledge to support productioncapacity, has not taken off in the region.The lack of foreign competition in general,coupled with import substitution policies, has136 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


also narrowed markets. Yet it is worth notingthat in a few cases openness, through internationaltrade – in the heartlands of rentiereconomies such as Dubai, Bahrain and Kuwait– has helped to stimulate the growth of economiccapacities capable of competing beyondnational borders.GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY ANDDISTRIBUTIONEconomic growthWhen societal conditions favour knowledgeacquisition, a virtuous cycle develops betweenlevels of economic output and rates of growthand productivity on the one side, and knowledgeacquisition on the other. High outputand fast growth rates allow resources to be investedin knowledge acquisition. At the sametime, intensive investment in knowledge acquisitionleads to the production of newknowledge, which then accelerates economicgrowth. Conversely, weak output and slowgrowth lead to under-investment in the knowledgesystem and in its application in society.Ultimately, whether a society allocates resourcesto knowledge acquisition in theamounts needed to bridge the knowledge gap(Chapter 1, Figure 1.1) depends crucially onits decision-makers. Currently, in Arab countries,both economic growth and productionare stumbling, as demonstrated by WorldBank figures on the Middle East and NorthAfrica region.Despite the popular perception that Arabcountries are rich 1 , the volume of economicproduct in the region is rather small. OverallGDP at the end of the 20 th century (US $604billion) was little more than that of a singleEuropean country such as Spain (US $559 billion)and much less than that of anotherEuropean country, Italy (US $1,074 billion)(UNDP 2002).Compared to the relatively high rates ofeconomic growth during the oil boom of the1970s, growth in combined Arab gross domesticproduct in the last quarter of the 20th centurywas extremely modest. (See Figure 7.3.)The figure indicates that the growth rate ingross domestic product in the Middle East andNorth Africa region was modest during thelast two decades of the past century, falling toless than half its levels in the 1970s (during thefirst oil boom). Indeed, in the 1980s it wasnegative. Moreover, the gross product growthrate in the region in the 1970s was well belowthat achieved in the East Asia and Pacific region;and less than that of low- and middle-incomecountries worldwide.Productivity in Arab countriesDeclining productivity is one of the majorchallenges facing Arab countries. Accordingto World Bank data (World Bank, 1998) 2 ,rates of productivity (the average productionof one worker) in Arab countries were negativeto a large and increasing extent in oil-producingcountries during the 1980s and ‘90s(see Figure 7.4). The gross national productper worker 3 in all Arab countries is less thanhalf that in two advanced developing countries:South Korea in Asia and Argentina inLatin America. (See Figure 7.5).Dividing Arab countries into three groups1This illusion has been accentuated by the concentration of Arab wealth in a limited number of lightly populated Arab oil-producing countries, andthe adoption of those countries as representative of all Arab states.2From tables 1, 3 and 1a in the source, with the work force in Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Somalia and the Sudan estimated as apercentage of the population (from the Arab Joint Economic Report, 1998), and on the assumption that the production per worker in Libya, Iraq,Djibouti and Somalia was $5000, $3000, $100, and $700 respectively.3As a preliminary indicator of productivity dictated by the more up-to-date data from one major source, and where the estimate of the labour force indeveloping countries is reduced to exclude women and children, particularly in informal economic activity, the estimate of productivity in this manneris expected to be higher than actual productivity.Despite the popularperception that Arabcountries are rich, thevolume of economicproduct in the regionis rather small.Figure 7.3Annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (%)Middle East and North Africa and other selected regions, 1970-2000Source: World Bank, 1993, 2000 and 2002.Declining productivityis one of the majorchallenges facing Arabcountries.SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 137


Figure 7.4Annual growth rate of GDP per worker (%)Middle East and North Africa Region, 1965-1993Source: (based on World Bank, 1995).Figure 7.5Gross national product (per worker) in Arab countriescompared to South Korea and Argentina, 1997countries (Tunisia, Syria and Egypt) is aboutone-sixth that of the comparator countries,while in the oil-poor countries (Jordan, Sudan,Somalia, Morocco, Yemen, Djibouti, Lebanonand Mauritania) it is less than one-tenth.This means that excluding oil rents fromthe picture would reduce apparent levels ofproductivity in Arab economies much morethan a simple overall comparison indicates.More important than the level of productivityis the change in productivity over time.Based on the data in the World DevelopmentReport for 1998/99, it is possible to comparethe GDP indicator 4 per worker in ten Arabcountries with that of some faster growingcountries 5 over a relatively long period of time(1980-1997).This comparison shows that productivityincreased annually by 15% in China, 8% inKorea and 6% in India. By contrast, thegrowth rate of productivity in the best performingArab country did not exceed 4% (respectively,according to value: it was 3-4% inOman and Egypt, 2-3% in Tunisia, Mauritaniaand Morocco, 1-2% in Jordan and Algeria andless than 1% in the United Arab Emirates andSaudi Arabia).Revitalising economic growth in the Arabregion is a necessary condition for initiating aknowledge renaissance. Yet growth alone isnot sufficient. A national consensus is requiredamong public, private and civil societydecision makers on the overriding importanceof building the knowledge society. This consensuswould amount to a new social contractreflected in all Arab spending and investmentdecisions.Income disributionSource: Calculated from World Bank data, 1998.Excluding oil rentsfrom the picturewould reduceapparent levels ofproductivity in Arabeconomies.according to the contribution of oil to theirGNP, with each group representing aboutone-third of the Arab labour force, yieldsclearer indicators of the low productivity ofthese countries.Productivity in the nine richest Arab countriesin terms of oil resources – the first group– barely exceeds half the productivity of aworker in two comparator countries. The productivityindicator in the medium oil-richIn any society, the distribution of income andwealth – and hence power – has an impact oneconomic growth and on the allocation of resourcesfor knowledge acquisition. Thoughglobal experience shows that some economieswere able to achieve economic growth underconditions where wealth was accumulated bya few, this occurred in an economic environmentthat was relatively closed. Globalisationand its open economies make growth in situationsof economic polarisation more difficult.4which reflects productivity better than GNP.5The indicator used here is the total of productivity rates in the two periods, calculated from the data provided in tables 3 and 11 in the source, whichgive the growth rates of the labour force and the GDP in both periods (1980-1990 and 1990-1997).138 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


The volume of Arab capital invested in industrialisedcountries and not at home demonstratesthis. Wide economic divides result ininstability, low productivity, extensive unemploymentand further deterioration in the distributionof income, wealth and power.Grossly unequal distributions of income,wealth and power adversely impact opportunitiesfor knowledge acquisition by undercuttingsustainable economic growth.In turn, the skewed distribution of income,wealth and power undermines <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> by fettering <strong>human</strong> capabilitiesand thwarting popular participation, itself oneof the main elements of <strong>human</strong> welfare. Thesecircumstances deny the poor opportunities toenlarge their capabilities or to influence decisionsaffecting their lives and thus lift themselvesout of poverty. Under these conditions,a society cannot accumulate high-quality<strong>human</strong> capital, one of the most important requirementsfor a dynamic knowledge system.Unfortunately, the data base on the extentand features of poverty and income distributionin Arab countries is extremely weak.There is almost no data at all on the distributionof wealth, and information on income distributionand the extent and characteristics ofpoverty is minimal, which diminishes the clarityof the picture of poverty and income distributionin the region.Some researchers estimate that poverty iseven more widespread and income distributionis more unequal than indicated by internationaldatasets, due to technical difficultiesin poverty assessments as well as data scarcity.In light of different indicators, there is concernthat both determinants of welfare are growingworse: it is estimated that poverty is increasingand income distribution is becoming more unequal.Estimates of poverty in Egypt in the1990s, for instance, vary between 30% and40%, which means that Egypt alone contributesnearly 10% to the overall poverty ratein the region. And this does not take into accountIraq or Morocco, let alone Sudan,Somalia and Djibouti. Based on country surveysin the 1990s, estimates of poverty varyfrom 21% in Jordan to 30% in Yemen, 45% inDjibouti and 85% in the Sudan (UNDP,1997). Figure 7.6 provides indicators of theextent of poverty in the 1990s, based on anumber of criteria. It indicates that poverty inArab countries is more widespread than isusually <strong>report</strong>ed in international data bases,particularly those compiled by the WorldBank and the International Monetary Fund.Even when field surveys of income and expenditure(which constitute the basic sourcefor estimates of income distribution) exist,such surveys suffer from defects that diminishtheir credibility, particularly with regard to theparameters of income distribution, as a resultof bias in the collected data. 6 In Egypt, for instance,relying on the results of income and expendituresurveys in the first part of the 1990sleads to an improvement of the Gini coefficient7 – i.e., income distribution becomesmore equal. But this does not correspond tothe overall economic situation, particularlyunemployment and poverty criteria and theobservations made of wealth distribution duringthe same period. The Gini coefficient wasestimated in 1997 at about 37% (Datte et al.,1998), compared to 28% in 1995 (WorldBank, 2000). This is a huge increase in a shortperiod of time, which indicates an acceleratedworsening of income distribution. Labour’sshare of the value added declined from nearly40% in 1975 to nearly 25% in 1994 (see FigureFigure 7.6Estimates of poverty in Arab countries in the 1990sSource; Nader Fergany, 2002.Grossly unequaldistributions ofincome, wealth andpower adverselyimpact opportunitiesfor knowledgeacquisition byundercuttingsustainable economicgrowth.Poverty in Arabcountries is morewidespread than isusually <strong>report</strong>ed ininternational databases.6Like the problem of "cutting the right tail" of income or expenditure distribution, which occurs in societies where surveys do not record the extremelyhigh values of expenditure or income. It prevails in societies or historical eras in which high incomes are derived primarily from activities thatare socially unacceptable or legally prohibited. "Cutting the right tail" produces values for the characteristics of income distribution that are moreequal than the real values.7A numerical measure related to a graphic device that depicts the degree of income or wealth inequality. (Journal of Economic Education)SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 139


The middle class inArab countries is onthe wane, contractingunder pressure fromrising poverty.7.7), which indicates a deterioration of GNPdistribution in favour of wealth returns.The question of distribution has, however,a composite effect on knowledge acquisition.In some societies, the accumulation of wealthin select circles that are willing to make philanthropiccontributions to support knowledgeactivities and endow knowledge-producing institutionshas had a salutary effect on knowledgeacquisition in the society as a whole. Inother societies, however, (perhaps closer tothe Arab situation) the very wealthy – with afew exceptions – seek only to accumulatewealth quickly through easy profits, particularlyfrom speculation and property holdings,and to indulge in ostentatious consumption.In such societies, the skewed distribution ofincome and wealth reduces the society's opportunitiesfor advancement in knowledge acquisition.It is only fair, however, to recognise thatbefore the rise of autocratic regimes, Arab societieswere noted for their substantial philanthropicactivities, through non-governmentalorganisations and Islamic endowment funds,particularly in health and education, includinghigher education. Autocratic regimes, however,with their restrictions on non-governmentalorganisations and their control ofMuslim endowment funds, have long disruptedsuch effective non-governmental work.Figure 7.7Development of workers’ share of GDP (%), Egypt 1974-1993The oil welfare state, on the other hand, spentgenerously on people and on public services,yet did not promote strong non-governmentalmovements in support of knowledge acquisition.Creating a knowledge society requireswealthy Arabs, states, institutions and individuals,to provide substantial and sustained supportfor the diffusion and production ofknowledge. This entails creating a societal environmentand developing tax and financialpolicies that facilitate the establishment andactivation of civil society organisations thatsupport knowledge acquisition and respond tothe call of national duty.CLASS STRUCTUREClass structure strongly influences the knowledgesystem. Wealth can play a positive role insupporting knowledge <strong>development</strong> and disseminationif a portion is invested in theknowledge system. Another favourable societalcondition is the existence of a large educatedmiddle class, able to appreciate andcultivate various forms of knowledge andblessed with the financial security that allowsit to participate in sharing knowledge and inproducing it (Galal Amin, 2002).Yet the middle class in Arab countries ison the wane, contracting under pressure fromrising poverty and the uneven distribution ofincome and wealth. This contraction has beenaggravated by a gradual decay in knowledgepursuits, particularly in Arabic. The enervatinginfluence of mass media entertainment andmass artistic production, the homogenisingimpact of global culture, the declining qualityof education and the general erosion of societalincentives for knowledge acquisition areall contributing factors.SOCIETAL INCENTIVESSource: Nader Fergany, 1977 and 1998.In their studies of current Arab knowledgesystems and intellectual movements, a largeand varied group of Arab thinkers across theregion has consistently attached great importanceto both reason and knowledge. Many ofthem have sought to justify the adoption ofthese two values, arguing that classical Arabcivilisation exalted reason, experiment, hu-140 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


BOX 7.1Patriarchal Society in Arab CountriesThe essence of the new patriarchy inArab society is the patriarchal family, theimportance of which can be grasped byunderstanding new patriarchal structuresand their basic internal relations, particularlythose relating to authority, hegemonyand dependence, which reflect and are reflectedin the structure of social relations.The father, the ideal new patriarchalpersonality, constitutes the central instrumentof oppression. His power and influenceare based on punishment.Oppression in the mind of the family isalso associated with widespread irrationalattitudes among the general public. Thisassociation facilitates the perpetuation ofthe status quo and leads people to subconsciouslyoppose change. The scientificmind, which explains phenomena withreference to causes that are subject to testingand proof, has not taken root in thecollective personality. Metaphysics andmagic continue to dominate the psychologicalenvironment of the individual.Therefore, rationality is not the principlethat governs individual behaviour or socialwork in general. Two sectors in the societycoexist side by side, one of them ismankind’s <strong>development</strong> on earth and the wisehusbanding of nature in its conceptual valuesystem.Yet other researchers studying modernArab culture have inferred that it is beset withirrational tendencies and that it underestimatesthe value of work, manual crafts and appliedsciences. A number of these thinkershave gone on to assert that most of the social,political and economic problems in the contemporaryArab world spring from the misuseof reason and a consequent incapacity to handlethe process of creative knowledge production.Attempting to look objectively at the Arabvalue system, it becomes apparent that political,social, and economic conditions haveplayed a decisive role in shaping values and societalincentives. After independence, mostArab countries came under political regimesthat represented little advance on the autocraticstyle of the past. Social and individualfreedoms were restricted in some areas, andwere totally absent in others. One need onlynote the characteristics of autocracy as sharplydelineated by Al-Kawakibi and his successors,and how such autocracies corrupt people’smorals and values and inhibit creativity and<strong>development</strong> (Box 7.2).Traditional Arab social structures,whether represented in patriarchal societies orin tribes and clans, were not less harmful tomodern <strong>human</strong> values. The values of citizenship,law and normal <strong>human</strong> rights – in additionto religious rights – all gave way to thementality of the tribe.In Arab countries, the distribution ofpower, which sometimes coincides with thedistribution of wealth, has had an effect on themorals of societies and individuals. The pursuitof personal gain, the preference for theprivate over the public good, social and moralcorruption, the absence of honesty and accountabilityand many other illnesses, are allrelated in one way or another to a skewed distributionof power and the resulting social disparities.Justice, before all else, has been thevictim of this state of affairs.Compared to the 1960s, Arab communitiestoday are witnessing a deterioration in societalincentives, which has a bearing oncreative work and the <strong>development</strong> of knowledge.Art, thought and knowledge are evaluatedby whether they are "sinful or permissibleby religion". The criteria for judgment are fidelityor heresy rather than beauty and ugliness,or right and wrong. Moreover, amongthe impoverished mass of people, the values ofIn a valuable analysis of Arab society,Hisham Sh<strong>arab</strong>i diagnosed the characteristicsof those relationships that hinderand distort progress in Arab countries. Heconcludes that Arab society is caught upin a vicious circle, where the “patriarchalcollective self” reproduces itself in orderto perpetuate the patriarchal pattern ofauthority and social relations.Arab society is not a traditional societyin the true sense of the word, neither isit a modern society. It is, rather, a confusingmixture of both. One of its aspects ismanifest in a set of traditional social relations,values and structures emanatingfrom a patriarchal society allied with ancienttribal, family, religious and sectarianrelations. The other aspect reflects a set ofmodern social relations and structures.The confusion is increased in Arab societybecause it suffers to a large extent from relianceon foreign political, economic andcultural influences. Sh<strong>arab</strong>i tries to explainArab patriarchy through its approachesto modernism. He suggests thefollowing comparison between patriarchyand modernism on the basis of six majorcomponents:COMPONENT Modernism PatriarchyKNOWLEDGEFACTLANGUAGEGOVERNMENTSOCIAL RELATIONSSOCIAL STRUCTUREIDEA – MINDSCIENTIFIC – REVOLUTIONARYANALYSISDEMOCRATIC – SOCIALISTHORIZONTALCLASSSUPERSTITION – BELIEFRELIGIOUS – NARRATIVERHETORICNEW PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITYVERTICALFAMILY – TRIBE – COMMUNITYsorcerous and the other is scientific.Traditional structures coexist with modernstructures, and a dependent, primitiveeconomy exists next to a modern, rationaleconomy.Arab societies are managed by manydespots of varying degrees of patriarchy:the head of the household, the elders inthe family, tribal chieftains, school principals,council chairmen, heads of state andother father figures. In such societies therecan be only small scope to develop initiativeand innovation in individuals who areunder the control of these petty despots.Hopes that Arab educational systemswould overturn the influence of patriarchalupbringing on individuals have beenfrustrated. On the contrary, the traditionalpatriarchal culture has penetrated the educationalsystem in most schools, reinforcingstudents’ submission to various formsof authority and stifling individual andcreative initiatives. Even in schools unburdenedby the weight of traditional society,such as foreign private schools, the encouragementof individual initiative andcreativity are the exception rather than therule.Source: Hisham Sh<strong>arab</strong>i, Neopatriarchy, The Distorted Change in Arab Society, Oxford University Press, 1988. Chapter 2,pp. 17-18.SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 141


BOX 7.2Al Kawakibi (1854-1902): The Inversion of ValuesUnder Despotism“We became accustomed to regardingabject submission as polite deference; obsequiousnessas courtesy; sycophancy asoratory; bombast as substance; the surrenderof basic rights as nobility; the acceptanceof humiliation as modesty; theacceptance of injustice as obedience; andthe pursuit of <strong>human</strong> entitlements as arrogance.Our inverted system portrayedthe pursuit of simple knowledge as presumption;aspirations for the future asimpossible dreams; courage as overreachingaudacity; inspiration as folly; chivalrySource: The Character of Despotism, p.126, p.118.Arab citizens areincreasingly pushedaway from effectingchanges or takingdecisions in theinterest of theircountries.Status inheritedremains a morepowerful value thanstatus acquired.as aggression; free expression as impertinence;free thinking as heresy; and patriotismas madness. ”“In your helplessness you accept amiserable life, and you call it contentment;you abdicate responsibility for yourdaily existence, saying ‘God will provide’and you believe yours is not to reasonwhy because what befalls you is God’swill. But, in God’s name, this passivity isnot the proper status of <strong>human</strong>kind. ”asceticism and other-worldliness prevail.Deprivation has caused them to transpose thelives they desire, but cannot lead, to the afterlife.Yet their non-material values have notprevented the appearance of an ostentatiouslyluxurious lifestyle among the affluent, drawingon the authority of scripture where it says:"Remember your share in life".The oil boom also played its role in erodinga number of values and societal incentivesthat would have been helpful in enhancingcreativity and the acquisition and disseminationof knowledge. With the spread of negativevalues during that period, creative abilitieswere neglected, and knowledge lost its significancefor <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. The socialstanding of scientists, educated people and intellectualsfell. Education became incapable ofproviding the poor with the tools and abilitiesthey need for social mobility. Social value wasmeasured by money and fortune, regardless ofhow those fortunes were gained.Proprietorship and possession replacedknowledge and intellectualism. Perhaps worstof all, the values of independence, freedomand the importance of a critical mind – valuesby which people can actively exercise choiceand lead conscious lives – were also buried.The aftershock of this collapse continues toweaken and undermine Arab societal incentivestoday. As a result, indifference, politicalapathy and a sense of futility are becomingdangerously common among broad segmentsof the populace. Arab citizens are increasinglypushed away from effecting changes or takingdecisions in the interest of their countries.The modern productive person is nolonger the model citizen. Instead, Arab societiesnow offer choices that people shouldrefuse to make. The question as to who is better:the productive or the religious citizen isone such false antithesis. The question shouldinstead be: can the Arab citizen be both productiveand religious? And what will it take tocombine those two traits? Such soul-searchingis, however, far from the norm. Work hasceased to be a precious value, and many stilltalk about ‘rizq’, or a livelihood, as a blessingfrom God. Popular proverbs and sayings denotea return to the view that production, incentivesand rewards are subject to fate anddestiny. Thus, current values are shrinking theboundaries of the <strong>human</strong> will. Status inheritedremains a more powerful value than status acquired.Fine speeches about ancestral glory aremuch in evidence. This narrow homage to thepast is held in higher esteem than attempts torebuild institutions or reinvent the social contract.Meanwhile, personal relations andfavouritism outweigh merit and efficiency inboth the public and private spheres. This suffocatingsocial climate stifles creativity, innovationand the acquisition of knowledge. Itweakens the sense of community and incites adestructive form of individualism driven byenvy and hostility, rather than by the healthyentrepreneurial spirit found in industrialisedcountries. It dismantles corporate teamworkand production, and undercuts collegial exchangesof experiences. The rise and prevalenceof ideologies in the Arab world in thesecond half of the 20th century also led to thedominance of dogmatic tendencies and radicalismand to increased repression by authorities.This has given rise to introvertedideologies and ideas of cultural specificity, differenceand the rejection of the "other" onboth the local and global levels.Severe restrictions on independentthinkers who could have contributed substantiallyto Arab creative knowledge cut societiesoff from legitimate intellectual dissent. At thesame time, a form of historical analysis andwriting serving the vested interests of somepolitical and social systems is resurfacing. Inthe meantime, freedom of thought has beenrestricted and outstanding and free thinkershave been oppressed. This is taking place142 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


amid the contraction of domestic economiesand the psycho-political constriction of national<strong>development</strong> induced by regional crises,the most prominent of which centre on governance,Arab unity and the Palestinian problem.Together, these trends portend a cultureof near-despair and rejection.These value-related issues in Arab societyform a vicious circle that stands in the way ofcognitive <strong>development</strong>, open-mindedness anda positive approach to life and knowledge.They militate against <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> andan Arab cultural and economic renaissance.A society that does not value knowledgeand innovation highly does not give theknowledge system the required elements orthe environment it needs to flourish. Hope isnow attached to the emergence of a strong andvibrant middle class, with well-educated memberswho have distinguished expertise andpossess a vision that looks forward to a betterand more <strong>human</strong>e life. The state, civil society,cultural and mass media institutions, enlightenedintellectuals and the public at large are allcalled upon to plant those values that encourageaction and innovation in the political, socialand economic spheres. Each one of thesespheres needs to be the base and instrument ofproduction and innovation in culture andknowledge. Each needs to build a system ofvalues that encourages respect for hard workand productivity and stimulates the capacity toinnovate using what is created by the local societyor by <strong>human</strong>ity as a whole.Promoting an Arab renaissance throughdemocratic valuesThe acquisition of knowledge is a differentmatter from the acquisition of material wealth.Quantitative economic advancement is associatedwith the accumulation of wealth that alreadyexists through the process of capitalformation. Such wealth may be concentratedin a few hands, whether in the state or the privatesector, depending on the prevailing economicmodel. Qualitative advancement,however, is associated with the <strong>development</strong>of a society’s knowledge base, with the continuousreplenishment of that base through newknowledge and with the free flow of knowledgeto all members of society, such that everycitizen, regardless of social position, economiclevel or age group, has an opportunity to contributeto knowledge <strong>development</strong> and to benefitfrom its outcome.Such free flows of knowledge within societyrequire a democratic value system and theelimination of corruption, which divertsknowledge, ideas and information in order toserve the personal interests of a few and hinderstheir movement for the good of society.Free flows of knowledge also call for the freemovement of people who are the vessels ofthat knowledge. This, in practice, requires respectingthe <strong>human</strong> rights of Arab workersmoving from one country of the region to anotherto enable them to interact positively withall groups in their host societies.Arab citizens must be accorded the fulldignity due to them as <strong>human</strong> beings. Theirinitiative, innovation and public participationmust be encouraged and rewarded. Their rightto different opinions and beliefs has to berecognised. Freedom from discrimination ofall kinds must be upheld for all citizens, especiallywomen and children, the groups thatsuffer the most iniquitous restrictions today.Modern Arab society has not given sufficientattention to women’s empowerment. The interpretationof laws and the production ofknowledge have not advanced sufficiently toguarantee Arab women their economic, socialand cultural rights, consistent with internationalconventions and without encroachmenton Islamic law.Effective measures must also be taken toeliminate traditions, laws and customs, whichentrench narrow traditional loyalties to thetribe and the clan in Arab societies and to replacethem with the concept and practice ofcitizenship, without which there can be no innovation.In economic life – which is closely associatedwith political and social philosophy – thevalue of justice must be introduced, becausethe values of freedom, democracy and equalitywill not bear fruit without justice. It is justicethat makes the values of integrity, accountabilityand peoples’ welfare – which are the basisof a sound ethical community life – possible,viable and effective.In short, the reform of the Arab knowledgemodel has to move in lockstep with thereform of Arab social values. The restorationFree flows ofknowledge withinsociety require ademocratic valuesystem and theelimination ofcorruption.Modern Arab societyhas not givensufficient attention towomen’sempowerment.SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 143


The restoration ofrationality... cannotproceed without therenovation of political,social and economicvalues.Between 1998 and2000 more than15,000 Arab doctorsmigrated.of rationality, scientific methods and openmindednesscannot proceed without the renovationof political, social and economic valuesand their wide diffusion as creative principles.The new core values that will drive the Arabrenaissance are freedom, justice, respect for<strong>human</strong> dignity and basic <strong>human</strong> rights, integrity,the pursuit of public welfare, accountability,pluralism and the ethics of dialogueand political alternation.MIGRATIONArab countries have witnessed two great outflowsof international emigration that have significantlyaffected local knowledgeacquisition. The first was directed to oil-richArab countries and took the form of temporarylabour migration. Nevertheless, restrictivepolicies and circumstances in both the countriesof destination and origin, and recurrentpolitical upheavals and armed conflicts, oftenimpeded real <strong>human</strong> exchanges among Arabcountries except in some cases where Iraq isconcerned. The level of education and skillsamong these temporary migrants varied fromone country of origin or destination to another.Many "oil" migrants, however, endedup working in the education sector and serviceindustries.The second outflow went to Westerncountries and was characterised by a higherfrequency of settlement in the countries ofdestination. Within that second flow two currentscan be distinguished: the first originatedin North Africa and set out for Europeancountries, especially the former colonial powers.It encompassed all levels of education andskill, but was dominated by unskilled labour.The second current is more significant fromthe knowledge perspective, as it entailed theemigration of highly qualified Arabs to dozensof Western countries. Settlement in the countriesof destination dominated that current.Emigration to other societies endows migrantswith new knowledge and experience.Under favourable conditions, those withwhom they mix also acquire knowledge. Arabmigration to Arab countries, especially whencentred on education, has certainly made valuablecontributions to knowledge, most of all inthe countries of destination. Migration betweenArab countries, despite serious difficultiesat times, has also contributed to strengtheningArab ties.However, in general, institutional arrangementsfor intra-regional migration and thegeneral policies of both countries of origin anddestination did not foster the best possible returnsto migrants or to their home and host societies.Most Arab conventions designed toregulate emigration, protect migrants’ rightsand ensure optimal <strong>development</strong>al outcomesremain little more than ink on paper, eventhough such conventions do not rise to thelevel of protection embodied in internationaltreaties.THE BRAIN DRAINArguably, emigration of highly qualified Arabsto the West has been one of the most seriousfactors undermining knowledge acquisition inArab countries. It is no exaggeration to characterisethis outflow as a haemorrhage. Thetrend is large-scale and is steadily accelerating.Data to adequately document the extent of thephenomenon is not readily available, but someindications that point to the extent and gravityof the brain drain are given below (Zahlan,background paper for the Report).It is estimated that by the year 1976, 23%of Arab engineers, 50% of Arab doctors, and15% of Arab BSc holders had emigrated.Roughly 25% of 300,000 first degree graduatesfrom Arab universities in 1995/96 emigrated.Between 1998 and 2000 more than 15,000Arab doctors migrated.Apart from the sheer scale of emigrationand its growth over time, looking into the motivesof emigrants reveals obstacles to buildingArab knowledge societies that are perhapsmore serious than the brain drain itself.Surveys of highly qualified Arabs living abroadindicate that their principal reasons for leavingrelate to the absence of a positive societal environmentand facilities that would allow themto play their role in the knowledge system andin the <strong>development</strong> of their countries. Ideallythis role should be performed under conditionsthat permit individual fulfilment and adecent standard of living. The denial of livableconditions to a host of highly qualified Arabsdrastically undermines any attempt to create144 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


knowledge societies in Arab countries. Theiremigration perpetuates weaknesses in both theproduction of knowledge and the demand forit, since the activities and pursuits of suchhighly qualified personnel would have significantlyincreased both supply and demand hadthey remained in their countries.Ironically, the Arab brain drain constitutesa form of reverse <strong>development</strong> aid since receivingcountries evidently benefit from Arabinvestments in training and educating their citizens.More significant, however, is the opportunitycost of high levels of skilled outflows:the lost potential contribution of emigrants toknowledge and <strong>development</strong> in their countriesof origin.The extent of that loss calls for serious action:firstly to tap the expertise and knowledgeof the Arab Diaspora abroad and secondly toprovide Arab expatriates with incentives to returnto their countries of origin either on temporaryassignments or for good. If they docome back, they will do so with a larger stockof knowledge capital than that with whichthey left. Yet this will not happen unless enablingconditions at home are in place – conditionsthat are conducive to fulfilment in theirpersonal, professional and public lives andthat allow them to contribute to national <strong>development</strong>.Creating such conditions is not aneasy task. It requires a serious project in<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in Arab countries, seriousenough to attract emigrants back to participatein the task of creating a knowledgesociety and to share in the honour of seeing itmaterialise.Ironically, the Arabbrain drain constitutesa form of reverse<strong>development</strong> aid.Contrary to the assessment regarding the state of Arab culture, the analysis in this chaptershows that Arab social and economic structures are obstacles to knowledge acquisition. This requiresa longer-term approach than that prescribed in the case of Arab culture, a challenge thathas to be taken on if a knowledge society is to emerge in the region.SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 145


CHAPTER 8The political contextPolitics is the final, and perhaps the most influential,frame of reference in analysing howknowledge is acquired in Arab countries. Asemphasised earlier, the vitality of a knowledgesystem depends on the political environment inwhich it grows. Among the most importantconditions are intellectual freedom and diversityprotected by the rule of law, other institutionalfoundations of good governance and apolitical context that supports the efficient disseminationand production of knowledge.Where do Arab countries stand in relation tothis model?The global explosion of knowledge has notonly accelerated global economic integration.It has given rise to regional blocs around theworld that challenge the new internationalorder for the purpose of extracting maximumgains for individual groupings of countriesseeking to join the global economy on advantageousterms. New ties within the EuropeanUnion (EU), the North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) and the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are justthree examples of a changing world map. Howis knowledge acquisition in Arab countries affectedby regional and global politics? What regionaland global policies would help Arabcountries create knowledge societies in theArab world under these conditions?GOVERNANCE AND LAWTHE POLITICAL CONTEXT FORKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITIONKnowledge is the totality of symbolic structuresheld by individuals or owned by society and itguides <strong>human</strong> behaviour at all levels of societyand in all fields. Politics, on the other hand, isthe science of managing the public affairs of asociety through material and non-materialmeans, including knowledge as just defined.The ruling power plays a key role in directingknowledge and in influencing its <strong>development</strong>or retardation. Since a ruling powerworks to foster knowledge patterns compatiblewith its orientation and goals, it inevitably resistsor even suppresses other patterns that contradictits general direction. Knowledgeconflicts in the Arab world are often versions ofpolitical conflicts in societies where both thesanctioned knowledge paradigm and that contestingit are motivated and sustained by thedeep and opposing ideological objectives ofruling powers and their opponents.Glancing through the many strategic <strong>report</strong>sof political parties, associations or blocsacross the region provides abundant evidenceof this polarised split. Some documents adoptthe official knowledge paradigm and are seenas supporting the prevailing political power,whether or not their authors are actively associatedwith it; other publications take a challengingstance in flat opposition to that power andits version of knowledge and values.Political systems and the cultural eliteCultural elites across the Arab region are eitherallied with, or stand in opposition to the politicalauthorities in power, adopting a worldviewof knowledge that may coincide with one politicaltrend or another. In most cases, however,their knowledge pursuits take an academicpath. These groups opt to produce and developknowledge irrespective of its use in one politicalfield or another. They have set themselvesup as stewards of knowledge, attempting to secureits growth through the positions many occupyin universities and scientific researchcentres. Their academic isolation poignantlyreflects the knowledge crisis created by the crisisof political power in the Arab world.The ruling power playsa key role in directingknowledge and ininfluencing its<strong>development</strong> orretardation.Knowledge conflicts inthe Arab world areoften versions ofpolitical conflicts.THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 147


The isolation ofcultural elites hasallowed politicalsystems to marginalisethem while polarisingsociety and rewardingsycophants.In the absence of apublic sphere boundedand protected by therule of law, the Arabintellectual walks afine line betweenprinciple andexpediency.BOX 8.1Political authorities have failed to accommodatethem. Instead, authorities have focusedon assimilating those intellectuals, academicsand scientists who are prepared to shore up aknowledge system consistent with their dominantgoal of controlling society’s socio-economic,political and cultural capabilities.The isolation of Arab cultural elites has, ofcourse, allowed political systems to marginalisethem while polarising society and rewardingsycophants. Thanks to the latter, culturaldisputes and debates are often overshadowedby attempts to legitimise the prevailing politicalsystem. The result is that Arab regimestend to underestimate the positive power ofknowledge, having grown accustomed to havingtheir fears about its transformative effectscalmed. Their view of knowledge is strictly expedient:knowledge is simply another meansto consolidate their power and plans.Neutral academics have either spoken outagainst their alienation at home, or have beencompelled to emigrate abroad to pursueknowledge without political pressure or containment.Although the Arab brain drain appearsto be financially motivated, it reflects adeep crisis in the role of knowledge in presentdayArab countries. The stark choices facingindependent intellectuals and scholars areJamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897)The Nation and the Authority of a TyrantIt is not Allah that hath wronged them, but they wrong themselves.(Qur'an: Ch. 3, Al Imran, verse 117)A nation that has no say in its own affairsis never consulted on its interests and itswill has no effect on its public welfare.Rather, is subjected to one ruler whosewill is the law and whose desire is theorder, who rules as he pleases and doeswhat he wants. Such a nation is one thathas no stability and cannot go along astraight path. It vacillates between happinessand misery and between knowledgeand ignorance. It alternates betweenwealth and poverty and between glory andhumiliation.If its ruler is ignorant, uncouth, of vileintentions, greedy, lustful, cowardly, uncertain,stupid, villainous and unprincipled,he will plunge the nation into theabyss, place a veil of ignorance in front ofits eyes and reduce it to poverty and destitution.He will rule people despotically,deviating from the road of justice andopening the way to aggression, causing thepowerful to usurp the rights of the weak.The system will then be destroyed. Valuesand manners will also be corrupted, thenation's esteem will be lowered and desperationwill prevail. As a result, acquisitiveeyes will be focused on the nation andinvading nations will strike at its belly withtheir claws.Source: Complete Works, Part II, Political Writings,Study and Examination by Dr. Muhammad Amarah, Arab Foundation for Studies and Publications, Beirut 1981, p.329.quite painful: to commit "treason of theclerks" 1 by declaring allegiance to politicalregimes, or to seek exile outside their countriesof birth.Yet a few Arab intellectuals do reach andinfluence the holders of political power.Observers of the Arab intellectual scene notethat the Arab scholar-activist influencespower, not so much by the weight of scholarshipor independent thinking, but to the extentthat he or she infiltrates power circles. Ithas been pointed out that the dilemma of theArab public intellectuals is that in order to beinfluential they must somehow connect withthe patronage networks of rulers and high officials.In the absence of a public spherebounded and protected by the rule of law, theArab intellectual walks a fine line betweenprinciple and expediency. More often thannot, when authoritative advice on policychoices is required, for a variety of historical,economic and political reasons, Arab rulersand think tanks often continue to preferknowledgeable outsiders to local intellectuals(Hudson, 2002) 2On the other hand, a group of neutralArab academics resorts to "intellectual migration"at home or is actually forced to emigratein search of new and broader horizons to developtheir knowledge, without political pressuresor containment. While the Arab braindrain is commonly understood to be motivatedby financial considerations, it in practicereflects a deeper crisis among knowledgeworkers in the Arab region. These workersare, in effect, resisters of an unacceptable accommodationwith ruling authorities.In between these two groups stands acommitted corps of intellectuals that seeks toapply knowledge to serve their communities,guided by their strategic thinking and their affiliationwith different civil society organisations.This group has recently started toexpand amongst the Arab intellectual elite,along with the increasing vitality of Arab communitiesand civil society organisations.1In I927, the French essayist Julien Benda published his famous attack on the intellectual corruption of the age, La Trahison des Clercs. The treasonin question was the betrayal by thinkers and intellectuals of their vocation to pursue the truth.2"On the Influence of the Intellectual in Arab Politics and Policymaking", Michael C. Hudson, paper presented to the conference on the Role of theIntellectual in Contemporary Political Life, Georgetown University, April 26-27, 2002.148 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


PATTERNS OF KNOWLEDGEPRODUCTION ANDDISSEMINATION IN THE ARABWORLDThe production of academic knowledge in theArab world takes place along the followingpattern:• Official institutions sponsored by politicalauthorities produce "party" or institutionalknowledge and employ cultural workers andframeworks that legitimise their power.• Knowledge networks are connected to theArab world’s political parties or blocs, such asthe Al-Ahram Political Studies Centre or theCentre for Arab Unity Studies.• Research centres connected to civil society,such as the Cairo Human Rights Centre,are rooted in specific issue campaigns.Various types of associations and federationsfall into this cluster, such as the associationsfor channelling youth requests for employmentin Morocco, or environmental preservationassociations.• "Professional" research centres are set upeither by researchers with former links to politicalregimes who seek to establish a strategicvision of international or Arab issues, or byacademics under the banner of "providingcustomer services". These centres have becomepopular venues for the production ofknowledge and depend largely on external financing.• Foreign research centres include theFrench Institute for the Near East, formerlythe Centre for Studies and Research in Jordan,Lebanon and Syria and the Centre for Studiesand Research on the Contemporary MiddleEast (CERMOC) in Egypt. These establishmentsproduce publications similar to those ofnational institutions and often serve as sanctuariesfor national knowledge producers seekingacademic outlets free from censorship.Open discussion in the Arab press on thedistinction between the academic researcherand the political activist, and on the natureand objectives of externally financed scientificresearch at many of these centres, has helpedto create more social space for knowledge producers.BOX 8.2Knowledge and Governance in the Arab WorldA major reason for the halting, if not arrestedprogress of learning and culturaladvancement in the Arab world may havebeen the failure of most Arab regimes, orso-called Arab systems, to relate to knowledge,in its multiple dimensions.Obviously, contemporary rulers andthose of yesteryear neither are, nor were,the "philosopher-kings" of Plato'sRepublic. And they were not expected tobe in the first place. Yet in more simpleand practical terms, from this governancegap there flowed a number of consequences:• the rise of rulers from closed, semi illiteratebackgrounds inclined to reject anyparticipant in government who advocatedthe advancement of learning, or the enhancementof the quality of educationand culture as objectives of statecraft, orwho were committed to the exercise ofacademic freedom.• disbelief among regimes in the need toseek cultural change based on those enlightened<strong>human</strong> values embodied in theArab Renaissance of the 19th and early20th century – values that have been rejectedand crushed since the 1920's by aresurgence of religious extremism and arbitraryand self-serving interpretation.• the negation of freedom of thoughtand expression in public education, includinghigher university levels, which accountsfor the near absence of investmentin research, particularly scientific research.The prevalence of state ideologiesand autocratic approaches that have led toobscurantism and lack of innovation andof adequate standards for proper education.This in turn has reduced openness tomodern technological advances and forward-lookingintellectual discourse anddebates.• the absence, generally, as a corollary ofabsolutist governance, of critical thought.The obvious consequence of intolerant religiousinterpretations of values and idealswas the freezing of thinking into dépasséideologies that permeated the minds andsouls of a significant majority of so-calledintellectuals. To such systems of values,any challenging ideas were consideredpunishable heresies. Many revolutionaryphilosophies were denigrated as "self-proclaimed”concepts that did not stand thetest of history and time. This attitude contributedto defeats in almost every field -political, diplomatic and military -whereby dependence on foreign assistanceand science became nearly total. Theglorification of leaders and their systemsled to rulers being equated with the nation,which rendered abject submissioncompulsory, and thus the persecution offree thinking admissible. Witness the endlessnumbers of jailed dissenters.Leadership was not questioned and theauthority of the day, no matter how corruptor despotic, was above accountability.• hostility to creative literature, not tomention creative philosophic writing,which was unwelcome and often censored.Intellectual openness to new horizonsof modern culture was next to nil,new ideas were held to be unwelcome anddestructive and only entered Arab societiesthrough limited windows of opportunity.The above might be considered aharsh caricature were its consequencesnot reflected in two major measurablefacts:• regression in literacy and reading, asevident in the decline of Arab writing andpublishing.• The emigration of creative artists that rejectconformity. Introversion in the artsbecame reflected in strange forms of unintelligiblesurrealism, when not imprisonedin naturalistic landscapes.A strange polity was born where excessiveconsumerism sometimes combinedwith an utter lack of imaginationand inventiveness.Thus, the distressful spectacle of anArab world where immense wealth was illicitlymanaged by despotic systems accumulatingobscene fortunes whileproduction, except of oil, sank, as did theArab share of international trade. Thepeople continued to live in a state of ignoranceand indescribable poverty, hardlybenefiting from this accumulated wealthand unaware of even their most elementaryrights to rebel or revolt, rights deniedthem by an oppressive force, the objectiveally of neo-colonial exploitation. See Iraq!In conclusion, the political outcomeof this situation, in the present context, isat one and the same time a sense oftremendous frustration, and a search for"purity" through invitations - at this stagemerely invitations - to soul-searching andself-criticism.Ghassan TwainyTHE POLITICAL CONTEXT 149


The goal should be toinstitutionalizeknowledge in adomain separate frompolitics, therebyensuring itsindependence.Power curtails theintellectual andpolitical scope ofscholars and thepublic alike – which inturn shackles goodminds, extinguishesthe flame of learningand kills the drive forinnovation.The diversion of knowledge production:separating politics from knowledgeThe vigorous analyses, varied interrelationshipsand often contradictory nature that typifysuch patterns underline the multipleloyalties criss-crossing Arab knowledge production.This is in addition to the tendency ofstates and political parties to manipulateknowledge selectively for political ends. Addto this the fact that the knowledge efforts ofthe intellectual vanguard are scattered and itbecomes clear that there are some fundamentalobstacles to the creation of a well-knit Arabknowledge society. The most serious obstacleis the exploitation of knowledge to serve politicalends, internal or external. Overcomingthis calls for a fresh look at the knowledge mapand those who interfere in it. The goal shouldbe to institutionalize knowledge in a domainseparate from politics, thereby ensuring its independence.Political instability and fierce struggles foraccess to political positions in the absence ofan established rule for the peaceful rotation ofpower – in short, democracy – obstruct thegrowth and maturation of knowledge in Arabsoil. A major consequence of the unstable politicalsituation is that questions of securitydominate the agenda of ruling regimes. Thisinevitably leads regimes to allocate substantialinvestments to sectors that guarantee the system’ssecurity. Spheres of social activity thatdo not yield direct and rapid returns are thefirst casualties when government budgets areskewed towards security measures. In theArab region, culture, knowledge and scientificresearch are exceptionally vulnerable to bothpolitical and financial neglect. Comparing scientificresearch allocations in Arab countrieswith equivalent spending in the industrialworld, or even in other developing countries,underlines this distortion.Another far-reaching and more profoundconsequence of this state of affairs is thatknowledge activities are deprived of <strong>human</strong>talents. Educated citizens migrate towardsbureaucratic, military, security and administrativeoccupations that provide significantlyhigher social and material rewards than scientificresearch and education can offer.A further grave consequence of the dominantmodel is that branches of political authoritycome to control all spheres of social activity,and to intervene in the affairs of scientific,technical, technological and literaryinstitutions. Very often, such authorities directknowledge workers to serve their own limitedgoals and impose work programmes, ideologicalconstructs and slogans in exchange for resourceallocations. Direct intervention bysecurity or political agencies in appointmentsto scientific, intellectual and literary positionsis the most blatant form of such interference,which of course disrupts knowledge <strong>development</strong>.It means that for the sake of securingpolitical dominance over knowledge institutions,efficiency criteria are sacrificed.Appointments driven by political allegiance,nepotism or private interest sooner or laterlead to the corruption of scientific researchand technical institutions, and eventually tothe destruction of knowledge itself.In summary, Arab scientific research institutionsare largely at the mercy of politicalstrategies and power conflicts. Political loyaltiestake precedence in the management ofthese institutions and both efficiency andknowledge suffer. Power curtails the intellectualand political scope of scholars and thepublic alike – which in turn shackles goodminds, extinguishes the flame of learning andkills the drive for innovation. These factorshave impoverished Arab scientific and technicalsystems and left them at their weakestwhen the need to liberate and leverage knowledgehas never been stronger.New foundations are needed to create arobust and coherent knowledge society. Farsightedsociological and legal analyses haveemphasised the importance of taking the politicsout of knowledge by founding an independentpolitical economy in the Arab world.Co-existence would be the first rule of thepolity under this reformation. Politicianswould hold public office in a balanced concordwith other spheres, without seeking tooppose or stifle them. Studies further suggestthat an independent knowledge sphere mustalso be established in parallel to the politicalsphere. It would focus on producing and developingknowledge free from political coercion,with the goal of embedding knowledgein society. Neither act of separation, whichwould truly liberate both spheres of influence,150 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


is possible except by democratising politicsand knowledge production.In other words, democratic transformationin the Arab world is a fundamental conditionfor the independence of knowledge,taking into account that such a transformationrequires synergy among economic, politicaland cultural actors. Whatever level of importanceis accorded to individual actors, politicalpower ranks high in comparison to otherelements. This fact implies two challenges forsociety: the first is to establish an independentand self-limiting political sphere, while thesecond has to do with codifying and harmonisingdemocracy so that both politics andknowledge are independent, yet complementaryrealms.Founding an independent polity in theArab world is supremely important for the establishmentof the knowledge society. Yet inthe absence of institutional rule, little progresscan be made towards that goal.The role of institutional independence instimulating the knowledge societyInstitutional independence is another facet ofthe rule of law. It is the normal outcome of establishingpolitical power legally through codification,and politically by democratisation.The fact is that the spirit of the rule of law isnot confined to the arrangement of lawswithin the state but is also embodied in thestate’s protection of rights and duties, and themaintenance of the dignity of <strong>human</strong> beings.Political authority requires a certain level ofaccumulated legal and institutional strength tolead society into democratic transformation.The absence of sustained institutional independenceis a common feature across theArab nation. Arab polities cannot be characterisedreliably by degrees of progress in institutionalgovernance. For example, it is notfeasible to set up comparisons on the basis ofthe type of regime (monarchy/republican), orthe extent of community participation (referendums/elections),or the degree of active involvementin the international <strong>human</strong> rightssystem. This is because each element has to bemeasured against the practical progress ofArab regimes in establishing political poweron the basis of a constitution and public respectfor its legitimacy. Such legitimacy isoften in question, and Arab regimes continueto be driven by the imperatives of survival andsecurity, to the detriment of the balance requiredin their relations with the governed.CODIFYING POLITICAL POWERAND DEMOCRACY: AFUNDAMENTAL STAGE IN THEESTABLISHMENT OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYFate has not decreed that political power inthe Arab world should permanently excludeparticipation by citizens. Whether participationis encouraged or not depends on the willand policies of regimes. Amid conflicts anddisputes over state legitimacy the power of democratisationand codification has beenunder-appreciated. Progress on those frontswould make all people, governors and governedalike, subject to the rule of law and helpthe institutional state to evolve. That, in turn,would secure the coexistence of all spheres ofsocietal activity in the Arab world under theumbrella of equality. Moving in this directionwill entail strengthening some key, yet stillfragile, constitutional provisions and tighteninglax laws that favour power structures.Towards political systems that serve theknowledge societyOvercoming the fragility of the constitutionalstructure has certainly become essential. Thisrequires creating a legal and political culturethat is capable of directing and guiding politicalpractice. The effectiveness of this culture,which has to be built on both democratic participationand opposition, will flow from itscapacity to produce methodological conceptsand tools sharp enough to understand Arabpolitical reality and analyse the structures ofpower in Arab societies. Attaining this balancerequires that Arab intellectuals drop ideology,resist compromises with the status quo and rejectnostalgic indulgence in heritage.Arab intellectuals must be actively involvedin building the conditions for democraticsocieties and especially in defending theimportance of their legal dimensions and thelimits of political power. The intelligentsiashould campaign for institutional rule, the absenceof which will impede the rise of theAmid conflicts anddisputes over statelegitimacy the powerof democratisationand codification hasbeen underappreciated.THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 151


BOX 8.3Imam Muhammad Abduh(1849-1905): Justice and ScienceThese two glorious, fundamental elements,justice and science, are insep<strong>arab</strong>lein <strong>human</strong> existence. Should one of themreach a country, the other would followsuit immediately; and when one leaves thecountry, the other will follow on its heels.One can hardly lift a foot or put it downwithout the other accompanying it. This iswhat history tells us. The chronicles ofstates in which the beacon of justiceburned bright and where the light of scienceshone tell us how their people enjoyedboth lights at the same time and flewto the heights of happiness with these twowings. Once the times turned around, destroyingone of the two foundations, theother one quickly followed, falling to theground. The afflicted state would fall intothe abyss. The atmosphere would becomepitch-dark, with thick black clouds andtween what is harmful and what is useful.It will be firmly established in their mindsthat equality and justice are the primarycause of lasting happiness. They will thenseek them, feeling that no price is toohigh. They will also know that injusticeand oppression are synonymous with destructionand misery. Were justice to havea firm foothold in a nation, it would pavefor it the roads to peace of mind and soul.Every person would then know his or herrights and duties. Their thoughts wouldthen become sharp and their senses gentle.Their hearts would be strong in bringingwhat is useful to them and warding offwhat is harmful. They would immediatelyrealise that what they have achieved is noteternal and that what they have acquired isnot lasting unless they support one anotherin building true knowledge, and unlessveils of ignorance blocking mortal sight.education becomes universal,The secret of this is now clear. If sciencespreads in a nation, it will enlightenthe ways for its people. Their roads willbecome brightly lit and they will clearlyembracing all members of society. Theywould all rush to acquire the sources ofknowledge and spread it to all parts of thenation.distinguish between good and evil, be-Source: Muhammad Abduh, 1990, p.25.knowledge society. Intellectuals and academicshave a clear stake in seeing due independenceestablished in the respective spheres ofknowledge and politics, which would lead toknowledge becoming at last a free entity.of thought and opinion, Arab laws suffer fromseveral structural defects that severely limittheir effectiveness and credibility.Firstly, Arab laws do not always capturereality, but rather remain theoretical, whichweakens their usefulness. Secondly, the gapbetween nominal or de jure acceptance of lawsand actual enforcement or implementation isextremely wide. This gap is quite marked inpublic legislation, especially that related to issuesof freedom and knowledge.This large gap creates a duality that impedesprogress. On the one hand, there is apositivist legal system that fails to interact withsociety – not surprisingly in a society that implementslaws only when forced to. And onthe other hand, there is a society that reproducesits values and systems in line with itsown notions, democratically legalising andconverting those notions to a state of respectabilityThat people often cannot exercise theirrights through participation and are furtherprevented from exercising them by "legal" oppressioncertainly contributes to freezing bothreality and the laws. Thus, the most hopefulcourse for legal <strong>development</strong> lies in a dynamicinteraction between the realms of "law" and"reality".The majority of Arabstates have signed theinternational <strong>human</strong>rights conventions–yet those conventionshave neither enteredthe legal culture norbeen incorporated insubstantivelegislation .THE LEGAL CONTEXT FORKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION,PRODUCTION ANDDISSEMINATIONFreedom of thought and expression areamong the fundamental principles for shapingfree, innovative societies, businesses and individuals.They are the essence of independentpublic opinion. For example, the protectionof innovation though intellectual propertyrights stimulates intellectual production andinvestment. The protection of people’s rightsof free speech and opinion stimulates creativethinking. Yet are Arab legal systems and institutionsqualified to protect such basic rights?Irregularity of the legal structureWhile the law is, in principle, the very basis ofcitizens’ rights to knowledge and to freedomInactive and nominal lawsThe majority of the Arab states have signedthe international <strong>human</strong> rights conventions 3 –all of them refer to respect for fundamentalfreedoms – yet those conventions have neitherentered the legal culture nor have they beenincorporated into the substantive legislation ofthose states. The conventions have remainednominal, as is apparent from the fact that theyare rarely raised before the judiciary for implementation,even though they are all bindingand enjoy priority relative to local laws. It ispresumed that a judge would implement theseconventions if a lawsuit were presented beforehim or her 4 , which in practice rarely happens.Furthermore, these conventions havenever been used, at the level of legislation, as alever; they could be used as tools to urge Arablegislative authorities to enact new laws or toamend unfair ones. This has not happened.3Most Gulf States have not yet signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights.4Some Arab legal systems have introduced in their procedural laws an explicit stipulation that judges are under obligation to apply the internationalconventions whenever such are brought up before them.152 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Declining efficiency of the judiciaryThe judiciary is one of the fundamental guarantorsof the protection of people’s rights andfreedoms. In turn, its independence and transparencyare the primary guarantee of its goodperformance. While most Arab states have underlinedthe principle of power separation, realityoften exposes a relationship betweenjudicial powers and political powers, at leastwith respect to appointments and promotions.When judges who collaborate with the executivebranch are rewarded with high executivepositions the independence and credibility ofthe judiciary decrease. Moreover, suspensionof laws by judges – at the behest of politicalauthorities – and the spread of corruptionhave caused the judiciary, as an institution andas individuals, to lose the moral immunity theyonce enjoyed.At the same time, it must be stressed thatjudges in Arab countries face an exceptionallydifficult task under circumstances that reducetheir efficiency. The high number of cases tobe heard and inadequately equipped courtroomswith poorly trained support stafflengthen the time needed for outcomes andhamper efforts to serve the public interest.While public faith in the judiciary is not ashigh as it once was, the institution, especiallyat its higher levels, remains vital for the peopleand stands between them and the excesses ofpolitical power.Yet respect for the judiciary did not increasewhen some Arab countries created exceptionalcourts that denied people the rightto regular civil hearings, due process and theright of appeal to higher courts. The latterright is important because the higher the courtthe more independent and respectful of dueprocedure it is likely to be.Consequently, seeking the judgement ofthe law and the judiciary has become a marginalresort for resolving disputes in someArab societies. The public’s growing lack ofconfidence in a judiciary that seems to be becomingmore dependent, together with a lackof popular awareness about what the law providesfor, may explain why so few cases concernedwith the denial of freedoms - economic,political, cultural and social – are beingbrought before Arab courts.Restoring the judiciary’s credibility and rebuildingits independence are urgent prioritiesfor guaranteeing the freedom of thought andexpression inherent in the knowledge society.FREEDOM OF THOUGHT,OPINION AND EXPRESSION INTHE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGALSYSTEMThe legal protection of freedomFreedoms are not confined to political andcivil freedoms; they embrace economic, socialand cultural freedoms as well. Without freedomof thought, opinion and expression –which head the list of fundamental rights indispensableto the knowledge society – the exerciseof other freedoms would remain a mereabstraction.International conventions and Arab constitutionsand laws sanction freedom as a natural<strong>human</strong> right. Most Arab states havesigned the international conventions 5 that protectfreedom, and have unanimously agreed toendorse freedom in the substance of their constitutions6 . They have further introduced intheir laws clauses that bear on the protection 7of freedom as part of legal controls thattighten or relax according to the type ofregime: controls may vary between censorshipand declaring a state of emergency.The problem with freedom in Arab countriesis not related to the implementation oflaws 8 , but to their violation. It has to do withthe spread of oppression and the erratic natureof the measures used. It also has to do with thehegemony of censorship and its use by politicalpowers to tighten their grip on those veryfreedoms that they have ostensibly recognised.General rules for the exercise of freedomThe exercise of freedom, in societies that respectit, is subject to well-defined generalrules, wherein a balance is struck between theRestoring thejudiciary’s credibilityand rebuilding itsindependence areurgent priorities.The problem withfreedom in Arabcountries is notrelated to theimplementation oflaws, but to theirviolation.5Such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and others.6Except for Saudi Arabia, which has not drafted a constitution per se, and the single-party states.7For example, the press and publishing laws in the Arab states provide that the freedom of issuing newspapers, printing and publishing is guaranteedaccording to those laws and that it is exercised within the framework of the constitution’s principles, the provisions of law and the profession’s codeof ethics. The same applies to the freedom of founding associations and organising general assemblies.8Those laws must be completed and adapted to the needs of Arab societies.THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 153


Penalties meted out tojournalists, publishinghouses and newsagencies used to be asmall fine; they nowrange from provisionalsuspensions tooutright closure.Authorities reachabove theconstitutionalinstitutions and thelaw, using the pretextof national security.requirements of justice and law on the onehand and those of the public good as agreedupon by all social groups on the other. Thusthose rules are perceived positively. Moreover,the legal system in those societies places lawsin the hands of a fair judiciary that refers tothose laws in the settlement of disputes. In thisframework the law has a double role: to providethe basis for resolutions in disputes and toinculcate the values it protects, penalising offendersagainst those values. People’s appealsto the rule of law and the judiciary attest totheir confidence in the proper performance ofthe legal system.What determines how well freedom ofthought, opinion and expression are protectedin practice are the general rules for enforcinglaws and ensuring public compliance and thedegree to which such compliance serves thepublic interest. If the legal restrictions that enforcecompliance with the law are statedclearly in the text of the law, are compatiblewith the constitution and conventions and thespirit of the legislation, and are implementedby the relevant legal authorities, then these restrictionsare effective and useful. Otherwise,they become harmful and oppressive.In the Arab world, restrictions imposed onfreedom take the form of legal constraints onpublications, associations, general assembliesand electronic media, which prevent thesefrom carrying out their communicative andcultural roles. Such restrictions also obstructthe dissemination of knowledge and the educationof public opinion, notwithstanding citizen’srights as secured by the law and theinternational charters.Restrictions on freedom vary in degreefrom one state to another. They range fromprohibiting the publication of new politicalnewspapers to banning the circulation of oneor more issues of existing journals, administrativeseizure of newspapers and publicationsand advance censorship of periodicals.Penalties meted out to journalists, publishinghouses and news agencies used to be a smallfine; they now range from provisional suspensionsto outright closure.Regulations governing the freedom toform associations that were laid down in thecolonial period endorsed the rule of free assembly,provided that the founding organisersinformed the competent authorities of the association’screation. The situation today isthat, except for those older laws, all otheramendments governing freedom of associationmade in the post independence and nationalliberation era are restriction-oriented. 9Yet the more dangerous restrictions arethose imposed by the security authoritieswhen they confiscate publications or ban peoplefrom entering the country or prevent thesale of certain books during fairs while promotingother kinds of books. In committingthese acts, these authorities reach above theconstitutional institutions and the law, usingthe pretext of national security – a criterionseldom clarified by them. Other forms of restrictioncome from classes of citizens themselves,who, as noted in chapter three, appointthemselves the custodians of public morality,and press for the censorship of books, articlesand media events.To escape this censorship-freedom contradiction,the rule of law should be enforced, asit guarantees freedom and shrinks the role ofcensorship. Yet, as noted earlier, Arab lawsand legal institutions suffer from several structuralproblems and many have lost their effectivenessand credibility. The restoration andeffective application of the law in the interestof public and individual freedoms dependcritically on addressing these problemsthrough significant reforms.Violation of political and legal guaranteesfor the protection of freedomMost constitutions have political and legalguarantees for the protection of freedom.Such political guarantees are reflected in therule of law and exemplified in the principles ofpeople’s sovereignty, equality and right toscrutinise the government’s policies and workand express their views on them. The legal9Originally, the formation of associations did not require a license from the administrative authorities; it only required that the association be proclaimedbefore those authorities. Now, laws governing associations require, upon proclamation or declaration of an association, that a temporary acknowledgementof recognition be delivered by the administrative authorities. Once the proclamation or the declaration text fulfils all the measuresprovided for in the same associations law, a final acknowledgement is delivered to the association, within a specified period. This acknowledgementrepresents a "license" that legitimises the work of the association. Should the authorities fail to deliver this acknowledgement within the specifiedperiod the association may operate in accordance with the objectives outlined in the relevant laws. However, by delivering the temporary and not thefinal acknowledgement, the administrative authority becomes able to revoke it whenever it likes, which is the core of the problem.Examples of this are the 1909 associations law of Lebanon and the statement of the minister of the interior issued on 17 January 1996; the associationslaw of Morocco of 23 July 2002 amending and complementing the 15 November 1958 law on the right to form associations. The same provisionsapply to the association of general assemblies.154 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


guarantees are embodied in respect for theprinciple of the separation of authorities, theprecedence of the law and in subjecting statesmenand public officials to a common judiciary.Legal guarantees are also embodied inclauses regulating interior affairs. These guarantees,however, are violated and become inactiveduring times of war and emergency inthe Arab world. Their suspension results in intensifyingrepressive measures – the sole co-ordinationframework found between Arabministers of the interior in their successivesummits.Repression of freedoms in emergenciesThe relative expansion in the sanctioning oflaws providing greater freedom in Arab countriesis a positive sign, yet its value is diminishedwhen contrasted with practices inenacting such laws. This often reveals a failureto reconcile the interests of the governmentwith the rights of the people and the exigenciesof state security with the principles of freedom.The positive trend is furtherundermined when the pressures of securitylead political authorities to curb freedoms thatthey believe threaten the status quo.Arab countries live in a state of maximumsecurity under the Arab-Israeli conflict.However, internal security procedures cannotalways be justified in that context. In fact,those procedures often eliminate all componentsof civil liberty, opposition and criticismin the name of mobilisation.Some Arab countries have declared a stateof emergency 10 . This act suppresses freedom,and shelves the political guarantees invested inthe rule of law and the institutions that safeguardpublic and individual freedoms. A stateof emergency releases the State from constitutionalaccountability under the rule of law andlegal accountability through the judiciary. Itcurtails respect for the rule of the separation ofauthorities by sanctioning direct interventionin the affairs of the judiciary and it freezes thelegal guarantees that protect individuals fromstate aggression.Freedoms that are hostage to matters of security,to censorship and to self-appointed10Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan.watchdogs of public morality are freedoms denied.The first victims of this denial are creativity,innovation and knowledge.The stifling legal context that has developedfrom the crisis of law in the region willcramp Arab minds, inhibit local knowledgeproduction and drive good Arab scholars andthinkers abroad, intensifying the region’sknowledge deficit. Overcoming that crisis is acentral part of the challenge of building theknowledge society.Protecting creativity and intellectualfreedom: copyright lawsAuthors are the fountainhead of literary andartistic creativity. With the ascent of knowledgeas a major factor of production and thearrival of digital publishing, the issue of authorshipand copyrights has extended beyondits closed world and has become relevant to allfields: cultural, social, economic, political,commercial and others. The growing value attachedto individual intellectual, artistic andcreative production and the high returns onintellectual investments in <strong>development</strong>, coupledwith the growing vulnerability of intellectualworks to blatant or concealed piracy andplagiarism, make copyright protection an importanttool of public policy in the new knowledgesocieties. Copyright has become theconcern of administrative, legislative, judicialand executive authorities.In the international context, copyright issueshave assumed great importance for developingcountries acceding to the WTO with itsarticles relating to intellectual property rights(IPRs) and trade. Thus, developing countries,including some Arab countries, have moved topromulgate laws conforming to internationalconventions on intellectual property rightsand to ensure their full implementation. Whilea few Arab countries, Morocco (1916, 1970) 11 ,Egypt (1954) 12 and Lebanon (1999) 13 havespecific IPR laws, most other Arab states stilllack such specialised legislation. Their laws reflectonly some articles in this respect; civilcodes, for example, cover certain aspectsunder property, while publication laws embodysome others.Freedoms that arehostage to matters ofsecurity, to censorshipand to self-appointedwatchdogs of publicmorality are freedomsdenied.The crisis of law in theregion will crampArab minds, inhibitlocal knowledgeproduction and drivegood Arab scholarsand thinkers abroad.11Law promulgated on 23 June 1916. Another law was promulgated on 24 January 1943. Pursuant to said law, the African Office for Copyrights andthe African Office for Men of Letters and Authors were founded. A decree was issued on 7 March 1965 concerning the formation of the MoroccanOffice for Copyright. The IPR law was promulgated on 29 July 1970.12Law No 354 on Intellectual Property Rights. It comprises 51 articles.13Law No 75, the second law, after the 1924 Law on Copyright.THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 155


Disregard forintellectual propertyprotection comes at aprice for individualauthors, publishedscientists and creativeartists.The Bern Convention on the Protection ofLiterary and Artistic Works 14 and theInternational Copyright Convention 15 constitutethe international legal framework 16 ofcopyright. The regional Arab Convention forCopyrights and national copyright legislation(in Egypt and Morocco) are derived fromboth. There are only six Arab countries in theBern Convention (by ratification, accession oracceptance) – Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon,Mauritania, Libya and Egypt. As regards theInternational Convention on Copyright, fiveArab countries have acceded, namely,Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, andSaudi Arabia 17 .Disregard for intellectual property protectioncomes at a price for individual authors,published scientists and creative artists whohave a right to recognition for their originalwork. It affects the national economy becausevalue adding knowledge ceases to be producedwhen it is easily stolen. And it undercutsinternational cooperation andunderstanding in the global information agewhen national laws do not meet internationalstandards of protection.Arab countries have taken some steps toprotect copyright as regards literary, scientificand artistic works in a unified manner 18 . ArabMinisters of Culture ratified in their conferenceheld on 5 November 1981 the ArabAgreement on Copyright Protection 19 .The Agreement had been subject to somecriticism. It is claimed that it does not rise tothe level of advanced countries’ legislation anddoes not embody the realities of Arab (andIslamic) countries in particular, and developingcountries in general. To ensure its applicability,the Agreement had to employ flexibilityas a first step. Nevertheless, further steps havenot been adopted since, which renders theAgreement imperfect and in need of review.All Arab countries, except the occupiedPalestinian territories and Comoros, participatein one international intellectual propertyrights organisation or another; 19 Arab countries(exceptions: Syria, <strong>Palestine</strong> andComoros Islands) are members of WIPO; 15Arab countries (exceptions: Saudi Arabia,Somalia, Qatar and Yemen) are members ofthe Paris Union; ten Arab countries (exceptions:Jordan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,Syria, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Yemen)are members of the Bern Union.Yet the <strong>development</strong> of IPR laws in theArab world is subject to the same variability asother laws. In only a few Arab countries dosuch laws explicitly stipulate the moral rightsof the author 20 . Moreover, numerous literary,scientific and artistic works in Arab countries14Dated 9 September 1886. At the beginning, only one Islamic country, Tunisia, signed, on 5 December 1887. Several needs generated reviews of thisConvention and reconsideration of new <strong>development</strong>s as follows: the Convention was complemented in Paris on 4 May 1889; amended in Berlin on13 November 1908. It was further complemented in Bern on 20 March 1914; re-amended in Rome on 2 June 1928 and Brussels on 26 June 1948.The Convention was then signed by 35 countries, inter-alia, five Arab and Islamic countries. Amidst the economic, social and political <strong>development</strong>sand transformations in the last half of the 20th century, the Convention was amended at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, in Paris on 24 July 1971 andchanged in 1979 (the Convention is managed by the WIPO which replaced in 1971 the World Intellectual Property Offices). The number of countries,up until the 1 January 1994, that acceded, ratified or accepted the Convention amounted to 105, including six Arab countries and seven Islamic countries,inter-alia, Malaysia.Article 2 of the Convention stipulates: "Literary and Artistic Works" shall include any production in the literary, scientific and artistic work regardlessof the mode of expression, such as books … etc." for more information, see (Ash-Sharqawi, in Arabic, 1995, 31-35, 49-52, 141).15Ratified by the International Governmental Conference on Copyright, Geneva, 18 August - 6 September 1952 (the International GovernmentalCommittee reviewed it for the benefit of developing countries, at UNESCO, Paris, 5-24 July 1971. The Convention was enforced as of 10 July 1974).The number of Islamic countries that acceded to the 1952 Convention up until the beginning of March 1993 had been limited, with only five ArabIslamic countries acceding.16Other international agreements and conventions include: The Hague Convention for International Deposit of Industrial Drawings and Designs issuedon 6 November 1925; The London Document (1934); The Hague Document (1960); The Additional Monaco Document (1961); The SupplementaryStockholm Document (1967) amended on 28 September 1979; the law on the implementation of the Convention (1 April 1994); The LucarnoAgreement on International Classification of Industrial Drawings and Designs. In the commercial field, TRIPS tackles intellectual property rights andtrade. Furthermore, "industrial rights" have been examined in the Madrid Accord that highlights strict measures against forged or fake data aboutproducts. There are other agreements, such as the International Agreement on the Protection of Performers, Sound Record Producers and BroadcastCorporations; the International Agreement on the Protection of Sound Records Producers against illegitimate production of their records. For moredetails, see Ibid., 15 …).17Up until 1997; it is likely that other countries have recently acceded to one of the two conventions or both.18According to Article 21 of the Arab Cultural Unity Charter (1964), Arab countries are asked to adopt legislation to protect intellectual property (literary,scientific and artistic) within the sovereignty of each country separately.19The Agreement is a blend of some of the legislative provisions set forth in the Bern Convention and the International Convention on Copyright.20Example: Copyright or the right to notice; the right to "parenthood" (authorship), the right to work, the right to title determination, the right toamendment, the right to regret or withdrawal.Copyright is an exclusive right. Most legislations name this right "copyright, the right to transmission or publicity". This right is vested in the authorwho alone can authorise others to use his work in any form. The legislations of some Arab and Islamic countries expressly stipulate this right, I.e.,Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, and Turkey.Concerning the right to parenthood (authorship), i.e. the affiliation of the creative work to its creator, the legislations of some Arab and Islamic countriesstipulate this right: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Arab Republic of Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the Sudan, Senegal, Pakistan, Iran andBangladesh.As regards the right to work or to complete the work, i.e., the author’s right to oppose any manipulation, omission or attempt to deform his work,some laws in Arab and Islamic countries enshrine this right, i.e., Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey,Senegal, Pakistan, Iran and Bangladesh.The right to title entails the author’s right to the original title specified. As regards the right to amendment, it entails the author’s right to introduceamendments to the work after publication. Only Egypt, Libya and the Sudan recognised this right.The right to regret or withdrawal entails the author’s right to recall the published work. Only Egypt, Libya and the Sudan recognise this right. (Ibid.,168-173).156 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


still swing between protection, applicationand codification 21 .Copyright concerns all segments of societyand includes all creators, innovators andthinkers in literary, scientific and artistic fieldsat all social, economic, commercial, legal, politicaland cultural levels.If Arab countries are to realise an economic,cultural and social renaissance, thosethat have not drafted national legislation oncopyright – the most fundamental instrumentfor protecting and stimulating knowledge production– must do so. Moreover, laws need enforcement:they must be implemented bypractical, preventive procedures and intensivepublic education. Two basic common valuesneed to be respected before freedom andknowledge can be converted into rights protectedby law. First the sanctity of <strong>human</strong> beingsas the essential and protected centres ofsociety must be accepted. This is a fundamentalvalue that should not be undermined.Second, society must value knowledge, scholarshipand intellectual effort by elevating themto their rightful position. The absence of thesetwo values is a systemic problem: coercion anddisregard for people are dominating values inpresent-day Arab society. Moreover, somesegments of the intellectual elite lack an effectivepolitical platform while others are seducedby the glamour of power and money,with the result that ordinary people neithertrust in nor recognise the importance ofknowledge production.THE REGIONAL AND GLOBALENVIRONMENTArab regional co-operation can be an importantasset in managing closer global integration,enabling Arab countries as a group topool their capabilities and experience in orderto maximise the rewards and mitigate the risksof globalisation. Globalisation offers importantopportunities to acquire knowledge fromworld stocks and to stimulate the performanceof the domestic knowledge system, particularlyin the fields of education, research andtechnological <strong>development</strong>.But the global context also poses potentialchallenges to knowledge acquisition in Arabcountries. These challenges include exposureto fluctuations in global economic relationsthrough world trade and foreign direct investment;the limited impact of both trade and investmentin Arab knowledge acquisition;unfairly restrictive IPR agreements; and therisk that weak production capacity in developingcountries, including Arab countries, willcondemn them to an inferior role in the globalproduction system, with negative consequencesfor knowledge acquisition. Strongerregional cooperation can help Arab countriesnegotiate such issues, whether involving technologytransfer and indigenisation, IPRs orpharmaceutical and drug prices, from positionsof greater advantage. Moreover, the fieldis open to Arab co-operation with other developingcountries in research, knowledge <strong>development</strong>and know-how exchanges.Knowledge is increasingly becoming a privatecommodity at the international as well asat the national level. This growing link betweenknowledge production and profit, coupledwith greater selectivity in knowledgeflows to points outside the rich world, may actuallyinhibit knowledge production, especiallythe forms of knowledge required bydeveloping countries and societies. A clear exampleis the production of affordable drugs tocombat diseases that devastate poor countries(tropical diseases, HIV-AIDS). Between 1975and 1996, 1,223 new drugs were marketedworldwide, only 13 for tropical diseases. In1998, global spending on health-related researchamounted to US $70 billion: of thistotal, just US $300 million was for HIV-AIDSand only US $100 million for malaria (UNDP,HDR, 2001, 109-110).Such issues could negatively impact theprices and production of drugs, especially inEgypt and Jordan, and underline why developingcountries need to acquire the requisiteknowledge and negotiating skills to betterleverage their intellectual property rights in internationalforums. Stronger Arab cooperationwould increase the region’s bargainingpower.Globalisation, in its present form, risks entrenchingthe dominance of the powerful overthe weak in terms of knowledge and wealth. Itis often pointed out that the distribution ofLaws needenforcement: theymust be implementedby practical,preventive proceduresand intensive publiceducation.Society must valueknowledge,scholarship andintellectual effort byelevating them totheir rightful position.21Lectures, speeches, sermons; articles on political, economic or religious items; industrial drawings and designs; carpet-related works; architecturalwork, etc. (Ibid, 286).THE POLITICAL CONTEXT 157


Concerns that theworld economicsystem will inflictsevere penalties ondeveloping countriesthat fall behind in therace for knowledgeare justified.Negotiations on themechanisms andagreements thatunderpin globalisationare tending to bolsterthe interests of thestronger parties.world income and wealth has worsened sincethe mid 1970s. The goal must rather be tomake globalisation a force that helps developingcountries achieve <strong>human</strong> progress.Structurally, globalisation, as it is unfoldingtoday, allows for the free movement of people,goods and services selectively in a manner thatoften secures the interests of the strongerparty. In terms of labour markets, for example,this leads to the migration of skilled developingcountry personnel to the industrialisedcountries, which causes a double loss for thecountries of origin. Arab countries are especiallyvulnerable to such outflows, as ChapterSeven noted.Concerns that the world economic systemwill inflict severe penalties on developingcountries that fall behind in the race forknowledge are justified. In 1998, the WorldBank President noted in his introduction tothe Bank’s <strong>report</strong> on "Knowledge forDevelopment" that "the globalisation of trade,finance and information flows increases competitionin a manner that raises the danger ofretarding the poorest countries and societies atan accelerating pace" (The World Bank,1998).BOX 8.4Integrating intellectual property rights and <strong>development</strong> policyIntellectual property systems may, if weare not careful, introduce distortions thatare detrimental to the interests of developingcountries. Developed countriesshould pay more attention to reconcilingtheir commercial self-interest with theneed to reduce poverty in developingcountries, which is in everyone’s interest.Higher IP standards should not bepressed on developing countries without aserious and objective assessment of theirimpact on <strong>development</strong> and poor people.We need to ensure that the global IP systemevolves so that the needs of developingcountries are incorporated and, mostimportantly, so that it contributes to thereduction of poverty in developing countriesby stimulating innovation and technologytransfer relevant to them, whilealso making available the products oftechnology at the most competitive pricesReport of the Commission on Intellectual Property RightsLondon, September 2002.possible.TRIPS has strengthened the globalprotection offered to suppliers of technology,but without any counterbalancingstrengthening of competition policiesglobally. Therefore, it may be unwise tofocus on TRIPS as a principal means of facilitatingtechnology transfer. A wideragenda needs to be pursued…Because the IP system does little tostimulate research on diseases that particularlyaffect poor people, public fundingfor research on health problems in developingcountries should be increased. Thisadditional funding should seek to exploitand develop existing capacities in developingcountries for this kind of research,and promote new capacity, both in thepublic and private sectors.Negotiations on the mechanisms andagreements that underpin globalisation aretending to bolster the interests of the strongerparties, the industrialised countries. An obviousexample is the insistence of these countries,notably the United States, onmaintaining agricultural subsidies to their ownfarmers while pressing developing countries todo away with such measures. The use of environmentaland social policy conditionalitiescan also become a way to debar developingcountries from industrial country markets.Themisuse of intellectual property rights cantransform knowledge from a public good intoa private commodity when products originatingin developing countries are usurped bylarge firms and producers, as has happened inthe case of pharmaceuticals and some other industries.The introduction of market principles andmechanisms to govern the supply of services,especially educational services, affects the <strong>development</strong>of knowledge in developing countriesand could lead to unfair competitionbetween local and foreign suppliers, therebyweakening the diffusion of knowledge.Lastly, current global governance arrangementsdo not compensate developing countriesfor losses they incur through adverseterms of trade and exchange. Despite the largeliterature that exists on the harmful impactsfor developing countries of the migration oftheir most highly educated and skilled peopleto the West, none of the proposals made forhelping these countries to recoup their losseshas found a receptive audience in the industrialisedworld.In this context of increasing global inequality,the acquisition of knowledge has becomeone of the key fields where "economiesof scale" and "economies of scope" have assumedgreat importance. Evidence of this canbe found in mounting co-operation betweenEuropean countries in higher studies programmes,in technological agreements withinand with other regional blocs and in synergyand mergers among giant multinationals in researchand technological <strong>development</strong>.Certainly, so-called "big science" 22 exceeds22Some fields of research and sophisticated technological <strong>development</strong> require vast institutional and funding capacity that far exceeds the potentialitiesof any country separately, even advanced countries. These fields include nuclear physics, space, and new energy <strong>development</strong>. Some advancedcountries have pooled all their potentialities in these fields in specialised centres. An early effort of this kind was CERN in Geneva, one of the world’slargest research centres in molecular physics. The latest is the International Space Station. Arab countries can follow similar models in the fields of researchand <strong>development</strong> that exceed the potentialities of one single country.158 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


BOX 8.5The effects of globalisation on growth and distribution throughout the world – UNCTADThe difference in the positions of developingcountries and advanced countries in the worldeconomy, as a result of globalisation, raisesquestions about the ascendance of the unfetteredmarket growth model after the collapseof the Soviet Union.The "Trade and Development" <strong>report</strong> issuedby UNCTAD in 1997 referred to severalobservable and disturbing trends in this respect,which are paraphrased below:Titled "Globalisation, Growth andDistribution," the <strong>report</strong> stresses that the essentialcharacteristic of the world economysince the early 1980s has been the free play ofmarket powers by dismantling restrictions onlocal markets and opening them to world competition.This has become the new "invisiblehand" at work in an environment where stateregulation has been weaker than in decades.The notion that world competition wouldbring about faster growth and eliminate hugedisparities in incomes and living standards hasproved to be rather optimistic.In fact, the world economy slowed downduring the same period in comparison with thegolden era of growth from the end of WorldWar II to the mid 1970s. World growth settledat a rate of about 3% from the mid 1980s, followedby a further drop as a result of the Asiancrisis, particularly in Japan, and the end of theboom enjoyed by the United States and Europein the late 1990s.Income distribution worsened from theearly 1980s. In 1965, the ratio of individual incomein the seven wealthiest countries to individualincome in the seven poorest countrieswas 1/20. In 1995 it rose to 1/39. The increasingdisparity between countries was accompaniedby a similar polarizsation within them.The share of the wealthiest increased at the expenseof the poorest, and the pauperisation ofthe middle classes became a characteristic ofincome distribution in many countries.Source: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1997The <strong>report</strong> attributes these negative trendsto the rapid liberalisation of economies in amanner that favoured certain social classes, inthe advanced and developing countries alike.Capital was strengthened at the expense oflabour: the share of profits rose while the shareof labour dropped. Among wage earners, theshare of highly qualified groups and traders increasedat the expense of producers. And as aresult of speedy financial liberalisation, publicand private debt increased in the developingand developed countries, which led to higherreal interest rates than before. This is clearerin the developing countries in particular wherethe distribution of wealth is more concentratedand the tax burden on the poorer classes isgreater. The increase in public debt meant theredistribution of wealth in favour of thewealthy. There is growing evidence that slowergrowth and increasingly skewed distributionare becoming permanent features of the world.According to the <strong>report</strong>, a more worryingobservation, from the perspective of futuregrowth, is that the concentration of income andwealth in the hands of the few was not accompaniedby a rise in investment, which normallystimulates faster growth. Hence, in this pattern,the chances of combating unemploymentworldwide and alleviating poverty in developingcountries – let alone eradicating it – areslim.The <strong>report</strong> attributes this discrepancy betweenthe high incomes of the wealthy and lowinvestment rates mainly to the hasty liberalisationof finance worldwide and the absence ofwell-sequenced national policies for regulatingcapital accounts. This trend encouraged speculationand volatility in financial markets as unfetteredcapital flows chased quick profitsaround the world, imposing high interest ratesand breaking the relationship between financeand productive investment.The <strong>report</strong> presents a policy package fortransforming rising profits for the few intohigher rates of investment in a manner sufficientto support a "social contract that couldjustify the present increasing discrepancy, andreduce it in the end through raising people’s incomeand living standards."These policies include, at the level ofstates, providing more incentives for investingprofits in improving job-creating productioncapacity, increasing real wages, closing nonproductivechannels of wealth accumulation,restricting luxury spending, forging integrationbetween local growth factors – through capitalaccumulation and increased local technologycapacity – on the one hand, and gradual andcalculated integration into the world economy,on the other. In individual countries, thesepolicies need to be tailored to the level of <strong>development</strong>and the capacities of industries andinstitutional structures. They should be accompaniedby new and serious standards of equitableemployment and income and access ofthe poor to capital, services and other assets,which in many countries requires agrarian reform.At the global level, complementary policyaction is required from the stronger powers inthe world economy. These policies should aimto introduce checks and balances in globalisationto minimise its harmful side effects on developingcountry growth. Areas for attentioninclude trade liberalisation, which has beenslower in the case of goods where developingcountries enjoy a comparative advantage. Richcountries still protect their agricultural productsand impose restrictions on imports of textilesfrom poorer countries. Another priority isto remove selectivity in global labour markets:while most restrictions on the movement ofcapital and highly qualified individuals are diminishing,restrictions on the movement of unskilledworkers are becoming stricter.the potentiality of any Arab country separately.In the case of Arab countries, a major leapin knowledge acquisition requires more profoundand highly efficient forms of co-operationat the Arab level. There are severalreasons for this proposition:Naturally, co-operation among countriesto acquire knowledge contributes to the increaseof their capacity collectively. This advantageincreases if some of the countries havecommon characteristics, a common languageand common challenges, as in the Arab world.Among Arab countries, there are widevariations in R&D components, especially<strong>human</strong> and financial resources. Integrationwill help to ensure that research and <strong>development</strong>flourishes on a regional scale and will liftthe weaker Arab countries up as full partners.Current literature on knowledge emphasisesthat a strong synergy among the elementsof the knowledge system is a key prerequisite.However, as the first AHDR pointed out,components of the knowledge system at theregional and national levels in the Arab worldare not optimised in relation to one other. ATHE POLITICAL CONTEXT 159


BOX 8.6Trade and Development: Prebisch’s demands still standIt is a sign of troubled times when, in the search forsolutions to the most pressing policy challenges of theday, it is considered necessary to look to earlier generationsfor guidance: a Marshall Plan - this time to fightglobal poverty; a Tobin tax to check financial volatility;and a Keynesian spending package to combat deflationarydangers spring readily to mind. The sourceof the trouble is the gap between the rhetoric and thereality of a liberal international economic order.Nowhere is this gap more evident than in the internationaltrading system. Even as Governments extol thevirtues of free trade, they are only too willing to interveneto protect their domestic constituencies that feelthreatened by the cold winds of international competition.Such remnants of neo-mercantilist thinkinghave done much to unbalance the bargain struck duringthe Uruguay Round.Since the third session of the WTO MinisterialConference, held in Seattle, a renewed effort has beenmade to address the concern of developing countries,culminating in a different kind of bargain beingstruck at Doha. Developing countries, by agreeing toa comprehensive programme of work and negotiations,demonstrated their commitment to tacklingglobal political and economic threats; in return, theyexpect that <strong>development</strong> concerns will be central tothe negotiations. The challenge is now to translate anexpanded negotiating agenda into a genuine <strong>development</strong>agenda.One voice from the past stands out in the searchfor a more balanced trading system. In his statementto the first United Nations Conference on Trade andSource: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report, 2002.Development in March 1964, Raul Prebisch, then itsSecretary-General, called on the industrial countriesnot to underestimate the basic challenge facing developingcountries in the existing system:"We believe that developing countries must notbe forced to develop inwardly—which will happen ifthey are not helped to develop outwardly through anappropriate international policy. We also deem it undesirableto accept recommendations which tend tolower mass consumption in order to increase capitalization,either because of the lack of adequate foreignresources or because such resources are lost owing toadverse terms of trade."Prebisch understood that recommending "thefree play of market forces" between unequal tradingpartners would only punish poorer commodity exportersat the same time as it brought advantages tothe rich industrial core. His agenda to attack the persistenttrade imbalance and create the essential externalconditions for accelerating the rate of growthincluded new modalities of participation for developingcountries in the trading system which would guaranteeprice stabilization and improved market accessfor primary exports, allow greater policy space to developlocal industries and reduce barriers to their exports,establish more appropriate terms of accessionto the multilateral system and reduce the burden ofdebt servicing. Although the participation of developingcountries in the trading system has since gonethrough important changes, the minimum agenda putforward by Prebisch remains the basis for rebalancingthat system in support of <strong>development</strong>.collaborative Arab knowledge system at theregional and national levels would create newand more efficient synergies.Another factor is that political conditionsin the Arab region, notably the Israeli occupationof Palestinian territories and the situationin Iraq, necessitate a more profound degree ofArab co-operation, not only from the perspectiveof progress but also for the purpose of nationalsecurity.Political obstacles to knowledge acquisition by Arab countries may well be more severe thanthose raised by their socio-economic structures. Those structures were themselves judged more ofa hindrance to knowledge acquisition than any supposedly innate cultural traits. Thus, the factorsto be reckoned with in creating the Arab knowledge society become more significant as one movesfrom one societal context to the next. Bold thinking about the separation of politics from knowledgehas become crucial.Unquestionably, freedom requires substantial reinforcement. And good governance needs tobe established in order to ensure the sustained expansion and promotion of freedom. Arab co-operationhas to be renewed and scaled up in order for Arab countries to meet the world on moreequal ground and to knit the sinews of the region. Finally, this chapter emphasises that Arabs needto take a positive, yet vigilant, approach to globalisation as both a source of, and a constraint onknowledge acquisition.160 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


PART IISection four: a strategic vision- thefive pillars of the knowledge societyThe last chapter in this Report outlines a strategic vision built on five pillars ofthe future Arab knowledge society. Its chief goal is to frame a forward-lookingand action-oriented discussion on knowledge in Arab countries that takes intoaccount their particular features and circumstances and that leads to specificoperational proposals for the advancement of Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 161


CHAPTER 9A strategic vision: the five pillars of theknowledge societyThis final chapter continues the practiceadopted in the first AHDR (2002) of chartingmajor milestones towards a better future forArab countries built on <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.The chapter does not purport to offerready recipes for building <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>in each and every Arab society. Rather, it drawsfrom the preceding chapters a number of commondirections that Arab societies could considerto achieve that goal. The term "society" isused deliberately, rather than "country" or"state", in order to emphasise that the "society"concerned could be part of an Arab stateor a group of states or the entire Arab world.Building <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> calls for socialinnovation, a process that can only be ledand undertaken by the people of each Arab societythemselves, for themselves. The Reporttherefore stops at delineating the main featuresof what could be considered a strategic vision 1for the task of building <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.This vision needs to be taken up, nurtured anddebated by <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> advocateswithin Arab society, recognising and paying attentionto dissenting views. Where the vision isadopted, a consensus on priorities needs to beaccompanied by decisions for implementingthe strategic vision under the specific conditionsof that society. Indeed, this process constitutesthe first stage of social innovation. Itcan stimulate the emergence of a societal movementfor unleashing innovative <strong>human</strong> potentialand utilising this potential in building<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.The future map of the Arab world must bedrawn from within the region. No externallyderived construct can elicit the conviction andguarantee the support of the Arab peoples inthe long run. The present attempt by Arab intellectualsto articulate a strategic vision of theArab knowledge society is a contribution tosuch internal efforts to reshape the underpinningsof Arab <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE INARAB COUNTRIES AND THECONSEQUENCES OFPERPETUATING THE STATUS QUOKnowledge in Arab countries today appears tobe on the retreat. Ingrained structural impedimentsstand in the way of building the knowledgesociety in the region. Current political andsocial orientations diminish the role played byknowledge in Arab societies, as previous sectionsof this Report have indicated. Whileknowledge in the region stumbles, the developedworld is racing towards knowledge-intensivesocieties. This trend will further accentuatethe asymmetry of world knowledge <strong>development</strong>and endow a few countries with near-supremacyin knowledge production andconsumption. Based on their present performance,Arabs would remain in a marginal positionin this next phase of <strong>human</strong> history. Thisposition would be the logical consequence of adecline that has lasted for seven centuries,while much of the world made enormousprogress in developing knowledge and <strong>human</strong>welfare. Continuing with this historic slide is anuntenable course if the Arab people are to havea dignified, purposeful and productive existencein the third millennium.Without a strong and growing contemporaryknowledge base of their own, Arab countrieswill be absorbed into the internationalknowledge society as passive consumers ofother countries’ proprietary knowledge, technologyand services. Without mastery of thecapabilities that knowledge brings, they will re-Knowledge in Arabcountries todayappears to be on theretreat.Without a strong andgrowing knowledgebase of their own,Arab countries will bedrawn into theinternationalknowledge society aspassive consumers.1Which, by definition, does not rise to the level of a "strategy".A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 163


Regional unitythrough "a Free ArabCitizenship Zone" ...will help Arabs tobenefit fromopportunities createdby globalisation andto manage its risks.main incapable of establishing their own spaceand growth under the often one-sided and restrictivetrade, investment and intellectualproperty rights regimes of a world that is oldand new: old in terms of <strong>human</strong> struggle andnew in terms of its rules of engagement. Onthe other hand, Arab countries can avert thispassive fate by indigenising knowledge andtechnology and developing the necessary absorptive,adaptive and innovative capacitiesand structures, which offer them the opportunityto participate proactively in the vigorouslygrowing global knowledge society from a positionof dignity and strength.Yet individual Arab countries are unlikelyto go far in that direction on their own. StrongArab co-operation that approaches regionalunity through "a Free Arab Citizenship Zone"will not only bolster the negotiating powers ofArabs in the world arena and help reduce monopolisticpressures; it will help Arabs to benefitfrom opportunities created byglobalisation and to manage its risks.THE FIVE PILLARS OF THEKNOWLEDGE SOCIETYThe strategic vision outlined below rests onfive pillars, the building blocks of which werelaid down in the preceding chapters and insections of the first AHDR.BOX 9.1Mustafa Al-Barghouthi – The Road to the FutureThe Arab peoples and states are facing fatefulchallenges at a time of accelerating changeswhich do not wait for those who are slow orlax in defending their interests.It is quite clear that the dilemma of Arab<strong>development</strong> will not be solved without focusingfully on <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> – the <strong>development</strong>of the citizen and his/her role ineconomic, social and political life.This calls for the achievement of fourgoals, which are interdependent and indispensable.First, the formation of the political citizenand his/her participation through the diffusionand deepening of democratic values andpolitical participation, beginning with the ruleof law, independent judiciary, equality beforethe law, freedom of political action andthought, freedom of the press, political pluralityand free democratic elections. Add tothat the freedom of civil society institutionsfrom governmental control and the freedomto organize, innovate and develop in society atlarge. Political participation, from a <strong>development</strong>alpoint of view, means the freedom ofcitizens to take part in policy-making and contributeto the determination of economic andsocial decisions affecting them.The second goal is the comprehensive <strong>development</strong>of education, beginning with preschooleducation and going through highereducation. This will not be achieved withoutopening opportunities for learning to all segmentsand classes of society, whether throughcompulsory education or through the establishmentof national funds to provide loansfor university education in which studentsenjoy equal rights regardless of their economic,social and political backgrounds. Thisgoal cannot be fully achieved without the <strong>development</strong>of a plan to develop scientific researchcentres and encourage research.The third goal is quality health care forall. This does not mean flooding countrieswith private commercial hospitals and specializedcentres for the elite, but developing acomprehensive system of high-quality primaryhealth care, health insurance and socialsecurity, mother-and-child care, care for thepoor and people with special needs and fullconcentration on the principles of preventionand healthy life styles instead of wasting resourceson medical-biological approaches,which have proven their failure. This entailsbelieving in the simple rule that health is notsimply the treatment of illness, but the removalof its causes.The fourth goal consists in taking the initiativeand moving from being reactive toproactive in all walks of life. Democracy, participationand freedom are rarely given. Theyare most often wrested in the struggle of thosewho believe in them. This requires that citizenstake on the challenges of demandingtheir rights and calling for sound policies. Thesame applies to Arab countries in their internationalrelations. Nobody is going to securetheir interests for them unless they take theinitiative and work for these interests.Perhaps <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in the Arabworld will not be realized without solving thedilemma of effective participation by youthand women. Youth constitutes two-thirds ofthe Arab world's population. They are mostlydenied opportunities to participate and thefreedom to innovate and take the initiative.Most women are still marginalized. These twosegments of the society constitute a huge<strong>human</strong> reservoir.The Palestinian people are perhaps facingthe most vicious challenge in their struggleto end aggressive occupation and settlementand to win what all other peoples already have– freedom, genuine independence, sovereigntyand the right to their own territory,borders, destiny and future.A just peace and effective <strong>development</strong> inour region will not be realized unless thePalestinian people establish a real state withfull sovereignty and until the <strong>Palestine</strong> refugeeproblem is solved in accordance with UnitedNations resolutions. The idea of an independentstate cannot be transformed into anothertransitional stage in the form of autonomywithout borders or sovereignty. We havelearned from experience that avoiding real issues,such as ending the occupation and settlementand the issues of Jerusalem andrefugees is only a prescription for more sufferingin the future.While the Palestinian people are strugglingto build a national home, citizenship,and real democracy, they have succeeded - inthe midst of a ferocious struggle against occupation,and despite huge <strong>human</strong> sacrifices - inbuilding pioneering <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>models, which are copied in many countries.This is due to their positive creative spirit andtheir rejection of frustration and despair.The Palestinian struggle is not a conflictbetween two parties negotiating a differenceover percentages. It is the crucial issue of peoplewho seek to achieve what has beenachieved by all peoples on the face of theearth: freedom, independence, self-determinationand a dignified life in peace and security.This is the natural basis for <strong>human</strong><strong>development</strong> anywhere in the world.164 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


1. UNLEASHING ANDGUARANTEEING THE KEYFREEDOMS OF OPINION, SPEECHAND ASSEMBLY THROUGH GOODGOVERNANCERecent history shows that it is undoubtedlypossible to achieve significant scientific andtechnological advances under oppressiveregimes, particularly in natural and micro-sciences,and more particularly in the design andmanufacture of armaments through strongsupport and substantial funding by nationalauthorities. Enlightened dictatorships havealso hosted knowledge breakthroughs in technicalareas, such as economic production, as inthe case of South Korea in an earlier period.But in such cases knowledge gains rarely,if ever, extend into the <strong>human</strong> and social sciences,the arts or literature. Moreover, gainsfrom targeted knowledge production do notreach all segments of the societies concerned.In other words, knowledge does not permeatethe entire society and does not improve people’swelfare. An example of this in the Arabworld is Iraq; in the wider world, North Koreasuggests itself as another case.Moreover, such knowledge production isnot sustainable because society does not havethe capacity to continue to provide the necessaryresources so long as other elements of thesocial structure remain weak. The most instructiveexample in this regard is the formerSoviet Union, which collapsed because,among other reasons, it was unable to meetpeople’s basic requirements or to continue tofund its military industries.From the perspective of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>,scientific advances under oppression arerelated to the curtailment of social freedomsand choices, which runs counter to the veryconcept of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> itself.If Arabs aspire for advanced knowledge inall spheres of creativity and innovation, freedomis a must. If Arabs seek <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>through knowledge, freedom is the firstand all-defining step.Thus, freedom and knowledge are centralequations of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. Freedom ofopinion, speech and assembly are the key freedomsthat guarantee other forms of <strong>human</strong> liberty.A climate of freedom is an essentialprerequisite of the knowledge society. Thesefreedoms ensure the vitality of scientific research,technological <strong>development</strong>, and artisticand literary expression, all of which aremeans of producing knowledge. They cannotbe restricted or curtailed except under verylimited circumstances provided for by law,(that is, after the law is reformed to take intoaccount the provisions discussed below), andby the International Bill of Human Rights(IBHR).The true protection of key freedoms willinvolve ridding constitutions, laws and administrativeprocedures of every restraint on freedomsof opinion, speech and assembly; it willalso require a guarantee that legal provisionsand procedures comply with the IBHR. Inpressing these changes through, lawmakers,jurists and peoples’ representatives in Arabcountries should not hesitate to model theirlegislation on that of countries with august traditionsin the protection of freedoms 2 .There can be no guarantee of freedomswithout the stable rule of law as the only basisfor governing all <strong>human</strong> conduct. Moreover,the execution of the provisions of the law protectingfreedoms must be in the hands of anupright, efficient and genuinely independentjudiciary. It is also imperative to end the era ofadministrative control and the grip of securityagencies over the production and disseminationof knowledge 3 and the various forms ofcreative activity that are the foundations forthe knowledge society in Arab countries.The legislative, executive and judiciarypowers of the Arab world have a weighty responsibilityto guarantee freedom. But that responsibilitydoes not stop with them. Officialand unofficial religious circles have alsosought to muzzle freedom of opinion andspeech through censorship, banning and libel.It is necessary to recall here a host ofQura’anic injunctions that condemn thesepractices: "Let there be no compulsion in religion."(Al-Baqarah, 256), and "wilt thou thencompel mankind, against their will, to be-A climate of freedomis an essentialprerequisite of theknowledge society.There can be noguarantee of freedomswithout the stable ruleof law.2This may help them atone somewhat for the preoccupation of some with inventing laws and procedures limiting freedoms in previous eras.3Among the crudest forms of this restriction is the limitation of the freedom of researchers in collecting data through fieldwork, which stifles seriousscientific research and hobbles solid scholarship in the social sciences and <strong>human</strong>ities. Not less crude, though, is the banning of views and informationopposing the ruling regimes in the official mass media.A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 165


The hijacking ofscience by politics isone of the reasons forthe decline of theknowledge system inArab countries.The battlefield forfreedom is large. . It isthe theatre ofcourageous,groundbreaking andsometimes fiercesocietal engagementby intellectuals.BOX 9.2Judge Al-Djorjani (290-366 A.H.): The Dues of ScienceI would not have given scholarship itsdue, if, whenever a temptation presenteditself, I used scholarship for my own ends.If scholars preserve scholarship, scholarshipwill protect them. If they glorifyscholarship, it will become august. Butthey have abused scholarship and in sodoing they have debased themselves.They have smeared its face with greeduntil it frowned.lieve?" (Yunus, 99). Indeed, if creed is basedon free choice, it is only logical that freedom ofopinion and speech should not be forced. Inthat regard, it is helpful to remember"…"Invite [all] to the Way of thy Lord withwisdom and beautiful preaching; and arguewith them in ways that are best and most gracious."(An-Nahl, 125) and "Wert thou severeor harsh-hearted, they would have brokenaway from about thee…" (Al ‘Imran, 159).These texts provide the authority for amore tolerant and less narrow-minded view ofthe role of key <strong>human</strong> freedoms, as sanctionedby Revelation itself.Knowledge in itself is neutral. It can beused by those in power to serve the interests ofauthority or it can liberate the weak, the uneducatedand the deprived. Science, like art,needs enlightened patrons and champions toassure its independence. Those who carry outscientific research cannot afford its costs, yetscience cannot be left solely under state authority.For too long, political regimes havesought to control research and educational institutions,particularly those of higher education,and to manipulate scientists either byreward or intimidation. The hijacking of scienceby politics is indeed one of the reasonsfor the decline of the knowledge system inArab countries. It has opened the sector, itsprogramme and priorities to domestic and foreigninterference.This does not mean, however, that theArab knowledge system should turn in on itself,a move that would set back knowledge acquisition.It rather points to intensifying Araband international co-operation in knowledgeacquisition along disinterested scientific andintellectual principles. It also underlines theessential roles of non-governmental R&D organisationsat the national, regional and internationallevels and the importance ofpublic-private partnerships for the advancementof research and education.This Report has exposed the harsh, and severelypolarised, societal environment surroundingscience and scientists in the Arabworld. The difficult choice facing many scientistsand scholars in these countries is whetherto be "intellectuals", i.e., thinkers, adoptingscience and knowledge as a means of liberatingthe weak and advancing the nation; or tobe affiliated with the status quo, the rulingregime or even foreign interests in one degreeor another. Scientists and scholars who enlistin current power structures, in the region orabroad, enjoy significant financial and politicalbenefits. "Intellectuals" on the other hand,often lack recognition and remuneration andare frequently marginalised by the authorities4 .It is natural that those who opt to be dedicatedintellectuals and socially responsible scientistsare few, and that those who persevereon this path are even fewer. Yet the results ofthis quandary have cost Arab societies dearly.They have, in effect, caused these societies toforfeit the noble mission of science and knowledgeas a means of liberation and progress,and have thus brought about the decline of<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> in the region.In other words, society has a massive stakein guaranteeing intellectual freedom. The expansionof freedom in Arab countries begins,first and foremost, with a dedicated effort byits first beneficiaries, i.e., the intellectuals andthe producers of knowledge. So long as thesegroups are silent, complacent or indifferentabout their own scope, the cause of intellectualfreedom will lack credible advocates. Thebattlefield for freedom is large. It is the theatreof courageous, groundbreaking and sometimesfierce societal engagement by intellectualsand producers of knowledge. Individualactions matter, but an organised campaigncentred on avant-garde knowledge organisationsis likely to be more successful.Freedom, as a <strong>human</strong> entitlement, requiressocietal structures and processes that create itand protect it at the same time, while nurturingits growth and advancement. Those structuresand processes are epitomised in systemsof good governance and embodied in the con-4The choice is perhaps most difficult in the social sciences and the <strong>human</strong>ities, with their potential for manipulating minds and masking reality. Yetserious social science is a difficult profession and one that is unrewarded in backward societies. The true scholar in this field seeks to spread his/herideas for which there are no outlets save the mass media, which are often muted under heavy authoritarian control.166 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


certed efforts of the state, civil society and theprivate sector. Good governance is based onthe following tenets (First AHDR):• It protects freedom in a manner that ensuresthe expansion of people’s choices.• It is built on full representation of all thepeople.• It is fully institutional.• Its institutions function with efficiencyand complete transparency.• Its institutions are subject to effective accountability,under the division and balance ofpower, directly by the people at large throughperiodic, free and upright elections to parliamentaryrepresentation.• Just law, protecting freedom and rights,prevails equally over all.• A just, efficient, and totally independent judiciaryimplements the law.When all of these elements of good governanceare in place, freedom cannot perish, butif even one is absent, it remains at risk.Noticeably, the peaceful rotation of power isboth safeguarded and guaranteed by these underpinningtenets.Good governance guarantees the rationalityof decision-making, which in the first instanceserves <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. It alsoincreases the demand on knowledge by all socialsectors, which pushes the knowledge systemforward.Since Arab governance is quite far removedfrom the prescribed model, its characteras a prerequisite for freedom would seemto make the latter unfeasible, if not impossible.But a more appropriate reading of this link isthat neither good governance nor freedom willbe achieved without a long, hard and dedicatedstruggle. Yet history, demography andthe majority of Arab people are on the rightside of that struggle, and the opponents of thisgrowing movement would do well to weighthe consequences of further delaying themarch towards greater freedom in the region.2. DISSEMINATING HIGHQUALITY EDUCATION TARGETEDON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMESAND LIFE-LONG LEARNINGA Greek saying (Protagoras) underscores thatman is the measure in all things. Human <strong>development</strong>embodies this principle from beginningto end. Human beings are the creatorsand carriers of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> andknowledge is the capability that empowersthem to be both. Yet if knowledge is to be acquiredfor this purpose, Arab countries willhave to undertake deep and serious reform ofthe educational system. The following guidelinespoint to the chief priorities:Improving learning in early childhoodSeeds planted in early childhood will influencethe quality of knowledge that a society harvestsmore radically than any comp<strong>arab</strong>le investment,while encouraging the blossomingof new generations of intellectually open, activeand talented citizens.This objective can be achieved by extendingeducation to the early stages of childhoodand into Arab households. This entails broadeningeducational systems to focus on the cultivationof talents during the early years of life.It is crucial, however, to ensure that educationalsystems are not heavy-handed and donot place additional fetters on the growth of<strong>human</strong> talent at this critical stage, since child<strong>development</strong> depends on rich mental andemotional stimulation (first AHDR).Recourse should be made to the best internationalpractices and experiences in early childhoodlearning, in parental education and insound principles and techniques of pedagogicnurturing. Another thrust is to provide freshand stimulating educational materials for infantsand young children inside the family,using ICT, audio-visual media and other modernlearning tools.Universal basic education for all, extendedto grade ten at leastThis step begins with eliminating all forms ofdeprivation from basic education, notablythose suffered by weaker social categories:girls and the poor.Extending this approach will require creativesolutions leading to the <strong>development</strong> ofan alternative educational system that can producemore efficient and higher quality education,and at an appropriate cost. This is an areaopen to more research, as well as to more socialand financial investment, including thescrutiny and reallocation of public budgets.If knowledge is to beacquired for thispurpose, Arabcountries will have toundertake deep andserious reform of theeducational system.Seeds planted in earlychildhood willinfluence the qualityof knowledge that asociety harvests morethan any comp<strong>arab</strong>leinvestment.A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 167


High illiteracy ratesamong adult Arabs,especially women, areintolerable.The government’sresponsibility forhigher education doesnot require highereducation institutionsto be governmentowned.Creating an efficient system for life-longlearningAn institutional system for adult education(continuous education) that is highly flexibleand ever developing is required to achieve twogoals: to combat effectively all forms of illiteracy;and to furnish graduates of the educationalsystem with opportunities to enlargetheir knowledge, sharpen their skills and developthe new capabilities demanded by acompetitive and constantly changing employmentmarket.Women merit priority in adult learning,not least because among those many who sufferfrom illiteracy in the Arab world womenare the most affected. To speak of creating theknowledge society in the Arab world is to understandthat high illiteracy rates among adultArabs, especially women, are intolerable. A seriouscampaign to stamp out illiteracy in theregion within the next decade is a task for allArab countries and joint Arab organisations.This task will require solid planning, qualifiedand sufficient personnel and the necessary resourcesto establish effective adult educationschemes in every Arab country. With literacystandards falling in the regular educationalsystem, those graduating from that systemshould also be eligible for remedial coaching.Such an important project is a natural andproper sphere for joint Arab cooperation.Raising the quality of education at all levelsThe quality of education, a long neglectedpriority in Arab societies, is as important as theavailability of education in building the foundationsof knowledge. Improving quality willinvolve inculcating basic capacities for selfteachingand developing people’s cognitive,analytic and critical faculties, all of which spurcreativity and innovation. It implies a profoundreform of Arab educational systems,particularly education methods, which need tobecome more student-centred, through teamsand projects, and more self-evaluating in all dimensionsof learning.Quality assurance also requires adoptingindependent and periodical evaluation ofquality at all levels of education, particularlythrough comparisons among Arab countriesand with reference to developed countries aswell.Special attention to improving highereducationHigher education acquires special importancein building advanced knowledge and skills, especiallyin connection with R&D.Higher education institutions produce theknowledge workers in a society, notably itsR&D scientists, technologists and researchers.They can, if suitably endowed, also becomecentres of state-of-the-art research and knowledgeproduction themselves. Yet the presentstate of Arab higher education prevents itfrom contributing effectively to the creation ofa knowledge society.Four main complementary policies are urgentlyneeded for a serious reform of highereducation:1. Governance: The continued responsibilityof the state should be affirmed and recast suchthat higher education is liberated from thedomination of both government and the unregulatedprofit motive. The government’s responsibilityfor higher education does notrequire higher education institutions to begovernment owned. In several cases, independentboards with quadripartite representation(the state, business, civil society and academia)could govern higher education through public-privatepartnerships. The profit motiveshould be regulated to ensure that the publicinterest is served, and the creation of non-governmental,non-profit educational organisationsought to be encouraged vigorously.An independent Arab organisation for theaccreditation of higher education programmeswould be a major step in this direction. TheUNDP/RBAS project on quality assurance inArab higher education institutions, whose initialresults were summarised in Chapter 2,could serve as the nucleus of such an organisation.2. Restructuring: A versatile and flexible systemconsistent with rapid and ceaseless changein the market for knowledge and jobs shouldbe established in higher education. Such a systemshould turn out graduates who are capableof continuous self-teaching and of takingtheir full part in societal progress. Versatilityand flexibility are two characteristics that willenable the higher education system to respondto fast changing local and global needs.In order to achieve versatility, the basic168 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


programmes of higher education institutionsshould not be replicas of old courses. More attentionshould be paid to scientific fields andorganisational structures that promote knowledge.Such fields include natural sciences andtechnology <strong>development</strong>, which receive littleattention in the existing educational system.Higher education should provide individualswith learning opportunities for life.In view of the accelerated obsolescence oftechnical skills in the modern world, highereducation should provide recurrent educationto individuals. Collaboration with the state,private business and civil society holds the key.Versatility also means an emphasis on theproductive function of higher education institutions.This function can boost both the financialand research resources of theinstitution. Autonomous, multidisciplinary research-and-<strong>development</strong>centres should becreated, in active partnership with the state,business and civil society.Flexibility, on the individual level, meansthe freedom to drop out and return to varioushigher education institutions. On the institutionallevel, flexibility means that the structureof institutions and the content of the programmesthey offer are continually revised byreview boards to guarantee a quick responseto local and international <strong>development</strong>s. Asnoted, quadripartite representation in the governanceof higher education institutionswould be of great value in supporting this typeof flexibility.3. Expansion: A great gap still exists betweenArab countries and advanced nations in thespread of higher education. This means that,for developing countries, there is no realtrade-off between spending on higher or basiceducation. Both are sorely needed. Buildingthe knowledge society in the Arab world requiresthe expansion and reform of higher education.Two important considerations should governthe expansion of higher education: first, itis necessary to end discrimination againstweaker social groups, especially youngwomen. Next, account must be taken of thefailures of uncalculated expansion in existinginstitutions, which have led to a tremendousdrop in quality. Higher education institutions,old and new, should enjoy high quality, diversity,and flexibility, and should focus on thefields and institutional forms required for scientificand technological progress.4. Quality: A powerful shake-up to improvequality in Arab higher education is long overdue.Quality should be improved in presentinstitutions and no new institutions, public orprivate, should be created unless they can providebetter standards of quality. Independentaccreditation organisations should be enlistedto help ensure the quality of higher educationprogrammes.Rapid and committed implementation ofthe above would substantially raise the qualityand outcomes of Arab higher education.Other priorities that are central to such changeare: sufficient and sustained funding for qualityeducation and quality research; improvedaccess to knowledge for students throughICT; and enhanced remuneration for teachingand research staff. None of these measureswill however succeed without the overhauland <strong>development</strong> of curricula at all educationallevels, coupled with appropriate teachingmethods that develop critical thinking andcreativity.3. INDIGENISING SCIENCE,UNIVERSALISING RESEARCH ANDDEVELOPMENT (R&D) INSOCIETAL ACTIVITIES ANDKEEPING UP WITH THEINFORMATION AGEThe limited achievement of Arab countries inthe fields of science and technology is an outcomeof several factors: the illusion that importingtechnology as embodied in productsand services is equivalent to aquiring knowledge;policy neglect of basic research in the region,reflected in its under-estimation andunder-funding; rentier science and technologyimportation; the weakness of national knowledgesystems, and, on the regional level, insufficientArab co-operation. A seriousprogramme to confront the current crisis mustfollow a dual strategy: internal reform in everyArab country, on the one hand, and deepeningco-operation among Arab countries in R&Don the other.The process of adapting and localisingtechnology starts with leadership reflected in aFor developingcountries, there is noreal trade-off betweenspending on higher orbasic education.A powerful shake-upto improve quality inArab higher educationis long overdue.A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 169


Arab governmentsmust support ArabR&D centres andtechnical consultancyfirms so that they cangrow and offerservices comp<strong>arab</strong>leto those sought byArab countries fromfirms abroad.Most of what isproduced in the Arabworld is notcompetitive with whatinternational marketsoffer.cogent national science and technology policyto attract private investors and a supportivefiscal and regulatory regime to encourage enterprise<strong>development</strong>. It requires the expansionand sustained financing of local R&D intarget technology sectors and substantial publicand private investment in <strong>human</strong> resourcesand professional skills <strong>development</strong>, especiallyin mathematics, the sciences, ICT and management.It calls for technology managementpolicies for selecting, adapting, creating andcommercialising technologies in response tomarket signals and opportunities for competitiveness.It entails organisational changeswithin industries and firms to internalise innovations,raise value added and instill flexibility.Above all, local technology <strong>development</strong> requiresa closely networked national innovationsystem to tie key public, private and internationalactors together.Successful adaptation and localisationtakes place over a long period of maturation.Nevertheless, late-starters can benefit fromglobal technology by participating in globalproduction chains on the basis of competitiveedge. At the same time, they should focus onbuilding agile workforces and sustaining economic,social and technical innovation inorder to convert acquired products andprocesses into new, useful and marketabletechnologies that serve national and regional<strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>. Vision, creativity andrisk-taking are indispensable to that process.As part of this process, Arab governmentsmust support Arab R&D centres and technicalconsultancy firms so that they can grow andoffer services comp<strong>arab</strong>le to those sought byArab countries from firms abroad.Most of what is produced in the Arabworld is not competitive with what internationalmarkets offer, due to quality and costconsiderations. It is essential to accelerate thestandardisation of specifications and qualitycontrol in the region and to subject all Arabproducts to those standards.At the same time, the link between <strong>human</strong>power and educational institutions on the onehand, and <strong>human</strong> power and professional associationsin Arab countries on the other, ismuch weaker than the minimum required forthe efficiency of the R&D system. This requiresestablishing and strengthening all formsof pan-Arab connectivity in all fields of R&D<strong>development</strong>, utilising ICT formats and channelsfor fast communication.At the national level, the goal should be topull together scientific and research systems asa prerequisite for coming together at the regionallevel in order to benefit from collaborationand economies of integration and scale.To that end, countries need to develop longtermpolicies on scientific research, reprioritisingtheir budgets to increase funding for R&Dand creating triangular cooperation betweenR&D institutes, universities and industry.Central to such policies is the realisation thatvarious components feeding into R&D mustbe developed simultaneously. These componentsinclude educational systems and standards,basic and applied research institutions,ICT infrastructure, services and informationsystems, funding institutions, professional societies,consulting services, technical supportsystems and science education for studentsand the public at large.Policies to strengthen the weak articulationbetween these components of the knowledgesystem would help Arab countries toconsolidate their national knowledge basesand to sustain higher rates of growth andhigher rates of technology acquisition.Technological <strong>development</strong> in Arab countriesshould centre on technologies needed inthe region, and those where Arabs enjoy a degreeof competitive advantage. Technologiesrelated to oil and natural gas, their by-productsand to improving their environmental impactare one such group. ICT, renewableenergy technologies, such as solar energy andwind, and water desalination are others. Theestablishment of regional "centres of excellence"in R&D, with research focus areas selectedaccording to country-specific needs orcompetitive advantages, is a high priority. Thebenefits that could accrue from these orientationswould, of course, be maximised throughclose and effective Arab co-operation.The efficient implementation of these policydirections requires essential contributionsby the state in building the knowledge society.The basic functions of the state include prioritysetting, designing policies, enacting lawsand procedures, providing tax incentives, allocatingresources and facilities. The state can170 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


also initiate innovation: it could make a majorcontribution by instituting R&D as a fundamentalactivity in public, private, state andcivil society organisations and enterprises.Civil society and actors at the householdlevel can play an influential role in establishingand supporting an effective non-governmentalinstitutional structure to stimulate knowledgeefforts throughout society as a whole. A stepforward would be to modernise and energisethe traditions of zakat (alms giving) and wakfs(religious endowments) to build <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>.Some specific suggestions for public andprivate action, already tried with some success,include: creating national business councils toprovide a common interface with multinationalfirms and investors; financing R&D, eitherthrough grants to non-profitorganisations or through soft loans to profitseekingenterprises, payable only when theR&D activity increases business revenues; allocatinga percentage of business profits,whether public or private, to finance R&D activitieswithin the enterprise and/or in societyat large; outsourcing non-core processes infirms to reduce fixed costs that cannot be recoveredover short production cycles; andpromoting the start-up and operations of venturecapital firms and business incubators.Keeping abreast of the Information AgeThe Arab world needs to join the ICT revolutionmuch more decisively. Yet certain specialArab features call for a special model for ICT<strong>development</strong>. Perhaps the most important ofthese is the dimension of language, particularlyafter the spread of the Internet. Indeed,the Arabic language can become one of theconstitutive elements of an Arab informationbloc that could effectively meet the informationchallenge faced by Arab countries.The Arab world is facing the challenge ofICT at a time when it is also confronting anacute economic crisis, a situation requiringmaximum care in allocating and rationalisingthe use of resources. Required as well is astrong commitment to sharing information resourceson both the national and regional levels.At the national level, action to populariseICT as a tool for knowledge acquisition shouldfocus on (a) boosting literacy, especiallyBOX 9.3Lebanon: A Bright Future for Information and CommunicationTechnology?Lebanon is moving to make ICT a forcefor <strong>development</strong>. The Government hasmade steady efforts to improve local informationand communication technologyservices. Out of many programmes beingcarried out, two notable programmes becameoperational in 2001: the student informationsystem of the LebaneseUniversity and the wide area network(WAN). Both programmes aim at improvingservices offered to students and facultyby providing easy access to informationand the ability to perform administrativework electronically from anywhere. Otherprojects include a UNESCO-supportedprogramme to improve scientific and engineeringeducation through ICT and governmentinitiatives to apply ICT toe-government and the management ofstate activities.Considerable attention has beengiven to promoting the wider use of informationand communication technology atnational level, including rural areas andconnecting them to international organizations.Lebanon signed, for instance, anSource: Country <strong>report</strong> prepared for AHDR 2.among women; (b) lowering monopolistic barriersfor Internet providers and telecommunicationsdevelopers; (c) lowering other costsaffecting access to the Internet; (d) overcomingrestrictions on ICT access by gender, economiccapability, geographic location or socialconditions; (e) using ICT as a tool for life-longlearning.At the regional level, a strong pan-Arab informationpolicy could be founded on the followingstrategic principles:• Adopting a supra-sectoral approach, i.e.,policies that respond to the growing integrationof the information, media and telecommunicationssectors.• Adopting a cultural approach to the informationindustry while recognising the computerisationof the Arabic language is a basicspringboard for Arab ICT <strong>development</strong> andapplications.• Emphasising Arab information integration,especially the principle of sharing resourcesand data.• Giving priority to the utilisation of ICT inthe fields of education, training, and publichealth and building an infrastructure for theArab cultural industry.agreement in February 1999 to benefitfrom the Euro-MediterraneanInformation Society (EUMEDIS), whichis a regional programme financed by theEuropean Union. The programme seeksto narrow the information and technologicalgap in the region through the establishmentof pioneering regional projectsand networks. The areas of interest coverfive main sectors: education; electronictrade and economic cooperation; health;cultural heritage and tourism; and industryand innovation.A new Lebanese national and regionaltechnological centre commencedits operations in October 2001. It acts as afacilitating network for projects and anopen space for high technology companies.On the financing front, theInvestment Development Foundation hascompleted a feasibility study to evaluatethe best way to offer necessary facilitiesand incentives to direct foreign and localinvestments in the information and communicationtechnology sector.The Arab world needsto join the ICTrevolution much moredecisively.A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 171


Arab countries,therefore, have littlechoice but to pursuedeep reforms in theirsocial and economicstructures.A successful transitionto new patterns ofknowledge productionis contingent onestablishing all pillarsof the knowledgesociety.• Developing concrete regional action plansfor ICT <strong>development</strong>, with visible, high-levelgovernment, donor and private sector support.4. SHIFTING RAPIDLY TOWARDSKNOWLEDGE-BASED PRODUCTIONIn Arab countries, even in non-oil countries,the socio-economic structure is dominated bya rentier mode of production and behaviour.In this mode, economic value depends on depletingexhaustible natural resources.Moreover, contrary to popular impressions,most Arab countries and most Arabs are notrich. The first AHDR noted that all Arab GDPcombined does not exceed that of a singlemedium-sized European country such as theNetherlands or Spain.Furthermore, the distribution of economicreturns, whether from income or wealth, is notby any means motivated by merit or need;rather, it is often based on narrow loyalties andfavouritism. Such a value system does not encourageproductive work, let alone knowledgeproduction. Add to this the restrictions onfreedoms and the penalties for expressing independentopinion discussed previously, andthe formidable gauntlet that Arab knowledgeproduction must run becomes quite apparent.Arab countries, therefore, have littlechoice but to pursue deep reforms in their socialand economic structures in order to laybetter foundations for the knowledge society.The central goal will be to shift to a highervalue added structure of production.In economic terms, that shift would beginwith:• Moving quickly to the upstream or downstreamends of processing in the oil and naturalgas industry, which require higher skillsand generate more value-adding activities thanpresent turnkey operations.• Recognising that total reliance on non-renewableoil rents is a rapidly diminishingprospect, and thus investing state resources indiversifying economic structures and marketsand developing renewable resources throughknowledge and technological capabilities.This shift will require a stronger Arabpresence in the new economy where valueadded is higher and grows faster. As economicactivities grow, they create new knowledge as abasis for economic value, thus establishing adynamic virtuous cycle between knowledgeand growth.Such a transformation, in turn, calls for theintensification of R&D efforts and a sharpfocus on technology. Higher education institutionscan spearhead this technological shift, aswas the case with universities in Brazil andMalaysia, for instance. The state, the businesssector and higher education institutionsshould unite to build consultancy and technology-launchingcentres and to create an atmosphereconducive to knowledge productionthrough innovation. This large task ought tobecome a major ‘societal project’ in every Arabcountry.A successful transition to new patterns ofknowledge production is contingent on establishingall pillars of the knowledge society setout in this chapter.5. ESTABLISHING AN AUTHENTIC,BROADMINDED ANDENLIGHTENED ARAB GENERALKNOWLEDGE MODELEffective contribution to <strong>human</strong> knowledge isnot foreign to Arabs or to Arab civilisation, asseveral aspects of this Report have, hopefully,demonstrated. Nevertheless, regaining thiseroded capacity will mean consciously overcominglegacies from the era of decline thatstill cling on stubbornly today. The establishmentof an authentic, broadminded, and enlightenedArab general knowledge modelrequires essential reforms in the societal contextin Arab countries. These reforms aresummed up in the following five actions:Delivering pure religion from politicalexploitation and honouring ijtihad(scholarship)Pure religion is innocent of any negative dispositiontowards knowledge acquisition. TheArab scientific renaissance in the past is cleartestimony to that; in fact, at that time a strongsynergy developed between religion (Islam)and science as pointed out in Chapter 1.Nonetheless, what applies to pure religiondoes not necessarily apply to religious institutionsand religious interpretations. There hasbeen enlightened and regressive religious in-172 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


BOX 9.4Imams (religious leaders) advocate ijtihad (scholarship)Abu Hanifa: "This is the best I have seen;nonetheless, he who provides betterwould be accepted by me."Malik: "I am but a <strong>human</strong> being who botherrs and says correct things, so look intomy opinions."BOX 9.5terpretation, the latter increasing after thedoors closed on true scholarship.Over the 20 th century, religion, as an Arabinstitution, lost its institutional distinction andrelative independence. This happened withthe rise of modern, centralised states that grewand expanded at the expense of relatively independentcivil society institutions – a processthat ran from the mid-19 th century until themid-20 th century. These states then took largeleaps towards domination during the secondhalf of the 20 th century.With these last leaps, the modern centralstate became, and remains, virtually the onlysocietal organisation, pushing non-governmentalinstitutions into the margins of society.The state’s approach to these institutions hasvaried: some were simply abolished, as in thecase of the endowments, others were subjectedto control and close monitoring, as inthe case of NGOs. A third group was annexed,as in the case of universities.Thus, religious institutions became eitherstate-affiliated, as mosques managed by thestate over the past 20 years in particular, or annexedto the state, as was the case with Al-Azhar, religious institutes and Sufi groups.The state and its other agencies evolved as thesource "guiding" the outlook of religious institutionson social and political reality. In effect,that outlook then defined the standpoint fromwhich religious jurisprudence proceeded andaccording to which religious interpretationsare issued.This resulted in the ousting of religiousthought incompatible with, or actively opposedto state influence over pulpits. Yet it isprecisely such ousted religious thinking thathas had the greatest appeal to people, that hascome closest to their hearts and influencedtheir religious consciousness on the spiritual,intellectual and sometimes the political levels.Emphatically, the restoration of the independenceof religious institutions would reinstatetheir genuine role and strongly empowerreligion as the protector of the people’s interests.As stressed in the Report, pure religion(Islam) provides great incentives for knowledgeacquisition. It is the political, and evencommercial, exploitation of religion that havecontributed to weakening the quest for knowledgein Arab countries.This conclusion is not directed solely, assome may imagine, at certain fanatical politicalIslamic movements. It applies as well to someArab governments, societal forces and evencertain traditional religious institutions, whichhave used religious exegesis to secure their dominionor reproduce their hold on the Arabpeople. The essential point is that the exploitationof religion, for objectives far removedfrom its sublime purpose and soul, can nolonger be tolerated if Arab society is to free itselfto build a living knowledge society.In Arab countries where the political exploitationof religion has intensified, toughpunishment for original thinking, especiallywhen it opposes the prevailing powers, intimidatesand crushes scholars. Penalties canamount to accusations of heresy, a license tokill offenders or the separation of spouses.Small wonder, then, that scholarship shrinksin the repressive grip of religion pervertedfrom its true course.Another aspect of the dominant climate ofbelief that calls out for action is the culture ofmyths, widespread in Arab countries. It oftenleads to the publication of worthless booksand tabloid journalism, cloaked in religion yetIbn Hazm: "It is not permissible for anyoneto imitate a live or a dead person;everyone has the right to practise scholarshipas much as he can."Jalal Ed-Din As-Syouti: "A Response toThose Who Became Idle and Did NotRealise that Scholarship is, in Every Age,a Duty.” (Title of work)Al Kawakibi, (1884-1902), on the need for religious reformSource: The Character of Despotism, pp 97-98.All Orientals, be they Buddhists, Muslims,Christians, Jews or otherwise, urgentlyneed sages who are not swayed by thefoolishness of the stupid and the careless,nor by cruel, ignorant rulers. We needsages who revive the investigative study ofreligion, thus restoring the lost aspectsthereof, and refining it from any false impurities– which normally attach to anyold religion. Thus, each religion needs innovatorswho restore it to its pure, uncontaminatedorigins that can reinstate<strong>human</strong> will and <strong>human</strong> happiness; thoseorigins that mitigate the misery of despotismand slavery; those origins that provideinsight into correct methods ofeducation and learning, and that prepareits followers for the basics of good upbringingand stable morality – all of whichmakes people <strong>human</strong>, and with whichpeople become brothers and sisters.The exploitation ofreligion, for objectivesfar removed from itssublime purpose andsoul, can no longer betolerated.In Arab countries ...tough punishment fororiginal thinking,especially when itopposes the prevailingpowers, intimidatesand crushes scholars.A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 173


The best way toadvance the Arabiclanguage in general isthrough working toconstruct a simplifiedArabic standard.BOX 9.6Medicine is, perhaps, as many see it, themost difficult discipline to teach inArabic. Yet in 1919 the Arab MedicalInstitute was reopened in Damascus aftera committee passed a draft law comprising12 Articles, one of which provided thatteaching be conducted in Arabic.The Faculty of Medicine then produceda thesaurus of medical terms inArabic, consisting of 14,534 terms. Thisdictionary was critically reviewed by thePresident of the Arabic Academy, andprofessor of endocrinology at the Facultyof Medicine at the time. Recommendedamendments and additions were thencompiled in a large volume containing1,102 pages and published in 1983.Eventually, the Unified (Arabic) MedicalDictionary was compiled in co-operationwith the WHO regional office.During the period 1970-1991 thefar removed from it. Texts that prey on superstitionclose the minds and spirits of men andwomen who have been denied education –and even of some educated classes – to genuineunderstanding and knowledge.Teaching medicine in Arabic is possible!Faculty of Medicine, DamascusUniversity, graduated 1,442 specialists, allof whom had studied medicine, and pursuedgraduate studies, in Arabic.More than one Arab conference hasbeen held to consider teaching medicinein Arabic:• The Regional Convention for theArabisation of Medical Teaching in ArabCountries (Cairo, 17-20 June 1990). Outof this convention emerged The StandingCommittee for the Follow-up onArabisation in medicine.• The Conference on the Arabisation ofMedicine and Medical Sciences in theArab World (Bahrain, February 1993).The proceedings of these conferenceswere strongly in favour of teaching medicinein Arabic, without neglecting foreignlanguages, and recommended Arab cooperationin this regard.Source: The Conference on the Arabisation of Medicine and Medical Sciences in the Arab World (Bahrain, February 1993).Advancing the Arabic languageLanguage is the reservoir of knowledge ingeneral, and a people’s mother tongue is themain medium for their creativity and knowledgeproduction. Historically, the Arabic languagehas proved itself capable of expressingand addressing the deepest, finest, most complexand most nuanced aspects of knowledge.As this Report has emphasised, the majormovement of translation into Arabic wasclosely linked to, and motivated by, an eminentscientific school fully capable of producingknowledge.Such a language has the structures, flexibilityand potential to propel Arabs into theage of information and knowledge-intensityand to sustain their position there. Yet gravedangers beset the Arabic language today andthreaten to extinguish the great opportunity itrepresents for Arabs to build their own knowledgesocieties.Advancing the Arabic language entailsmoving on several fronts. The present discourseon the Arabic language has becomesterile. It should be succeeded by a more comprehensive,profound and discriminating perceptionof the Arabic language system,whether concerning its interdependent internalelements, or their strong relationship withother systems in society. Moving towards theknowledge society is an opportunity to speedup linguistic reform, taking advantage of new<strong>development</strong>s in linguistic science.The Arabisation of university education isa further priority, not for reasons of nationalismper se, but as a prerequisite for developingnative tools of thought, analysis and creativity.Arabisation of higher studies will also acceleratethe social assimilation of rapidly changingand advancing knowledge, a marked feature ofthe knowledge society. Moreover, so long asthe sciences are not taught in Arabic, it will bedifficult to build bridges between the variousdisciplines. But it is absolutely critical that effortsto Arabise knowledge proceed in tandemwith the improvement of foreign languageteaching in all fields of knowledge. Both avenuesof knowledge acquisition must be keptopen.Promoting Arabisation also requires a newoutlook on the mechanisms of word-construction;encouraging writing in Arabic in variousscientific fields; supporting machine translationand using information technologies tobuild terminology banks and to analyse theconceptual structure of Arabic words so thatforeign terms pass into Arabic with maximumfidelity to the concepts they contain.Perhaps the best way to advance theArabic language in general is through workingto construct a simplified Arabic standard.Some specific suggestions follow:• One proposal in this regard is to initiate acreative composition movement for youngchildren: a movement conducted byrenowned, capable writers able to tame, simplifyand modernise the language without sacrificingits inherent values. Success would givenew generations of Arab writers and readers avibrant medium for producing Arab workswith new vistas and inspiration.• Related to this, the inauguration of seriousresearch in Arabic language studies, preferablyon the pan-Arab level, is a key priority.Arabic linguists should participate with specialistsin other disciplines to:• Compile specialised, functional dictionariesand thesauruses. These could be espe-174 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


cially useful in the production of materialsfor children and educational curricula, inaddition to specialised scientific materials.• Cast scientific terminology in Arabic andcoin derived terms free from obscurities.• Conduct research to facilitate Arabicgrammatical rules and simplify their terminology.• Write general books on Arabic grammartranscending national curricula to presentmodels that show how to teach correct languagewithout excessive reliance on rules.• Facilitate the acquisition of correct Arabicvia various formal and non-formal learningchannels.• Encourage the computerisation of theArabic language.• Enrich the Arabic content of informationnetworks and websites.Renovating the Arab general knowledgemodel: the past as inspiration for thefutureAmong the ironies of the present Arab realityand the reasons for its knowledge deficitstoday is the fact that the creativity and thirstfor knowledge that produced ancient renaissanceshas not been allowed to live on in present-daysociety. Current tendencies do notspur Arabs to assume their place in the globalknowledge society or reclaim their best historicalinfluences. On the contrary, those influencesonly surface briefly in ceremonies andcelebrations, reflecting empty pageantry, andare either quickly forgotten or relegated tomuseums and the pantheon of memory.A resolute and concerted effort is requiredto revive, in a forward-looking manner,sources of illumination in the Arab knowledgeheritage, and to encourage those sources to irradiatethe Arab general knowledge model,particularly through the mass media and institutionsof modern education. This effort hasnothing to do with nostalgia. Rather, it is aboutstimulating the genuine comprehension andre-assimilation of those cultural values, mindsetsand intellectual currents that can nurture amodern Arab knowledge renaissance.BOX 9.7Christians love to read the poems and romancesof the Arabs; they study Arab theologiansand philosophers, not to refutethem but to form a correct and elegantArabic. Where is the layman who nowreads the Latin commentaries on the HolyScriptures, or who studies the Gospels,prophets or apostles?Alas! All talented young ChristiansSource: (Menocal, 2002, 66).Paul Alvarus 5 : Mother TonguesEnriching, supporting and celebratingcultural diversity in the regionFrom the perspective of the International Billof Human Rights (IBHR), a respected perspectivein itself, minorities enjoy inalienablerights that protect their cultural and religiousspecificity. In addition, the IBHR had becomeinsep<strong>arab</strong>le from the legal structure of themany Arab states that have ratified the internationalconventions and charters concerned,which makes its provisions binding.However, above and beyond safeguardingrights – a supreme <strong>human</strong> end –cultural diversityoffers any society incomp<strong>arab</strong>le advantageswhen it comes to building knowledge."A single flower does not a garden make, nordoes a single bird bring spring." Beauty andbounty are the result of diversity. Cross-fertilisationgives birth to strong offspring, whetherin nature or in knowledge.Each Arab country represents an extraordinarycultural and knowledge mix that,through cross-fertilisation among ethnic, religiousand social groups, could contribute tothe enrichment of Arab societies across the region.An Arab Free Citizenship Area encouragingthe interaction of all symbolic structures,ideas and their <strong>human</strong> carriers in the Arabworld would realise dividends even larger thanthose ensuing from the integration of commoditiesand capital. Entrance to the worldknowledge society from this strengthenedbase would substantially enhance both whatArabs can contribute to, and what they can acquirefrom the new age.read and study with enthusiasm the Arabbooks; they gather immense libraries atgreat expense; they despise Christian literatureas unworthy of attention. They haveforgotten their own language. For everyone who can write a letter in Latin to afriend, there are a thousand who can expressthemselves in Arabic with elegance.A resolute andconcerted effort isrequired to revive, in aforward-lookingmanner, sources ofillumination in theArab knowledgeheritage.5Respected Christian luminary of Cordoba in the mid-9th century. Quote is from his famous polemical work, The Unmistakable Sign (Menocal. 2002,66-67).A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 175


No civilisation inhistory has everflourished withoutinteracting creativelywith other centres of<strong>human</strong> advancement,past or contemporary.The Arab world needsto regain its historicalprowess intranslation.Opening up to other culturesNo civilisation in history has ever flourishedwithout interacting creatively with other centresof <strong>human</strong> advancement, past or contemporary.The Arab-Islamic culture at its zenith wasa role model for borrowing and assimilation,followed by generous giving when it establishedits distinguished knowledge edifice.What is known nowadays as "Western"knowledge is itself an accumulation of <strong>human</strong>contributions throughout history, to which theArab world contributed when the Arab-Islamic civilisation flourished, and afterwardsthrough the Library of Alexandria. As worldcitizens, as contributors to the global stock ofknowledge and as seekers of new knowledge,the Arab peoples can, and should, embrace allopportunities to understand and relate toother cultures in the West and in the developingworld.Translation into Arabic and otherlanguagesBOX 9.8Ibn Rushd (Averroes), (1126-1198 AD):The Need to Learn fromthe Efforts of Previous NationsIf we find that the nations which precededus had a vision and consideration for existingthings, depending on the requirementsof proof, we must look into whatthey said on that and what they wrote intheir books. Anything of what they said,which complied with the truth, we wouldtake, feel happy with and thank them for.Source: (Ibn Rushd, 1999, P.93.).What did not comply with the truth, weshould point to, warn against and giveprevious nations an excuse for (learnedpeople are legally excused if they makemistakes)… Thus, we find that we arelegally bound to look into the books ofprevious nations.Translation is a wide bridge for transferringand localising knowledge. As argued elsewhere,the Arabisation of learning and a returnto a vigorous movement centred ontranslating works from other languages holdthe keys to rapid knowledge acquisition andassimilation. This movement is also linked toindigenising science and technology and rebuildingArab R&D. The Arab world needs toregain its historical prowess in translation aspart of opening itself to new cultures and as aprerequisite for building the knowledge society.Translation from Arabic is a differentissue; it is currently limited to a few literaryworks and essentially depends on personalconnections and chance. Important translationsfrom Arabic await a critical mass of qualityknowledge production by Arabs, as was thecase historically in Andalusia.In advancing cultural interaction, Arabsliving abroad and the citizens of other countriesof Arab origin – many of whom are highlyqualified – can be indispensable connectorsbetween the Arab world and other societies.Expatriate Arabs often benefit from relativelyfree societies and enjoy better access to knowledgeand ideas than their counterparts in theregion. They can be among the outriders of anetworked Arab knowledge renaissance. ButArab countries must undertake to support theArab Diaspora consciously through explicitchannels. This can take various forms: establishingup-to-date, computerised rosters of expatriateArabs; creating attractive, regularmeans of communication through the use ofICT; and providing facilities for Arab expatriatesto visit and work in all Arab countries, aswell as supporting Arab culture in countriesthat host Arab emigrants.Arab countries can also establish knowhowtransfer programmes that allow expatriateArabs to undertake short, intensiveconsultancies and business advisory services.Models for such programmes exist in the workof UNDP and other international organisations.Arab countries can also sponsor ICT virtualnetworks among expatriate Arabs andthose desiring to benefit from their knowledgeand expertise in Arab countries. The fosteringof organisations specifically designed to bringexpatriate Arabs together will institutionalisetwo-way ties between emigrants and theircountries of origin.An intelligent way to benefit from non -Arab civikisationsThis Report has adopted a wide definition ofknowledge as the arterial system that connectsall <strong>human</strong> actions and symbolic structures in<strong>human</strong> cultures. It has therefore not limitedknowledge to scientific production alone buttaken a broader view encompassing all the sciences,arts, literature and even values, habitsand customs in both formal and folk culture.Civilisational cross-fertilisation is a sureway to enrich knowledge on both sides of theexchange. Yet Arabs today seem content toaccept a passive, one-way relationship with176 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


just one external point of reference and to remainon the receiving end of cultural flowsfrom the West. This is the very antithesis ofhealthy cross-fertilisation because it leads tothe adoption of a poor copy of the other culture.Relations between Arabs and the West, especiallyafter September 11, have come underintense strain. As noted in this Report, Arabs,Muslims and Islam have since been subjectedto defamation and misrepresentation, a reflectionin many instances of ignorance and insome cases an expression of unjustified abuse.While this appears to be growing intomore than a difference of opinion, Arabsshould not close up to the outside world.From the standpoint of cross-fertilisation andknowledge, American society represents amore enduring source of ideas, cultural resourcesand values than any single political administration,which is bound to changethrough democratic processes. Differences atthe political level, no matter how intense,should not be allowed to eclipse this all-importantfact and to shut the door on culturaldialogue.The West includes, but is more than theUS. Europe represents a pole of values, knowledgeand culture that has geographic (theMediterranean) and historical and cultural ties(especially through Spain) with the Arabs,which need to be invested in for the good ofboth parties. Cultural, and especially scientificand technological transfers and exchanges, aspart of these relations, will further the establishmentof the knowledge society in Arabcountries.Arabs need to open up to all cultures, notsolely the West. The experiences of the Asiancircle and other non-Arab neighbours offerimportant opportunities for interaction basedon a deep common understanding and mutualrespect.Taking full advantage of what regional andinternational organisations offer andparticipating in global governanceBOX 9.9Al-Kindi, (175-260 AH): Appreciating the truth regardless of thesource"We must not shy away from appreciatingthe truth and adopting it regardless of itssource, even if it came from people whoare far away from us and different fromRegional and international organisations canplay an important role in cultural cross-fertilisationbetween Arabs and other civilisations.Yet Arab countries, as a group and individually,do not benefit from such organisations effectively,or make optimal use of their servicesor play a significant role in their governance.Moreover, the structure of such organisations,where performance has deteriorated in aunipolar world, has reduced the benefits todeveloping countries of the noble goals ofthese institutions. To the extent that developingcountries, including Arab countries, letdisunity and division undermine their representationin international organisations, includingthe UN, their structures and serviceswill continue to be dominated by other blocsand power interests. Arab countries need toenergise their financial, political and technicalcontributions to regional and international activities,and thus develop a stronger internationalimage while reaping the benefits ofcloser co-operation and unity through suchbodies. This is especially important with respectto those organisations that can contributeto building the knowledge society inthe Arab world.The international architecture of globalgovernance is often weighted preponderantlyin favour of the interests of the rich and powerfulnations. Without changes that tip thebalance of these structures more towards theneeds and aspirations of developing countries,including Arab countries, globalisation cannotbecome a locomotive of <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong>or a force for the spread of knowledge in theworld.So long as Arabs remain divided amongthemselves and in disarray, they will not beable to contribute effectively to the rebalanc-us. There is no greater reason to seek thetruth than truth itself. One should not belittlethe truth or belittle the person whosaid it or conveyed it."Source: Ibn Rushd ( Averroes ), “The Final Say on the Determination of the Relationship between Islamic Law andWisdom” (quoted in Abed Al-Jaberi, 1999).BOX 9.10Ibn Miskawieh, (325-421 AH): On lauding cultural crossfertilisation"I have selected this title for the book,Gawidan Khurd (Eternal Wisdom, inPersian), to tell the reader that the mindsof all nations are essentially but one. Theydo not differ from one another from countryto country; they do not change withtime, and they do not grow old and fragile."Source: Ibn Miskawieh, Gawidan Khurd (Eternal Wisdom)¸ p.147 b, in Frantz Rosenthal’s: Methods of Muslim Scientistsin Scientific Research, in Arabic, Dar Ath-Thaqafa, Beirut, 1980.Arabs need to openup to all cultures, notsolely the West.Arab countries needto energise theirfinancial, political andtechnicalcontributions toregional andinternationalactivities.A STRATEGIC VISION: THE FIVE PILLARS OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 177


Knowledge lights thelamps that point outthe way on the Arabjourney to the future.ing of systems of global governance and thusnudge these systems into playing their role infacilitating the creation of knowledge societies.Indeed, the present situation can onlyleave Arabs on the receiving end of an internationalorder that is frequently inequitable andunresponsive to their own objectives in freedomand knowledge.Building a knowledge society across theArab world is the only way to lead the regioninto a renaissance that can change its presentcourse and help all Arab countries to positionthemselves on a new and much more hopefulcurve of <strong>development</strong> in the region and contributeto a new world for <strong>human</strong>ity at large.This will require the reengineering of Arab cooperation,and wide restructuring in Arabcountries, basing both on full public participation,a key element that has been missing sofar. Lack of voice and representation in regionalinitiatives has greatly reduced the effectivenessand sustainability of joint Arab action.Bold restructuring by Arab leaders and institutionsneeds to be supported by sustained,well-designed and efficiently implementedprogrammes of action for establishing theknowledge society, following the guidelinessuggested in this chapter. Committed Arab cooperationcan create a Free Arab CitizenshipZone open to all people of the region and areal opportunity for Arabs to participate inglobalisation from a position of dignity andstrength.Knowledge lights the lamps that point outthe way on the Arab journey to the future.Nothing in religion, culture and history blocksthose beacons. On the contrary, Arab heritagedeclares that knowledge must shine throughall the endeavours of <strong>human</strong>kind. What hasblotted out that light is the work of mortals:the defective structures – political, social andeconomic - that have hidden knowledge fromthe Arab people and eclipsed its full possibilities.Yet what <strong>human</strong> beings have wrought<strong>human</strong> beings can remove, and must, so thatthe flame of Arab learning can once againburn bright and long in this new Millenniumof Knowledge.178 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


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Annex 1: List of background papersAnnex 1: List of Background Papers(Author name, paper title, number of pages)IN ARABIC:Al-Taher Labib, Scientific Production in theHumanities and Social Sciences, 14Baqer Alnajjar, the Impact of theContemporary Social and EconomicFormation on Innovation, 7Taoufik Jebali, Artistic Production andInnovation: Theatre, 6Hayder Ibrahim Ali, The System of Incentivesand Innovation in the Arab World, 5Khalida Said, The Arabic Language andKnowledge Acquisition, 26Dina El Khawaga, Governing and the Legaland Procedural Context for the Productionand Acquisition of Knowledge, 39Roshdi Rashed, The Arab World and theInternalization of Science, 23Rukia El Mossadeq, Towards a PoliticalGovernment in the Service of the KnowledgeSociety, 13Sa'adallah Agha Al Kala'a, Artistic Productionand Innovation, Music, 21Sami Al Banna, The Conceptual Framework,54Siham A. Al-Sawaigh, the System ofUpbringing (Education) and its Relationshipwith Knowledge Acquisition in ArabSocieties, 26Shawki Galal, Transfer of Knowledge andTranslation in the Arab World, 29Tarek Al-Bishry, Observations (Comments)on Religion and Knowledge, 8Taher Hamdi Kanaan, Entrepreneurship andArab Economic Development, 12, ( translated)Atif Kubursi, The Necessary Conditions forthe Transition to a Knowledge Based Society,14 (translated)Abd El Hameed Hawwas, Popular Cultureand Knowledge Acquisition, 15Aziz Al-Azmeh, Arab Intellectual Heritage, 22Aziz Al-Azmeh, The General IntellectualPattern (Paradigm) in the Arab Countries, theArab Mind, 6Imad Moustapha, The OrganizationalContext for Acquiring Knowledge: Transfer,Administration and Internalization ofTechnology, 22Amr Najeeb Armanazi, Scientific Productionin Natural Sciences and TechnologicalDevelopment, 40Fadle M. Naqib, Knowledge and Economicgrowth, 12Fowziyah Abdullah Abu-Khalid, Poetry in theArab World, 17186 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Clovis Maksoud, Introduction to the ArabHuman Development Report <strong>2003</strong>, 19Laila Abdel Majid, Information Media in theArab States and the Transfer of Knowledge,57Atif Kubursi, The Necessary Conditionsfor the Transition to a Knowledge BasedSociety, 14Atif Kubursi, The Socio-economic Context ofArab Society and Economy, 23Mari Rose Zalzal, Freedom and Knowledgebetween Ordinary and Condensed Time, 14Mohamed Al-Mili, Cultural Diversity andAcculturation, 18Mohammed Berrada, Literary Production andInnovation: The Short Story and Novel, 6Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin, Religion andKnowledge Acquisition, 8Mohamed Mahmoud El-Imam, Demand forKnowledge, 51Mohammad Malas, Artistic Production andInnovation: Cinema, 12Muna Al-Khalidi, Health and Environment inthe Arab World, 7Munir Bashshur, Contemporary EducationSystems in the Arab Countries: TheirContribution to Knowledge Acquisition, 38Nabil Ali, Arabic Language and theKnowledge Society, 16Hichem Djait, Knowledge in the Arab World:The Problem of the Intellectual Heritage, 13IN ENGLISH:Inglehart R., Arab Development: the WorldValues Survey, 10A. B. Zahlan, The Arab Brain Drain and thePromotion of a Knowledge Based Society, 53Taher H. Kanaan, Entrepreneurship and ArabEconomic Development, 8ANNEX 1: LIST OF BACKGROUND PAPERS 187


Annex 2: Designing a questionnaire to samplethe opinions of faculty members in highereducation institutions.A questionnaire was designed to explore theopinions of small samples of Arab intellectualsof different ages and both sexes about incentivesand obstacles to innovation in the Arabcountries and the extent to which knowledgeproduction and societal institutions in the areain question contribute to the promotion ofknowledge acquisition. The survey was conductedunder the auspices of UNDP offices inthe Arab countries which host them. The surveyalso sought to explore the opinions of 96Arab intellectuals active in public life chosen,for convenience, from members of faculties atthe universities in each country. (To ensurefair representation, it was stipulated that 48cases would be surveyed from the biggest andoldest universities, and 48 from the small andrecently established universities.) It was alsodecided that the sample would be distributedaccording to three criteria: sex, academic specializationand academic level as follows: halfrepresenting the <strong>human</strong>ities and social sciences,and the second half other sciences. Halfmen and half women. One quarter from eachof the following four academic levels:Assistants - tutors - teachers- primary academiclevel, associate professors - the middleacademic level and professors - the highestacademic level. Hence, the intersection of thefour criteria would be represented in 32 cells,for which it was suggested that the samplecover three items in each one.Given that the survey addressed a sampleof highly qualified academics, it was not expectedthat problems which other field surveysusually encounter in the Arab countrieswould arise since the respondents were wellable to respond the questionnaire by themselves.As such it was assumed that the wholeprocess would be limited to sample selection,sending the questionnaires to the chosen intellectualsand ensuring the retrieval of completedforms. However, the <strong>report</strong> team onlysucceeded in obtaining the results of the surveysfrom 15 out of 22 Arab countries. Onlythree Arab countries ( Tunisia, Algeria, andMorocco) succeeded in completing the survey,while the results from the other four countrieswhich responded to the questionnaire fellshort of the survey goal: twenty responsesfrom Bahrain, Lebanon, and Sudan, and 39from Egypt only.188 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Elements of opinion survey of Arab intellectualsArab Human Development Report <strong>2003</strong>Building a Knowledge Society in Arab CountriesCountry: ............................................General guidelines----------------------Please circle the right answer when there is more than one option. Please answer briefly, write clearly, and put thenumbers in the defined boxes.Name (optional).......................... age: ............ year sex: male femaleHighest degree: Bachelor Master PhD Scientific Branch: .......................... Specialization:................Rank in the academic profession: faculty assistant ( tutor, assistant teacher ) First level for faculty (Teacher)Intermediate Level (associate professor) Highest Level (Professor)What is the extent of your satisfaction with the state of knowledge acquisition in your country( 1%- 100% ) ....%What is your evaluation of the extent to which knowledge acquisition serves economic <strong>development</strong> in yourcountry (1% - 100 ) ................%What is in your opinion the most important obstacle to innovation in your country? ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................Other comments about knowledge acquisition in your country ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Other comments about knowledge acquisition in the Arab countries ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................Please evaluate the fields which are embodied in the columns against the nine criteria given in the rows:Field: (these were the knowledge acquisition/diffusion/production areas selected for the survey).Criteria: (in each case, concrete criteria illustrative of the field in question were indicatedto guide respondents.)The extent of sufficiency of the right to knowledge in society (1%- 100%)..... ..... .......The extent of sufficiency of the incentive system for knowledge acquisition in society (1% - 100%) ... ... ...The extent to which the field serves <strong>human</strong> <strong>development</strong> (1% - 100%) .... .... ..... ....The extent to which cultural diversity in the society is reflected in the field (1% - 100%) .... .... ....The extent to which the field keeps pace with the global state of the art in knowledge (1%-100% ) .... ...... ..The extent of improvement in the field over the last ten years (1% - 100% ) ..... ...... ....How do you compare the situation in the Arab countries in this field with that in India*?China?East Asian Tigers?* 1% to 100% or more than 100% if you think the situation in your country is better. You can put the sign" - " to denote " don't know"ANNEX 2: DESIGNING A QUESTIONNAIRE 189


Statistical Tables on Knowledgein Arab CountriesTable A-1Table A-2Table A-3Table A-4Table A-5Table A-6Table A-7Table A-8Table A-9Table A-10Table A-11Table A-12Table A-13Net enrolment ratios (%) in pre-primary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Net enrolment ratios (%) in primary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Net enrolment ratios (%) in secondary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Gross enrolment ratios (%) in tertiary education by gender,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Pupils per teacher ratio by education level,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNI,Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Relative distribution of tertiary education students (%) by levels ofhigher education, Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Percentage of females among tertiary education students (%) by levels ofhigher education, Arab and comparator countries, 1999/2000Mean years of schooling (25 years or older) by gender,Arab countries and three Asian tigers, 1960-2000Values of indicators on knowledge capital in 109 countries,around the year 2000Reported and imputed values of indicators on knowledge capital in 109 countries,around the year 2000Ranking of 109 countries on knowledge capital indicators,around the year 2000 (sorted by total ranks)Values of knowledge outcomes and other <strong>development</strong> indicators in 109 countries,around the year 2000STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 191


Table A-1NET ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000Country Males Females TotalArab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen2.7836.891.790.3210.545.7429.2166.0364.9259.064.5434.5225.475.318.9011.8860.770.932.7635.521.760.4010.005.7326.8335.4863.6234.213.9632.4524.844.808.0315.7160.820.762.7736.221.780.3610.285.7428.0565.7564.2846.874.2533.5125.165.068.4713.7360.790.85Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).75.8944.7376.0744.7175.9744.73Table A-2NET ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN PRIMARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000Country Males Females TotalArab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen98.7992.5659.5834.8594.96100.0093.2368.1270.8263.0478.9765.6098.9194.7660.0248.6095.8899.1577.9475.8495.5995.4849.8726.2989.5585.6693.9364.5671.0859.3769.8164.5799.3895.7555.7840.7588.8597.1478.5644.8297.2393.9854.7830.5992.3293.0693.5766.3770.9561.2174.4865.0999.1495.2457.9544.7492.4398.1778.2460.71Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea91.80100.0096.71* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).94.67100.0097.9193.16100.0097.27192 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Table A-3NET ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN SECONDARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000Country Males Females TotalArab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen57.2676.9381.2939.6173.4049.2367.2132.7458.3274.6574.5539.2165.8663.3852.0859.8386.6376.6526.0478.4650.2373.3427.0458.7779.2781.6435.9269.9572.1421.0758.5281.6479.0332.9975.8749.7270.2429.9458.5476.9078.0137.5967.8667.4636.98Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea87.3594.4688.8694.2488.0894.35* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).Table A-4GROSS ENROLMENT RATIOS (%) IN TERTIARY EDUCATION BY GENDER,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000Country Males Females TotalArab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen19.601.260.3917.4626.7613.0135.2251.7410.5926.9613.6819.597.1419.5816.6531.130.920.339.4930.6329.9838.1550.588.0424.8946.1625.356.5619.004.5814.9825.201.090.3639.0013.5728.6221.0836.6751.175.609.3425.9527.6622.446.856.0919.3012.1010.77Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea41.7590.2859.3851.977.4550.3071.69* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 193


Table A-5PUPILS PER TEACHER RATIO BY EDUCATION LEVEL,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000CountryArab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemenPre-primaryeducation26.8720.9725.9335.6724.0014.8221.8815.7014.388.3618.2519.1922.0229.0510.4829.8223.5420.4118.6216.55Primaryeducation28.4017.8134.7731.9722.9821.3913.7818.698.4444.9928.7625.0831.0713.1211.9926.7222.9123.2116.5729.84Secondaryeducation18.0614.2710.9721.4116.9519.7411.0111.817.0826.7916.9717.9331.6110.1612.7323.0414.6719.1412.8114.11Comparator countriesChina26.66IndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea23.82* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).19.7843.0013.3932.2317.1110.3722.13Table A-6PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNI,ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000Country 1999/2000Arab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen3.663.503.404.055.091.924.525.199.273.537.82Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea2.122.887.613.80* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).194 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


Table A-7RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION STUDENTS (%) BY LEVELS OFHIGHER EDUCATION, ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000CountryLower than firstuniversity degreeFirstuniversity degreeHigherdegreesArab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen94.4864.2931.0594.9278.8398.3488.8364.9492.7692.7692.8083.42100.0085.075.5235.7168.954.4020.890.0010.4732.562.067.244.6710.840.0014.920.000.000.000.680.281.660.702.505.190.002.535.740.000.01Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea51.7777.7558.6947.4919.6540.290.732.601.02* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).Table A-8PERCENTAGE OF FEMALES AMONG TERTIARY EDUCATION STUDENTS (%) BY LEVELS OFHIGHER EDUCATION, ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000CountryLower than firstuniversity degreeFirst universitydegreeHigherdegreesPercentage offemales in highereducationArab countriesAlgeriaBahrainComorosDjiboutiEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitLebanonLibyaMauritaniaMoroccoOman<strong>Palestine</strong>QatarSaudi ArabiaSomaliaSudanSyriaTunisiaUAEYemen33.7723.7347.1167.9653.3550.5943.1345.9655.6449.2822.0756.4757.2567.9839.2245.2333.0553.6994.7840.1313.2624.6253.6432.3941.9831.1220.0036.6649.286.2560.0141.8846.8434.0551.4167.6651.7248.6242.3046.5271.8555.9347.2048.2920.75Comparator countriesChinaIndiaIsraelRepublic of Korea58.1235.1054.8835.5722.1051.1123.8357.3035.18* Data in shaded cells refer to the year 1998/99.Source: UNESCO <strong>2003</strong>. UNESCO web site (www.unesco.org).STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 195


Table A-9RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TERTIARY EDUCATION STUDENTS (%) BY LEVELS OFHIGHER EDUCATION, ARAB* AND COMPARATOR COUNTRIES, 1999/2000Gender Country/Region 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000MALESAverageFEMALESAverageTOTALAverageAlgeriaBahrainEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitSudanSyriaTunisiaHong KongKoreaTaiwanArab countriesHong Kong, Korea and TaiwanAlgeriaBahrainEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitSudanSyriaTunisiaHong KongKoreaTaiwanArab countriesHong Kong, Korea and TaiwanAlgeriaBahrainEgyptIraqJordanKuwaitSudanSyriaTunisiaHong KongKoreaTaiwanArab countriesHong Kong, Korea and Taiwan1.191.730.000.352.112.260.541.620.946.654.584.640.564.800.760.890.000.080.651.420.040.350.132.832.041.840.192.060.971.370.000.211.402.590.290.990.544.743.233.320.383.400.501.860.300.642.582.340.582.131.136.785.815.230.675.720.790.940.000.160.791.340.040.550.263.103.162.190.222.900.651.420.000.401.702.410.311.340.714.904.433.800.394.301.532.371.161.193.363.340.672.661.486.826.235.861.356.160.231.080.010.331.192.060.080.670.403.443.382.630.203.180.821.820.570.762.292.880.371.670.915.114.764.390.764.681.773.202.022.034.113.430.823.371.857.137.226.271.956.920.491.430.630.621.662.440.150.960.654.134.383.600.594.151.082.441.321.332.913.030.482.171.255.665.775.041.265.552.343.523.122.704.134.601.024.262.837.978.267.482.727.980.862.361.330.961.703.760.281.441.015.395.425.121.065.331.553.122.211.832.934.290.642.861.926.736.816.371.886.672.974.124.223.385.335.261.495.063.508.539.368.073.578.881.323.161.671.292.525.310.422.031.466.426.765.561.466.392.143.782.932.343.945.280.953.542.487.518.036.872.517.643.955.054.914.456.726.061.855.924.069.1810.478.644.349.782.074.562.241.934.005.870.682.791.987.528.086.142.057.483.014.873.573.205.395.991.264.353.028.379.257.443.208.634.935.755.585.157.316.682.206.754.6010.0011.239.045.0110.452.895.262.892.835.486.401.053.682.578.648.996.932.758.383.915.574.244.006.426.541.625.213.589.3310.098.033.889.415.746.276.325.418.347.192.477.125.1410.0911.549.325.6110.733.705.813.763.256.356.891.354.383.268.839.427.693.468.884.726.095.054.347.377.051.915.744.209.4710.468.534.549.80Source: Barro, R. J. and Jong-Wha Lee (2000)."International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications". Harvard University,April 2000 (http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.htm, visited on 24 October 2002).196 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 197ArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherAlgeriaArgentinaArmeniaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBeninBoliviaBotswanaBrazilBulgariaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCanadaCentral African Rep.ChileChinaColombiaCongoCongo, Dem. Rep.Costa RicaCroatiaCzech Rep..DenmarkDominican RepublicEcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorEstoniaEthiopiaFinlandTable A-10VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THE YEAR 20003.0163.05.0447.0762.056.01.05.0525.09.070.0123.0136.090.02.02.010.0285.01.0222.066.053.024.00.352.0231.0424.0631.082.038.021.0118.0387.00.3720.057.0213.0152.0525.0467.0104.04.0269.0498.08.060.093.0182.0350.04.03.06.0g677.03.0221.0112.0169.07.00.3249.0365.0g378.0720.0105.0100.086.0100.0363.04.0550.04.4324.1135.8994.57a55.5595.41.4127.3629.20.43.5744.894.9125.92.2366.0694.71218.52727.4120.6b83.320.8105.22332.17.12533.37.9158.46611.12524.113731.43038.51.62552.58494.614.862.0187.73544.30.81767.7129.048.129.90.6151.52968.620577.624.617.810.619031.40.121045.671113083320160527355122962307174171168128917213009473704593453314941317324014049319216410528921863951625463145101011620316398943271552322722171213538727244758595293122675480564024168122413767532350296793108675156444543337116310778335433358112437527133680311411784193244646931951496381232329329627917416025527402571371592984683941152543095270404817414552.34.95.74.40.75.00.72.43.22.11.56.00.74.04.72.02.21.33.14.62.13.32.32.25.2CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),2000***0.37.40.885.759.00.20.30.229.40.00.21.55.22.20.30.00.377.40.34.90.11.10.30.31.93.715.462.90.90.30.30.128.40.3102.3Internethosts(per 1000people),2000***+Numberoftelephonesmainline,(per 1000people),2000***Number ofbook titles(per millionpeople),1990s****Patentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997**Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000***Televisionsets (per1000 people),1998**Radios(per 1000people),1997**Dailynewspapers(per 1000people),1996**QualityAdjustedMYS 15+,2000*


198 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherComparatorArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherFranceGermanyGhanaGreeceGuatemalaHaitiHondurasHong KongHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIrelandIsraelItalyJapanJordanKenyaKorea, Rep. OfKuwaitKyrgystanLatviaLesothoLithuaniaMacedoniaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaliMexicoMoldovaMongoliaMoroccoMyanmarNetherlandsNew ZealandTable A-10VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THE YEAR 2000493.0586.06.0557.061.03.0g24.0809.0302.04.017.015.0658.0702.0737.0526.058.04.0567.0249.02.0166.010.0142.057.04.05.0213.01.0142.032.045.083.00.3670.0563.0579.0611.012.0532.057.09.046.0583.0372.032.031.0149.0420.0482.0474.0586.092.010.0464.0244.077.0303.010.0321.0255.03.04.0199.03.0125.0133.056.050.06.0618.0500.0660.2951.70.4383.742.04.11035.214.00.6210.3328.2562.9442.3cd5.1652.8cd115.385.7907.51107.36.8229.02.970.3271.213.04.81422.41902.62141.41767.07777.611.81.121.3345.73010.510.121.36.021955.35057.31589.73288.51627.42783.35123.111259.624741.57242.713076.51635.94418.9290.6363.35889.510553.210.95699.99246.626862873104510393124915859021321570132249602139214574109020313871215421333446824902197601580994661265904314376913615740331848670752213464914549225459250212166122612976316075435089379482384777955386684689121156265699520878955287104103366011271049513200192249420543257401512419597899021831114153333557921862428150290104578589393374152478932153158197602726103062163.95.21.64.11.50.82.05.14.82.12.12.34.85.74.85.43.41.86.22.91.81.43.50.33.80.85.05.8CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),2000***19.124.80.310.50.50.30.334.310.40.30.10.329.729.517.836.50.10.18.51.80.410.70.34.80.80.30.33.10.35.70.40.10.10.3101.990.6Internethosts(per 1000people),2000***+Numberoftelephonesmainline,(per 1000people),2000***Number ofbook titles(per millionpeople),1990s****Patentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997**Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000***Televisionsets (per1000 people),1998**Radios(per 1000people),1997**Dailynewspapers(per 1000people),1996**QualityAdjustedMYS 15+,2000*


Table A-10VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THE YEAR 2000CountryGroupQualityAdjustedMYS 15+,2000*Dailynewspapers(per 1000people),1996**Radios(per 1000people),1997**Televisionsets (per1000 people),1998**Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000***Patentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997**Number ofbook titles(per millionpeople),1990s****"Numberoftelephonesmainline,(per 1000people),2000***Cellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),2000***Internethosts(per 1000people),2000***+NicaraguaNigeriaNorwayPakistanPanamaPeruPhilippinesPolandPortugalRomaniaRussian FederationSaudi ArabiaSenegalSierra LeoneSingaporeSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSpainSri LankaSwedenSwitzerlandSyriaTajikistanThailandTogoTunisiaTurkeyUgandaUkraineUnited KingdomUnited StatesUruguayUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamZambiaZimbabweOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther1.95.91.64.74.04.65.22.60.70.74.22.13.53.65.85.42.43.31.42.12.21.54.86.14.03.42.32.33024588236207911375300105575436018519932100294453372020634311112543292152933206412192852239159829927315952330431941832114225382258040631733320993210002781422322182231801288841436214660746546810712193190665798818714410841354223342026241133484023561255069253153570285236181982862749064584724127518547137302031540957822915614601583139333972218217062161992156218845073058296601021021243032521212678410317541942747112.75.759.731.347.1843.010668.71297.1331.452.12160.59413.85223.513723.52851.31397.013068.215673.94059.886.718.3423.12135.6659.82495.1835.8121.81096.7104.3351.39.21743.611.51107.875.618.2497.2218.6351.5249.1186.2583.91725.0125.11483.1246.31425.82537.91.5129.71.1132.643.812.4126.71868.1240.7def204.240.3159.1c31.04.0532.022.0151.067.040.0282.0430.0175.0218.0137.022.04.0484.0314.0386.0114.0421.040.0682.0727.0103.036.092.09.090.0g280.03.0206.0589.0700.0278.067.0108.032.08.018.018.00.3751.02.0145.050.084.0174.0665.0112.022.064.026.02.0684.0205.0612.0190.0609.023.0717.0644.02.00.350.011.06.0g246.08.016.0727.0398.0132.02.0217.010.09.023.00.30.3101.10.35.40.40.38.86.21.92.20.20.20.345.27.011.04.411.30.167.336.70.30.31.10.30.31.10.30.728.2295.216.30.30.70.30.10.3Notes:- Quality adjusted MYS15+: Calculated by multiplying the mean years of schooling and the average test scores.The average test scores is the average of the test scores data available from both sources (Barro & Lee, 1997 and TIMSS).Test scores used from Barro & Lee, 1997 refer to the years 1990-91 & 1993-98.Countries were categorised by level of mean years of schooling and missing data of average test scores was filled by the average test scores available forother countries in the same category.- Source of Population (in millions), 2000 used to compute Patents applications filed per million people and Number of book titles per million people was the HDR 2002,- Book titles data for Qatar and Malawi were considered missing because the figures refer to School textbooks, Children's books or government publications only.- Missing data for Cellular mobile subscribers and Internet hosts from HDR 2002, and referred to as "less than half the unit shown" by the symbol (.), was replaced by 0.25.+ Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified for all countries except Malta, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Nigeria, Benin and Burundi.Their data refer to a year before 1990.^ Patent applications filed figures are for residents and non-residents of the the country. Missing figures for residents are considered zero.STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 199


Table A-10VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THE YEAR 2000(a) Not including school textbooks or yearbooks.(b) Partial data(c) First editions only.(d) Not including pamphlets.(e) Not including government publications and university theses but including juvenile titles for which a class breakdown is not available .(f) Not including school textbooks.(g) Data refer to 1999.Sources:* MYS: Barro and Lee, 2000. "International Data on educational Attainment: Updates and Implications,CID Working Paper no. 42, April.Test Scores: Barro and Lee, 1997. "Schooling Quality in a Cross-section of Countries", August.Test Scores: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (1996), Science (Mathematics)Achievement in the Middle School Years: IEA’s Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS),TIMSS International Study Centre, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA, November."** World Bank, 2000. "World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty", Oxford University Press,New York.*** UNDP, 2002. "2002 Human Development Report", Oxford University Press, New York.**** UNESCO, 2002. UNESCO Web site (www.unesco.org).200 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>


STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 201ArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherAlgeriaArgentinaArmeniaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBeninBoliviaBotswanaBrazilBulgariaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCanadaCentral Arican Rep.ChileChinaColombiaCongoCongo, Dem. Rep..Costa RicaCroatiaCzech Rep.DenmarkDominican RepublicEcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorEstoniaEthiopiaFinlandFranceTable A-11REPORT AND IMPUTED VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES,AROUND THE YEAR 20003.0163.05.0447.0762.056.01.05.0525.09.070.0123.0136.090.02.02.010.0285.01.0222.066.053.024.00.352.0231.0424.0631.082.038.021.0118.0387.00.3720.0493.057.0213.0152.0525.0467.0104.04.0269.0498.08.060.093.0182.0350.04.03.06.0677.03.0221.0112.0169.07.00.3249.0365.0378.0720.0105.0100.086.0100.0363.04.0550.0579.04.4324.1135.81020.3994.655.5-204.0595.41284.41.4482.4-51.7127.3629.20.4-165.13.5744.8-32.694.9139.4125.9-51.22.2366.0694.71218.52727.4120.683.320.8105.22332.17.12533.3660.27.9158.46611.12524.113731.43038.51.62552.58494.61848.014.862.0187.73544.31921.90.81159.51767.71858.8129.048.129.91490.40.62478.9151.52968.620577.62025.424.617.810.619031.40.121045.61902.6-59.7711.01308.03320.01605.02735.051.02296.02307.0174.0171.0-190.5168.01289.017.021.0-212.13009.047.0370.0459.0290.534.0-473.1533.01494.01317.03240.0277.6140.0493.019.02164.0-243.83340.82686.0105.0289.0218.0639.0516.0254.06.0314.0510.010.0116.020.0316.0398.09.04.032.0715.05.0232.0272.0217.012.0135.0387.0272.0447.0585.095.0293.0122.0675.0480.05.0640.0601.0241.0681.0224.01376.0753.023.050.0296.0793.0108.0675.0156.0444.0543.033.071.0163.01077.083.0354.0333.0581.0124.0375.0271.0336.0803.01141.0178.0419.0324.0464.0693.0195.01496.0937.038.0123.023.0293.0296.027.09.0174.0160.02.055.027.040.0257.01.03.07.0159.02.098.076.146.08.03.094.0115.0254.0309.052.070.040.048.0174.01.0455.0218.02.34.92.65.74.42.40.73.65.00.72.43.22.14.22.42.41.56.00.74.04.72.02.21.33.14.14.64.62.13.32.32.23.32.45.23.9CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),20000.37.40.885.759.00.20.30.229.40.00.21.55.22.20.30.00.377.40.34.90.11.10.30.31.93.715.462.90.90.30.30.128.40.3102.319.1Internethosts(per 1000people),2000Numberoftelephonesmainline,(per 1000inhabitant),2000Number ofbook titles(per millionpeople),1990sPatentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000Televisionsets(per 1000people),1998Radios(per 1000people),1997Dailynewspapers(per 1000people),1996QualityAdjustedMYS 15+,2000


202 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherComparatorArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherGermanyGhanaGreeceGuatemalaHaitiHondurasHong KongHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIrelandIsraelItalyJapanJordanKenyaKorea(Rep. of)KuwaitKyrgystanLatviaLesothoLithuaniaMacedoniaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaliMexicoMoldovaMongoliaMoroccoMyanmarNetherlandsNew ZealandNicaraguaNigeriaNorwayTable A-11REPORT AND IMPUTED VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES,AROUND THE YEAR 2000586.06.0557.061.03.024.0809.0302.04.017.015.0658.0702.0737.0526.058.04.0567.0249.02.0166.010.0142.057.04.05.0213.01.0142.032.045.083.00.3670.0563.018.00.3751.0611.012.0532.057.09.046.0583.0372.032.031.0149.0420.0482.0474.0586.092.010.0464.0244.077.0303.010.0321.0255.03.04.0199.03.0125.0133.056.050.06.0618.0500.031.04.0532.0951.70.4383.7-187.742.04.1-166.11035.214.00.6210.32331.4328.2562.9442.35.1-18.4652.8115.385.7907.51954.01107.31103.76.8352.3229.02.970.3271.2727.613.04.8675.11422.4-57.811.51107.82141.41767.07777.611.81.121.3345.73010.510.121.36.021955.35057.31589.73288.5-371.41627.42783.3352.15123.111259.624741.57242.713076.51635.94418.9290.62725.5363.35889.510553.210.92139.65699.99246.6-615.5878.77112.72873.0-371.21045.0103.0-392.3-132.093.01249.0158.0-175.4590.02132.01570.01322.04960.0197.8-307.62139.0214.0574.01090.0973.62031.0387.012.0-161.8154.0-170.1213.0334.0468.0119.4-147.82490.02197.0203.015.04095.0580.099.0466.0126.05.090.0431.0437.069.0136.0157.0403.0318.0486.0707.052.021.0346.0491.045.0492.025.0459.0250.021.02.0166.012.0261.0297.063.0160.07.0543.0508.0190.066.0579.0948.0238.0477.079.055.0386.0684.0689.0121.0156.0265.0699.0520.0878.0955.0287.0104.01033.0660.0112.0710.049.0513.0200.0192.0249.0420.054.0325.0740.0151.0241.095.0978.0990.0285.0223.0915.0311.014.0153.033.03.055.0792.0186.045.124.028.0150.0290.0104.0578.058.09.0393.0374.015.0247.08.093.021.05.03.0158.01.097.060.027.026.010.0306.0216.030.024.0588.05.21.64.11.50.82.05.14.82.12.12.34.85.74.85.43.41.86.22.92.83.61.83.22.72.91.43.50.33.83.12.52.50.85.05.81.92.65.9CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),200024.80.310.50.50.30.334.310.40.30.10.329.729.517.836.50.10.18.51.80.410.70.34.80.80.30.33.10.35.70.40.10.10.3101.990.60.30.3101.1Internethosts(per 1000people),2000Numberoftelephonesmainline,(per 1000inhabitant),2000Number ofbook titles(per millionpeople),1990sPatentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000Televisionsets(per 1000people),1998Radios(per 1000people),1997Dailynewspapers(per 1000people),1996QualityAdjustedMYS 15+,2000


STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 203OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherPakistanPanamaPeruPhilippinesPolandPortugalRomaniaRussian FederationSaudi ArabiaSenegalSierra LeoneSingaporeSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSpainSri LankaSwedenSwitzerlandSyriaTajikistanThailandTogoTunisiaTurkeyUgandaUkraineUnited KingdomUnited StatesUruguayUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamZambiaZimbabwePercentage imputedTable A-11REPORT AND IMPUTED VALUES OF INDICATORS ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL IN 109 COUNTRIES,AROUND THE YEAR 20002.0145.050.084.0174.0665.0112.022.064.026.02.0684.0205.0612.0190.0609.023.0717.0644.02.00.350.011.06.0246.08.016.0727.0398.0132.02.0217.010.09.023.00.022.0151.067.040.0282.0430.0175.0218.0137.022.04.0484.0314.0386.0114.0421.040.0682.0727.0103.036.092.09.090.0280.03.0206.0589.0700.0278.067.0108.032.08.018.00.0-148.7106.675.618.2497.2218.6351.5249.1186.213.9136.81139.9583.91725.0125.11483.1246.31425.82537.9165.41.5129.71.1132.643.812.4126.71868.1240.7204.240.3159.1-96.0-144.4-8.325.75.759.731.347.1843.010668.71297.1331.452.11685.42160.59413.85223.513723.51286.32851.31397.013068.215673.9420.14059.886.7473.518.3423.12135.6659.82495.1835.8121.81096.7104.3351.39.21743.615.678.0428.9229.0156.01460.01583.01393.03397.0730.42.0-320.82182.01706.02161.0992.01562.0188.04507.03058.029.0660.0102.0102.0124.0303.025.02121.02678.04103.01908.01754.0194.0274.0-194.2-248.122.988.0187.0144.0108.0413.0542.0233.0420.0262.041.013.0348.0402.0356.0125.0506.092.0531.0535.070.0285.0236.018.0198.0286.027.0490.0645.0847.0241.0275.0185.047.0137.030.00.098.0299.0273.0159.0523.0304.0319.0418.0321.0142.0253.0822.0580.0406.0317.0333.0209.0932.01000.0278.0142.0232.0218.0223.0180.0128.0884.01436.02146.0607.0465.0468.0107.0121.093.00.023.062.00.079.0113.075.0300.0105.057.05.04.0360.0185.0199.032.0100.029.0445.0337.020.020.063.04.031.0111.02.054.0329.0215.0293.03.0206.04.012.019.01.81.64.74.04.65.22.64.13.12.80.70.74.23.73.72.13.53.65.85.42.42.23.31.42.12.21.53.14.86.14.02.73.42.52.32.325.7CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),20000.35.40.40.38.86.21.92.20.20.20.345.27.011.04.411.30.167.336.70.30.31.10.30.31.10.30.728.2295.216.30.30.70.30.10.30.0Internethosts(per 1000people),2000Numberoftelephonesmainline,(per 1000inhabitant),2000Number ofbook titles(per millionpeople),1990sPatentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000Televisionsets(per 1000people),1998Radios(per 1000people),1997Dailynewspapers(per 1000people),1996QualityAdjustedMYS 15+,2000


204 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorFinlandSwedenSwitzerlandDenmarkNorwayUnited KingdomNetherlandsJapanNew ZealandAustraliaGermanyCanadaAustriaUnited StatesSingaporeBelgiumIrelandKorea (Rep. of)FranceEstoniaIsraelCzech Rep.SloveniaItalyHungaryLatviaGreeceSpainSlovakiaLithuaniaBulgariaPortugalPolandHong KongTable A-12RANKING OF 109 COUNTRIES ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL INDICATORS AROUND THE YEAR 2000(SORTED BY TOTAL RANKS)6.07.013.014.03.05.010.021.019.024.017.029.02.026.09.022.012.018.023.027.08.025.015.04.028.039.020.016.036.042.549.011.038.01.012.04.01.02.013.58.06.09.016.015.07.05.021.03.018.017.025.022.011.030.019.027.026.020.028.034.013.524.033.032.031.023.035.010.03.010.02.01.015.07.026.035.011.019.021.023.020.045.014.012.05.028.027.04.040.013.08.032.018.022.036.09.031.016.029.047.033.0107.03.010.06.04.019.038.022.029.015.037.041.049.07.064.014.016.02.034.046.05.025.032.08.055.031.011.017.033.023.018.028.012.063.072.06.02.09.08.04.014.015.01.018.07.011.010.029.03.019.016.023.022.013.020.031.037.021.036.040.041.042.032.028.025.039.030.034.081.06.015.014.09.011.05.012.03.018.07.010.02.016.01.037.017.032.038.08.024.039.027.036.023.028.020.025.019.033.026.034.013.031.029.02.014.08.05.015.03.010.011.09.04.012.06.021.01.018.020.024.07.013.025.036.019.046.017.026.023.038.051.533.037.034.058.035.027.04.05.09.012.02.010.013.03.023.016.511.032.015.024.08.031.035.06.022.029.518.020.026.041.027.021.034.042.028.046.019.049.038.01.011.06.09.525.54.021.015.09.55.08.012.03.027.02.028.016.018.51.036.049.07.024.039.020.018.541.032.043.538.051.029.062.013.014.0CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),20002.08.012.09.04.019.03.013.05.06.020.07.010.01.011.017.015.031.021.018.016.024.026.022.029.027.028.025.033.039.043.534.030.014.0Internethosts(per1000people),200055.081.083.589.590.5130.0132.0134.5139.0143.5162.0166.0168.0170.0176.0184.0191.5207.0220.0231.5239.0248.0251.0270.0273.5279.0285.5295.0316.0332.5335.5339.0350.0356.0TotalRankNumberoftelephonesmainline(per 1000people),2000Numberof booktitles(per millionpeople),1990sPatentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000Televisionsets(per 1000people),1998Radios(per 1000people),1997Dailynewspapers(per1000people),1996QualityAdjusted MYS15+,2000


STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 205OtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherUruguayCroatiaArgentinaKuwaitRomaniaRussian FederationCosta RicaMoldaviaUkraineBelarusChileMalaysiaMacedoniaVenezuelaMexicoPanamaTurkeyBrazilChinaArmeniaSouthAfricaSaudi ArabiaColombiaThailandEcuadorAzerbaijanDominican RepublicMongoliaEl SalvadorBoliviaPhilippinesUzbekistanLesothoPeruIranSri LankaKyrgystanTable A-12RANKING OF 109 COUNTRIES ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL INDICATORS AROUND THE YEAR 2000(SORTED BY TOTAL RANKS)45.032.040.030.048.072.061.066.076.088.033.035.058.034.042.541.031.044.054.088.037.055.060.062.565.059.052.064.047.053.050.098.080.062.577.070.598.037.029.044.041.048.043.040.054.045.038.042.046.039.058.055.051.036.047.057.050.056.053.049.065.562.560.059.075.062.572.078.570.589.570.552.078.569.049.025.041.063.039.043.037.042.059.030.066.046.017.052.070.064.072.058.053.055.061.050.060.057.068.071.062.024.065.034.076.074.06.069.048.044.067.079.077.076.070.058.073.039.021.065.036.078.074.09.080.069.083.067.075.085.020.059.084.088.081.089.030.044.013.097.094.086.061.01.087.0101.057.024.026.033.046.063.035.05.050.057.024.017.056.074.055.067.064.054.058.071.053.038.043.045.059.079.575.012.060.052.089.070.073.027.044.062.048.068.049.054.048.544.021.056.030.035.042.022.041.057.064.053.063.051.062.045.040.048.558.072.050.059.055.043.052.078.085.04.074.075.047.093.067.066.079.088.031.050.028.030.056.045.065.022.016.060.049.043.078.039.053.059.081.042.051.573.057.055.032.072.044.0109.082.087.041.029.084.040.0107.064.066.077.094.016.537.036.07.014.040.045.053.058.029.543.033.080.025.044.052.039.063.548.078.567.055.061.051.050.073.059.073.060.056.547.0100.090.5109.071.070.084.034.031.017.056.030.054.052.055.053.040.035.043.560.045.037.022.079.087.523.063.087.558.089.047.547.571.086.065.081.072.025.561.092.033.076.042.059.0CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),200023.041.032.047.045.543.545.559.055.596.038.042.053.555.535.036.050.037.0103.053.540.096.050.050.078.596.052.0103.0103.096.062.078.578.559.078.5103.059.0Internethosts(per1000people),2000394.5403.5404.0428.0429.5448.5469.5471.0473.5475.5497.0500.5502.5518.5520.5524.0558.0565.0576.0577.0579.5601.0607.0621.0622.5633.0634.0641.0649.5650.5657.0657.0681.5683.0683.5689.0691.0TotalRankNumberoftelephonesmainline(per 1000people),2000Numberof booktitles(per millionpeople),1990sPatentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000Televisionsets(per 1000people),1998Radios(per 1000people),1997Dailynewspapers(per1000people),1996QualityAdjusted MYS15+,2000


206 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>ArabOtherArabArabArabOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherArabComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherEgyptTajikistanJordanSyriaTunisiaBotswanaMoroccoHondurasNicaraguaGuatemalaMalawiAlgeriaIndiaNigeriaVietnamZimbabweMadagascarGhanaSierra LeoneCongoSenegalTogoIndonesiaUgandaCameroonBurkina FasoMyanmarBeninPakistanZambiaKenyaCongo, Dem. Rep.MaliCentral African Rep.EthiopiaHaitiBangladeshBurundiTable A-12RANKING OF 109 COUNTRIES ON KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL INDICATORS AROUND THE YEAR 2000(SORTED BY TOTAL RANKS)73.0107.057.098.085.546.051.068.574.056.088.093.591.0107.080.070.591.085.598.068.567.078.075.084.080.098.0107.082.598.082.591.0107.0103.0103.0107.093.5103.098.068.080.065.561.067.064.076.077.083.573.5100.573.581.5100.581.587.0106.088.0100.595.085.591.583.5106.096.5100.596.593.585.593.589.5109.0106.0106.0100.591.5100.5106.075.091.084.051.056.0101.079.087.0102.0108.038.086.077.081.0103.097.083.096.054.0100.078.093.094.080.088.095.085.092.0105.0104.098.090.089.099.082.073.0109.0106.093.027.0108.068.092.082.096.091.0109.095.026.0100.098.062.071.051.053.050.040.056.052.066.090.043.060.045.042.048.0102.099.054.0106.035.047.0107.0104.0103.0105.051.047.066.086.076.0100.077.095.065.078.097.094.072.091.061.0104.092.0107.0106.085.093.079.599.087.0102.090.096.069.082.0101.0105.0109.098.084.0103.0108.083.088.073.046.086.082.060.096.065.080.061.071.0109.076.083.084.087.091.094.577.098.099.589.097.069.092.090.0102.0103.0101.081.068.094.570.099.5106.0106.0106.0104.0108.054.088.561.063.074.585.569.547.062.0102.068.069.592.574.596.0100.080.071.067.091.088.576.085.590.083.0108.099.095.098.092.597.048.0105.0101.079.0104.0106.0103.063.581.554.081.568.073.075.056.569.066.0100.065.062.076.596.083.093.585.096.090.593.596.076.5104.092.0107.087.0104.078.586.088.5100.0107.0104.0107.0100.088.5100.074.080.046.068.084.050.066.090.091.098.0100.077.083.064.067.078.057.094.0107.082.0105.599.085.097.096.073.0103.0108.095.075.093.0101.0109.0105.570.0102.0104.069.0CountryGroupCellularmobilesubscribers(per 1000people),200078.578.5103.078.578.548.0103.078.562.057.078.578.578.578.578.562.078.578.578.578.596.078.5103.078.578.578.578.5108.578.5103.0103.078.578.578.578.578.578.5108.5Internethosts(per1000people),2000703.0726.5730.5737.0741.5745.5757.5770.5778.5804.5805.0813.0818.5819.0821.0823.5828.5832.0845.0846.0848.0854.5860.5861.5866.0897.0897.0901.5903.5904.5913.5918.5930.0934.0940.0960.5979.5991.5TotalRankNumberoftelephonesmainline(per 1000people),2000Numberof booktitles(per millionpeople),1990sPatentapplicationsfiled (permillionpeople)1997Scientistsandengineersin R&D(permillionpeople),1990-2000Televisionsets(per 1000people),1998Radios(per 1000people),1997"Dailynewspapers(per1000people),1996QualityAdjusted MYS15+,2000


Table A-13VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE OUTCOMES AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THEYEAR 2000CountryGroupHightechnologyexports(% of totalgoodsexports),1999NuclearFacilities*_Spaceprograms*TAIvalue,1999AHDIrankHDIvalue,2000GDP percapita(PPP$),2000AlgeriaArgentinaArmeniaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBangladeshBelarusBelgiumBeninBoliviaBotswanaBrazilBulgariaBurkina FasoBurundiCameroonCanadaCentral African Rep..ChileChinaColombiaCongoCongo, Dem. Rep..Costa RicaCroatiaCzech Rep..DenmarkDominican RepublicEcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorEstoniaArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOther0.33.04.05.012.01.00.35.011.021.09.06.01.011.00.31.021.02.044.08.012.019.00.31.02.06.017.01111101010001100010111010011001000101000000001000010110000000001000.2210.3810.5870.5440.5530.2770.3110.4110.5890.3570.2990.2740.3580.3910.4650.2440.2530.2360.2539732898316786062533491104953963172401112310374992480.6970.8440.7540.9390.9260.7410.4780.7880.9390.4200.6530.5720.7570.7790.3250.3130.5120.9400.3750.8310.7260.7720.5120.4310.8200.8090.8490.9260.7270.7320.6420.7060.826530812377255925693267652936160275442717899024247184762557109765911703278401172941739766248825765865080911399127627603332033635449710066STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 207


208 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherComparatorOtherOtherOtherComparatorOtherOtherArabOtherComparatorArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabEthiopiaFinlandFranceGermanyGhanaGreeceGuatemalaHaitiHondurasHong KongHungaryIndiaIndonesiaIranIrelandIsraelItalyJapanJordanKenyaKorea(Rep. of)KuwaitKyrgystanLatviaLesothoLithuaniaMacedoniaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaliMexicoMoldovaMongoliaMoroccoTable A-13VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE OUTCOMES AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THEYEAR 200066824996242232510319641650138211467245325153124162358304358842986620131236262675539661022173801579927117045203171065086840615906879790232109178335460.3270.9300.9280.9250.5480.8850.6310.4710.6380.8880.8350.5770.6840.7210.9250.8960.9130.9330.7170.5130.8820.8130.7120.8000.5350.8080.7720.4690.4000.7820.3860.7960.7010.6550.602101715712964875624806910117151868387083598645790.7440.5350.5830.1390.4370.2080.4550.4640.2010.2110.2600.5140.4710.6980.1290.6660.3960.389001100000001000101000000000000000000111110000111101110010010100010100027.022.018.02.05.04.03.01.024.024.05.07.00.342.029.011.030.02.033.00.34.06.07.03.02.052.028.02.00.30.3CountryGroupGDP percapita(PPP$),2000HDIvalue,2000AHDIrankTAIvalue,1999SpaceprogramsNuclearFacilitiesHightechnologyexports(% of totalgoodsexports),1999


STATISTICAL TABLES ON KNOWLEDGE IN ARAB COUNTRIES 209OtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherArabOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherMyanmarNetherlandsNewZealandNicaraguaNigeriaNorwayPakistanPanamaPeruPhilippinesPolandPortugalRomaniaRussian FederationSaudi ArabiaSenegalSierra LeoneSingaporeSlovakiaSloveniaSouth AfricaSpainSri LankaSwedenSwitzerlandSyriaTajikistanThailandTogoTunisiaTurkeyUgandaUkraineUnited KingdomUnited StatesTable A-13VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE OUTCOMES AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THEYEAR 200010272565720070236689629918192860004799397190511729064238377113671510490233561124317367940119472353024277287693556115264021442636369741208381623509341420.5520.9350.9170.6350.4620.9420.4990.7870.7470.7540.8330.8800.7750.7810.7590.4310.2750.8850.8350.8790.6950.9130.7410.9410.9280.6910.6670.7620.4930.7220.7420.4440.7480.9280.939465110759035543330194489431346121035294936712110.6300.5480.1850.5790.1670.3210.2710.3000.4070.4190.3710.1580.5850.4470.4580.3400.4810.2030.7030.2400.3370.2550.6060.733000000000000010000000000000000100110100011001111100001111011001001001126.05.00.30.35.01.02.01.026.08.07.04.03.00.37.058.07.012.04.010.03.026.026.00.330.00.33.07.00.329.032.0CountryGroupGDP percapita(PPP$),2000HDIvalue,2000AHDIrankTAIvalue,1999SpaceprogramsNuclearFacilitiesHightechnologyexports(% of totalgoodsexports),1999


Table A-13VALUES OF KNOWLEDGE OUTCOMES AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS IN 109 COUNTRIES, AROUND THEYEAR 2000CountryGroupHightechnologyexports(% of totalgoodsexports),1999NuclearFacilitiesSpaceprogramsTAIvalue,1999AHDIrankHDIvalue,2000GDP percapita(PPP$),2000UruguayUzbekistanVenezuelaVietnamZambiaZimbabweOtherOtherOtherOtherOtherOther2.00.31.01011000000000.3430.220214784760.8310.7270.7700.6880.4330.5510.8310.7270.7700.6880.4330.551Notes* "1" means "exist" and "0" means does not exist._ A country is identified to have a nuclear capability (taking the value "1") if it has either power reactor(s), constructed or under construction, or research reactor(s), constructed or underconstruction, or both.Sources:AHDI:HDI value &GDP per capita (PPP$)TAI value &High-Technology exportsNuclear facilitiesSpace ProgramsArab Human Development Report, 2001.UNDP, 2002. "2002 Human Development Report", Oxford University Press, New York.UNDP, 2001. "2001 Human Development Report", Oxford University Press, New York.Compiled by Ted Flaherty, 19 September 1996 (www.cdi.org\issues\proliferation\reactab.html) from:"Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty". Arms Control <strong>report</strong>er (1996), pp.602.A.7-602.A.10."World List of Nuclear Power Plants". Nuclear News, September 1993, pp. 43-62.Indicator was identified through an internet search.210 ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT <strong>2003</strong>

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