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Immigration in Europe - HumanitarianNet - Universidad de Deusto

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No part of this publication, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the cover <strong>de</strong>sign, maybe reproduced, stored or transmitted <strong>in</strong> any form or by andmeans, whether electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical,record<strong>in</strong>g or photocopy<strong>in</strong>g, without prior permission or thepublisher.Publication pr<strong>in</strong>ted on ecological paperIllustration of front page: Xabi Otero© <strong>Universidad</strong> <strong>de</strong> <strong>Deusto</strong>Apartado 1 - 48080 BilbaoI.S.B.N.: 84-7485-905-0Legal Deposit: BI - 2.716-03Pr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>/Impreso en EspañaDesign by: IPAR, S. Coop. - BilbaoPr<strong>in</strong>ted by: Artes Gráficas Rontegui, S.A.L.


8 CONTENTSThird country nationals and labour immigration <strong>in</strong> the NetherlandsJeroen Doomernik (University of Amsterdam) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159Spanish immigration policies: a critical approach from a human rightsperspectiveEduardo Ruiz Vieytez (University of <strong>Deusto</strong>) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Contradictory dynamics with<strong>in</strong> British multiculturalism: pursu<strong>in</strong>g ethnicpluralism while exclud<strong>in</strong>g asylum seekersCharles Husband (University of Bradford) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191Mutual acceptance or rejection? Explor<strong>in</strong>g social distance among German,Turkish and Resettler adolescentsJoachim Brüß (University of Bielefield) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207Vot<strong>in</strong>g rights for third country nationals <strong>in</strong> Vienna: a new step towards<strong>de</strong>mocratic participation <strong>in</strong> AustriaCatr<strong>in</strong> Pekari (University of Graz) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227Women migrants: <strong>in</strong>visible or creative actors?Tr<strong>in</strong>idad L. Vicente (University of <strong>Deusto</strong>) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235


PrefaceThis book has been published with<strong>in</strong> the framework of<strong>HumanitarianNet</strong>: Thematic Network on Humanitarian DevelopmentStudies, with the support of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Commission DG for Educationand Culture. <strong>HumanitarianNet</strong> consists of over 100 universities, researchcentres, and governmental and non-governmental organisations. Theactivities of the network are <strong>de</strong>veloped us<strong>in</strong>g a holistic, <strong>in</strong>terdiscipl<strong>in</strong>aryapproach with a <strong>Europe</strong>an dimension.This volume focuses on the challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g the differentstakehol<strong>de</strong>rs <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the immigration <strong>de</strong>bate <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>ggovernments, NGOs and migrants themselves. Participants <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>policymakers, representatives of NGOs from different <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries, and aca<strong>de</strong>mic experts, not only from the Migration group of<strong>HumanitarianNet</strong>, but also from other fields with<strong>in</strong> the ThematicNetwork: Human Rights, Poverty and Development, HumanitarianAssistance, and Peace and Conflict Studies.This is the fourth book to have been produced by the Migrationgroup on the theme of Migration, Cultural I<strong>de</strong>ntities, and Territory <strong>in</strong><strong>Europe</strong>. The others were Cultural I<strong>de</strong>ntities and Ethnic M<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong><strong>Europe</strong> (ed. D. Turton and J. Gonzalez, 1999); Ethnic Diversity <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>:Challenges to the Nation State (ed. D. Turton and J. Gonzalez, 2000);and Diversity <strong>in</strong> the City (ed. M. Mart<strong>in</strong>iello and B. Piquard, 2002).We would like to thank Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez and Ann-MarieGallagher and the staff of both the Institute of Human Rights and theDepartment of International Relations at the University of <strong>Deusto</strong>, forhost<strong>in</strong>g the conference and provid<strong>in</strong>g the necessary resources for thesuccess of the event. We also wish to express our gratitu<strong>de</strong> toMargaret Okole of the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford,for her meticulous and skilful copy edit<strong>in</strong>g.THE EDITORS


12 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZglobal migration flows. To un<strong>de</strong>rstand immigration <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, therefore,we have to take <strong>in</strong>to account certa<strong>in</strong> general features of <strong>in</strong>ternationalmigration which have emerged dur<strong>in</strong>g the last twenty years or so. Themost important of these was a rapid <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> migration from the less<strong>de</strong>veloped to the more <strong>de</strong>veloped world, caus<strong>in</strong>g some <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries, which had traditionally seen themselves as countries ofemigration, to become countries of immigration (even if their politicallea<strong>de</strong>rs have been slow to recognise this <strong>in</strong> public). In Spa<strong>in</strong>, forexample, although the number of resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreigners rema<strong>in</strong>s smallcompared with countries of northern <strong>Europe</strong>, it was ten times greater<strong>in</strong> 1998 than <strong>in</strong> 1962, while the proportion of resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreignersorig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>de</strong>veloped countries has fallen from eighty to thirty%over the past fifty years (Ruiz). Former “guest worker” countries, suchas the Netherlands and Germany, cont<strong>in</strong>ued to receive a steady flow ofimmigrants, even after these schemes had been halted <strong>in</strong> the early1970s, first through “family reunion” migration and then by asylumapplications (Bosswick and Doomernik). In the Netherlands, “cha<strong>in</strong>migration” has resulted <strong>in</strong> “ethnic communities” around ten times aslarge as the orig<strong>in</strong>al guest worker population (Doomernik). There hasbeen a dramatic rise <strong>in</strong> the number of “spontaneous arrivals” —illegalimmigrants and asylum seekers— most of whom make use of theflourish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustry <strong>in</strong> people smuggl<strong>in</strong>g and traffick<strong>in</strong>g which has<strong>de</strong>veloped s<strong>in</strong>ce the 1970s <strong>in</strong> response to grow<strong>in</strong>g restrictions on legalimmigration. There has also been an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> —or at least an<strong>in</strong>creased recognition of— the participation of women <strong>in</strong> migratorymovements, not simply as the <strong>de</strong>pendants of male migrants but as<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt actors (Vicente).Perhaps the most salient result of these new patterns of <strong>in</strong>ternationalmigration has been a blurr<strong>in</strong>g of the traditional categories that servedto structure the immigration and asylum policies of states. The cha<strong>in</strong>migrations just referred to, whereby the movement of people from, forexample, Turkey to Germany and other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries, cont<strong>in</strong>ued<strong>in</strong>to the 1970s and 1980s, through the “si<strong>de</strong> doors” of family reunionand the asylum system, are a good illustration of this (Bosswick). Thisblurr<strong>in</strong>g is also seen <strong>in</strong> the use by asylum seekers of migrant networksand smugglers and the use by economic migrants of the “asylumroute”. This has led <strong>Europe</strong>an governments to impose ever strictercontrols on asylum —with the avowed aim of mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ationprocedures more “efficient” (Boutruche), and thereby preserv<strong>in</strong>g the“<strong>in</strong>tegrity” of the asylum system. Even historical countries of immigration,such as Canada, Australia and the US have felt the same need. Thus,Canada’s M<strong>in</strong>ister of Citizenship and <strong>Immigration</strong>, El<strong>in</strong>or Caplan, <strong>in</strong>


INTRODUCTION 13<strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g a new <strong>Immigration</strong> and Refugee Protection Bill <strong>in</strong> May2000, stated that,…clos<strong>in</strong>g the back door to those who would abuse the system willallow us to open the front door wi<strong>de</strong>r —both to genu<strong>in</strong>e refugees,and to the immigrants Canada will need to grow and prosper <strong>in</strong> thefuture (quoted <strong>in</strong> VAN KESSEL, 2001, p. 13).This sounds reasonable enough, until one recognises that, by focus<strong>in</strong>gattention on their “back doors”, as a condition for open<strong>in</strong>g their “frontdoors”, the rich <strong>in</strong>dustrialised countries are mak<strong>in</strong>g asylum policy afunction of immigration policy. Their obligation un<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternational law toprovi<strong>de</strong> protection for refugees is be<strong>in</strong>g subsumed un<strong>de</strong>r their overrid<strong>in</strong>gdomestic agenda, which is to control the movement of people and,above all, to pursue the “fight” aga<strong>in</strong>st illegal immigration. Hence,“refugee protection <strong>in</strong> the North has almost entirely been taken overby the strengthen<strong>in</strong>g of the immigration control regime” (COLLINSON,1999, p. 16). Asylum, <strong>in</strong> other words, has come to be treated, to all<strong>in</strong>tents and purposes, as a loophole to be closed, rather than as a rightto be protected.The danger this poses for refugee protection is a recurrent theme ofthe contributors. Gallagher writes of the need for governments to“separate out” the issues of immigration and asylum <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to meettheir obligations un<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternational refugee law. V<strong>in</strong>uesa, whilerecognis<strong>in</strong>g that most refugees arriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> today do not conformto the traditional profile of a “Convention refugee”, makes the samepo<strong>in</strong>t: <strong>de</strong>fend<strong>in</strong>g the rights of refugees is a matter of <strong>in</strong>ternational law,not of the discretionary immigration policies of states. Boutruchepo<strong>in</strong>ts out that the restrictive measures <strong>in</strong>troduced by <strong>Europe</strong>angovernments to <strong>de</strong>ter the arrival of undocumented migrants (such ascarrier sanctions and visa requirements) not only fail to take <strong>in</strong>toaccount the particular situation of asylum seekers but have provi<strong>de</strong>dfertile ground for the growth of a huge <strong>in</strong>ternational bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong>people smuggl<strong>in</strong>g and traffick<strong>in</strong>g. His call for a “more balanced” and“complementary” EU asylum and immigration regime appears to rest onthe hope that an expansion of legal immigration would help to reducethe pressure on the asylum route. This <strong>in</strong> turn would open up the spacenee<strong>de</strong>d for states to meet their obligations un<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternational law torefugees, a specific group of immigrants <strong>in</strong> need of <strong>in</strong>ternationalprotection.As Boutruche admits, it is by no means certa<strong>in</strong> that the expansionof opportunities for legal immigration would have a downward impacton asylum applications. If it is <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed the case that most asylum seekers


14 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZare economic migrants us<strong>in</strong>g the asylum route to circumventimmigration controls, then such an effect could logically be expected.But, as GIBNEY and HANSEN po<strong>in</strong>t out (2002, p.20), the expansion ofhigh skilled migration that has taken place <strong>in</strong> the UK and Germany <strong>in</strong>recent years, and the regularisation of low skilled economic migrants <strong>in</strong>Spa<strong>in</strong> and Italy <strong>in</strong> the 1990s, does not appear to have had anobservable and significant impact on asylum applications. There are,however, other arguments for the expansion of immigrationopportunities, which we discuss <strong>in</strong> the next section.Arguments for a more liberal immigration regimeFirst, there is the simple need to meet shortages of both skilled andunskilled labour. The case studies make it clear that there is a grow<strong>in</strong>gawareness amongst EU member states of the need for <strong>in</strong>creased labourimmigration to help <strong>de</strong>al with such shortages This new awareness isconveniently marked by a Communication from the <strong>Europe</strong>an Commissionto the Council and the <strong>Europe</strong>an Parliament on a Common<strong>Immigration</strong> Policy (2000), <strong>in</strong> which it is noted that “as a result ofgrow<strong>in</strong>g shortages of labour at both skilled and unskilled levels, anumber of member States have already begun to recruit third countrynationals from outsi<strong>de</strong> the Union” (quoted by Doomernik). It urgesMember States to re-th<strong>in</strong>k their immigration policies <strong>in</strong> the light oftheir expected needs for labour immigration. The th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d thisCommunication is that labour immigration policies should address thesupply si<strong>de</strong> (by means, for example, of a quota system) as well as the<strong>de</strong>mand si<strong>de</strong> (by us<strong>in</strong>g immigration to target specific sectors of thelabour market). For some countries, however, this would be, asDoomernik puts it for the Netherlands, “a bridge too far”. In Spa<strong>in</strong>also, there is a basic consensus that immigrants should only beadmitted where there are no Spanish workers to fill the jobs (Ruiz).The greatest stirr<strong>in</strong>gs of potential change <strong>in</strong> this area have perhapsbeen seen <strong>in</strong> Germany, where an <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt Commission onimmigration reported <strong>in</strong> 2001 that the expansion of immigration hadbecome an economic necessity. It even went so far as to recommend apo<strong>in</strong>ts system similar to the Canadian mo<strong>de</strong>l (Bosswick). Although a newimmigration act, <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g this and other recommendations of theCommission, was blocked <strong>in</strong> the second chamber, Bosswick <strong>de</strong>scribesthese proposals as herald<strong>in</strong>g an “historic change <strong>in</strong> Germany’s policiestowards immigrants and foreign resi<strong>de</strong>nts”. In France there has been talkover the last few years, at least amongst the “political classes”, of the


INTRODUCTION 15need to expand the immigration of unskilled as well as skilled labour (MaMung), while <strong>in</strong> Belgium the government is hold<strong>in</strong>g back on a moreliberal approach to immigration, presumably because of worries aboutpublic op<strong>in</strong>ion, even though the bus<strong>in</strong>ess world is <strong>in</strong> favour of expan<strong>de</strong>dimmigration to help meet shortages of high skilled labour (Mart<strong>in</strong>iello).Second, there is a related but more fundamental and long termargument to be ma<strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong> favour of expand<strong>in</strong>g immigration flows,namely that this is necessary to meet <strong>Europe</strong>’s “<strong>de</strong>mographic <strong>de</strong>ficit”.Niessen would like to shift the <strong>de</strong>bate about immigration <strong>in</strong> the EU froma preoccupation with the need to exclu<strong>de</strong> third country nationals to theneed for <strong>in</strong>creased immigration <strong>in</strong> the context of a <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g population.The average number of children per woman of childbear<strong>in</strong>g age <strong>in</strong> theEU <strong>in</strong> 2000 was 1.53, as aga<strong>in</strong>st 2.1 nee<strong>de</strong>d to replace the population.Because of <strong>in</strong>creased life expectancy, the proportion of those aged 65and over will reach 22 % <strong>in</strong> 2025, hav<strong>in</strong>g risen from 16 % <strong>in</strong> 1998. Theresult is that the population of work<strong>in</strong>g age will have fallen by about 40million <strong>in</strong> 2050 and the ratio of workers to pensioners will have <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>edfrom four to one, to two to one. Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g regional variations,this <strong>de</strong>mographic arithmetic has stark implications for the future ofpensions and health care systems <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>an welfare states. While itseems obvious that the expansion of immigration could play a part(along with policies to <strong>in</strong>crease fertility and encourage greaterparticipation <strong>in</strong> the labour force) <strong>in</strong> help<strong>in</strong>g to turn this situation round<strong>in</strong> the short term, the long term effects of <strong>in</strong>creased immigration on thelabour market cannot be easily predicted because, as Niessen po<strong>in</strong>tsout, immigrants are also subject to the age<strong>in</strong>g process!Both of the above arguments might be called Euro-centric, <strong>in</strong> thatthey are based upon the economic self-<strong>in</strong>terest of <strong>Europe</strong>an welfarestates. A third argument is based on the potential contribution of an<strong>in</strong>creased flow of labour migrants from less <strong>de</strong>veloped to more<strong>de</strong>veloped countries (and an opposite flow of remittances) to rais<strong>in</strong>gthe liv<strong>in</strong>g standards and life chances of the world’s poor. S<strong>in</strong>ce thisargument is not presented <strong>in</strong> any <strong>de</strong>tail by the contributors to thisbook, we give some space to it here because we believe it is potentiallythe most important and, therefore, one that <strong>de</strong>serves particularconsi<strong>de</strong>ration. Nor is it is without a significant, if <strong>in</strong>direct, element of<strong>Europe</strong>an self <strong>in</strong>terest, if we assume that global <strong>in</strong>equality is the greatestlong term threat to the security and well be<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>in</strong>habitants of therich <strong>in</strong>dustrialised countries.One of the most strik<strong>in</strong>g ways of represent<strong>in</strong>g the rich-poor divi<strong>de</strong><strong>in</strong> the world today is to note that farmers <strong>in</strong> the EU receive a subsidy ofUS$2 per day, for each of their cattle, while 1.3 billion of the world’s


16 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZpoorest people live on an <strong>in</strong>come of less than US$1 per day. In otherwords, cattle <strong>in</strong> the EU “enjoy” double the “<strong>in</strong>come” of a third of theworld’s population. This way of represent<strong>in</strong>g the gap between rich andpoor, based as it is on the EU’s highly protective Common AgriculturalPolicy, is particularly apposite, given the so-called “Wash<strong>in</strong>gtonConsensus” of the 1980s and 1990s. This was the view that the bestway to make globalisation pay for the poor is the ever wi<strong>de</strong>r adoptionof policies of free tra<strong>de</strong> and free <strong>in</strong>vestment, a view which hasdom<strong>in</strong>ated the policies of the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund for the past twenty years.With the benefit of h<strong>in</strong>dsight, a new consensus appears to begrow<strong>in</strong>g among economists that it is not quite as simple as that(RODRIK, 2002). First, most <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries grew faster before theyabandoned tra<strong>de</strong> protection policies. Second, while there has been avery small <strong>de</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> global poverty levels (0.2 % per year between1988 and 1998), this is largely accounted for by the progress ma<strong>de</strong> bythe world’s most populous country, Ch<strong>in</strong>a. Hav<strong>in</strong>g one of the mostprotected economies <strong>in</strong> the world, and hav<strong>in</strong>g jo<strong>in</strong>ed the World Tra<strong>de</strong>Organisation only <strong>in</strong> 2001, Ch<strong>in</strong>a is hardly a glow<strong>in</strong>g advert for theWash<strong>in</strong>gton Consensus. Third, if Ch<strong>in</strong>a did not get where it is today byfollow<strong>in</strong>g the dictates of the Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Consensus, neither did the verycountries which today preach its benefits. The EU’s Common AgriculturalPolicy is one illustration of this. Another is the use ma<strong>de</strong> of protectionistpolicies by the US economy when it was catch<strong>in</strong>g up with and surpass<strong>in</strong>gBrita<strong>in</strong>’s <strong>in</strong> the latter part of the n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century (RODRIK, 2002, p. 4).The other si<strong>de</strong> of the co<strong>in</strong> of tra<strong>de</strong> liberalisation, imposed by therich countries through the multilateral f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>stitutions theycontrol, is restrictive immigration policies, imposed unilaterally by<strong>in</strong>dividual welfare states.Thanks to the efforts of the United States and other rich countries,barriers to tra<strong>de</strong> goods, f<strong>in</strong>ancial services, and <strong>in</strong>vestment flows havenow been brought down to historic lows. But the one market wherepoor nations have someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> abundance to sell —the market forlabor services— has rema<strong>in</strong>ed untouched by this liberaliz<strong>in</strong>g trend.Rules on cross-bor<strong>de</strong>r flows are <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed almost always unilaterally(rather than multilaterally as <strong>in</strong> other areas of economic exchange)and rema<strong>in</strong> highly restrictive. Even a small relaxation of these ruleswould produce huge ga<strong>in</strong>s for the world economy, and for poornations <strong>in</strong> particular. (RODRIK, loc. cit.)This is because the gap between what people can earn from thesame —even menial— jobs <strong>in</strong> rich countries and poor countries is


INTRODUCTION 17much wi<strong>de</strong>r than the gap between the prices of goods tra<strong>de</strong>d betweenthose countries. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Rodrik, a “back-of-the-envelopecalculation” suggests that an expansion of labour migration from poorto rich countries, amount<strong>in</strong>g to 3 % of the rich countries’ labour force,“would easily yield $200 billion of <strong>in</strong>come annually for the citizens of<strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g nations, which is vastly more than the exist<strong>in</strong>g WTO tra<strong>de</strong>agenda is expected to produce” (loc.cit.) 2 Similar, if less dramatic,conclusions are reached by WINTERS et al. (2002) us<strong>in</strong>g, not the backof an envelope but a computer simulation. They conclu<strong>de</strong> that…by <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>veloped economies’ quotas on <strong>in</strong>ward movementsof both skilled and unskilled labour by just 3% of their labour forces,world welfare would rise by $US156 billion...This figure is half aslarge aga<strong>in</strong> as the ga<strong>in</strong>s expected from the liberalisation of allrema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g goods tra<strong>de</strong> restrictions ($US 104 billion). In general,<strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries ga<strong>in</strong> most …with higher ga<strong>in</strong>s from the <strong>in</strong>crease<strong>in</strong> quotas on unskilled labour than on skilled labour. (p. 3)If these arguments are correct, then the ma<strong>in</strong> reason why the gapbetween rich and poor countries cont<strong>in</strong>ues to grow, with all thedangers this holds for the long term peace and security of the rich aswell as the poor, is the restrictive immigration policies of the rich<strong>in</strong>dustrialised nations. By ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g these policies, while forc<strong>in</strong>gthrough tra<strong>de</strong> and <strong>in</strong>vestment liberalisation (except where it is harmfulto their own producers!), they ensure that their own citizens hold on tothe lion’s share of the benefits of globalisation.There are at least two criticisms that can be ma<strong>de</strong> of the argumentthat the liberalisation of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration would have a dramaticand positive impact on global <strong>in</strong>equality. The first is that Rodrik andothers are assum<strong>in</strong>g a more straightforward relationship betweenmigrants’ remittances and <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>in</strong> their countries of orig<strong>in</strong>than is justified by the evi<strong>de</strong>nce. There has been much research on thistopic, with no clear-cut conclusions.2 The current level of remittances already amounts to twice that of <strong>in</strong>ternational<strong>de</strong>velopment assistance. “Estimated at about US$75 billion a year <strong>in</strong> the early 1990s…and at US$100 billion <strong>in</strong> 2000 (Mart<strong>in</strong>, 2001), migrants’ remittances represent a largeproportion of world f<strong>in</strong>ancial flows and amount to substantially more than globaloverseas <strong>de</strong>velopment assistance… By the mid 1990s. [<strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>de</strong>velopmentassistance]… had stagnated at the level of US$50 billion net of <strong>de</strong>bt repayments… Toun<strong>de</strong>rl<strong>in</strong>e their importance for the <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g world, 60 percent of remittances werethought to go to <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries <strong>in</strong> the year 2000 (Mart<strong>in</strong>, 2001).’ (SØRENSEN et al.,2002, p. 20).


18 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZThe relationship between migration and <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>in</strong> poorcountries has been a topic of <strong>de</strong>bate for a long time. There are twoma<strong>in</strong> views. The negative view holds that <strong>in</strong>ternational migrationresults <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy of the country of orig<strong>in</strong> onremittances and, furthermore, it distorts the <strong>de</strong>velopment processs<strong>in</strong>ce the remittances only benefit the “lucky” few, creat<strong>in</strong>g wealthdisparities and therefore political and economic unrest. The otherview regards remittances as one of the key factors <strong>in</strong> povertyalleviation <strong>in</strong> labour-send<strong>in</strong>g countries and a good source ofeconomic <strong>de</strong>velopment (LEON-LEDESMA/PIRACHA, 2001, p. 1).Thus, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Stephen Castles, “..migration can present effective<strong>in</strong>dividual strategies for survival and improvement <strong>in</strong> life chances, but itcannot provi<strong>de</strong> general solutions to global disparities… There is littleevi<strong>de</strong>nce that migration un<strong>de</strong>r current arrangements, does anyth<strong>in</strong>g tosupport <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>in</strong> the areas of orig<strong>in</strong>” (2000a, pp. 91-92). On theother hand, a recent “Policy Study” carried out by the Centre forDevelopment Research, Copenhagen, on the “migration-<strong>de</strong>velopmentnexus” (SØRENSEN et al., 2002) states that “there is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g evi<strong>de</strong>ncethat remittances from abroad are crucial to the survival of communities<strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries..” (p. 19). In their own study of the effect ofeconomic flows <strong>de</strong>rived from migration on Central and East <strong>Europe</strong>aneconomies, León-Le<strong>de</strong>sma and Piracha found that remittances had apositive effect on productivity and employment, through their effect on<strong>in</strong>vestment. But this raises another important qualification —namely thatthe benefits of remittances to economic <strong>de</strong>velopment are unevenlydistributed across poor countries and it does not appear to be the poorestwhich benefit most. 3The second possible flaw <strong>in</strong> the arguments of Rodrik and W<strong>in</strong>terset al. lies <strong>in</strong> their assumption that the <strong>in</strong>creased flows of migrant labourthey envisage could be restricted to temporary migrants, who wouldbe replaced by others after three or four years. This time limit isnecessary <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to ensure that opportunities for <strong>in</strong>creased labourmigration are enjoyed by a sufficiently wi<strong>de</strong> range and large number ofmigrants, without creat<strong>in</strong>g popular antagonism to the policy <strong>in</strong> hostcountries. Rodrik th<strong>in</strong>ks this could be achieved “by build<strong>in</strong>g specific<strong>in</strong>centives <strong>in</strong>to the scheme” —such as withhold<strong>in</strong>g a portion of themigrant’s earn<strong>in</strong>gs until he or she returned home, or reduc<strong>in</strong>g thesend<strong>in</strong>g countries’ quotas <strong>in</strong> proportion to the numbers who failed to3 Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of global remittances <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed from 8% to 4%between 1980 and 1999, while the “w<strong>in</strong>ners” have been Eastern <strong>Europe</strong>, Central Asia,South and Central America and the Caribbean (GAMMELTOFT, 2002, p. ii).


INTRODUCTION 19return (loc.cit.). Consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the history of immigration <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> s<strong>in</strong>cethe 1970s, 4 one could be forgiven for see<strong>in</strong>g this as another <strong>in</strong>dicationthat the predictions of economists are more conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g, the less theyare encumbered by the complexities of the real world, and thebehaviour of real people.The best we can conclu<strong>de</strong>, perhaps, is that <strong>in</strong>creased labourmigration, especially by unskilled workers, could make a more significantcontribution to reduc<strong>in</strong>g global <strong>in</strong>equality than the liberalisation of tra<strong>de</strong>and <strong>in</strong>vestment. But the usual caveat applies: it should not be seen as apanacea or, <strong>in</strong> Castles’ words, a “general solution”. Still less should it beseen as a substitute for carefully targeted <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>de</strong>velopmentassistance, bear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d the regional differences <strong>in</strong> the contributionma<strong>de</strong> by remittances to the economies of <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries.I<strong>de</strong>ntity, belong<strong>in</strong>g and citizenshipThe issue of the <strong>in</strong>tegration of cultural m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>ansocieties naturally figures prom<strong>in</strong>ently <strong>in</strong> the chapters which follow. It isan issue which raises fundamental questions about membership,i<strong>de</strong>ntity and citizenship and, ultimately, about the future of the nationstatemo<strong>de</strong>l of political organisation itself. These questions must befaced by all countries with significant immigrant m<strong>in</strong>orities, but theyare perhaps most keenly felt <strong>in</strong> those which, until recently, either werenot, or did not see themselves as, countries of immigration.Germany comes <strong>in</strong>to the latter category. Bosswick’s chapter tracesthe slow and pa<strong>in</strong>ful process by which, over the past fifty years,German politicians came to terms with the fact that Germany was a“<strong>de</strong> facto country of immigration”. 5 A key aspect of this process hasbeen the erosion of the ethnic concept of the German nation, throughthe <strong>in</strong>troduction of changes <strong>in</strong> German citizenship and naturalisationlaw. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the early 1990s, the number of children born <strong>in</strong> Germany offoreign parents was 80 % more than the number of foreigners whobecame citizens through naturalisation. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1 January 2000, however,children of foreign parents born <strong>in</strong> Germany have automatically becomeGerman citizens, provi<strong>de</strong>d one parent holds resi<strong>de</strong>nce rights, while4 In particular, the failed efforts of such countries as France and Germany to <strong>in</strong>ducesignificant numbers of immigrants to return to their home countries after the clampdownon legal immigration <strong>in</strong> the early 1970s (Bosswick, Ma Mung).5 Dur<strong>in</strong>g this period, there was a net ga<strong>in</strong> of 9 million people through immigration,with an annual net immigration average of 200,000 foreign citizens (Bosswick).


20 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZthose born s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990 have been able to apply for naturalisation. Otherforeigners are now entitled to citizenship after eight years of legalresi<strong>de</strong>nce, on condition that they do not have a crim<strong>in</strong>al record, that theyare not <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on social welfare and that they have a certa<strong>in</strong> levelof proficiency <strong>in</strong> the German language.The imposition of these conditions suggests that the successful (fromthe immigrants’ po<strong>in</strong>t of view) <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrant m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong>German society is still hampered by a stereotypical characterisation ofimmigrant communities as hav<strong>in</strong>g more than their fare share ofcrim<strong>in</strong>als and welfare scroungers. This impression is supported by Brüß’schapter, <strong>in</strong> which he compares the attitu<strong>de</strong>s of German adolescents toadolescents from settled Turkish immigrant familes who had been <strong>in</strong>Germany for <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s, and “Resettler” adolescents (that is “Aussiedler”or “ethnic Germans”), who came from the ex-USSR and Eastern<strong>Europe</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce the mid 1980s. His results show that there is more “socialdistance” between German and Turkish adolescents than betweenGerman and Resettler adolescents and that Turkish adolescentstherefore run the risk of social marg<strong>in</strong>alisation.Bosswick draws attention, at the end of his chapter, to the importantpo<strong>in</strong>t that the <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrants is not a one-way process —italways implies a process of adjustment and adaptation by members ofthe host society, a process which has led <strong>in</strong> Germany to a reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g ofthe notion of the German nation as a homogeneous, ethnic entity. This,no doubt, is why the process has been slow and pa<strong>in</strong>ful, and why it hasprocee<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> fits and starts In other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries, whereimmigration from the South is a relatively new phenomenon comparedto Germany, such as Spa<strong>in</strong>, F<strong>in</strong>land and Italy, this process is onlybeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g and promises to be equally pa<strong>in</strong>ful and equally far-reach<strong>in</strong>g.In Spa<strong>in</strong>, there has been a “qualitative change” <strong>in</strong> the nature ofimmigration s<strong>in</strong>ce the 1980s, with a large <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> immigrants fromLat<strong>in</strong> America and Africa (Ruiz). But while this relatively rapid and recent<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> cultural plurality has begun to affect Spanish “collectivepsychology”, policies to protect the rights of cultural m<strong>in</strong>orities are“practically nonexistent”, the overrid<strong>in</strong>g concern of the authorities be<strong>in</strong>gto control immigration. This reflects public concerns and anxieties aboutimmigration, which is now consi<strong>de</strong>red “one of the ma<strong>in</strong> problems of thecountry”. And yet, by <strong>Europe</strong>an standards, Spa<strong>in</strong> has a low population ofresi<strong>de</strong>nt foreigners —1.5 million (a quarter of whom are <strong>Europe</strong>ancitizens) out of a total population of 40 million.F<strong>in</strong>land, unlike other “Nordic welfare states” has been, like Spa<strong>in</strong>, acountry of emigration until the last ten years, dur<strong>in</strong>g which there hasbeen a relatively large <strong>in</strong>flux of refugees and asylum seekers (Similä). It


INTRODUCTION 21has a fairly homogeneous population of about five million, of whichonly arournd 18,000 belong to national m<strong>in</strong>orities (Sami, Roma, Jewsand Tatars). With the need for labour immigration likely to grow, F<strong>in</strong>landis faced, more or less for the first time <strong>in</strong> its history, with the familiarproblem of how to reconcile the universalistic values of the liberal<strong>de</strong>mocratic state with the need to accommodate cultural diversity.In Italy, another country which has moved <strong>in</strong> a very short time frombe<strong>in</strong>g, predom<strong>in</strong>antly, a country of emigration to a country ofimmigration, and <strong>in</strong> which access to citizenship is based upon thepr<strong>in</strong>ciple of jus sangu<strong>in</strong>is (“law of the blood”), the problem presentsitself as how to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> Italian i<strong>de</strong>ntity (Pace). There is, accord<strong>in</strong>g toPace, a grow<strong>in</strong>g awareness among the Italian public of the need toarrive at a new basis for “social solidarity”, which <strong>in</strong> time will presumably<strong>in</strong>volve mov<strong>in</strong>g away from the present ethnic mo<strong>de</strong>l of the Italiannation (itself a fairly recent “<strong>in</strong>vention”) to a new un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g ofwhat it means to be Italian.Two countries covered <strong>in</strong> this book, France and the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom,have long and significant histories as countries of immigration, althougheach has followed a different approach when it comes to the <strong>in</strong>tegrationof m<strong>in</strong>orities. The French “Republican mo<strong>de</strong>l” of immigration has<strong>in</strong>volved the <strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>in</strong>dividuals rather than groups (Ma Mung).This is perhaps best <strong>de</strong>scribed as assimilation rather than <strong>in</strong>tegrations<strong>in</strong>ce, as Ma Mung puts it, accord<strong>in</strong>g to this mo<strong>de</strong>l, “The foreigner istolerated only on condition that he/she disappears”. The British approachto the management of ethnic and cultural diversity has conta<strong>in</strong>e<strong>de</strong>lements of assimilationism, but has comb<strong>in</strong>ed this with a strongemphasis on “cultural pluralism”, which has been the hallmark of the“classical” countries of immigration —Canada, the USA and Australia(CASTLES, 2000b, 134-140).The Republican mo<strong>de</strong>l rema<strong>in</strong>ed paramount <strong>in</strong> France after thecessation of labour immigration <strong>in</strong> the 1970s but began to change <strong>in</strong>the 1990s as a result of the <strong>in</strong>terplay of both progressive and repressivepolicies towards immigrants. On the one hand, there was a new focuson the problem of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. The recognition that <strong>in</strong>dividuals arediscrim<strong>in</strong>ated aga<strong>in</strong>st because of their ethnic group, clearly entails policies<strong>de</strong>signed to help the <strong>in</strong>tegration of groups rather than <strong>in</strong>dividuals andtherefore represents a move away from an assimilationist approach to themanagement of ethnic diversity. On the other hand, the toughen<strong>in</strong>g ofimmigration policy through the so-called “Pasqua Laws” 6 had the effect,6 Named after the M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Interior of the right-w<strong>in</strong>g Balladur governmentwhich came to power <strong>in</strong> 1993.


22 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZamong other th<strong>in</strong>gs, of tak<strong>in</strong>g away the automatic entitlement offoreigners to become French. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ma Mung, <strong>Europe</strong>an<strong>in</strong>tegration and new forms of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration, which have ma<strong>de</strong>the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of “mono-belong<strong>in</strong>g” to a s<strong>in</strong>gle nation-state <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyoutmo<strong>de</strong>d, are profoundly affect<strong>in</strong>g the found<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the Frenchnation-state. They “<strong>in</strong>vite us”, he writes, “to reth<strong>in</strong>k our relations with theforeigner, otherness and exteriority: <strong>in</strong> other words, with the world.”The <strong>in</strong>terplay of progressive and repressive policies, which can be<strong>de</strong>tected <strong>in</strong> Ma Mung’s account of changes <strong>in</strong> the traditional Frenchapproach to the <strong>in</strong>tegration of foreigners, is the central issue <strong>in</strong>Husband’s chapter on the UK. He contrasts the “creep of progressivelegislation” <strong>de</strong>signed to combat discrim<strong>in</strong>ation and promote culturalpluralism, which has been accompanied by little <strong>in</strong> the way of publicfanfare, with <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly restrictive policies towards asylum seekersand illegal immigrants, which have been pursued with “a robust an<strong>de</strong>xplicit political rhetoric”. The two policies are clearly <strong>in</strong> opposition toeach other, s<strong>in</strong>ce the “fight” aga<strong>in</strong>st illegal immigrants (co<strong>de</strong> for“asylum seekers”), accompanied as it is by a lurid media campaign, ishardly calculated to <strong>in</strong>crease tolerance and respect for immigrantm<strong>in</strong>orities amongst the host population. It is difficult not to agree withHusband that the public assault on “bogus” asylum seekers has moreto do with calculations of short term electoral advantage than it haseither with the protection of “genu<strong>in</strong>e” refugees or with thepromotion of multicultural values.And yet it is not quite as simple as this. What all these examplesillustrate is a contradiction, with<strong>in</strong> the nation-state mo<strong>de</strong>l of politicalorganisation, between citizenship, as the universal source of <strong>in</strong>dividualrights, and nationality as the primary and fundamental source of an<strong>in</strong>dividual’s social i<strong>de</strong>ntity. The contradiction between citizenship andnationality arises from two <strong>in</strong>terrelated assumptions which lie at theheart of the nation-state mo<strong>de</strong>l but which have become <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyproblematic <strong>in</strong> the face of grow<strong>in</strong>g levels of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration andthe <strong>de</strong>velopment of transnational networks. First, there is the assumptionthat the population liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the territory of a state is a homogeneousnational community, with common values, sentiments and attachments.This was always a myth, but it has become <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly difficult to susta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong> today’s conditions of globalisation, where membership of <strong>in</strong>digenousand ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities has become an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly salient basis of subnationali<strong>de</strong>ntity. Second, there is what JOPPKE calls the “pr<strong>in</strong>ciple ofse<strong>de</strong>ntar<strong>in</strong>ess” (1998, p. 6), the assumption that an <strong>in</strong>dividual’s nationali<strong>de</strong>ntity, unlike any other basis of social differentiation, is all embrac<strong>in</strong>gand exclusive.


INTRODUCTION 23…states are an archaic anomaly with<strong>in</strong> the organization of mo<strong>de</strong>rnsociety, which is based on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of non-territorial, functionaldifferentiation. This functional or<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong>tegrates <strong>in</strong>dividuals only <strong>in</strong>certa<strong>in</strong> specific respects (e.g. as workers, consumers or churchgoers),but never <strong>in</strong> their totality, thus requir<strong>in</strong>g them to be multiply orientedand allied, and <strong>in</strong> this sense perpetually flexible and mobile. Statesare an exception to this. They <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> the <strong>in</strong>dividual as a whole and<strong>in</strong>voluntarily by ascription at birth, further expect<strong>in</strong>g her to be attachedto just one state among a plurality of similarly conceived states, andnot to change this attachment over a lifetime…..Unlike Schumpeter’sclasses, states cannot afford to be like buses, always full but alwaysfilled by different people (see Schumpeter, 1953, p. 171). (JOPPKE,1998, p. 6).Clearly, what is nee<strong>de</strong>d is a tra<strong>de</strong>-off, or balance, between themobility and flexibility which “the organisation of mo<strong>de</strong>rn society”requires of the <strong>in</strong>dividual, and the “se<strong>de</strong>ntar<strong>in</strong>ess” which is necessaryfor political life to be organised by the nation-state mo<strong>de</strong>l. The sameneed for balance is expressed by Hirschman <strong>in</strong> terms of an oppositionbetween “exit” and “loyalty” (1970, pp. 69-71, cited <strong>in</strong> JORDAN/DÜVELL, 2003, p. 23). By “exit” he refers to the need for <strong>in</strong>dividuals, <strong>in</strong>a market system, to shop around between different products and firmsto f<strong>in</strong>d the one offer<strong>in</strong>g the greatest advantage for themselves. Political<strong>in</strong>stitutions, on the other hand, require “loyalty”, if members are to bepersua<strong>de</strong>d that it is worth their while tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> collective <strong>de</strong>cisionmak<strong>in</strong>g.Hirschman argued that all k<strong>in</strong>ds of organizations —firms andNGOs as well as states— should try to balance exit…and loyalty…Whatever membership systems evolve or are created <strong>in</strong> this centurywill face this challenge, and the fate of <strong>de</strong>mocracy as a pr<strong>in</strong>ciple ofcollective rule will <strong>de</strong>pend on the achievement of this balance.(JORDAN/DÜVELL, 2003, p. 23).There has, presumably, always been the need for states to achieve sucha “balance”. Pursu<strong>in</strong>g this metaphor, we might say that what is new todayis that the level and <strong>in</strong>tensity of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration over the past few<strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s, l<strong>in</strong>ked to other globalis<strong>in</strong>g trends, has pushed the “balanc<strong>in</strong>gpo<strong>in</strong>t” to the limit of the scale. F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a new balanc<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t, therefore,will <strong>in</strong>volve radical changes <strong>in</strong> the notions of membership, citizenship andi<strong>de</strong>ntity to which we have become accustomed dur<strong>in</strong>g the triumphantrise of the nation-state to its present position as the dom<strong>in</strong>ant politicalorganis<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of the mo<strong>de</strong>rn world. One example of a small butsignificant step towards the achievement of such a balance is provi<strong>de</strong>d


24 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZby Pekari, <strong>in</strong> her chapter on the extension of the right to vote <strong>in</strong> localelections <strong>in</strong> Vienna to “third country nationals” —long term resi<strong>de</strong>ntswho are neither Austrian nor EU citizens. This proposal (which had notentered <strong>in</strong>to force at the time Pekari was writ<strong>in</strong>g) breaks the l<strong>in</strong>kbetween citizenship and vot<strong>in</strong>g rights (albeit at the most local level), byrecognis<strong>in</strong>g that resi<strong>de</strong>nt non-citizens have the right to participate <strong>in</strong>political <strong>de</strong>cision-mak<strong>in</strong>g processes that affect citizens and non-citizensalike.The role of aca<strong>de</strong>mics and civil societyAca<strong>de</strong>mics who write about immigration and asylum are, like thecontributors to this book, more often than not highly critical of thepolicies pursued by the governments of liberal <strong>de</strong>mocratic states,particularly over the past few <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s. One basis for criticism is ethicaland philosophical and concerns the failure of governments to protectthe rights of immigrants and to honour their obligations towardsrefugees and asylum seekers un<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternational law. Another commoncriticism is pragmatic, and concerns the frequently noted ten<strong>de</strong>ncy ofimmigration policy to be ambivalent and <strong>in</strong>consistent <strong>in</strong> its aims and tohave unforeseen consequences, sometimes the direct opposite of whatthe policy-makers <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d.The most obvious example of this to be found <strong>in</strong> the chapterswhich follow are the restrictions imposed by <strong>Europe</strong>an countries onlabour immigration <strong>in</strong> the 1970s and 80s, and on the entrance of asylumseekers, particularly <strong>in</strong> the 1990s. One “un<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d si<strong>de</strong> effect” of thehalt on recruitment of foreign workers to Germany <strong>in</strong> 1973, and theaccompany<strong>in</strong>g unsuccessful attempts to promote significant voluntaryreturn, was that many foreigners stayed on precisely because theywould not have the option of return<strong>in</strong>g to Germany if they went home(Bosswick). All <strong>in</strong> all, and taken together with measures <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d toreduce asylum applications, recent efforts by <strong>Europe</strong>an states to ga<strong>in</strong>greater control over immigration have, as noted earlier, contributed toa huge and ever more resourceful <strong>in</strong>ternational “<strong>in</strong>dustry” <strong>in</strong> peoplesmuggl<strong>in</strong>g and traffick<strong>in</strong>g. As Boutruche remarks, “probably the moststrik<strong>in</strong>g paradox of the EU immigration policy” was that “by giv<strong>in</strong>g thehighest priority to the combat aga<strong>in</strong>st illegal migration, it fostered theproblem it was <strong>in</strong>itially supposed to tackle”.These criticisms of <strong>Europe</strong>an immigration policy, both ethical andpragmatic, raise questions about the effectiveness of research andadvocacy as a means of <strong>in</strong>fluenc<strong>in</strong>g the process of political <strong>de</strong>cision


INTRODUCTION 25mak<strong>in</strong>g. Gallagher, based on US experience, emphasises the impactaca<strong>de</strong>mics and advocates can have on policy, if they work closelytogether and are sufficiently well organised. She clearly believes, nodoubt rightly, that <strong>Europe</strong>an aca<strong>de</strong>mics and advocates have a long wayto go <strong>in</strong> this direction by comparison with their American counterparts.Pace sees local level activity by “the movements of civil society”,work<strong>in</strong>g at the level of schools and work-places, as virtually the onlyhope of stemm<strong>in</strong>g the outlandish fears of the Italian public aboutforeigners tak<strong>in</strong>g away their jobs, schools and i<strong>de</strong>ntity.Ruiz, on the other hand, is less sangu<strong>in</strong>e about the contribution ofNGOs to improv<strong>in</strong>g immigration policy <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>. The number of theseorganisations work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the area of migration has “grown spectacularly”<strong>in</strong> recent years but, at the same time, their <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce, and thereforetheir capacity to have a “transformative” effect on society, has beencompromised by their economic <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce on public funds. They havebecome, <strong>in</strong> effect, subcontractors to “the powers that be”, supply<strong>in</strong>gservices that are legitimised by government policy.These remarks hold a warn<strong>in</strong>g also for aca<strong>de</strong>mics work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theimmigration and refugee field, for they also are often <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt ongovernment fund<strong>in</strong>g and they certa<strong>in</strong>ly strive to make their research“relevant” to problems as perceived and <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed by policy makers. Weshould like to end this Introduction by suggest<strong>in</strong>g that, paradoxically,aca<strong>de</strong>mic research is likely to have a more beneficial impact on policy,the more distanced it is from the immediate concerns and preoccupationsof policy makers and from the concepts and categories by which thoseconcerns and preoccupations are structured. 7How to bridge the so-called “research-practice divi<strong>de</strong>” is a familiartopic of <strong>de</strong>bate <strong>in</strong> any problem-oriented field of enquiry. At first sight,the answer seems obvious. If we want our research to <strong>in</strong>fluence policy,then we had better <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>e its aims and objectives <strong>in</strong> terms of categoriesand concepts which are employed by policy makers. This was theapproach adopted by refugee studies, when it emerged as a field ofaca<strong>de</strong>mic enquiry <strong>in</strong> the 1980s. Its concern to be “relevant” and, itmust be admitted, its need for fund<strong>in</strong>g, led it to adopt policy relatedcategories and concerns <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its subject matter and sett<strong>in</strong>g itsresearch agenda. The trouble with this approach is that the categoriesand concepts employed by policy makers may not be helpful —<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed,they are likely to be downright unhelpful— when it comes to thepursuit of scientific un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g. This, after all, is not their ma<strong>in</strong>7 The follow<strong>in</strong>g paragraphs are based upon an argument also presented <strong>in</strong> TURTON(<strong>in</strong> press, 2003).


26 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZpurpose. 8 And yet, we must assume that the more rigorous thescience, both theoretically and methodologically, the more likely it is tohave a beneficial impact on policy.Perhaps the most common way of characteris<strong>in</strong>g the “gap” betweenresearch and practice is to dist<strong>in</strong>guish between two k<strong>in</strong>ds of people,aca<strong>de</strong>mics and practitioners, each engaged <strong>in</strong> a different k<strong>in</strong>d ofprofessional activity. and each with a different objective: aca<strong>de</strong>mics, itis sometimes said, want to un<strong>de</strong>rstand the world, while practitionerswant to change it. This apparently clear dist<strong>in</strong>ction soon becomesblurred, however, when one seeks to give it empirical content. For, onthe one hand, it turns out to be no easy matter to sort <strong>in</strong>dividualsunambiguously <strong>in</strong>to the two categories (aca<strong>de</strong>mics often want tochange the world too!) and, on the other, un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g the world isobviously a prerequisite for <strong>de</strong>liberately, systematically and beneficiallychang<strong>in</strong>g it.A more productive way of approach<strong>in</strong>g the issue might be todist<strong>in</strong>guish, not between two k<strong>in</strong>ds of people or professional activities,each focused on a different objective, but between two k<strong>in</strong>ds ofknowledge, scientific (or aca<strong>de</strong>mic) and practical, which the sameperson can happily comb<strong>in</strong>e and make use of, <strong>de</strong>pend<strong>in</strong>g on contextand situation. S<strong>in</strong>ce all knowledge is socially produced, an obviousbasis on which to dist<strong>in</strong>guish between different k<strong>in</strong>ds of knowledge isto focus on differences <strong>in</strong> their mo<strong>de</strong>s of production and reproduction.Thus, we can say that practical knowledge is produced “by do<strong>in</strong>g” —thatis, through the very performance of a task or activity which is not aimedprimarily at produc<strong>in</strong>g knowledge— while scientific knowledge isproduced by an activity which has precisely that objective. We can say,further, that it is a characteristic of practical knowledge to be unreflectiveand unself-conscious (though not necessarily false) because it is producedby “do<strong>in</strong>g” and that it is a characteristic of scientific knowledge to bereflective and self-conscious (though not necessarily true) because it isproduced by the <strong>de</strong>liberate application of scientific method.From this po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the best way to make aca<strong>de</strong>mic knowledge“relevant” to policy and practice is to use it to scrut<strong>in</strong>ise and problematisewhat practical knowledge takes for granted, not to susta<strong>in</strong> or legitimiseit. It follows that we should at least consi<strong>de</strong>r the possibility that, the“un<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d” and “unforeseen” consequences of immigration policymay be partly the result of research <strong>in</strong> this area be<strong>in</strong>g too closely tied to8 Quite what is their ma<strong>in</strong> purpose is another matter. In any case, we assume that itis the first priority of any <strong>in</strong>stitution, political or otherwise, to pursue its own vested<strong>in</strong>terests and to ensure its own survival.


INTRODUCTION 27the immediate, short term problems of the policy world (CASTLES, 2003,p. 26). Good research will always call <strong>in</strong>to question the a<strong>de</strong>quacy andusefulness of taken for granted generalisations, assumptions andcategories —one might say that this is what research is for. It is by suchquestion<strong>in</strong>g, therefore, that research can play its most effective part <strong>in</strong>the general improvement of human welfare. In the words of LouisPasteur, a scientist whose practical contribution to the improvement ofhuman welfare it is difficult to exaggerate: “Il n’existe pas <strong>de</strong> sciencesappliquées mais seulement <strong>de</strong>s applications <strong>de</strong> la science” (1872, p. 42).ReferencesCASTLES, S. (2000a) “Migration and M<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>: Perspectives for the1990s: Eleven Hypotheses”. In: S. Castles, Ethnicity and Globalization:From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen. Sage Publications, London.CASTLES, S. (2000 b) “Multicultural Citizenship: The Australian Experience”. In:S.Castles, Ethnicity and Globalization:From Migrant worker to TransnationalCitizen, Sage Publications, London.CASTLES, S. (2003) “Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and SocialTransformation”. In: Sociology 37 (1), pp. 13-34.COLLINSON, S. (1999) Globalisation and the Dynamics of International Migration:Implications for the Refugee Regime. Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper No. 1, New Issues <strong>in</strong>Refugee Research, UNHCR, Geneva.GAMMELTOFT, P. (2002) Remittances and other F<strong>in</strong>ancial Flows to Develop<strong>in</strong>gCountries. Expert Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper, Centre for Development Research,Copenhagen.GIBNEY, M.; HANSEN, R. (2002) “Asylum policy <strong>in</strong> the West: Past trends, futurePossibilities”. Paper prepared for the WIDER International Conference onPoverty, International Migration and Asylum, Hels<strong>in</strong>ki, 27-28 September.HIRSCHMAN, A.O. (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> Firms,Organisations and States. .Harvard University Press, Harvard, MA.JOPPKE, C. (1998) “<strong>Immigration</strong> Challenges to the Nation-State”. In: Challengesto the Nation-State: <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>in</strong> Western <strong>Europe</strong> and the United States,ed. C. Joppke. Oxford University Press, Oxford.JORDAN, B.; DÜVELL, F. (2003) Migration: The Boundaries of Equality and Justice.Polity Press, Cambridge.LEÓN-LEDESMA, M.; PIRACHA, M. (2001) “International Migration and the Role ofRemittances <strong>in</strong> Eastern <strong>Europe</strong>”. Department of Economics, University ofKent at Canterbury. www.ukc.ac.uk/economics/papers/papers-pdf/2001/0113.pdf (read, 1/10/03).MARTIN, S. (2001) Remittance Flows and Impact. Paper prepared for theRegional Conference on Remittances as a Development Tool, organized bythe Multilateral Investment Fund and the Inter-American DevelopmentBank.


28 DAVID TURTON & JULIA GONZALEZPASTEUR, L. (1872) Comptes rendus <strong>de</strong>s travaux du Congrès viticole et séricicole<strong>de</strong> Lyon, 9-14 SeptemberRODRIK, D. 2002 “Globalization for whom? Time to change the rules —andfocus on poor workers”. Harvard Magaz<strong>in</strong>e, 104:6, July-August 2002.www.harvard-magaz<strong>in</strong>e.com/on-l<strong>in</strong>e/070280.html (read 23/9/03).SCHUMPETER, J. (1953) “Die sozialen Klassen im ethnisch homogenen Milieu”.In: Aufsätze zur Soziologie, ed. J. Schumpeter, Mohr, Tüb<strong>in</strong>gen [firstpublished <strong>in</strong> 1927].SØRENSEN, N.N.; VAN HEAR, N.; ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, P. (2002) The Migration -Development Nexus: Evi<strong>de</strong>nce and Policy Options. State of the Art Overview.Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper 02.6, Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen.TURTON, D. (<strong>in</strong> press, 2003) Refugees, forced resettlers and “other forcedmigrants”: towards a unitary study of forced migration. Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper,New Issues <strong>in</strong> Refugee Research, UNHCR, Geneva.VAN KESSEL, G. (2001) “Global Migration and Asylum”. In: Forced MigrationReview, 10, pp. 10-13.WINTERS, L.A.; WALMSLEY, T.L.; WANG, Z.K.; GRYNBERG, R. (2002) Liberalis<strong>in</strong>g theTemporary Movement of Natural Persons. Economics Discussion Paper No.87, University of Sussex, UK.


Fram<strong>in</strong>g the issues and meet<strong>in</strong>g the challenges:the role of practitioners and aca<strong>de</strong>micsAnna Marie GallagherIntroductionWe are a people on the move. In a world population of over 6 billion(US BUREAU OF CENSUS, 2003), there are approximately 37 millionrefugees, asylum seekers and <strong>in</strong>ternally displaced persons worldwi<strong>de</strong>(USCR, 2002, p. 3, 4). In a population of over 375 million people with<strong>in</strong>the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union (EU), less than a million persons are refugees andasylum seekers (ibid.). Over 13 million immigrants from outsi<strong>de</strong> the EUare currently liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> EU member states. The number of undocumentedpersons or <strong>de</strong> facto resi<strong>de</strong>nts has been estimated to be as high as 5million persons <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>.Today immigration and asylum are among the most importantissues fac<strong>in</strong>g EU member states. F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g ways to <strong>de</strong>velop and formulatejust and fair policies regard<strong>in</strong>g refugees and asylum seekers on the onehand and those seek<strong>in</strong>g to immigrate or those already present <strong>in</strong> theEU on the other hand poses some of the greatest challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g theEU and its member states <strong>in</strong> the twenty first century.Frequently, government policy makers mistakenly comb<strong>in</strong>e issuesrelat<strong>in</strong>g to these two very separate groups —migrants on the onehand and asylum seekers and refugees on the other— whendiscuss<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>de</strong>bat<strong>in</strong>g and f<strong>in</strong>ally formulat<strong>in</strong>g migration and refugeepolicy <strong>in</strong> their countries. Real or imag<strong>in</strong>ed fear of potential mass<strong>in</strong>fluxes of refugees causes governments to pursue restrictive policiestowards immigrants generally as well as refugees and asylum seekersspecifically.In or<strong>de</strong>r for countries to satisfy their moral and legal obligationsun<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternational refugee law, EU member states must respect therights of refugees and asylum seekers. This respect should not be


30 ANNA MARIE GALLAGHERmodified or qualified by real or imag<strong>in</strong>ed concerns regard<strong>in</strong>g irregularimmigration and bor<strong>de</strong>r security issues. In separat<strong>in</strong>g out the issues,member states should carefully exam<strong>in</strong>e their own economic and socialneeds <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>vis<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g a sound immigration policy to benefitthe host communities, immigrants themselves and the communitiesthat they leave beh<strong>in</strong>d.The issue of asylum and immigration <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> is one of the fourbroad themes on which the current Greek Presi<strong>de</strong>ncy of the EU willfocus its energies. In the Draft Programme of the Council for 2003, theGreek and Italian Presi<strong>de</strong>ncies state that progress on <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g acommon EU policy on the separate but related issues of asylum andimmigration are a political priority for both. As advocates and aca<strong>de</strong>mics,we should urge the current presi<strong>de</strong>ncy to exam<strong>in</strong>e and discuss theseissues separately <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to protect and promote respect for the rightsof all migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.Specific challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong>IntroductionThe migration context <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> has changed dramatically over thelast few <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s. Many countries have converted from countries ofemigration to countries of immigration. Some are old hands <strong>in</strong> the<strong>de</strong>bate, such as France, Germany and England. Others are relativenewcomers, such as Ireland, Italy and Spa<strong>in</strong>. All member states with<strong>in</strong>the EU are faced with many migration-related challenges and conflict<strong>in</strong>gpriorities.Some of the specific challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g member states <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>irregular migration, <strong>in</strong>tegration, bur<strong>de</strong>n of shar<strong>in</strong>g responsibility forasylum seekers and refugees, and last, but certa<strong>in</strong>ly not least, address<strong>in</strong>gthe root causes of migration. The ultimate challenge will be to createand promote policies with the participation of and for the benefit of allaffected parties, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g national governments, regional bodies,migrants, refugees and the host communities which receive them.Root causes of migrationOne of the most press<strong>in</strong>g and important challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g the EU isto i<strong>de</strong>ntify and address the root causes of migration. This will <strong>in</strong>volvelong term plann<strong>in</strong>g and commitment by the member states. Many statesdo recognise the importance of this issue; unfortunately, however, it is


FRAMING THE ISSUES AND MEETING THE CHALLENGES... 31not <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d as an <strong>in</strong>tegral and equal part <strong>in</strong> immigration policy andplann<strong>in</strong>g by governments.Most migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, leave their countriesbecause they have to, not because they want to. Many migrants arecompelled to flee their countries because of extreme poverty, politicalconflict or natural disaster. After reach<strong>in</strong>g their f<strong>in</strong>al <strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ations andf<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g work, the great majority become a primary source of supportfor those left beh<strong>in</strong>d. For most migrants, the issue of immigration is anissue of survival for themselves and their loved ones.In or<strong>de</strong>r to seriously and s<strong>in</strong>cerely address the root causes ofmigration, the EU must look at its level of overseas <strong>de</strong>velopment aid(ODA). In <strong>Europe</strong>, the ODA contribution has been as low as 0.14 % ofGDP. The recommen<strong>de</strong>d United Nations target is 0.7 % of GDP. In 2001,if every country worldwi<strong>de</strong> had met this target, an extra $112 billioncould have been available for support of work <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries(JRS, 2002, p. 2). Overseas aid is key to help<strong>in</strong>g poorer economies <strong>de</strong>velopand create the conditions necessary for people to stay and supporttheir families <strong>in</strong> their own communities.In <strong>de</strong>vis<strong>in</strong>g immigration policies, member states must <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> theissue of overseas aid as an <strong>in</strong>tegral part of any plan. Member statesshould work closely with the governments of send<strong>in</strong>g countries to i<strong>de</strong>ntifyregions with the highest numbers of out migration and <strong>de</strong>velop projects<strong>in</strong> those regions to support and susta<strong>in</strong> the livelihoods of potentialmigrants and their family members.Irregular migrationMember states <strong>in</strong> the EU are confronted with and fear cont<strong>in</strong>uedirregular immigration. Uncontrolled irregular migration harms both themigrants themselves —some lose their lives <strong>in</strong> transit, while all facedifficult conditions after arrival— and the receiv<strong>in</strong>g communities, whichmay have <strong>in</strong>a<strong>de</strong>quate resources to accommodate the needs of largenumbers of undocumented persons.How should <strong>Europe</strong> address the issue of the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number ofundocumented persons liv<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> its bor<strong>de</strong>rs? Their presence is areality. Most flee situations of political <strong>in</strong>stability or poverty <strong>in</strong> theirhome countries. Many enter illegally. They work <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, raise theirchildren here, contribute to the economy and often play a major role <strong>in</strong>the support and <strong>de</strong>velopment of the villages and communities theywere forced to leave beh<strong>in</strong>d. They contribute to the labour market andcultural richness <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> and to the <strong>de</strong>velopment of the rest of theworld. However, they are the most vulnerable of populations. Most


32 ANNA MARIE GALLAGHERirregular migrants receive low pay, have little or no access to healthcare, and face limited educational opportunities. 1 What can and should<strong>Europe</strong> do to protect the rights of these <strong>de</strong> facto resi<strong>de</strong>nts? Howshould <strong>Europe</strong> recognise their contributions?In spite of attempts by governments to control and clamp down onirregular immigration and <strong>de</strong>spite the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly dangerous conditionsfaced by many undocumented migrants <strong>in</strong> their journey north, thenumbers cont<strong>in</strong>ue to rise. Some estimate the number of undocumentedpersons <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> to be 5 million. Others believe the number may beeven higher. The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between regular and irregular migration islikely to rema<strong>in</strong> a feature of immigration reality <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> for years tocome. EU member states should exhibit the same respect for thehuman rights of undocumented migrants with<strong>in</strong> their bor<strong>de</strong>rs as theydo for the human rights of persons liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> unstable and dangerousregimes abroad. Although improv<strong>in</strong>g basic conditions for undocumentedpersons may be seen by member states as <strong>in</strong>compatible with their<strong>de</strong>sire to curb illegal migration, this so called “pull factor” should notbe exaggerated.Therefore, a major challenge for the EU is the creation of a wellconceivedand <strong>de</strong>veloped immigration policy —asi<strong>de</strong> from issues ofbor<strong>de</strong>r control and enforcement— which <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s as one of its goalsthe reduction of irregular migration. Any such plan should recognisethe contributions of long-term <strong>de</strong> facto resi<strong>de</strong>nts, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g grant<strong>in</strong>glegal status to long-term resi<strong>de</strong>nts with significant ties to their hostcommunities. Many studies have shown that EU member states needboth skilled and unskilled workers. Therefore, an effective and fair plancannot be <strong>de</strong>veloped without realistically exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the labour needsof each country and whether the native population can meet thoseneeds.At the meet<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Council <strong>in</strong> Seville <strong>in</strong> June 2002, alarge amount of time was <strong>de</strong>voted to the <strong>de</strong>bate on the <strong>de</strong>velopmentof a future common policy on immigration and asylum. Discussionsprimarily focused on issues relat<strong>in</strong>g to bor<strong>de</strong>r surveillance, repatriationto countries of orig<strong>in</strong> and the cooperation of police <strong>in</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g illegal1 For general <strong>in</strong>formation about undocumented persons <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, visit the websiteof the Platform for International Cooperation on the Rights of Undocumented Migrantsat http://www.picum.org. Also, see, Outsi<strong>de</strong> the Protection of the Law: The Situation ofIrregular Migrants <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, by Dr. Matthew GIBNEY. This report summarises theresearch sponsored by the Jesuit Refugee Service regard<strong>in</strong>g the situation ofundocumented persons <strong>in</strong> Germany, the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom and Spa<strong>in</strong>. More <strong>in</strong>formationabout this research and copies of the reports are available on the JRS website athttp://www.jesref.org un<strong>de</strong>r the Research section of the Resources division.


FRAMING THE ISSUES AND MEETING THE CHALLENGES... 33immigration. The challenge for the EU and its member states will be tomove further <strong>in</strong> the policy <strong>de</strong>bate and address issues relat<strong>in</strong>g tocommon policy on labour needs and immigration and the protection ofthe human rights of both undocumented migrants and asylum seekers.Bur<strong>de</strong>n shar<strong>in</strong>gAnother challenge for a grow<strong>in</strong>g EU is the issue of bur<strong>de</strong>n shar<strong>in</strong>g.Legally and morally, what contributions should each member state maketowards receiv<strong>in</strong>g and accommodat<strong>in</strong>g refugee populations? Whatcontributions should member states make to poorer countries throughoutthe world to support them <strong>in</strong> accept<strong>in</strong>g and protect<strong>in</strong>g refugees?Although not specifically required by conventions or <strong>in</strong>ternationallaw norms, a limited number of countries admit refugees on a permanentbasis through refugee resettlement programmes. Canada, the UnitedStates and Australia have admitted refugees un<strong>de</strong>r their immigrationprogrammes for <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s. In addition to process<strong>in</strong>g asylum claims ofpersons with<strong>in</strong> and at their bor<strong>de</strong>rs, Canada, the United States andAustralia yearly i<strong>de</strong>ntify refugees <strong>in</strong> third countries for admission andparticipation <strong>in</strong> refugee resettlement programmes. In 2001, the UnitedStates admitted over 68,000 refugees; Canada admitted over 12,000;and, Australia admitted over 6,000 (see UNHCR, 2002, p. 60). Unfortunately,these numbers represent an 8 % reduction <strong>in</strong> the number ofrefugee resettlement cases accepted the previous year.<strong>Europe</strong>, on the other hand, is primarily confronted with asylumseekers, many who end up stay<strong>in</strong>g. Only a handful of EU memberstates regularly admit a yearly number of permanent refugees throughresettlement programmes. However, the <strong>Europe</strong>an Commission hascreated a <strong>Europe</strong>an Refugee Fund which distributes money and assistsmember states <strong>in</strong> process<strong>in</strong>g and host<strong>in</strong>g refugees already <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>.Hopefully, member states will access and use some of these funds tosupport the creation of permanent refugee resettlement programmes.Although <strong>de</strong>veloped countries contribute most of the fund<strong>in</strong>g forprogrammes that assist refugees, the least-<strong>de</strong>veloped and poorestcountries host the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of the world´s refugees (USCR,2002, p. 10, 11). Poor countries are thus faced with a double bur<strong>de</strong>n:how to provi<strong>de</strong> for their own nationals dur<strong>in</strong>g times of great economicand social crisis and, at the same time, attempt to protect and servelarge numbers of refugees cross<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to their territories. If a united effortby both send<strong>in</strong>g and receiv<strong>in</strong>g countries is not ma<strong>de</strong> to adjust the bur<strong>de</strong>nsborne by poor countries, the number of migrants flee<strong>in</strong>g political an<strong>de</strong>conomic strife will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to soar.


34 ANNA MARIE GALLAGHERIntegrationAnother major challenge fac<strong>in</strong>g both migrants and their hostcommunities is the issue of <strong>in</strong>tegration. Migrants to <strong>Europe</strong> come from allover the world. Often, the places that receive them are overwhelm<strong>in</strong>glylarge cities which quickly become a rich mix of cultures, i<strong>de</strong>ntities andhistories. These cities are the foundations of <strong>in</strong>tegration where thecultural diversity of the new immigrants and the challenges of liv<strong>in</strong>gtogether as a community are brought together <strong>in</strong> neighbourhoods thatare truly multiethnic urban villages.In or<strong>de</strong>r to un<strong>de</strong>rstand the ways <strong>in</strong> which immigrants and theirchildren build lives <strong>in</strong> new communities, we must conceive of <strong>in</strong>tegrationas someth<strong>in</strong>g more than simple notions of a unidirectional assimilation.Integration is now un<strong>de</strong>rstood as susta<strong>in</strong>ed mutual <strong>in</strong>teraction betweenimmigrants and the societies that receive them, an <strong>in</strong>teraction that maylast for generations. Recent North American and <strong>Europe</strong>an researchshows that immigrants quickly adopt many of the traditional normsand values of the receiv<strong>in</strong>g society but also ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> strong andpositive values for their own cultures and languages. Unfortunately,socio-economic <strong>in</strong>tegration and mobility may be proceed<strong>in</strong>g at aslower pace.The <strong>de</strong>gree of social <strong>in</strong>tegration and socio-economic mobility ofimmigrants is generally assessed by look<strong>in</strong>g at a variety of variables,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g:—L<strong>in</strong>guistic Integration: Language used <strong>in</strong> public <strong>in</strong>teractions,competency <strong>in</strong> the new language, language used at home,language used among family members.—Labour Market Integration: Education level, labour forceparticipation of men and women, unemployment rate, socioprofessionalmobility, <strong>in</strong>dividual or household <strong>in</strong>come.—Civic/Political Integration: Participation <strong>in</strong> political parties,unions, neighbourhood associations, religious <strong>in</strong>stitutions and/orcommunity groups.—Educational Integration: School performance, school drop-outrates, choice of school, post-secondary education atta<strong>in</strong>ment,parent-teacher communication.—Resi<strong>de</strong>ntial Integration: Degree of resi<strong>de</strong>ntial concentration/segregation, resi<strong>de</strong>ntial mobility, homeownership rates, dwell<strong>in</strong>gsize/crowd<strong>in</strong>g, discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> rental markets.Immigrants and their children face daily challenges <strong>in</strong> their newworlds. Meet<strong>in</strong>g those challenges <strong>in</strong> part will <strong>de</strong>mand effective social


FRAMING THE ISSUES AND MEETING THE CHALLENGES... 35and economic policies on the part of host communities to help addressproblems faced by immigrants <strong>in</strong> places where they settle. Integrationpolicies and programmes will succeed only if they are based on theparticular socio-economic, cultural and political circumstances of thecommunities that receive them.Host communities themselves will be faced with new challenges,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g whether they have the capacity, the will and the resources toaddress the needs of newcomers fairly and a<strong>de</strong>quately. If not, how canthey access such resources? If they are not capable of <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>gnewcomers, what accounts for this <strong>in</strong>ability? How can member statespromote education campaigns to curb the rise of racism and xenophobia<strong>in</strong> response to <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g immigration? These are only some of themany questions that need to be asked, discussed and answered <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>vis<strong>in</strong>g sound <strong>in</strong>tegration policy and programmes to benefit bothimmigrants and the members of the host communities.Aca<strong>de</strong>mics, non-governmental organisations and practitionerswork<strong>in</strong>g together: an American perspectiveNon-governmental organisations (NGOs), aca<strong>de</strong>mics and practitioners<strong>in</strong> the United States have come together over the last fifteen years tocreate a dynamic, collaborative relationship to advocate for the rights ofimmigrants, refugees and asylum seekers <strong>in</strong> the United States. Thatcollaboration has resulted <strong>in</strong> the provision of direct legal, social an<strong>de</strong>ducational services to immigrants and asylum seekers, direct lobby<strong>in</strong>g ontheir behalf before local, regional and national <strong>de</strong>cision makers andfe<strong>de</strong>ral court litigation to challenge unfair and discrim<strong>in</strong>atory laws andpolicies. A large, diverse and powerful NGO community across the UnitedStates is <strong>de</strong>voted to promot<strong>in</strong>g respect for the rights of migrants, refugeesand asylum seekers. The immigration bar association —the American<strong>Immigration</strong> Lawyers Association— has over 8,000 members who arelawyers practis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the field of immigration law, primarily <strong>in</strong> the UnitedStates (see their website at http://www.aila.org). Aca<strong>de</strong>mics <strong>de</strong>dicated tomigration and refugee issues have organised sophisticated networks andassociations through which they share i<strong>de</strong>as, <strong>in</strong>formation and research. 22 In the field of immigration, nationality and constitutional law, many legal aca<strong>de</strong>micsand scholars belong to focus groups with<strong>in</strong> the American Association of Law Schools(AALS). For <strong>in</strong>formation on AALS and those groups, visits its website at http://www.aals.org Additionally, immigration and nationality law professors <strong>in</strong> the United Stateshave organised a list serve, known as the immprof list, with close to 200 participants.


36 ANNA MARIE GALLAGHERA well-<strong>de</strong>veloped network of NGOs across the United States worktogether locally, regionally and nationally to promote the <strong>de</strong>velopmentof sound immigration policies which protect the rights of all immigrants,regardless of legal status. 3 Many NGOs have headquarters <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton,D.C. where staff are primarily responsible for lobby<strong>in</strong>g the governmentalagencies, the White House itself and the United States Congress forpromotion of better policies, laws and regulations relat<strong>in</strong>g to immigration<strong>in</strong> the United States. NGOs often serve as a source of <strong>in</strong>formation onthe lives and needs of immigrants, legally, socially and economically, forthe government, aca<strong>de</strong>mic researchers and the press.NGOs work together <strong>in</strong> coalition to <strong>de</strong>vise effective, unified lobby<strong>in</strong>gstrategies based on their direct experiences with and knowledge ofimmigrant communities. Local NGO representatives <strong>in</strong> cities across theUnited States regularly meet with local <strong>Immigration</strong> and NaturalizationService (INS) personnel to discuss ongo<strong>in</strong>g problems and challengesfac<strong>in</strong>g the communities they represent. NGOs also liaise with localgovernment officials, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g police, municipal authorities and schoolboard officials, on all matters affect<strong>in</strong>g immigrants, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g hous<strong>in</strong>g,education and safety issues.National NGOs work together to promote better laws and policiesfor immigrants and their family members before the United StatesCongress. They meet regularly with members of Congress and theirstaff to discuss immigration policy issues and to educate them on thecomplexities of implementation and <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the many immigrationlaws and regulations <strong>in</strong> force. Many times, members of Congresswill ask NGO representatives to draft portions of proposed legislation <strong>in</strong>immigration related bills. NGO representatives serve as a source of<strong>in</strong>formation to the United States Congress on all areas of immigrationlaw and policy.NGO representatives <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, D.C. also regularly meet withhigh officials <strong>in</strong> the INS and other governmental agencies with jurisdictionover immigration matters to discuss topics relat<strong>in</strong>g to immigrants <strong>in</strong> theUnited States, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g backlogs <strong>in</strong> adjudication of immigrationapplications, <strong>de</strong>tention of immigrants, and refugee and asylum issues.Over the last ten years, the relationship between the NGO communityand the INS and other governmental agencies has become more openand fluid.The NGO community and governmental officials have workedtogether on a variety of <strong>in</strong>itiatives which have resulted <strong>in</strong> greater3 For more <strong>in</strong>formation regard<strong>in</strong>g these organisations, visit the website of theAmerican <strong>Immigration</strong> Law Foundation at http://www.ailf.org and click on L<strong>in</strong>ks.


FRAMING THE ISSUES AND MEETING THE CHALLENGES... 37protection of immigrants’ rights <strong>in</strong> the United States. The NGO communityworked closely with the INS <strong>in</strong> the early 1990s on a major reform andoverhaul of the asylum system. This collaboration resulted <strong>in</strong> the creationof much improved policies, laws and regulations to protect the rightsof refugees and asylum seekers <strong>in</strong> the United States. In fact, manyNGO representatives <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the asylum reform process later werehired by the INS as asylum officers with<strong>in</strong> its Asylum Offices across thecountry.The NGO community and the INS worked together to draft andpublish Detention Standards govern<strong>in</strong>g the treatment of INS <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ees<strong>in</strong> prisons and <strong>de</strong>tention centres across the country pend<strong>in</strong>g theoutcome of their <strong>de</strong>portation cases. At the request of the INS, severalNGOs <strong>de</strong>veloped “Know Your Rights” programmes which provi<strong>de</strong><strong>in</strong>formation to INS <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ees regard<strong>in</strong>g their rights to rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> theUnited States, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g provid<strong>in</strong>g pro bono representation to <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ees.In a jo<strong>in</strong>t collaboration between the Board of <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeals —theimmigration appellate authority which <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>s appeals from localimmigration court <strong>de</strong>cisions— and the NGO community, a Pro BonoProject was created to provi<strong>de</strong> free representation to INS <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>eesaround the country <strong>in</strong> appeals of their cases. These are a few examplesof the many collaborative efforts which have resulted from strong andunified lobby<strong>in</strong>g by NGOs across the United States.Unfortunately, s<strong>in</strong>ce John Ashcroft has been named AttorneyGeneral, the relationship between the NGO community and the INS(which is un<strong>de</strong>r the jurisdiction of the United States Department ofJustice) has become somewhat stra<strong>in</strong>ed. Attorney General Ashcroft hastaken the lead <strong>in</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g secretive immigration policies, has draftedregulations authoris<strong>in</strong>g secret <strong>de</strong>portation hear<strong>in</strong>gs, has stripped theadm<strong>in</strong>istrative appellate body <strong>in</strong> charge of immigration related appeals—the Board of <strong>Immigration</strong> Appeals— of much of its authority and hasgenerally promoted the restriction of immigrant rights after September11, 2001. 4 In response to these attacks on immigrants’ rights, NGOshave filed litigation seek<strong>in</strong>g open hear<strong>in</strong>gs and challeng<strong>in</strong>g newrestrictions on the rights of immigrants. They have also <strong>de</strong>velopedmedia campaigns to publicise and report on what is happen<strong>in</strong>g to4For more <strong>in</strong>formation on actions by US government agencies relat<strong>in</strong>g to immigrations<strong>in</strong>ce September 11, 2001, visit the American <strong>Immigration</strong> Law Foundation website athttp://www.ailf.org. Click on the Legal Action Center to access Post September 11 LegalResources which lists Executive Branch Actions s<strong>in</strong>ce September 11, 2001. This list<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s all the <strong>in</strong>itiatives taken by Attorney General John Ashcroft restrict<strong>in</strong>g immigrantrights <strong>in</strong> the United States.


38 ANNA MARIE GALLAGHERimmigrants and their family members as a result of special registrationprocedures, secret proceed<strong>in</strong>gs and <strong>de</strong>tention of long time resi<strong>de</strong>nts.NGO representatives and aca<strong>de</strong>mics from universities throughoutthe United States have also <strong>de</strong>veloped a close work<strong>in</strong>g relationship overthe last fifteen years. In the area of immigration law and policy, immigrationand constitutional law professors have provi<strong>de</strong>d direct assistanceto NGOs and private attorneys <strong>in</strong> draft<strong>in</strong>g compla<strong>in</strong>ts and legal briefs <strong>in</strong>support of the many lawsuits filed <strong>in</strong> the fe<strong>de</strong>ral courts challeng<strong>in</strong>gunfair and discrim<strong>in</strong>atory immigration laws. Law professors, NGOrepresentatives and private practitioners have challenged the INSpractice of <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>de</strong>tention of immigrants with <strong>de</strong>portation or<strong>de</strong>rswho cannot be <strong>de</strong>ported for diplomatic reasons. They have workedtogether to challenge unfair asylum procedures which eventuallyresulted <strong>in</strong> a major reform of the asylum system <strong>in</strong> the early 1990s.Law professors across the United States have established over 30refugee and immigration law cl<strong>in</strong>ics with<strong>in</strong> university law faculties. Thesecl<strong>in</strong>ics serve two purposes: to provi<strong>de</strong> quality, free legal representation toimmigrants and asylum seekers, and to tra<strong>in</strong> law stu<strong>de</strong>nts to effectivelyand assertively advocate on behalf of these vulnerable groups. Manylaw stu<strong>de</strong>nts cont<strong>in</strong>ue to provi<strong>de</strong> pro bono representation to asylumseekers and immigrants for many years after their cl<strong>in</strong>ical experience <strong>in</strong>law school.Law professors have also promoted the creation and <strong>de</strong>velopmentof NGOs which provi<strong>de</strong> direct legal services to immigrants and asylumseekers <strong>in</strong> their communities. They have helped immigrants and familymembers create and establish their own NGOs to lobby on behalf ofthemselves and their family members adversely affected by unfairimmigration laws and practices. 5Aca<strong>de</strong>mics also serve as an important source of <strong>in</strong>formation to thepress and public. As aca<strong>de</strong>mics, they are seen as credible and thoughtfulanalysts of issues relat<strong>in</strong>g to immigration policies and practices <strong>in</strong> theUnited States and, therefore, serve as a powerful voice on behalf ofmigrants, refugees and asylum seekers.Aca<strong>de</strong>mics play an important and <strong>in</strong>tegral role <strong>in</strong> litigation ofimmigration matters before the fe<strong>de</strong>ral courts. There have been many<strong>in</strong>stances where the NGOs and the INS have been unable to reachagreements <strong>in</strong> resolv<strong>in</strong>g problems. NGOs, therefore, have been forced5 Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice is an NGO created with support fromfaculty at the New York University Law School. It fights for the rights of long termresi<strong>de</strong>nts whom the INS seeks to <strong>de</strong>port as a result of the commission of crimes, most ofwhich are m<strong>in</strong>or. For more on CIEJ, see http://www.ciej.org


FRAMING THE ISSUES AND MEETING THE CHALLENGES... 39to br<strong>in</strong>g matters before the courts for resolution. In those <strong>in</strong>stances,the NGOs have worked closely with private lawyers and law professors<strong>in</strong> draft<strong>in</strong>g compla<strong>in</strong>ts, fil<strong>in</strong>g lawsuits and prepar<strong>in</strong>g and submitt<strong>in</strong>glegal briefs to the courts <strong>in</strong> support of their positions. Because of theircredibility with<strong>in</strong> the legal community, aca<strong>de</strong>mics play an importantand <strong>in</strong>fluential part <strong>in</strong> immigration related litigation.F<strong>in</strong>ally, and perhaps most importantly, aca<strong>de</strong>mics <strong>in</strong> the UnitedStates often shape the terms and <strong>in</strong>fluence the outcome of the immigration<strong>de</strong>bate. For example, law professors <strong>in</strong> the United States regularlywrite articles and books analys<strong>in</strong>g and criticis<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>atory and<strong>in</strong>effective immigration law and policies and often offer proposedalternatives to such. Supreme Court Justices and fe<strong>de</strong>ral court judgeslook to these articles <strong>in</strong> review<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>de</strong>cid<strong>in</strong>g important immigrationcases before them. It is also quite common for immigration and constitutionallaw professors to serve <strong>in</strong> high positions with<strong>in</strong> the Departmentof Justice and the <strong>Immigration</strong> and Naturalization Service for differentperiods of time dur<strong>in</strong>g their professional careers. 6ConclusionIn light of the many press<strong>in</strong>g issues and challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong>,and the role that aca<strong>de</strong>mics and NGOs can play, it is vital that we worktogether to promote the <strong>in</strong>vestigation, publication and dissem<strong>in</strong>ationof credible and reliable <strong>in</strong>formation about migrants and refugeesavailable for use by migrants, their advocates and the <strong>de</strong>cision makersthroughout <strong>Europe</strong>. The thoughtful and analytical qualities possessedby aca<strong>de</strong>mics comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the energy, experience and knowledge ofNGO advocates and practitioners work<strong>in</strong>g with and for migrantcommunities provi<strong>de</strong> the best sett<strong>in</strong>g to meet and address the manymigration-related challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>in</strong> the twenty-first century.ReferencesJRS (2002): JRS-<strong>Europe</strong> annual report 2001-2002, available on the JRS-<strong>Europe</strong>website at http://www.jrseurope.org.6 David Martín, a law professor at the University of Virg<strong>in</strong>ia School of Law and AlexAle<strong>in</strong>ikoff, a law professsor at the Georgetown University Law Center have both served atdifferent times dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1990s as General Counsel of the <strong>Immigration</strong> and NaturalizationService.


40 ANNA MARIE GALLAGHERUS BUREAU OF CENSUS (2003): International Programs Center, U.S. Bureau ofCensus at http://blue.census.gov/ipc, provid<strong>in</strong>g world population statisticsas of January 29, 2003.USCR (2002): World Refugee Survey 2002 available from the USCR website athttp://www.refugees.orgUNHCR (2002): Statistical Yearbook 2001, UNHCR, Geneva.


Build<strong>in</strong>g a rights based asylum system for <strong>Europe</strong>:a UNHCR perspectiveBelén García <strong>de</strong> V<strong>in</strong>uesaThe Amsterdam Treaty, with the EU Member States ’ agreement torel<strong>in</strong>quish their sovereign right to pursue national policies <strong>in</strong> the fieldsof asylum and immigration, represents the most significant step towardsthe build<strong>in</strong>g of a common EU asylum system. The Member States thereby«agreed to agree» on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of who is to receive protection,what it entails, where and how it is to be implemented. Four out of thefive years of the Amsterdam timeframe have gone by, and three<strong>in</strong>struments have been adopted: the Council Decision creat<strong>in</strong>g a <strong>Europe</strong>anRefugee Fund; the Directive on Temporary Protection; and the Directivesett<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>imum standards for the reception of asylum seekers. Politicalagreement has been reached on one further <strong>in</strong>strument: the Regulationreplac<strong>in</strong>g the Dubl<strong>in</strong> Convention for <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the State responsible forexam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g an application for asylum. However, most of those questionsI have just mentioned on the common asylum system rema<strong>in</strong> unanswered.If we take a close look at the context <strong>in</strong> which a common EU asylumsystem is emerg<strong>in</strong>g, we cannot ignore that it is not the best of timesfor the birth of a regional asylum system to be taken as a mo<strong>de</strong>l bymany, if not all, regions <strong>in</strong> the world. The portrait that many have of arefugee —often close to a caricature— no longer corresponds to theearlier image of a political opponent to a communist regime received <strong>in</strong>a Western State. Nor does it even correspond to the victims runn<strong>in</strong>gaway from ethnic cleans<strong>in</strong>g shown by the terrible images on the CNN.The refugee who currently knocks at our doors is a peasant milked by aguerrilla army who cannot pay any longer because he or she is ru<strong>in</strong>ed,or a woman who fears genital mutilation and <strong>in</strong> some cases is forced<strong>in</strong>to prostitution upon arrival <strong>in</strong> our country. It is <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed a new profileof refugees, and some say that such persons are not real refugees,although they acknowledge that they might be <strong>in</strong> need of protection.


42 BELEN GARCIA DE VINUESAMany refugees nowadays arrive together with many of their countrypeople who have suffered the consequences of economic <strong>in</strong>equalityand the aftermath of a conflict and see themselves forced to choosebetween a hopeless struggle to survive at home, or an uprooted existencewhere they might nonetheless rega<strong>in</strong> the hope of lead<strong>in</strong>g a dignifiedlife. They reach what has been called a “fortress” <strong>Europe</strong> and seek thebest way to enter its territory, be it through the available legal means,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the asylum procedures, or with the aid of smugglers andtraffickers who take them across bor<strong>de</strong>rs concealed <strong>in</strong> lorries, at highf<strong>in</strong>ancial cost and great personal risk.In an attempt to manage these migration flows, <strong>Europe</strong>an Statescreate new tools and mechanisms that might, or might not beeffective for such purpose, but often put asylum systems at risk, if notthe mere possibility of hav<strong>in</strong>g access to the territory of a State wherean asylum application can be lodged. Even when an asylum seekermanages to enter the territory of one of the Member States and lodgean application, he or she risks be<strong>in</strong>g sent back to any ‘safe thirdcountry’ outsi<strong>de</strong> the Union through which he or she passed en routeto <strong>Europe</strong>. Although the <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition of a safe third country implies thatsuch country is a party to the 1951 Convention on the Status ofRefugees and has status <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation procedures <strong>in</strong> compliance withthis, often there is no guarantee that the asylum seeker will f<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ffective protection <strong>in</strong> it.<strong>Europe</strong>an States are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly preoccupied with the <strong>in</strong>tegrity oftheir asylum systems and the prevention of their abuse. They study thelow recognition rates and make calculations of the money spent <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>cid<strong>in</strong>g who is and who is not an asylum seeker, as well as the costsof repatriat<strong>in</strong>g unsuccessful asylum seekers where this is achieved.They compare these figures to UNHCR’s overall budget and the moneyspent to assist refugees worldwi<strong>de</strong> and won<strong>de</strong>r whether it would notbe more cost-effective to spend their money <strong>in</strong> assist<strong>in</strong>g what theyconsi<strong>de</strong>r to be the «real refugees» <strong>in</strong> regions of orig<strong>in</strong>.Migration and asylum issues become major themes of electioncampaigns, which have noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with <strong>in</strong>ternational solidarity and<strong>in</strong>ternational human rights commitments, and turn them <strong>in</strong>to “problems”which are to be solved by any means as a first step to solv<strong>in</strong>g any otherproblem at the national level. These trends, reflected and fuelled by themass media, result <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g xenophobic and paranoid attitu<strong>de</strong>samong <strong>Europe</strong>an citizens, who, un<strong>de</strong>r a revolv<strong>in</strong>g door effect, <strong>de</strong>mandstricter migration and asylum policies from their Governments.All these elements, together with the fact that unanimous vot<strong>in</strong>g isrequired to adopt any of the measures foreseen by the Treaty of


BUILDING A RIGHTS BASED ASYLUM SYSTEM FOR EUROPE: A UNHCR PERSPECTIVE 43Amsterdam, make the build<strong>in</strong>g of a common <strong>Europe</strong>an asylum system,as said earlier, a difficult task, which requires a solid legal frameworkand a firm and clear common un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g of the premises uponwhich it is built.From the perspective of UNHCR, the motive for <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g acommon asylum system is the need to provi<strong>de</strong> a predictable andstructured framework for ensur<strong>in</strong>g effective <strong>in</strong>ternational protection ofpersons whose life or liberty is at risk <strong>in</strong> their country of orig<strong>in</strong>. When aperson must, out of necessity, exercise his or her human right to seekasylum, that person’s treatment and fate at the hands of a State are amatter of <strong>in</strong>ternational law and obligations, not a matter of the State’sdiscretionary immigration policy. The scope and content of a common<strong>Europe</strong>an asylum system must be <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed, therefore, aga<strong>in</strong>st thebackdrop of established pr<strong>in</strong>ciples and standards of <strong>in</strong>ternationalrefugee and human rights law.The construction of a coherent, rights-based asylum system restson certa<strong>in</strong> assumptions. The UNHCR Bureau for <strong>Europe</strong> sets out sevenpremises <strong>in</strong> this area (UNHCR, unpublished).First, the scope of the 1951 Convention is a matter of <strong>in</strong>ternationallaw. Therefore, its <strong>in</strong>terpretation is not, or should not be, subject tovariations on the basis of the history, legal culture or political necessityof each State Party to the Convention. As observed, for <strong>in</strong>stance, bythe UK House of Lords (2000), “<strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple there can only be one true<strong>in</strong>terpretation of a treaty” and “there is not a band of permissiblemean<strong>in</strong>gs of Article 1A(2) [of the 1951 Convention].” As such, the1951 Convention must be given an “autonomous and <strong>in</strong>ternationalmean<strong>in</strong>g” <strong>de</strong>rivable from the sources mentioned <strong>in</strong> Articles 31 and 32of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 1Second, the true mean<strong>in</strong>g of the refugee concept must be <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ntly from the f<strong>in</strong>ancial or other costs attach<strong>in</strong>g to the grant<strong>in</strong>gof asylum, the management issues perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to asylum procedures, orany other limitations on a State’s capacity to meet <strong>in</strong>ternationalobligations as regards the treatment of refugees. The level of legalobligations that a State Party has to assume once it grants refugeestatus cannot be a justifiable ground to circumscribe the <strong>in</strong>ternationallyagreedrefugee <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition <strong>in</strong> a narrow conception which limits the1 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the House of Lords, one such source that should be relied on for theenquiry <strong>in</strong>to the “true autonomous mean<strong>in</strong>g” of the refugee concept is the UNHCRHandbook, because of its “high persuasive authority” and the fact that it constitutes“good evi<strong>de</strong>nce of what has come to be <strong>in</strong>ternational practice with<strong>in</strong> Article 31(3)(b) ofthe Vienna Convention.”


44 BELEN GARCIA DE VINUESAnumbers of those who qualify for refugee status. A person whosatisfies the established <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itional criteria of the Convention is, andrema<strong>in</strong>s, a refugee regardless of whether the State is able or will<strong>in</strong>g tomeet its <strong>in</strong>ternational obligations to provi<strong>de</strong> for the rights and entitlementsset out <strong>in</strong> the Convention. It may be useful to recall <strong>in</strong> this context the<strong>de</strong>claratory nature of refugee status. As set out <strong>in</strong> paragraph 28 of theUNHCR Handbook, a person does not become a refugee because ofrecognition of his or her refugee status, but is recognised as suchbecause he or she is a refugee.Third, the oft-repeated argument about the chang<strong>in</strong>g character ofthe refugee problem today as grounds for narrow<strong>in</strong>g down theapplicability of the 1951 Convention requires a more careful, objectiveappraisal. What has actually been different <strong>in</strong> recent years whencompared to 1951? Refugee problems have become more wi<strong>de</strong>spreadand countries of orig<strong>in</strong> more diverse, encompass<strong>in</strong>g virtually all corners ofthe globe. Other recent changes concern the multiplicity and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gcomplexity of the causes of flight. There have also been significantchanges <strong>in</strong> the patterns of refugee movements, with a disproportionateshift of the bur<strong>de</strong>n towards the poor nations and regions least able toreceive and care for refugees.In the post-Cold War era, <strong>in</strong>ternal conflicts fuelled by national, ethnicand religious differences and result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tolerance have <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glybecome the ma<strong>in</strong> cause of refugee flight. This era has witnessed moreand more frequently the use of war and violence as <strong>in</strong>struments of persecution,the means chosen by the persecutor to repress or “cleanse”specific groups merely on account of their ethnicity, religion or otheraffiliations. In many of today’s wars, the plight of the civilian populationis not simply a matter of be<strong>in</strong>g caught <strong>in</strong> the cross-fire or suffer<strong>in</strong>g theun<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d consequences of armed conflict, but be<strong>in</strong>g specificallytargeted by the combatants and subjected to extortion, sexual violence,forced labour and displacement.If these are the basic changes that have marked the global refugeesituation <strong>in</strong> recent years, they do not <strong>in</strong> any way put <strong>in</strong>to question therelevance and validity of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.Today’s refugees, whether their vulnerability and victimisation occur <strong>in</strong>the context of war or <strong>in</strong> peacetime, are just as <strong>de</strong>serv<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>ternationalprotection as those who prece<strong>de</strong>d them. There can be no <strong>de</strong>ny<strong>in</strong>g thatthe 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, even while they need tobe supplemented with other protection tools or regimes, cont<strong>in</strong>ue tobe both effective and relevant <strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g a coherent rights-basedapproach to the protection of most of today’s refugees. All that isnee<strong>de</strong>d is to apply them <strong>in</strong> the spirit <strong>in</strong> which they were drafted and


BUILDING A RIGHTS BASED ASYLUM SYSTEM FOR EUROPE: A UNHCR PERSPECTIVE 45adopted, i.e. <strong>in</strong> a less rigid and more pr<strong>in</strong>cipled, protection-m<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>dway. 2Fourth, restrictive asylum policies of one State or region do not<strong>de</strong>ter refugees from flee<strong>in</strong>g persecution <strong>in</strong> their country. They may onlydivert refugee movements elsewhere, often to those States <strong>in</strong> theregion of orig<strong>in</strong> that are least able to guarantee effective protection.Clearly, responsibilities for refugee protection and the result<strong>in</strong>g costsshould not be a matter of a State’s geographical position, but rather acoherent, planned strategy for a collective humanitarian response tothe victims of human rights violations, persecution or armed conflict.Fifth, neither the <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition of refugee <strong>in</strong> Article 1 of the 1951Convention nor the observance of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of non-refoulement <strong>in</strong>Article 33 is entirely an <strong>in</strong>ter-State treaty obligation. The obligation is asmuch towards the refugee, whose fundamental human rights are thesubject of the Convention. Even when there is a specific formalagreement among a group of States to apportion responsibility forreceiv<strong>in</strong>g and consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g applications for refugee status, any numberof these States would bear the responsibility for direct or <strong>in</strong>directbreach of the non-refoulement obligation if this were to occur. 3Sixth, employ<strong>in</strong>g a narrow construction of the refugee concept willnot help reduce the numbers of non-refugee migrants claim<strong>in</strong>g asylum.At best, it limits the number of refugees who are recognised as such. Ina rather circular logic, States have sometimes found it convenient to<strong>in</strong>flate the rate of rejections of refugee claims so as to justify str<strong>in</strong>gentmeasures aga<strong>in</strong>st the “abusers” of the asylum system.In no way does rejection of a refugee claim imply that the applicantabused the asylum system. Some unsuccessful refugee claimants arepeople who actually meet the requisite criteria for refugee status, butwhose claims are rejected only because of a restrictive application ofthe refugee <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition or str<strong>in</strong>gent evi<strong>de</strong>ntiary requirements. Yet others are2 See, for example, UK Court of Appeal, Reg<strong>in</strong>a v. Secretary of State for the HomeDepartment Ex parte Adan and Aitsegeur [1999] 3 W.L.R, 1274, at p. 1296: “It is clearthat the signatory States <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d that the Convention should afford cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>gprotection for refugees <strong>in</strong> the chang<strong>in</strong>g circumstances of the present and future world.The Convention has to be regar<strong>de</strong>d as a liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>strument.”3See, for example, the <strong>Europe</strong>an Court of Human Rights, T.I. v. the United K<strong>in</strong>gdomjudgement of 7 March 2000, at p. 16: “Where States establish <strong>in</strong>ternational organisations,or mutatis mutandis <strong>in</strong>ternational agreements, to pursue co-operation <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> fieldsof activities, there may be implications for the protection of fundamental rights. Itwould be <strong>in</strong>compatible with the purpose and object of the Convention if Contract<strong>in</strong>gStates were thereby absolved from their responsibility un<strong>de</strong>r the Convention <strong>in</strong> relationto the field of activity covered by such attribution.”


46 BELEN GARCIA DE VINUESApeople who genu<strong>in</strong>ely view themselves as refugees, but, un<strong>de</strong>rstandably,without hav<strong>in</strong>g expert knowledge about legal <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itions and thresholdsthat must be met. Furthermore, not every so-called “economic migrant”is by <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition an abuser or a cheater. Many economic migrants whohave recourse to asylum systems may lack sufficient un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g thatthe solution to their problems lies with<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>de</strong>velopmentand economic co-operation, not with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>stitution of asylum.F<strong>in</strong>ally, Governments and communities have, as a matter of course,legitimate <strong>in</strong>terests to ensure that their hospitality and generosity arenot exploited. Problems of real and serious misuse of States’ asylumsystems can and should f<strong>in</strong>d their effective redress with<strong>in</strong> theestablished national procedures for the <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation of refugee status,but certa<strong>in</strong>ly not through political discourse edg<strong>in</strong>g on xenophobia or bydowngrad<strong>in</strong>g generally accepted protection standards. Likewise,refugee applicants have duties to the country of asylum to conform toits laws and regulations, and to fully co-operate with and facilitate thetasks of the authorities charged with status <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation.It should, however, be recognised that <strong>in</strong> the adversarial refugeestatus <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation systems which presently exist <strong>in</strong> most <strong>Europe</strong>anStates, it is often difficult for refugee claimants to know what attitu<strong>de</strong>to take towards the status <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ers who simultaneously act as bothjudges and prosecutors. Given the prosecutorial posture dom<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g therefugee status <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation process — with the authorities challeng<strong>in</strong>gevery asylum claim brought before them — claimants often feelimpelled likewise to employ whatever means possible to “<strong>de</strong>fendthemselves” rather than simply recount<strong>in</strong>g truthfully the facts an<strong>de</strong>vents surround<strong>in</strong>g their claims. Refugee status <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation shouldnot be an adversarial contest. Justice would be better served if therefugee applicant and the <strong>de</strong>cision-maker properly shared the duty toascerta<strong>in</strong> all the relevant facts rather than oppose each other. Thisrequires, above all, the restoration of mutual trust and confi<strong>de</strong>nce <strong>in</strong>the refugee status <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation processes.It is important to bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that the <strong>in</strong>struments to be adoptedun<strong>de</strong>r the asylum agenda represent but a first phase towards acommon asylum system. Important changes are still necessary to achievethis goal. In UNHCR’s view, important ga<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> efficiency can be ma<strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong>such a common asylum system, while still ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g high standards offairness. Such ga<strong>in</strong>s should overri<strong>de</strong> the costs of necessary legislativechanges on a national level. The <strong>de</strong>velopment of such a commonsystem requires, however, will<strong>in</strong>gness on the part of Member States toquestion and revise current national systems and practices. Reservations,“standstill” clauses and other flexible provisions <strong>in</strong> EC <strong>in</strong>struments


BUILDING A RIGHTS BASED ASYLUM SYSTEM FOR EUROPE: A UNHCR PERSPECTIVE 47sett<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>imum standards on asylum eventually <strong>de</strong>feat the purpose ofharmonisation, while agreement at the lowest common <strong>de</strong>nom<strong>in</strong>atorcan only be harmful to bona fi<strong>de</strong> asylum-seekers and refugees. However,this <strong>de</strong>velopment also requires that all of us, who are committed to the<strong>de</strong>fence of the rights of asylum seekers and refugees <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, do notgive up a cont<strong>in</strong>ued dialogue with our Governments and other actors,<strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to uphold the human rights of these persons, which, as saidbefore, is a matter of <strong>in</strong>ternational law and obligations, and not of theState’s discretionary immigration policy.ReferencesUK HOUSE OF LORDS (2000): Reg<strong>in</strong>a v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,Ex parte Adan and Aitseguer, Judgement of 19 December 2000.UNHCR (unpublished): “Towards a common <strong>Europe</strong>an asylum system: a viewfrom UNHCR”. Draft article to be published <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an Series.


The consequences of <strong>de</strong>mographic change:is there a role for immigration?Jan Niessen and Yongmi SchibelThe Migration Policy Group (MPG) is an <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt organisationcommitted to policy <strong>de</strong>velopment on mobility, migration, diversity,equality and anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ation by facilitat<strong>in</strong>g the exchange betweenstakehol<strong>de</strong>rs from all sectors of society, with the aim of contribut<strong>in</strong>g to<strong>in</strong>novative and effective responses to the challenges posed by migrationand diversity.This paper aims to make the case for <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g immigration <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>bates on <strong>Europe</strong>’s social and economic goals and objectives. Asubsequent paper will exam<strong>in</strong>e how to l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong>ternational migrationwith foreign and <strong>de</strong>velopment policies.IntroductionCan immigration become one of the multiple responses to thechallenges <strong>Europe</strong> and the expand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong>an Union are fac<strong>in</strong>g? Canimmigrants play a mean<strong>in</strong>gful role <strong>in</strong> shap<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong>’s future? Thesequestions seem to be out of place consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the almost exclusiveattention migration restriction and prevention are currently receiv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>public and policy <strong>de</strong>bates. Concerns expressed <strong>in</strong> these <strong>de</strong>bates areabout the real and feared consequences of uncontrolled migration andthe perceived or real unsuccessful <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrants. In responsegovernments <strong>de</strong>sign and ref<strong>in</strong>e policies that tighten the admission ofimmigrants.Nevertheless, the questions <strong>de</strong>serve to be answered. Certa<strong>in</strong> trends<strong>in</strong> the labour market with un<strong>de</strong>sired implications for <strong>Europe</strong>’s economyand welfare system warrant an exam<strong>in</strong>ation of the role of immigrationas a complementary labour market strategy. In a situation of steady


50 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELpopulation <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e and worsen<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>mographic imbalances immigrantscould contribute to revers<strong>in</strong>g these <strong>de</strong>velopments.This paper argues that immigration should be consi<strong>de</strong>red as anoption <strong>in</strong> the policy <strong>de</strong>bates on strategic economic and social goals andfundamental values that un<strong>de</strong>rp<strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>’s social market economy.Immigrants should be valued for their contribution to achieve thesegoals and this will enhance their <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to society. <strong>Immigration</strong> isabout susta<strong>in</strong>able <strong>de</strong>velopment, economic <strong>in</strong>terests and social values.In other words, this paper is an attempt to change the terms of thecurrent <strong>de</strong>bate on <strong>in</strong>ternational migration: from a <strong>de</strong>bate that focusesalmost exclusively on admission issues to one where these issues areonly discussed <strong>in</strong> the context of an assessment of immigration needsaga<strong>in</strong>st the backdrop of a <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and age<strong>in</strong>g population. This makesthe migration <strong>de</strong>bate dist<strong>in</strong>ct from the refugee <strong>de</strong>bate, which is aboutprotection needs and human rights commitments. It also makes itdist<strong>in</strong>ct from the <strong>de</strong>bate on all forms of forced migration to be addressedby <strong>Europe</strong>’s foreign and <strong>de</strong>velopment policies.First we exam<strong>in</strong>e briefly the significance of <strong>de</strong>mographic factors foreconomic <strong>de</strong>velopment. We then look at future <strong>de</strong>mographic trendsand spell out the implications for labour markets, pension and healthcare systems. This is followed by an overview of policies to addressemerg<strong>in</strong>g challenges and by some f<strong>in</strong>al remarks. We focus on theexpand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong>an Union and refer regularly to work un<strong>de</strong>rtakenwith<strong>in</strong> the Council of <strong>Europe</strong>.Why <strong>de</strong>mography mattersThe <strong>Europe</strong>an Union has embarked upon an ambitious programmeof becom<strong>in</strong>g ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-base<strong>de</strong>conomy <strong>in</strong> the world capable of susta<strong>in</strong>ed economic growth withmore and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Presi<strong>de</strong>ncyconclusions, Lisbon <strong>Europe</strong>an Council, 23 and 24 March 2000). Suchgoals crucially <strong>de</strong>pend on people: people who will generate growth,create and fill jobs, and contribute to social security systems; andpeople who will live <strong>in</strong> and shape the societies that benefit fromeconomic <strong>de</strong>velopment. How many people live <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, and howmany will there be <strong>in</strong> twenty or fifty years? What is their age profile,and how is it chang<strong>in</strong>g? The achievement of <strong>Europe</strong>’s long-term goalsis <strong>in</strong>timately bound up with the size and age of its population.Demography and <strong>de</strong>mographic change, then, matter for social an<strong>de</strong>conomic progress <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>.


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 51Some trendsDemographic projections show that <strong>Europe</strong>’s population is dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> size as well as becom<strong>in</strong>g ol<strong>de</strong>r. While on average around 2.1 childrenper woman of childbear<strong>in</strong>g age are required to replace the population,the EU average is 1.53. In addition to the <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> fertility, life expectancyis <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g. The proportion of those aged 65 and over is projected torise from about 16 % of the total population <strong>in</strong> 1998 to 22 % by 2025.With<strong>in</strong> this, the relative number of people of 80 and ol<strong>de</strong>r is ris<strong>in</strong>gfaster still (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, n.d.). This means that a grow<strong>in</strong>gnumber of people above retirement age will need to be supported bythose <strong>in</strong> employment. On present trends, for the current 15 memberstates, the population of work<strong>in</strong>g age will fall by approximately 40million people from 2000 until 2050 and the old age <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratiowill double from 24 % to 49 % (COM, 2002).Regional differences are significant for all the measures exam<strong>in</strong>ed.For <strong>in</strong>stance, whereas a number of regions <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the south of Franceand Greece will not face population <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e for <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s, population isalready <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> some regions of Spa<strong>in</strong>, Italy, Germany and theNordic countries, and <strong>in</strong> most of the candidate countries. With regard tothe old-age <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratio —the number aged 65 and over relativeto those of work<strong>in</strong>g age (15 to 64)— the most marked <strong>in</strong>creases areexpected to take place <strong>in</strong> Italy, Swe<strong>de</strong>n, F<strong>in</strong>land and Germany and thesmallest <strong>in</strong> Ireland, Portugal and Luxembourg. For the current 15members, the old age <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratio was 24 % <strong>in</strong> 2000. An <strong>in</strong>creaseto 27 % is projected by 2010 (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, p. 63).In look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>de</strong>mographic change, total population size is animportant measure. However, the size of the labour force and thebalance between economically active and <strong>in</strong>active persons are the mostpolicy relevant dimensions because of their impact on the labourmarket, on pensions and on health care systems. At the same time asthere is <strong>de</strong>mographic <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, there is also an employmentcreation process. A low labour supply aggravates labour marketmismatches and shortages, particularly if comb<strong>in</strong>ed with an unfavourableskill profile. The negative economic effects result<strong>in</strong>g from theseimbalances affect the state’s revenue base and can endanger spend<strong>in</strong>gon pensions and health care. More directly, the fewer people work, thenarrower is the base of contributions on which pensions and healthcare systems rest. The higher the number of ol<strong>de</strong>r persons, the heavieris the bur<strong>de</strong>n that these systems have to bear.Which of these factors should be addressed by policy? The <strong>in</strong>crease<strong>in</strong> the number of ol<strong>de</strong>r persons is a result of the fall <strong>in</strong> mortality rates.


52 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELLife expectancy has <strong>in</strong>creased over the last 50 years by about 10 years<strong>in</strong> total. This is a positive <strong>de</strong>velopment, which is projected to cont<strong>in</strong>ue.The attention of policy makers should therefore be on ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g orenlarg<strong>in</strong>g labour supply (the sum of employed and unemployedpersons), <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to keep the “economic <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratio” as low aspossible. Labour supply can expand <strong>in</strong> two ways: through hav<strong>in</strong>g morepeople <strong>in</strong> the labour force ages, or through <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> labour forceparticipation rates MACDONALD/KIPPEN, 2000, p. 4). Increases <strong>in</strong>fertility and immigration are two ways of add<strong>in</strong>g to the number ofpeople <strong>in</strong> the labour force ages, while higher participation rates lift thepercentage of those <strong>in</strong> the labour force ages who are, <strong>in</strong> fact, part ofthe labour force. Projections and scenarios for <strong>de</strong>mographic change <strong>in</strong><strong>Europe</strong> thus <strong>de</strong>pend on <strong>de</strong>velopments <strong>in</strong> fertility rates, labour marketparticipation and immigration.FertilityFertility is the most <strong>in</strong>fluential <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ant of <strong>de</strong>mographicchange <strong>in</strong> the long term. Changes <strong>in</strong> fertility not only affect thenumber of children but also of succeed<strong>in</strong>g generations. For thisreason relatively small changes <strong>in</strong> fertility can have very significantconsequences on future population size and age structure (LUTZ/SCHERBOV, 1999, p. 2).Along with most other <strong>de</strong>veloped countries, <strong>Europe</strong>an societiesexperience the susta<strong>in</strong>ed slippage of birth rates below replacementfertility (2.1). The total fertility rate for the EU was 1.53 <strong>in</strong> 2000(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001, p. 63). The situation differs betweencountries. In the Mediterranean countries (Spa<strong>in</strong>, Italy, Greece andPortugal), fertility dropped relatively late, but fast and to very lowlevels. Spa<strong>in</strong> (1.19) and Italy now have the lowest fertility rates <strong>in</strong> the<strong>Europe</strong>an Union. Ireland (1.89), France and the Nordic countries haverelatively high rates, although they are still below replacement level.Developments <strong>in</strong> Belgium and the Netherlands are characterised byfluctuat<strong>in</strong>g fertility rates, whereas Austria has had low and stagnat<strong>in</strong>gbirth rates for almost 20 years. Accession countries have seen aparticularly dramatic <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> fertility (EUROPEAN COMMISSION,2002, p. 5; BAGAVOS/MARTIN, 2000, p. 47f). However, with theexception of the accession countries, projections for fertility rates arefor stagnation at low levels rather than further <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e. In 2000, theonly EU countries that still experienced a <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> birth rates were theUnited K<strong>in</strong>gdom and Germany.


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 53Participation <strong>in</strong> the labour marketWhile participation <strong>in</strong> the labour market is not strictly a <strong>de</strong>mographicmeasure, it is an effective tool for <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the impact of <strong>de</strong>mographicchange on a society. It gives <strong>in</strong>formation about the employmentcomponent of the work<strong>in</strong>g age population rather than about its sizeonly. This is relevant because large parts of the work<strong>in</strong>g age populationmay be <strong>in</strong> education, retired, or may not be actively seek<strong>in</strong>g workbecause of personal responsibilities. They may not form part of thelabour force because of illness or <strong>in</strong>capacity, or not seek work becauseof discouragement about the availability of work (PUNCH/PEARCE,2000, p. 47).The labour force participation rate (i.e. the share of the populationthat is actively <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the labour market) varies substantively formen and women, as well as for people <strong>in</strong> different age groups. On theone hand, of the men of prime work<strong>in</strong>g age, 25 to 54, almost 93 %are economically active. On the other hand, the participation of ol<strong>de</strong>rmen aged 55 to 64 is only 51.5 %, with figures around 35 % <strong>in</strong>Belgium and France. Low participation rates are also found amongyoung men and women un<strong>de</strong>r 25 —the drop <strong>in</strong> their employmentrates has effectively reduced the EU work force by almost 5 millions<strong>in</strong>ce the mid-1980s. The participation rate of ol<strong>de</strong>r women has risenbut is still low at 30 %. The ma<strong>in</strong> source of labour force growth <strong>in</strong> theUnion s<strong>in</strong>ce the mid-1980s has been women aged 25 to 54, whoseparticipation rate is now at 72.5 %. In recent years, however, the rateof <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> this group has shown signs of slow<strong>in</strong>g down (ALGOECONSULTANTS, 2002, p. 15; figures are for 2000).It is difficult to project future changes <strong>in</strong> labour force participationrates. It is unlikely that <strong>Europe</strong>ans aged less than 25 years will participatemuch more <strong>in</strong> the future, as educational requirements cont<strong>in</strong>ue to rise.The participation of ol<strong>de</strong>r persons is strongly <strong>in</strong>fluenced by the <strong>in</strong>centivesystems <strong>in</strong> place and will be affected by political choices. The process ofexpansion <strong>in</strong> the participation rates of women has not come to an end,and several <strong>Europe</strong>an countries may catch up with states such asSwe<strong>de</strong>n, where women already have participation rates close to those ofmen. It is important to note that the general economic climate has anoticeable effect on participation rates, as low expectations for f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gemployment may <strong>in</strong>duce people to drop out of the labour market.<strong>Immigration</strong>S<strong>in</strong>ce 1989, net migration has been the ma<strong>in</strong> component of annualpopulation change <strong>in</strong> the Union. In 2000, the annual net migration


54 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELrate was 2 per 1000 population, represent<strong>in</strong>g around 65 % of totalpopulation growth. Without positive net migration the populations ofGermany, Greece, Italy and Swe<strong>de</strong>n would be <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e. In addition,unrecor<strong>de</strong>d immigration is significant <strong>in</strong> a number of member states,especially <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Europe</strong>. A disproportionate number of immigrants<strong>in</strong>to the EU have been men and women <strong>in</strong> their 20s. On average,people <strong>in</strong> this age group represented some 40 % of all immigrants <strong>in</strong>the second half of the 1990s, while those <strong>in</strong> their 30s accounted foranother 20 %. Accord<strong>in</strong>gly, immigrants of non-EU nationality ad<strong>de</strong>d anaverage of 0.8 % a year to the resi<strong>de</strong>nt population of 20 to 29 year olds<strong>in</strong> the Union over this period. However, this <strong>in</strong>flux was partly offset byemigration. The specific age and sex structure of most immigrantgroups means that apart from the direct <strong>de</strong>mographic effect throughthe <strong>in</strong>flux of persons, migration also has secondary effects, namely ahigher number of births and a lower number of <strong>de</strong>aths compared withthe host population. Many recent immigrant groups also have a higherfertility rate (HAUG, 2002, p. 2).Migration is the most volatile of the components <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gpopulation size. While fertility and mortality rates change gradually, thenumber of people enter<strong>in</strong>g or leav<strong>in</strong>g a country can vary significantlyfrom one year to the next (LUTZ/SCHERBOV, 1999, p. 3). The past 10years have witnessed great fluctuations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>an migration levels,as well as significant regional variations. Future migration trends largelyturn on policy <strong>de</strong>cisions about migration needs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>. However,the supply si<strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong> the form of cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g migration pressure fromoutsi<strong>de</strong> the EU is also a much-discussed aspect. Researchers havead<strong>de</strong>d a <strong>de</strong>mographic perspective to this theme by po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out thatthe “stagnat<strong>in</strong>g entity” <strong>Europe</strong> is “surroun<strong>de</strong>d by populations withrun-away growth” (SCHMID, 2001). Projections suggest that while <strong>in</strong>the post-World War II era, the population of Spa<strong>in</strong> was three timeslarger than Morocco’s, <strong>in</strong> about 2050 Morocco’s population might be50 per cent larger than Spa<strong>in</strong>’s. A similar picture emerges whencompar<strong>in</strong>g France and Algeria or Germany and Turkey.Consequences of <strong>de</strong>mographic change <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>Demographic change is tak<strong>in</strong>g place, and it matters for the socialand economic future of <strong>Europe</strong>. But how exactly will it affect <strong>Europe</strong>aneconomies and societies? Where will it be felt first, and by whom?Labour markets are an obvious po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>de</strong>parture, with <strong>de</strong>mand forworkers at all skill levels projected to persist, and certa<strong>in</strong> sectors already


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 55affected by a lack of labour supply. Hav<strong>in</strong>g people <strong>in</strong> jobs also susta<strong>in</strong>s<strong>Europe</strong>’s pension and health care systems: those <strong>in</strong> employment needto support those out of employment, and the more unfavourable theproportion between the two groups, the higher the bur<strong>de</strong>ns willbecome. This section will exam<strong>in</strong>e the implications of population<strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e and age<strong>in</strong>g for these key components of the <strong>Europe</strong>an socialeconomy.Implications for the labour marketWill the <strong>de</strong>mographic changes <strong>de</strong>scribed above have a negativeimpact on <strong>Europe</strong>an labour markets? <strong>Europe</strong>an economies are far fromfully employed economies. The <strong>de</strong>gree of labour un<strong>de</strong>r-utilisation is clearlygreater than that <strong>in</strong>dicated by unemployment rates. For <strong>in</strong>stance, at themoment less than a quarter of people aged 60-64 are <strong>in</strong> employment. Forthese reasons, some researchers conclu<strong>de</strong> that the size of the reservelabour force, which could be tapped <strong>in</strong>to by rais<strong>in</strong>g participation rates,is enough to prevent any shortages on the labour market. They assertthat “<strong>in</strong> this context, the fact that the new cohorts reach<strong>in</strong>g work<strong>in</strong>gage are less numerous will not matter much” (PUNCH/PEARCE, 2000,p. 61). However, there rema<strong>in</strong> questions as to how much participationrates can be raised before the social and cultural changes requiredbecome prohibitive, and whether such measures can, <strong>in</strong> fact, compensatefor the effects of <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g fertility. Like future labour supply, futurelabour <strong>de</strong>mand is, to an extent, a matter of speculation. However,there are <strong>in</strong>dications that advances <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation technology will leadto greater <strong>de</strong>mand for skilled labour. Labour-<strong>in</strong>tensive services, fromleisure to health and personal care, will be <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>mand by aged personsand by workers with affluent lifestyles. Low-skilled labour will also berequired by the construction <strong>in</strong>dustry (MACDONALD/KIPPEN, 2000, p. 4).In addition to the <strong>de</strong>mographically <strong>in</strong>duced fall <strong>in</strong> labour supply, thehistorical trend <strong>in</strong>dicates that the annual number of hours worked per<strong>in</strong>dividual is <strong>de</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g through time, as leisure becomes moreimportant (PEDERSEN, 2002, p. 11).Unsatisfied <strong>de</strong>mand for labour at both the high and the low end ofthe skill spectrum can lead to shortages and skills <strong>de</strong>ficiencies. The<strong>Europe</strong>an Commission has acknowledged that these exist <strong>in</strong> the EU<strong>de</strong>spite the high unemployment levels that rema<strong>in</strong>, and that they mayseriously limit <strong>Europe</strong>’s capacity for further growth (EUROPEAN COM-MISSION, 2001a, p. 45). More <strong>de</strong>tail is given <strong>in</strong> the Jo<strong>in</strong>t EmploymentReports adopted annually by Commission and Council <strong>in</strong> response tothe National Action Plans on Employment, <strong>in</strong> which Member States


56 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBEL<strong>de</strong>scribe the state of their labour market as well as their policyresponses. The 2000 Jo<strong>in</strong>t Employment Report mentions the tighten<strong>in</strong>g ofthe labour market supply of high tech professionals (p. 56). Specifically,the report i<strong>de</strong>ntifies a tighten<strong>in</strong>g of the labour market supply <strong>in</strong> Swe<strong>de</strong>n,Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Northern Italy and Flan<strong>de</strong>rs. The2001 Jo<strong>in</strong>t Employment Report refers to Gui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>e 6 un<strong>de</strong>r theemployability pillar, which asks Member States to i<strong>de</strong>ntify and preventemerg<strong>in</strong>g bottlenecks. It comments on the National Action Plans, <strong>in</strong>which Italy, F<strong>in</strong>land, Swe<strong>de</strong>n, the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom and France statethat their labour shortages are ma<strong>in</strong>ly limited to a few occupations/sectors and regions. At the other end of the spectrum, it notes thatF<strong>in</strong>land, Ireland and the Netherlands f<strong>in</strong>d themselves <strong>in</strong> very tightlabour markets, with shortages <strong>in</strong> both high and low skill occupations.It conclu<strong>de</strong>s that “most Member States anticipate the problemsbecom<strong>in</strong>g more serious <strong>in</strong> the near and mid term future, based oncomb<strong>in</strong>ed economic and <strong>de</strong>mographic forecasts” (EUROPEAN COM-MISSION, 2001b, p. 24).Apart from the size of the labour force, there is also a <strong>de</strong>bateabout its composition and about potentially negative effects of age<strong>in</strong>g.In particular, there is a discussion as to whether a smaller and ol<strong>de</strong>rlabour force would have a lower ability to <strong>in</strong>novate, which wouldaffect the competitiveness of <strong>Europe</strong>an economies.Implications for pension and health care systemsAge<strong>in</strong>g has the effect of shorten<strong>in</strong>g the employed period withrespect to the whole life. Concerns about the f<strong>in</strong>ancial stability ofpensions and wi<strong>de</strong>r social security systems are therefore often framed<strong>in</strong> terms of the old age <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratio or the proportion of persons<strong>in</strong> retirement ages relative to those of work<strong>in</strong>g age. It is important to notethat this ratio does not accurately reflect the true ratio of beneficiaries tosocial contributors <strong>in</strong> the social security system. However, it gives animportant <strong>in</strong>dication of the <strong>de</strong>mographic dynamics affect<strong>in</strong>g thesystem, where fewer persons <strong>in</strong> employment will need to support morepersons out of employment. In the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union, it is projected thatthe ratio of workers to pensioners will <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e from four to one to lessthan two to one by 2040.In <strong>Europe</strong>an welfare states, pensions account for, on average, 40-50 % of the total expenditure on social security (COUNCIL OF EUROPE,2002). The proportion is especially high <strong>in</strong> Italy, while it is low <strong>in</strong>relatively “young” countries such as Ireland. It is a particular challengeto fund a<strong>de</strong>quate pensions for those whose work<strong>in</strong>g career has not


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 57been sufficiently long or cont<strong>in</strong>uous to accumulate satisfactory pensionrequirements. This is frequently true for women, who predom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong>ol<strong>de</strong>r age groups and whose share of the population <strong>in</strong>creases withadvanc<strong>in</strong>g age. It is projected that public spend<strong>in</strong>g on pensions, healthcare and care for the el<strong>de</strong>rly will <strong>in</strong>crease between 4 % and 8 % ofGDP by 2040 <strong>in</strong> most Member States (EUROPEAN COMMISSION,2002a). For governments, pension spend<strong>in</strong>g could thus lead to higher<strong>de</strong>ficits. For <strong>in</strong>dividuals, the <strong>de</strong>mographic <strong>de</strong>velopments could mean“pay more, work longer, and get less” (BOLKESTEIN, 2001). As thef<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>g of pensions is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly precarious, it is partly be<strong>in</strong>g shiftedfrom the public to the private sector. Of the three pillars of pensionsystems —statutory social security schemes, occupational schemes andpersonal schemes— the third is grow<strong>in</strong>g the most rapidly. The importanceof private pension schemes for the <strong>in</strong>comes of retired people may<strong>in</strong>crease further as governments try to conta<strong>in</strong> the bur<strong>de</strong>n of ris<strong>in</strong>gpension expenditure on public f<strong>in</strong>ances.Health care systems likewise need to meet the challenge of age<strong>in</strong>g.Life expectancy <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union now stands at 81 years forwomen and 75 for men. When it comes to the provision of care for theel<strong>de</strong>rly, the family network and the public sector (local and centralgovernment) are the two most important actors. However, there is agrow<strong>in</strong>g trend across <strong>Europe</strong> to use more publicly fun<strong>de</strong>d services.While <strong>in</strong> the Nordic countries the state is already the ma<strong>in</strong> supplier ofservices, <strong>in</strong> Southern countries the family is still the most importantprovi<strong>de</strong>r of care for the el<strong>de</strong>rly. However, it is expected that thesecountries will expand their formal services (COUNCIL OF EUROPE,1995). It is also important to note that age-related illnesses, which maybe serious enough to make sufferers completely <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on others,often require long-term care (outpatient care, <strong>in</strong> long-stay units or <strong>in</strong>psychiatric units). This may not be a matter for the conventional healthsystem, but for the medical-social sector (EUROPEAN COMMISSION,2001c). As is the case with other health services, such care will belabour-<strong>in</strong>tensive.Over the last <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>, health expenditure <strong>in</strong> the majority of EUcountries rose as a percentage of GDP, and <strong>in</strong> 1999 total EU expenditureon health represented 8 % of EU GDP. Clearly, ol<strong>de</strong>r persons needmore health care. However, <strong>in</strong> recent UN sponsored discussions aroundage<strong>in</strong>g the EU po<strong>in</strong>ted out that population age<strong>in</strong>g is not a pr<strong>in</strong>cipalcause of the ris<strong>in</strong>g healthcare costs (UNECE, 2002). In<strong>de</strong>ed, researchconfirms that the rise <strong>in</strong> health expenses is higher than would havebeen predictable purely due to age<strong>in</strong>g. Thus some other factors mustbe contribut<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>flate health expenses. One possible explanation is


58 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELthat health expenses are viewed as luxury goods and are allotted<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g shares of <strong>in</strong>dividual budgets as economic conditions improve.As many among the new cohorts of el<strong>de</strong>rly people have experiencedimproved liv<strong>in</strong>g conditions dur<strong>in</strong>g their lifetime, they may have raise<strong>de</strong>xpectations and higher perceived needs. New and more sophisticateddrugs are also <strong>de</strong>veloped and produced at greater cost. The question ishow much health care should be publicly provi<strong>de</strong>d, and whether the(partial) privatisation of health expenses does not lead to ris<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> health (DE SANTIS, 2001).Pension and health care patterns <strong>in</strong>teract with the labour market <strong>in</strong>a variety of ways. Firstly, the grow<strong>in</strong>g need for care for the el<strong>de</strong>rlygenerates <strong>de</strong>mand for both skilled and unskilled labour. Secondly,participation and social systems are <strong>in</strong>terrelated. This is because choos<strong>in</strong>gto participate <strong>in</strong> the labour market <strong>de</strong>pends critically on the alternativesavailable to the <strong>in</strong>dividual. Choices about whether to enter the labourmarket or not will often h<strong>in</strong>ge on f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>centives. The level ofwages will <strong>in</strong>teract with levels of social support and the tax system to<strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>e whether there is a f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>centive to work (EUROPEANCOMMISSION, 2002b, p. 22). F<strong>in</strong>ally, the revenue base of pension andsocial protection systems <strong>de</strong>pends on a healthy labour market an<strong>de</strong>conomy, as the scope for taxation will grow with higher employmentrates and high productivity.Policy optionsIt can be argued that a <strong>de</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the population <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries would <strong>in</strong> fact have a favourable effect on the environmentand quality of life. Individuals may benefit if competition for access tothe labour market, education, and hous<strong>in</strong>g opportunities is less <strong>in</strong>tense.On the macroeconomic level, a smaller work force may <strong>in</strong>duce capital<strong>de</strong>epen<strong>in</strong>g and so have a positive impact on productivity and economicgrowth. On such a view, only adaptive measures should be taken toadjust social structures and services to the emerg<strong>in</strong>g age<strong>in</strong>g society.However, the mount<strong>in</strong>g of fiscal pressures and anxieties about thesusta<strong>in</strong>ability of pension and health care systems have comb<strong>in</strong>ed withconcerns about labour market shortages and lower economic growthto impel governments to respond to <strong>de</strong>mographic change with avariety of policies. Some of these measures are general efforts to boosteconomic growth, <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to broa<strong>de</strong>n the tax base and alleviate publicf<strong>in</strong>ance problems. Many government policies <strong>in</strong> the social, economic,education, hous<strong>in</strong>g, migration and regional plann<strong>in</strong>g fields are affected


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 59by <strong>de</strong>mographic trends and are now frequently tak<strong>in</strong>g on a <strong>de</strong>mographicdimension. Three clusters of policies will be exam<strong>in</strong>ed here, correspond<strong>in</strong>gto the pivotal factors i<strong>de</strong>ntified above: policies to <strong>in</strong>crease fertility,policies to raise labour market participation rates, and migration policies.Policies to <strong>in</strong>crease fertilityDespite its importance, the consequences of low fertility are notexplicitly discussed <strong>in</strong> all <strong>Europe</strong>an countries. While discussion is lively<strong>in</strong> the UK and <strong>in</strong> Germany, public <strong>de</strong>bate <strong>in</strong> Austria and Italy does not<strong>de</strong>vote much space to the potential consequences of low fertility(STARK/KOHLER, 2000). Public pressure for government <strong>in</strong>tervention onfertility is therefore low <strong>in</strong> most countries, and is controversial <strong>in</strong> othersfor historical reasons. At the <strong>Europe</strong>an level, there is no competence <strong>in</strong>the field of “family policies”, and no official <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition of the familyexists <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an treaties (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002c, p. 3).However, <strong>in</strong> 2000 a <strong>Europe</strong>an Commission-sponsored sem<strong>in</strong>ar on lowfertility came to the conclusion that “fertility is unlikely to stay at verylow levels for long because governments will be forced to dosometh<strong>in</strong>g about it due to the problems associated with massiveage<strong>in</strong>g” (BAGAVOS/MARTIN, 2000, p. 45).It has been suggested that fertility <strong>de</strong>cisions, from an economicpo<strong>in</strong>t of view, have changed from <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>de</strong>cisions to become‘consumption’ <strong>de</strong>cisions. As the economic role of children <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>es andless material benefits are expected from them later <strong>in</strong> life, the cost ofbear<strong>in</strong>g and rear<strong>in</strong>g a child becomes the most important factor <strong>in</strong>parental <strong>de</strong>cisions (PUNCH/PEARCE, 2000, p. 75). For governmentsaim<strong>in</strong>g to br<strong>in</strong>g down the economic costs of children, it is important torecognise that the actual monetary expenditure on a child (the directcost) is less important than the earn<strong>in</strong>gs lost because of the need tospend time bear<strong>in</strong>g and car<strong>in</strong>g for the child (the <strong>in</strong>direct costs). Cashbenefits and other measures with an impact on direct costs have notbeen very successful <strong>in</strong> encourag<strong>in</strong>g childbear<strong>in</strong>g. Policies to lower<strong>in</strong>direct costs, on the other hand, work by mak<strong>in</strong>g it easier to comb<strong>in</strong>ework and family. The importance of this factor is borne out by thecircumstances of very low fertility especially <strong>in</strong> Southern <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries. It can be argued that a powerful cause for very low fertility isthe <strong>in</strong>coherence between gen<strong>de</strong>r equity <strong>in</strong> the areas of education an<strong>de</strong>mployment and the more traditional attitu<strong>de</strong>s that dom<strong>in</strong>ate withregard to family (MACDONALD, 2000, p. 10; for factors <strong>in</strong> low fertility<strong>in</strong> Italy, see PALOMBA, 2001). Policies should therefore aim to <strong>in</strong>creasegen<strong>de</strong>r equity <strong>in</strong> the family and avoid penalis<strong>in</strong>g women <strong>in</strong> the workplace.


60 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELSuch policies would support workers with family responsibilities irrespectiveof gen<strong>de</strong>r and give more recognition to fathers as parents. They would<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> paid parental leave for both parents, flexible work<strong>in</strong>g time, andaffordable childcare.Reconcil<strong>in</strong>g work and family life has <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed become a priority <strong>in</strong>national family policies across <strong>Europe</strong>, reflected and encouraged by<strong>de</strong>velopments at the <strong>Europe</strong>an level. In 1996, the Commission adopteda gen<strong>de</strong>r ma<strong>in</strong>stream<strong>in</strong>g approach, which has s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong>formed a wi<strong>de</strong>variety of its policies especially <strong>in</strong> the field of Employment and SocialAffairs. The <strong>Europe</strong>an Employment Strategy’s Equal Opportunities pillarhas also been the site of much activity to encourage gen<strong>de</strong>r equity. The2002 employment gui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es pay particular attention to reconcil<strong>in</strong>gwork and family life and advise Member States to implement policieson career breaks, parental leave and part-time work. They emphasisethat good quality care for children is crucial, as is an equal shar<strong>in</strong>g offamily responsibilities.The fertility factor has a powerful effect on the size of the labourforce, but it is not an easy target for policies. Any rise <strong>in</strong> birth rates needstwenty years to make an impact. Implement<strong>in</strong>g policies to achieve such arise would require major cultural and attitud<strong>in</strong>al changes, especially thoserelat<strong>in</strong>g to gen<strong>de</strong>r equity. There are also <strong>in</strong>dications that good familypolicies cannot guarantee higher fertility. While <strong>in</strong> Norway the relativegenerosity of family policies, which reduce the costs of hav<strong>in</strong>g children,seems to have contributed to higher fertility, this has not worked <strong>in</strong>Swe<strong>de</strong>n to the same extent. It can therefore be argued that good familypolicies are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for higher fertility(RØNSEN, 2001). Decisions about childbear<strong>in</strong>g are also crucially<strong>in</strong>fluenced by the general economic climate. High unemployment andprecarious job opportunities frustrate the reproductive plans of couplesand lead to lower fertility. Moreover, fertility tends to be lowest wherefemale labour force participation is also low (SIRCELJ, 2002).Policies to raise labour market participation ratesPolicies aim<strong>in</strong>g to raise labour market participation rates must take<strong>in</strong>to account the diverse reasons that cause low participation <strong>in</strong>different groups. For example, lower than average and/or <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gparticipation rates may be observed among young people due tolonger time spent on education, the old because of early retirement ordisability, women due to traditional gen<strong>de</strong>r norms or difficulties <strong>in</strong>reconcil<strong>in</strong>g work and family life, and migrant groups as a result of<strong>in</strong>tegration issues. More education for young people is generally


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 61regar<strong>de</strong>d as a positive <strong>de</strong>velopment, although governments do worry thatfor some, education is a <strong>de</strong>fault option because of a lack of opportunitieson the labour market. The focus of policy activity, however, is onrais<strong>in</strong>g the participation rates of women and of ol<strong>de</strong>r people. A recentstudy commissioned by the Directorate-General of Employment and SocialAffairs po<strong>in</strong>ts out that <strong>in</strong> all countries, the growth of participation ofwomen is seen as the most important potential source of labour forcegrowth. This is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly so <strong>in</strong> the southern Member States, wherethe <strong>in</strong>volvement of women <strong>in</strong> the work force has historically been low.Increas<strong>in</strong>g weight is also accor<strong>de</strong>d to expand<strong>in</strong>g the participation ofol<strong>de</strong>r people, although the study’s authors question the extent towhich this is a priority among employers (ALGOE CONSULTANTS, 2002,p. 64).Policies for rais<strong>in</strong>g the participation rates of ol<strong>de</strong>r people can<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> support for flexible and gradual retirement formulas andpromot<strong>in</strong>g access to life long learn<strong>in</strong>g, which can improve employability.The quality of jobs is also important for reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g workers <strong>in</strong> employment.The <strong>Europe</strong>an Commission advocates such policies, for <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> areport on “Increas<strong>in</strong>g labour force participation and promot<strong>in</strong>g activeage<strong>in</strong>g” which it prepared for the Spr<strong>in</strong>g 2002 Council meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>Barcelona. The report notes that the <strong>Europe</strong>an Councils at Lisbon andStockholm set ambitious targets for rais<strong>in</strong>g employment rates <strong>in</strong> theUnion by 2010: to close to 70 % for the work<strong>in</strong>g-age population as awhole, to over 60 % for women and to 50 % for ol<strong>de</strong>r workers.Reach<strong>in</strong>g these targets would imply an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> employment ofabout 20 million <strong>in</strong> total, of 11-12 million women and 5 million ol<strong>de</strong>rworkers. The report po<strong>in</strong>ts out that at the moment, participation ratesof men, particularly those <strong>in</strong> low skilled manual occupations, beg<strong>in</strong> to<strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e rapidly from the age of 50 onwards. Those for women start to<strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e earlier, at around 45, but do so less rapidly. Much of the <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>eis due to the use of early retirement schemes dur<strong>in</strong>g cyclical downturns.However, the report po<strong>in</strong>ts out that these times should, on thecontrary, be used to “prepare the labour force for the next upsw<strong>in</strong>g”and so workers’ participation should be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed. In fact, the 2002<strong>Europe</strong>an Council <strong>in</strong> Barcelona set the objective that <strong>in</strong> 2010, the ageat which <strong>Europe</strong>ans actually leave the labour market should be<strong>in</strong>creased by five years. Today the <strong>Europe</strong>an average is 58.The extent of labour market participation of ol<strong>de</strong>r people may alsobe limited by negative attitu<strong>de</strong>s towards their employment. One of thedimensions addressed by the UN and EU alike is the <strong>in</strong>clusiveness oflabour markets for ol<strong>de</strong>r workers. The Madrid <strong>in</strong>ternational plan ofaction on age<strong>in</strong>g, adopted <strong>in</strong> 2002 by the second world assembly on


62 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELage<strong>in</strong>g, promotes the concept of a “society for all ages” and, <strong>in</strong>paragraph 31, specifically lists the objective of “Employment opportunitiesfor all ol<strong>de</strong>r persons who want to work”. An implementation strategy forthe UNECE region is to be adopted on 11-13 September 2002 <strong>in</strong> Berl<strong>in</strong>at a M<strong>in</strong>isterial Conference on Age<strong>in</strong>g. 1 At the EU level, the <strong>in</strong>stitutionsaim to safeguard the <strong>in</strong>clusion of ol<strong>de</strong>r persons through a rights-basedapproach l<strong>in</strong>ked to its anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ation strategy. However, <strong>de</strong>spitestandard- and target-sett<strong>in</strong>g activities at the <strong>in</strong>ternational level, acomprehensive approach towards active age<strong>in</strong>g policies is lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>most Member States and measures taken rema<strong>in</strong> limited <strong>in</strong> their scopeand impact.Rais<strong>in</strong>g the labour market participation of women has been thegoal of a variety of policies address<strong>in</strong>g issues such as the wage gap andlabour market segregation. Employment gui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es have consistentlycalled for member state action <strong>in</strong> those areas and <strong>in</strong> the year 2000 alsostarted exam<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the impact of gen<strong>de</strong>r issues <strong>in</strong> social protection andtaxation on women’s employment. These policies were clearly l<strong>in</strong>kedwith <strong>de</strong>mography and age<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an Op<strong>in</strong>ion of the Economic andSocial Committee, which argued that “gen<strong>de</strong>r equality must be seen asa factor <strong>in</strong> productivity. It is quite clear that women must enter the labourmarket if the EU is to achieve the economic growth nee<strong>de</strong>d to susta<strong>in</strong> itssocial —and not least pension— systems. Equality is important toproductivity <strong>in</strong> a <strong>Europe</strong> where ol<strong>de</strong>r people will account for an<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly greater proportion of the population. And if <strong>Europe</strong> is to beable to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> its level of social protection, women must also be ableto contribute to the economy through paid employment” (ECONOMICAND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, 2000). In some countries, there has <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>edbeen a notable rise <strong>in</strong> the number of women <strong>in</strong> work, which has beencited as a major achievement. However, the rise <strong>in</strong> participation hasbeen significantly less <strong>in</strong> full-time equivalent (FTE) terms, i.e. <strong>in</strong> theamount of work<strong>in</strong>g time contributed to the labour force, than <strong>in</strong> termsof numbers. This is the result of the strong growth of part-time work<strong>in</strong>g,especially <strong>in</strong> the north of the Union. A recent study argues that theextent of part-time work<strong>in</strong>g is not necessarily a matter of choice butreflects the cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g lack of affordable childcare facilities, and that“<strong>in</strong> many cases, the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> participation of women seems to have1 Regional Implementation Strategy for the Madrid International Action Plan onAge<strong>in</strong>g 2002, 4 th consolidated draft, ECE/AC.23/2002/2/Rev.4, 19 June 2002. For the<strong>Europe</strong>an Commission’s contribution to the 2 nd World Assembly on Age<strong>in</strong>g on April 8-12 2002, at which the Plan of Action was adopted, see Communication (COM (2002)143), Promot<strong>in</strong>g economic and social progress <strong>in</strong> an age<strong>in</strong>g world, 18.03.2002.


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 63occurred <strong>de</strong>spite the lack of support<strong>in</strong>g policies rather than because ofthem” (ALGOE CONSULTANTS, 2002, p. 19).Rais<strong>in</strong>g the participation rates of non-EU nationals has been astated goal un<strong>de</strong>r the Equal Opportunities pillar. Among the range ofrelevant perspectives, the l<strong>in</strong>k with gen<strong>de</strong>r equity has so far been thema<strong>in</strong> focus. In<strong>de</strong>ed, employment rates for non-EU women areparticularly low. In 2000, only around 53 % of women aged 25 to 54of non-EU nationality liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Union were economically active asaga<strong>in</strong>st 73 % of nationals. This gap is common to all member states <strong>in</strong>the north of the Union, but is not evi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> the south, <strong>in</strong> many partsof which participation rates of women are low. It also applies to peopleat all education atta<strong>in</strong>ment levels, but is especially wi<strong>de</strong> for womenwith university <strong>de</strong>grees or the equivalent qualifications (ALGOECONSULTANTS, 2002, p. 20; however, there are arguments that thenumber of economically active migrant women may be significantlyun<strong>de</strong>restimated by official statistics, consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the importance of the<strong>in</strong>formal economy for many migrant communities). While a concernwith the labour market participation of non-EU women is justified, abroa<strong>de</strong>r approach to this topic would <strong>in</strong>crease governments’ chancesof mak<strong>in</strong>g an impact <strong>in</strong> this area. The employment rates of non-EUnationals are broadly <strong>in</strong>fluenced by <strong>in</strong>tegration, anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ation andimmigration policies, which are currently un<strong>de</strong>rgo<strong>in</strong>g changes <strong>in</strong> manymember states as well as at EU level.As is the case with policies to <strong>in</strong>crease birth rates, the effectivenessof policies to raise labour market participation is not uncontroversial. Itcan be argued that the actual potential labour reserve <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries is not as large as it may seem from the absolute number of<strong>in</strong>active persons. For <strong>Europe</strong> as a whole, the major reasons for <strong>in</strong>activityare personal or family responsibilities (almost 20 % of the total<strong>in</strong>actives), own illness or disability (9 %), education and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g (27 %,almost 90 % <strong>in</strong> the 15-24 group) and retirement (16 %, about 90 % <strong>in</strong>the 55-64 group) (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002b). While policies onthe labour market, family and education will have an impact on thesefactors, the extent to which they will respond to government <strong>in</strong>terventionmay be limited. Availability may be constra<strong>in</strong>ed for reasons that are notopen to change, or simply by the wi<strong>de</strong>spread and grow<strong>in</strong>g reluctanceon the part of nationals to take low quality and low-paid jobs. In somecountries such as Swe<strong>de</strong>n, further large <strong>in</strong>creases <strong>in</strong> participation arenot feasible as labour force participation is already very high (around85 % <strong>in</strong> the three Nordic countries). Lastly, while policies to raise labourmarket participation rates, if successful, can have a strong and immediateeffect on the size of the labour force, this will necessarily be a “one-off”


64 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELeffect mobilis<strong>in</strong>g a limited reserve without provisions for its renewal.Implement<strong>in</strong>g economic measures may mean buy<strong>in</strong>g time <strong>in</strong> the short ormedium term, but it will not remove the necessity of address<strong>in</strong>g the issueof population renewal through fertility and migration (LESTAEGHE, 2000).Policies to susta<strong>in</strong> health care and pension systemsSocial policy systems across <strong>Europe</strong> differ wi<strong>de</strong>ly from one another.Until now, national policies have been dom<strong>in</strong>ant, with standard sett<strong>in</strong>gand co-ord<strong>in</strong>ation activities be<strong>in</strong>g un<strong>de</strong>rtaken at the <strong>in</strong>ternational level.The Council of <strong>Europe</strong> is active <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g and promot<strong>in</strong>g standardsfor social security and <strong>in</strong> encourag<strong>in</strong>g social security co-ord<strong>in</strong>ationamong its member states, argu<strong>in</strong>g that social rights are a legal basis forsocial cohesion. Its <strong>Europe</strong>an Co<strong>de</strong> for Social Security, which sets out am<strong>in</strong>imum level of social security protection, has so far been ratified by18 member states, while its more extensive Protocol has been ratifiedby seven member states. 2 At EU level, the Commission sees its role asfoster<strong>in</strong>g the shar<strong>in</strong>g of best practices and i<strong>de</strong>ntify<strong>in</strong>g challengescommon to all member states. In a 2001 Communication, it suggestedthat the ma<strong>in</strong> challenge for health care systems <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an Unionis that of atta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the three-fold objective of access to health care forall, a high level of quality <strong>in</strong> health care and ensur<strong>in</strong>g the f<strong>in</strong>ancialviability of health care systems (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001c).F<strong>in</strong>ancial viability is the overrid<strong>in</strong>g concern, as it is with regard topension systems. Public spend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> these areas could lead to higher<strong>de</strong>ficits and endanger the sound public f<strong>in</strong>ances required by theStability and Growth pact. In this context, the Broad Economic PolicyGui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es for 2001 stress that member states need to <strong>de</strong>velopcomprehensive strategies for address<strong>in</strong>g the economic and budgetarychallenges posed by age<strong>in</strong>g populations. Strategy measures might<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> reform of pension and health care systems, and care for theel<strong>de</strong>rly.The Commission has issued two Communications on “safe andsusta<strong>in</strong>able pensions” and suggested the <strong>in</strong>troduction of an “openmethod of co-ord<strong>in</strong>ation” <strong>in</strong> this area (EUROPEAN COMMISSION,2 Council of <strong>Europe</strong>, Implications of labour migration for social security systems <strong>in</strong><strong>Europe</strong>an countries - activities of the Council of <strong>Europe</strong>, report of the 8 th Conference of<strong>Europe</strong>an M<strong>in</strong>isters responsible for Social Security, Bratislava, 22 and 23 May 2002. Theseven member States that have signed the ‘Protocol’ are Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg,the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Swe<strong>de</strong>n. Note that a revised ‘<strong>Europe</strong>an Co<strong>de</strong> ofSocial Security’ was adopted <strong>in</strong> 1990, but has not yet entered <strong>in</strong>to force.


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 652000, 2001d). These plans were adopted by the Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters <strong>in</strong>December 2001. Pensions rema<strong>in</strong> a national responsibility, but memberstates agree on common objectives and annual policy review along thel<strong>in</strong>es of the Employment Strategy. The first national reports on pensionswere due <strong>in</strong> September 2002, and the first Jo<strong>in</strong>t Report on pensions isexpected for the <strong>Europe</strong>an Council meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Spr<strong>in</strong>g 2003. An <strong>in</strong>itialreview of pension systems and reform activities by member statesrecords some progress, although it notes that <strong>in</strong> some cases (Germany,Austria, Portugal) additional measures may be required <strong>in</strong> the future tosecure f<strong>in</strong>ancial susta<strong>in</strong>ability. Belgium, Spa<strong>in</strong>, France and Italy ares<strong>in</strong>gled out as member states where reforms need to proceed as amatter of urgency. The report observes that reserve funds have beencreated <strong>in</strong> a number of member states (Belgium, Spa<strong>in</strong>, Ireland andFrance) but regrets their limited size (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002d,p. 21).A parallel effort that addresses both labour market participationand social protection is the Social Inclusion Process, which was agreedat the 2000 Lisbon summit. National action plans aga<strong>in</strong>st poverty andsocial exclusion are submitted by member states every two years. Thefirst set of reports from June 2001 remarks on the challenge of equalaccess to health care and also shows that pension systems are animportant component of overall policies to combat poverty and socialexclusion. In its Draft Jo<strong>in</strong>t Report on Social Inclusion, which builds onthe National Action Plans, the Commission aga<strong>in</strong> un<strong>de</strong>rl<strong>in</strong>es the dualrole of social policy as a productive factor and as a key <strong>in</strong>strument toreduce <strong>in</strong>equalities and promote social cohesion. It notes that certa<strong>in</strong>countries (Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Swe<strong>de</strong>n and Ireland)have emphasised the need to <strong>in</strong>crease the labour participation ofspecific groups, such as ol<strong>de</strong>r people, immigrants or people withdisabilities “also with a view to tackl<strong>in</strong>g current labour shortages”(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2001e, p. 26). 3 With regard to health care,the report notes that “although the objective of affordability is sharedby all Member States, the <strong>de</strong>gree of coverage and the quality of careprovi<strong>de</strong>d un<strong>de</strong>r the different systems may differ wi<strong>de</strong>ly across countries”(p. 39). A common concern is how to face a grow<strong>in</strong>g number ofsituations of <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy, given the limitations of public care servicesand the <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g support role of families. On this question, differentpolicy <strong>in</strong>struments have been envisaged across the EU, rang<strong>in</strong>g fromthe <strong>de</strong>velopment of long-term care facilities to the implementation of3 <strong>Europe</strong>an Commission, Draft Jo<strong>in</strong>t Report on Social Inclusion, COM (2001) 565f<strong>in</strong>al, Brussels, 10 October 2001, p. 26 pp.


66 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELlong-term care <strong>in</strong>surance schemes. However, the general impression isone of dispersed and limited policy <strong>in</strong>itiatives.As with other policies to address <strong>de</strong>mographic change, the generaleconomic climate is a critical <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ant of success <strong>in</strong> this area. Whilethe mo<strong>de</strong>rnisation of pension and health care systems themselves is animportant objective, coherent employment, social and economic policiesare nee<strong>de</strong>d to <strong>in</strong>crease the revenue base on which such systems rest.Moreover, a drop <strong>in</strong> public <strong>de</strong>bt can lower <strong>in</strong>terest payments and helpgovernments to offset some of the projected <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> spend<strong>in</strong>g onpensions and health care. How do policies to susta<strong>in</strong> pension and healthcare systems <strong>in</strong>teract with other policies mentioned <strong>in</strong> the context of<strong>de</strong>mographic change? Higher employment rates re<strong>in</strong>force the aim off<strong>in</strong>ancial viability as they improve the revenue base of pensions systemsand as work<strong>in</strong>g to higher ages eases the pressure on these systems. Onthe other hand, <strong>in</strong>creased employment rates of women mean that fewerof them will be available as <strong>in</strong>formal health care provi<strong>de</strong>rs. Such a<strong>de</strong>velopment will require <strong>in</strong>creased public provision of long-term healthcare for the el<strong>de</strong>rly. With regard to fertility, it can be argued that policiesthat respond to fiscal pressure on social <strong>in</strong>surance systems, such as<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g taxes or social security contributions or reduc<strong>in</strong>g benefitsprovi<strong>de</strong>d by employers, do not encourage childbear<strong>in</strong>g (MACDONALD,2000, p.14). Similarly, less progressive taxation systems (which maystimulate <strong>in</strong>vestment and job creation, thereby rais<strong>in</strong>g participation rates)provi<strong>de</strong> relatively higher benefits to higher <strong>in</strong>come earners who tend notto be young people on the verge of family formation. There areexamples for mutually re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g policies, such as the positive effects of<strong>in</strong>creased childcare provision on both fertility and the participation rate ofwomen. However, there are also <strong>in</strong>dications that policies <strong>in</strong> the differentareas affected by <strong>de</strong>mographic change, such as fertility and socialsupport systems, can have contradictory effects.<strong>Immigration</strong> policies<strong>Immigration</strong> for <strong>de</strong>mographic reasons has long been <strong>de</strong>bated byscientific experts and is now <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly mak<strong>in</strong>g the transition <strong>in</strong>topolicy <strong>de</strong>bates. An example for the topic’s ris<strong>in</strong>g profile is the <strong>Europe</strong>anPopulation Conference 2003, which will be organised <strong>in</strong> Warsaw bythe <strong>Europe</strong>an Association for Population Studies <strong>in</strong> collaboration withPolish partners. The draft programme lists <strong>in</strong>ternational migration,population age<strong>in</strong>g, and “population and policies” as topics to bediscussed. In the framework of the Council of <strong>Europe</strong>, several studiescompleted un<strong>de</strong>r the aegis of the Population Committee have ma<strong>de</strong>


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 67the connection between labour market and migration policies. Acurrent research project addresses reconciliation policies to comb<strong>in</strong>ework and family life, retirement policies, and <strong>in</strong>ternational labourmigration as different “aspects of the problem of an age<strong>in</strong>g population”(COUNCIL OF EUROPE, n.d.).With<strong>in</strong> member state governments and EU <strong>in</strong>stitutions, migration isalso <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly be<strong>in</strong>g connected with <strong>de</strong>mographic consi<strong>de</strong>rationsand is enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to policies implemented to meet related challenges.The <strong>Europe</strong>an Employment Strategy and the Broad Economic PolicyGui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es, the emerg<strong>in</strong>g policies on age<strong>in</strong>g and health, and activities topromote gen<strong>de</strong>r equity <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly conta<strong>in</strong> references to the immigrationof third country nationals. In most cases, the relevant texts still take acautious position, mention<strong>in</strong>g migration as an option but refra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g fromadvocat<strong>in</strong>g it more strongly. For <strong>in</strong>stance, the Commission’s 2001Communication on pensions states that “immigration can [..] make asignificant contribution to stabilis<strong>in</strong>g total population and employmentfigures” but then ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that no “realistic level of immigration” canhalt the <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> the ratio of workers to pensioners. Similarly, the2002 Social Situation report conclu<strong>de</strong>s that “immigration can contributeto fill<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> specific gaps on the <strong>Europe</strong>an labour market, but itcan <strong>in</strong> no way stop or reverse the process of significant populationage<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>”. The hesitancy of policy makers with regard toimmigration as an answer to <strong>de</strong>mographic challenges is connected tothree ma<strong>in</strong> aspects: the composition of the immigrant flows <strong>in</strong>volved,the social susta<strong>in</strong>ability of large scale immigration, and the susta<strong>in</strong>abilityof immigration’s effect on age<strong>in</strong>g.With regard to composition, the <strong>de</strong>bate is about the <strong>de</strong>gree ofselectivity that is possible and <strong>de</strong>sirable when manag<strong>in</strong>g immigration, andabout the criteria that should be employed when select<strong>in</strong>g immigrants.Many commentators advocate select<strong>in</strong>g immigrants who can provi<strong>de</strong>the skills that are lack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the domestic labour market. However, otherswarn that shortages <strong>in</strong> specific sectors are often short-term, whileimmigrants, at least from less affluent countries, tend to be permanent.Moreover, they po<strong>in</strong>t out that immigration should not be an ‘easy’ wayof temporarily evad<strong>in</strong>g hard choices about the need to reform the<strong>Europe</strong>an labour market, education, social protection and retirementpolicies. Some of the strongest voices for immigration come from thoseconcerned with budgetary stability and the susta<strong>in</strong>ability of publicf<strong>in</strong>ances. To maximise the positive effects of immigration for pensionand health care systems, the <strong>de</strong>sired immigrants would be as young aspossible. However, if the selection criteria were entirely <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on<strong>de</strong>mographic objectives, flows would have to be closely regulated and


68 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELrepresentatives of particular age groups would have to be selected.Such a policy of ‘f<strong>in</strong>e-tun<strong>in</strong>g’ would be impossible to implement(PUNCH/PEARCE, 2000, p. 107. This study further argues that “it cannotbe expected that migratory flows will have a major impact on thestructure of the population of <strong>Europe</strong>”).Apart from the composition of the immigrant <strong>in</strong>take, its size alsorema<strong>in</strong>s a controversial issue. The UN 2000 report led to a polarised<strong>de</strong>bate about numbers, which focused on the highest scenarios andneglected the amount of choice that societies have <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>sign<strong>in</strong>g policyresponses to age<strong>in</strong>g. While now there is a greater acknowledgement ofthe need for immigration, numbers are still a sensitive issue. Somescholars assert that the proponents of migration for <strong>de</strong>mographic reasonsneglect to consi<strong>de</strong>r the “<strong>in</strong>direct economic costs and the social, culturaland political externalities of immigration” (COLEMAN, 2000). Suchcomments refer to the issue of social cohesion relat<strong>in</strong>g to migration,which is now high on the agenda of many <strong>Europe</strong>an countries. While it istrue that <strong>in</strong>creased flows <strong>in</strong>to countries with little historical experience ofimmigration would require social and cultural adjustments, it is importantto keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that alternative policies to meet <strong>de</strong>mographic challengesmay also <strong>de</strong>mand far-reach<strong>in</strong>g changes. Increas<strong>in</strong>g the labour forceparticipation rates for women and for ol<strong>de</strong>r men would shift the socialbalance <strong>in</strong> countries such as Italy and Greece. “Fertility-friendly” changes<strong>in</strong> family culture and <strong>in</strong> the levels of social support for men and womenwith family responsibilities would require a <strong>de</strong>gree of gen<strong>de</strong>r equity notcurrently feasible <strong>in</strong> many societies (MACDONALD/ KIPPEN, 2000, p. 18).Scepticism about migration for <strong>de</strong>mographic reasons questions thesusta<strong>in</strong>ability of the “migration effect” to counter population age<strong>in</strong>g. Onthis view, replacement migration is not a long-term solution to populationage<strong>in</strong>g, because migrants also age. While <strong>in</strong>creased immigration wouldcerta<strong>in</strong>ly have an immediate impact on the work<strong>in</strong>g-age population, thelong-term effects are less certa<strong>in</strong>. Current immigrant populations <strong>in</strong><strong>Europe</strong> have a relatively young age structure (the median age of newimmigrants is on average about 30 years, compared with 36 years forthe overall OECD population. Among the immigrant populations present<strong>in</strong> the EU, Turkish immigrants have the lowest old-age <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratio).A recent OECD commissioned study also notes that fertility ratesamong immigrant women are often relatively high, which “can helpboost overall fertility and hence long-term population growth” (COPPEL/DUMONT/VISCO, 2001, p. 21). However, these fertility levels may droponce the migrants are <strong>in</strong> the country, especially if they are temporaryworkers with little security of work and resi<strong>de</strong>nce. Hence, the fertilityfactor rema<strong>in</strong>s key to the process of population age<strong>in</strong>g.


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 69Some conclud<strong>in</strong>g remarks: migration as an optionThe previous sections have tried to show that migration is andshould be consi<strong>de</strong>red an important <strong>in</strong>gredient <strong>in</strong> a diversified approachto respond to <strong>de</strong>mographic trends <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>. Demographic trendssuggest that keep<strong>in</strong>g the “economic <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratio” —the relationof the economically active to the economically <strong>in</strong>active— low will becrucial for creat<strong>in</strong>g a balanced labour market and for safeguard<strong>in</strong>g thesusta<strong>in</strong>ability of pension and health care systems. A long-term view is<strong>in</strong>dispensable here, both because population policy <strong>de</strong>als with longtime periods such as generations and because uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty and lack ofplann<strong>in</strong>g for the future lead to fear among <strong>Europe</strong>an citizens. Th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>gabout <strong>de</strong>mographic <strong>de</strong>velopments and about ways to respond to themimplies mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>cisions about the shape of future <strong>Europe</strong>an societies.Aga<strong>in</strong>, a broad and long-term view is vital <strong>in</strong> this context, and “it is notso much the <strong>in</strong>dividual policies that matter but the nature of the societyas a whole” (MACDONALD, 2000, p. 21). Beyond the play of sanctionsand <strong>in</strong>centives, the far-reach<strong>in</strong>g changes required if the size of thelabour force and the old age <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy ratio are to be kept at currentlevels will not be achieved without shifts <strong>in</strong> culture and attitu<strong>de</strong>s. It isessential to raise support for these shifts and to promote a <strong>de</strong>bateabout their implications. This <strong>de</strong>bate should ask how immigrationcould help to shape <strong>Europe</strong>’s answer to <strong>de</strong>mographic change, andwhich terms and conditions would best strengthen the positive role ofimmigration and the successful <strong>in</strong>tegration and equal treatment ofimmigrants. 4In the context of this <strong>de</strong>bate one should have another look at thelegislative proposals un<strong>de</strong>r consi<strong>de</strong>ration with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union.The Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs has presentedseveral proposals for Directives sett<strong>in</strong>g out the parameters of a commonimmigration policy. The draft Directive on the conditions of entry andresi<strong>de</strong>nce of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employmentand self-employed activities (COM (2001) 368) aims to provi<strong>de</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>glenational application procedure lead<strong>in</strong>g to one comb<strong>in</strong>ed title for bothresi<strong>de</strong>nce and work permits. The draft Directive on the conditions ofentry and resi<strong>de</strong>nce of third-country nationals for the purposes ofstudies, vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g or voluntary service (COM (2002) 548) was4 An important part of <strong>in</strong>tegration is anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. Effective anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ationlaw is essential <strong>in</strong> the promotion of equality and to avoid the social and economic costsof discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. For more <strong>in</strong>formation about MPG’s work on anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ation,please see MPG’s website at www.migpolgroup.com.


70 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELpresented on 7 October 2002 and covers non-employment relatedpurposes of stay. These two texts aim to <strong>in</strong>troduce a measure ofharmonisation <strong>in</strong>to the admission <strong>de</strong>cisions of member states. Twofurther <strong>in</strong>struments have strong implications for the equal treatmentand <strong>in</strong>tegration of third-country nationals. The Directive on the right tofamily reunification was <strong>in</strong>itially presented <strong>in</strong> 1999, with amen<strong>de</strong>dversions proposed <strong>in</strong> 2000 and 2002 (COM (2002) 225). The Directiveon the status of third-country nationals who are long-term resi<strong>de</strong>nts(COM (2001) 127) proposes that after five years of legal resi<strong>de</strong>nce <strong>in</strong> amember state long-stay third-country nationals will be entitled to apermanent resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit that is valid for ten years and automaticallyrenewable. The text also <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s provisions for free movement, i.e.resi<strong>de</strong>nce <strong>in</strong> another member state.S<strong>in</strong>ce the 1999 <strong>Europe</strong>an Council <strong>in</strong> Tampere, member states haverepeatedly emphasised the centrality of the immigration agenda with<strong>in</strong>Justice and Home Affairs, and consecutive presi<strong>de</strong>ncies have highlightedvarious parts of this agenda as priorities. In<strong>de</strong>ed, the importance of theproposed measures becomes even more evi<strong>de</strong>nt when seen <strong>in</strong> thecontext of the <strong>de</strong>mographic arguments ma<strong>de</strong> above. Once <strong>Europe</strong> has<strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d that immigrants are important, and why, its governments needto th<strong>in</strong>k about ways of attract<strong>in</strong>g and admitt<strong>in</strong>g them, and they needto create a coherent system of rules that support <strong>in</strong>tegration. Integration,<strong>in</strong> turn, will be enhanced by valu<strong>in</strong>g immigrants for their contribution toachiev<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong>’s socio-economic goals and alleviat<strong>in</strong>g the consequencesof <strong>de</strong>mographic change. It is crucial that the rights of immigrants, equaltreatment and security of resi<strong>de</strong>nce should form the cornerstone ofimmigration and <strong>in</strong>tegration policies throughout <strong>Europe</strong>. Discussionand adoption of the Commission’s proposals, then, should be takenforward <strong>in</strong> parallel with the policy <strong>de</strong>bates on <strong>de</strong>mography and on thefundamental values that un<strong>de</strong>rp<strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>’s social market economy.This paper has consistently taken the <strong>Europe</strong>an framework as itsreference po<strong>in</strong>t, look<strong>in</strong>g not only at the EU but also at its accession statesand at the Council of <strong>Europe</strong>. It is difficult to see how purely nationalpolicies can be <strong>de</strong>signed <strong>in</strong> a <strong>Europe</strong>an Union that is both unify<strong>in</strong>g an<strong>de</strong>xpand<strong>in</strong>g. The establishment of a common market and the abolition of<strong>in</strong>ternal bor<strong>de</strong>rs mean that common rules need to be <strong>de</strong>vised regard<strong>in</strong>gexternal bor<strong>de</strong>rs as well. Beyond the <strong>in</strong>ternal market, <strong>Europe</strong>’s states alsoseek to create a political community un<strong>de</strong>r Community law that protectsfundamental rights and promotes a social policy agenda. These ambitiousgoals call for the jo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>de</strong>velopment of a balanced immigration system,which looks beyond present concerns and is <strong>de</strong>signed to meet thechallenge of the long term.


THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR IMMIGRATION? 71The <strong>Europe</strong>an Migration Policy DialogueOne forum for discussion on these issues was created <strong>in</strong> May 2002 withthe <strong>Europe</strong>an Migration Policy Dialogue, a partnership to stimulate nationaland <strong>Europe</strong>an <strong>de</strong>bates on <strong>Europe</strong>an migration policies. Dialogue is promotedbetween key stakehol<strong>de</strong>rs and between stakehol<strong>de</strong>rs and policymakers <strong>in</strong> thefield. The <strong>Europe</strong>an Migration Policy Dialogue seeks to <strong>in</strong>crease the level of<strong>in</strong>formation and participation among non-governmental actors work<strong>in</strong>g onthe national level <strong>in</strong> EU Member States as well as accession states. Its partners<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> NGOs, th<strong>in</strong>k tanks, foundations, and service <strong>de</strong>liver<strong>in</strong>g organisationsprovid<strong>in</strong>g advice and support to migrants while be<strong>in</strong>g active <strong>in</strong> policy<strong>de</strong>velopment as well.Partner organisations of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Migration Policy DialogueAustriaBelgiumDenmarkF<strong>in</strong>landFranceGermanyGreeceHungaryIrelandItalyLuxembourgNetherlandsPolandPortugalSpa<strong>in</strong>UKViennese Fund for Integration (Wiener Integrationsfonds)K<strong>in</strong>g Baudou<strong>in</strong> Foundation (Fondation Roi Baudou<strong>in</strong>/Kon<strong>in</strong>gBou<strong>de</strong>wijnsticht<strong>in</strong>g)MS Movement for Solidarity (Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke)F<strong>in</strong>nish League for Human Rights (Ihmisoikeusliitto)CERI (Centre d’Etu<strong>de</strong>s et <strong>de</strong> Recherches Internationales)Institut PanosDGB Bildungswerk with Interkultureller Rat (Intercultural Council)Hellenic League for Human RightsResearch Group on International Migration and Refugees,Research Institute on M<strong>in</strong>ority Issues, Hungarian Aca<strong>de</strong>my ofSciencesNCCRI (National Consultative Committee on Racism andInterculturalism)CIE (Centro di Iniziativa per l’Europa)CENSIS (Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali)ASTI (Association <strong>de</strong> Soutien aux Travailleurs Immigrés)FORUM (Institut voor Multikulturele Ontwikkel<strong>in</strong>g)CSM (Center for International Relations)ISP (Institute for Public Affairs)Luso-American Foundation (Fundação Luso-Americana)CIDOB Foundation (Fundació CIDOB)Ortega y Gasset Foundation (Fundación José Ortega y Gasset)UKREN (UK Race and <strong>Europe</strong> Network)IAS (<strong>Immigration</strong> Advisory Service)


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74 JAN NIESSEN & YONGMI SCHIBELPUNCH, A.; PEARCE, D. L. (eds.) (2000): <strong>Europe</strong>’s population and labour marketbeyond 2000, Council of <strong>Europe</strong>.RØNSEN, M. (2001): Fertility and family policy <strong>in</strong> Norway: is there a connection?,paper given at the IUSSP sem<strong>in</strong>ar on “International Perspectives on LowFertility: Trends, theories and policies”, Tokyo, March.SCHMID, J. (2001): Political responses to immigration pressures <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>anUnion, paper presented at the XXIV IUSSP General Population Conference,Salvador, Brazil, 18-24 August.SIRCELJ, M. (2002): The <strong>Europe</strong>an Population Committee’s Recent DemographicStudies and their Relevance for Social Cohesion, Council of <strong>Europe</strong><strong>Europe</strong>an Population Paper Series No.2, Council of <strong>Europe</strong>.STARK, L.; KOHLER, H.-P. (2000): The Public Perception and Discussion of Fall<strong>in</strong>gBirth Rates: The Recent Debate over Low Fertility <strong>in</strong> the Popular Press,MPIDR Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper, October 2000 (revised 8 June 2001).UN (2000): Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and Age<strong>in</strong>gPopulations? New York: United Nations Population Division.UNECE (2002): Regional Implementation Strategy for the Madrid InternationalAction Plan on Age<strong>in</strong>g 2002, 4 th consolidated draft, UNECE, 19 June.


<strong>Immigration</strong> and asylum <strong>in</strong> the harmonisation policiesof the EU: the need for balanceSamuel Boutruche“The separate but closely related issues of asylum and migrationcall for the <strong>de</strong>velopment of a common EU policy” (author’s emphasis).§ 10 of the Conclusions of the Tampere <strong>Europe</strong>an Council held on 15and 16 October 1999, clearly illustrates the ambiguity of the nexusbetween these two issues.Un<strong>de</strong>r the Amsterdam Treaty framework, asylum and migration areboth embraced <strong>in</strong> the umbrella concept of the Area of Freedom, Securityand Justice referred to <strong>in</strong> article 61 (Title IV of the EC treaty). This newobjective of the EU <strong>de</strong>veloped <strong>in</strong> the Vienna Action Plan is <strong>de</strong>signed as aset of fundamental rights to be offered first to EU nationals but also tothird country nationals legally resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the EU (BOELES, 2001, pp. 1-12).One of the key issues <strong>in</strong> implement<strong>in</strong>g the AFSJ is therefore to <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ethe conditions of entry <strong>in</strong>to this area for non-EU nationals. S<strong>in</strong>ce asylumand immigration both relate to the admission of third country nationals<strong>in</strong>to the EU territory —yet for clearly different reasons— they are closelyl<strong>in</strong>ked to the realisation of this objective. Article 63 of the Amsterdamtreaty provi<strong>de</strong>s a s<strong>in</strong>gle legal basis for the harmonisation processconcern<strong>in</strong>g asylum and refugee law on the one hand (§ 1 and § 2) andimmigration on the other hand (§ 3 and § 4).On one si<strong>de</strong>, <strong>in</strong> a broad sense, asylum policy —un<strong>de</strong>rstood as theelaboration of a common <strong>Europe</strong>an asylum regime— <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s theprocedural and substantial aspects of asylum together with the otherforms of protection offered to persons fall<strong>in</strong>g outsi<strong>de</strong> the scope of the1951 Geneva Convention, the elaboration of a Temporary Protectionscheme <strong>in</strong> case of mass <strong>in</strong>flux and the sett<strong>in</strong>g up of a bur<strong>de</strong>n shar<strong>in</strong>gmechanism (see Conclusions of the Presi<strong>de</strong>ncy, Tampere). On the othersi<strong>de</strong>, immigration policy refers to the regulation of the conditions ofentry and resi<strong>de</strong>nce of legal migrants, and the prevention and fightaga<strong>in</strong>st illegal immigration.


76 SAMUEL BOUTRUCHEAsylum and immigration rema<strong>in</strong> strictly different <strong>in</strong> nature and <strong>in</strong>scope: whereas asylum is seen as a human right (GOODWIN-GILL, 2001)—the right to seek asylum rather than the right to be granted asylum—for persons flee<strong>in</strong>g because of a reasonable fear of persecution,immigration refers to “voluntary” moves of populations triggered bysocio-economic factors. The specific causes and conditions of the flightof asylum seekers allow them to apply for a certa<strong>in</strong> protection which islegally <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed un<strong>de</strong>r b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational or regional <strong>in</strong>struments.In<strong>de</strong>ed, the persons concerned are entitled to certa<strong>in</strong> rights <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gthe right to non-refoulement either on the ground of Article 33 of theGeneva Convention or on the ground of Article 3 of the <strong>Europe</strong>anConvention on Human Rights. By contrast, the admission of economicmigrants is entirely at the discretion of the sovereign receiv<strong>in</strong>g state.Despite this legal dist<strong>in</strong>ction, draw<strong>in</strong>g a clear divid<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>e betweenthe “forced” and the “voluntary” population flows is rather theoretical.In reality, the displacement phenomenon is often prompted by a mixtureof overlapp<strong>in</strong>g factors; i<strong>de</strong>ntify<strong>in</strong>g the prevail<strong>in</strong>g cause is thereforedifficult (CDR, 2002). The confusion is also due to the fact that asylumseekers are often <strong>de</strong>emed to resort to illegal migration networks to ga<strong>in</strong>access to the EU territory. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the imprecise use of the term<strong>in</strong>ologyby the media when <strong>de</strong>al<strong>in</strong>g with refugee and immigration matters isalso quite mislead<strong>in</strong>g (e.g. the cover<strong>in</strong>g of the Sangatte issue <strong>in</strong> thenews <strong>in</strong> which the terms “refugees”, “asylum seekers” and “immigrants”were used regardless of the dist<strong>in</strong>ctions between them).For these reasons, <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation of the need of protection becomescrucial, not only <strong>in</strong> asylum policy itself, by establish<strong>in</strong>g a fair and efficientregime for process<strong>in</strong>g asylum claims, but also <strong>in</strong> immigration policy bysecur<strong>in</strong>g access to this regime. This is precisely what a number ofrestrictive measures <strong>in</strong> the field of immigration fail to achieve. UNHCRemphasises that <strong>de</strong>ny<strong>in</strong>g the specificity of asylum seekers is the “majorproblem common to virtually all the immigration measures <strong>in</strong>troducedby States(…)” (2002, p. 4).The first aim of this paper is to analyse to what extent the restrictivetrend observed <strong>in</strong> EU immigration policy <strong>in</strong>terferes with the negotiationsfor the future <strong>Europe</strong>an asylum regime. On the one hand, giv<strong>in</strong>g thehighest priority to combat irregular entry of migrants (especially dur<strong>in</strong>gthe Seville Summit <strong>in</strong> June 2002) may contribute to create a major gapwith<strong>in</strong> the common immigration policy itself by neglect<strong>in</strong>g the harmonisationof legal channels of migration towards the EU territory. Onthe other hand, this lack of attention to legal immigration togetherwith the <strong>in</strong>crease of <strong>de</strong>terrent restrictive measures also un<strong>de</strong>rm<strong>in</strong>e thecoherence and <strong>in</strong>tegrity of the asylum policy as a whole, by prevent<strong>in</strong>g


IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN THE HARMONISATION POLICIES OF THE EU... 77the access of undocumented third country nationals to the EU territoryregardless of their need for protection.The second aim of this paper is to stress the necessity and theprospects for reconcil<strong>in</strong>g the legitimate <strong>in</strong>terest of the member states <strong>in</strong>manag<strong>in</strong>g migratory flows and the specific rights of the people <strong>in</strong> needof protection. Beyond the negative impact of the immigration policywhich is systematically highlighted, it can also be argued that abalanced regulation of migration can strengthen the future <strong>Europe</strong>anasylum regime. This is particularly important <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to guarantee thecoherence of the comprehensive “common EU policy” referred to <strong>in</strong>the Tampere Conclusions; <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed, far from be<strong>in</strong>g two contradictorypolicies to be carried out simultaneously, immigration and asylum couldbenefit from each other if <strong>de</strong>signed <strong>in</strong> a complementary way without<strong>in</strong>terference. The repeated call for a more balanced approach <strong>in</strong> variousEU documents goes <strong>in</strong> that direction. In November 2000, the Commissionpresented a Communication on a Community immigration policy whichaimed at clarify<strong>in</strong>g “the way <strong>in</strong> which the other components of an overallimmigration policy must be taken <strong>in</strong>to consi<strong>de</strong>ration (…) and especiallythe humanitarian dimension —the asylum policy” (COM, 2000, p. 6).Even more relevant is the Communication on a common policy on illegalimmigration where the Commission stressed that “the measures relat<strong>in</strong>gto the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st illegal immigration have to balance the right to<strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> whether to accord or refuse admission to the territory to thirdcountry nationals and the obligation to protect those genu<strong>in</strong>ely <strong>in</strong> needof <strong>in</strong>ternational protection” (COM, 2001, p. 7).The emerg<strong>in</strong>g common immigration policy and especially itscomponent <strong>in</strong> the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st illegal immigration put the asylumregime un<strong>de</strong>r a double stra<strong>in</strong>: on the one hand, the restrictive measuresto prevent illegal migration flows directly limit access to the asylumprocedure for undocumented asylum seekers; on the other hand,specific <strong>de</strong>terrent measures have been taken un<strong>de</strong>r the asylum policyitself with the aim of fight<strong>in</strong>g abuses. However, recent <strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>in</strong> theEU immigration policy may contribute to a more balanced approachand benefit to the asylum regime.The consolidation of exist<strong>in</strong>g restrictive measures to fight illegalimmigrationThe focus <strong>in</strong> June 2002 at the Seville summit on combat<strong>in</strong>g illegalimmigration must not be mislead<strong>in</strong>g: this has been a long last<strong>in</strong>g priorityof the EU member states which contributed to orient the harmonisation


78 SAMUEL BOUTRUCHEprocess <strong>in</strong> the field of immigration. Beyond the worsen<strong>in</strong>g of theeconomic situation <strong>in</strong> the member states, another specific factor l<strong>in</strong>kedto the <strong>Europe</strong>an <strong>in</strong>tegration process itself, is often put forward to justifythe shift towards more restrictive migration controls: strengthen<strong>in</strong>g thecontrols at the external bor<strong>de</strong>rs aims at compensat<strong>in</strong>g for the suppressionof the <strong>in</strong>ternal barriers to freedom of movement of persons with<strong>in</strong> the EU.The <strong>in</strong>tegrated notion of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice —s<strong>in</strong>gledout as one of the prime objectives of the EU (pursuant to Article 4 § 4of the TEU)— clearly reflects this trend.As a matter of fact, a number of recent <strong>de</strong>velopments of the EUharmonisation process with regard to immigration are mostly <strong>de</strong>signedto strengthen the exist<strong>in</strong>g tools <strong>de</strong>spite the repeated concern abouttheir negative impact on the possibility of apply<strong>in</strong>g for asylum. The socalled “fortress” <strong>Europe</strong> shows little signs of openness and consolidates<strong>in</strong> many ways the walls erected <strong>in</strong> the 1990s.This paper does not aim at present<strong>in</strong>g an exhaustive list of all thecurrent texts adopted or un<strong>de</strong>r negotiation concern<strong>in</strong>g the fight aga<strong>in</strong>stillegal migration and the <strong>in</strong>creased control of EU external bor<strong>de</strong>rs whichmay restrict access to the asylum procedure for people <strong>in</strong> need ofprotection. We shall only focus on several <strong>in</strong>struments to <strong>de</strong>monstratethat they fail to secure a clear dist<strong>in</strong>ction between economic migrantsand asylum seekers and apply <strong>in</strong>differently to both categories regardlessof the humanitarian nature of the refugee problem. This is particularlyworry<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce these texts merely adapt the exist<strong>in</strong>g measures taken atthe <strong>Europe</strong>an and the national level (KJÆRUM, 2002, p. 516) <strong>in</strong>stead ofsuggest<strong>in</strong>g necessary improvements.Throughout the 1990s, a set of restrictive tools to <strong>de</strong>ter the arrivalof undocumented third country nationals on the EU territory wasadopted. In the absence of any chance to lodge an asylum applicationfrom the country of orig<strong>in</strong> (NOLL/FAGERLUND, 2002), the exercise ofthis human right is therefore <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on access to the EU territory.As a result, <strong>de</strong>ny<strong>in</strong>g entry <strong>in</strong>to the EU clearly amounts to <strong>de</strong>ny<strong>in</strong>gaccess to the asylum procedure as such.Moreover, <strong>in</strong> elaborat<strong>in</strong>g the policy to combat irregular migration, themember states placed a particular emphasis on the legal characteristic ofthe flows: no one could be admitted to the EU territory without specifici<strong>de</strong>ntity and visa documents. These requirements, although legitimate toguarantee the efficiency of a planned management of migration flows,do not fit at all with the particular situation of asylum seekers. These latterare often flee<strong>in</strong>g a violent conflict without any possibility of apply<strong>in</strong>g for avisa. Moreover, they often <strong>de</strong>stroy their own passports so as not to bei<strong>de</strong>ntified <strong>in</strong> their home country. These particular circumstances are


IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN THE HARMONISATION POLICIES OF THE EU... 79taken <strong>in</strong>to account un<strong>de</strong>r Article 31 of the 1951 Convention whichrecognises that there are reasons justify<strong>in</strong>g a refugee’s unauthorise<strong>de</strong>ntry or presence <strong>in</strong> a receiv<strong>in</strong>g country. The texts elaborated at the EUlevel are therefore <strong>in</strong>consistent with the member states’ <strong>in</strong>ternationalcommitments as they impe<strong>de</strong> the undocumented asylum seekers fromga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g access to the EU territory.However, the <strong>in</strong>struments <strong>de</strong>scribed hereafter cont<strong>in</strong>ue to neglectthe specificity of the asylum seekers.The carrier sanction mechanism is probably the most troubl<strong>in</strong>g(LAMBERT, 1995, pp. 198-202). Article 26 of the Convention implement<strong>in</strong>gthe Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 signed on 19 June1990 laid down the obligations and sanctions imposed upon the carrierstransport<strong>in</strong>g undocumented foreign third country nationals <strong>in</strong>to theterritory of the member states. First of all, the transfer to a privatecompany of the sovereign competence of the state to control who is (not)entitled to enter the national territory is rather questionable. Moreover,these companies are by no means authorised, un<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong>ternational law, toassume asylum <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ation responsibilities, precisely because thisprocess required particular legal tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and practical skills to i<strong>de</strong>ntify theprotection need of the persons concerned. Despite these problems, theCouncil Directive of 28 June 2001 supplement<strong>in</strong>g the provisions of Article26 only strengthened the exist<strong>in</strong>g sanction mechanism and theobligations imposed to the carriers. 1A second example concerns the visa policy elaborated un<strong>de</strong>r Article62 (§ 2 b) i.) of the Amsterdam treaty and formalised by the Councilregulation of 15 March 2001. 2 This text lists the third countries whosenationals must be <strong>in</strong> possession of visas when cross<strong>in</strong>g the externalbor<strong>de</strong>rs and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.Although this list is regularly reviewed, it <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s a number of countrieswhere there is documented evi<strong>de</strong>nce of grave human rights violationsor wi<strong>de</strong>spread persecution <strong>in</strong> the context of ethnic or religious conflict(UNHCR, 2002, p. 6).F<strong>in</strong>ally, the recent Commission Communication on the <strong>in</strong>tegratedmanagement of the EU external bor<strong>de</strong>rs also comprises certa<strong>in</strong> aspects1 Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplement<strong>in</strong>g the provisions of Article 26 of theConvention implement<strong>in</strong>g the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ L 187, 10 July2001, p. 45.2Council Regulation list<strong>in</strong>g the third countries whose nationals must be <strong>in</strong>possession of visas when cross<strong>in</strong>g the external bor<strong>de</strong>rs and those whose nationals areexempt from that requirement, No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, Official Journal L 081,21 March 2001, pp. 1-7.


80 SAMUEL BOUTRUCHEwhich may challenge the humanitarian dimension of the asylum<strong>in</strong>stitution if proper safeguards are not implemented. Among other<strong>in</strong>itiatives such as a common unit of immigration practitioners or a<strong>Europe</strong>an bor<strong>de</strong>r guards corps, the future EU network of immigrationliaison officers raises concerns. This network is <strong>de</strong>signed as anotherpreventive tool for controll<strong>in</strong>g entry <strong>in</strong>to the EU territory and supportsthe range of exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>terrent measures. Unlike the airl<strong>in</strong>e personnel,these officers belong to the member states’ immigration offices buttheir capacity to <strong>de</strong>al with asylum cases rema<strong>in</strong>s unclear. These casesrequire particular skills and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to ensure that a person covered bythe 1951 Geneva Convention or entitled to another form of protectionwill not be prevented from embark<strong>in</strong>g for purely adm<strong>in</strong>istrative reasons.Surpris<strong>in</strong>gly enough, the same <strong>in</strong>itiative (e.g. asylum liaison officers) hasnot yet been suggested <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to counterbalance the exclusive focuson bor<strong>de</strong>r management and to take <strong>in</strong>to account the “<strong>in</strong>terrelated”dimension of asylum and immigration. The network of immigrationliaison officers illustrates a new feature of “fortress” <strong>Europe</strong>.The entire set of restrictive measures has not yiel<strong>de</strong>d the expectedresults <strong>in</strong> terms of prevent<strong>in</strong>g illegal immigration. On the contrary, asstated by ECRE “ever stricter control measures have not only obstructedthe right of asylum seekers to access to the territory of <strong>Europe</strong> buthave also forced people to resort to illegal entry and rely on crim<strong>in</strong>alnetworks” (2002). This is probably the most strik<strong>in</strong>g paradox of EUimmigration policy: by giv<strong>in</strong>g the highest priority to the fight aga<strong>in</strong>stillegal migration, it fostered the problem it was <strong>in</strong>itially supposed totackle. Kjærum <strong>in</strong>sists that “the sharp <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> human traffick<strong>in</strong>g is adirect result of the restrictive policies and the lack of alternativesmeasures” (2002, p. 517).This restrictive trend observed <strong>in</strong> immigration policy had anotherdirect consequence on the asylum issue. Besi<strong>de</strong> the impediments <strong>in</strong>terms of access to the procedure, a number of member states tookrestrictive measures with<strong>in</strong> the asylum policy itself, us<strong>in</strong>g this protection<strong>in</strong>strument as a tool for migration management. This is replicated atthe <strong>Europe</strong>an level <strong>in</strong> a number of proposals.The search for efficiency of the emerg<strong>in</strong>g EU asylum policyA <strong>de</strong>tailed exam<strong>in</strong>ation of the critical aspects of the emerg<strong>in</strong>gasylum regime is beyond the scope of the present paper. The risksraised by the use of the notions of safe third country or safe country oforig<strong>in</strong> and the Dubl<strong>in</strong> Convention or the readmission agreements have


IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN THE HARMONISATION POLICIES OF THE EU... 81already long been discussed (CREPEAU, 1995). I will only review heretwo recent proposals which illustrate the search for <strong>in</strong>creased efficiency<strong>in</strong> the process<strong>in</strong>g of asylum claims, and which may un<strong>de</strong>rm<strong>in</strong>e protectionstandards for asylum seekers: the amen<strong>de</strong>d proposal for a Councildirective on m<strong>in</strong>imum standards on asylum procedures 3 and the recentproposal of the British government to create “Transit Process<strong>in</strong>g Centres”<strong>in</strong> third countries. These two texts are partly based on the assumptionthat the asylum regime would be subject to repeated abuses fromillegal economic migrants and that further steps should be taken toi<strong>de</strong>ntify these bogus refugees as quickly as possible.The amen<strong>de</strong>d proposal for a directive on asylum proceduresPursuant to the Conclusions of the Justice and Home AffairsCouncil held <strong>in</strong> December 2001, the Commission was <strong>in</strong>vited to modifythe <strong>in</strong>itial proposal of a directive on asylum procedures (COM (2000)578, 20 September 2000). The structure of the new text has beensignificantly changed. The dist<strong>in</strong>ction between admissibility proceduresand substantial exam<strong>in</strong>ation procedure disappeared. The admissibilityprocedure (isolated <strong>in</strong> Chapter III of the preced<strong>in</strong>g text) is now<strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong> the chapter on accelerated procedures.The major change regards the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> cases <strong>in</strong> which asylumclaims can be processed un<strong>de</strong>r an accelerated procedure (Art. 23). Inaddition to the cases of <strong>in</strong>admissible applications (Art. 25), themanifestly unfoun<strong>de</strong>d applications (Art. 29) and the other cases un<strong>de</strong>rthe accelerated procedure (Art. 32), two new types of asylum claimsare <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> this category: the subsequent asylum application (Art. 33)and the asylum application ma<strong>de</strong> at the bor<strong>de</strong>r (Art. 35). Surpris<strong>in</strong>glyenough the regular procedure is <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> relation to the acceleratedprocedures: paragraph 2 of Article 23 states that all other proceduresshall be consi<strong>de</strong>red as regular procedures. Given the extensive numberof cases un<strong>de</strong>r accelerated procedures, the scope of the regularprocedure seems to be rather limited.This <strong>de</strong>parture from the <strong>in</strong>itial proposal clearly <strong>de</strong>monstrates thewill to <strong>in</strong>crease the efficiency of the management of asylum seekers <strong>in</strong>or<strong>de</strong>r to prevent abuses (for a complete analysis, see LAURAIN, 2003).This extension of accelerated procedures raises major concerns s<strong>in</strong>cethe suspensive effect of the appeal proceed<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>de</strong>cisions taken3 Amen<strong>de</strong>d proposal for a Council directive on m<strong>in</strong>imum standards on procedures <strong>in</strong>Member States for grant<strong>in</strong>g and withdraw<strong>in</strong>g refugee status, COM(2002) 326 f<strong>in</strong>al, 18June 2002.


82 SAMUEL BOUTRUCHE<strong>in</strong> this type of procedure is subject to further exceptions <strong>in</strong> comparison tothe rules applicable to the regular procedure. In both procedures,national legislations may provi<strong>de</strong> that the applicant for asylum is notallowed to rema<strong>in</strong> on the territory of the Member State concernedawait<strong>in</strong>g the outcome of his appeal or review. In that case, “the MemberStates shall ensure that the court of law has the competence to rulewhether or not such an applicant may, given the particular circumstancesof his/her case, rema<strong>in</strong> on the territory of the Member State concerned(…)”. No expulsion may take place until the court of law has ruled onthis right to rema<strong>in</strong>. In the regular procedure, the proposal allows theMember State to provi<strong>de</strong> for only one exception to this prohibition:when grounds of national security or public policy preclu<strong>de</strong> the applicantfor asylum from rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g on the territory of the Member Stateconcerned. By contrast, <strong>in</strong> the accelerated procedures, the text allows fora wi<strong>de</strong>r range of exceptions. Expulsion may take place (Art. 40):—where it has been <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d that the asylum application is <strong>in</strong>admissible;—where the applicant has not submitted new facts after a court oflaw has aleardy rejected his/her claim to rema<strong>in</strong> on the territoryof the Member State concerned;—where it has been <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d that a subsequent application will notbe further exam<strong>in</strong>ed and—where it has been <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d that grounds of national security orpublic policy preclu<strong>de</strong> the applicant for asylum from rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gon the territory of the Member State concerned.These restrictive provisions on the suspensive effect of the appealproceed<strong>in</strong>g must be analysed <strong>in</strong> relation to the norms conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> therelevant <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>struments and especially the non refoulementpr<strong>in</strong>ciple set up explicitly <strong>in</strong> Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Conventionand <strong>in</strong> Article 3 of the 1984 Convention aga<strong>in</strong>st Torture, or implicitly <strong>in</strong>Article 3 of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Convention on Human Rights (NOLL, 2002,pp. 3-5). Pursuant to these texts —which are legally b<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g for all EUMember States 4 — the expulsion of an asylum seeker to another statewhere there is a risk for his/her security is prohibited. Therefore, it canbe questioned whether the proposal is fully consistent with thisobligation (LAURAIN, 2003, pp. 2-6).In addition, the new proposal allows for a wi<strong>de</strong>r use of <strong>de</strong>tention.The previous limited list of cases which could justify the <strong>de</strong>tention of an4 Except for Ireland and Belgium which have not yet ratified the Convention aga<strong>in</strong>stTorture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad<strong>in</strong>g Treatment or Punishment.


IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN THE HARMONISATION POLICIES OF THE EU... 83applicant for asylum is now replaced by two general provisions (Art.17.2): these clauses allow <strong>de</strong>rogation of the prohibition of <strong>de</strong>tentionwhen it is consi<strong>de</strong>red as “objectively necessary for an efficient exam<strong>in</strong>ationof the application” or “necessary for a quick <strong>de</strong>cision to be ma<strong>de</strong>”. Aguarantee of maximum duration (two weeks) is only specified withregard to the second justification.Besi<strong>de</strong>s, a series of limitations of m<strong>in</strong>imum standards has been<strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the proposal concern<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> procedural rights whichmust be normally guaranteed to the applicant for asylum. The right toan <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>terview, access to legal advice or access to an <strong>in</strong>terpreterare subject to certa<strong>in</strong> restrictions.On the basis of this brief analysis of the content of the amen<strong>de</strong>dDirective proposal on asylum procedure, it can be argued that theemerg<strong>in</strong>g asylum policy is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>de</strong>signed to regulate the flow ofasylum seekers, especially through a more efficient and acceleratedscrut<strong>in</strong>y of their claims.The British proposal for Transit Process<strong>in</strong>g CentresThe recent proposal of the British government to create “TransitProcess<strong>in</strong>g Centres” <strong>in</strong> the third countries pursued the same goal. This<strong>in</strong>itiative was presented <strong>in</strong> a letter sent by the British Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister tohis EU partners on 10 March 2003. The reasons for this proposal ma<strong>in</strong>lylay <strong>in</strong> the need to <strong>de</strong>crease and better share the cost paid for eachrefugee received <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, the emphasis on the illegal channels theasylum seekers resort to <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to ga<strong>in</strong> access to the EU territory, thelow number of <strong>de</strong>cisions grant<strong>in</strong>g protection to these people and thedifficulties the Member States are fac<strong>in</strong>g to process the asylum claims(see MARIANI, 2003, pp. 75-80). This <strong>in</strong>itiative consist <strong>in</strong> the creationof “Transit Process<strong>in</strong>g Centres” <strong>in</strong> the third countries located on asylumseekers’ routes where they would be transferred when arriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theEU territory. Those applicants granted asylum would be re<strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> aMember State whereas the others would be directly <strong>de</strong>ported back totheir country of orig<strong>in</strong>.This new proposal must be analysed <strong>in</strong> the context of theexternalisation of the asylum regime (LAVENEX, 1998; LAVENEX/UÇARER, 2002) which aims at shift<strong>in</strong>g away from the EU externalbor<strong>de</strong>rs the bur<strong>de</strong>n of the asylum seekers through the clauses of safethird country or first country of asylum and the <strong>de</strong>velopment ofreadmission agreements. The British <strong>in</strong>itiative marks a crucial turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong> this process: it suggests a complete transfer of the responsibilities ofprocess<strong>in</strong>g the asylum claims from the EU Member States to the third


84 SAMUEL BOUTRUCHEcountries regardless of the type of countries the asylum seeker transitedthrough. The impact on the common asylum policy would be drastic: ifsuch a system were to be implemented, it would merely make the new<strong>Europe</strong>an asylum regime irrelevant s<strong>in</strong>ce most of the asylum claimswould be exam<strong>in</strong>ed outsi<strong>de</strong> the EU.This <strong>in</strong>itiative is already highly criticised by NGOs <strong>de</strong>al<strong>in</strong>g withhuman rights and refugee protection (MARIANI, 2003, p. 78). It wasdiscussed at the <strong>in</strong>formal JHA Council <strong>in</strong> Veria on 28 and 29 March2003. Member States <strong>in</strong>vited the <strong>Europe</strong>an Commission together withUNHCR to prepare a jo<strong>in</strong>t report to be exam<strong>in</strong>ed at the 5-6 June JHACouncil and at the 20-21 June <strong>Europe</strong>an Council <strong>in</strong> Thessaloniki.Attention must be drawn to these measures taken un<strong>de</strong>r the immigrationpolicy framework and un<strong>de</strong>r the asylum policy framework whichare motivated by the management of flux <strong>in</strong> general and the fight aga<strong>in</strong>stillegal immigration <strong>in</strong> particular, regardless of the protection needs of thepersons concerned. As far as the asylum procedure is concerned,priority is given to efficiency and the limitation of costs over substantialrights.A more balanced approach is highly nee<strong>de</strong>d between the immigrationand asylum policies on the one hand and with<strong>in</strong> each of these policieson the other hand. This is a prerequisite to ensure the coherence offuture EU common policy <strong>in</strong> these areas.Positive prospects for a more balanced immigration policyThe <strong>in</strong>trusion of the restrictive immigration agenda <strong>in</strong>to the asylumnegotiations leads Member States to focus on the procedural aspectsof the asylum regime with a view to fight<strong>in</strong>g subversion of the procedureby economic migrants. Suspicion of “bogus” asylum seekers seems tobe supported by statistics which <strong>in</strong>dicate a significant drop <strong>in</strong> acceptancerates of refugees. In reality, this figure is also due to a narrower<strong>in</strong>terpretation of the refugee <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition of the 1951 Convention (BOU-TEILLET-PAQUET, 2001, p. 21). As a result, it seems that the “spectre”of the abuses is somehow overestimated. However, it would be amistake to <strong>de</strong>ny it. It must be consi<strong>de</strong>red as a key factor <strong>in</strong> analys<strong>in</strong>g thepossible use of asylum policy as a tool for migration management.Moreover, it should be taken <strong>in</strong>to account <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to reconcile asylumand immigration as two “separate but closely related issues”. S<strong>in</strong>ce theseabuses of the asylum system partly stem from the absence of alternativeavenues to ga<strong>in</strong> legal access to the EU territory, a more balanced EUimmigration policy might lift the pressure on the asylum regime.


IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN THE HARMONISATION POLICIES OF THE EU... 85“I believe (…) the moment has come to acknowledge that we <strong>in</strong> factneed legal immigration” António Vitor<strong>in</strong>o, EU Commissioner for Justiceand Home Affairs, stated <strong>in</strong> his clos<strong>in</strong>g speech at the Conference onthe role of Civil Society <strong>in</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g Integration held <strong>in</strong> Brussels on 10September 2002. A number of directives recently adopted or un<strong>de</strong>rdiscussion <strong>in</strong> the Council seem to make this commitment. These textsaim at establish<strong>in</strong>g legal channels of labour migration and promot<strong>in</strong>g the<strong>in</strong>tegration of third country nationals legally resid<strong>in</strong>g on EU territory. Thepurpose of this paragraph is neither to give an extensive <strong>de</strong>scription ofall the relevant <strong>in</strong>struments <strong>in</strong> the field of immigration, nor to discuss thedifferent views concern<strong>in</strong>g the need for immigration as “a complementarylabour market strategy” (NIESSEN, n.d.). These issues are betteraddressed by other contributors <strong>in</strong> this book. My option is rather topo<strong>in</strong>t out a few elements which have a direct impact on the asylumregime itself <strong>in</strong> the sense that they may contribute to lift the migratorypressure and restore the specificity of the protection mechanism.The Directive proposal on the conditions of entry and resi<strong>de</strong>nce ofthird-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and selfemployed economic activities provi<strong>de</strong>s for a coherent set of m<strong>in</strong>imumstandards. 5 This text aims at establish<strong>in</strong>g a uniform application procedureand a common legal status for migrants admitted <strong>in</strong> the EU. My firstassumption is that the proposal provi<strong>de</strong>s the EU with a real opportunityto counterbalance the emphasis on the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st illegal migration.It lays down common criteria for admitt<strong>in</strong>g third-country nationals toemployed activities and self-employed economic activities. It is notargued that the issue of fight<strong>in</strong>g illegal immigration will disappear fromthe <strong>Europe</strong>an agenda. Nonetheless, the harmonisation of the ways toregulate migration for economic purposes may contribute to a betterdistribution of the flow towards the EU. However, as stated by Vitor<strong>in</strong>o,the proposal is based on a consi<strong>de</strong>rable <strong>de</strong>gree of flexibility to adapt tothe national and regional needs of the labour market. Therefore, theMember States may choose to further <strong>de</strong>velop a migration scheme un<strong>de</strong>rspecific conditions focus<strong>in</strong>g on high skill workers and <strong>de</strong>pend<strong>in</strong>g onthe chang<strong>in</strong>g needs of the labour market (WEIL/LOCHAK, 2002, p. 49).It has also been questioned whether or not immigration could be anoption to address the <strong>de</strong>mographic changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> (NIESSEN/SCHIBEL, 2002). In reality, “migrants cannot be thought of as apanacea for all ills” (LEWIS/ABBING, 2001-2002, p. 508). The risk of5 Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and resi<strong>de</strong>nce of thirdcountrynationals for the purpose of paid employment and self employed economicactivities, COM(2001) 386 f<strong>in</strong>al, 11 July 2001.


86 SAMUEL BOUTRUCHE<strong>in</strong>strumentalis<strong>in</strong>g the migrants pursuant to conjunctural factors ispend<strong>in</strong>g. With regard to asylum, this possibility would hardly fulfil theexpectations of the migrants themselves who would probably cont<strong>in</strong>ueto resort to the asylum procedure to ga<strong>in</strong> access to the EU territory.However, this proposal has to be analysed <strong>in</strong> relation to two otherproposals concern<strong>in</strong>g the social <strong>in</strong>tegration of economic migrants <strong>in</strong>the receiv<strong>in</strong>g country. 6 These texts could <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed favour long termmigrations and therefore <strong>in</strong>itiate a structural change <strong>in</strong> the migrationpolicy of the EU.ConclusionThe Green paper on a Community return policy of illegal resi<strong>de</strong>ntspresented by the Commission on 10 April 2002 argues that, “as partof a comprehensive immigration policy, the adoption of commonprocedures for labour migrants could to a certa<strong>in</strong> extent also reducepressure on channels for humanitarian admission and that illegal migrantswould be further <strong>de</strong>terred by more effective jo<strong>in</strong>t action aga<strong>in</strong>stsmuggl<strong>in</strong>g and traffick<strong>in</strong>g” (COM (2002) 175 f<strong>in</strong>al, p. 7). This approachclearly <strong>de</strong>monstrates that the immigration and asylum policies of theEU are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly thought of <strong>in</strong> a complementary way <strong>in</strong>stead of thecontradictory way which long prevailed. Putt<strong>in</strong>g a stress on the positive<strong>in</strong>ter<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce of these two issues would potentially allow for amore coherent EU policy <strong>in</strong> the field of forced and voluntary migrations.The condition for successfully implement<strong>in</strong>g this new approach is toguarantee the dist<strong>in</strong>ction between illegal migrants and asylum seekers.This is precisely what the Commission po<strong>in</strong>ts out <strong>in</strong> this Green paperon return <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to ensure that no expulsion will take place beforethe need of any form of protection has been exam<strong>in</strong>ed.Reconsi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the impact of immigration policy on the asylumregime also requires <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g a set of rights for the immigrantsthemselves. The recent EU <strong>in</strong>itiatives aim<strong>in</strong>g at combat<strong>in</strong>g smuggl<strong>in</strong>gand traffick<strong>in</strong>g of human be<strong>in</strong>gs must be welcome. They seem to<strong>in</strong>itiate a change <strong>in</strong> the conception of the migrant, who is no longerseen merely as a smuggler but as a victim entitled to certa<strong>in</strong> rights.6 Amen<strong>de</strong>d proposal for a Council directive on the right to family reunification,COM(2002) 225 f<strong>in</strong>al, Official Journal C 203 E, 27August 2002, pp. 136-141.


ReferencesIMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM IN THE HARMONISATION POLICIES OF THE EU... 87BOELES, P. (2001): “Introduction: Freedom, Security and Justice for all.” In:Implement<strong>in</strong>g Amsterdam: immigration and asylum rights <strong>in</strong> EC law, ed. E.Guild and C. Harlow. Hart, Oxford.BOUTEILLET-PAQUET, D. (2001): L’<strong>Europe</strong> et le droit d’asile, L’Harmattan, Paris.CDR (2002): “The migration-<strong>de</strong>velopment nexus.” In: Aid policy and practice,Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen.COM (2000): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the<strong>Europe</strong>an Parliament on a Community <strong>Immigration</strong> Policy, COM(2000)757 f<strong>in</strong>al, 22 November.COM (2001): Communication from the Commission to the Council and the<strong>Europe</strong>an Parliament on a Common Policy on illegal immigration,COM(2001) 672 f<strong>in</strong>al, 15 November.CRÉPEAU, F. (1995): Droit d’asile: <strong>de</strong> l’hospitalité aux contrôles migratoires,Bruylant, Université <strong>de</strong> Bruxelles, Coll. Droit <strong>in</strong>ternational.ECRE (2002): Press Release, “Seville Summit: block<strong>in</strong>g access to <strong>Europe</strong> is notthe answer”, 17 June 2002, available at (visited27 January 2003).GOODWIN-GILL, G. S. (2001): “The <strong>in</strong>dividual refugee, the 1951 Convention andthe Treaty of Amsterdam.” In: Implement<strong>in</strong>g Amsterdam: immigration andasylum rights <strong>in</strong> EC law, ed. E. Guild and C. Harlow. Hart, Oxford.KJÆRUM, M. (2002): “Refugee protection between state <strong>in</strong>terests and humanrights: where is <strong>Europe</strong> head<strong>in</strong>g?” In: Human Rights Quarterly, 24(2), pp.513-536.LAMBERT, H. (1995): “Seek<strong>in</strong>g asylum: comparative law and practice <strong>in</strong> selected<strong>Europe</strong>an countries”.LAURAIN, M. (2003): “Vers <strong>de</strong>s normes m<strong>in</strong>imales européennes concernant laprocédure d’octroi et <strong>de</strong> retrait du statut <strong>de</strong> réfugié. Réflexions sur uneproposition <strong>de</strong> directive.” In: Actualité et Droit International, available on.LAVENEX, S. (1998): “’Pass<strong>in</strong>g the buck’: the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union refugee policiestowards Central and eastern <strong>Europe</strong>.” In: Journal of Refugee Studies,11(2), pp. 126-145.LAVENEX, S.; UÇARER, E. (eds.) (2002): Migration and the externalities of<strong>Europe</strong>an <strong>in</strong>tegration, Lex<strong>in</strong>gton Books, Oxford.LEWIS, R.; ABBING, F. R. (2001-2002): “An asylum and immigration policy for the<strong>Europe</strong>an Union.” In: Law and <strong>Europe</strong>an Affairs, 5, p. 508.MARIANI, T. (2003): Quelle politique d’asile pour l’<strong>Europe</strong>?, Rapport d’<strong>in</strong>formation<strong>de</strong> l’Assemblée Nationale, n.° 817, mai 2003, pp. 75-80.NIESSEN, J. (n.d.): “Chang<strong>in</strong>g the terms of the <strong>de</strong>bate: immigrants and <strong>Europe</strong>’sfuture”, Speech of Mr Niessen, Director of Migration Policy Group, availableon NIESSEN, J.; SCHIBEL, Y. (2002): Demographic changes and the consequences for<strong>Europe</strong>’s future. Is immigration an option?, Migration Policy Group, availableon


88 SAMUEL BOUTRUCHENOLL, G. (2002): Fixed <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itions or framework legislation? The <strong>de</strong>limitation ofsubsidiary protection ratione persone, UNHCR Work<strong>in</strong>g Paper No. 55,available on NOLL, G.; FAGERLUND, J. (2002): “Safe avenues to asylum? The actual andpotential role of EU diplomatic representations <strong>in</strong> process<strong>in</strong>g asylumrequests”, The Danish Centre for Human Rights and UNHCR, available at (visited 30 August 2002).UNHCR (2002): UNHCR’s Observations on the Communication from the<strong>Europe</strong>an Commission on a common policy on illegal immigrationCOM(2001) 672 f<strong>in</strong>al, UNHCR, Geneva.WEIL, P.; LOCHAK, D. (2002): “Quand l’<strong>Europe</strong> choisit ses immigrés”, Alternatives<strong>in</strong>ternationales, Septembre-Octobre, p. 49.


Belgian immigration policy 1Marco Mart<strong>in</strong>ielloBelgium is one of the most multicultural and multiracial countriesof the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union. Today, the population of immigrant orig<strong>in</strong>(about 900,000 foreign nationals and 300,000 with Belgian citizenship)represents about 12 % of the total population (about 10 million people).Unlike some neighbour<strong>in</strong>g states, EU citizens (ma<strong>in</strong>ly Italians, French andDutch) account for more than 60 % of the total population of immigrantorig<strong>in</strong>. Outsi<strong>de</strong> the EU, Moroccans (more than 120,000 people) and Turks(about 70,000) are the largest groups but almost all the nationalities ofthe world are represented. The immigrant population is unequallydistributed. In the capital city, Brussels, it composes more than 28 % ofthe population, whereas <strong>in</strong> Wallonia it is 10 % and <strong>in</strong> Flan<strong>de</strong>rs does notreach 5 %.In 1974, the Council of M<strong>in</strong>isters took three important <strong>de</strong>cisions.Firstly, it stopped officially any new immigration of workers. Secondly, ittook measures to control clan<strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>e immigration. Thirdly, it regulariseda few thousand undocumented migrant workers. S<strong>in</strong>ce then and untilvery recently, the doctr<strong>in</strong>e of zero immigration has dom<strong>in</strong>ated the <strong>de</strong>batesand policy <strong>in</strong>itiatives <strong>in</strong> this field. Even though immigration <strong>in</strong>to Belgiumhas cont<strong>in</strong>ued un<strong>de</strong>r different patterns (family reunions, free movementof EU citizens, foreign stu<strong>de</strong>nts, refugees and asylum-seekers, illegalimmigration) and has contributed to the diversification of Belgian society,there has never been a proactive policy of immigration based onpolitical acknowledgment of the fact that Belgium is <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed <strong>de</strong> facto acountry of immigration. The stress has been on means to reduce immigrationas much as possible, to prevent migration and to reverse it.1 This chapter was previously published <strong>in</strong> the International Migration Review, 27(1),2003. It is repr<strong>in</strong>ted here with the permission of the Editor.


90 MARCO MARTINIELLOS<strong>in</strong>ce 2000, a new <strong>de</strong>bate has slowly been emerg<strong>in</strong>g. The impactof the report on replacement migration published by the PopulationDivision of the UN has certa<strong>in</strong>ly contributed to put the issue of a partialreopen<strong>in</strong>g of the bor<strong>de</strong>rs on the media and political agenda. The Belgiancorporate world views immigration of highly skilled workers as a partialsolution to the labour market shortages. But the government is reluctantto envisage a more open approach to migration <strong>in</strong>-flows. The logic ofthe markets and the logic of the state do not move <strong>in</strong> the same directions.Furthermore, immigration policy, whether it <strong>de</strong>als with the regulationof migratory flows or with policies of <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrants, is traditionallyan exclusive right of nation-states. However, s<strong>in</strong>ce the sign<strong>in</strong>gof the Treaty of Rome, the <strong>Europe</strong>an construction has had an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>fluence on certa<strong>in</strong> aspects of the migratory policies of the memberStates of the Union. While the latter try to keep control over these policies,the process of suppress<strong>in</strong>g national boundaries with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>anspace and the free circulation of <strong>Europe</strong>an citizens have produced a<strong>Europe</strong>an convergence of national immigration legislation, which <strong>de</strong>alsmore with the control of migratory flows than with <strong>in</strong>tegration policies.The member states of the Union are no longer free to <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> on theirown what immigration policy to implement. In the field of <strong>in</strong>tegration,their marg<strong>in</strong> of autonomy rema<strong>in</strong>s wi<strong>de</strong>r.This paper addresses some of the key issues <strong>in</strong> Belgian immigrationand <strong>in</strong>tegration policies today. It focuses on what is be<strong>in</strong>g done morethan on what could and should be done <strong>in</strong> the fields of legaladmissions, asylum, illegal immigration and the ‘sans-papiers’,<strong>in</strong>tegration policies, adm<strong>in</strong>istration and relations with source countries.Legal admissionsThe <strong>de</strong>cision taken <strong>in</strong> 1974 not to recruit any new migrant workersdid not put an end to migration <strong>in</strong>to Belgium. Even though the immigrant<strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed as a person who is entitled to live and work permanently <strong>in</strong>Belgium and eventually to become a citizen is not emblematic of theBelgian migration experience, there are legal gates for admission to thecountry, first temporarily and later, permanently. Leav<strong>in</strong>g tourists asi<strong>de</strong>,five ma<strong>in</strong> patterns of legal migration characterise the post-1974 era.The mobility of EU citizens is the first source of legal admission.Un<strong>de</strong>r EU law, citizens’ mobility with<strong>in</strong> the member states is facilitatedand even promoted. In public discourse, the issue of the free movementof EU citizens and the issues of immigration are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly separated,the latter be<strong>in</strong>g reserved for non-EU migrants. Meanwhile, the number


BELGIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 91of French and Dutch citizens who have <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to work and live <strong>in</strong>Belgium has constantly <strong>in</strong>creased over the last ten years.Family reunion is a second significant pattern of migration. Foreignerswho are legally settled <strong>in</strong> Belgium have the right to br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their spouse,children un<strong>de</strong>r 18, and <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> specific conditions, other members oftheir family. Family reunion is significant s<strong>in</strong>ce many young people ofimmigrant orig<strong>in</strong> marry a partner from their home country dur<strong>in</strong>g vacation.It also concerns Belgian citizens or EU citizens who want to br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>their non-EU spouse or children. In 2000, 4,871 persons (out of 5,460applicants) were granted the right to jo<strong>in</strong> their family <strong>in</strong> Belgium. Thisfigure corresponds approximately to the average number of familyreunion visas granted between 1995 and 2000.Thirdly, Belgium grants temporary resi<strong>de</strong>nce permits to foreignstu<strong>de</strong>nts. Some stu<strong>de</strong>nts from less <strong>de</strong>veloped countries receive aBelgian grant. Others come with their own resources. In theory, theirresi<strong>de</strong>nce permit expires at the end of their studies, but some overstay.Between 1995 and 1999 the number of permits granted each year didnot exceed 1,665.Fourthly, asylum applications are another important channel oflegal admission <strong>in</strong> Belgium. This po<strong>in</strong>t will be <strong>de</strong>veloped <strong>in</strong> the nextsection.F<strong>in</strong>ally, specific categories of foreign workers receive each year theright to come and work <strong>in</strong> Belgium. There are two types of workpermit for foreign workers. Work permit A is unlimited <strong>in</strong> time and isvalid for all salaried jobs and professions. The applicant must proveeither five years of legal resi<strong>de</strong>nce <strong>in</strong> Belgium without <strong>in</strong>terruption <strong>in</strong> theperiod before the application or four years of work without <strong>in</strong>terruptionand covered by a work permit B <strong>in</strong> the same period. Work permit B islimited to one year and is renewable un<strong>de</strong>r specific conditions. With awork permit B, the foreign worker is only authorised to work for oneemployer <strong>in</strong> cases of non-availability of Belgian or EU workers to fill aposition. Between 1974 and 1984, 30,000 B permits were granted.Throughout the 1990s about 4,000 foreign workers received a Bpermit each year. Furthermore, there are other special categories offoreign workers such as au pairs, professional athletes and artists whoare legally admitted each year.These data illustrate the fact that there has never been a proactiveplann<strong>in</strong>g of immigration <strong>in</strong> Belgium. They also clearly <strong>de</strong>monstrate that theend<strong>in</strong>g of immigration <strong>in</strong> 1974 is a myth. By and large, the <strong>de</strong>mographersagree that yearly legal admissions s<strong>in</strong>ce 1962 have never droppedbelow 35,000. The patterns of migration and the profile of migrantshave changed over the years but legal immigration has cont<strong>in</strong>ued. Pro-


92 MARCO MARTINIELLOimmigration groups tend sometimes to overestimate the restrictivecharacter of Belgian immigration policy. But Belgian officials overestimatethe openness of the same policy. Even though there are <strong>in</strong> theory severalways to be legally admitted to Belgium, it has <strong>in</strong> practice been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glydifficult to do so. Most of those who would like to migrate legally toBelgium are not allowed to do so.Refugees and asylum seekersS<strong>in</strong>ce the mid-eighties, asylum policy has become more and moreclearly a matter of <strong>in</strong>tergovernmental cooperation on a <strong>Europe</strong>an an<strong>de</strong>ven greater <strong>in</strong>ternational scale. Belgian sovereignty <strong>in</strong> matters of asylum,like that of its EU partners, has progressively been ero<strong>de</strong>d. However, itwould be <strong>in</strong>correct to claim that the member states have lost all autonomy<strong>in</strong> their application of the general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples regulat<strong>in</strong>g asylum. Eachstate enjoys a relatively large freedom of <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>in</strong> the <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itionof exam<strong>in</strong>ation and application criteria for asylum requests. Thus nationalsovereignty is not entirely replaced by the <strong>Europe</strong>an framework.Asylum policy <strong>in</strong> Belgium has evolved consi<strong>de</strong>rably over the last 15years. Asylum procedure has been modified several times between1987 and 2000. The <strong>de</strong>cisions ma<strong>de</strong> by Belgium were often <strong>in</strong>fluencedby <strong>Europe</strong>an constra<strong>in</strong>ts and by the <strong>Europe</strong>an <strong>de</strong>bate on asylum andrefugees. The 1987 Belgian <strong>in</strong>itiative to impose sanctions on transporterswho br<strong>in</strong>g asylum seekers without papers onto Belgian territory, forexample, prece<strong>de</strong>d by a few weeks a <strong>de</strong>cision by the <strong>Europe</strong>an m<strong>in</strong>isterscharged with immigration affairs. Similar <strong>de</strong>cisions were ma<strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong>several <strong>Europe</strong>an countries at about the same time. Belgium could nothesitate to follow the direction of its <strong>Europe</strong>an partners. Such was alsothe case for the provisions of 1991, 1993 and 1996. These texts reflectsome common concerns of EU member states. They also take upprovisions <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> previous legislation by other <strong>Europe</strong>an states.Between 1988 and 1999 more than 180,000 people applied forasylum <strong>in</strong> Belgium. In 2000 alone, more than 42,000 asylum applicationswere lodged. In the end, the rate of acceptance as refugee as <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed bythe Geneva Convention rarely excee<strong>de</strong>d 5-10 % of the total applications.Those whose application is rejected must <strong>in</strong> theory leave the country.Those whose application is not even taken <strong>in</strong>to consi<strong>de</strong>ration are<strong>de</strong>prived of their liberty <strong>in</strong> closed <strong>de</strong>tention centres <strong>in</strong> which they waitfor repatriation.Dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1980s and 1990s exam<strong>in</strong>ation of these applications wasvery slow. This has been a major concern for Belgian policy makers and


BELGIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 93for asylum seekers themselves, who often have to wait for more thantwo years, and sometimes up to seven years, for a <strong>de</strong>cision on theirapplication. In most cases it is rejected. While wait<strong>in</strong>g, they nowreceive material aid <strong>in</strong>stead of f<strong>in</strong>ancial support, as was the case before2000, and they are not entitled to work. The length of the procedure isa dramatic problem s<strong>in</strong>ce it leads to the expulsion of people who hadplenty of time to <strong>in</strong>tegrate <strong>in</strong>to the Belgian social fabric. Many otherrejected applicants opt for the clan<strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>e life and become undocumented.There have been discussions with<strong>in</strong> the government to completely reformthe procedure but so far, no agreement has been reached on how to<strong>de</strong>al with this complex and divisive issue.Illegal immigration and the ‘sans-papiers’As <strong>in</strong> other countries, there are endless discussions between specialistsabout the vocabulary to be used <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to <strong>de</strong>scribe accuratelyphenomena related to migration. But the general public does not seemto make any difference between illegal, clan<strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>e, and undocumentedmigrants and often also asylum-seekers. This is not the place to discussthe important issue of categories. It nevertheless seems clear that peopleenter Belgium illegally, that some people work clan<strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ely <strong>in</strong> thecountry and that others overstay after their legal document has expired.Unfortunately nobody has clear figures for this very versatile reality,which is not new at all.Furthermore, Belgium is also a transit country for migrants whowant to reach the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom and from there, North America.People smugglers operate by boat on the Belgian coast, help<strong>in</strong>g migrantsto cross the North Sea for a huge payment. Others are offered a passageon board one of the thousands of lorries that cross the Channel everymonth. In 2002, the tragic <strong>de</strong>ath of 58 young Ch<strong>in</strong>ese <strong>in</strong> a refrigeratedtruck bound for Dover, England, probably revealed just the tip of aniceberg. Polic<strong>in</strong>g this traffic is not an easy task. It implies cooperationwith neighbour<strong>in</strong>g states, some party to the Schengen agreement andsome not. This cooperation is far from always be<strong>in</strong>g harmonious.At the end of the year 2000, the Belgian government also launcheda major campaign to regularise undocumented migrants (called <strong>in</strong>French les ‘sans-papiers’) for the second time s<strong>in</strong>ce 1974. After the tragicstory of Semira Adamu, a young Nigerian rejected asylum seeker whodied by suffocation dur<strong>in</strong>g her <strong>de</strong>portation by the Belgian gendarmerie,the NGOs mobilised for amnesty and supported the <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ntorganisation of the undocumented themselves, who occupied churches


94 MARCO MARTINIELLOand even universities. After months of discussion and political negotiations,a law on regularisation of aliens present on the territory before 1 October1999 was passed on 22 December 2000. In or<strong>de</strong>r to be regularised,applicants were required to fulfill one of the four follow<strong>in</strong>g conditions:hav<strong>in</strong>g been engaged <strong>in</strong> the asylum procedure for an abnormally longperiod without hav<strong>in</strong>g been <strong>in</strong>formed about the <strong>de</strong>cision on their case(four years <strong>in</strong> general, three years for families with m<strong>in</strong>or children); nothav<strong>in</strong>g the objective possibility to return to one’s country, for examplebecause of a war; suffer<strong>in</strong>g a serious illness; hav<strong>in</strong>g lived <strong>in</strong> Belgium atleast six years without hav<strong>in</strong>g received any official notification to leavethe country dur<strong>in</strong>g the last five years. This last category of potentialapplicants is consi<strong>de</strong>red to be <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong> Belgium.More then 36,000 applications were submitted dur<strong>in</strong>g the periodof three weeks <strong>de</strong>dicated to the first phase of the regularisationcampaign. In fact, the applications concerned more than 50,000 peoplefrom 140 nationalities, among whom the Congolese and the Moroccanswere the largest groups. There is also reason to believe that theregularisation campaign did not touch all the undocumented liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> thecountry. Firstly, some of them could not fulfill the conditions establishedby the law. Secondly, some of them did not really trust the wholeprocess and feared expulsion if they applied. This one-shot campaignhas so far not been completed. Thousands of people are still wait<strong>in</strong>gfor a <strong>de</strong>cision about a year after hav<strong>in</strong>g submitted their application.Integration policiesFac<strong>in</strong>g at the same time a migration situation and a post migrationsituation, Belgium has to <strong>de</strong>sign <strong>in</strong>tegration policies for newcomers aswell as for the second and third generation. Integration policies <strong>de</strong>velopedquite late because until the 1980s, there was a hid<strong>de</strong>n consensus on theprovisional character of immigration: both the migrants themselves andthe host <strong>in</strong>stitutions seemed to consi<strong>de</strong>r immigration simply as atemporary addition to the labour force.Most issues l<strong>in</strong>ked to <strong>in</strong>tegration (education, health, hous<strong>in</strong>g, partlyemployment) are <strong>de</strong>alt with either by the communities or by the region,i.e. the fe<strong>de</strong>rated entities of the Belgian state. Therefore, there is nonational mo<strong>de</strong>l of <strong>in</strong>tegration. Historically, different approaches <strong>de</strong>veloped<strong>in</strong> the North and <strong>in</strong> the South of the country. To put it very superficially,Flan<strong>de</strong>rs‘ approach was for a long time <strong>in</strong>spired by the Dutch multiculturalmo<strong>de</strong>l whereas Wallonia was more attracted by the French republicanmo<strong>de</strong>l. Declared multicultural policies were <strong>de</strong>signed <strong>in</strong> Flan<strong>de</strong>rs whereas


BELGIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 95the Walloon government opted for general anti-exclusion policies. Th<strong>in</strong>gshave started to change <strong>in</strong> the mid-n<strong>in</strong>eties. Wallonia slowly opened up toissues l<strong>in</strong>ked to cultural diversity whereas Flan<strong>de</strong>rs, like the Netherlands,gave more weight to social and economic consi<strong>de</strong>rations <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>tegrationpolicies. It rema<strong>in</strong>s the case that <strong>in</strong>tegration policies are often different<strong>in</strong> the north and the south of the country. Even the vocabulary used <strong>in</strong>legislation is often not the same at all. The region of Brussels, acrossroads between Belgian national groups, newcomers and “old”migrants is try<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>de</strong>velop its own approach by comb<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g elementsfrom the available mo<strong>de</strong>ls.At the fe<strong>de</strong>ral level, access to citizenship has been seen as a meansto stimulate <strong>in</strong>tegration. Belgian nationality law has changed severaltimes <strong>in</strong> the past 15 years. The most recent change took place <strong>in</strong>March 2000. The new nationality law presents three ma<strong>in</strong> novelties.Firstly, the acquisition of Belgian citizenship by a simple <strong>de</strong>claration isnow open to foreigners who have legally resi<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Belgium for sevenyears with an unrestricted permit. Secondly, access to naturalisation isma<strong>de</strong> easier. Three years of legal resi<strong>de</strong>nce for foreigners and two yearsfor refugees are required to apply for naturalisation. The procedure isfree. Thirdly, the notion of will<strong>in</strong>gness to <strong>in</strong>tegrate has been suppressedas a basic condition to be granted naturalisation. It is fair to say thatBelgium has one of the most liberal laws on nationality <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>anUnion. However, the implementation of the law is highly problematic.It seems that the adm<strong>in</strong>istration often privileges a very restrictive<strong>in</strong>terpretation of this liberal legislation, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a grow<strong>in</strong>g backlogof applications.Adm<strong>in</strong>istration and relations with governments of source countriesIn an extremely complex fe<strong>de</strong>ral state like Belgium, the adm<strong>in</strong>istrationof immigration policy is highly problematic. <strong>Immigration</strong> matters are<strong>de</strong>alt with by several fe<strong>de</strong>ral m<strong>in</strong>isterial <strong>de</strong>partments: Economics whichhosts the National Institute of Statistics, Social Integration, Interior whichhosts the opaque Foreigners’ Office, Foreign Affairs and Employment.Even though the possibility of discussion with<strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>ter<strong>de</strong>partmentalconference exists, there are problems of communication and sometimes,different approaches between the various <strong>de</strong>partments which h<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>rthe <strong>de</strong>velopment of a coord<strong>in</strong>ated and coherent immigration policy,not to mention the gap between policies and their implementation.Another crucial problem is the lack of accurate and up-to-datestatistics. This is probably partly l<strong>in</strong>ked to problems of communications


96 MARCO MARTINIELLObetween m<strong>in</strong>isterial <strong>de</strong>partments but also to an un<strong>de</strong>rfund<strong>in</strong>g of statisticaltools. The current government has <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to create an observatory ofmigration flows, which is located at the Centre for Equal Opportunitiesand the Struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st Racism, but it has not <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong>construct<strong>in</strong>g a<strong>de</strong>quate statistics.As to relations with the governments of source countries, a dist<strong>in</strong>ctionshould be ma<strong>de</strong> between cooperation <strong>in</strong> the field of <strong>de</strong>velopment andforms of cooperation aim<strong>in</strong>g more directly at prevent<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>flows orrevers<strong>in</strong>g migration trends. Firstly, Belgium is engaged <strong>in</strong> various formsof cooperation with numerous source countries. It is often naivelyhoped that <strong>de</strong>velopment will slow down <strong>de</strong>partures. Secondly, therehave been negotiations with Central and Eastern <strong>Europe</strong> governmentsto sign readmission agreements for dismissed asylum-seekers andillegal migrants <strong>in</strong> BelgiumConclusionIn July 1999, the fe<strong>de</strong>ral government presented its programme <strong>in</strong>the field of migration. Five ma<strong>in</strong> objectives were targeted: the creationof a status for persons displaced by war, the reduction of the length ofthe asylum procedure, a reform of nationality law to encourage the<strong>in</strong>tegration of migrants, launch<strong>in</strong>g a campaign of regularisation an<strong>de</strong>xpell<strong>in</strong>g the undocumented migrants not admitted to regularisation,reform<strong>in</strong>g adm<strong>in</strong>istration and <strong>in</strong>stitutions <strong>de</strong>al<strong>in</strong>g with immigration.The government has certa<strong>in</strong>ly ma<strong>de</strong> progress on some of these keypolicy areas. But, it has not so far advanced significantly towards amore proactive immigration policy. A major <strong>Europe</strong>an policy conferenceon immigration coord<strong>in</strong>ated by the M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Interior is scheduledfor 16 and 17 October 2003. Optimists like to believe that dur<strong>in</strong>g itspresi<strong>de</strong>ncy of the EU, Belgium will seize the opportunity to proposegui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es for a common proactive immigration policy. Pessimists saythat no advance will be ma<strong>de</strong> for a long time. Realists wait and see.


Immigrants and m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land:problems and challengesMatti SimiläF<strong>in</strong>land shares many th<strong>in</strong>gs with the other Nordic countries, alsowhen it comes to immigration policies. But F<strong>in</strong>land is also <strong>in</strong> many waysvery different from the other Nordic countries and as regards immigrationit also has some matters <strong>in</strong> common with Spa<strong>in</strong>!The commonplace that F<strong>in</strong>land belongs to the periphery of <strong>Europe</strong>is a truth <strong>in</strong> need of some qualifications. Historically, F<strong>in</strong>land is best<strong>de</strong>scribed as an <strong>in</strong>ter-face-periphery, a region between and <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nton the two centres of Stockholm and Petersburg as has been shown byKLINGE (1975) and ALAPURO (1980). Contrary to what has sometimesbeen alleged, F<strong>in</strong>land did not so markedly differ from the rest of <strong>Europe</strong>,except for the F<strong>in</strong>nish language.In comparison with its Scand<strong>in</strong>avian neighbours, four F<strong>in</strong>nishfeatures are worthy of note. A first dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g feature is the violenthistory of the recent past (the civil war follow<strong>in</strong>g the Declaration ofIn<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce and the Second World War). A second is the centralposition of agriculture until very recently, and the result<strong>in</strong>g impact onF<strong>in</strong>nish politics of what was earlier the Agrarian Party and is now theCentre Party, as well as the non-existence of a strong liberal party. Athird is the heavy emigration to Swe<strong>de</strong>n <strong>in</strong> the 1970s. F<strong>in</strong>ally, a fourthdist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g feature is the furious speed of structural changes <strong>in</strong> the1970s, which ma<strong>de</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land more similar to its Scand<strong>in</strong>avian neighbours.As regards the dist<strong>in</strong>ctive features related to migration, I will come tothem a little later, but as is well known, immigration to F<strong>in</strong>land startedlater and the number of immigrants is much smaller.


98 MATTI SIMILÄThe F<strong>in</strong>nish nation stateF<strong>in</strong>land is a young nation and the nation build<strong>in</strong>g process started aftera period of 600 years as part of the Swedish K<strong>in</strong>gdom. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the period1808-1917 F<strong>in</strong>land was an autonomous Grand Duchy un<strong>de</strong>r the Russiantsar and this was the period of nation build<strong>in</strong>g and the <strong>de</strong>velopment ofthe F<strong>in</strong>nish language. As a young nation with a history of be<strong>in</strong>gdom<strong>in</strong>ated by two of its present neighbours, it is perhaps tempt<strong>in</strong>g toclassify F<strong>in</strong>land as a “nation-state” rather than a “state-nation”. Thiscould be said about Norway too, while Denmark and Swe<strong>de</strong>n belong tothe old states of <strong>Europe</strong>. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to some theories, young nations putmore emphasis on cultural differences, while ol<strong>de</strong>r ones stress the i<strong>de</strong>alsof citizenship com<strong>in</strong>g out of the French revolution (see for <strong>in</strong>stanceBRUBAKER, 1990).However, while it is true that F<strong>in</strong>land is a young nation state, F<strong>in</strong>landis also a Nordic Welfare State. This means that there is an emphasis onuniversal values and rights and on equality and sameness. This mo<strong>de</strong>l hasits strength <strong>in</strong> safeguard<strong>in</strong>g social security for all <strong>in</strong>habitants, regardlessof citizenship, but maybe also builds on a strong assumption of sameness,which can cause problems. I will come back to this issue.F<strong>in</strong>land as a country of emigration and immigrationIn sharp contrast to other Nordic countries, F<strong>in</strong>land has ma<strong>in</strong>ly beena country of emigration. Between 1946 and 1980, 610,000 personsemigrated from F<strong>in</strong>land of whom about 50 % returned to F<strong>in</strong>land. Thismeans that F<strong>in</strong>ns emigrated to Swe<strong>de</strong>n at the same time as manyWestern countries attracted labour migrants to their factories and laterto the service sector. For Swe<strong>de</strong>n, the F<strong>in</strong>nish group was —and is— thebiggest of these labour migrants. For F<strong>in</strong>land, this means that thislabour market immigration never happened. The history of hav<strong>in</strong>gbeen a country of emigration until very recently puts F<strong>in</strong>land <strong>in</strong> thesame group of countries as Portugal, Spa<strong>in</strong>, Italy and Greece, <strong>de</strong>spiteall other differences.A short look at historyIn a longer perspective, a comparison of F<strong>in</strong>land with the otherNordic countries reveals that although F<strong>in</strong>land has been a country ofemigration, emigration has not been a very dist<strong>in</strong>ctive feature. Emigrationto America <strong>in</strong> the 19th century was clearly lower from F<strong>in</strong>land than


IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FINLAND: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 99from the other Nordic countries. Between 1850 and 1910, 7.7 % of thepopulation <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land emigrated, compared to 17.5 % of the population<strong>in</strong> Swe<strong>de</strong>n. So, F<strong>in</strong>land was a country of emigration, but the really bigwaves of emigration occurred as late as 30 years ago.Dur<strong>in</strong>g the first three <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s of this century F<strong>in</strong>land was both acountry of transit and a country of permanent resi<strong>de</strong>nce for refugees,especially after 1917, when many refugees from Russia arrived <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land.The peak was <strong>in</strong> 1922, when the number was 33,500. From 1930 onthere was a hesitant attitu<strong>de</strong> to refugees from Central <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>in</strong> all theNordic countries —Austrians, Su<strong>de</strong>ten Germans, Czechs and Jews.F<strong>in</strong>land took the smallest number of refugees from these areas, onlyabout 200-300 (ENGMAN, 1989).Dur<strong>in</strong>g the war years 1943-1944 63,000 Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns were movedto F<strong>in</strong>land. In the Peace Treaty F<strong>in</strong>land bound herself to send back theIngrian F<strong>in</strong>ns “who had been <strong>in</strong>terned and forcibly brought to F<strong>in</strong>land”.About 8,000 stayed <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land, of whom 4,000 left for Swe<strong>de</strong>n for fearof be<strong>in</strong>g sent back to the Soviet Union. 55,000 were sent back. Theseevents have an impact even today, s<strong>in</strong>ce the Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns are presentlyregar<strong>de</strong>d as “return migrants” and are thus given a special status withright to “return” to F<strong>in</strong>land.The greatest population movement <strong>in</strong> Northern <strong>Europe</strong> came aboutas a consequence of the territories lost to the Soviet Union after thewar. 417,000 people —11 % of F<strong>in</strong>land’s population— moved fromthe lost areas to the rest of F<strong>in</strong>land. The <strong>in</strong>tegration of these peoplewas very successful. There were never any refugee camps; <strong>in</strong>stead,special laws were <strong>in</strong>stituted signify<strong>in</strong>g that landowners had to give apiece of land to the refugees. This was possible thanks to the strongfeel<strong>in</strong>gs of solidarity with the refugees. A great number of small farmswere thus established, which postponed the structural change <strong>in</strong>agriculture <strong>in</strong> the countrysi<strong>de</strong> until the 1960s and 1970s, when thepostponed changes came with brutal rapidity, creat<strong>in</strong>g new waves ofmigrants to the cities and abroad to Swe<strong>de</strong>n.In the period after the war, F<strong>in</strong>land was <strong>in</strong> some respects on theperiphery, be<strong>in</strong>g a Western country, neutral and with an Agreement ofFriendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union. Asylum seekers fromthe Soviet Union were neither <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of our Eastern neighbournor <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terest of F<strong>in</strong>land. The bor<strong>de</strong>r was very well controlled fromboth si<strong>de</strong>s, and F<strong>in</strong>land <strong>de</strong>veloped a special unit for bor<strong>de</strong>r controldirectly un<strong>de</strong>r the M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interior. The change occurred at theend of the 1980s with a clear <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the foreign population; this<strong>de</strong>velopment was advanced by the collapse and disruption of theSoviet Union, Somalia and former Yugoslavia.


100 MATTI SIMILÄF<strong>in</strong>nish m<strong>in</strong>oritiesF<strong>in</strong>land is fairly homogenous with only a few endogenous, nationspecific m<strong>in</strong>orities: the Sámi (about 6,000), the Roma (about 9,000),the Jews (less than 2,000) and the Tatar (less than 1,000). In somerespects the Swedish speak<strong>in</strong>g population (ca. 300,000) can be regar<strong>de</strong>dto be a <strong>de</strong> facto m<strong>in</strong>ority, but <strong>in</strong> a legal sense it is not a m<strong>in</strong>ority, but anationality with equal status. F<strong>in</strong>land is sparsely populated and thetotal number of <strong>in</strong>habitants is about five million people. Besi<strong>de</strong>s the twoofficial nationalities —F<strong>in</strong>nish speak<strong>in</strong>g F<strong>in</strong>ns and Swedish speak<strong>in</strong>gF<strong>in</strong>ns— the Sámi people have an official status with l<strong>in</strong>guistic and culturalrights with<strong>in</strong> the Sámi territory. Other m<strong>in</strong>ority groups do not haveofficial rights <strong>in</strong> the same respect, but F<strong>in</strong>land has ratified the HumanCharter for the Protection of Regional or M<strong>in</strong>ority Languages.LanguageF<strong>in</strong>land is a bil<strong>in</strong>gual country where the F<strong>in</strong>nish and Swedishnationalities are regar<strong>de</strong>d as equal <strong>in</strong> the constitution, although, as statedabove, <strong>in</strong> practice the size of the Swedish population —5.7 %— makesit a m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>in</strong> many respects. The local rights of the language groupsare connected with the municipalities and language relations with<strong>in</strong>the municipality, based on censuses every tenth year. Municipalities canbe F<strong>in</strong>nish, bil<strong>in</strong>gual or Swedish, <strong>de</strong>pend<strong>in</strong>g on the relative size of thetwo groups. The status of a municipality changes if the languagerelations change, which has consequences for the local adm<strong>in</strong>istrativeservice, day-care centres and schools, etc., <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>nish and Swedishrespectively.Another case is the Åland Islands, which are <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed as a monol<strong>in</strong>gualSwedish territory, which has a consi<strong>de</strong>rable amount of self-government.The population amounts to about 25,000 people.ReligionF<strong>in</strong>land is predom<strong>in</strong>antly Lutheran, and the Lutheran church is aNational church and a State church. Over 86 % of the populationbelongs to this (bil<strong>in</strong>gual) Lutheran church, while about 12 % do notbelong to any religious association. The Orthodox Church is historicallywell established <strong>in</strong> Eastern F<strong>in</strong>land, but <strong>in</strong> fact less than 60,000 peoplebelong to it. Other groups are even smaller, like Catholics or the Jewishand Islamic congregations.


IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FINLAND: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 101Background to the present handl<strong>in</strong>g of immigration issuesWhen analys<strong>in</strong>g the situation and the politics as regards migrationit is clear that some important changes <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land took place fairlyrecently. The end of the cold war and the breakdown of the SovietUnion were obvious factors of relevance; others were membership ofthe <strong>Europe</strong>an Council, the EEA agreement and membership of the EU.These <strong>de</strong>velopments led to the present situation.The laws as regards immigration and rights of foreign citizens areharmonised with the EU. Be<strong>in</strong>g a Nordic welfare state means that lawson social security <strong>in</strong> most respects are very close to the rules <strong>in</strong> the otherNordic countries with which F<strong>in</strong>land has had so much co-operations<strong>in</strong>ce World War II.The present situation as regards immigration <strong>in</strong> general termsFrom hav<strong>in</strong>g been a country of emigration, F<strong>in</strong>land now has asurplus of immigrants. Besi<strong>de</strong>s the Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns, many are asylumseekers. Although the figures are very mo<strong>de</strong>st, the relative <strong>in</strong>creasesome years ago was quite substantial and led to new <strong>de</strong>mands on theadm<strong>in</strong>istrative agencies handl<strong>in</strong>g visas, work permits, and the <strong>in</strong>tegrationand support of refugees and other immigrants.The special features <strong>in</strong> the case of F<strong>in</strong>land as regards immigrationcan be summarised as follows:—The number of immigrants is still very low <strong>in</strong> a Western <strong>Europe</strong>ancontext.—Many immigrants are return<strong>in</strong>g migrants with F<strong>in</strong>nish ancestry,mostly from Swe<strong>de</strong>n.—F<strong>in</strong>land has never had flows of labour migration.—F<strong>in</strong>land has its special composition of immigrants as regardscountry of orig<strong>in</strong> (the importance of Russia, Estonia and theIngrian immigrants)—Because of the earlier flows of immigration ma<strong>in</strong>ly through marriagewith a F<strong>in</strong>nish citizen, a rather high proportion of the foreignpopulation is married to a F<strong>in</strong>n even today.—And, of course, F<strong>in</strong>land has no colonial past.One other difference from many other countries is the low proportionof illegal immigrants, due to a traditionally strong bor<strong>de</strong>r control onboth si<strong>de</strong>s of the Russian bor<strong>de</strong>r. There is illegal labour <strong>in</strong> the sense ofpeople com<strong>in</strong>g on tourist visas and work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the constructionsector, agriculture or as prostitutes. Most of these people come from


102 MATTI SIMILÄRussia or Estonia. But there are no large numbers of illegal resi<strong>de</strong>ntsliv<strong>in</strong>g permanently <strong>in</strong> the country.Earlier, immigrants came to F<strong>in</strong>land <strong>in</strong> very small numbers, for<strong>in</strong>stance as a consequence of marriage to a F<strong>in</strong>nish citizen. Only dur<strong>in</strong>gthe last ten years have greater numbers arrived as refugees and asylumseekers. This <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of refugees has, of course, led tofurther immigration <strong>in</strong> terms of family reunification. This means that—Most immigrants have lived <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land for a very short time.—The <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> immigration happened <strong>in</strong> a period when F<strong>in</strong>landwas struck by a very heavy <strong>de</strong>pression <strong>in</strong> the early years of thelast <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>.—Therefore, it seems to be too early to assess the success or failureof the present <strong>in</strong>tegration policyThe low number of immigrants is, of course, not just a co<strong>in</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>nce.Besi<strong>de</strong>s the fact that other countries have attracted more immigrants andasylum seekers, F<strong>in</strong>land has traditionally tried to limit the <strong>in</strong>flux fromabroad. In fact there has been a long trend of homogenisation dur<strong>in</strong>gthe last century. At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 1900 there were 13 % Swedishspeakers <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land and, as said earlier, after the Russian revolution therewas an <strong>in</strong>flux of Russian refugees. The trend thereafter went towardshomogenisation, which reached its peak <strong>in</strong> the 1980s. Migration s<strong>in</strong>cethen has really had a very limited effect, as the percentage with F<strong>in</strong>nishas mother tongue has <strong>de</strong>creased from 93 % to 92.6 %.The Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>nsA special group of immigrants are the Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns, who areconsi<strong>de</strong>red “return migrants” due to their F<strong>in</strong>nish roots. In practice,many Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns, and especially when <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g all family members,are Russian speak<strong>in</strong>g. As Annika Forsan<strong>de</strong>r has suggested, this may beseen not only as a special form of ethnomigration, but perhaps also thefirst attempt from the F<strong>in</strong>nish si<strong>de</strong> to allow for a small scale labourmigration. With an age<strong>in</strong>g population, this issue will be challeng<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>the future, because it will call for a radical change of contemporaryattitu<strong>de</strong>s (FORSANDER, 2000).Attitu<strong>de</strong>s, media, discrim<strong>in</strong>ation and racismThe fact that new immigrant groups arrived at the time when therecession was <strong>de</strong>epest is one probable factor beh<strong>in</strong>d resentful attitu<strong>de</strong>samong F<strong>in</strong>ns. Magdalena Jaakkola has ma<strong>de</strong> several studies on attitu<strong>de</strong>s


IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FINLAND: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 103<strong>in</strong> the F<strong>in</strong>nish population, the latest published some years ago. In asummaris<strong>in</strong>g article she conclu<strong>de</strong>s that attitu<strong>de</strong>s are more positive thandur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>de</strong>epest recession. The attitu<strong>de</strong>s towards foreigners weremore negative dur<strong>in</strong>g the time of wi<strong>de</strong>spread unemployment <strong>in</strong> 1993than before (1987) or afterwards (1998-99). A strong economy andgood education seem to be two important factors connected withmore tolerance towards immigrants. Contacts with immigrants alsocorrelate with more positive attitu<strong>de</strong>s. Those with little education,pensioners, the unemployed, men, supporters of the Central Party andthose liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> rural areas had more negative attitu<strong>de</strong>s. In 1998 over athird of the young men liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the countrysi<strong>de</strong> supported the actionsof sk<strong>in</strong>heads aga<strong>in</strong>st immigrants (JAAKKOLA, 2000).The role of the media is another factor that has been studied.REKOLA (1996) and RAITTILA/KUTILAINEN (2000) have studied theF<strong>in</strong>nish press and its representation of immigrants, refugees andm<strong>in</strong>orities, and a recent study has looked specifically at the same issues<strong>in</strong> the Swedish press <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land (SANDLUND, 2000). Also, a recentdissertation has studied the parliamentary <strong>de</strong>bate around immigrationissues, with a special focus on differences of op<strong>in</strong>ion as regards IngrianF<strong>in</strong>ns and Somalian refugees (LEPOLA, 2000).Lepola’s study is about the <strong>de</strong>bate <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land on immigration andforeign resi<strong>de</strong>nts dur<strong>in</strong>g the period 1988-1999 and what this <strong>de</strong>batetells about F<strong>in</strong>ns’ perceptions of F<strong>in</strong>land and F<strong>in</strong>nish i<strong>de</strong>ntity. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the1990s multiculturalism became a fashionable term <strong>in</strong> policy regard<strong>in</strong>gforeign resi<strong>de</strong>nts. In practice multiculturalism has been consi<strong>de</strong>red to bean issue directly related to immigrants: firstly as be<strong>in</strong>g a consequence oftheir presence, and secondly as giv<strong>in</strong>g them the responsibility to learnF<strong>in</strong>nish customs and the F<strong>in</strong>nish language, while preserv<strong>in</strong>g their ownculture.The conceptual boundary between a F<strong>in</strong>n and a foreigner appearson the basis of this research to be virtually <strong>in</strong>surmountable. Immigrantsare left fundamentally outsi<strong>de</strong> the i<strong>de</strong>a of a F<strong>in</strong>nish i<strong>de</strong>ntity, with theexception of the Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns. Whether foreign resi<strong>de</strong>nts <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land willever actually be regar<strong>de</strong>d as F<strong>in</strong>ns will <strong>de</strong>pend on whether F<strong>in</strong>nishi<strong>de</strong>ntity stresses ethnic orig<strong>in</strong>s or F<strong>in</strong>nish citizenship, resi<strong>de</strong>nce <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>landand participation <strong>in</strong> the F<strong>in</strong>nish society.In 2002 a dissertation by Annika FORSANDER analysed the situationfor the immigrants on the labour market and connected the situation tothe specific qualities of the Nordic welfare state mo<strong>de</strong>l. She conclu<strong>de</strong>sthat the position of immigrants <strong>in</strong> the society is <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed by thestructure of the receiv<strong>in</strong>g society, and that the Nordic Welfare State isbased on the i<strong>de</strong>al of national homogeneity. Therefore, social structures


104 MATTI SIMILÄdo not adapt easily to respond to the grow<strong>in</strong>g diversity of life-styles. Inthe Nordic societies the threshold to labour market <strong>in</strong>clusion is high,which keeps unemployment high among immigrants. In spite of this,the Nordic Welfare State has been successful <strong>in</strong> reject<strong>in</strong>g poverty,though the danger of ethnification of poverty exists. She also foundthat the region of orig<strong>in</strong> was the factor best expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g unemploymentamong immigrants. The labour market status of refugees and thosewho immigrated from <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries is weakest, whereas itproved strongest among Asians and especially immigrants fromWestern countries. This pattern could only partially be expla<strong>in</strong>ed byeducational background. The majority of the immigrants were <strong>in</strong> anunstable or marg<strong>in</strong>al position <strong>in</strong> the F<strong>in</strong>nish labour market or outsi<strong>de</strong>the labour force.A weak attachment to the labour market causes <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy onsocial <strong>in</strong>come transfer. In 1997 61 % of immigrants received social <strong>in</strong>cometransfers, most typically unemployment benefits. Forsan<strong>de</strong>r notes thatthere is an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g emphasis on cultural and social knowledge <strong>in</strong> thelabour market, alongsi<strong>de</strong> traditional human capital, such as education,work experience and language skills. This <strong>de</strong>velopment is problematic forthe immigrants. In the present situation very many of them are extremelyvulnerable to the labour market effects of economic trends and changes<strong>in</strong> production structures (FORSANDER, 2002a and 2002b).Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the 1997 Eurobarometer, F<strong>in</strong>ns consi<strong>de</strong>r themselvesvery racist somewhat more often (10 %) than <strong>in</strong> EU on average (9 %).Also, while on average 34 % of all <strong>Europe</strong>ans felt they were not racistat all, only 22 % of the F<strong>in</strong>ns say so. F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> 1998 2 % fully acceptedsk<strong>in</strong>heads’ activities aga<strong>in</strong>st foreigners, while 7 % <strong>in</strong> part accepted theiractions.It may be noted, though, that no groups on the extreme right w<strong>in</strong>ghave been able to register as parties, because of lack of support. Thiscerta<strong>in</strong>ly is a positive fact <strong>in</strong> comparison with many other <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries. But although the attitu<strong>de</strong>s of regular F<strong>in</strong>ns have become morepositive, F<strong>in</strong>land too has seen the number of racist crimes doublebetween 1997 (194 cases) and 1998 (414 cases). (SISÄASIAINMINISTERIÖ,1999). The more positive attitu<strong>de</strong>s towards refugees from Kosovo suggestthat plenty of <strong>in</strong>formation about the background of the refugees, thesituation <strong>in</strong> their home country, their distress and need for aid, comb<strong>in</strong>edwith political lea<strong>de</strong>rs’ stress on F<strong>in</strong>land’s <strong>in</strong>ternational obligations, mayhave positive effects on op<strong>in</strong>ions about refugees.Foreigners are generally well come as tourists, experts/scientists,stu<strong>de</strong>nts and language teachers, but not as “economic refugees” andneither are they very welcome as musicians, restaurant owners or


IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FINLAND: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 105jobseekers. On the other hand, attitu<strong>de</strong>s towards jobseekers are morepositive now than earlier dur<strong>in</strong>g the recession.As regards refugees, the Kosovo refugees accepted <strong>in</strong> 1999 wereaccepted with much more positive attitu<strong>de</strong>s than quota refugeeswere. A reasonable hypothesis is that the <strong>in</strong>formation about the warma<strong>de</strong> people regard them as “real” refugees to a larger extent thanotherwise.As regards attitu<strong>de</strong>s towards different groups, there seems to exista Nordic/Western/ethnic dimension, with most favourable attitu<strong>de</strong>stowards Norwegians, Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns, and English, Danish, Swedish andAmerican citizens. Most negative attitu<strong>de</strong>s are directed towardsSomalians, Arabs, Russians and Kurds.A comparative study of Kurds <strong>in</strong> England and F<strong>in</strong>land by ÖstenWAHLBECK (1999) <strong>de</strong>scribes the Kurdish communities abroad asdiasporas. Despite the large differences between England and F<strong>in</strong>land,Wahlbeck f<strong>in</strong>ds many common features, such as the Kurds’ wish toreturn, their feel<strong>in</strong>g of displacement and various psychologicalproblems ow<strong>in</strong>g to their refugee experiences. All the Kurdish refugees,regardless of country of orig<strong>in</strong> or of exile, also created and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>edtransnational social networks. These networks <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d contacts withKurds <strong>in</strong> Kurdistan and <strong>in</strong> the world-wi<strong>de</strong> diaspora. As for the countryof settlement, he further found important differences as well. Wahlbeckargues that neither country has fully un<strong>de</strong>rstood the specific nature ofrefugee migration, although they approach the issue from totallydifferent perspectives. The UK adopts a traditional communitarian andmulticultural approach, while <strong>in</strong> practice F<strong>in</strong>land has a more assimilationistresettlement policy.There were notable differences between the two countries <strong>in</strong> termsof practical problems experienced by refugees. In F<strong>in</strong>land, the officialresettlement programmes and the structure of the welfare state greatlydim<strong>in</strong>ished the practical problems related to hous<strong>in</strong>g, education and<strong>in</strong>come support. The refugees <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land even experienced fewerproblems connected with language than did the refugees <strong>in</strong> England.In London, however, the strong Kurdish communities and the Kurdishsocial networks were important resources for the refugees. The refugeeswere more isolated and their associations were not as well organised <strong>in</strong>F<strong>in</strong>land as <strong>in</strong> England. The ethnic labour market <strong>in</strong> London was oftenable to facilitate the refugees’ employment. However, the only jobsavailable were poorly paid with bad work<strong>in</strong>g conditions. In F<strong>in</strong>land, thesevere unemployment situation <strong>in</strong> practice exclu<strong>de</strong>d refugees from thelabour market. Xenophobia and racism were also more visible featuresof society <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land than was the case <strong>in</strong> the multicultural environment


106 MATTI SIMILÄof London. Resettlement policies were wi<strong>de</strong>ly different. The F<strong>in</strong>nish policywas to resettle refugees <strong>in</strong> small groups dispersed all over the country,while <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> almost all Kurds lived <strong>in</strong> London. This led to notabledifferences <strong>in</strong> the social networks and types of social <strong>in</strong>tegration.Regard<strong>in</strong>g the present situation of immigration issues, it is noteworthythat there is no political party <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land which could be labelled racist orxenophobic. There may, however, be a similarity common to all Nordicstates, which could be <strong>de</strong>scribed as an uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty about how to comb<strong>in</strong>ethe values of universalism and <strong>in</strong>dividualism of the Welfare State with thenew <strong>de</strong>mands for cop<strong>in</strong>g with diversity due to immigration. At least,immigrants <strong>in</strong> all Nordic countries show a very high rate of unemploymentand the <strong>de</strong>bate on how to <strong>in</strong>tegrate immigrants is lively.One possible future <strong>de</strong>velopment is connected with the enlargementof the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union. The near future will change the situation forF<strong>in</strong>land, when the Baltic States become members of the EU. The Estonians<strong>in</strong> particular, who not only live very close to Southern F<strong>in</strong>land, but whoselanguage is also closely related to F<strong>in</strong>nish, will probably f<strong>in</strong>d the F<strong>in</strong>nishlabour market attractive. On the other hand, at that po<strong>in</strong>t the limited,but exist<strong>in</strong>g problem of illegal labour migration from that area willcease to exist.Migration and migration policy todayThe present situation as regards immigration and immigrationpolicy can shortly be <strong>de</strong>scribed <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way.StatisticsThe number of people resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land is a little over 5 million. In2001 145,000 (2.9 %) were born abroad and 98,000 (2.0 %) wereforeign citizens. (In 1990 the correspond<strong>in</strong>g figures were about 65,000born abroad and 25,000 foreign citizens.)The biggest immigrant groups are from the former Soviet Union,especially Russia and Estonia. Immigrants from Swe<strong>de</strong>n are also relativelymany, mostly F<strong>in</strong>nish remigrants. Other groups worth mention<strong>in</strong>g arefrom Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Iraq.The Ingrian F<strong>in</strong>ns are estimated to be around 23,000, family members<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d. They come from Russia or Estonia and are <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> thefigures above.


IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FINLAND: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 107Table 1Foreigners <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land by country of citizenship, 2001Russia 22,724Estonia 11,662Swe<strong>de</strong>n 7,999Somalia 4,355Yugoslavia 1 4,240Iraq 3,222United K<strong>in</strong>gdom 2,352Germany 2,327Former Soviet Union 2,249Iran 2,166USA 2,110Turkey 1,981Ch<strong>in</strong>a 1,929Vietnam 1,778Bosnia and Herzegov<strong>in</strong>a 1,668Thailand 1,540Ukra<strong>in</strong>e 1,133Others 23,142Total 98,5771 Former Yugoslavia and Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic of Yugoslavia.Source: Statistics F<strong>in</strong>land, Demographic statisticsThe total number of refugees s<strong>in</strong>ce 1973 (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those grantedresi<strong>de</strong>nce permits based on need for protection or on humanitariangrounds and also <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g persons received through the familyreunification programme) is 21,000.The number of undocumented persons <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land is, of course, notknown. It has been estimated that there may be 10,000 illegalimmigrants <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land per year (SORAINEN, 2002). Yet, this is not to saythat 10,000 persons are liv<strong>in</strong>g permanently and illegally <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land.Rather, people come on tourist visas and work illegally, for <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong>the construction sector, agriculture, clean<strong>in</strong>g, nurs<strong>in</strong>g and child caresectors (and as prostitutes). The illegal immigrants are mostly peoplewho have entered legally, but whose resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit, visa or visaexempt period of resi<strong>de</strong>nce has expired. Entry of permanent illegalresi<strong>de</strong>nts is not a big problem <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land. They have quite aptly beenlabelled work<strong>in</strong>g tourists (FORSANDER, 2002a). Yet, the problem maybe grow<strong>in</strong>g and should still be taken seriously.The number of asylum seekers were 3,170 <strong>in</strong> 2000 and 1,651 <strong>in</strong>2001. S<strong>in</strong>ce the processes are slow, it is not possible to say how many will


108 MATTI SIMILÄbe admitted <strong>in</strong>to the country, but very few of those who are admitted tostay are given a Convention status. It seems clear that although F<strong>in</strong>landfollows the same rules as other countries <strong>in</strong> the EU and Western <strong>Europe</strong>,the <strong>in</strong>terpretation and implementation leads to a very restrictive policy<strong>de</strong> facto, with only 0.2 % of the applications granted Conventionstatus as a refugee. The figures for the two last years are the follow<strong>in</strong>g:Table 2Total number of applications <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d and the statuses accor<strong>de</strong>dStatuses2000 2001Number % Number %No status awar<strong>de</strong>d 2,121 58% 1,083 49%Convention status, status A3 9 0.2% 4 0.2%Need of protection, status A3 248 7% 347 16%Status A4 199 5% 427 19%Resi<strong>de</strong>nce Permit, status A5 — — 47 2%Annulment 1,049 29% 300 14%Total <strong>de</strong>cisions 3,626 100% 2,208 100%Source: Directorate of <strong>Immigration</strong>Most applicants <strong>in</strong> 2001 came from Russia, Ukra<strong>in</strong>e, Iraq, FormerYugoslavia and Turkey. Compared with 2000 there was a <strong>de</strong>crease <strong>in</strong>applicants from Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, due to the<strong>in</strong>troduction of accelerated asylum procedures and obligatory visas forSlovakia (the applicants were virtually all Roma).In 2001, the <strong>in</strong>take of quota refugees to F<strong>in</strong>land were 647, mostlyfrom Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, Croatia and Iraq. In addition, 100 Iraqisand Iranians from Turkey were selected by the F<strong>in</strong>nish quota refugeemission, but were given a negative report by the F<strong>in</strong>nish Security Police.They are still <strong>in</strong> Turkey, s<strong>in</strong>ce the Directorate of <strong>Immigration</strong> could notgrant asylum for them.The number of unaccompanied m<strong>in</strong>ors <strong>in</strong> 2001 was 32 (not anofficial number).Asylum seekers may withdraw their application. If the <strong>de</strong>cision islikely to be negative, withdrawal may prevent gett<strong>in</strong>g a prohibition ofre-entry. Statistically, the Directorate of <strong>Immigration</strong> does not separatecessations and withdrawals. In the year 2000 the number of annulledapplications was 1,049, <strong>in</strong> 2001 only 300.Number of work permits: In the year 2000 there were 15,000 workpermits granted of which about 5,000 were extensions


IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FINLAND: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 109Deportation statistics: In 2001 altogether 108 persons were returnedon grounds of “safe country”. The countries consi<strong>de</strong>red safe (one shouldbear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that many applicants belong to m<strong>in</strong>orities, as for <strong>in</strong>stancethe Roma people, etc) were: Algeria, Ethiopia, Lithuania, Morocco,Slovakia, Czech Republic, Turkey and Estonia. 122 persons were returnedon Dubl<strong>in</strong> Convention grounds.No figures for 2001 are available for expulsion/<strong>de</strong>portation ofasylum seekers. Normally rejected asylum seekers are expelled.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour there were 37 refugees whoreceived a return allowance.Detention of non-crim<strong>in</strong>al immigrants: Asylum seekers whose i<strong>de</strong>ntityand travel route cannot be verified are often <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed upon arrival <strong>in</strong>F<strong>in</strong>land. Detention is also used <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to prepare for the expulsion ofrejected asylum seekers. Annually, approximately 10 to 15 % of allasylum seekers are <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed.Overview of immigration lawsThe legal basis: The Geneva Convention and New York Protocol,The Aliens Act of February 1991 (will be reformed and has recentlybeen presented to the Parliament), The Aliens Decree of 1994, The Acton the Integration of Immigrants and Reception of Asylum seekers ofApril 1999 (The Integration Act), The Dubl<strong>in</strong> Convention and TheSchengen Agreement.Work permits: Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Sora<strong>in</strong>en, the statistics have not beenreliable, but it seems that labour immigration is ris<strong>in</strong>g. Several groupsof foreigners are exempt from work permit procedures. This <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>sforeigners with permanent resi<strong>de</strong>nce permits, stu<strong>de</strong>nts <strong>in</strong> regard topart-time work and holiday jobs, refugees and people receiv<strong>in</strong>g resi<strong>de</strong>ncepermits due to need for protection, asylum seekers who have been <strong>in</strong>F<strong>in</strong>land for at least three months, entrepreneurs, and teachers andresearchers at universities (SORAINEN, 2002).Family unification: Refugees and people who have permission tostay <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land on grounds of need for protection can ask for familyunification. Those accepted as family members are spouse and un<strong>de</strong>rageunmarried children. The process is very slow and often lasts severalyears. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the change <strong>in</strong> the Aliens Act <strong>in</strong> 2000, the relationto the family may be proved by a DNA test. Most tested persons comefrom Africa. In 2001, 105 families (581 persons) were offered the testand 73 (389) were tested. The Directorate of <strong>Immigration</strong> makes the<strong>de</strong>cision on family unification. As for m<strong>in</strong>ors who have applied forasylum, there has been a possibility to seek family unification too. In


110 MATTI SIMILÄthe proposal for the new Aliens Act, the Government wants, as a rule,to send the child to the country where its parents resi<strong>de</strong>.Asylum: Convention Status was only given to 0.2 % of the applicants<strong>in</strong> 2001 and 2000 (9 and 4 cases respectively). Convention status isgranted <strong>in</strong> the form of a so-called A3 resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit. Recognisedrefugees are entitled to permanent resi<strong>de</strong>nce after two years.A resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit based on the need for protection may be issued.This resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit is consi<strong>de</strong>red to be a <strong>de</strong> facto status. Hol<strong>de</strong>rs areentitled to family unification and the same social benefits as Convention(and quota) refugees. They also are entitled to permanent resi<strong>de</strong>nceafter two years. In 2001, 16 % of the applicants got a resi<strong>de</strong>nce permiton these grounds.Until May 1999 it was also possible to grant resi<strong>de</strong>nce permits onhumanitarian grounds.Role of the police: The police have normally been <strong>in</strong>terview<strong>in</strong>g asylumseekers. In 2001 the Directorate of <strong>Immigration</strong> started to conduct asylum<strong>in</strong>terviews. However, the police still do most of the <strong>in</strong>terviews. The asylum<strong>in</strong>terviews will gradually be transferred to the Directorate of <strong>Immigration</strong> by2004. (The police will still, however, <strong>in</strong>vestigate the i<strong>de</strong>ntity of the asylumseeker and the travel route.) The objective is to speed up the process.Assistance programmes: S<strong>in</strong>ce F<strong>in</strong>land is a Nordic Welfare State, itis hard to cover all the components <strong>in</strong> the battery of support that canbe given to immigrants, s<strong>in</strong>ce the i<strong>de</strong>a of universal rights for all resi<strong>de</strong>ntsapplies to immigrants as well as to all other resi<strong>de</strong>nts. There are, of course,also many special programmes aim<strong>in</strong>g at facilitat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrationprocess, such as labour market tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, special education programmes,and programmes <strong>in</strong> schools for young immigrants.TrendsIllegal immigration may be <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g, but not dramatically. It is stilla small problem, compared with what many other countries experience.On asylum policies, legislation is “liberal”, but practice is restrictive.It rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen how the new version of the Aliens Act will differ,but radical changes will hardly occur.Detention: A new law on the establishment of a <strong>de</strong>tention centrefor foreigners taken <strong>in</strong>fo custody un<strong>de</strong>r the Aliens Act came <strong>in</strong>to forceon 1 March 2002. Before that, <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed asylum seekers were kept <strong>in</strong>police cells and county prisons together with common crim<strong>in</strong>als. The<strong>de</strong>tention centre was opened <strong>in</strong> July 2002. However, the capacity ofthe centre is only 30, so <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed asylum seekers are still kept <strong>in</strong> policecells <strong>in</strong> some parts of F<strong>in</strong>land.


IMMIGRANTS AND MINORITIES IN FINLAND: PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 111Labour issues: need for foreign labour? The procedures for workpermit options changed on 1 April 2001. From this date an alien whohas lived <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land for three months as an asylum seeker is allowed towork without a work permit <strong>in</strong> accordance with more precise or<strong>de</strong>rsfrom the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour.There will be a need for foreign labour, as the population gets ol<strong>de</strong>r. Inten years the po<strong>in</strong>t where the population starts to <strong>de</strong>crease will be close.The proportion of retired people <strong>in</strong>creases and the proportion <strong>in</strong> the activeages <strong>de</strong>creases. However, a change <strong>in</strong> national policy is not foreseeable forthe moment, but the pressure to open up to labour migration will <strong>in</strong>crease<strong>in</strong> a longer perspective. The enlargement of the union will also probablylead to <strong>in</strong>creased immigration. However, it is not probable thatimmigration will reach such levels that it could provi<strong>de</strong> a long-termsolution to the structural problems of the F<strong>in</strong>nish labour market.The question rema<strong>in</strong>s: If <strong>in</strong> the future there will be a grow<strong>in</strong>g needof labour migrants due to <strong>de</strong>mographic <strong>de</strong>velopments, is it thenpossible to pursue a restrictive policy as regards refugees with asystematic <strong>in</strong>take of labour migrants without problems? What is therelation between immigration rules and the possibilities of <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>gimmigrants? Another question is how it will be possible to changeattitu<strong>de</strong>s <strong>in</strong> a country where people have ten<strong>de</strong>d to see foreigners as apotential threat, rather than a potential resource?ReferencesALAPURO, R. (1980): F<strong>in</strong>land: an <strong>in</strong>terface periphery, Research Group forComparative Sociology, University of Hels<strong>in</strong>ki.BRUBAKER, W. (1990): “<strong>Immigration</strong>, citizenship and the nation state <strong>in</strong> Franceand Germany: a comparative historical analysis”, International Sociology,379-407.ENGMAN, M. (1989): “De förflytta<strong>de</strong> karelarna: evakuer<strong>in</strong>g och <strong>in</strong>tegrer<strong>in</strong>g”(The transplanted Karelians: evacuation and <strong>in</strong>tegration). In Nordiskflykt<strong>in</strong>gpolitik i världskrigets epok (Nordic refugee policy <strong>in</strong> the epoch ofthe second world war), eds. R. Johansson and H.-A. Persson. University ofLund.FORSANDER, A. (2000): “New trends <strong>in</strong> migration and ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land”,A country report presented at the EUROFOR Annual Conference, Brussels,22-27 November 2000.FORSANDER, A. (2002a): Luottamuksen ehdot. Maahanmuuttajat 1990-luvunsuomalaisilla työmarkk<strong>in</strong>oilla (Conditions of trust: immigrants <strong>in</strong> the 1990sF<strong>in</strong>nish labour market), Väestöliitto, D 39 2002, Diss.FORSANDER, A. (ed.) (2002b): <strong>Immigration</strong> and economy <strong>in</strong> the globalisationprocess: the case of F<strong>in</strong>land. Sitra Report Series.


112 MATTI SIMILÄJAAKKOLA, M. (2000): “F<strong>in</strong>nish attitu<strong>de</strong>s towards immigrants <strong>in</strong> 1987-1999”,Yearbook of population research <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land, 36.KLINGE, M. (1975): Bernadotten ja Len<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong> välissä. Tutkielma kansallisistaa<strong>in</strong>eista (Between Bernadotte and Len<strong>in</strong>: a study on national matters),Porvoo.KOSKIMIES, S. (2000): Experiences of ethnic and racial discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land:a presentation of NEON material, 1998-1999, Swedish School of SocialScience, University of Hels<strong>in</strong>ki. Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations andNationalism (CEREN).KUUSISTO, P. (2000): Ethnicity <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t. Implicit l<strong>in</strong>guistic manifestations of theconstruction of ethnicity <strong>in</strong> British and F<strong>in</strong>nish newspapers. Pragmatics,I<strong>de</strong>ology and Contacts. Monographs 1. Department of English, Universityof Hels<strong>in</strong>ki. Diss.LEPOLA, O. (2000): Ulkomaalaisesta suomenmaalaiseksi (From foreigner to“F<strong>in</strong>lan<strong>de</strong>r”). Hels<strong>in</strong>ki: SKS. Diss.PENTIKÄINEN, J.; HILTUNEN, M. (1995): Cultural m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land: an overviewtowards cultural policy. Publications of the F<strong>in</strong>nish National Commissionfor UNESCO, No 66, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Education.RAITTILA, P.; KUTILAINEN, T. (2000): Rasismi ja etnisyys Suomen sanomalehdissäsyksyllä 1999 (Racism and ethnicity <strong>in</strong> the F<strong>in</strong>nish press <strong>in</strong> autumn 1999),Journalism<strong>in</strong> tutkimusyksikkö, Tiedotusop<strong>in</strong> laitos, Tampereen yliopisto,Sarja C31/2000. Tampere.REKOLA, J. (1996): Exclud<strong>in</strong>g the m<strong>in</strong>orities: ethnic representation <strong>in</strong> the F<strong>in</strong>nishpress. KEPA Reports No 10/1996. Service Centre for DevelopmentCooperation.SANDLUND, T. (ed.) (2000): Rasism och etnicitet i <strong>de</strong>n f<strong>in</strong>landssvenskatidn<strong>in</strong>gspressen, SSKH (Racism and ethnicity <strong>in</strong> the Swedish press <strong>in</strong>F<strong>in</strong>land), Med<strong>de</strong>lan<strong>de</strong>n. Nr 57.SIMILÄ, M. (2002): “Integration and multiculturalism: key concepts <strong>in</strong> the age ofglobalisation.” In: Reflections on diversity and change <strong>in</strong> mo<strong>de</strong>rn society.A Festschrift for Annick Sjögren, eds. N. B. Gomes et al.The MulticulturalCentre, Botkyrka.SISÄASIAINMINISTERIÖ (1999): Polis<strong>in</strong> tietoon tullut rasist<strong>in</strong>en rikollisuus Suomessa1998. (Racist crimes known to the police <strong>in</strong> F<strong>in</strong>land 1998), Poliisihall<strong>in</strong>onjulkaisu 11.SORAINEN, O. (2002): “F<strong>in</strong>land.” OECD Sopemi. Trends <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationalmigration, 2001 edition, M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour, F<strong>in</strong>land.WAHLBECK, Ö. (1999): Kurdish diasporas: a comparative study of Kurdishrefugee communities, Macmillan, Bas<strong>in</strong>gstoke.Statistical data, legal and adm<strong>in</strong>istrative issues and trends have been soughtfrom various M<strong>in</strong>istries, The Refugee Advice Centre ECRE, Statistics F<strong>in</strong>land,the Institute of Migration and Annika Forsan<strong>de</strong>r’s EUROFOR report. Specialthanks to Annika Forsan<strong>de</strong>r at CEREN and Reetta Helan<strong>de</strong>r at the RefugeeAdvice Centre.


French immigration policy dur<strong>in</strong>g the last twenty yearsEmmanuel Ma MungThe historical contextThe history of migration <strong>in</strong> France is noticeably different from that<strong>in</strong> other western <strong>Europe</strong>an countries: it is not a country of emigrationto “new countries” as was the case with northern and southern<strong>Europe</strong>an countries <strong>in</strong> the last few hundred years. French emigration tothe New World and the colonies was far less substantial than <strong>in</strong> other<strong>Europe</strong>an countries: on the contrary, the particularity of France is that ithas a long history of immigration. For example, <strong>in</strong> the 17 th century,Colbert, a m<strong>in</strong>ister un<strong>de</strong>r Louis XIV, recommen<strong>de</strong>d br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> t<strong>in</strong>plateworkers from Koblenz to work <strong>in</strong> French factories <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to compensatefor the shortfall <strong>in</strong> labour force. This characteristic dist<strong>in</strong>guishes itmarkedly from other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries (SIMON, 1995).For several centuries France has had a <strong>de</strong>mographic <strong>de</strong>ficit, hence along-term trend of encourag<strong>in</strong>g labour immigration with the authorityto stay <strong>in</strong> the country and have the effect of boost<strong>in</strong>g the population. Itcan be said that immigration has always been implicitly thought of as apermanent settl<strong>in</strong>g of people who are to become French, hence thenationality co<strong>de</strong> <strong>de</strong>veloped dur<strong>in</strong>g the 19 th century to facilitate theacquisition of French nationality. The <strong>in</strong>tegration of foreigners has been—and still is— thought of as the <strong>in</strong>tegration of future nationals ratherthan the <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong>to society of people who reta<strong>in</strong> their foreigncharacter. This is illustrated by the French mo<strong>de</strong>l of <strong>in</strong>corporation <strong>in</strong>tothe nation based on the <strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>in</strong>dividuals and not groups,whether religious, regional or ethnic (SCHNAPPER, 1994). For thisreason, the image of the foreigner is ambivalent: it is positive when theforeigner is thought of as an <strong>in</strong>dividual who will become a national andthereby lose his/her extraneous nature; it is negative when theforeigner rema<strong>in</strong>s a foreigner. The foreigner is tolerated only on condition


114 EMMANUEL MA MUNGthat he/she disappears —not physically by return<strong>in</strong>g to his/her countryof orig<strong>in</strong>, for example, but one could say semantically, by abandon<strong>in</strong>ghis/her foreign character (see LACROIX, 2002). Hence the strength of theconcept of immigration/<strong>in</strong>corporation <strong>in</strong> the nation which characterisesimmigration policy. Thus, immigration <strong>in</strong> France has two dimensionswhich persist today: an economic dimension, through mak<strong>in</strong>g use of aworkforce which orig<strong>in</strong>ates outsi<strong>de</strong> the country, and a <strong>de</strong>mographicdimension through the need to boost the French population. 1 The trendof encourag<strong>in</strong>g immigration for the purposes of labour and populat<strong>in</strong>gthe country has however seen significant variations over time and it hasun<strong>de</strong>rgone a profound transformation with <strong>Europe</strong>an <strong>in</strong>tegration andthe change <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational migratory trends.Fluctuations <strong>in</strong> immigration policyFrom the 19 th century up to the Second World War, immigrationorig<strong>in</strong>ated ma<strong>in</strong>ly from Germany, Belgium and Switzerland andthereafter Poland, central <strong>Europe</strong>an countries, Italy and also Spa<strong>in</strong>(result<strong>in</strong>g from the war aga<strong>in</strong>st the Republicans). A lower rate ofimmigration can be noted from France’s colonies <strong>in</strong> North and WestAfrica which only became extensive from the 1960s.The “trente glorieuses” and the 1974 crisis: from “laisser-fairelaisser-passer” to clos<strong>in</strong>g down the bor<strong>de</strong>rsIn the post-war years, national reconstruction and the “trenteglorieuses” (thirty years of economic growth) meant that as far asimmigration was concerned, there was ever greater call on coloniallabour (ma<strong>in</strong>ly from Algeria) and foreign labour ma<strong>in</strong>ly from southern<strong>Europe</strong> (Italy, Spa<strong>in</strong> and Portugal). Dur<strong>in</strong>g this period, 80 to 90 % ofthe workers who entered France bypassed the legal entry proceduresand the immigration policy consisted <strong>in</strong> facilitat<strong>in</strong>g the entries as far aspossible by relax<strong>in</strong>g the controls and encourag<strong>in</strong>g immigration to meet<strong>in</strong>dustry’s grow<strong>in</strong>g need for labour. Bilateral agreements were signedwith the countries of orig<strong>in</strong> as and when the need arose, but nomeasures were taken towards an overall organisation of immigration(COSTA-LASCOUX/WEIL, 1992).1 For a history of the construction of French immigration policy and the regulationof the foreign presence based on the analysis of the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative structures whichmanaged them, see the outstand<strong>in</strong>g work by V<strong>in</strong>cent VIET (1998).


FRENCH IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS 1151975: halt<strong>in</strong>g labour immigration and establish<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>tegration policyThe mid 1970s marks a turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> France’s immigrationpolicy. Like the other major immigration countries, this <strong>in</strong>volved thesud<strong>de</strong>n cessation of labour immigration. Incentives were brought <strong>in</strong> toencourage immigrants to return to their home countries, but they hada very limited effect and <strong>in</strong>volved only a few thousand people. At thesame time, measures were taken to favour family reunion and br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>the spouses and children of immigrants already established <strong>in</strong> thecountry. <strong>Immigration</strong> has cont<strong>in</strong>ued at a rate of several thousand peopleper year, but it is no longer labour immigration, but rather to boost thepopulation, as was the case for most immigration <strong>in</strong> the preced<strong>in</strong>g<strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s and the last century. Between 1975 and 1998, the averagenumber of immigrants per year was 73,000, with variations between55,000 <strong>in</strong> 1985 and 118,000 <strong>in</strong> 1998. The total number of immigrantsdur<strong>in</strong>g this “closed” period was 1,760,000, while <strong>in</strong> the period 1950to 1974 when immigration was encouraged, the total amounted toonly 1,330,000 (see Table 1). In 1999, there were 4,310,000 immigrants<strong>in</strong> France accord<strong>in</strong>g to INSEE, mak<strong>in</strong>g up 7.4 % of the population ofmetropolitan France. 2It was at this time that the subject of <strong>in</strong>tegration (<strong>in</strong> the sense of<strong>in</strong>corporation <strong>in</strong>to the nation) grew <strong>in</strong> the public m<strong>in</strong>d and the media and<strong>in</strong> the arena of research on <strong>in</strong>ternational migration (see GAEREMYNCK,2002). Despite the significance of this <strong>de</strong>bate <strong>in</strong> all spheres of socialand political life, specific measures centr<strong>in</strong>g on foreigners are rare. Themost important of them concerned the br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g together of families,which was <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d to favour the <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrants who hadalready settled. On the other hand, a “city policy” was graduallyimplemented <strong>in</strong> the 1980s <strong>in</strong> urban areas fac<strong>in</strong>g social difficulties suchas unemployment, hous<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>quency —where immigrantfamilies were also to be found. This policy was not directed specificallyat immigrants, but rather “problem populations” of which the immigrantpopulations were assumed to be a part. Given that the target of themeasures was not specifically immigrant families, the significance ofthe French mo<strong>de</strong>l of republican <strong>in</strong>tegration rema<strong>in</strong>s paramount,<strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegration of <strong>in</strong>dividuals rather than groups. In<strong>de</strong>ed,measures for populations chosen accord<strong>in</strong>g to their ethnic or national2 For INSEE (French national <strong>in</strong>stitute of economic and statistical <strong>in</strong>formation), thosecounted as immigrants are people who are foreign or naturalised French, born outsi<strong>de</strong>the national territory. A French person by blood but born <strong>in</strong> another country is notrecor<strong>de</strong>d as an immigrant, as for a person with a foreign nationality born on Frenchterritory.


116 EMMANUEL MA MUNGTable 1Immigrants <strong>in</strong> France <strong>in</strong> 1999 by country of orig<strong>in</strong>Total 4,306,094 100.0%Total <strong>Europe</strong> 1,934,144 44.9%Total <strong>Europe</strong>an Union 1,629,457 37.8%Germany 123,186 2.9%Belgium 93,622 2.2%United K<strong>in</strong>gdom 75,020 1.7%Spa<strong>in</strong> 316,232 7.3%Italy 378,649 8.8%Netherlands 25,419 0.6%Portugal 571,874 13.3%Other EU countries 45,455 1.1%Other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries 304,687 7.1%Poland 98,571 2.3%Romania 23,270 0.5%Switzerland 45,065 1.0%Former Soviet Union 26,009 0.6%Former Yugoslavia 75,262 1.7%Other countries 36,510 0.8%Total Africa 1,691,562 39.3%Total North Africa 1,298,273 30.1%Algeria 574,208 13.3%Morocco 522,504 12.1%Tunisia 201,561 4.7%Other countries of Africa 393,289 9.1%Cameroon 26,798 0.6%Congo 35,449 0.8%Ivory Cost 29,885 0.7%Madagascar 28,091 0.7%Mali 35,534 0.8%Mauritius 28,220 0.7%Senegal 53,762 1.2%Congo (Rép. Dém., ex-Zaïre) 23,747 0.6%Other countries 131,803 3.1%Total Asia 549,994 12.8%Cambodia 50,675 1.2%Ch<strong>in</strong>a (PRC) 30,932 0.7%Laos 36,838 0.9%Sri-Lanka 24,613 0.6%Turkey 174,160 4.0%Viet Nam 72,237 1.7%Other countries 160,539 3.7%Total America and Oceania 130,394 3.0%USA 29,396 0.7%Brazil 14,600 0.3%Canada 12,058 0.3%Haïti 19,131 0.4%Other countries 51,005 1.2%Source: INSEE, Census 1999.


FRENCH IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS 117orig<strong>in</strong> would revert to <strong>de</strong>signat<strong>in</strong>g groups to be <strong>in</strong>tegrated rather than<strong>in</strong>dividuals and would contradict this mo<strong>de</strong>l. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the same periodan <strong>in</strong>stitution was established: the “Haut Conseil à l’Intégration”whose mission was to put forward proposals to favour <strong>in</strong>tegration.A further <strong>de</strong>bate <strong>de</strong>veloped: the right of foreigners to vote, whichalso <strong>in</strong>volved the notion of citizenship. It is a <strong>de</strong>bate which isperiodically opened <strong>in</strong> the run up to elections. Those <strong>in</strong> favour see it asa measure which greatly favours <strong>in</strong>tegration for it confers on foreignersthe quality of citizens: for them, a person who resi<strong>de</strong>s, works and paystaxes <strong>in</strong> the country has the right to have representatives elected<strong>de</strong>mocratically regardless of his/her nationality. Opponents object to it<strong>in</strong> the name of the nation’s <strong>in</strong>tegrity and fall <strong>in</strong>to two ma<strong>in</strong> camps: thefirst <strong>de</strong>velops th<strong>in</strong>ly disguised xenophobic arguments (or clearlyaffirmed <strong>in</strong> the case of the extreme right); the second opposes the right<strong>in</strong> the name of the <strong>de</strong>fence of the republican mo<strong>de</strong>l of <strong>in</strong>tegration.Citizenship —the most important expression of which is the right tovote— has a national character which has noth<strong>in</strong>g to do withxenophobia (it is not <strong>de</strong>nied that a foreigner may become French) butshows itself <strong>in</strong> the adherence to a community of values which foun<strong>de</strong>dthe nation and the republic. This adherence lies <strong>in</strong> nationality and theacquisition of nationality expresses this adherence. It is necessarytherefore to favour not only the concept of the right to vote but alsothe acquisition of French nationality which br<strong>in</strong>gs with it the right tovote. Attribut<strong>in</strong>g the right to vote to foreigners from a <strong>Europe</strong>an Unioncountry complicates the task of those who are aga<strong>in</strong>st foreignershav<strong>in</strong>g the right to vote, but to date, the ban rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> place for othernationals.The 1990s saw a significant shift <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegration policy with theappearance of the theme of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. In the public sphere, thisled to the creation at the end of the 90s of GELD (“Le Groupe d’Etu<strong>de</strong>set <strong>de</strong> Lutte contre les Discrim<strong>in</strong>ations”). This organisation was statef<strong>in</strong>anced and its mission was to i<strong>de</strong>ntify and analyse signs of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation<strong>in</strong> access to work, hous<strong>in</strong>g and leisure activities and put forwardproposals to fight aga<strong>in</strong>st it (an anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>ation law was passed <strong>in</strong>2001). This shift is important as it can be seen as a recognition of thefact that <strong>in</strong>tegration measures have to be aimed at groups rather than<strong>in</strong>dividuals. In<strong>de</strong>ed, recognis<strong>in</strong>g that discrim<strong>in</strong>ation is exercised aga<strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>dividuals because they belong to a racial, ethnic or religious groupclearly means the recognition of the sociological existence of such groups.And the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st this discrim<strong>in</strong>ation with a view to <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>dividuals leads on to work<strong>in</strong>g for the <strong>in</strong>tegration of the groups towhich they belong.


118 EMMANUEL MA MUNGThe 1990s: immigration policy toughensIn 1993, a right-w<strong>in</strong>g government came to power. From the firstfew weeks <strong>in</strong> office, the Balladur government put forward bills whichbecame “les lois Pasqua” (the Pasqua laws), named after the M<strong>in</strong>isterof the Interior of the time. They marked a turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t, but werenonetheless a cont<strong>in</strong>uation of projects <strong>in</strong>itiated by the previousgovernment. Discussions had already been tak<strong>in</strong>g place among thepolitical classes —both left and right— for some years. 3 Furthermore,these policies were not called <strong>in</strong>to question when the left returned topower <strong>in</strong> 1996. There has therefore been a cont<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>in</strong> the majortrends <strong>in</strong> French immigration policy dur<strong>in</strong>g the last twenty years,regardless of which government was <strong>in</strong> power. And the Pasqua lawsare not only the culm<strong>in</strong>ation of <strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>in</strong> France, butalso the effect of recommendations ma<strong>de</strong> by the <strong>Europe</strong>an authoritieswith<strong>in</strong> the framework of the Schengen Agreement and the MaastrichtTreaty (COSTA-LASCOUX, 1993). One can consi<strong>de</strong>r that they mark thebeg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the end of the particular character of French immigrationpolicy to boost the population, and the move towards a gradualalignment with a <strong>Europe</strong>an conception, 4 which, on the contrary, waspreoccupied for historical <strong>de</strong>mographic reasons with overpopulation.These measures illustrate a har<strong>de</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of French immigration policyand aim to limit the presence of foreigners. They also aim to fight aga<strong>in</strong>stillegal immigration, which had been tolerated and even encourageddur<strong>in</strong>g the years of economic growth when workers entered thecountry without hav<strong>in</strong>g to go through the normal legal entryprocedures. Furthermore, the question of <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g foreigners, whichhas always been posed as a compensation for restrictive policies, doesnot result <strong>in</strong> supplementary measures to favour <strong>in</strong>tegration. The <strong>de</strong>bateon <strong>in</strong>tegration which emerged <strong>in</strong> the 1970s and 80s also har<strong>de</strong>ned.The generalisation “foreigner = crim<strong>in</strong>al” grew along the cha<strong>in</strong> ofmean<strong>in</strong>gs “foreigner / irregular / clan<strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>e / <strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>quent / crim<strong>in</strong>al”and gave substance to the authorised <strong>de</strong>portation of foreigners <strong>in</strong> anirregular situation. 5 With the turn<strong>in</strong>g ti<strong>de</strong>s of the 1990s, <strong>de</strong>portation,3 In 1990, Socialist prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Michel Rocard <strong>de</strong>clared: “France cannot open itsarms to all the world’s miseries.” Even though it was not the m<strong>in</strong>ister’s aim, thisstatement was consi<strong>de</strong>red as a sign of a toughen<strong>in</strong>g approach towards immigration.4For V<strong>in</strong>cent VIET (1998), the Pasqua laws symbolise the end of <strong>de</strong>colonisation andthe special relations France enjoyed with its former colonies which were a specific signof the French immigration problem.5Charles Pasqua, M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Interior, chartered a plane to return Malians totheir home country who were <strong>in</strong> an irregular situation.


FRENCH IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS 119which had until then been consi<strong>de</strong>red an extreme measure, becamepart of the immigration policy (MARIE, 2002).The Pasqua laws concerned three doma<strong>in</strong>s: the nationality co<strong>de</strong>,the control of immigration flows (conditions of entry, reception andresi<strong>de</strong>nce for foreigners) and i<strong>de</strong>ntity checks. Each clause taken <strong>in</strong>isolation does not violate constitutional pr<strong>in</strong>ciples or basic liberties.However, consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g them together —<strong>in</strong> a climate of mistrust towardsforeigners— leads to disproportionate repressive attitu<strong>de</strong>s with regardto the situation of the vast majority of immigrants liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> France(COSTA-LASCOUX, 1993).The reform of the nationality co<strong>de</strong> is the measure which has givenrise to the most controversy, for it broke with the tradition of automaticentitlement to French nationality once people met certa<strong>in</strong> prerequisites.Thus children born <strong>in</strong> France of foreigners who were formerly able toobta<strong>in</strong> French nationality through the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of jus soli (the right ofthe soil) would now have to <strong>de</strong>monstrate their commitment to do<strong>in</strong>gso. This reform which —more <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tention that <strong>in</strong> fact— limited accessto French nationality is a clear break with the French tradition of<strong>in</strong>tegration s<strong>in</strong>ce foreigners no longer had the automatic entitlement tobecome French. Equally, as foreigners, they could be requested to leave.However, the obligation to prove a clear <strong>de</strong>sire to become French wasannulled <strong>in</strong> 1998. The unexpected result of the Pasqua Laws was anoticeable <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the number of naturalisations, which grew froman average of 70,000 per year at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of 1990s to 100,000 atthe end of 1990s.Controll<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>flow of immigrants also led to much controversy,concern<strong>in</strong>g the rules for foreigners to be allowed entry; the requirementsfor issue of resi<strong>de</strong>nce permits; br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> family members; the right ofasylum and ever more str<strong>in</strong>gent i<strong>de</strong>ntity checks. The rules for foreignersto be granted entry rema<strong>in</strong> basically the same, but their implementationhas become more str<strong>in</strong>gent and pernickety: control of entries has beenre<strong>in</strong>forced by way of rules and laws already <strong>in</strong> place. On the other hand,concern<strong>in</strong>g resi<strong>de</strong>nce permits, more modifications have been <strong>in</strong>troducedwhich aim to restrict the conditions un<strong>de</strong>r which both temporary andpermanent (10-year) permits are issued and they are becom<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly difficult to obta<strong>in</strong>. Moreover, it is now possible to withdrawthe permanent resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit of a polygamous foreigner who did not<strong>de</strong>clare his situation at the time of issue. This measure has led tonumerous contradictory <strong>de</strong>bates on the subject of polygamy.The conditions un<strong>de</strong>r which immigrants may br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> other familymembers to jo<strong>in</strong> them are becom<strong>in</strong>g more restrictive and have adissuasive effect. To the exist<strong>in</strong>g requirements (such as hav<strong>in</strong>g sufficient


120 EMMANUEL MA MUNGresources to support the family and suitable liv<strong>in</strong>g accommodation)have been ad<strong>de</strong>d new elements, such as requir<strong>in</strong>g the approval of themayor <strong>in</strong> the commune of resi<strong>de</strong>nce. This opens up the possibility forarbitrary <strong>de</strong>cisions (the elected representatives on the far right willmake the most of such provisions), the obligation of a m<strong>in</strong>imum periodof resi<strong>de</strong>nce on the part of the foreign applicant and, <strong>in</strong> the case of apolygamous family, limit<strong>in</strong>g the family members who can jo<strong>in</strong> theimmigrant to one spouse and the children of this same spouse.As COSTA-LASCOUX (1993) po<strong>in</strong>ts out, the essence of the restrictivepolicy of the Pasqua law resi<strong>de</strong>s <strong>in</strong> the measures concern<strong>in</strong>g thebr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g together of families. Coupled with the clauses on the right ofasylum, the dissuasive effect is further strengthened. In a period ofhigh unemployment and a crisis <strong>in</strong> social hous<strong>in</strong>g, the adm<strong>in</strong>istrativeconditions are strengthened to create obstacles which are difficult toovercome.The 1990s also marked a turn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the policy on asylum<strong>in</strong>sofar as it became a party to the treatment of the immigration issue. 6Formerly clearly separated from the immigration problem, asylumpolicy has <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly become one of the elements <strong>in</strong> immigrationpolicy. Asylum policy was strongly marked by the context of the coldwar but s<strong>in</strong>ce the implosion of the Soviet bloc, the political andgeopolitical challenges of asylum policy have disappeared for westernstates (LEGOUX, 2002a). The treatment of political asylum has conformedto the l<strong>in</strong>e of immigration. The right of asylum has become limited.Asylum seekers are suspected of be<strong>in</strong>g economic migrants and of us<strong>in</strong>gthe procedure to circumvent bor<strong>de</strong>r closures for economic immigration.New measures have been planned to allow for the refusal of permissionto stay, but above all asylum seekers have to provi<strong>de</strong> very specific proofof <strong>in</strong>dividual persecution —not just collective persecution. Those whoflee their country because they consi<strong>de</strong>r themselves persecuted for theirpolitical, religious or ethnic convictions, but who have not beenpersonally and directly implicated (for example through imprisonmentor violence to the person), may be refused entry and have to leave theterritory with<strong>in</strong> one month. In<strong>de</strong>ed, the rejection rate for asylum requests<strong>in</strong>creased noticeably between 1990 and 2001, with 83 % of requeststurned down. The implementation of the right of asylum <strong>in</strong> France hasevolved towards a restrictive <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the Geneva Convention,notably on the fact that persecutions carried out by agents operat<strong>in</strong>g6 The colloquium “la place <strong>de</strong> l’asile politique dans l’immigration” (The place ofpolitical asylum <strong>in</strong> immigration) (Poitiers 4-5 February, 2000), the word<strong>in</strong>g of which isreveal<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>de</strong>alt with this issue at length. The proceed<strong>in</strong>gs are to be published <strong>in</strong> 2003.


FRENCH IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS 121outsi<strong>de</strong> the parameters of any state control are beyond the bounds ofthe Convention. An effect of this <strong>in</strong> France has been to refuse refugeestatus to Algerian <strong>in</strong>tellectuals who had fled their country because theywere un<strong>de</strong>r threat from Islamic terrorists. In France, as <strong>in</strong> other <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries, there has been a passage from the “right to leave” to the“right to stay <strong>in</strong> one’s country”, <strong>in</strong> the words of LEGOUX (2002b). Apreoccupation of asylum countries which would be very noble if it wasnot hid<strong>de</strong>n beh<strong>in</strong>d the preoccupation of limit<strong>in</strong>g the numbers ofasylum seekers com<strong>in</strong>g to the country. The current crisis <strong>in</strong> asylumpolicy <strong>in</strong> France, as <strong>in</strong> other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries, has resulted <strong>in</strong> theobstruction of procedures; a noticeable lengthen<strong>in</strong>g of procedures; anextremely high refusal rate and the establishment of sub-statutes forrefugees which ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> people <strong>in</strong> forms of “<strong>in</strong>stitutional illegality”(LEGOUX, 2002a). This situation has given rise to phenomena such asthe Sangatte refugee camp where almost 40,000 asylum seekerspassed <strong>in</strong> transit wish<strong>in</strong>g to settle <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. The way <strong>in</strong> which theproblematical situation at Sangatte was resolved is a good illustrationof this evolution, s<strong>in</strong>ce the issue of refugees and asylum seekers wastreated as an immigration problem, without tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account thepolitical protection of the asylum seekers, or if so, only <strong>in</strong> a subsidiaryfashion.The Pasqua laws gave rise to numerous objections when they werepromulgated but we are forced to note that they have un<strong>de</strong>rgone nofundamental modifications by subsequent governments. Some polemicm<strong>in</strong>ds even asserted that the “Chevènement laws”, named after theM<strong>in</strong>ister of the Interior <strong>in</strong> the Socialist government which followed,simply modified them slightly while keep<strong>in</strong>g to the same orig<strong>in</strong>al spirit.2000 and the resumption of labour immigrationIn October 2000, the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industryannounced that it lacked 200,000 workers to meet the need for labour<strong>in</strong> the construction, cater<strong>in</strong>g and cloth<strong>in</strong>g sectors <strong>in</strong> the Paris region. Itsuggested that the shortage could be solved by resum<strong>in</strong>g immigration.In contrast with the preced<strong>in</strong>g years when, as <strong>in</strong> other <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries, there was talk of the lack of skilled and highly skilled labour<strong>in</strong> different sectors (especially comput<strong>in</strong>g), this concerned unskilledlabour. S<strong>in</strong>ce then, people have talked more and more openly aboutthe resumption of immigration, a subject which was still taboo <strong>in</strong> thelate 1990s, but which now seems to be acknowledged, if not by publicop<strong>in</strong>ion at least by the political class, with the obvious exception of thefar right. The target of “zero immigration” has now been abandoned.


122 EMMANUEL MA MUNGThe right-w<strong>in</strong>g M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Interior N. Sarkozy, <strong>in</strong> a televisionprogramme broadcast <strong>in</strong> December 2002, judged it to be unrealistic,just as prime m<strong>in</strong>ister J.P. Raffar<strong>in</strong> has done <strong>in</strong> several <strong>de</strong>clarations.In October 2002, J.P. Raffar<strong>in</strong> presented his immigration policy atthe re-election of the “Haut Conseil à l’Intégration”. The choice ofvenue was clearly symbolic. He came down aga<strong>in</strong>st the right offoreigners to vote and took a stance <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with French tradition:ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the national character of citizenship (for non-EU citizens),but encourag<strong>in</strong>g the acquisition of French nationality and with it theright to vote: “Let us not open the door to the right to vote forforeigners and close the door giv<strong>in</strong>g access to nationality. That wouldgo aga<strong>in</strong>st our tradition […] There are currently 100,000 naturalisationsper year <strong>in</strong> France. This figure shows that naturalisation is a realpossibility <strong>in</strong> our country.” Accord<strong>in</strong>g to his <strong>de</strong>clarations, his policy is tobe organised <strong>in</strong> three ma<strong>in</strong> themes: a policy of accepted immigration; aproject of renewed <strong>in</strong>tegration and a reworked campaign aga<strong>in</strong>stdiscrim<strong>in</strong>ation. Le Mon<strong>de</strong> of 24 October 2002 summed up the ma<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ts of the policy thus:The government’s plan aims to <strong>de</strong>velop a positive immigration <strong>in</strong>France. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Raffar<strong>in</strong>: “necessary immigration control” willresult <strong>in</strong> a reform of the asylum procedure, sett<strong>in</strong>g up statisticalanalyses nee<strong>de</strong>d for a “<strong>de</strong>tailed assessment of the situation” and theefficient organisation of the policy “to send people home, whether ona forced or voluntary basis.” He ad<strong>de</strong>d: “Immigrants who are acceptedand welcomed on arrival will spare us distress<strong>in</strong>g immigration problems<strong>in</strong> the future that we have experienced before.”Conversely, the reception of legal immigrants is a “nationalquestion”. The prime m<strong>in</strong>ister cont<strong>in</strong>ued: “It concerns tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> withdignity the 100,000 legal immigrants who arrive <strong>in</strong> our country eachyear.” The reception contract planned by the government will offerthese immigrants opportunities for language tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, guidance onvocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and access to state controlled employment. Inexchange, the candidates will have to take on civic commitments. Hestressed: “ A public policy of <strong>in</strong>tegration has first and foremost apolitical objective to ensure that children of immigrants liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> ourcountry all have the same rights and duties.”The third pillar <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tegration policy aims to campaign effectivelyaga<strong>in</strong>st discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. Mr. Raffar<strong>in</strong> hammered out: “Several generationsof young people ‘born of immigrants’ have full Frenchcitizenship —which some people still seem to f<strong>in</strong>d difficult to grasp.”This policy can be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as an <strong>in</strong>centive for immigration whilema<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g strict entry controls as well as a policy of <strong>in</strong>tegration based


FRENCH IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS 123on the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of <strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g foreigners <strong>in</strong> the nation and rely<strong>in</strong>gon a campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. All th<strong>in</strong>gs consi<strong>de</strong>red, the policyis <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e with French tradition as to the relationship of the nation withforeigners: they are <strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ed to become French nationals. However, thepolicy also raises serious questions about immigration control. How willthe policy of send<strong>in</strong>g people back be carried out —especially when itmust be done by force? And <strong>in</strong> particular: how will the reform of theright of asylum take shape, s<strong>in</strong>ce it is not the situation <strong>in</strong> the asylumseekers’ country of orig<strong>in</strong> that predom<strong>in</strong>ates, but the immigrationsituation <strong>in</strong> the country of arrival?ConclusionOver the long term, there has been much cont<strong>in</strong>uity <strong>in</strong> thepr<strong>in</strong>ciples at the basis of France’s immigration policy coupled withmuch fluctuation <strong>in</strong> its implementation. The short period of the lasttwenty years is a good illustration of this cont<strong>in</strong>uity and fluctuation.The pr<strong>in</strong>ciples have rema<strong>in</strong>ed the same: labour immigration to boostthe population and as a consequence, <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> the nation.However, <strong>in</strong> practice, this has moved from a period when bor<strong>de</strong>rs wereclosed to labour immigration while immigration to br<strong>in</strong>g familymembers together <strong>in</strong>creased —the attempt to limit this <strong>in</strong> the 1990shad little effect as the figures show— to an open resumption of labourimmigration policies.However, it is not certa<strong>in</strong> that this immigration policy will ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>its pr<strong>in</strong>ciples for much longer because of two phenomena: <strong>Europe</strong>an<strong>in</strong>tegration and the new forms of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration. The harmonisationof immigration policies required by <strong>Europe</strong>an <strong>in</strong>tegration are<strong>in</strong>evitably affected by the found<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of the member nations asconcerns the relations between <strong>in</strong>dividuals and the nation as acommunity. And these vary significantly from one <strong>Europe</strong>an country toanother. Transformations are appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Germany <strong>in</strong> particular wherethe nationality co<strong>de</strong> has recently been substantially modified <strong>in</strong> its formand bases. Unless French national pr<strong>in</strong>ciples are transposed on a<strong>Europe</strong>an scale, they will probably un<strong>de</strong>rgo significant changes.Furthermore, these pr<strong>in</strong>ciples are no longer suited to the pattern of<strong>in</strong>ternational migrations today. As several works have shown (CHAREF,1999; DORAÏ/HILY/MA MUNG, 1998a, 1998b; MA MUNG 1996;PERALDI, 2001; TAPIA, 1996; TARRIUS, 2002), attachments to nationroots have become more elastic because of the growth <strong>in</strong> migratorymovement and peoples’ mobility. Specific allegiances to the country of


124 EMMANUEL MA MUNGsettlement or the country of orig<strong>in</strong> —formalised by the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple ofmono-belong<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the nation-state— have multiplied and <strong>in</strong>terwoven,helped by the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> immigration.Immigrants are now <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>de</strong>mand<strong>in</strong>g multiple belong<strong>in</strong>g,not be<strong>in</strong>g either from here or over there, but from here and over there(TARRIUS/MISSAOUI, 1995). Integration can no longer aim at <strong>in</strong>corporation<strong>in</strong>to the nation French-style, or no more than —<strong>in</strong> the Britishand American fashion— <strong>in</strong>corporation <strong>in</strong>to communities <strong>in</strong> multiculturalsocieties which is the other face of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of mono-belong<strong>in</strong>g atthe base of stato-national societies. The forms of <strong>in</strong>ternationalmigration <strong>in</strong>vite us to reth<strong>in</strong>k our relations with the foreigner, othernessand exteriority: <strong>in</strong> other words, with the world.ReferencesCHAREF, M. (1999): La circulation migratoire maroca<strong>in</strong>e un pont entre <strong>de</strong>uxrives. Edition Sud Contact, Rabat.COSTA-LASCOUX, J. (1993): “Cont<strong>in</strong>uité ou rupture dans la politique française <strong>de</strong>l’immigration: les lois <strong>de</strong> 1993.” In: Revue européenne <strong>de</strong>s migrations<strong>in</strong>ternationales, 9(3), pp. 233-261.COSTA-LASCOUX, J.; WEIL, P. (1992): Logiques d’Etats et immigrations. Kimé,Paris.DORAÏ, K.; HILY, M.-A.; MA MUNG, E. (1998a): “Bilan <strong>de</strong>s travaux sur lacirculation migratoire. Rapport f<strong>in</strong>al pour le M<strong>in</strong>istère <strong>de</strong> la Solidarité et <strong>de</strong>l’Emploi, Direction <strong>de</strong> la Population et <strong>de</strong>s Migrations (DPM)” MIGRINTER,CNRS - Université <strong>de</strong> Poitiers.DORAÏ, K.; HILY, M.-A.; MA MUNG, E. (1998b): “La circulation migratoire.”Migrations étu<strong>de</strong>s, 24, pp. 3-19.GAEREMYNCK, J. (2002): “De l’immigration à l’<strong>in</strong>tégration.” Cahiers français,307, pp. 66-76.LACROIX, T. (2002): “La politique migratoire <strong>de</strong> la France: l’usage politique <strong>de</strong>l’altérité au sevice <strong>de</strong> la nation.” In: Quand l’altérité se fait en-jeux, ed.Ludovic Joyeux. Paris: L’Harmattan. pp. 23-56.LEGOUX, L. (2002a): “La crise <strong>de</strong> l’asile en France: <strong>de</strong>s droits <strong>de</strong> l’Homme à laraison d’Etat.” In: <strong>Immigration</strong>, marché du travail, <strong>in</strong>tégration, ed. FrançoisHéran. Paris: La Documentation Française. pp. 273-284.LEGOUX, L. (2002b): “Vers une redéf<strong>in</strong>ition du droit d’asile.” Cahiers français,307, pp. 77-86.MA MUNG, E. (ed.) (1996): Mobilités et <strong>in</strong>vestissements <strong>de</strong>s émigrés: Maroc,Tunisie, Turquie, Sénégal. L’Harmattan, Paris.MARIE, C. V. (2002): “Les politiques européennes <strong>de</strong> gestion <strong>de</strong>s flux: contrôleet restrictions.” Cahiers français, 307, pp. 57-65.PERALDI, M. (ed.) (2001): Cabas et conta<strong>in</strong>ers: activités marchan<strong>de</strong>s <strong>in</strong>formelleset réseaux migrants transfrontaliers. Maisonneuve et Larose, Paris.


FRENCH IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS 125SCHNAPPER, D. (1994): La communauté <strong>de</strong>s citoyens: sur l’idée mo<strong>de</strong>rne <strong>de</strong>nation. Gallimard, Paris.SIMON, G. (1995): Géodynamique <strong>de</strong>s migrations <strong>in</strong>ternationales dans le mon<strong>de</strong>(1re éd. ed). Presses universitaires <strong>de</strong> France, Paris.TAPIA, S. DE, (1996): “La circulation migratoire dans les diasporas ouvrières <strong>de</strong> laMéditerranée. Turquie Maroc. Rapport f<strong>in</strong>al d’une recherche pour leM<strong>in</strong>istère <strong>de</strong> l’éducation nationale et <strong>de</strong> la culture” MIGRINTER, CNRS -Université <strong>de</strong> Poitiers.TARRIUS, A. (2001): “Au-<strong>de</strong>là <strong>de</strong>s États-nations: <strong>de</strong>s sociétés <strong>de</strong> migrants.”Revue européenne <strong>de</strong>s migrations <strong>in</strong>ternationales, 17(2), pp. 37-62.TARRIUS, A. (2002): La mondialisation par le bas, les nouveaux noma<strong>de</strong>s <strong>de</strong>l’économie souterra<strong>in</strong>e. Balland, Paris.TARRIUS, A.; MISSAOUI, L. (1995): Arabes <strong>de</strong> France dans l’économie mondialesouterra<strong>in</strong>e. Ed. <strong>de</strong> l’Aube, Paris.VIET, V. (1998): La France immigrée, construction d’une politique, 1914-1997.Fayard, Paris.


Germany - still a reluctant countryof immigration?Wolfgang BosswickIntroductionAt the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the 1990s, the American scholar Phil Mart<strong>in</strong>characterised Germany as be<strong>in</strong>g a “reluctant country of immigration”(MARTIN, 1993). This characterisation encompasses two aspects: firstly,that Germany had become a <strong>de</strong>-facto country of immigration, a factwhich was fiercely ignored by official policy at this time, and secondly,that German politics refused to <strong>de</strong>al with the consequences of be<strong>in</strong>g acountry of immigration. How much did this situation change with theprofound <strong>de</strong>velopments <strong>in</strong> political discourse and legislative <strong>in</strong>itiativeswhich took place dur<strong>in</strong>g the last <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>?In 2001, the Presi<strong>de</strong>nt of the German Bun<strong>de</strong>stag, WolfgangThierse, stated that he is happy «that we do not anymore eschew the<strong>in</strong>sight of be<strong>in</strong>g an immigration country» (THIERSE, 2001). This <strong>in</strong>sightmeanwhile seems to be shared by the overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g majority of theGerman public and politics, acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g the facts discussed <strong>in</strong> manypublications and officially ma<strong>de</strong> public by the report of the Commissionon <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2001: Dur<strong>in</strong>g the five <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s after the foundationof the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic of Germany, a total of approximately 31 millionpeople migrated <strong>in</strong>to Germany, while 22 million left <strong>in</strong> this period; thenet ga<strong>in</strong> of 9 million people <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s an annual net immigrationaverage of 200,000 foreign citizens (ZUWANDERUNGSKOMMISSION,2001, p. 15). At the end of the millennium, more than 40 % of theforeign population had been liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Germany for more than 15 years(LEDERER, 1997, p. 86). In many metropolitan areas, a large share ofthe population are foreign citizens (p. 100); even <strong>in</strong> cities which are notmajor centres of foreign immigration such as Köln, Frankfurt, Stuttgartor München, approximately one third of the population are first or


128 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKsecond generation migrants (Bosswick 2000, 86). The fact of be<strong>in</strong>g acountry of immigration today is not only a matter of statistics, butresults <strong>in</strong> daily experience of profound and visible changes, especially <strong>in</strong>the metropolitan areas.Nevertheless, politics has rema<strong>in</strong>ed reluctant to <strong>de</strong>al with theconsequences of this situation. The discourse on immigration stayswith<strong>in</strong> the national frame of reference, to a large extent ignor<strong>in</strong>g thegrow<strong>in</strong>g global <strong>in</strong>ter<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce and its impact on migration patternsand regimes. The discourse usually focused on small sectors of theoverall migration situation such as the question of political asylum. Itwas only after the change of the German government to the Red-Green coalition <strong>in</strong> 1998 that core questions of immigration policy andcitizenship became <strong>in</strong>tensively discussed <strong>in</strong> public, and the Germandiscourse on immigration reached a new level. Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g, theconflicts with<strong>in</strong> the political spectrum on admission policy as well as onthe concept and implementation of <strong>in</strong>tegration policies persist, andpolitical action <strong>in</strong> the field of migration policy has to a large extentbeen paralysed by the blockage of the conservative CDU/CSU opposition.Thus, the 1990 characterisation by Phil Mart<strong>in</strong> still seems to rema<strong>in</strong>valid, at least as long the conservative ma<strong>in</strong>stream refuses to supportthe <strong>de</strong>velopment of a mo<strong>de</strong>rn migration policy. This paper gives anoverview on the historical background of this situation and discussescurrent perspectives.<strong>Immigration</strong> to GermanyGermany has a long-stand<strong>in</strong>g experience of immigration andlabour migration. In the aftermath of the <strong>de</strong>vastat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>population oflarge areas dur<strong>in</strong>g the Thirty Years War 1618-48, several emperors ofthe 17 th and early 18 th century <strong>in</strong>tentionally settled migrants fromabroad. A prom<strong>in</strong>ent example is the settlement of Huguenots from Franceand refugees from Switzerland and Austria by Friedrich Wilhelm, emperorof Bran<strong>de</strong>nburg-Prussia. In the Edict of Potsdam (29 October 1685),the emperor guaranteed the same civil and economic rights to thesettlers as held by the <strong>in</strong>digenous population (BIRNSTIEL/REINKE, 1990,p. 47). At that time, <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the local population by settl<strong>in</strong>g immigrantswas usually consi<strong>de</strong>red as be<strong>in</strong>g a benefit to resources and economic<strong>de</strong>velopment, a strategy which had also been followed by Central andEastern <strong>Europe</strong>an emperors, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a period of emigration fromGermany to Russia dur<strong>in</strong>g the late 18 th century (CONZE, 1993). Withthe population <strong>in</strong>crease dur<strong>in</strong>g the 19 th century, this emigration


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 129expan<strong>de</strong>d to the USA, and contributed to an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>mand forlabour dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>dustrialisation of Germany <strong>in</strong> the late 19 th century.In the mid-1890s, Prussia <strong>in</strong>stalled a strictly controlled rotation systemfor agricultural labourers from cont<strong>in</strong>ental <strong>Europe</strong>, i.e. occupied Poland.Migrant labour was not only <strong>de</strong>man<strong>de</strong>d by the agricultural sector, but<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d recruited settlement of ethnic Polish m<strong>in</strong>ers of Prussiannationality from the Upper Silesia coal m<strong>in</strong>e area to the West GermanRuhr and Emscher coal areas from 1870 onwards. The temporary labourmigrant system for Polish workers <strong>in</strong> the agricultural sector and Italianworkers <strong>in</strong> the construction sector contributed to an <strong>in</strong>crease of foreignnationals <strong>in</strong> Germany from approximately 207,000 <strong>in</strong> 1871 to 1.26million <strong>in</strong> 1910 (BADE, 1983, p. 29). Dur<strong>in</strong>g World War I, the rotationsystem practised ma<strong>in</strong>ly by the Prussian state was suspen<strong>de</strong>d, and theforeign labourers <strong>in</strong> the agricultural sector were forced to stay; their workforce (approx. 374,000 at the end of World War I) was supplemented byforced labour by prisoners of war (approx. 900,000 at October 1918),both be<strong>in</strong>g an important factor for the war economy (BADE, 1983, p.47). Follow<strong>in</strong>g the restoration of the Polish state after World War I, aconsi<strong>de</strong>rable return migration to Poland took place. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the WeimarRepublic, the employment of foreign labour <strong>in</strong> 1922 became centrallycontrolled on the national level by the semi-official German LabourCentre (Deutsche Arbeiterzentrale), which <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed the quota forseasonal labour from Central <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>in</strong> cooperation with the regionallabour authorities. This pattern cont<strong>in</strong>ued after the reform of the nationallabour adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>in</strong> 1927 (Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung undArbeitslosenversicherung) which issued visas only if the labour <strong>de</strong>mandcould not be met by Germans. Consequently, the numbers of workersadmitted closely followed economic <strong>de</strong>velopments dur<strong>in</strong>g the WeimarRepublic, <strong>de</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g to less than a quarter of the pre-war levels.Other than the policy of German emperors before the 18 th centurywho usually consi<strong>de</strong>red population growth and foreign settlers as aga<strong>in</strong> for their territories, the attitu<strong>de</strong> of the labour migrant rotationsystem of the 19 th and 20 th century was best expressed <strong>in</strong> 1918 by thelater presi<strong>de</strong>nt of the Weimar Republic’s labour office.Without doubt, the German economy draws a high profit fromthe labour force of foreigners who are <strong>in</strong> their prime, while thecountry of orig<strong>in</strong> had to raise the costs of rear<strong>in</strong>g them to work<strong>in</strong>glife. But even more important is the expulsion or reduced recruitmentof foreign labourers <strong>in</strong> times of economic <strong>de</strong>pression... If employmentof foreign labourers is unavoidable, it seems —with regard to socialpolitical questions— necessary to allocate them to the lowest sectorsof the economy not requir<strong>in</strong>g any education, and to employ them at


130 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKlowest wages; thus, for the native labourers arises the remarkableadvantage that their rise from ord<strong>in</strong>ary low paid day-labourers’ jobsto qualified and well-paid skilled workers’ jobs will be facilitated(SYRUP, 1918, p. 297, quoted <strong>in</strong> TREIBEL, 1999, p. 120. Translationby the author).Regardless of the general economic growth dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1930s andthe <strong>in</strong>creased labour <strong>de</strong>mand <strong>in</strong> Germany un<strong>de</strong>r the Nazi dictatorship,the employment of foreign labour rema<strong>in</strong>ed on a very low level until1939 (less than 500,000 <strong>in</strong> 1939), although agreements with Italy,Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on hir<strong>in</strong>g foreignlabourers had been contracted (BADE, 1983, p. 53). But immediatelyafter the German occupation of Poland <strong>in</strong> September 1939, Polishlabourers for the agricultural sector were <strong>de</strong>ported on a large scale(560,000 by May 1940, up to a total of 1.8 to 2 million by the end ofthe war). The <strong>de</strong>portation of forced labourers from all occupied territoriesand the forced labour of prisoners of war <strong>in</strong> Germany led to a peak of8.5 million foreigners <strong>in</strong> 1944 (PROUDFOOT, 1957, p. 81), a figure notexcee<strong>de</strong>d s<strong>in</strong>ce then. In several sectors such as agriculture, m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g andthe chemical <strong>in</strong>dustry, the share of foreign labourers grew up to 40 %<strong>in</strong> 1944 (BADE, 1983, p. 56). This brutal forced labour system, evenaim<strong>in</strong>g at exterm<strong>in</strong>ation for some groups such as Russian prisoners ofwar and concentration camp <strong>in</strong>mates (“Vernichtung durch Arbeit”),cannot be compared at all to forced labour dur<strong>in</strong>g World War I an<strong>de</strong>ven less to the seasonal labourer system un<strong>de</strong>r Prussian rule.Nevertheless, it was implemented on the ground <strong>in</strong> agriculture, theconstruction sector and <strong>in</strong>dustry by farmers and regular civil employerswho often actively hired forced labourers from the labour adm<strong>in</strong>istrationor the SS. With the exception of the <strong>de</strong>pression dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1920s andthe national autonomy policy of the 1930s, <strong>in</strong> several sectors of theGerman economy there was a cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g structure of foreign labouremployment which shifted <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly to the German <strong>in</strong>dustrial sectorby the massive use of forced labour <strong>in</strong> World War II. This cont<strong>in</strong>uity ofemployment of foreign labour <strong>in</strong> German <strong>in</strong>dustry and the constructionsector was only <strong>in</strong>terrupted dur<strong>in</strong>g the chaotic situation after 1945:43.7 million refugees and expelled ethnic Germans from Central<strong>Europe</strong> immigrated to the three Western Zones of Germany by 1949(BADE, 1983, p. 59), when the post-war period began with thecurrency reform of 20 June 1948, and the foundation of the Fe<strong>de</strong>ralRepublic of Germany <strong>in</strong> 1949.


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 131<strong>Immigration</strong> and migration policy <strong>in</strong> the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republicof GermanyUntil 1960, the first year of full employment of the labour force <strong>in</strong>Germany, a large share of the <strong>de</strong>mand for labour could be met byreturn<strong>in</strong>g German prisoners of war (4 million up to the end of 1950),German refugees from Central <strong>Europe</strong> (4.7 million) and migrants fromthe German Democratic Republic (1.8 million up to 1961, BADE, 1987,p. 60). Nevertheless there was regional <strong>de</strong>mand <strong>in</strong> some sectors; thefirst Italian guest workers were employed <strong>in</strong> 1952 by South WestGerman farmers regardless of an overall unemployment rate of 9.5 %(see HECKMANN, 1981, p. 149f).In 1955 at the very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the guest worker programme, animportant <strong>de</strong>cision was ma<strong>de</strong> when the government, the employers’associations and the unions agreed upon full <strong>in</strong>tegration of the labourmigrants <strong>in</strong>to the social security system (MEHRLÄNDER, 1980, p. 77ff).S<strong>in</strong>ce then, the German social security system does not differentiatebetween foreigners and German nationals. The guest worker programmerespon<strong>de</strong>d to the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>mand <strong>in</strong> construction and <strong>in</strong>dustry —partlydue to the sett<strong>in</strong>g up of the German armed forces <strong>in</strong> 1956— an<strong>de</strong>ncompassed active recruitment of foreign workers by agreementswith several <strong>Europe</strong>an countries: 1955 Italy, 1960 Spa<strong>in</strong> and Greece,and 1961 Turkey. These agreements were not only <strong>in</strong> the German<strong>in</strong>terest; several send<strong>in</strong>g countries <strong>in</strong>tervened to <strong>in</strong>crease the migrantnumbers or to be <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the guest worker programme (STEINERT,1995). After the erection of the Berl<strong>in</strong> Wall and the closure of the GDRbor<strong>de</strong>r <strong>in</strong> 1961, further agreements with Morocco, Portugal, Tunisiaand Yugoslavia were signed by 1968.Until the halt on recruitment <strong>in</strong> 1973 <strong>in</strong> the context of the oil crisis,the number of employed foreign workers rose to 2.6 million, the mostprom<strong>in</strong>ent groups be<strong>in</strong>g Turks (23 %), Yugoslavs (18 %) and Italians(16 %) (LEDERER, 1997, p. 52). This foreign work force compensatedfor <strong>de</strong>mographic <strong>de</strong>velopments and the <strong>de</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g economic activity ofnatives (women, common prolongation of educational career). Althoughit led only to a m<strong>in</strong>or <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the total work force supply, itcontributed consi<strong>de</strong>rably to the general economic growth (HECKMANN,1981, p. 152ff). The employment of the guest workers has beenun<strong>de</strong>rstood as be<strong>in</strong>g temporary usually by both the German hostsociety and the migrants. Although the “rotat<strong>in</strong>g ex- and import ofeach time ‘young and fresh’ guest workers” was officially <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d(Hans Filb<strong>in</strong>ger, Presi<strong>de</strong>nt of Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Württemberg 1966, quoted byTRÄNHARDT, 1984, p. 123), other than for the seasonal migrant workers


132 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKbefore World War I there was no enforcement of a rotation scheme. Onthe contrary, s<strong>in</strong>ce the migrants were employed <strong>in</strong> unattractive sectorsof <strong>in</strong>dustry (m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, construction, metals and textiles), employers were<strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g their tra<strong>in</strong>ed workers. Nevertheless, the foreigners’law of 1965 which replaced the “Foreigners’ Police Decree” of 1938then still <strong>in</strong> force, placed the foreigner’s stay with<strong>in</strong> extensive discretionof the authorities (SANTEL/WEBER, 2000, p. 111).By the early seventies, it was <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly obvious that the rotationconcept was not feasible; at the same time, the proportion of non-<strong>Europe</strong>an migrants visible <strong>in</strong> public <strong>in</strong>creased. With the 1973 halt onrecruitment of non-EEC nationals <strong>in</strong> the context of the oil shock, theofficial rotation policy was replaced by a policy promot<strong>in</strong>g voluntaryrepatriation. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1973, family reunion (spouses and children belowthe age of 16) has been the only possibility of immigration; <strong>in</strong> 1974,the high proportion of foreign families among the total births (20 %)was already be<strong>in</strong>g publicly discussed (HETTLAGE, 2001, p. 76). In anambiguous policy with the official goals of stopp<strong>in</strong>g new recruitment,promot<strong>in</strong>g voluntary return and <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g socially those who wereunlikely to return (see HECKMANN, 1994, p. 161), <strong>in</strong> 1975 thegovernment <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreign families <strong>in</strong> family allowanceregulations, while at the same time, an <strong>in</strong>terdiction on foreignersmov<strong>in</strong>g to several metropolitan areas was imposed until 1977. As anun<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d si<strong>de</strong> effect of the halt on recruitment, many foreignerspreferred to stay s<strong>in</strong>ce the option of return to Germany no longerexisted. In 1978, the German parliament stated that problems ofhous<strong>in</strong>g, medical services, school<strong>in</strong>g of migrant children and relationswith the German population carried a risk of ris<strong>in</strong>g conflicts, and<strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to establish the office of a “Commissioner for the Promotionof Integration of Foreign Employees and their Families”, which wasallocated to the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour and Social Affairs. In September1979 the first commissioner, He<strong>in</strong>z Kühn, former presi<strong>de</strong>nt of NorthRh<strong>in</strong>e-Westphalia, published a memorandum on the state of <strong>in</strong>tegrationof foreign migrants which <strong>de</strong>man<strong>de</strong>d an active <strong>in</strong>tegration policy forthe immigrant population (GEIß, 2001, p. 128). The foundation of thisoffice showed that the <strong>in</strong>tegration of migrants was officially recognisedand <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed as necessity (MAHNIG, 1998, p. 53). Nevertheless, thefollow<strong>in</strong>g two <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s have been characterised by <strong>de</strong>fensive andrestrictive measures, while <strong>in</strong> the area of <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>de</strong>velopment hasstagnated. In December 1983, a new law came <strong>in</strong>to force whichpromoted voluntary return of migrants by f<strong>in</strong>ancial support such asrefund of the employees’ share of pension fund payments <strong>in</strong> case ofpermanent return. About 250,000 migrants returned un<strong>de</strong>r this


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 133scheme, but the expectations of the government were not met:repatriation numbers were far below the <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d figures, and it turnedout that many of the returnees only accelerated their already plannedreturn project <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to get the benefits of the programme (SANTEL,2000, p. 112). After the programme’s <strong>de</strong>adl<strong>in</strong>e, the repatriation figuresdropped sharply compared to the level before 1983. While the<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d result of the law had been very limited, its implicit message as“symbolic policy” both to the foreign population and the Germanpublic was crystal clear, thus counteract<strong>in</strong>g the goal of social<strong>in</strong>tegration of settled migrants (MEIER-BRAUN, 1988, p. 69).Although the halt on recruitment officially stopped <strong>de</strong>mand drivenimmigration to Germany and the figure of employed foreign workers<strong>de</strong>creased from its peak of 2.6 million <strong>in</strong> 1973 to 1.6 million <strong>in</strong> 1984,approx. 3 million foreigners immigrated until 1980 via family reunion(LEDERER, 2001, p. 141). In addition to this mostly ignored familyreunion, <strong>in</strong> the late seventies, a second si<strong>de</strong> door for immigration becamerelevant: supply driven immigration via the asylum procedure accord<strong>in</strong>g toarticle 16 (2) of the Basic Law. In 1980, asylum application figures peakedat 93,000, and the topic of asylum became prom<strong>in</strong>ent dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1980Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Württemberg election campaign and the national electioncampaign of 1981. S<strong>in</strong>ce then, the question of the right to asylum hasbeen the focus of public discourse on immigration and of numerous legal<strong>in</strong>itiatives and <strong>de</strong>terrent measures (BOSSWICK, 1997, p. 56f).Faced with the settled guest workers and their families, dur<strong>in</strong>g theeighties politicians and the majority of society realised that thepopulation of foreign migrants <strong>in</strong> Germany was a long term fact whichcould not be <strong>de</strong>alt with only as a labour reserve or social problem. Inaddition to the structural <strong>in</strong>tegration of the migrants <strong>in</strong>to the socialsecurity and welfare system, the large welfare organisations <strong>de</strong>velopedmeasures for social <strong>in</strong>tegration of the foreign migrant population.Religious welfare organisations (Catholic Caritas for Italian, Spanish andCroatian guest workers, Protestant Diakonie for Greeks and Yugoslavs)and the Arbeiterwohlfahrt stemm<strong>in</strong>g from the workers’ movement(Turkish and North African migrants) were already offer<strong>in</strong>g counsell<strong>in</strong>gservices for migrant workers dur<strong>in</strong>g the sixties. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the eighties,these <strong>in</strong>stitutions faced <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>mand for broa<strong>de</strong>r social an<strong>de</strong>ducational services from the migrants’ families. As a consequence, <strong>in</strong>1984 the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral M<strong>in</strong>istry for Labour and Social Affairs enacted a“Regulation for tasks, rules of operation and organisation for socialcounsell<strong>in</strong>g of foreign employees and their families” which set rules forsocial work with migrants and a guaranteed comb<strong>in</strong>ed fe<strong>de</strong>ral andstate fund<strong>in</strong>g for the work of the three welfare organisations mentioned


134 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKabove. The traditional area of responsibility of the three welfare organisationsaccord<strong>in</strong>g to ethnic orig<strong>in</strong> was confirmed <strong>in</strong> the regulation (seeBOSSWICK, 2001, p. 18).The migrant population <strong>in</strong> Germany <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly tried not only tocope with their precarious life situation but also to achieve a bettersocial status, recognition and upward mobility. In <strong>in</strong>tellectual circles,the former assimilative concept of <strong>in</strong>tegration was criticised and thei<strong>de</strong>a of a multicultural society was —sometimes quite naively—discussed. Politics however moved <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly towards a restrictiveposition. In the mid-eighties the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral M<strong>in</strong>ister of the InteriorFriedrich Zimmermann (CSU) promoted a bill for a new foreigners’ lawwhich <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d among other restrictive measures to lower the agelimit for family reunification from the age of 16 to 6 years. This bill diedwhen it was massively criticised by the churches, the welfare organisationsand the labour unions which supported the resistance of LiselotteFuncke, the second Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs (GEIß, 2001,p. 130). At the same time, public discourse became <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glypolarised by the dispute on Article 16 (2), the right to asylum. From1984 onwards, asylum application figures rose aga<strong>in</strong>, and the questionof asylum seekers framed by the pejorative term “Asylanten” (LINK,1986, p. 55) was raised by the conservative parties as a ma<strong>in</strong> topic ofseveral election campaigns. In the political discourse, it was assertedthat economically motivated immigration was lead<strong>in</strong>g to an “abuse ofthe generous German right to asylum” by fraudulent asylum claims. Asa consequence of grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternationalisation and air travel opportunities,asylum seekers <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly came from non-<strong>Europe</strong>ancountries of orig<strong>in</strong> (i.e. Sri Lanka, Iran and Lebanon, see LEDERER, 1997,p. 274). Dur<strong>in</strong>g the national election campaign 1986-87, the conservativesalso claimed a serious threat to German national i<strong>de</strong>ntity bymulticultural foreign <strong>in</strong>filtration (see BOSSWICK, 2000, p. 46). Dur<strong>in</strong>gthe same year, the number of violent attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st asylum seekersand foreigners <strong>in</strong>creased by 134 % to 117 cases (LEDERER, 1997, p.167). The l<strong>in</strong>k between these xenophobic attacks and the heated public<strong>de</strong>bate on asylum was quite obvious. Nevertheless, the governmentargued that the number of asylum seekers had to be reduced <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>rto reduce unrest with<strong>in</strong> the German population and to combat thisviolence, thus legitimat<strong>in</strong>g the alleged causes for xenophobic attacks(BIELEFELD, 1993). At the end of the eighties, the discussion on <strong>in</strong>tegrationof foreigners had been eclipsed <strong>in</strong> the political discourse by thepredom<strong>in</strong>ant asylum issue; asylum seekers became the new bottom ofthe hierarchy of immigrants, while the presence of South <strong>Europe</strong>anmigrants <strong>in</strong> German society was meanwhile more or less accepted.


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 135Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g consi<strong>de</strong>rable immigration via family reunion, asylumseekers and ethnic Germans from Poland and Romania dur<strong>in</strong>g the eighties,the official position of the German government refused to <strong>de</strong>velop animmigration policy; this position was explicitly stated by the formeradm<strong>in</strong>istrative regulations for the German naturalisation law: «TheFe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it doesnot aim to <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong>tentionally its number of citizens by naturalisation»(E<strong>in</strong>bürgerungsrichtl<strong>in</strong>ien 2.3, 7.3.1989, translation by the author).Although a large share of the migrant population had <strong>in</strong> fact settledpermanently <strong>in</strong> Germany, many of them be<strong>in</strong>g already resi<strong>de</strong>nt formore than two <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s, naturalisation after a m<strong>in</strong>imum stay of fifteenyears was at the discretion of the authorities. This restrictivenaturalisation law placed Germany after Ireland at the bottom of thelist of naturalisations per foreigners <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>between 1984 and 1994 (50 per 1000 foreigners), while <strong>in</strong> 1990,several rul<strong>in</strong>gs of high courts up to the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Constitutional Court<strong>de</strong>nied foreigners the right to vote <strong>in</strong> local elections. Hammar co<strong>in</strong>edthe apt term <strong>de</strong>nizens for this population with permanent resi<strong>de</strong>ncestatus, but <strong>in</strong> Germany <strong>de</strong>prived of any political rights (HAMMAR,1990). Until 1990, the strict jus sangu<strong>in</strong>is concept of German citizenshiplaw rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> force. This dated back to 1913, when it was <strong>in</strong>troducedto provi<strong>de</strong> citizenship for <strong>de</strong>scendants of Germans who had beenpermanently <strong>in</strong> the colonies, while exclud<strong>in</strong>g half-caste children ofGerman colonial settlers (OBERNDÖRFER, 1989a, p. 7). This concept ofan ethnic nation state, stemm<strong>in</strong>g from the German Romantik of the early19 th century <strong>in</strong> opposition to the French republican concept of nationdur<strong>in</strong>g the occupation by Napoleon, had far reach<strong>in</strong>g consequences:Germans <strong>in</strong> an ethnic sense, particularly German m<strong>in</strong>orities <strong>in</strong> severalEastern and central <strong>Europe</strong>an states, were entitled to German citizenshipwhen migrat<strong>in</strong>g to Germany, while <strong>in</strong>clusion of migrants by naturalisation<strong>in</strong>to a nation which un<strong>de</strong>rstands itself as a community of <strong>de</strong>scent andculture was <strong>de</strong>nied or at least <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed as an exception to the rule(HECKMANN, 2001, p. 16). Although the conservative ma<strong>in</strong>stream stillsubscribed to the ethnic nation state concept and its myths, after theNazi experience and the <strong>de</strong>velopment of the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic it wasreplaced to a large extent by new concepts. The historian Mommsen<strong>de</strong>scribed this situation <strong>in</strong> 1990 as follows:A new k<strong>in</strong>d of national consciousness has <strong>de</strong>veloped <strong>in</strong> theFe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic. It is no longer un<strong>de</strong>r the <strong>in</strong>fluence of political andlegal traditions of imperial Germany. This new national consciousnessrelates primarily to economic success and to the <strong>de</strong>mocratic and


136 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKliberal political system. It is no longer <strong>in</strong> conflict with the politicalcultures of Western <strong>Europe</strong> and the U.S.A, as has been the case forso many years (MOMMSEN, 1990, p. 272).However, the question of immigration, especially the problem ofhigh numbers of asylum applications up to 1993, became a stressfultest for this new concept of the German nation as well as for civilsociety. The fall of the iron curta<strong>in</strong> and German reunification elim<strong>in</strong>ateda major migration barrier while at the same time, the civil war <strong>in</strong>Yugoslavia generated massive refugee movements which were hostedpredom<strong>in</strong>antly by Germany and Austria. These refugee migrationmovements culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> 1992 at a peak of 438,000 applications,while the immigration of ethnic Germans —s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990 predom<strong>in</strong>antlystemm<strong>in</strong>g from the states of the former Soviet Union— peaked <strong>in</strong>1990 at 397,000 immigrants. Dur<strong>in</strong>g 1992, reception facilities all overGermany had been stretched to their limits, and gymnasiums and schoolshad to be used for <strong>in</strong>itial accommodation. While the immigration ofethnic Germans was still fully supported by the conservative government,the political conflict on asylum escalated to the end of 1992. Therespective article 16 (2) of the German constitution —politicallypersecuted persons enjoy the right to asylum— was a prom<strong>in</strong>ent normout of a republican tradition <strong>in</strong> the German Basic Law of 1948. Basedon the experiences of German exiles flee<strong>in</strong>g the Nazi dictatorship, thearticle limited the sovereign nation state’s control upon its bor<strong>de</strong>rs; anasylum seeker had the right to enter the territory and to have his claimjudged. For the liberal and left ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>in</strong> Germany, thisconstitutional article was an important element of the German Fe<strong>de</strong>ralRepublic after the totalitarian Nazi state. For the conservative ma<strong>in</strong>stream,the right to asylum was an unacceptable limitation of the nation state’sright to control its bor<strong>de</strong>r. These two positions had already clasheddur<strong>in</strong>g the formulation of the Basic Law article <strong>in</strong> 1948, and theconflict cont<strong>in</strong>ued until 1992 at vary<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tensity; a series of restrictivemeasures by the government and the adm<strong>in</strong>istration s<strong>in</strong>ce theseventies tried to limit the access to asylum while jurisdiction until thelate seventies <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly realised this <strong>in</strong>stitutional norm <strong>in</strong> their rul<strong>in</strong>gs(see BOSSWICK, 1997). S<strong>in</strong>ce 1987, the conservative governmentargued that the ris<strong>in</strong>g numbers of asylum seekers could only bestopped by an amendment to the constitution, and that the refusal ofthe opposition to vote for the required two-thirds parliamentarymajority h<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>red the government from solv<strong>in</strong>g this serious problem. Inface of the sharply ris<strong>in</strong>g application figures at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of then<strong>in</strong>eties, the government and the media adopted an image of


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 137emergency. This situation contributed to a belief among some of thepublic that the people themselves had to take action, a <strong>de</strong>velopmentwhich Leggewie <strong>de</strong>scribed as “violent plebejan activism” (LEGGEWIE,1992, p. 59). From reunification <strong>in</strong> October 1990 until mid-1993, morethan 5,000 violent crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st foreigners were committed, result<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> at least 49 <strong>de</strong>aths. Fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased political pressure with<strong>in</strong> its ownranks from local communities which had to shelter <strong>in</strong>com<strong>in</strong>g migrants,and <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to keep the asylum issue out of the headl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> theupcom<strong>in</strong>g national election campaign, the Social Democratic Partyagreed <strong>in</strong> December 1992 to a compromise for an amendment ofarticle 16. Among other regulations, the right to asylum becamerestricted by the safe third country rule, the immigration of ethnicGermans became limited to 225,000 annually, and the citizenship lawwas amen<strong>de</strong>d. The numbers of asylum applications dropped sharply <strong>in</strong>1993, stabilis<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce then at the levels of 1980; although this waswi<strong>de</strong>ly perceived as impact of the constitutional amendment, it is likelythat the practical implementation of acceleration measures <strong>in</strong> April1993 and bilateral repatriation agreements for asylum seekers withseveral countries of transit or orig<strong>in</strong> caused the <strong>de</strong>crease (BOSSWICK,1997, p. 67). Although access to the asylum procedure was possiblelegally only via an airport (approx. 17,500 applications to end of 1999),<strong>in</strong> practice the vast majority of the 811,000 asylum seekers after theamendment until end of 1999 entered illegally and concealed theirentry path, thus ren<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the safe third country rule of the amendmentquite <strong>in</strong>effective. A consequence of this rule together with <strong>in</strong>tensifiedbor<strong>de</strong>r control has been an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g market for professional smugglerswhich became necessary for cross<strong>in</strong>g the German bor<strong>de</strong>r. This<strong>de</strong>velopment also contributed to a certa<strong>in</strong> shift of the asylum discoursefrom the context of illegitimacy (fraudulent asylum seekers) to illegality,although illegal entry for asylum purposes is not persecuted yet.The level of xenophobic attacks however rema<strong>in</strong>ed high comparedto the figures before the asylum <strong>de</strong>bate escalated <strong>in</strong> 1990. In 1992, anarsonist attack on the home of a Turkish family <strong>in</strong> Sol<strong>in</strong>gen, kill<strong>in</strong>g thefather and two children, f<strong>in</strong>ally awakened the German public. Inresponse to a series of such attacks, a grass root <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>in</strong> Munichorganised a large <strong>de</strong>monstration of approximately 400,000 people on6 December 1992. While numerous earlier attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st asylumseekers did not trigger major public worries and had been combatedby the authorities with a certa<strong>in</strong> restra<strong>in</strong>t, the expansion of the attacksonto the Turkish guest worker m<strong>in</strong>ority raised the awareness thatpublic or<strong>de</strong>r was <strong>in</strong> danger; a series of large <strong>de</strong>monstrations aga<strong>in</strong>stright w<strong>in</strong>g xenophobic violence took place <strong>in</strong> 1993.


138 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKWith regard to the labour migrants, <strong>in</strong> January 1991 the conservativegovernment enacted a new foreigners’ law, replac<strong>in</strong>g the 1965regulations. The new law regulated family reunion and the legal statusof immigrants un<strong>de</strong>r the family reunion scheme, replac<strong>in</strong>g variousLän<strong>de</strong>r regulations and the hitherto wi<strong>de</strong> discretion of the authorities.Further it guaranteed a return to Germany for foreigners with permanentresi<strong>de</strong>nce status. Although the new law was heavily criticised for itsrestrictive ten<strong>de</strong>ncy <strong>in</strong> many aspects (e.g. HUBER, 1992), it ma<strong>de</strong> a firstbreakthrough regard<strong>in</strong>g German naturalisation law. For the first time,foreigners resi<strong>de</strong>nt for fifteen years obta<strong>in</strong>ed a right to naturalisationwhich was not at the discretion of the foreigners’ authorities (§§85, 86AuslG 90), and naturalisation was ma<strong>de</strong> easier for foreigners aged 16to 23 if they had stayed <strong>in</strong> Germany cont<strong>in</strong>uously for eight years. This<strong>in</strong>troduction of jus domicilii <strong>in</strong>to German citizenship legislation officiallyacknowledged the fact of long-term resi<strong>de</strong>nt immigrant m<strong>in</strong>orities,although the right was limited by a 1995 <strong>de</strong>adl<strong>in</strong>e. As part of theasylum compromise of 1992, the opposition succee<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> lift<strong>in</strong>g thislimitation and <strong>in</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g the eased naturalisation for adolescents to aright to naturalise. These amendments for the first time <strong>in</strong>troduce<strong>de</strong>lements of the citizenship regulations of “classical” countries ofimmigration, although un<strong>de</strong>r quite restrictive conditions. Naturalisationwas un<strong>de</strong>rstood by the government as a f<strong>in</strong>al step of a successful<strong>in</strong>tegration process, a concept upheld by the conservative ma<strong>in</strong>streamtill today.At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the n<strong>in</strong>eties, two new schemes for immigrationwere <strong>in</strong>troduced which raised little <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> public, but en<strong>de</strong>d thepolicy of non-immigration adopted s<strong>in</strong>ce 1973. The first door wasopened by the last, already <strong>de</strong>mocratically elected government of theGDR <strong>in</strong> 1990 enact<strong>in</strong>g a law which allowed immigration of Jewishpersons from the former Soviet Union by a facilitated procedure. Afterthe reunification <strong>in</strong> October 1990, the reunified Germany cont<strong>in</strong>uedthis practice. Although numbers have been comparatively low(120,515 by the end of 1999), this immigration had a large impact onthe small Jewish communities <strong>in</strong> Germany which had serious difficultieswith the task of <strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g their new members.More significant <strong>in</strong> end<strong>in</strong>g the halt on recruitment, was the “Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung”(<strong>de</strong>cree on exceptions from the halt onrecruitment) enacted <strong>in</strong> 1990. It <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed groups of labour migrantswho are admitted. The most relevant groups are the “Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer”(contract labourers) and “Saisonarbeitnehmer” (seasonallabourers). Contract labourers are employees of foreign enterpriseswhich are subcontractors of German enterprises, usually <strong>in</strong> the


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 139construction <strong>in</strong>dustry. These contract labourers may stay a maximum ofthree years; accord<strong>in</strong>g to the labour market situation, each year quotasare <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Labour and Social Affairs. Bilateralagreements on this programme had been conclu<strong>de</strong>d with severalCentral and South East <strong>Europe</strong>an countries. Although contract labourhad been possible s<strong>in</strong>ce 1982 on a small scale of 10,000 to 20,000workers, their number grew only dur<strong>in</strong>g the n<strong>in</strong>eties to a maximum of95,000 <strong>in</strong> 1992. This programme was heavily criticised s<strong>in</strong>ce thesecontract labourers —unlike the guest workers s<strong>in</strong>ce 1955 and all otheradmitted groups of the n<strong>in</strong>eties— were not <strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to theGerman social security system, but were subject to the social securityregulations of their country of orig<strong>in</strong>; the unions consi<strong>de</strong>red it as a pilotprogramme for lower<strong>in</strong>g social standards. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the follow<strong>in</strong>g years,the quota was no longer exhausted (LEDERER, 1997, p. 249).S<strong>in</strong>ce 1991, seasonal labourers have been admitted for a maximumof three months per year, if the labour <strong>de</strong>mand <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> sectors(farm<strong>in</strong>g, forestry, gastronomy) cannot be filled by Germans or EUcitizens. Their numbers varied between 130,000 (1991) and 221,000(1996).The “Anwerbestopausnahmeverordnung” did not contributesignificantly to the migrant population <strong>in</strong> Germany, although itregularised <strong>de</strong>mand-driven immigration for the first time aga<strong>in</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce1973. Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g the small numbers of admitted migrants, eachof the n<strong>in</strong>e doors for immigration (EU <strong>in</strong>ternal migrants, spouses andchildren of permanently resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreigners, ethnic Germans, Jewishimmigrants from CIS countries, asylum seekers and Geneva Conventionrefugees, temporary protection refugees, new guest workers (contractlabourers etc.), foreign stu<strong>de</strong>nts and immigrat<strong>in</strong>g German nationals) isaccompanied to a vary<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>gree by irregular movements or employment.The supply-driven asylum system <strong>in</strong> particular became <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyl<strong>in</strong>ked to illegal migration and human smuggl<strong>in</strong>g, or disappearance<strong>in</strong>to illegality after an unsuccessful asylum claim. Out of the regularimmigration, the family reunion scheme is the only one whose size canbe estimated, s<strong>in</strong>ce no central statistics are available. A calculation ofthe upper limit for family reunion immigration dur<strong>in</strong>g the n<strong>in</strong>eties,results <strong>in</strong> an annual average of 400,000 persons (LEDERER, 2001, p.154). Although the unknown real numbers are lower than these upperlimits, family reunion immigration is likely to be the most significantscheme, clearly exceed<strong>in</strong>g all other immigration sources dur<strong>in</strong>g then<strong>in</strong>eties.In general, German policy on foreigners cont<strong>in</strong>ued its restrictivecourse dur<strong>in</strong>g the n<strong>in</strong>eties, notably with an amendment to the foreigners’


140 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKlaw <strong>in</strong> 1997 which <strong>in</strong>vented visa requirements for foreign childrencom<strong>in</strong>g unaccompanied from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Morocco andTunisia, and the requirement of an application for resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit foralready resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreign children of parents from these states. Theasylum and temporary protection regulations <strong>in</strong> particular becameextremely restrictive, push<strong>in</strong>g the vast majority of civil war refugeesfrom the Balkans <strong>in</strong>to a “voluntary” return (BOSSWICK, 2000, p. 50).On the other si<strong>de</strong>, the social <strong>in</strong>tegration of resi<strong>de</strong>nt labour migrantsand the second generation was actively promoted by numerous<strong>in</strong>stitutions, namely the large publicly fun<strong>de</strong>d welfare organisations,the local communities and the local labour adm<strong>in</strong>istrations (<strong>in</strong>tegrationmeasures <strong>in</strong>to the labour market). Dur<strong>in</strong>g the n<strong>in</strong>eties, these programmesexpan<strong>de</strong>d to provi<strong>de</strong> a broad scope of services for migrants such ascommunity related social work, social educational counsell<strong>in</strong>g formigrant families and young migrants, health care, support for entry<strong>in</strong>to the labour market, language acquisition, drug addict counsell<strong>in</strong>g,probation support for adolescent crim<strong>in</strong>al offen<strong>de</strong>rs, counsell<strong>in</strong>g forschool<strong>in</strong>g and educational career as well as for vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g etc.In most cases, these services were not explicitly directed towardsmigrants, but <strong>in</strong> fact have a large share of resi<strong>de</strong>nt migrant populationamong their clients. These programmes at the local level are animportant contribution to the <strong>in</strong>tegration of the migrant populationand the prevention of conflicts. An analysis of their extent shows that am<strong>in</strong>imum of 70 million Euro annual expenses (1999/2000) was spenton measures explicitly directed to the foreign migrant population andimplemented by the large welfare organisations; the real efforts areconsi<strong>de</strong>rable higher s<strong>in</strong>ce this calculation could not <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> measuresfun<strong>de</strong>d by the local communities and measures implemented by otherorganisations. The regulations for <strong>in</strong>tegration measures imposed astrict separation of the various immigrant groups; ethnic Germansreceived a broad range of services, while access for asylum seekers and<strong>de</strong>-facto refugees was heavily restricted. This traditional segmentationof fe<strong>de</strong>ral and state fund<strong>in</strong>g schemes for <strong>in</strong>tegration measures accord<strong>in</strong>gto the target groups ethnic German immigrants, foreign immigrantsand refugees became permeable at the end of the <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>; <strong>in</strong> practice,this strict separation was often circumvented by local <strong>in</strong>stitutions s<strong>in</strong>ceit <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly did not meet the practical requirements: The servicesbecame <strong>de</strong>man<strong>de</strong>d by resi<strong>de</strong>nts with a migratory backgroundregardless of their legal status. The total volume spent by the welfareorganisations alone for specific migrant <strong>in</strong>tegration measures onlyamounts to a m<strong>in</strong>imum of more than 158 million Euro per year(BOSSWICK, 2001, p. 46).


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 141These <strong>de</strong>centralised <strong>in</strong>tegration activities by welfare NGOs and localcommunities were wi<strong>de</strong>ly ignored <strong>in</strong> the political discourse.Nevertheless, as a result of these massive efforts for the <strong>in</strong>tegration ofmigrants dur<strong>in</strong>g the n<strong>in</strong>eties, the state of social <strong>in</strong>tegration especially ofthe second generation of migrant youth is quite good compared toother <strong>Europe</strong>an countries. As regards entry <strong>in</strong>to the labour market, theGerman practice is comparatively successful, while legal and perceptional<strong>in</strong>tegration falls beh<strong>in</strong>d other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries due to the restrictivecitizenship practice (HECKMANN et al., 2001, p. 16).With the change <strong>in</strong> government <strong>in</strong> 1998, two <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s of stagnation<strong>in</strong> official German migration and <strong>in</strong>tegration policy gui<strong>de</strong>d by theparadigm «Germany is not a country of immigration» seemed to been<strong>de</strong>d. As one of the first activities of the Social Democrat/Greencoalition, the citizenship law was amen<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> May 1999, com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>toforce on 1 January 2000. The govern<strong>in</strong>g coalition <strong>in</strong>troduced jus soli forchildren born to foreigners <strong>in</strong> Germany, who s<strong>in</strong>ce 2000 automaticallybecome German citizens if one parent has been resi<strong>de</strong>nt for eight yearsand has resi<strong>de</strong>nce right (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) or unlimitedresi<strong>de</strong>nce permit for at least three years. Children fulfill<strong>in</strong>g these requirementsand born <strong>in</strong> Germany s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990 are entitled to naturalisationupon application. The resi<strong>de</strong>nce time requirement of the jus domiciliiregulation of 1992 was also reduced; after eight years of legalresi<strong>de</strong>nce, foreigners are entitled to citizenship if they hold a resi<strong>de</strong>ncepermit, have no crim<strong>in</strong>al record, are able to afford the costs of liv<strong>in</strong>gfor themselves and their family without social welfare benefits andhave a sufficient command of German. Orig<strong>in</strong>ally, dual citizenshipshould have been accepted as a rule for the first and second generation.This <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d regulation was used by the conservative CDU <strong>in</strong> the1999 election campaign of Hesse, start<strong>in</strong>g a massive campaign aga<strong>in</strong>stdual citizenship. This campaign, which raised a xenophobic mood <strong>in</strong>the population, contributed to the narrow success of the conservativeCDU coalition with the liberals, consequently end<strong>in</strong>g the previousSocial Democratic/Green majority <strong>in</strong> the second chamber, the Bun<strong>de</strong>srat.S<strong>in</strong>ce the amendment had to pass this chamber, the dual citizenshipregulation had to be taken out of the bill, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an obligation forjus soli children to choose either German citizenship or the citizenshipof their parents between the ages 18 to 23. The legal consequences ofthis rule are still unclear. Due to the compromise, naturalisationsaccord<strong>in</strong>g to the jus domicilii regulation also exclu<strong>de</strong>d dual citizenshipexcept <strong>in</strong> cases of hardship; <strong>in</strong> practice however, dual citizenship wasaccepted <strong>in</strong> about two thirds of the 143,267 naturalisations <strong>in</strong> 1999(RÜHL/LEDERER, 2001, p. 80). This reform of the German citizenship


142 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKlaw <strong>in</strong>troduced the concept of naturalisation as an important stepsupport<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegration process <strong>in</strong>to official policy and f<strong>in</strong>ally en<strong>de</strong>da situation <strong>in</strong> which the numbers of naturalisations dur<strong>in</strong>g the first halfof the n<strong>in</strong>eties were excee<strong>de</strong>d by the number of foreign children born<strong>in</strong> Germany by more than 80 %, thus result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a foreign populationwhich would grow even at zero net immigration levels.The quest for a new immigration actIn response to <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>de</strong>mand for foreign specialists <strong>in</strong> the IT<strong>in</strong>dustry, <strong>in</strong> March 2000 the German chancellor announced the<strong>in</strong>troduction of a so-called «Green Card» for the recruitment of foreign<strong>in</strong>formation technology experts. Although the proposed regulation wasmore like the US H1-B visa regulations and not comparable at all withthe US Green Card, and although the new regulation did not exceedsubstantially the exceptions to the halt on recruitment <strong>in</strong> force s<strong>in</strong>ce1991, this proposal had a massive, presumably un<strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d si<strong>de</strong> effect.Public discourse on immigration ma<strong>de</strong> a profound turn from the restrictiveten<strong>de</strong>ncy and perception of immigration as a bur<strong>de</strong>n towards a connotationof immigration as an important resource <strong>in</strong> global competition.This unexpected <strong>de</strong>velopment left the conservative ma<strong>in</strong>stream <strong>in</strong> aquite precarious situation, requir<strong>in</strong>g several substantial corrections <strong>in</strong>their hitherto very restrictive position, especially due to harsh criticismfrom <strong>in</strong>dustry which repeatedly stated the urgency of liberal immigrationregulations. Un<strong>de</strong>r these circumstances, the M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interiormoved from former restra<strong>in</strong>t to promot<strong>in</strong>g a general reform of theGerman immigration and foreigners legislation and <strong>in</strong>stalled an<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt commission on immigration (politicians, representatives ofimportant <strong>in</strong>stitutions such as churches, unions, <strong>in</strong>dustry associationsand experts) with the task of analys<strong>in</strong>g the current situation <strong>in</strong> the fieldof migration and <strong>in</strong>tegration of migrants. The commission was to<strong>de</strong>velop proposals for a general reform of the legal and <strong>in</strong>stitutionalframework. Un<strong>de</strong>r the presi<strong>de</strong>ncy of the former presi<strong>de</strong>nt of theparliament, Rita Süssmuth (CDU), the commission presented theirresults on 2001 July 4 <strong>in</strong> a comprehensive and well foun<strong>de</strong>d report(ZUWANDERUNGSKOMMISSION, 2001). In this report, the commissionconstituted a historic change <strong>in</strong> Germany’s policies toward immigrantsand foreign resi<strong>de</strong>nts, conclud<strong>in</strong>g that immigration has become anecessity for economic as well as <strong>de</strong>mographic reasons. For regulat<strong>in</strong>gmigration <strong>in</strong>flows, the commission recommen<strong>de</strong>d a po<strong>in</strong>ts systemsimilar to the Canadian mo<strong>de</strong>l, where po<strong>in</strong>ts are granted accord<strong>in</strong>g to


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 143migrants’ age, language skills, qualification and other criteria; furtherproposals were a reform of the asylum system and coord<strong>in</strong>ated<strong>in</strong>tegration measures for migrants.Shortly after the presentation of the commission’s report, theM<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interior Otto Schily presented a proposal for a newimmigration and foreigners legislation. This proposal followed <strong>in</strong> someareas the commission’s report and <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d a complete restructur<strong>in</strong>g ofthe foreigners’ law (only two resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit statuses <strong>in</strong>stead ofcurrently seven), but fell beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> several areas (especially <strong>in</strong> the fieldof asylum and the age limit for the immigration of children with<strong>in</strong> thefamily reunion scheme). By such concessions to the conservativeopposition, the government tried to ga<strong>in</strong> the necessary support <strong>in</strong> thesecond chamber of the Län<strong>de</strong>r which has to pass such legislation.Although a consi<strong>de</strong>rable part of the CDU opposition party was <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>edto support the compromise bill which was passed by parliament on 1March 2002, the conservative jo<strong>in</strong>t CDU/CSU opposition, ruled by theBavarian prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Stoiber (CSU), the candidate for chancellor <strong>in</strong>fe<strong>de</strong>ral elections of September 2002, <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to reject the law <strong>in</strong> theBun<strong>de</strong>srat. S<strong>in</strong>ce the vote of the Län<strong>de</strong>r governed by the oppositionand by coalition governments with CDU participation constituted halfof the votes, the fe<strong>de</strong>ral government lacked the required one tiebreak<strong>in</strong>gvote for pass<strong>in</strong>g and enact<strong>in</strong>g the bill. In a unique clash <strong>in</strong> theLän<strong>de</strong>r chamber after weeks of heated political <strong>de</strong>bate, the SPD PrimeM<strong>in</strong>ister of Bran<strong>de</strong>nburg (SPD/CDU coalition) broke the coalitionagreement by overrul<strong>in</strong>g the vote of his M<strong>in</strong>istry of Interior (CDU). Thisact raised hitherto unsolved constitutional questions about procedure.These questions had been summarised precisely by the GermanPresi<strong>de</strong>nt Johannes Rau <strong>in</strong> his official statement about his <strong>de</strong>cision to signthe law on 20 June 2002 (RAU, 2002). The opposition immediatelyannounced a constitutional plea at the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Constitutional Court, butdid not file a plea for immediate action, preferr<strong>in</strong>g to avoid the highrisk of a rejection dur<strong>in</strong>g the fe<strong>de</strong>ral election campaign. CandidateStoiber’s strategy has been to reserve the immigration issue as acampaign joker while primarily focus<strong>in</strong>g on the economic and labourmarket situation. Thus, the dispute on immigration played a m<strong>in</strong>or roledur<strong>in</strong>g the campaign until the last week before election day. In thepublic and the media nevertheless, rais<strong>in</strong>g this issue was primarilyconsi<strong>de</strong>red as a last m<strong>in</strong>ute attempt of campaign<strong>in</strong>g.After the narrow success of the govern<strong>in</strong>g Red/Green coalition, theimmigration act was scheduled to become law on 1 January 2003, butseveral Län<strong>de</strong>r governed by a CDU or CSU majority (Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Württemberg,Bayern, Hessen, Saarland, Sachsen and Thür<strong>in</strong>gen) filed a plea aga<strong>in</strong>st


144 WOLFGANG BOSSWICKthe law <strong>in</strong> the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Constitutional Court, which f<strong>in</strong>ally <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d toannul the immigration act due to formal faults <strong>in</strong> the vot<strong>in</strong>g procedureof the Bun<strong>de</strong>srat (<strong>de</strong>cision of 18 December 2002, Az. 2 BvF 1/02).The bill for an immigration act was <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d to replace theForeigners’ Law (Auslän<strong>de</strong>rgesetz) of 1991 which had very complicatedregulations by a new “law on stay, work and <strong>in</strong>tegration of foreigners”(Gesetz über <strong>de</strong>n Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integrationvon Auslän<strong>de</strong>rn im Bun<strong>de</strong>sgebiet). The law was to reduce the hithertoseven different stay and resi<strong>de</strong>nce permits to two permits, one fortemporary resi<strong>de</strong>nce and one for settlement. For the first time <strong>in</strong>Germany’s legislative history, regulations for immigration, labourmarket access, the stay of foreigners and the <strong>in</strong>tegration of resi<strong>de</strong>ntmigrants would have been comb<strong>in</strong>ed to an <strong>in</strong>tegrated legislativeconcept, differentiat<strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g to the purpose of resi<strong>de</strong>nce only. Thebill <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d a simplification of the hitherto parallel application processfor a resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit at the foreigners’ authorities and a work permit atthe labour authorities with its mutual <strong>in</strong>ter<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncies and bureaucraticoverhead by a s<strong>in</strong>gle procedure at the local foreigners’ authorities(“one stop government”). For highly qualified personnel and specialists,an immediate settlement permit was <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d, also cover<strong>in</strong>g corefamily members. Provisions were ma<strong>de</strong> for periods of labour marketshortages, <strong>in</strong> which labour immigration based on a comb<strong>in</strong>ed quotaand po<strong>in</strong>t system (comparable to the Canadian regulations) wasplanned. With regard to refugees, the bill no longer referred to theright to asylum which carries a long history of political controversies,but regulated resi<strong>de</strong>nce permits for political asylees as well as otherrefugees (Geneva Convention, <strong>de</strong>-facto refugees) un<strong>de</strong>r the commonhead<strong>in</strong>g “Humanitarian Reasons”, thus abolish<strong>in</strong>g the discrim<strong>in</strong>ationaga<strong>in</strong>st refugees who do not meet the narrow criteria for politicalasylum (BOSSWICK, 2000, p. 46). A completely new feature of the lawwas the <strong>in</strong>clusion of <strong>in</strong>tegration measures. For all newcomers, thefe<strong>de</strong>ral state was supposed to provi<strong>de</strong> basic language courses (300hours) and basic orientation courses (30 hours). Further <strong>in</strong>tegrationmeasures were up to the Län<strong>de</strong>r, be<strong>in</strong>g regulated by a national legalframe.Although the planned immigration act was <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d to streaml<strong>in</strong>ethe regulations for immigration and settlement, abolish<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> manyareas the restrictive regulations of the former legislation, it also had somevery restrictive elements. Not all had been <strong>in</strong>troduced by negotiationswith the conservative opposition dur<strong>in</strong>g 2001, such as the lower<strong>in</strong>g ofthe regular age limit for immigration of children un<strong>de</strong>r the familyreunification scheme from 16 to 12 years. The bill for the 2003 immi-


GERMANY - STILL A RELUCTANT COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION? 145gration act stated explicitly that its general aim is steer<strong>in</strong>g and limitationof immigration as well as the promotion of <strong>in</strong>tegration.ConclusionGermany —still a reluctant country of immigration? With regard tomany sectors of German society, this characterisation has ceased to fit.Most important collective actors of German society —the employers’associations, the unions, both large churches, the majority of thepolitical parties <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the liberals— supported the <strong>in</strong>itiative for areform of migration and <strong>in</strong>tegration policy by the proposed newimmigration act. Due to the tie <strong>in</strong> the second chamber, the conservativeopposition was able to block this <strong>in</strong>itiative. Nevertheless, <strong>in</strong> many areasconsi<strong>de</strong>rable progress had been ma<strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong> adapt<strong>in</strong>g the political, legaland adm<strong>in</strong>istrative structure to the fact of an immigration situation.The changes <strong>in</strong> citizenship law especially are highly relevant for thefuture <strong>in</strong>tegration of resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreign migrants.Even the conservative opposition subscribed to the necessity of<strong>de</strong>al<strong>in</strong>g with the consequences of immigration and supports the sett<strong>in</strong>gup of a coord<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong>tegration programme for migrants. This currentconsensus on the necessity of an <strong>in</strong>tegration policy, however, covers upa hitherto obscured conflict upon some core questions: Integration <strong>in</strong>towhat, and how? This relates to the self-image of German society andrelated conflicts with<strong>in</strong> the German political spectrum as well as to theresult<strong>in</strong>g conception of «<strong>in</strong>tegration».One can expect that with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an unification process which<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly shifts the <strong>de</strong>cisions on migration and <strong>in</strong>tegration policyfrom the national to the <strong>Europe</strong>an level (TOMEI, 2001), further majorchanges to German society and its relation to immigrant m<strong>in</strong>orities willtake place. This process carries serious risks. Of course, migrationprocesses raise practical problems such as the <strong>de</strong>mand for resourcesand socio-economic conflicts. Both were evi<strong>de</strong>nt dur<strong>in</strong>g the precarioussituation of German reunification and contributed to the escalation ofthe conflict. But also important is another aspect: The dispute with<strong>in</strong>German society on the question of asylum <strong>in</strong> the context of thereunification process can also be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as an <strong>in</strong>ternal conflict onthe self-un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g and self-i<strong>de</strong>ntification of German society.Migration processes always require a process of adjustment by thereceiv<strong>in</strong>g population and often a restructur<strong>in</strong>g of the consensus andthe self-un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g of the society. This process is not easy and isoften projected onto the migrants who are the strangers, the “other”,reflect<strong>in</strong>g conflict l<strong>in</strong>es with<strong>in</strong> the receiv<strong>in</strong>g society. <strong>Europe</strong>an societies


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Between guilt and gift: the politics of i<strong>de</strong>ntityand immigration policy <strong>in</strong> ItalyEnzo PaceIntroductionA recent survey, carried out by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Education, <strong>in</strong>to thepresence of foreign stu<strong>de</strong>nts <strong>in</strong> every type and level of school <strong>in</strong> Italyshows with what speed and <strong>in</strong>tensity Italian society is chang<strong>in</strong>g(MINISTERIO PUBBLICA ISTRUZIONE, 2002). In the school year 2000-2001, for every hundred stu<strong>de</strong>nts enrolled, two were foreign; ten yearsbefore, there were two for every thousand enrolled. It is not only thepercentage that has changed but also the cultural composition of theschool population. The new generation of foreigners has brought thenumber of different ethnic groups present up to 184. Alongsi<strong>de</strong> thema<strong>in</strong> ones, Albanians and Moroccans <strong>in</strong> first and second place, therehas been a marked <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the presence of pupils from Ch<strong>in</strong>a,Rumania, Serbia, Peru, Macedonia, the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es, Tunisia and India(see Table 1) <strong>in</strong> our schools. These constitute the first ten groups <strong>in</strong>or<strong>de</strong>r of magnitu<strong>de</strong>, but the list <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s pupils from a vast range oforig<strong>in</strong>s: S<strong>in</strong>halese, Sikh, Ghanaian, Egyptian, Somali, Senegalese,Nigerian, Kurdish, Lebanese, Colombian, Ecuadorian and so on (PACE,2002).These figures highlight what can be <strong>de</strong>scribed as the substantialavant-gar<strong>de</strong> of a new generation of Italians, composite and multiethnic.In such a short time, Italy, a relatively homogeneous society, has, so tospeak, changed complexion. The choice of metaphor is by no meanscasual. If you happen one day to visit a Catholic parish <strong>in</strong> the outskirtsof a megalopolis like Chicago, the white American parish priest willshow you how the <strong>de</strong>mographic composition of his community haschanged over the last twenty years: the white component is <strong>in</strong> sharp<strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>e, the black component is stationary, and the Lat<strong>in</strong> element is


150 ENZO PACETable 1Foreign stu<strong>de</strong>nts by type of school and country of orig<strong>in</strong>CountryPrimaryschoolSecondaryschoolTotalAlbania 15,984 9,064 25,050Morocco 14,993 8,659 23,652Ch<strong>in</strong>a 4,558 4,100 8,658Serbia-Montenegro 5,466 3,077 8,543Romania 3,891 2,213 6,104Peru 1,898 2,598 4,496The Philipp<strong>in</strong>es 2,704 1,152 3,856Macedonia 2,612 1,183 3,795Tunisia 2,326 682 3,008India 2,004 921 2,925Source: M<strong>in</strong>istero Pubblica Istruzione, 2002.strongly on the <strong>in</strong>crease. The latter is a recent arrival from the lessfortunate areas of the Lat<strong>in</strong>-American cont<strong>in</strong>ent, but it has only partiallyboosted the presence of Catholics at Sunday mass, s<strong>in</strong>ce many havebrought with them either the ancient Afro-American cults or the new,<strong>in</strong>numerable Pentecostal churches. A parish which changes complexionso quickly poses immediate and substantial pastoral problems: thelanguage, mentality, and lifestyles of the new arrivals are very differentfrom those of the longstand<strong>in</strong>g parishioners and the parish priest.We need not travel very far to have a concrete example of thephenomenon <strong>in</strong> question. Near at hand are the many global villages <strong>in</strong>the highly <strong>in</strong>dustrialised areas of the North East of Italy, typified byextremely specialised production, low technological content, and apowerful vocation for export. A visit to one of these would soonconv<strong>in</strong>ce us that the problems of our Chicago priest are basically the sameas that of a small municipality <strong>in</strong> the heart, for example, of the ski-bootmanufactur<strong>in</strong>g district. In the crèche attached to the parish, nowadaysmost of the children are Ghanaian; their families are usually Christian,but not Catholic (they belong to Protestant neo-Pentecostal churches,often with high ethnic homogeneity). So, what is to be done? Welcomethem or draw a <strong>de</strong>marcation l<strong>in</strong>e between those who are Catholic andthose of other religions? Would not a crèche closed to non-Catholicsconstitute, <strong>in</strong> the long term —also for practical reasons— an <strong>in</strong>tolerablesocial surplus for the spirit of Catholicism and for the small localcommunity called upon to receive the newcomers without conflict and


BETWEEN GUILT AND GIFT: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY... 151trauma? The data on foreign pupils <strong>in</strong> Italian schools, together with thetwo examples of the changes with<strong>in</strong> a parish (whether large or smallthe problems appear to be the same), will enable us to formulate thequestion we <strong>in</strong>tend to analyse. We may put it <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g terms:a) a society <strong>in</strong> which various different cultures coexist aga<strong>in</strong>st thebackground of a dom<strong>in</strong>ant culture, for example Catholicism <strong>in</strong>Italy, will sooner or later be called upon to rewrite the pact forsocial and political solidarity which should, <strong>in</strong> theory, b<strong>in</strong>d allwho form part of it;b) the rewrit<strong>in</strong>g of the pact for solidarity is necessary because thesimultaneous presence of people of different cultures may giverise to conflicts of values and political competition for therecognition of cultural differences;c) s<strong>in</strong>ce both these types of conflict <strong>de</strong>velop <strong>in</strong> the public sphere and<strong>in</strong>volve the ma<strong>in</strong> public <strong>in</strong>stitutions (such as schools, hospitals,prisons, job centres and tra<strong>de</strong>-union representation), the differenceis not hid<strong>de</strong>n, but emerges and is perceived by the culturallydom<strong>in</strong>ant majority, <strong>in</strong> the constituent stage of the multiculturalsociety, as someth<strong>in</strong>g extraneous;d) there are basically two methods of <strong>de</strong>al<strong>in</strong>g with culturalextraneity, if we turn to Todorov’s theorem (TODOROV, 1992):either as someth<strong>in</strong>g which may ultimately be assimilated, byproject<strong>in</strong>g onto the Other the values (so perceived) of themajority, s<strong>in</strong>ce the Other is imag<strong>in</strong>ed as be<strong>in</strong>g potentially thesame as me, or on the other hand, as someth<strong>in</strong>g which isradically different and therefore <strong>in</strong>compatible with my valuesystem, someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ferior and imperfect; luckily, between thedilemma of assimilat<strong>in</strong>g or recognis<strong>in</strong>g the difference, there are<strong>in</strong>termediate possibilities, but this does noth<strong>in</strong>g to remove thesocial actors’ difficulty <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g a po<strong>in</strong>t of balance to promotea new solidarity among foreigners (HABERMAS, 1997);e) solidarity among foreigners is what is at stake <strong>in</strong> both real andsymbolic terms, for so-called multicultural societies: it is a questionof gradually draw<strong>in</strong>g the social map of the conflict amongactors (social, political, religious, tra<strong>de</strong>-union and so forth) onthe public stage, compet<strong>in</strong>g not only for material advantage,but also and <strong>in</strong> particular for the right of recognition for culturaldifferences, with all the normative corollary which that entails;f) each recognition implies, on the one hand, the presentation andrepresentation of different world views, on the basis of whichvalue conflicts might (or might not) arise (on a cont<strong>in</strong>uum of


152 ENZO PACEmaximum to m<strong>in</strong>imum negotiability) and, on the other, the willto act to reach a possible agreement between socio-l<strong>in</strong>guisticevi<strong>de</strong>nce and different symbolic worlds («Should a trafficpoliceman giv<strong>in</strong>g a ticket be expected to take <strong>in</strong>to account thesocio-religious i<strong>de</strong>ntity of a young Sikh rid<strong>in</strong>g his motor bikewithout a crash-helmet, which he cannot wear for religiousreasons?»).In a society, such as that of Italy, which is becom<strong>in</strong>g multicultural,the fundamental sociological and political problem is the relationshipbetween the majority culture (sociological Catholicism) and the “newentry”. There is a grow<strong>in</strong>g perception <strong>in</strong> Italian society that a new pactfor social solidarity must be drawn up. This conviction is graduallytak<strong>in</strong>g root <strong>in</strong> the collective consciousness, with ramifications <strong>in</strong> allwalks of civil society (from bus<strong>in</strong>essmen to el<strong>de</strong>rly people <strong>in</strong> need ofdomestic assistance; from Catholic voluntary organisations to the majortra<strong>de</strong> unions). It also constitutes the mass of resistance to all thosepolitical and cultural ten<strong>de</strong>ncies which have no <strong>in</strong>tention of extend<strong>in</strong>gthe rights of citizenship to immigrants. The i<strong>de</strong>ological conflict whichhas <strong>de</strong>veloped <strong>in</strong> Italy over the last ten years on the issue of immigrationhas, however, brought to the fore the question of Italian i<strong>de</strong>ntity. Ananalysis of immigration policies reveals that we have passed from a giftpolicy, un<strong>de</strong>r the centre-left government, to a guilt policy un<strong>de</strong>r thecentre-right. In the first case, the reception of immigrants is seen as agenerous act of recognition of the Other as the hol<strong>de</strong>r of rights andbearer of legitimate cultural differences. In the second, it is viewed as alimited concession of rights to avoid jeopardis<strong>in</strong>g the Italian nationali<strong>de</strong>ntity, s<strong>in</strong>ce each concession is seen as a guilty yield<strong>in</strong>g of sovereignty“<strong>in</strong> one’s own home”. The presence of a substantial Muslim community <strong>in</strong>Italy (approximately 600,000 people) has become the centre of extremei<strong>de</strong>ological contrasts, especially s<strong>in</strong>ce the events of September 11. Infact, Islam provi<strong>de</strong>s a pretext for many political and social forces toprevent policies of <strong>in</strong>tegration and the protection of immigrants’ rightsand to keep immigrants <strong>in</strong> a condition of legal and social <strong>in</strong>feriority.<strong>Immigration</strong> policy <strong>in</strong> ItalyWhat are the features of the current policy on immigration <strong>in</strong> Italy?The pattern which emerges is that it is based, primarily, on the notionof the guest worker, though slightly different from the GermanGastarbeiter: a guest un<strong>de</strong>r observation, seen as a potential <strong>de</strong>viant,s<strong>in</strong>ce, if he should lose his job, his prospects are either to f<strong>in</strong>d another


BETWEEN GUILT AND GIFT: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY... 153with<strong>in</strong> six months or face repatriation. All the recent legislation onimmigration suffers from the security syndrome. The ma<strong>in</strong> problemseems to be to show that we are able to combat the phenomenon ofillegal entry, <strong>de</strong>liberately confus<strong>in</strong>g the issue of <strong>in</strong>tegration forimmigrants who have been part of Italian society for years and who, <strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t of fact, conduct themselves as citizens to all <strong>in</strong>tents and purposes,on the one hand, with that of the repression of clan<strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>e immigration.As has occurred <strong>in</strong> other countries <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union, the mostrecent election campaigns featured the theme of security and, with<strong>in</strong>that, the issue of illegal immigration <strong>in</strong> somewhat xenophobic tones (ifnot racist, <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> cases), accord<strong>in</strong>g to the various political lean<strong>in</strong>gs.Secondly, the Italian mo<strong>de</strong>l regulates access to citizenship accord<strong>in</strong>gto the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of jus sangu<strong>in</strong>is and not jus soli. Despite the reforms<strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> the early 1990s, there are severe restrictions on acquir<strong>in</strong>gcitizenship. This partially expla<strong>in</strong>s why a proposal to extend the right tovote at local adm<strong>in</strong>istrative elections to immigrants was convenientlyforgotten. Moreover, it expla<strong>in</strong>s certa<strong>in</strong> violations of religious freedomand the right to worship carried out by the centre-right mayors of manycities <strong>in</strong> Northern Italy, by stopp<strong>in</strong>g the open<strong>in</strong>g of mosques (on a varietyof bureaucratic pretexts), and even bann<strong>in</strong>g prayer meet<strong>in</strong>gs for the endof the month of Ramadan. In the prosperous city of Treviso, the NorthernLeague mayor refused worshippers the use of a hall to celebrate the endof Ramadan, so the chairman of Benetton (the cloth<strong>in</strong>g cha<strong>in</strong> based <strong>in</strong>Treviso) let them use the local sports stadium (his property) and the localCatholic clergy will<strong>in</strong>gly agreed (<strong>in</strong> open dispute with the mayor) to takepart <strong>in</strong> the ceremony and address a message of reconciliation.Thirdly, the Italian mo<strong>de</strong>l gives the State control of the flow andregulation of access to the labour market, <strong>in</strong> open contradiction to thecentre-right government’s <strong>de</strong>clared <strong>de</strong>votion to free market i<strong>de</strong>ology and<strong>de</strong>centralisation. In other words, central government sets itself the taskof lay<strong>in</strong>g down the annual entry quota and check<strong>in</strong>g for the presence ofirregular immigrants as well as forms of organised crime which exploitimmigrant labour illegally (such as prostitution and drug-traffick<strong>in</strong>g).However, this policy has by no means come up to expectations: illegalland<strong>in</strong>gs of immigrants cont<strong>in</strong>ue and are on the <strong>in</strong>crease; the governmenthas had to <strong>in</strong>troduce a mass regularisation of illegal workers of anunprece<strong>de</strong>nted 700,000 people; neither for 2001, nor 2002 was the<strong>in</strong>flux of immigrants fixed. Moreover, the fiscal crisis has pushed thegovernment <strong>in</strong>to mov<strong>in</strong>g the social costs for <strong>in</strong>tegration from the coffersof the State onto <strong>in</strong>dustry and private associations, such as voluntarygroups, cooperatives, tra<strong>de</strong> unions, and local churches, effectivelyshift<strong>in</strong>g onto them the bur<strong>de</strong>n of the right to shelter and education.


154 ENZO PACEThe social conflict map and its actorsOur <strong>de</strong>scription of the Italian immigration policy mo<strong>de</strong>l over the lastfew years shows the number and type of conflicts it has given rise to. Themovements of the social actors on the public stage reveal the different,chang<strong>in</strong>g stakes. We can trace the outl<strong>in</strong>e of a map, i<strong>de</strong>ntify<strong>in</strong>g the<strong>in</strong>terests and i<strong>de</strong>al perspectives which the actors, <strong>in</strong> their different ways,look to and <strong>de</strong>fend. In this way we can also dist<strong>in</strong>guish the rhetoricalrepertoires which show to what extent the immigration question istackled with reference to an Italian ethnic/national i<strong>de</strong>ntity. Below is abrief summary of the Italian situation with its complexity reduced as faras possible (see Figure 1 and Table 2).+ACCESSRecognition of citizens’rights and culturaldifferences on humanrights groundsEntrepreneurs →Part of the centre-rightwith Catholic <strong>in</strong>spiration↔Catholic Church (themajority of the hierarchyand clergy and voluntarygroups and associations)→Centre-left social andpolitical forces (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gtra<strong>de</strong> unions of workerswith Catholic or left-w<strong>in</strong>glean<strong>in</strong>gs →→ <strong>in</strong>dicates affirmative actionInterests and i<strong>de</strong>als at stakeIncreas<strong>in</strong>g manpower shortage/better <strong>in</strong>tegrated, thoughculturally different, workersDefence of the rule of lawaga<strong>in</strong>st illegal immigration,assertion of Italian ethnic andcultural i<strong>de</strong>ntity aga<strong>in</strong>st foreign<strong>in</strong>vasionAssertion of their role, on theone hand, as repository of thenational collective memoryand, on the other, as controllerof public ethics: welcom<strong>in</strong>gnewcomers but without cast<strong>in</strong>gdoubts on the Catholic i<strong>de</strong>ntityof Italians and <strong>de</strong>fend<strong>in</strong>g itwhenever it is attacked orthreatened (e.g. the issue ofcrucifixes <strong>in</strong> schools and publicoffices)Extension of citizens’ rights,seek<strong>in</strong>g to represent newsubjects (immigrants), seen asthe “new proletariat”–ACCESSLimited access to citizens’rights and limitedrecognition of culturaldifferences↔ Many vote centre-right← Social and politicalforces of the centre-right↔ Wi<strong>de</strong> variety ofsituations among localchurches: some ready towelcome newcomers,others more cautious oreven sceptical↔ In factories where thenew proletariat form themajority there is noshortage of conflicts↔ <strong>in</strong>dicates contradictionFigure 1Predom<strong>in</strong>ant poles <strong>in</strong> the social and political division on immigration


BETWEEN GUILT AND GIFT: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY... 155From the map, we observe that for some subjects the tension betweenimmigration policy and i<strong>de</strong>ntity policy is very low or even absent, whereasfor others it is much higher. In the follow<strong>in</strong>g table we summarise the<strong>de</strong>gree of social anxiety caused by the presence of the Other amongthe various components of Italian society.Table 2Degrees of social anxiety for one’s own national i<strong>de</strong>ntityImmigrants threaten theItalian national i<strong>de</strong>ntityExtreme right-w<strong>in</strong>g parties(Northern League andNeo-Fascists)Neo-<strong>in</strong>tegrist CatholicgroupsCerta<strong>in</strong> bishops of theCatholic hierarchyImmigrants may threatenthe cultural <strong>in</strong>tegrity ofthe Italian nationOfficialChurchCatholicSocial and politicalforces of the Centre(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those ofCatholic and post-Fascist lean<strong>in</strong>gs)Immigrants are aneconomic and culturalresource and do notthreaten the Italian i<strong>de</strong>ntityEmployers’ AssociationsSocial and politicalforces of the Centre-left(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>de</strong> unionsand Catholic voluntaryassociations)If we take a look at the surveys (FONDAZIONE NORDEST, 2001)which have been carried out repeatedly to monitor attitu<strong>de</strong>s towardimmigrants, statistics show a gradual shift over the last five years: fearand suspicion has been replaced among the majority by a ten<strong>de</strong>ncy tolive with the i<strong>de</strong>a that immigrants constitute a resource. Only a m<strong>in</strong>ority(approximately 30 %) are conv<strong>in</strong>ced that immigrants constitute a threatto i<strong>de</strong>ntity and the cause of evils such as unemployment and disruption<strong>in</strong> public or<strong>de</strong>r.ConclusionAga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Treviso, a city which is virtually a test<strong>in</strong>g ground for thecontradictions <strong>de</strong>scribed above, the Northern League mayor or<strong>de</strong>red anumber of slum dwell<strong>in</strong>gs to be knocked down <strong>in</strong> September 2002.They were council properties and had been occupied for years by 20 orso immigrant families, all of whom held valid stay permits and hadlegal employment contracts. F<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g themselves sud<strong>de</strong>nly on the streetwithout notice, these families took refuge <strong>in</strong> the cathedral portico. The


156 ENZO PACEBishop of Treviso took up their <strong>de</strong>fence, thus attract<strong>in</strong>g the mayor’swrath, and un<strong>de</strong>rtook to persua<strong>de</strong> a group of local bus<strong>in</strong>essmen toprovi<strong>de</strong> money and shelter to cope with the emergency. The bishop’smediation was successful, thanks to the social pressure of certa<strong>in</strong>movements of the civil society which moved to create a girdle ofsolidarity around the families. Faced with this unexpected turn ofevents, the mayor asked for the supreme authorities of the Church ofRome to <strong>in</strong>tervene to call its priests to or<strong>de</strong>r, whom he accused ofbe<strong>in</strong>g excessively <strong>in</strong>dulgent and yield<strong>in</strong>g to those not belong<strong>in</strong>g to the“race of the Piave” (i.e. local stock, the river Piave flows through theVeneto and has a special place <strong>in</strong> the historic memory of Italians, be<strong>in</strong>gthe site of the last battle aga<strong>in</strong>st the Austro-Hungarian Empire dur<strong>in</strong>gthe First World War; <strong>in</strong> the past, those who lived on the banks of thisriver felt proud to be the bearers of this patriotic memory).This episo<strong>de</strong>, which is typical of Italian prov<strong>in</strong>cialism and its unwill<strong>in</strong>gnessto accept changes, <strong>de</strong>serves little comment. It isnevertheless useful to illustrate the light and shadows of the Italiansituation. The shadows are clearly visible: the stigmatisation of theOther as a guest “<strong>in</strong> our house”, whom we tolerate temporarily producesfeel<strong>in</strong>gs and attitu<strong>de</strong>s of closure and xenophobia. As for the light: thecivil society, rather than political parties, seems to be a vital force(<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the economic world, voluntary organisations, as well as localchurches, not only the Catholic Church but also the Protestant m<strong>in</strong>ority,and the Jewish community which has on a number of occasions comeout aga<strong>in</strong>st the new law on immigration passed <strong>in</strong> 2002). This weld<strong>in</strong>gtogether of such different <strong>in</strong>terests and i<strong>de</strong>als is only possible at thislevel; politics is impaired by a logic based on i<strong>de</strong>ological <strong>de</strong>marcationand the pursuit of consensus. In truth, it is no longer enough to seekconsensus on the question of immigration. There is a ten<strong>de</strong>ncy, chiefly(but not only) among centre-right parties <strong>in</strong> many <strong>Europe</strong>an countries,to play to the anti-immigrant mood and fears which the majority ofcitizens are assumed to have. This leads them to make choices whichcurtail basic freedoms: for example, why should only immigrants bef<strong>in</strong>gerpr<strong>in</strong>ted? Why stop people from bury<strong>in</strong>g their <strong>de</strong>ad until theyhave a permanent stay permit? Why should a person be expelled fromthe country without a proper trial? Such restrictions may dignify anegative collective i<strong>de</strong>a by feed<strong>in</strong>g it with stereotypes and prejudice.There is always some political entrepreneur who tries to exploit it toga<strong>in</strong> political consensus.We can only place our hopes <strong>in</strong> the movements of the civil societyand groups which operate at the micro-social level (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> schoolsand at the work-place), to stem the sense of collective guilt which


BETWEEN GUILT AND GIFT: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY... 157seems to affect the m<strong>in</strong>ority of Italians worried about los<strong>in</strong>g theiri<strong>de</strong>ntity and about not do<strong>in</strong>g enough to oppose foreigners who comehere and take over streets, houses, schools and jobs. The feel<strong>in</strong>g ofguilt is difficult to remove because it <strong>in</strong>volves resentment: one’s owni<strong>de</strong>ntity becomes an object of contention (between me and the Other).The only th<strong>in</strong>g to do is to oppose this sense of gift —not i<strong>de</strong>ologically,but through the concrete experience of everyday life. This is whatMarcel Mauss (1950) has taught us to speak of <strong>in</strong> sociology: a giftcreates a tie, it expects someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> exchange. In political terms, itpresupposes the rewrit<strong>in</strong>g of the pact for social solidarity, someth<strong>in</strong>gwhich has to be done <strong>in</strong> the countries of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union, whichhave become multi-ethnic and muti-religious.ReferencesFONDAZIONE NORDEST (2001): Rapporto sulal situazione sociale ed economica <strong>de</strong>lNor<strong>de</strong>st, Venezia.HABERMAS, J. (1997): Solidarietà fra estranei, Milano, Guer<strong>in</strong>i & Associati.MAUSS, M. (1950) Teoria generale <strong>de</strong>lla magia e altri saggi, Tor<strong>in</strong>o, E<strong>in</strong>audi.MINISTERO DELLA PUBBLICA ISTRUZIONE (2002): Rapporto sulla presenza di stu<strong>de</strong>ntistranieri nelle scuole italiane, Roma.PACE, E. (2002): “Conflitti di valore e riconoscimento <strong>de</strong>lle differenze <strong>in</strong> unsistema educativo multiculturale”, <strong>in</strong> R. De Vita, F. Berti (a cura di),Dialogo senza paure, Milano, Angeli, pp. 60-71.TODOROV, T. (1992): La conquista <strong>de</strong>ll’America, Tor<strong>in</strong>o, E<strong>in</strong>audi.


Third country nationals and labour immigration<strong>in</strong> the NetherlandsJeroen DoomernikIntroductionThe Amsterdam Treaty, which came <strong>in</strong>to force <strong>in</strong> May 1999,potentially is to fundamentally change policy mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the field ofimmigration and asylum <strong>in</strong> all the member states of the <strong>Europe</strong>anUnion. As an important element of this Treaty, member states haveagreed on the establishment of an area of free movement for allpersons legally resi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> the EU (be they nationals of member statesor third country nationals) with<strong>in</strong> the bor<strong>de</strong>rs of the Union. In or<strong>de</strong>r tomake this possible, and also as a goal <strong>in</strong> its own right, it was furthermore<strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d that the Union should with<strong>in</strong> five years arrive at commonimmigration and asylum policies. In effect, by May 2004, all memberstates will have to surren<strong>de</strong>r a key element of their national sovereignty,i.e. the right to <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> whom they admit to their territory, to Brussels.As <strong>in</strong> most other countries, <strong>in</strong> the Netherlands this is consi<strong>de</strong>red to be asensitive issue. Nevertheless, the Dutch government, together with allother EU governments, has clearly committed itself to the implementationof this element of the Amsterdam Treaty as became clear at theTampere meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> late 1999. Furthermore, the <strong>Europe</strong>an Commissionwas requested to formulate an outl<strong>in</strong>e for such common policies. Theresponsible Commissioner, Antonio Vitor<strong>in</strong>o, <strong>in</strong> November 2000 publishedhis Communication from the Commission to the Council and the<strong>Europe</strong>an Parliament on a Common <strong>Immigration</strong> Policy (COM(2000)757 f<strong>in</strong>al). In the <strong>in</strong>troduction, on page three, the follow<strong>in</strong>g statementcan be found:On the one hand large numbers of third country nationals haveentered the Union <strong>in</strong> recent years and these migratory pressures are


160 JEROEN DOOMERNIKcont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g with an accompany<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> illegal immigration,smuggl<strong>in</strong>g and traffick<strong>in</strong>g. On the other hand, as a result of grow<strong>in</strong>gshortages of labour at both skilled and unskilled levels, a number ofMember States have already begun to actively recruit third countrynationals from outsi<strong>de</strong> the Union. In this situation a choice must bema<strong>de</strong> between ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the view that the Union can cont<strong>in</strong>ue toresist migratory pressures and accept<strong>in</strong>g that immigration willcont<strong>in</strong>ue and should be properly regulated, and work<strong>in</strong>g together totry to maximise its positive effects on the Union, for the migrantsthemselves and for the countries of orig<strong>in</strong>.In this Communication member states are urged to come up withmedium and long term analyses of their expected need for labourimmigration and to re-evaluate current immigration policies. As to theconcrete measures proposed, among these is the suggestion to<strong>in</strong>troduce visas for prospective labour immigrants as part of the commonimmigration policy. This would, <strong>in</strong> other words, be a supply driven<strong>in</strong>strument. To discuss these suggestions and <strong>in</strong>vestigate their relevanceand implications for the Dutch case an expert meet<strong>in</strong>g was called, with<strong>in</strong>put from employers and tra<strong>de</strong> unions, several m<strong>in</strong>istries (Employmentand Social Affairs, Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs), th<strong>in</strong>k tanks, andaca<strong>de</strong>mia. The f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs of this expert meet<strong>in</strong>g were to serve theCab<strong>in</strong>et <strong>in</strong> its response to the above-mentioned document.At more or less the same time, <strong>in</strong> Germany, a country that <strong>in</strong> manyrespects can be consi<strong>de</strong>red the Netherlands’ bigger brother, thegovernment of Chancellor Schrö<strong>de</strong>r has proposed to completely andfundamentally reth<strong>in</strong>k the country’s stance on immigration. While untilvery recently, Germany was officially not a country of immigration,these days it is agreed to be one, even by the CDU, the party whichlou<strong>de</strong>st proclaimed Deutschland ist ke<strong>in</strong> E<strong>in</strong>wan<strong>de</strong>rungsland. It rema<strong>in</strong>sto be seen whether this change <strong>in</strong> rhetoric will <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed mean completelydifferent types of immigration and immigration management or will boildown to the re-labell<strong>in</strong>g of exist<strong>in</strong>g migration flows. Yet, even wordshave consequences.The <strong>in</strong>timate relationship between the Netherlands and Germanyhas <strong>in</strong> the past always been very visible <strong>in</strong> the mak<strong>in</strong>g of immigrationpolicies. Few if any exceptions can be found to the rule that changes <strong>in</strong>admission policies (especially where they are aimed at restrict<strong>in</strong>g accessfor unsolicited immigrants) <strong>in</strong> Germany are copied <strong>in</strong> the Netherlandssome time later. It is therefore the more remarkable that when <strong>in</strong>October 2001 the Dutch Cab<strong>in</strong>et respon<strong>de</strong>d to Vitor<strong>in</strong>o’s communicationand ma<strong>de</strong> public the way it chooses to go regard<strong>in</strong>g (labour) immigrationthis turned out be: let’s keep th<strong>in</strong>gs as they are. Four key arguments


THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND LABOUR IMMIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 161were put forward. First of all, the Netherlands is not yet fac<strong>in</strong>g a<strong>de</strong>mographic need for (more) immigration. The Dutch population isrelatively young, compared to Germany and especially to the Southern<strong>Europe</strong>an states. Secondly, pension schemes <strong>in</strong> the Netherlands are, toa large extent, capital fun<strong>de</strong>d, mak<strong>in</strong>g the ratio between those ofwork<strong>in</strong>g age and those who are retired a much less crucial variable than itis <strong>in</strong> a country like Germany. Thirdly, where necessary labour immigrationis already possible. And lastly, the number of <strong>in</strong>active people of work<strong>in</strong>gage is consi<strong>de</strong>rable. Among them are approximately 800,000 personswho are not employed because of physical or mental disabilities butused to be employed at one stage or another and could, and <strong>in</strong> thegovernment’s view should, therefore be re<strong>in</strong>tegrated <strong>in</strong>to the labourmarket. Satisfy<strong>in</strong>g labour market needs through more immigration would,accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Dutch cab<strong>in</strong>et, permanently exclu<strong>de</strong> those people(among whom are many previous immigrants).The government is moreover of the op<strong>in</strong>ion that a visa systemaccommodat<strong>in</strong>g the supply si<strong>de</strong> on the migration market is not a verygood i<strong>de</strong>a as it fears an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> illegal resi<strong>de</strong>nts if those particularimmigrants fail to f<strong>in</strong>d employment. However, and <strong>in</strong> contrast toGerman and Austrian proposals, the government has ma<strong>de</strong> public thatit wants to immediately extend freedom of movement to citizens ofCentral <strong>Europe</strong>an states once these have become full EU members.Brief history of Dutch immigrationIt was suggested above that Dutch and German <strong>de</strong>velopments <strong>in</strong>the field of immigration policies and experience have often been similar(this was different when it came to <strong>in</strong>tegration policies, see DOOMERNIK,1998). From the early 1960s until the mid 1970s both countries recruitedguest workers around the Mediterranean; Germany first and foremost<strong>in</strong> Yugoslavia and Turkey, the Netherlands ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> Turkey and Morocco.Very dissimilar is the Dutch experience when it comes to the arrival of(post) colonial immigrants. Indonesian <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce brought numerouspeople to the Netherlands who were labelled repatriates (most of whomwhere born <strong>in</strong> Indonesia) and who had served the colonial adm<strong>in</strong>istration.Often these people were of mixed <strong>de</strong>scent. When Sur<strong>in</strong>am became<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> 1975 its citizens, until then Dutch nationals, were giventhe choice of becom<strong>in</strong>g Sur<strong>in</strong>amese nationals or rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Dutch.Many preferred the latter and moved to the Netherlands. Between 1975and 1980 Sur<strong>in</strong>amese nationals could still opt for Dutch citizenship. Dueto the fact that <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce turned out to be fraught with problems,


162 JEROEN DOOMERNIKanother <strong>in</strong>flux of Sur<strong>in</strong>amese immigrants took place shortly before1980. In effect, around a third of the Sur<strong>in</strong>amese population now lives<strong>in</strong> the Netherlands. Of the Dutch colonies today there is one left, ormore accurately, the Dutch k<strong>in</strong>gdom still conta<strong>in</strong>s the island of Arubaand the Dutch Antilleans. Its resi<strong>de</strong>nts are thus still Dutch nationals andcan freely move to and from the Netherlands.S<strong>in</strong>ce the second half of the 1980s the Netherlands and Germanyhave shared the same experience aga<strong>in</strong> as they have been confrontedwith large numbers of unsolicited immigrants claim<strong>in</strong>g asylum fromseem<strong>in</strong>gly random countries of orig<strong>in</strong>. Meanwhile, as is discussedbelow, former immigration still has its after-effects <strong>in</strong> the form of cha<strong>in</strong>migration of family members and spouses and of friends and acqua<strong>in</strong>tances(often with an irregular resi<strong>de</strong>nce position, see STARING, 2001).Unlike <strong>in</strong> Germany, immigrants these days are usually not referredto as aliens or Auslän<strong>de</strong>r but as allochthonous persons, mean<strong>in</strong>g foreignborn or the child of a foreign born person. The ma<strong>in</strong> reasons for notreferr<strong>in</strong>g to them as aliens is that this would unduly stress irrelevantdifferences and because they are encouraged to naturalise and thereforemany are <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed not aliens but Dutch nationals (or have always beenDutch nationals). Among those allochthonous persons certa<strong>in</strong> categoriesare p<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ted for special attention: Turks, Moroccans, Sur<strong>in</strong>amese,Antilleans and refugees. These are the target groups of Dutch <strong>in</strong>tegrationpolicies. The category “refugees” is of grow<strong>in</strong>g importance as can be<strong>de</strong>duced from a close look at table 1. Immigrants from such countriesas Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia are clearly on the <strong>in</strong>crease andthe second generations are still relatively small.Present Dutch immigration policiesIn 2000 132,000 people immigrated to the Netherlands, while80,000 moved elsewhere, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a net ga<strong>in</strong> of 52,000 persons.Broadly speak<strong>in</strong>g half of all annual immigrants who arrive <strong>in</strong> theNetherlands are either Dutch nationals or citizens of another EU memberstate, many of whom can be consi<strong>de</strong>red labour migrants. The other halfconsists of third country nationals. Aga<strong>in</strong> half of those or less (or no morethan one quarter of all immigrants) are asylum applicants. In recentyears about 40 % of asylum applicants have eventually been grantedsome type of resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit. Other third country nationals areadmitted <strong>in</strong>to the country for a number of other reasons (study, work,medical care, etc.) among which family reunification and education areprom<strong>in</strong>ent.


THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND LABOUR IMMIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 163Table 1Non-Western allochthonous population, all and (first generation) × 10001995 1999 2000 2001Afghanistan 3 (3) 16 (15) 21 (20) 26 (24)Ch<strong>in</strong>a 22 (15) 28 (19) 30 (20) 32 (22)Egypt 11 (8) 14 (9) 14 (9) 15 (9)Philipp<strong>in</strong>es 7 (5) 9 (6) 10 (6) 10 (7)Ghana 12 (9) 15 (10) 16 (11) 16 (11)Hong Kong 17 (10) 17 (10) 18 (10) 18 (10)India 9 (7) 11 (8) 12 (8) 12 (8)Iraq 8 (7) 30 (27) 33 (30) 38 (34)Iran 14 (12) 22 (19) 23 (20) 25 (21)Cape Ver<strong>de</strong> 16 (11) 18 (11) 18 (11) 19 (11)Morocco 219 (140) 252 (149) 262 (153) 273 (156)Dutch Antilleans and Aruba 86 (57) 99 (63) 107 (69) 117 (77)Pakistan 14 (9) 16 (10) 16 (10) 17 (11)Somalia 17 (15) 27 (21) 29 (21) 30 (22)Sur<strong>in</strong>am 276 (179) 297 (182) 303 (183) 309 (185)Turkey 264 (166) 300 (175) 309 (178) 320 (182)Vietnam 13 (9) 14 (10) 15 (10) 15 (11)South Africa 9 (5) 12 (6) 13 (7) 13 (7)Other 111 (78) 149 (102) 161 (110) 178 (122)Total 1,129 (744) 1,346 (854) 1,409 (886) 1,483 (929)Source: Centraal Bureau voor <strong>de</strong> Statistiek, 2001, p. 82 and 83.Labour immigrationAfter the end of the guest worker era <strong>in</strong> 1973, labour immigrationwas subjected to a restrictive regime. Until then, the Dutch governmentwas not overly concerned about immigrants who arrived illegally andonly applied for a resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit upon f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g employment. In fact,approximately half of all guest workers arrived spontaneously <strong>in</strong>steadof be<strong>in</strong>g recruited directly by employers (PENNINX et al., 1993).When the government <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d that, <strong>in</strong> view of the economicdownturn follow<strong>in</strong>g the first oil crisis, further labour immigration wasnot <strong>de</strong>sirable, it was more or less taken for granted that unemployedimmigrants would return to their countries of orig<strong>in</strong>, ma<strong>in</strong>ly to Turkeyand Morocco. Even though some did return, most <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to stay <strong>in</strong>the Netherlands and gradually started to br<strong>in</strong>g over their familymembers. This was the start of a long process of cha<strong>in</strong> migration thatby now has created ethnic communities broadly ten times as large as


164 JEROEN DOOMERNIKthe orig<strong>in</strong>al guest worker populations. Even though the governmentnever pursued policies that would seriously curb this type of secondaryimmigration, it is clear that implicitly it was not welcomed either. Thiswas especially due to questions as to what extent and how thesenewcomers could be <strong>in</strong>tegrated, for <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> the labour market. To thisvery day, but more markedly <strong>in</strong> the 1980s and 1990s, unemploymentlevels among former guest workers and their relatives have rema<strong>in</strong>edmuch higher then for the population at large (see DOOMERNIK, 1998for <strong>de</strong>tails). This unforeseen outcome of the guest worker era hascerta<strong>in</strong>ly contributed to the current restrictive policies when it comes tolabour immigration and tends to ta<strong>in</strong>t any discussion on possibleliberalisation of the current immigration regime.Labour immigration <strong>in</strong> the Netherlands is regulated through the WetArbeid Vreem<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>gen (WAV) (the Law on the Employment of Aliens).This law is entirely <strong>de</strong>mand driven and allows an employer to recruit thirdcountry nationals not already legally resi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> the country only when hecan <strong>de</strong>monstrate that he ma<strong>de</strong> every possible attempt, with<strong>in</strong> reason, torecruit a Dutch national, someone already legally resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theNetherlands (exclud<strong>in</strong>g those aliens without a work permit like asylumseekers or stu<strong>de</strong>nts) or a national of one of the other EU member states. Ifthis condition is met, the worker who is recruited will, as a rule, onlyreceive a temporary work and resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit (usually not exceed<strong>in</strong>g aone year period). Once the employment period is com<strong>in</strong>g to its end, thework permit may be exten<strong>de</strong>d provi<strong>de</strong>d the same conditions still prevail.After a three year period, a work permit is no longer required and theemployee may seek employment with another employer if he so <strong>de</strong>sires.Labour immigrants are exempted from the <strong>in</strong>tegration courses (seebelow) most other newcomers are obliged to participate <strong>in</strong>. Whereappropriate, they can be accompanied by their family members (spouseand m<strong>in</strong>or children).Table 2Granted work permits, 1997-20001997 1998 1999 2000Work permits granted 11,065 15,181 20,816 27,678Source: Twee<strong>de</strong> Kamer, verga<strong>de</strong>rjaar 2001-2002, 19637, nr. 616, p. 17.The numbers of people granted a work permit un<strong>de</strong>r the WAV has <strong>in</strong>recent years seen a gradual <strong>in</strong>crease and <strong>in</strong> the year 2000 stood at 28,000


THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND LABOUR IMMIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 165(see table 2). This figure should not be equated with numbers ofimmigrants. First of all, many permits were given to workers who enteredthe country to take seasonal employment <strong>in</strong> horticutlure and agriculture.These people do not qualify for registration <strong>in</strong> the municipal populationregistry and hence should not be consi<strong>de</strong>red to be immigrants. The sameapplies if a permit is granted to an artist who comes to perform <strong>in</strong> aDutch theatre or to someone who is to conduct an <strong>in</strong>ternship. Permitsgranted to workers already <strong>in</strong> the country and whose employment isexten<strong>de</strong>d are also counted. Asylum seekers and immigrants withtemporary leave to rema<strong>in</strong> (a category no longer <strong>in</strong> existence s<strong>in</strong>ce a newaliens law was <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong> April 2001) can temporarily be employed (forasylum seekers a maximum of twelve weeks annually) but require a workpermit. No good statistics are available but it seems reasonable to assumethat <strong>in</strong> the end approximately 8.000 people who were granted a workpermit dur<strong>in</strong>g 2000 can be consi<strong>de</strong>red to be immigrants (officially: whenthe <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d duration of stay exceeds four months of the first half yearupon arrival (NICOLAAS/SPRANGERS, 2000 p. 10)). Sixty% of all permitshave a duration of less than one year and just over 20 % are immediatelygranted for three years, the maximum duration possible un<strong>de</strong>r the WAV(Twee<strong>de</strong> Kamer, verga<strong>de</strong>rjaar 2001-2002, 19637, nr.616, p.17).Among third country nationals who immigrate to the Netherlands tofill vacancies <strong>in</strong> the labour market, employees of multi-national companiesare an important category. As a rule these are people who are regularlyrelocated to different offices around the world as part of their career.Of the approximately 6,500 WAV related immigrants from outsi<strong>de</strong> theEU <strong>in</strong> 1998, over 1,000 were US citizens and almost 500 were Japanese(ibid.). Who the other 5,000 immigrants were and where they camefrom is not easy to f<strong>in</strong>d out but they will have <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d IT workers(NICOLAAS/SPRANGERS, 2001) and others with very specialisedprofessions like imams to serve the Muslim communities, soccer players,and chefs for exotic restaurants.In the years 2000 and 2001 the WAV was also used to alleviateshortages <strong>in</strong> the medical sector, especially of qualified nurses. Severalhundreds were reportedly imported from the Republic of South Africaand Sur<strong>in</strong>ame. In these countries Dutch, or very similarly Afrikaans, isthe l<strong>in</strong>gua franca, which is an obvious advantage <strong>in</strong> this type of job. Yet,<strong>in</strong> public discussions the recruitment of nurses from these countries isgenerally <strong>de</strong>picted as be<strong>in</strong>g fraught with problems. For one, the styleof work these nurses were used to differs consi<strong>de</strong>rably from theNetherlands, especially with regard to South Africa, <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>al<strong>in</strong>g withpatients and colleagues alike. Furthermore, many consi<strong>de</strong>r it unethicalto recruit nurses from countries where medical staff and care are already


166 JEROEN DOOMERNIKscarce. It seems unlikely, therefore, that this type of labour recruitmentis go<strong>in</strong>g to be cont<strong>in</strong>ued to any extent.Integration coursesPolicy makers elsewhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>, for <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> Germany andAustria, show consi<strong>de</strong>rable <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the Dutch Wet Inburger<strong>in</strong>gNieuwkomers (WIN) (Law on the Integration of Newcomers). This law,which came <strong>in</strong>to force <strong>in</strong> September 1998, makes it compulsory fornewcomers to meet m<strong>in</strong>imum standards <strong>in</strong> terms of language skills andgeneral knowledge of Dutch society and culture. Upon admission tothe Netherlands, an <strong>in</strong>terview is held with the aim of assess<strong>in</strong>g whetherthe immigrant already meets those standards and can be exemptedfrom the WIN or, if not, precisely what type of course should be offered.Once this is established, a contract is drawn up <strong>in</strong> which both parties (theeducational <strong>in</strong>stitution which provi<strong>de</strong>s the courses and the immigrant)commit themselves to the completion of the course. If the immigrantfails to comply sanctions may be imposed (adm<strong>in</strong>istrative f<strong>in</strong>es) and,furthermore, the same rules apply as those which govern schoolattendance for children of school age. Typically the key element of an<strong>in</strong>tegration course consists of 600 hours of language tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.It is <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note that the WIN is only applicable to immigrantswho have been admitted upon an asylum request and those arriv<strong>in</strong>gfor family reunification and marriage. EU citizens and labour migrantswho enter the country un<strong>de</strong>r the provisions of the WAV are exclu<strong>de</strong>d.In contrast, the discussions <strong>in</strong> other countries, where similar policies areun<strong>de</strong>r consi<strong>de</strong>ration, tend towards <strong>in</strong>tegration courses for labourimmigrants and not for immigrants who are admitted on humanitariangrounds. In the Netherlands, the i<strong>de</strong>a has been that if an immigrant isallowed <strong>in</strong>to the country because of his particular skills, <strong>in</strong>tegration —atany rate <strong>in</strong> the labour market— is guaranteed. Furthermore, the WAVis geared towards a stay that is of a temporary nature.It is somewhat of a paradox to note that many, although it is unknownhow many precisely, immigrants do not complete their course becausethey are lured <strong>in</strong>to the labour market. The present labour shortage, <strong>in</strong>comb<strong>in</strong>ation with the un<strong>de</strong>rstandable <strong>de</strong>sire among immigrants toearn their own liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stead of <strong>de</strong>pend<strong>in</strong>g on social security benefits,is the ma<strong>in</strong> reason for this un<strong>de</strong>rm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the WIN. The sanctions thatthe authorities have at their disposal are too weak to counter this<strong>de</strong>velopment: the adm<strong>in</strong>istrative f<strong>in</strong>es are <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed as a small%age ofstandard social security benefits. Once <strong>in</strong> employment these f<strong>in</strong>es hardlycause any pa<strong>in</strong>. Moreover, local governments, who are responsible for


THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND LABOUR IMMIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 167the implementation of the WIN, do not seem to prioritise the impositionof sanctions. It rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen whether those immigrants who donot complete their course will not be among the first to be ma<strong>de</strong>redundant once an economic downturn sets <strong>in</strong>.Asylum immigrationAlthough immigrants who apply for asylum are not <strong>in</strong> any wayscreened for their skills and only for their humanitarian needs, oncethey are admitted <strong>in</strong>to the country and have been granted a resi<strong>de</strong>ncepermit, at a certa<strong>in</strong> stage they are likely to participate <strong>in</strong> the labourmarket. The annual <strong>in</strong>flow of asylum seekers varies due to the extentto which wars and persecution uproot people, the ability of those peopleto seek refuge <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> <strong>in</strong> general and the Netherlands <strong>in</strong> particular, andas a result of policy responses <strong>in</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g countries. Nevertheless,the number of asylum seekers arriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Netherlands has dur<strong>in</strong>g thepast few years shown some stability and fluctuates between 35,000and 45,000 persons (table 3).Table 3Number of asylum applications <strong>in</strong> the Netherlands, 1997-20001997 1998 1999 2000Total 34,443 45,217 39,299 43,895Afghanistan 5,920 7,118 4,400 5,055Yugoslavia 1,652 4,289 3,692 3,851Iraq 9,641 8,300 3,703 2,773Iran 1,253 1,679 1,527 2,543Turkey 1,153 1,222 1,490 2,277Source: Twee<strong>de</strong> Kamer, verga<strong>de</strong>rjaar 2001-2002, 19637, nr. 616, p. 21.If we use past admission rates, this <strong>in</strong>flow annually adds approximately15,000 to 16,000 immigrants to the legally resid<strong>in</strong>g population (andaccounts for 0.01 % <strong>in</strong> population growth).In the past, many asylum seekers were given a temporary protectionstatus, <strong>in</strong>stead of be<strong>in</strong>g recognised as a refugee. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the first twoyears this kept them from the labour market, unless they successfullyapplied for a work permit un<strong>de</strong>r the WAV. The Aliens Law that came<strong>in</strong>to force <strong>in</strong> April 2001 no longer provi<strong>de</strong>s for this category of immigrantsto exist. Anyone admitted as an asylum seeker, un<strong>de</strong>r the new regime,


168 JEROEN DOOMERNIKis granted all the rights previously reserved for recognised refugees.This <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s the right to work.The rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g asylum seekers, i.e. those who are not admitted, are, asa rule, not forcibly removed. Un<strong>de</strong>r the new Aliens Law rejected asylumseekers are granted a 28 day period <strong>in</strong> which to voluntarily leave thecountry. After these four weeks, all rights are retracted (where applicablethe rental agreement is term<strong>in</strong>ated, otherwise eviction from the hosteltakes place, social security and other benefits are no longer available etc.)and the police will establish whether the person <strong>in</strong> question still resi<strong>de</strong>s atthe last known address. If the answer is negative, the conclusion is that theformer asylum seeker has left the country —at any rate adm<strong>in</strong>istratively.Currently about 85,000 asylum seekers are still await<strong>in</strong>g the outcomeof their application. As a consequence it can be expected that with<strong>in</strong> theforeseeable future a large number of aliens are to be adm<strong>in</strong>istrativelyremoved.Family formation and reunionImmigrants who arrive <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to reunite with their family membersor to settle with a (marriage) partner are numerous (see table 4) and,like asylum immigrants, also have labour market implications. Not all ofthose will become active on the labour market (among former guestworker populations labour market participation among women is stilllower than the national Dutch average) and some are still of school go<strong>in</strong>gage, but many will want to be <strong>in</strong> employment. Follow<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>tegrationcourse should enable those immigrants to become <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt.Table 4Migration motives of third country nationals, 1998Asylum Secondary Labourmigration migration migrationStudy Other TotalNon-EU 17,300 32,000 6,600 4,300 3,200 63,600Turkey 300 4,400 300 100 100 5,100Morocco 300 4,400 200 300 100 5,300Sur<strong>in</strong>am 100 2,700 100 100 100 3,200Afghanistan 3,300 600 0 0 0 3,900Iraq 5,700 1,600 0 0 0 7,400USA 0 1,500 1,100 200 300 3,100Former SU 700 1,200 300 300 100 2,600Others 6,800 15,600 4,600 3,300 2,500 32,800Source: Twee<strong>de</strong> Kamer, verga<strong>de</strong>rjaar 2001-2002, 19637, nr. 616, p. 6.


THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND LABOUR IMMIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 169In the Dutch labour market statistics it is not possible to discern theformal motive un<strong>de</strong>r which an immigrant is admitted. We can merelyestablish that immigrants who, <strong>in</strong> all likelihood, were admitted assecondary immigrants (family formation and reunion) are a) less likelyto be <strong>in</strong> the active labour force, and b) if they are, are more likely to beunemployed. Among the explanations for this phenomenon, the mostprom<strong>in</strong>ent is a mismatch between labour supply and current labour marketneeds. As a rule these immigrants lack the qualifications nee<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> apredom<strong>in</strong>antly service based economy (DOOMERNIK/ PENNINX, 1999).The net participation rate (<strong>in</strong> 1998) among Turks and Moroccansstands at 47 % and 44 % respectively, where for the native populationthe rate is 69 %. For the ol<strong>de</strong>r cohorts the discrepancy is even moremarked. Of people <strong>in</strong> the age bracket 55-64 the figures are 6, 16 and27 respectively (MARTENS, 1999, p. 45). The unemployment levels forTurks and Moroccans <strong>in</strong> 1998 stood at 17.5 and 19.5 whereas for thenative population it was a mere 3.6 % (p. 47). Meanwhile the <strong>de</strong>mandfor labour has further <strong>in</strong>creased and the unemployment levels amongformer guest workers and their <strong>de</strong>pendants have dropped further butrema<strong>in</strong> approximately four times as highUndocumented workersImmigrants who work illegally are ma<strong>in</strong>ly found <strong>in</strong> those sectors of theeconomy known for their high level of <strong>in</strong>formality: the cater<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dustry,the clean<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess and horticulture. Virtually noth<strong>in</strong>g is known aboutthe numbers of people who are irregularly employed on the Dutch labourmarket. Only <strong>in</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>ntally police raids on a particular company or areaprovi<strong>de</strong> some <strong>in</strong>sight. In early October 2001, for <strong>in</strong>stance, a tomato farmwas rai<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the Westland (an area with <strong>de</strong>nse horticulture near theHague). Among the 170 workers present, 110 turned out to be irregularlyemployed. This amounts to 65 % of this firm’s labour force.Recently, the market for employment agencies has been completelyliberalised, which fact has caused a mushroom<strong>in</strong>g of such agencies <strong>in</strong>the larger cities. It is generally assumed that many of these act asbrokers between illegal immigrants and employers. In other words, it issafe to assume that the Dutch labour market has a consi<strong>de</strong>rable, yetunquantifiable, need for unskilled, flexible and cheap work.Not only is the <strong>de</strong>mand for irregular labour given, the supply ispresent too. Aga<strong>in</strong> no reliable data are available but the estimates thathave been ma<strong>de</strong> suggest that the number of immigrants who rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>the country without a resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit is also consi<strong>de</strong>rable. ENGBERSEN/VAN DER LEUN (2001, p. 82) refer to research done dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1990s <strong>in</strong>


170 JEROEN DOOMERNIKthe four largest cities (Amsterdam, the Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht),which gave reason to suspect that, on top of the legally resid<strong>in</strong>g membersof the traditional immigrant communities (Turks, Moroccans and Sur<strong>in</strong>amese)another 7 % are illegal resi<strong>de</strong>nts. This would roughly be equivalentto 63,000 people. As we saw <strong>in</strong> table 1, the total number of non-Westernimmigrants and their <strong>de</strong>scendants stands at almost 1.5 million. Sevenpercent on top of that would mean a total of 105,000 persons. Inaddition, it can be safely assumed that a certa<strong>in</strong> percentage of theadm<strong>in</strong>istratively removed former asylum seekers mentioned earlier rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong> the country. It is not known how many asylum seekers have nee<strong>de</strong>d theassistance of a smuggler on their way to the Netherlands but theimmigration authorities estimate their number to be high (70 % issometimes quoted). Nor is it known how much these migrants havenee<strong>de</strong>d to pay for these services. In spite of these uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties it seemssafe to assume that many former asylum seekers will have <strong>in</strong>vested theirown money (or that of relatives and friends) and are unlikely to returnbefore those <strong>in</strong>vestments have been earned back. Among them especiallythose who cannot fall back on the assistance of a large community oflegally resid<strong>in</strong>g co-ethnics, are forced to accept any employment offerma<strong>de</strong> if they are not to resort to crime. This assumption is supported byENGBERSEN et al. (2002) who currently estimate the number ofundocumented immigrants to lie between 112,000 and 163,000 persons,some of whom <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed have to resort to “survival crime”.At times it has been suggested to generously regularise illegalimmigrants. Although this has been ma<strong>de</strong> possible for a very selectnumber (those who could prove a long history of legal employmentbut without possess<strong>in</strong>g a resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit) the government fears thearrival of more illegal migrants (hop<strong>in</strong>g for another pardon <strong>in</strong> the nearor distant future) if it <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to do so.ConclusionWe have seen that the <strong>in</strong>ternational context, <strong>in</strong> which Dutch policymak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the field of immigration is tak<strong>in</strong>g place, has drastically changeddur<strong>in</strong>g the past year or so. The <strong>Europe</strong>an Commission has formulated along-term vision of the future of labour immigration <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>anUnion, which dismisses fundamentally restrictive policies as a suitableanswer to future <strong>de</strong>mographic and economic <strong>de</strong>velopments. Also <strong>in</strong>Germany, the Dutch neighbour and a close relative, w<strong>in</strong>ds are com<strong>in</strong>gfrom an entirely new direction. What both the Commission’s and theGerman government’s reason<strong>in</strong>g have <strong>in</strong> common is that labour immi-


THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AND LABOUR IMMIGRATION IN THE NETHERLANDS 171gration policies should not only address the <strong>de</strong>mand si<strong>de</strong> but shouldalso <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> the supply si<strong>de</strong>, for <strong>in</strong>stance by means of quota systems(possibly <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a po<strong>in</strong>t system like the Canadians use). To theprevious, and present Dutch governments (which should leave officesometime this year) such an adjustment towards the <strong>in</strong>corporation ofsupply driven immigration, other than via the asylum channel, is clearlya bridge too far. Whether its successor will still be able and/or will<strong>in</strong>g toma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the status quo is, obviously, an open question. Yet, it is hardto envisage common EU policies <strong>in</strong> the field of immigration andasylum, to which the Dutch government unequivocally has committeditself, on the same basis as currently un<strong>de</strong>rp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g Dutch policies. It willtherefore be <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to see how the government which comes <strong>in</strong>tooffice after the next elections is go<strong>in</strong>g to tackle this issue.ReferencesCENTRAAL BUREAU VOOR DE STATISTIEK (2001): Allochtonen <strong>in</strong> Ne<strong>de</strong>rland 2001Voorburg/Heerlen: CBS.DOOMERNIK, J.; PENNINX, R. (1999): “Economische groei, werkgelegenheid enimmigranten: veran<strong>de</strong>ren<strong>de</strong> verhoud<strong>in</strong>gen?” <strong>in</strong>: J. Godschalk (ed.) Die Tijdkomt nooit meer terug. De arbeidsmarkt aan het e<strong>in</strong>d van <strong>de</strong> eeuw.Amsterdam: Het Sp<strong>in</strong>huis, pp.115-132.DOOMERNIK, J. (1998): The effectiveness of <strong>in</strong>tegration policies towardsimmigrants and their <strong>de</strong>scendants <strong>in</strong> France, Germany and The Netherlands.Geneva: International Labour Office.ENGBERSEN, G.; VAN DER LEUN, J. (2001): “Uitsluit<strong>in</strong>g van illegale migranten;risico’s van het restrictieve vreem<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>genbeleid” <strong>in</strong>: JustitiëleVerkenn<strong>in</strong>gen 27 (8), pp.80-90.ENGBERSEN, G.; STARING, R.; VAN DER LEUN, J.; DE BOOM, J.; VAN DER HEIJDEN, P.;CRUIJFF, M. (2002): Illegale vreem<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>gen <strong>in</strong> Ne<strong>de</strong>rland. Omvang,overkomst, verblijf en uitzett<strong>in</strong>g Rotterdam: RISBO.MARTENS, E.P. (1999): M<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>rhe<strong>de</strong>n <strong>in</strong> beeld. SPVA-98 Rotterdam: Instituutvoor Sociaal Economisch On<strong>de</strong>rzoek.NICOLAAS, H.; SPRANGERS, A. H. (2000): “De nieuwe gastarbei<strong>de</strong>r: manager uit<strong>de</strong> VS of <strong>in</strong>formaticus uit India” <strong>in</strong>: Maandstatistiek van <strong>de</strong> bevolk<strong>in</strong>g nr.9,pp.9-12.NICOLAAS, H.; SPRANGERS, A. H. (2001): “Waarom komen immigranten naarNe<strong>de</strong>rland?” <strong>in</strong>: Maandstatistiek van <strong>de</strong> bevolk<strong>in</strong>g nr.1, pp.4-7.PENNINX, R.; SCHOORL, J.; VAN PRAAG, C. (1994): The impact of <strong>in</strong>ternationalmigration on receiv<strong>in</strong>g countries: the case of the Netherlands The Hague:NiDi.STARING, R. (2001): Reizen on<strong>de</strong>r Regie. Het migratieproces van illegale Turken<strong>in</strong> Ne<strong>de</strong>rland Amsterdam: Het Sp<strong>in</strong>huis.


Spanish immigration policies:a critical approach from a human rights perspectiveEduardo J. Ruiz VieytezIntroductionThis paper aims to present a critical analysis of immigration policies<strong>in</strong> the Spanish State. The target of this critique is, fundamentally, thework of the state’s central <strong>in</strong>stitutions, but also the role played <strong>in</strong> thisfield by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).With this aim, the presentation consists of four fundamental parts.In the first part, some basic <strong>in</strong>formation on the reality of immigration <strong>in</strong>Spa<strong>in</strong> is presented. Secondly we approach the critical analysis of<strong>in</strong>stitutional policy on immigration, dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g four types of policy:normative, organisational, social and cultural. In the third section, wereflect on the responses of society, particularly the actions of NGOs.F<strong>in</strong>ally, by way of conclusion, we will sketch a panorama of what, <strong>in</strong>our op<strong>in</strong>ion, are the most relevant challenges <strong>in</strong> this area, and thestrategies with which we should face them.<strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong><strong>Immigration</strong> from the countries of the South constitutes a recentphenomenon for Spa<strong>in</strong>. Until the 1980s, Spa<strong>in</strong> was traditionally consi<strong>de</strong>redto be an emigrant country. Even today, there are approximatelytwice as many Spanish resi<strong>de</strong>nt abroad as foreigners resi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>.The total number of foreigners resi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> Spanish territory is roughlyone and a half million, out of a total population of approximately 40million. The proportion of resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreigners who are <strong>Europe</strong>an citizenshas been fall<strong>in</strong>g significantly dur<strong>in</strong>g recent years, and they now formabout a quarter of the total.


174 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZThis means above all that the Spanish State still has an extremelylow proportion of foreign resi<strong>de</strong>nts <strong>in</strong> relation to its native population,compared with the proportions <strong>in</strong> the countries of central and northern<strong>Europe</strong>, which have two, three or four times the percentage of foreigners.However it is also true that, though immigration is still a relativelym<strong>in</strong>or phenomenon <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> the last two <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s it has appearedas a new and unfamiliar process for Spanish society. At the same time,it is a process subject to significant acceleration. The total number offoreigners is small, but even so, the population of foreigners legallyresi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1998 was ten times greater than <strong>in</strong> 1962 and twicethat of 1992. At the same time, a qualitative change <strong>in</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong> ofmigrants is evi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> recent years. From 1998 to 2002 the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong>immigration from Africa and, especially, Lat<strong>in</strong> America has been a verylarge proportion of the whole. Fifty years ago eight of every 10 resi<strong>de</strong>ntforeigners <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> were from <strong>de</strong>veloped (First World) countries,whereas at present they are at most three out of 10. All this has begunto <strong>in</strong>fluence the collective psychology of a society which has movedfrom be<strong>in</strong>g very homogeneous to experienc<strong>in</strong>g plurality <strong>in</strong> a relativelybrief space of time.The location of non-<strong>Europe</strong>an immigrants with<strong>in</strong> the territory of theSpanish State is very unbalanced. In effect, from the geographical po<strong>in</strong>tof view, there is a clear trend towards the concentration of immigrantsaround Madrid and along the whole Mediterranean coast, fromCatalonia to Andalusia. With less <strong>in</strong>tensity, the Canary Islands and theEbro Valley are also zones of attraction and concentration for non-EUimmigrants. As regards the Basque Country, it has not <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple beenan area of preference for socioeconomic reasons, but there has been asignificant <strong>in</strong>crease especially <strong>in</strong> the large cities and along the Ebro.As regards the nationality of immigrants to Spa<strong>in</strong>, far <strong>in</strong> the lead arethe Moroccans, who comprise 40 % of non-EU foreigners. Further back,but still worthy of note, are immigrants from Ch<strong>in</strong>a and the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es,together with certa<strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> American countries, pr<strong>in</strong>cipally Peru,Ecuador, the Dom<strong>in</strong>ican Republic, Argent<strong>in</strong>a, Colombia and Cuba.As regards gen<strong>de</strong>r, accord<strong>in</strong>g to official sources, the ratio betweenmen and women among legally resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreigners is becom<strong>in</strong>g morebalanced, compared with the past. There is still a notable disproportionbetween the sexes, however, with respect to work permits and SocialSecurity cards, which <strong>in</strong>dicate lower participation by immigrant women<strong>in</strong> the labour market, at least formally. With<strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> national groups,such as from the Dom<strong>in</strong>ican Republic, Equatorial Gu<strong>in</strong>ea, the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es,Colombia and Peru, however, women have more work permits thatmen. There is also a significant number of foreign m<strong>in</strong>ors <strong>in</strong> Spanish


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 175territory, of which approximately 40 % are of Maghreb orig<strong>in</strong>. With<strong>in</strong>this group, there are an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of unaccompanied m<strong>in</strong>orswho live un<strong>de</strong>r the actual or theoretical protection of Spanish<strong>in</strong>stitutions. As regards recognised political refugees, this group is verysmall <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>. Half of asylum-seekers come from African countries,although applications for asylum dim<strong>in</strong>ished drastically with the entry<strong>in</strong>to force of the Law of Asylum of 1994. On the other hand there arean <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g number of foreigners <strong>de</strong>prived of freedom <strong>in</strong> Spanishjails, who at the moment constitute roughly a quarter of the totalprison population. As regards the number of irregular immigrants, thelatest regularisation procedures have shown that there was a largernumber than <strong>in</strong>itially estimated. In any case, estimates of the size ofthis group are very approximate and subject to cont<strong>in</strong>uous variationsover time, but we can say that at all times there has been a percentageof irregular immigrants at least equal to 15 % or 20 % of the totalforeign resi<strong>de</strong>nt populationIt is also worth po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g out as <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>de</strong>scriptive <strong>in</strong>formation thatmost immigrants arrive <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> by air or, fail<strong>in</strong>g that, land. The numberarriv<strong>in</strong>g by irregular, seaborne routes is only a very small percentage ofthe total. From the legal po<strong>in</strong>t of view, probably the most habitualmo<strong>de</strong> of access is with transit documentation (tourist visa) and, therefore,legally. Possibly this reality does not co<strong>in</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> with the average citizen’simage of immigration, distorted by the mass media, which might leadone to th<strong>in</strong>k that the majority of immigrants arrive <strong>in</strong> open boats acrossthe Straits of Gibraltar.F<strong>in</strong>ally, it should be emphasised when we talk about the reality ofimmigration <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>, that the presence of foreign workers is economicallyvery profitable for Spanish society. More than 800,000 foreigners makecontributions to the Spanish Social Security system, while only a verysmall number receive unemployment benefit. On the other hand, <strong>in</strong>certa<strong>in</strong> areas of work, pr<strong>in</strong>cipally those related ones to the primarysector and domestic work, the numbers of work permits granted<strong>de</strong>monstrates the need for foreign workers to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the respectiveeconomic activities.Critique of public immigration policiesNormative policy: the law of immigrationThe normative policy carried out <strong>in</strong> relation to immigration iscon<strong>de</strong>nsed <strong>in</strong> the so-called Law of Foreigners or of <strong>Immigration</strong> (Derecho<strong>de</strong> Extranjería). By virtue of its content and the procedures followed <strong>in</strong> its


176 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZpreparation, the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> can serve as a summary of the wholeof public policy relat<strong>in</strong>g to immigration. As <strong>in</strong> other sectors of the law, theLaw of <strong>Immigration</strong> simply reflects <strong>in</strong> legal language the political <strong>de</strong>cisionstaken <strong>in</strong> the area and converts them <strong>in</strong>to coercive rules. In this way, theLaw reflects a certa<strong>in</strong> conception of foreigners, the public response tothem and a certa<strong>in</strong> i<strong>de</strong>a (or lack of i<strong>de</strong>a) of the future <strong>de</strong>sign of society.In l<strong>in</strong>e with the novelty of immigration <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>, the Spanish Law of<strong>Immigration</strong> is also a new law. It should be ma<strong>de</strong> clear that by the Lawof <strong>Immigration</strong> we un<strong>de</strong>rstand a set of rules that is coherent and displaysa systematic pattern. In this respect, the Spanish Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> hasits orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the mid-1980s. From that po<strong>in</strong>t, <strong>in</strong> our op<strong>in</strong>ion, three differentstages or moments <strong>in</strong> the evolution of this Law can be dist<strong>in</strong>guished:1) The creation of the first generation of laws on immigration. Thisfirst generation of laws was approved <strong>in</strong> the mid-1980s. Thus,<strong>in</strong> 1985 the first Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> saw the light of day, withits correspond<strong>in</strong>g regulation of <strong>de</strong>velopment adopted <strong>in</strong> 1986.In parallel, the Law of Asylum was approved <strong>in</strong> 1984 and itsregulation of <strong>de</strong>velopment <strong>in</strong> 1985. To this regulation we mustadd the Royal Decree of 1986 regulat<strong>in</strong>g the situation of<strong>Europe</strong>an citizens (so-called <strong>Europe</strong>an citizenship did not thenexist) and two important judgments of the Constitutional Court:107/1984, relat<strong>in</strong>g to the fundamental rights of foreigners <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>,and 115/1987, which resolved the charge of unconstitutionalitylevelled by the Defen<strong>de</strong>r of the People aga<strong>in</strong>st parts of the Lawof <strong>Immigration</strong>. This first generation of immigration laws markedthe basic gui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> the matter and the govern<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples thatwould rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> force from then on. These laws as a whole clearlyput the emphasis on the control of migratory flows, and theregulation of the requirements created by the presence offoreigners <strong>in</strong> the territory of the State, two particular classes offoreigners be<strong>in</strong>g established which were clearly favoured relativeto the general case: citizens of <strong>Europe</strong>an community countries,and asylum-seekers.2) The second generation of laws on immigration. The orig<strong>in</strong> ofthis stage is <strong>in</strong> a non-legal resolution adopted by the Congressof Deputies <strong>in</strong> 1991. As a consequence of this resolution, also <strong>in</strong>1991 an important extraord<strong>in</strong>ary procedure for regularisation offoreigners <strong>de</strong>veloped. From this moment, and after the entry<strong>in</strong>to force of the Agreement of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union (by which<strong>Europe</strong>an citizenship was created), the Law of Asylum wasmodified substantially <strong>in</strong> 1994 and its Regulation <strong>in</strong> 1995, as


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 177well as the Regulation of <strong>de</strong>velopment of the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>,<strong>in</strong> 1996. The modification of the latter showed a greater <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong> the regulation of aspects relat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrants<strong>in</strong>to society, without los<strong>in</strong>g the basically controll<strong>in</strong>g character ofthe regulation. At the same time, processes of participation forrelevant social organisations were opened. Also <strong>in</strong> this periodthe first Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants saw thelight of day. By this time two important <strong>in</strong>ter-governmentalregulations had already been <strong>in</strong>corporated <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>ternal Law: onone hand, the Dubl<strong>in</strong> Agreement, relat<strong>in</strong>g to the regulation ofasylum and its application procedures and, on the other hand,the Agreements for application of the Schengen Agreementregulat<strong>in</strong>g the disappearance of <strong>in</strong>ternal bor<strong>de</strong>rs between anumber of Member States.3) The acceleration of the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>. In the year 2000 weentered a phase of acceleration of legal reforms. This stage isarticulated around two polemical reforms of the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>,prepared over a longer space of time, but <strong>in</strong>troduced <strong>in</strong>the short space of a year. The first reform, <strong>in</strong> force dur<strong>in</strong>g most ofthe year 2000, marks clearly a more <strong>in</strong>tegratory <strong>in</strong>tention and a<strong>de</strong>sire to partially overcome the scheme of the Law of 1985. Inthis respect, the second Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> seems to mark apositive po<strong>in</strong>t of <strong>in</strong>flexion <strong>in</strong> the treatment of the phenomenon,both <strong>in</strong> its content, and <strong>in</strong> its mo<strong>de</strong> of preparation which was pluraland participatory, though without very substantial modifications <strong>in</strong>the un<strong>de</strong>rly<strong>in</strong>g policy. The opposition of the Partido Popular(Popular Party) to this law, was translated <strong>in</strong>to a swift reform of it<strong>in</strong> the same year 2000. This process of legal modification wasrapid and with little dialogue, and conclu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> December 2000with the adoption of a new draft of many of the articles of theLaw. In this case, the most evi<strong>de</strong>nt trends appear <strong>in</strong> threedirections: the legal status of irregularity became harsher; theregime of sanctions became harsher <strong>in</strong> both content and procedure;f<strong>in</strong>ally, the power given to the Executive to <strong>de</strong>velop thecontent of the Law was <strong>in</strong>creased enormously. From this base, theGovernment procee<strong>de</strong>d to approve <strong>in</strong> 2001 a new and extensivereform of the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>, which followed the generalcriteria of the second reform and en<strong>de</strong>d up constitut<strong>in</strong>g the bulkof the Spanish Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> currently <strong>in</strong> force.Nevertheless, the acceleration <strong>in</strong> legislative reforms <strong>in</strong> this area, as<strong>in</strong> neighbour<strong>in</strong>g countries, has not f<strong>in</strong>ished, s<strong>in</strong>ce the Popular Party


178 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZGovernment itself has formally announced its <strong>in</strong>tention of aga<strong>in</strong>reform<strong>in</strong>g the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>. Everyth<strong>in</strong>g suggests that beforelong we will aga<strong>in</strong> see a new legislative modification with the basic aimof giv<strong>in</strong>g government more flexibility to act on immigration. It is<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to remember <strong>in</strong> this respect that the current Law of<strong>Immigration</strong> is un<strong>de</strong>r appeal before the Constitutional Tribunal forsupposed violation of the fundamental rights of immigrants, thanks tothe <strong>de</strong>cision adopted by the Parliament of the Basque Country <strong>in</strong> thisregard.This group of laws that we call the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> can becon<strong>de</strong>nsed around two ma<strong>in</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, which <strong>in</strong> previousworks we have come to call the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of authorisation and thepr<strong>in</strong>ciple of viability. The pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of authorisation establishes that noforeigner can rema<strong>in</strong> on Spanish territory without correspond<strong>in</strong>g adm<strong>in</strong>istrativeor legal authorisation. From the breach of this basic pr<strong>in</strong>ciple isdirectly <strong>de</strong>rived the existence of the legal category of illegality orirregularity, which characterises this normative group. As for the pr<strong>in</strong>cipleof viability, this implies the grant<strong>in</strong>g or recognition of authorisation, andwith it the condition of legality, to those foreigners who can <strong>de</strong>monstratethe economic and social viability of their project of life <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>. Thisviability is essentially accredited by a stable <strong>in</strong>come, which could comefrom an employment contract, viable self-employment or from theavailability of sufficient economic resources for ma<strong>in</strong>tenance. Togetherwith these two govern<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, the Constitution proclaims, <strong>in</strong> a waythat is more generic than real, equality of rights between Spanish subjectsand foreigners, apart from political rights. Nevertheless, the excess ofexecutive power that we have previously criticised as one of the basiccharacteristics of the law on immigration, goes a long way to dispelthis illusion of equality, relegat<strong>in</strong>g the efficiency and effectiveness of thispr<strong>in</strong>ciple to a secondary level.The possible critiques of the content of the Spanish Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>are numerous and affect both the regulation itself and theprocedure by which it was prepared. Nevertheless, here we will focuson what we consi<strong>de</strong>r the fundamental conceptual bankruptcy orfracture of this Law. This fracture bears a direct relation to the existenceof the legal status of illegality, an essential part of our Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>,as we have already expla<strong>in</strong>ed. The <strong>in</strong>coherence of this sectionof the law on this po<strong>in</strong>t can be ascribed, <strong>in</strong> our op<strong>in</strong>ion, to two reasons.On one hand, because the legal condition of irregularity <strong>in</strong> itself formsan important challenge to allegedly basic values of our political culture,such that we must weight the reality of such an adm<strong>in</strong>istrative <strong>in</strong>fractionaga<strong>in</strong>st the supposed universality of the most basic human rights. On


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 179the other hand, because the mere existence of these irregular situationsends up contraven<strong>in</strong>g the logic of the system and makes it evi<strong>de</strong>nt,reflect<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>a<strong>de</strong>quacy of our laws when compared with the realityof our migratory environment.In effect, the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> is revealed as openly unsatisfactory<strong>in</strong> the social context <strong>in</strong> which it acts. Its govern<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples make itchronically and permanently obsolete with regard to the reality that itseeks to legislate. To support this it is enough to remember that thenumber of foreigners <strong>in</strong> an irregular legal situation <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> has variedconsi<strong>de</strong>rably through period of existence of the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>.Far from disappear<strong>in</strong>g, the number of foreigners <strong>in</strong> an irregular situationhas <strong>in</strong>creased spectacularly on several occasions throughout these 17years, and on others <strong>de</strong>creased, thanks to juridical procedures adoptedto that effect. These cyclical variations <strong>in</strong> the size of the “irregular”group are expla<strong>in</strong>ed from the legal po<strong>in</strong>t of view by the occurrence of“extraord<strong>in</strong>ary” processes of foreigners’ regularisation. In effect, <strong>in</strong>these 17 years of the <strong>de</strong>velopment of the Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>,at least four “extraord<strong>in</strong>ary” processes of regularisation of foreignershave taken place, imply<strong>in</strong>g the resolution of more than 400,000 cases.Besi<strong>de</strong>s these processes, there have been other normative mechanismswith the same purpose of regularis<strong>in</strong>g foreigners <strong>in</strong> an illegal situation:us<strong>in</strong>g the annual quotas of work licences for foreigners already present<strong>in</strong> the territory of the State, assignment of extraord<strong>in</strong>ary permissions tothose who enter the State by way of certa<strong>in</strong> bor<strong>de</strong>rs (fundamentallyCeuta and Melilla) and other, alternative mechanisms of documentation,such as the one <strong>de</strong>veloped <strong>in</strong> the year 2001 concern<strong>in</strong>g the concept of“root<strong>in</strong>g”.All these procedures, then, qualified <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple as extraord<strong>in</strong>ary,break with the logic of the system constructed around the previouslystated pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of authorisation and viability. Nevertheless, if we lookat the alleged “extraord<strong>in</strong>ary” nature of the aforementioned normativemechanisms, we f<strong>in</strong>d that their quantitative effects have been as muchor more than those of the permanent or ord<strong>in</strong>ary procedures. Ifanyth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>monstrates this contradiction it is the evi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong>sufficiencyof these normative rules effectively to conta<strong>in</strong> or to regulate themigratory process. With the accumulation of experiences <strong>in</strong> this respect,and with the acceleration of legislative reforms previously <strong>in</strong>dicated, ahigh level of legal <strong>in</strong>security is created, and “call effects” (efecto llamada)are provoked that theoretically ought to be avoi<strong>de</strong>d.The result<strong>in</strong>g panorama seems to be <strong>in</strong>ten<strong>de</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> effect, to keepimmigrants and social organisations “<strong>in</strong> suspense”, thus elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g orreduc<strong>in</strong>g the responsive capability of alternative proposals. The legal


180 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZsystem <strong>in</strong> question is merely a pattern that is applied repeatedly <strong>in</strong> theshort term, but which provokes contradictory effects <strong>in</strong> the mediumand long term, probably with <strong>de</strong>vastat<strong>in</strong>g consequences for socialcohesion and certa<strong>in</strong>ly, for the human rights of the immigrants. Def<strong>in</strong>itively,from a merely legal analysis, the system is today characterised by anotable absence of legal security <strong>in</strong> the regulation of immigration. Thisdynamic, <strong>in</strong> which the processes of regularisation are cyclical anddispersed, with regulations sometimes differentiated by geographicalzones or by countries of orig<strong>in</strong> of the immigrants and with more or lesspermanent messages of com<strong>in</strong>g normative modifications, must beconsi<strong>de</strong>red as opposed to the basic requirements of a constitutionalstate, <strong>in</strong> violation of the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of juridical security. Not only ethical,but also utilitarian arguments <strong>in</strong> our op<strong>in</strong>ion move us to make radicalchanges to this normative policy and to advance <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formed<strong>de</strong>sign of a consistent Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> for a multicultural socialstage <strong>in</strong> the long term.Organisational policyAccord<strong>in</strong>g to the Spanish Constitution, the whole area, both <strong>de</strong>cisionmak<strong>in</strong>gand executive, relat<strong>in</strong>g to immigration, asylum, nationality,passports, bor<strong>de</strong>rs and foreigners is the responsibility of the centralbodies of the State. From the executive po<strong>in</strong>t of view, most of thecompetences have traditionally been distributed among the Departmentsof Interior, Foreign Affairs, Work and Social Matters. S<strong>in</strong>ce 1995 thereis an Inter-m<strong>in</strong>isterial Commission for Foreigners and <strong>in</strong> 1999 a newSecretariat of State (Government Delegation) for <strong>Immigration</strong> andForeigners was created. This Secretariat, which constitutes the topgovernmental body for immigration, is un<strong>de</strong>r the M<strong>in</strong>ister of the Interior,represent<strong>in</strong>g a vision of migration <strong>in</strong> which the police perspectivepredom<strong>in</strong>ates over that of social <strong>in</strong>tegration.The Autonomous Communities and Municipalities participate<strong>in</strong>directly <strong>in</strong> the area of immigration through the exercise of theircompetences <strong>in</strong> such matters as social well-be<strong>in</strong>g, education, healthand hous<strong>in</strong>g. Certa<strong>in</strong> differences exist <strong>in</strong> the policies of both <strong>in</strong> thisregard. S<strong>in</strong>ce 2001 there has been a Higher Council on <strong>Immigration</strong>Policy, as the body for coord<strong>in</strong>ation between adm<strong>in</strong>istrations. Nevertheless,it does not seem as if its work to date has served to shed excessivelight on this panorama of general lack of coord<strong>in</strong>ation.Among the Autonomous Communities which have expressed importantdifferences with the restrictive policy of the central government,the Basque Country certa<strong>in</strong>ly stands out. The contradiction between


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 181the Spanish and Basque governments <strong>in</strong> this matter is testified to bythe mutual battle of regulations <strong>in</strong> the courts. The Basque Governmentis currently <strong>in</strong> the approval phase of a very progressive Plan of <strong>Immigration</strong>,which undoubtedly contradicts the policy of the State on thematter.As regards social participation <strong>in</strong> public policy, the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal <strong>in</strong>stitutionto this effect is the Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants,created <strong>in</strong> 1995 as the supreme consultative body <strong>in</strong> the matter. Publicadm<strong>in</strong>istrations, unions, representatives of bus<strong>in</strong>ess and NGOs, bothnative and immigrant, take part <strong>in</strong> this body. Its effectiveness, afterseven years of existence, has <strong>in</strong> general been very limited. This is due,<strong>in</strong> our op<strong>in</strong>ion, to three factors:a) The manipulation of the organisation of the Forum by theGovernmentb) The lack of publicity for its meet<strong>in</strong>gs and <strong>de</strong>cisionsc) The <strong>in</strong>ability of the NGOs to carry out unified strategies.As regards functional participation <strong>in</strong> the creation of <strong>in</strong>stitutionalregulations or plans, this has <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>d basically on the political circumstancesand, especially, on the political will of the act<strong>in</strong>g government.In the 1990s there were positive experiences, which were sharplytruncated by the legal reforms of 1999 and 2000. In recent years, thegeneral policy of the central government <strong>in</strong> this regard has been one ofscanty and fragmented dialogue: divi<strong>de</strong> and rule. Unfortunately, thelack of political or economic <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce of many organisations hasfacilitated this situation, <strong>in</strong> which the government seems to be comfortably<strong>in</strong>stalled.Social policiesRegard<strong>in</strong>g the social political for immigration <strong>de</strong>veloped throughoutthe last 17 years, we will synthesise our critique from four basic aspects:1) Social policy has always been relegated to second place beh<strong>in</strong>drepressive control. We have already reflected on this i<strong>de</strong>a,hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed the law <strong>in</strong> force as a Law of Foreigners and notso much a Law of <strong>Immigration</strong>.2) The proliferation of agents that control social policy of foreigners,<strong>de</strong>rived from the complex <strong>in</strong>stitutional organisation, which hasprovoked a great lack of coord<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> the adoption an<strong>de</strong>xecution of policy. There are important differences betweenterritories and areas of <strong>in</strong>tervention.


182 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZ3) The appearance <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> of immigrants from the specific countriesfrom which they have come, co<strong>in</strong>cid<strong>in</strong>g with periods <strong>in</strong> whichthe welfare state is be<strong>in</strong>g reconsi<strong>de</strong>red <strong>in</strong> theory and practice.The treatment of immigration is a fertile field for new i<strong>de</strong>as.There has been a marked <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> participation by the socialorganisations <strong>in</strong> this area of public management.4) A social, <strong>in</strong>stitutional and media trend exists l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g immigrationwith social exclusion. This vision makes a blank slate of theenormous differences between immigrants and impe<strong>de</strong>s theadoption of social policy of true <strong>in</strong>tegration, not mere welfare.From the state po<strong>in</strong>t of view, two plans for social <strong>in</strong>tegration ofimmigration have been approved to date, <strong>in</strong> 1994 and 2001. The firstserved as a base for the creation of the Forum for the Social Integrationof Immigrants and of the Permanent Observatory for <strong>Immigration</strong>.In 2001 the “GRECO” Plan 1 was approved. This plan has as its centralaxes, bor<strong>de</strong>r control, social <strong>in</strong>tegration and <strong>de</strong>velopment cooperation.Nevertheless, many critiques can be ma<strong>de</strong> of this programme, whichcan be summarised as follows:a) The plan was <strong>de</strong>signed fundamentally by the M<strong>in</strong>istry of theInterior and not by the M<strong>in</strong>istry for Social Mattersb) The philosophy of the Plan centres on the control of immigrationnot on the social <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrantsc) The plan does not conta<strong>in</strong> money for its execution or <strong>de</strong>velopmentd) Its preparation was accelerated and cryptic, without space foran authentic <strong>de</strong>bate with other policy, <strong>in</strong>stitutional or socialagents <strong>in</strong>volved.At present, it cannot be said that the GRECO Plan should be thedocument of reference for the social policy of immigration. Nor has theexistence of regional immigration plans so far served to illum<strong>in</strong>ate aclear and unanimous mo<strong>de</strong>l of <strong>in</strong>tegration. On the contrary, immigrationis related exclusively to the <strong>de</strong>mand for work and is seen as aphenomenon of the moment. Social policy is <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itively fragmented,<strong>in</strong>effective and dispersed. Equally uncoord<strong>in</strong>ated and dispersed are theauxiliary social services given by many social organisations <strong>in</strong> collaborationwith the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration.As result of all this, basically the same social problems persist whichwere perceived <strong>in</strong> the first analysis fifteen years ago: difficulties <strong>in</strong>1 Global programme of Regulation and Coord<strong>in</strong>ation of Foreigners <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>, whoseapplication covers the period 2000-2004.


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 183access to hous<strong>in</strong>g, scanty social or community participation of labourimmigrants, precariousness and exploitation, etc. To these are ad<strong>de</strong>dmore recent social problems such as high rates of school failure, familyprecariousness, the complex situation of many unaccompanied m<strong>in</strong>orsor that of prostitutes who are the victims of networks of human traffick<strong>in</strong>g.Cultural policiesThe processes of immigration <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly raise challenges not onlywith respect to social <strong>in</strong>tegration, but also the need to articulate liv<strong>in</strong>gtogether <strong>in</strong> cultural diversity, beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g by assur<strong>in</strong>g the ma<strong>in</strong>tenanceand potential <strong>de</strong>velopment of the immigrants’ own cultures. Thecultural area affects basic elements of human dignity and, therefore, itstreatment is also a requirement of the universal respect for humanrights.Nevertheless, <strong>in</strong> the Spanish State today cultural policy for immigrationis practically nonexistent. Beyond occasional actions, there is noexpression, however fa<strong>in</strong>t, with<strong>in</strong> any <strong>in</strong>stitutional area of a culturalpolicy that calls for assur<strong>in</strong>g the survival of other cultures, still less forachiev<strong>in</strong>g a f<strong>in</strong>al state of multicultural coexistence. The lack of a consi<strong>de</strong>redmo<strong>de</strong>l <strong>in</strong> this respect is evi<strong>de</strong>nt. The fundamental concern today is overcontroll<strong>in</strong>g migration and, at most, over the consequences of migration,<strong>in</strong> terms of collective security. In the most optimistic vision, we run upaga<strong>in</strong>st social policy of <strong>in</strong>tegration, but without know<strong>in</strong>g about thenew cultural reality that appears to us.Critique of social responsesThe reaction of societyBased on analysis of the <strong>in</strong>formation offered by sociological studies,it seems possible to <strong>de</strong>duce that Spanish society has hardly reacted tothe new situation. If we look at the evolution of the so-called <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>x ofxenophobia, we observe that for the period 1991-1997, there were onlysmall variations and, <strong>in</strong> any case, a certa<strong>in</strong> positive trend (DEPARTMENTOF WORK AND SOCIAL MATTERS, 1998, p. 14). Racist and xenophobicattitu<strong>de</strong>s have retreated for the most part; but nor does Spanish societyshow a generous attitu<strong>de</strong>, a priori, either to immigration or to theequality of foreigners with natives. In this respect, there is a predom<strong>in</strong>antview that the arrival of immigrants can or should only be allowed<strong>in</strong>asmuch as the Spanish socio-economic situation permits. Thus, themajority is <strong>in</strong> agreement with proposals to admit immigrant workers


184 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZwhen there are no Spanish workers to fill those jobs (ORIZO/ELZO,2000, p. 73). This basic consensus can be exten<strong>de</strong>d to almost all socialareas, though differences exist. Thus, the most open and progressiveattitu<strong>de</strong>s are abundant among young people (as opposed to ol<strong>de</strong>rpeople), s<strong>in</strong>gle people (as opposed to families) and those with universityeducation (as opposed to those with a lower level of education). Fromthe policy po<strong>in</strong>t of view, the most favourable attitu<strong>de</strong>s to foreignerscorrespond to the voters of Izquierda Unida (United Left) and somenationalist parties of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. On theother hand, the voters of the Partido Popular show a clear trend to limitthe entry of immigrants, an aspect <strong>in</strong> which they do not seem to differsignificantly from the voters of the Partido Socialista Obrero <strong>de</strong> España(Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party). As regards social participation <strong>in</strong>organisations related to immigration, it turns out to be almost irrelevant.Passive participation is very scarce, as is voluntary action, <strong>in</strong> these areas.But it is relevant <strong>in</strong> this respect to state that immigration is seen today,from the po<strong>in</strong>t of view of public op<strong>in</strong>ion, as one of ma<strong>in</strong> problems of thecountry. An important sector of society <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly relates immigrationto <strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>quency and the question of immigration is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly present<strong>in</strong> the electoral <strong>de</strong>bate.F<strong>in</strong>ally, we must say that until now, topics related to immigrationand multiculturality have not provoked a major theoretical <strong>de</strong>bate <strong>in</strong>Spa<strong>in</strong>. In recent years the number of publications, sem<strong>in</strong>ars and spacesfor reflection <strong>in</strong> this area has <strong>in</strong>creased, but this fact seems to be theresult of a short-term fashion <strong>in</strong> policy more than the existence of anauthentic, long-term profound reflection on the mo<strong>de</strong>l of society.Organised society: NGOsS<strong>in</strong>ce the second half of the 1980s, associative voluntary movementswith the aim of promot<strong>in</strong>g the social <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrants <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>have begun to appear. In fact, social organisations <strong>de</strong>al<strong>in</strong>g with migrationdid not make their public presence felt until the 1990s. Today <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>there is a complex panorama of organisations work<strong>in</strong>g wholly or partly<strong>in</strong> this area. Their number has grown spectacularly <strong>in</strong> recent years.From the state po<strong>in</strong>t of view, we could classify these organisations asfollows:a) NGOs whose fundamental activity centres on the <strong>de</strong>fence ofimmigrants’ human rights. Some orig<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> groups formedwith<strong>in</strong> the Catholic Church, some of which have s<strong>in</strong>ce become<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Red Acoge (Welcome Web), Andalucía


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 185Acoge and ACEM.; other organisations focus on work withrefugees (CEAR) or on campaign<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st racism (SOS-Racismo).b) NGOs focused generally on the struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st exclusion,which <strong>de</strong>vote part of their activity to immigrants: among them,fundamentally Caritas and the Red Cross.c) Humanitarian aid and <strong>de</strong>velopment cooperation NGOs which<strong>de</strong>dicate part of their activity <strong>in</strong> the fourth world to support<strong>in</strong>gimmigrants: Medicos <strong>de</strong>l Mundo, Medicos s<strong>in</strong> Fronteras, MPDL.d) Labour unions that <strong>de</strong>vote part of their activity to the specific<strong>de</strong>fence of immigrant workers: with<strong>in</strong> the area of the Spanishstate, fundamentally UGT and CCOO.e) Associations and organisations of immigrants and refugees. Thereare now numerous organisations of this type, both state-wi<strong>de</strong>and local. Their representation of the respective groups is limited.Their purpose and pr<strong>in</strong>ciples of action are as diverse as those ofthe NGOs. Their structure follows a union mo<strong>de</strong>l <strong>in</strong> most casesand they particularly <strong>de</strong>fend <strong>in</strong>terests of orig<strong>in</strong>, <strong>de</strong>pend<strong>in</strong>g on thenational or cultural group that forms them.We have already noted how the reformulation of the welfare state haslegitimised the adoption by these organisations of a relevant role <strong>in</strong> thesubsidiary execution of public social policy. In pr<strong>in</strong>ciple this phenomenoncan be judged to be a positive channel for social participation <strong>in</strong> publicmanagement. Nevertheless, it had and cont<strong>in</strong>ues to have its disadvantages.In effect, this dynamic has negatively affected the <strong>de</strong>velopment ofseveral organisations, especially the <strong>de</strong>velopment of united strategiesof political pressure. From the organisational po<strong>in</strong>t of view, manyorganisations which <strong>in</strong>itially consisted almost exclusively of volunteersnow have a significant percentage of contracted personnel <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r toprovi<strong>de</strong> services subcontracted or promoted by the adm<strong>in</strong>istration. Inmany cases this has meant that the voluntary and i<strong>de</strong>ological elementof NGOs has moved <strong>in</strong>to second place and, at the same time, they havebecome strongly economically <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on the public adm<strong>in</strong>istration.To this we must add the paradox that many of these organisations withhumanitarian and socially responsible aims keep their own workers <strong>in</strong>precarious conditions which sometimes verge on the exploitative. Thisdoes not help them to provi<strong>de</strong> quality services, let alone the trulytransformative action which many NGOs should theoretically carry out.On top of this there is the lack of coord<strong>in</strong>ation with and betweenpublic bodies which has already been criticised.Def<strong>in</strong>itely, their substantial f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce on outsi<strong>de</strong>,specifically public, fund<strong>in</strong>g, tends <strong>in</strong> many cases to cancel out the


186 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZtransformative capacity of NGOs. We must add to this other elementswhich meet perniciously <strong>in</strong> our social movement, among which wewould highlight:a) The personal or partial <strong>in</strong>terests that are frequently brought <strong>in</strong>tothe organisationsb) The absence of long-term strategic reflectionc) The absence of a culture of honest coord<strong>in</strong>ation of efforts andof work <strong>in</strong> networksd) The weak <strong>in</strong>ternational presence and work experience ofSpanish NGOs.In this respect, today we face a situation <strong>in</strong> which a dispersed andweakly coord<strong>in</strong>ated group of social organisations end up supply<strong>in</strong>g afew services to the powers that be. On many occasions this leads to<strong>in</strong>evitable strategic contradictions, s<strong>in</strong>ce those who manage theseorganisations are habitually <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on public fund<strong>in</strong>g through theprogrammes that they carry out. The adm<strong>in</strong>istration thus also becomesthe legitimat<strong>in</strong>g agent of many of their policies. The organisations thatare highly professionalised and strongly <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on external f<strong>in</strong>anc<strong>in</strong>gthus drastically reduce their transformative and critical capacity, serve theprocess of slimm<strong>in</strong>g down the welfare state and lengthen their life <strong>in</strong>an <strong>in</strong>term<strong>in</strong>able process of manag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g programmes (andconsequently resources) that do noth<strong>in</strong>g but provoke larger doses of<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce.In this situation, the efficiency of NGOs should always be measuredaga<strong>in</strong>st their power to transform reality. Social movements should<strong>de</strong>velop <strong>de</strong>eply political-i<strong>de</strong>ological work, to the <strong>de</strong>triment of theirresolutional work. Transformative action today <strong>de</strong>mands the greater<strong>in</strong>volvement of social groups <strong>in</strong> the area of social sensitisation and policypressure, and a <strong>de</strong>ep strategic re<strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition. In this respect, it must beemphasised that other NGOs or social agents, not exclusively related toimmigration nor necessarily Spanish, have <strong>in</strong>itiated an appropriatestrategy <strong>in</strong> this respect <strong>in</strong> our environment. Among these we couldmention Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Jesuit RefugeeService and some aca<strong>de</strong>mic areas.Pr<strong>in</strong>cipal challenges for migration policy todayIn conclusion, we will next present the most relevant challengesthat we face today <strong>in</strong> relation to migration policy <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong>. This set ofchallenges can be synthesised, <strong>in</strong> our view, around three fundamental


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 187axes or processes: <strong>Europe</strong>an construction, respect for human rights andsocial participation.The process of <strong>Europe</strong>an constructionThe process of <strong>Europe</strong>an construction is projected, certa<strong>in</strong>ly, basedon the set of <strong>in</strong>stitutional policies on which we have commented. In thenew and irreversible <strong>Europe</strong>an reality accelerated by the entry <strong>in</strong>to forceof the Amsterdam Agreement, we must th<strong>in</strong>k about the follow<strong>in</strong>gpo<strong>in</strong>ts:a) The <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g weight of the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>cision-mak<strong>in</strong>gon migration is balanced neither by mechanisms of control norby a <strong>de</strong>mocratisation of community <strong>in</strong>stitutions. The centres of<strong>de</strong>cision <strong>in</strong> the matter become more distant without theappearance of new mechanisms of <strong>de</strong>mocratic participation.b) The <strong>in</strong>stitutions of the Union must construct social and culturalpolicy to accompany policy regulations. Common immigrationpolicy cannot be reduced to the regulation of the phenomenonfrom the prism of control.c) Development cooperation and co-<strong>de</strong>velopment are conceptsused rhetorically <strong>in</strong> many <strong>Europe</strong>an documents relat<strong>in</strong>g tomigratory flows. The <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itive communitarisation of immigrationshould imply the same for this area of foreign policy.d) The NGOs of the Spanish State lack <strong>in</strong>ternational projection,contacts and experience. They must be prepared to urgentlymake the leap to the <strong>Europe</strong>an area <strong>in</strong> their work of politicalpressure. The creation and consolidation of <strong>Europe</strong>an networksof non-governmental organisations <strong>in</strong> this area is urgent.Respect for fundamental rightsIn this theory, the legal structure consists of a reference to collectivesafety <strong>in</strong> the face of the hypothetical arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess of public power. Nevertheless,as we have previously <strong>in</strong>dicated, <strong>in</strong> the area of immigration,the Law does not comply with the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of legal security, and <strong>in</strong>reality <strong>in</strong>tegrates a system tend<strong>in</strong>g to the segregation of non-nativepersons. In this framework, it is necessary to attend to the follow<strong>in</strong>gelements:a) The Law of <strong>Immigration</strong> must be reformed <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>pth, even <strong>in</strong> itsbasic pr<strong>in</strong>ciples, <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to adapt to the social reality which ittakes charge of controll<strong>in</strong>g. Legal <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> the migratory


188 EDUARDO J. RUIZ VIEYTEZphenomenon must be fundamentally focused with regard to thehuman rights of migrants and not to their harsh control. First of all,the system must guarantee legal safety to the persons, <strong>in</strong>stitutions,organisations and bodies <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the migratory process. Theso-called extraord<strong>in</strong>ary processes of regularisation cannot cont<strong>in</strong>ueshor<strong>in</strong>g up an essentially repressive system.b) Respect for human rights also <strong>de</strong>mands the disappearance of“dark zones” or “opaque zones” <strong>in</strong> which foreigners can be foundand where most violations of human rights take place: bor<strong>de</strong>rs,jails, centres of <strong>in</strong>ternment or <strong>de</strong>tention, ships or aircraft <strong>in</strong> thecase of human traffick<strong>in</strong>g, and similar environments which theguarantees of a constitutional state hardly reach. The gravity ofhuman rights violations <strong>in</strong> such areas <strong>de</strong>mands a reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g ofthe guarantees that the State must provi<strong>de</strong>, which is translatedfundamentally <strong>in</strong>to a <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ite <strong>in</strong>vestment <strong>in</strong> suitable means,both from the economic and human po<strong>in</strong>ts of view.Social participationF<strong>in</strong>ally, it is <strong>in</strong> any case necessary to penetrate <strong>in</strong>to the process of<strong>de</strong>mocratisation of the State <strong>in</strong>asmuch as it concerns the area ofimmigration. This process carries with it the need to contribute efforts<strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g areas:a) The creation of authentic participative conduits <strong>in</strong> public <strong>de</strong>cisionmak<strong>in</strong>g,which ensure the presence of effective and <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ntrepresentatives both of the immigrants themselves and of thehost society <strong>in</strong> the cont<strong>in</strong>uous <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition and assessment of the<strong>de</strong>velopment of public policy.b) The promotion of the construction of social fabric, particularlyamong immigrant groups. This <strong>de</strong>velopment of the associativemovement should take place with<strong>in</strong> cultural parameters whichgive priority to voluntary work and the <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt criteria ofthe movements themselves.c) The <strong>in</strong>stitutionally coord<strong>in</strong>ated adoption of strategic plans <strong>in</strong> thelong term with respect to the phenomenon of immigration. Theplans must ultimately be adopted by the representative politicallevel of our system, but avoid<strong>in</strong>g the commercialisation of theircontent on the electoral market.d) The creation of coherent policies of education and public communicationwith a positive vision of immigration and multiculturality.The role of the public mass media could be fundamental


SPANISH IMMIGRATION POLICIES: A CRITICAL APPROACH FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS... 189for a suitable social <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the dysfunctions that theprocess will <strong>in</strong>evitably produce, without end<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> dynamicsof conflict or rejection.e) A <strong>de</strong>ep reflection on the role that the NGOs have played <strong>in</strong> thisarea <strong>in</strong> the last fifteen years. We need a change of course <strong>in</strong> thestrategy of the social movement, and the assumption of social andpolitical pressure as the fundamental area of action of organisedcivil society, reject<strong>in</strong>g their conversion <strong>in</strong>to a mere complementaryand cheap response that serves to mitigate the social dysfunctionsprovoked by the established system. On this level, we need toactivate the organisation of qualified volunteers and achieveeconomic <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce for the movement.Def<strong>in</strong>itively, the basic criteria that today orientate public policy relat<strong>in</strong>gto immigration <strong>in</strong> the Spanish State must be profoundly revised andreoriented. In this respect, it is urgent that social movements help to createthe necessary conditions so that the above mentioned review can takeplace. It is also the responsibility of the committed aca<strong>de</strong>mic area tostimulate and facilitate this dynamic as part of its contribution to a cultureof human rights. Not without reason, it is <strong>in</strong> the area of immigrationthat <strong>Europe</strong> will live through its greatest conflict over human rights, atleast <strong>in</strong> the first half of the 21 st century.ReferencesDEPARTMENT OF WORK AND SOCIAL MATTERS/PERMANENT OBSERVATORY ON IMMIGRATION(1998): Attitu<strong>de</strong>s towards Immigrants, Institute of Migrations and SocialServices, Madrid.Orizo, F. A.; Elzo, F. J. (eds.) (2000): Spa<strong>in</strong> 2000, between localism andglobalism. The third <strong>Europe</strong>an survey of values, 1981-1999, FoundationSanta Maria / University of <strong>Deusto</strong>, Bilbao.


Contradictory dynamics with<strong>in</strong> British multiculturalism:pursu<strong>in</strong>g ethnic pluralism while exclud<strong>in</strong>g asylum seekersCharles HusbandIn this paper I want to track two contradictory strands <strong>in</strong> the politicsof contemporary British multiculturalism, and explore their implicationsfor immediate and future <strong>de</strong>velopments. One strand is the creep ofprogressive legislation and the attendant policy directives that are<strong>in</strong>crementally consolidat<strong>in</strong>g a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive commitment to a pluralisticmulticulturalism. A strik<strong>in</strong>g feature of this process is the unusual politicalmo<strong>de</strong>sty with which the Government is pursu<strong>in</strong>g this agenda.The other strand is the pursuit of a politics aimed at <strong>de</strong>terr<strong>in</strong>grefugees and asylum seekers from consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g Brita<strong>in</strong> as a preferredplace of refuge, and as a corollary of this to drastically reduce thenumber of asylum seekers who are granted refugee status. Unlike theformer political <strong>in</strong>itiative this policy is be<strong>in</strong>g pursued with a robust an<strong>de</strong>xplicit political rhetoric which pan<strong>de</strong>rs to xenophobic and racistsentiments.As any comparative analysis of <strong>Europe</strong>an states’ management ofethnic diversity would reveal, the history of their nation build<strong>in</strong>g andthe particular construction of their dist<strong>in</strong>ctive political <strong>in</strong>stitutions, isalways central to an un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g of any country’s current politics ofmulticulturalism (KOOPMANS/STATHAM, 2002; GEDDES, 2003). Thus, Iwould like to <strong>in</strong>itially provi<strong>de</strong> a thumbnail sketch of key features of theBritish experience.Firstly, <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> there is a long history of the management ofethnic diversity. The United K<strong>in</strong>gdom itself represents a process ofconquest and partial <strong>in</strong>corporation by the English of the Irish, the Scotsand the Welsh: memorably <strong>de</strong>scribed by HECHTER (1975) as InternalColonialism. And, from COLLEY’s (1992) <strong>in</strong>fluential account, the mesh<strong>in</strong>gof these national m<strong>in</strong>orities together <strong>in</strong> armed struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st “common”Catholic enemies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> helped to forge a British i<strong>de</strong>ntity.


192 CHARLES HUSBANDExternally the dual processes of colonisation and Imperial adm<strong>in</strong>istrationthat were the weft and warp of the British Empire provi<strong>de</strong>dcenturies of experience of the management of ethnic diversity overseas.The practice of Imperial management was, of course, accompanied bya complementary process of i<strong>de</strong>ological justification. One core elementof this was the progressive elaboration of race theory which <strong>de</strong>veloped<strong>in</strong> response to, and legitimated, British <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> slavery and theexpropriation of other peoples’ lands and resources. A second i<strong>de</strong>ologicalelement which was central to early race th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, until substantiallyovertaken by scientific racism, was Christian theology (JORDAN, 1969).In the late n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century “muscular Christianity” provi<strong>de</strong>d apowerful un<strong>de</strong>rp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to British expansionism <strong>in</strong> Africa and elsewhere.Race th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g (BARZUN, 1965) and Christian theology and idiomcont<strong>in</strong>ue to exist <strong>in</strong> British life as two i<strong>de</strong>ological strands <strong>in</strong> a nationalimagery woven together like strands of DNA, with the many bridg<strong>in</strong>gl<strong>in</strong>kages be<strong>in</strong>g formed around specific issues <strong>in</strong> ethnic <strong>in</strong>teraction. Thegrowth of Islamophobia <strong>in</strong> recent years has been one such highlyvisible, and disturb<strong>in</strong>g, l<strong>in</strong>kage.With this history the British, and perhaps particularly the English, arecomfortable with the management of ethnic diversity. It is an establishedpart of our political repertoire and has both the <strong>in</strong>stitutional structuresand the conceptual language comfortably established as part of thenational political fabric. Recognis<strong>in</strong>g ethnic diversity and manag<strong>in</strong>g ethnicrelations does not embarrass the British either personally or politically.A sense of how important this is can be ga<strong>in</strong>ed by compar<strong>in</strong>gBrita<strong>in</strong> with France, where, as an on-go<strong>in</strong>g consequence of the Jacob<strong>in</strong>tradition of the French Revolution, the political system is <strong>de</strong>eply uncomfortablewith recognis<strong>in</strong>g ethnic diversity. The concept of laïcitéun<strong>de</strong>rp<strong>in</strong>s a secular citizenship which is entire unto itself; not someth<strong>in</strong>gto be fragmented by consi<strong>de</strong>rations of gen<strong>de</strong>r, religion or ethnicity(HARGREAVES, 1995). As struggles over the wear<strong>in</strong>g of the chador <strong>in</strong>school by young Muslim women have revealed, a rout<strong>in</strong>e acceptanceof cultural diversity and differential citizenship does not sit easily withFrench political tradition (GEDDES, 2003).In Brita<strong>in</strong> on the other hand, there is both a political capacity and alanguage for address<strong>in</strong>g ethnic diversity. It is the language of “race”and of colour. Early <strong>in</strong> the mo<strong>de</strong>rn phase of <strong>de</strong>mographic change throughpost-war migration of labour from the Commonwealth <strong>in</strong>to Brita<strong>in</strong> bothof these languages became established as the norm. In the 1960s and1970s it was through a discourse about “coloured immigration” thatthe British state and the British people <strong>de</strong>veloped their un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>gof contemporary events (HARTMANN/HUSBAND, 1974); and the state


CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS WITHIN BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM 193apparatus rapidly <strong>de</strong>veloped a corpus of law and <strong>in</strong>stitutional practicebased around a series of Race Relations Acts: 1965, 1968,1976(SOLOMOS, 1993).Thus, <strong>in</strong> the British political context we now have four <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s ofparliamentary policy formulation and highly contested public <strong>de</strong>bate, <strong>in</strong>which the language of race and colour has been normalised as bothunproblematic and acceptable. We should pause to consi<strong>de</strong>r thePromethean significance of this discursive practice. Firstly, we shouldperhaps reassert its fundamental factual <strong>in</strong>accuracy and consequentpolitical danger.Race is a social construct, not a mean<strong>in</strong>gful biological entity. Thus,as BANTON/HARWOOD (1975) noted:As a way of categoris<strong>in</strong>g people, race is based upon a <strong>de</strong>lusionbecause popular i<strong>de</strong>as about racial classification lack scientific validityand are moul<strong>de</strong>d by political pressures rather than by the evi<strong>de</strong>ncefrom biology (p. 8; see also MASON, 1986).The danger, and error, <strong>in</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g the language of race is that it<strong>in</strong>troduces a whole historically rooted mo<strong>de</strong> of thought, of “race th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g”which makes rigid categorisation of peoples reasonable; and readilyfacilitates the rout<strong>in</strong>e utilisation of socially constructed stereotypes.Where “race” is used to “expla<strong>in</strong>” social phenomena there is necessarilya distortion of un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g. This process of racialisation (OMNI/WINANT, 1986) exclu<strong>de</strong>s other mo<strong>de</strong>s of un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g and specifically<strong>de</strong>nies acknowledgement of the complexity, flexibility and social natureof human i<strong>de</strong>ntity and behaviour that is potentially 1 accessible throughthe alternative language of ethnicity.However, if the historical experience of contact with people ofother cultures has provi<strong>de</strong>d Brita<strong>in</strong> with a cultural and <strong>in</strong>stitutionalcapacity to recognise ethnic diversity, and to manage it through aracialised un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g of difference, it has also laid down a quitedifferent edifice of belief and value that is relevant to our currentcircumstances. The British have a strand of self-belief and self-stereotyp<strong>in</strong>gthat can be found rooted <strong>in</strong> the collective sense of the long cont<strong>in</strong>uityof Brita<strong>in</strong> as a Parliamentary <strong>de</strong>mocracy. In the creative acts of selectiveretention and strategic myopia that goes <strong>in</strong>to the build<strong>in</strong>g of a nationali<strong>de</strong>ntity, and the “<strong>in</strong>vention of tradition” (HOBSBAWM/RANGER, 1983),the British have come to see themselves as blessed with an <strong>in</strong>herent1 Ethnicity is of course itself capable of reduction to rigid and <strong>in</strong>flexible usage;especially where essentialist notions of i<strong>de</strong>ntity generate powerful polic<strong>in</strong>g of theprocesses of <strong>in</strong>clusion and exclusion from membership <strong>in</strong> an ethnic group (ERIKSON, 1995).


194 CHARLES HUSBAND<strong>de</strong>cency. Notions of Brita<strong>in</strong> the “mother of Parliaments”, of be<strong>in</strong>g anhistorical haven for refugees and of hav<strong>in</strong>g a dist<strong>in</strong>ctive capacity fortolerance, are part of this tradition (HUSBAND, 1974, 1987). That thereare historical bases for these perceptions is important. Equally, a criticalscrut<strong>in</strong>y of these claims would require a consi<strong>de</strong>rable exercise ofqualification and suitable humility. However, the veracity of self-imagesis not the sole <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g facet of their relevance. Their credibility is<strong>de</strong> facto more important than their truth, and their ubiquity as generali<strong>de</strong>as is more potent than knowledge of any support<strong>in</strong>g evi<strong>de</strong>nce.These i<strong>de</strong>as and values have <strong>in</strong> the past un<strong>de</strong>rp<strong>in</strong>ned imperial expansion,as Brita<strong>in</strong> “took up the White Man’s Bur<strong>de</strong>n”, and <strong>in</strong> the last <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>sthey have been co-opted <strong>in</strong>to the politics of negotiat<strong>in</strong>g the chang<strong>in</strong>gethnic <strong>de</strong>mography of Brita<strong>in</strong>.A recurrent theme <strong>in</strong> the political discourse of manag<strong>in</strong>g the chang<strong>in</strong>gethnic diversity of Brita<strong>in</strong> has been an explicit concern with “ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gharmonious community relations”. This liberal concern with guarantee<strong>in</strong>gtolerance and <strong>de</strong>cency <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-ethnic <strong>in</strong>teractions both draws upon andsusta<strong>in</strong>s this notion of British <strong>de</strong>cency. It was classically <strong>in</strong>voked <strong>in</strong> the1960s when a Labour government sought to <strong>in</strong>troduce immigrationcontrols. In the 1965 words of the Labour politician, Roy Hattersley:“Without <strong>in</strong>tegration limitation is <strong>in</strong>excusable, without limitation<strong>in</strong>tegration is impossible.” This casuistry <strong>in</strong> which a tolerant concern forethnic harmony can be <strong>in</strong>voked to justify discrim<strong>in</strong>atory immigrationlegislation was not without its prece<strong>de</strong>nts; and has been much copiedsubsequently.Notoriously, after Kristallnacht <strong>in</strong> 1938 Nazi Germany, the BritishGovernment un<strong>de</strong>rstood the current and future circumstances of GermanJews, and yet they assiduously en<strong>de</strong>avoured to limit the number ofJewish people who would be received as refugees <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. In the wordsof one commentator:… one basic assumption emerged, whether all its implications wereconsciously un<strong>de</strong>rstood or not. If more Jewish refugees meant, ormight eventually mean, more anti-Semitism <strong>in</strong> host countries, thenthe cause of anti-Semitism was —the Jew. And s<strong>in</strong>ce anti-Semitism,at least <strong>in</strong> its more virulent form, was clearly wrong and barbarous,the only course was to prevent any notable <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> our ownJewish population (SHARF 1964, p. 170).Here we have a won<strong>de</strong>rfully corrupt rhetorical formula which <strong>in</strong> itsessence states:—as <strong>de</strong>cent and tolerant people we are naturally opposed to anyform of racism and discrim<strong>in</strong>ation and simultaneously


CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS WITHIN BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM 195—we are committed to a harmonious society—immigrants and ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities have a capacity to generateracial hostility and discrim<strong>in</strong>ation from the majority population—consequently, <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to guarantee harmonious communityrelations we must rigorously control immigration; but not all immigration—just the immigration of categories of people who attractracist responses.Consequently, Jews are responsible for anti-Semitism and “colouredimmigrants” are responsible for creat<strong>in</strong>g racism and discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. Thelocus of this racism, and the access to discretionary power that permitsdiscrim<strong>in</strong>ation rema<strong>in</strong>s an irrelevant penumbra <strong>in</strong> this formulaic rehearsalof British tolerance and <strong>de</strong>cency. It is a formula that has been irresistibleto successive Governments of the left and right <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. In 1973,after a Labour government had passed the <strong>de</strong>liberately discrim<strong>in</strong>atory1968 <strong>Immigration</strong> Act, and when the then Conservative government waspursu<strong>in</strong>g rapid and extreme policies to stop the entry of East AfricanAsians <strong>in</strong>to Brita<strong>in</strong>, the then Home Secretary, Robert Carr, assertedthat:The Government therefore th<strong>in</strong>ks it right, at this time, when wehave just swiftly and honourably accepted the Ugandan Asian refugeesand when there is no threat to UK passport-hol<strong>de</strong>rs elsewhere, tomake it clear that while we shall cont<strong>in</strong>ue to accept our responsibilityto UK passport-hol<strong>de</strong>rs by admitt<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>in</strong> a controlled and or<strong>de</strong>rlymanner through the special voucher scheme, this is as much as it isreasonable and realistic for us to do if good community relations areto be ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>.This mo<strong>de</strong> of argumentation has been rehearsed by politiciansadvocat<strong>in</strong>g controls on immigration throughout the last four <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s,and is amply present <strong>in</strong> the current politics of anti-Asylum seeker policy.It is important to recognise the real double agenda <strong>in</strong> this rhetoric.Whilst its aim is to susta<strong>in</strong> illiberal and discrim<strong>in</strong>atory bor<strong>de</strong>r policies, italso does rehearse the British concern with tolerance and <strong>de</strong>cency. Whilstefficiently legitimat<strong>in</strong>g racism it also asserts assumed common fundamental<strong>de</strong>cencies. That unalloyed explicit racism has been <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed as extremistand beyond the political pale is important. The existence of far rightneo-Fascist parties, such as the National Front <strong>in</strong> the 1970s and theBritish National Party (the BNP) currently, is a potent complement to therhetoric of generic tolerance and <strong>de</strong>cency because they provi<strong>de</strong> an entirelyarbitrary, but politically expedient, <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition of racism as extremism. If theBNP racists are extremists, then by <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition the rest of us are mo<strong>de</strong>ratesand reasonable citizens. Through this perversion of a commitment to


196 CHARLES HUSBAND<strong>de</strong>cency, racist policies may be <strong>de</strong> facto pursued. And the ma<strong>in</strong>streamsteals the thun<strong>de</strong>r of the explicit far right. Perhaps also the persistenceof an extreme racist far right political movement <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> makes acommitment to this fig leaf of <strong>de</strong>cency for the majority rout<strong>in</strong>ely important.As I proceed later <strong>in</strong> my argument I will return to this question <strong>in</strong>or<strong>de</strong>r to ask why these values are not equally available for co-option tosupport progressive political <strong>in</strong>itiatives.Hav<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>veloped this brief historical context, let me now return tothe two parallel processes I wish to exam<strong>in</strong>e. I will start with a selectiveaccount of two <strong>in</strong>stances of progressive policy <strong>de</strong>velopment. The first isan <strong>in</strong>stance of primary legislation signall<strong>in</strong>g a political will to pursueequity and social <strong>in</strong>clusion. From the 1960s British policy response tomigration and a chang<strong>in</strong>g ethnic <strong>de</strong>mography has conta<strong>in</strong>ed two parallelagendas echo<strong>in</strong>g Hattersley’s formulation. <strong>Immigration</strong> legislation <strong>in</strong> 1962,1968, 1971 and 1981 progressively restricted entry <strong>in</strong>to Brita<strong>in</strong> andattempted to close the boundaries of “Fortress Brita<strong>in</strong>”; whilst <strong>in</strong> 1965,1968, 1976 and 2000 Race Relations Acts sought to prohibit discrim<strong>in</strong>ationon the grounds of race, and set up <strong>in</strong>stitutional bodies —theCommunity Relations Commission and, subsequently, the Commissionfor Racial Equality— to promote equality and ethnic cohesion. The 1976Act was particularly significant <strong>in</strong> its move away from conceptualis<strong>in</strong>gracism as merely a behavioural expression of personal prejudice. The1965 and 1968 Acts were focused around direct discrim<strong>in</strong>ation.Critically, the 1976 Act <strong>in</strong>troduced the concept of <strong>in</strong>direct discrim<strong>in</strong>ationwhich addressed situations where treatment is formally equal, but <strong>in</strong> itseffect discrim<strong>in</strong>ates aga<strong>in</strong>st a group <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> racial or ethnic terms.This removed the issue of <strong>in</strong>tent from the process of <strong>de</strong>monstrat<strong>in</strong>g discrim<strong>in</strong>ationand opened up the exploration of <strong>in</strong>stitutional racism wherethe rout<strong>in</strong>e practices of an organisation <strong>in</strong> their effect are discrim<strong>in</strong>atory(see, for example, CRE, 1999). From this perspective workplace culturesrather than <strong>in</strong>dividual actions become significant <strong>in</strong> expos<strong>in</strong>g thediscretionary powers of the majority <strong>in</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>alis<strong>in</strong>g and discrim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>gaga<strong>in</strong>st m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic communities. Practically, it reveals the distress<strong>in</strong>gtruth that “nice people” can discrim<strong>in</strong>ate.This Act provi<strong>de</strong>d a legislative environment <strong>in</strong> which no <strong>in</strong>stitutioncould take for granted the a<strong>de</strong>quacy of its equal opportunities policyand practice. The absence of explicit racist behaviour was no guaranteeof <strong>de</strong>fend<strong>in</strong>g yourself aga<strong>in</strong>st successful prosecution un<strong>de</strong>r the Act forprocedural discrim<strong>in</strong>ation. The Commission for Racial Equality <strong>in</strong> its proactive,educational mo<strong>de</strong> published a framework for local authorities togui<strong>de</strong> their performance <strong>in</strong> race equality. This was entitled Racial equalitymeans quality —a standard for racial equality for local government <strong>in</strong>


CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS WITHIN BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM 197England and Wales. More usually referred to as “The Standards”, thesegui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es have been <strong>in</strong>fluential <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>g policy and practice.Currently the Government is implement<strong>in</strong>g the implications of itsRace Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 which came <strong>in</strong>to effect thisyear. Section 71 (i) of this Act now imposes on every public authority(or organisation fulfill<strong>in</strong>g public functions) a new general duty to:make arrangements to ensure that its functions are carried out withdue regard to the need:(a) to elim<strong>in</strong>ate unlawful racial discrim<strong>in</strong>ation(b) to promote equality of opportunity and good relationsbetween persons of different racial groups.This Act moves towards a proactive policy <strong>in</strong> which <strong>in</strong>stitutions must<strong>de</strong>monstrate that they have anticipated their capacity to respond to thecultural diversity that is present <strong>in</strong> the world <strong>in</strong> which they operate.Much will <strong>de</strong>pend upon how this legislation is implemented andpoliced. But, it is potentially a significant shift <strong>in</strong> State <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong>regulat<strong>in</strong>g ethnic relations <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. It is at the very least an <strong>in</strong>dicationof a political will to confront racism and discrim<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> the mundanepractices of the majority and not just <strong>in</strong> the expressive extremism of thefar right racists.A parallel process of progressive Governmental <strong>in</strong>tervention hasprocee<strong>de</strong>d through the policy <strong>in</strong>itiatives of <strong>in</strong>dividual government<strong>de</strong>partments where, through <strong>de</strong>partmental directives and policystatements, significant shifts <strong>in</strong> practice have been promoted. I willillustrate this <strong>in</strong> relation to health and social care, where over the lastten years I have been actively engaged <strong>in</strong> policy related research and<strong>de</strong>velopment.Isolated grass roots commitment to recognis<strong>in</strong>g the dist<strong>in</strong>ctive healthcare needs, and health care beliefs, of m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic populations hasbeen present <strong>in</strong> the health care professions s<strong>in</strong>ce at least the 1970s. But,this has very much been driven by the personal <strong>in</strong>sight and commitmentof isolated <strong>in</strong>dividuals. As recently as 1996, when with Kate Gerrishand Jenny Mackenzie (GERRISH et al. 1996) we published our extensivestudy of nurse education <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>, the provision of tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> transculturalhealth care practice was sporadic, excessively <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt upon m<strong>in</strong>orityethnic professional <strong>in</strong>itiative and frequently totally absent. And, <strong>in</strong> arecent study of how m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic nurs<strong>in</strong>g staff achieved senior positionswith<strong>in</strong> the NHS, it was revealed that the supportive actions of isolated<strong>in</strong>dividuals was one of the key variables (ELLIOT et al. 2002). Equalopportunities and transcultural competence <strong>in</strong> nurs<strong>in</strong>g had not become


198 CHARLES HUSBANDaddressed <strong>in</strong> a systemic manner. In effect, it was up to “nice people”to take responsibility for putt<strong>in</strong>g these issues on the professionalagendaNow, however, quietly and cumulatively the Department of Healthhas shifted the policy framework. There has been a consi<strong>de</strong>rable bodyof research on the <strong>in</strong>equality <strong>in</strong> access to care and discrim<strong>in</strong>ation with<strong>in</strong>health care experienced by m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic communities (AHMAD, 1993;NAZROO, 1997) and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g awareness of the differ<strong>in</strong>g health careneeds and health care beliefs of m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic communities. These<strong>in</strong>sights have been reflected <strong>in</strong> the recent policy <strong>in</strong>itiatives of theDepartment of Health. For example, the 2000 Department of HealthPaper The vital connection clearly stated the <strong>in</strong>tention of the NationalHealth Service to address the health care needs of m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic users.And, the regulatory body of professional nurs<strong>in</strong>g, the UKCC, <strong>in</strong> its 2000Requirements for pre-registration nurs<strong>in</strong>g programmes put transculturalcompetence onto the level of a professional requirement. And currently,as the NHS rolls out National service frameworks which provi<strong>de</strong> clearguidance on health care provision and benchmark<strong>in</strong>g of good practicefor specific health care needs, issues of race equality have been explicitly<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> these documents. And more recently, the Department ofHealth’s (2002) Essence of health: patient focused benchmark<strong>in</strong>g for healthcare practitioners cont<strong>in</strong>ues the process <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g the benchmark<strong>in</strong>g ofcl<strong>in</strong>ical practice to the process of cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance. Clearly, theDepartment of Health has actively engaged with address<strong>in</strong>g the challengeof provid<strong>in</strong>g equality of care, and appropriate care, for the m<strong>in</strong>ority ethniccommunities <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. It is important to recognise a key conceptualagenda that has been implicit <strong>in</strong> this process.In recognis<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>de</strong>mands of guarantee<strong>in</strong>g equitable treatment <strong>in</strong>the provision of health care to a diverse range of m<strong>in</strong>ority ethniccommunities it has necessarily become apparent that “treat<strong>in</strong>g everyonethe same” is not a viable option. The universalism of TAYLOR’s (1992)equality of respect does not provi<strong>de</strong> an a<strong>de</strong>quate basis for respond<strong>in</strong>gto the different health beliefs and priorities conta<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> a multiethnicclient population. Consequently, pragmatically, there has been adrift towards a necessary acceptance of Taylor’s politics of differencewith its powerful implication that “if you want to treat me equally youmay have to be prepared to treat me differently”. This could sit comfortablywith the normative mantra of British nurs<strong>in</strong>g —“we <strong>de</strong>liver<strong>in</strong>dividualised holistic care”; but generic xenophobic and racist assumptionshave also to be conten<strong>de</strong>d with with<strong>in</strong> the profession.Given the start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t of only a <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong> ago this transition with<strong>in</strong>the British nurs<strong>in</strong>g profession constitutes a positive and important


CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS WITHIN BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM 199policy transition. It is <strong>in</strong> its <strong>in</strong>fancy <strong>in</strong> its impact on actual practice; but itnonetheless represents a significant shift <strong>in</strong> policy.For the purpose of my argument here, one of the most strik<strong>in</strong>gfeatures of this transition <strong>in</strong> health care policy, and <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>troductionof the Race Relations Act (Amendment) 2000, has been the relativelylow profile these <strong>in</strong>itiatives have occupied <strong>in</strong> the Labour Government’spropaganda. At the last election the potential of the Race Relations Actas an explicit <strong>in</strong>dication of the Government’s commitment to equalityand <strong>de</strong>cency was not a major platform <strong>in</strong> the electoral strategy. And, itis likely that the expand<strong>in</strong>g transcultural agenda with<strong>in</strong> the NHS isunknown outsi<strong>de</strong> of the health care service.It is as though the positive values that these <strong>in</strong>itiatives articulatecannot be relied upon to generate an a<strong>de</strong>quate political pay-off. It seemsas though these values of <strong>de</strong>cency, tolerance and equality are part of anational rhetoric of self-regard that can only be pressed <strong>in</strong>to service whenthey are self-serv<strong>in</strong>g. Or put another way, these values are not so robustthat they can effectively compete with other prevail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests andvalues. We can pursue this question by turn<strong>in</strong>g our attention to thesecond major policy area of this address, namely bor<strong>de</strong>r policy and asylumseek<strong>in</strong>g.In 1962, when a Conservative government <strong>in</strong>troduced the firstlegislation to restrict immigration from the Commonwealth <strong>in</strong>to Brita<strong>in</strong>,the Labour Party were resolutely opposed to it. However, follow<strong>in</strong>g theunambiguous electoral evi<strong>de</strong>nce of 1964, of how effective the “racecard” could be <strong>in</strong> national elections, when Peter Griffiths won a seatfor the Tories, aga<strong>in</strong>st the national trend to Labour, with the slogan “Ifyou want a nigger neighbour vote Labour”, the Labour Party havepragmatically pan<strong>de</strong>red to the racist sentiments of the electorate. The1968 <strong>Immigration</strong> Act which was rushed through Parliament <strong>in</strong> threedays <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to restrict Asian immigration from East Africa ma<strong>de</strong> somepeople <strong>de</strong> facto stateless and represented an explicit escalation <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpartywill<strong>in</strong>gness to use racial antipathy for electoral ga<strong>in</strong>. The processof <strong>in</strong>ter-party competition resulted <strong>in</strong> a legislative progression throughthe 1971 <strong>Immigration</strong> Act until <strong>in</strong> 1981 un<strong>de</strong>r Margaret Thatcher, Brita<strong>in</strong>had a new British Nationality Act. As GEDDES (2003, p. 37) observed:“The effect was that millions of people found their citizenship statusamen<strong>de</strong>d to <strong>de</strong>ny them access to the country of which ostensibly theyhad been citizens.”In effect, economic immigration of labour <strong>in</strong>to Brita<strong>in</strong> had exhaustedits potential as a dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g feature of party politics. However, familyrenewal and asylum seek<strong>in</strong>g rema<strong>in</strong>ed potential issues for politicalcontestation.


200 CHARLES HUSBANDFrom 1990 onwards there has been an erratic, but consistent trend,of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g asylum applications for entry <strong>in</strong>to Brita<strong>in</strong>: from 26,205 <strong>in</strong>1990 to 71,700 <strong>in</strong> 2001. This <strong>de</strong>mographic reality has fuelled a “moralpanic” of classic proportions over the threat such immigration representsto British life and culture. This fed a political ferment to radically<strong>de</strong>monstrate that Brita<strong>in</strong> was not generous to settl<strong>in</strong>g refugees. TheLabour Government has applied itself with zeal to this task, perhapssuccoured by their i<strong>de</strong>ological flirtation with communitarianism. Throughthe prism of communitarianism the Government actively <strong>de</strong>veloped adiscourse which favours a moral emphasis on communities; and specificallyon the rights and obligations of <strong>in</strong>dividuals with<strong>in</strong> them. This emphasison “the community” has the capacity to extru<strong>de</strong> asylum seekers fromdomestic affiliation and ren<strong>de</strong>r the moral claims of equality un<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>ternational legal <strong>in</strong>struments appear flimsy and emotionally th<strong>in</strong> bycomparison. Such sentiments would certa<strong>in</strong>ly be supportive of theGovernment’s attempts to place asylum seekers outsi<strong>de</strong> of the normativecircle of persons entitled to welfare benefits.Whilst <strong>in</strong> opposition the Labour Party had opposed the ConservativeGovernment’s tough stance on asylum seek<strong>in</strong>g. But, follow<strong>in</strong>g theirlandsli<strong>de</strong> election <strong>in</strong> 1997, they set about the task of reduc<strong>in</strong>g thenumber of asylum seekers enter<strong>in</strong>g the country. The 1999 <strong>Immigration</strong>and Asylum Act <strong>in</strong>troduced vouchers for asylum seekers <strong>in</strong>stead of cashbenefits and <strong>in</strong>troduced a national dispersal system to <strong>in</strong>hibit theconcentration of asylum seekers <strong>in</strong> London and the South East. This Acthas subsequently been superse<strong>de</strong>d by the 2002 Nationality, <strong>Immigration</strong>and Asylum Act which, amongst other th<strong>in</strong>gs, scrapped the vouchersthat had generated a good <strong>de</strong>al of anger amongst Labour Party activists,and set up the system of rural accommodation centres to pursue theirpolicy of dispersal of refugees and asylum seekers.Additionally, the Government have been actively purs<strong>in</strong>g a proposal tocreate “regional protection process<strong>in</strong>g”, which would be temporaryhold<strong>in</strong>g centres for asylum seekers enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong>; these would be with<strong>in</strong>the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union. This is itself a mo<strong>de</strong>rate variation of the i<strong>de</strong>as floatedby the Blair adm<strong>in</strong>istration to have “refugee transit process<strong>in</strong>g centres” onroutes of entry <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Europe</strong>. These would be based outsi<strong>de</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>anUnion <strong>in</strong> countries such as Albania. In these centres the asylum seekerswould lodge their claims and be <strong>de</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed while they are be<strong>in</strong>g processed.One such camp is reportedly un<strong>de</strong>r construction at Trstenik near Zagreb <strong>in</strong>Croatia. These camps would be the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom’s version of ChristmasIsland, and asylum seekers arriv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> and seek<strong>in</strong>g to lodge a claimwould no longer stay <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong> while their claims were be<strong>in</strong>g processed.They would <strong>in</strong>stead be transferred to one of the camps outsi<strong>de</strong> the UK.


CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS WITHIN BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM 201At the recent <strong>Europe</strong>an Union Summit on 19 June 2003 these controversialplans for such “zones of protection” proposed by Brita<strong>in</strong> and someother member states, were rejected. However, to the accompaniment ofthe sound of a pragmatic wash<strong>in</strong>g of hands, Brita<strong>in</strong> was given permissionto proceed on an experimental basis with pilot schemes. Perhaps theBritish historical experience of <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g concentration camps <strong>in</strong>toSouth Africa dur<strong>in</strong>g the Boer War has lowered our sensitivity to policiesother member states f<strong>in</strong>d distasteful.The frenetic pace of recent policy formation around asylum seek<strong>in</strong>gand the accompany<strong>in</strong>g assertive rhetoric of Draconian impacts onasylum seek<strong>in</strong>g numbers can perhaps be better un<strong>de</strong>rstood <strong>in</strong> the lightof the press coverage of the issue. Whilst bor<strong>de</strong>r policy and the polic<strong>in</strong>gof Fortress Brita<strong>in</strong> has rema<strong>in</strong>ed a recurrently popular theme <strong>in</strong> Britishmedia coverage of ethnic relations, <strong>in</strong> recent years the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g numberof asylum applications has been paralleled by an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly rabidmedia coverage of the issue.Throughout 2000/2001 the “threat” posed by asylum seekersenter<strong>in</strong>g Brita<strong>in</strong> through the Channel tunnel from a Red Cross receptioncentre at Sangatte <strong>in</strong> France provi<strong>de</strong>d a focus for a media neurosis. Theperception was that Brita<strong>in</strong> was seen as a “soft option” for refugees,with more generous welfare benefits than elsewhere. And media anger atthe French Government was matched by a vehement populist campaignaga<strong>in</strong>st asylum seekers. In January of this year, the Sun newspaper, apopulist tabloid newspaper with the largest circulation of any newspaper<strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>, launched a “crusa<strong>de</strong>” aga<strong>in</strong>st what it called “Asylum madness”.On 17 January, un<strong>de</strong>r the headl<strong>in</strong>e “Asylum Meltdown”, it urged itsrea<strong>de</strong>rs to “Read this and get angry.” At the end of the month thepaper was able to claim that it had “touched a nerve <strong>in</strong> the nation”and that more than half a million people had signed its petition urg<strong>in</strong>gthe government “to stop bogus refugees flood<strong>in</strong>g the country”.Over the last six months the Sun has not been alone <strong>in</strong> pursu<strong>in</strong>gthis fetid agenda. The Daily Mail, the Express and the Daily Telegraphhave similarly milked the issue of asylum seek<strong>in</strong>g with a relish that hasma<strong>de</strong> a mockery of extant co<strong>de</strong>s of practice for report<strong>in</strong>g ethnic relations.Asylum seekers have been pa<strong>in</strong>ted as crim<strong>in</strong>als, welfare scroungers andas occupants of extravagantly favourable hous<strong>in</strong>g at state expense.However, as if association with terrorism, malfeasance and unwarrantedprivilege was not an a<strong>de</strong>quate stigmatisation of asylum seekers, theyhave also been accused <strong>in</strong> the press of be<strong>in</strong>g the vehicles for the entry<strong>in</strong>to Brita<strong>in</strong> of Aids, tuberculosis and Hepatitis B.The language of this media assault has rem<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>d me of the m<strong>in</strong>dlessvenom unleashed aga<strong>in</strong>st Germans dur<strong>in</strong>g World War I. It is beyond


202 CHARLES HUSBANDany <strong>de</strong>fence of relevant fact, it is <strong>de</strong>liberately emotive and extreme andit is calculated to engen<strong>de</strong>r hatred aga<strong>in</strong>st a whole category of people.It is propaganda of the vilest k<strong>in</strong>d that should shame British journalism.However, it does <strong>in</strong>crease newspaper circulation.In its Parliamentary existence as one of the most press<strong>in</strong>g policyissues and <strong>in</strong> its centrality to press report<strong>in</strong>g of ethnic diversity, theissue of asylum seek<strong>in</strong>g has revealed a <strong>de</strong>ep ve<strong>in</strong> of xenophobia andmyopic nationalism with<strong>in</strong> British life. The ease with which governmentpolicies can ren<strong>de</strong>r someone <strong>de</strong>stitute, provi<strong>de</strong>d they are an asylumseeker, and the ease with which the media can maliciously vilifythousands of people, provi<strong>de</strong>d they are asylum seekers, must bechallenged. That this should be so <strong>in</strong> a country that is simultaneouslypursu<strong>in</strong>g progressive multicultural <strong>in</strong>itiatives adds an ironic and bittertwist to the current situation.The reality is that <strong>in</strong> comparison with many other nation states <strong>in</strong>the <strong>Europe</strong>an Union, and <strong>in</strong> the ten accession states of the expand<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Europe</strong>an Union, Brita<strong>in</strong> has a much more extensive legislative and<strong>in</strong>stitutional framework aimed at challeng<strong>in</strong>g racism and at promot<strong>in</strong>gethnic equality with<strong>in</strong> a pluralistic framework. Additionally, althoughevi<strong>de</strong>nce of discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, racial antipathy and, <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed, racial assault isnot hard to f<strong>in</strong>d, judged aga<strong>in</strong>st a benchmark of 1960, or 1970 thenature and extent of such behaviour has changed. And, undoubtedlyBrita<strong>in</strong> is a <strong>de</strong> facto multi-ethnic society <strong>in</strong> which ethnic diversity hasbeen normalised <strong>in</strong> everyday life <strong>in</strong> a way that would have beenunimag<strong>in</strong>able to the anti-immigrant lobby and the racist i<strong>de</strong>ologues ofthe 1960s and 1970s. M<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic communities and <strong>in</strong>dividuals arepresent <strong>in</strong> the everyday fabric of society <strong>in</strong> a way that <strong>de</strong>monstrates aprogressive transition toward equitable pluralist multiculturalism. Thereis a long way to go; but, without an historical perspective the currentracism and discrim<strong>in</strong>ation can seem <strong>in</strong>evitable and irresistible.Thus, <strong>in</strong> this context the parallel politics of anti-asylum seekermalice and social exclusion, and the contradictory cumulative creep ofprogressive anti-discrim<strong>in</strong>atory policy and practice, is both distress<strong>in</strong>g anddangerous. And, I would like to conclu<strong>de</strong> by offer<strong>in</strong>g a brief analysis ofthis scenario.To return to my open<strong>in</strong>g argument I feel it is necessary to locateaspects of the i<strong>de</strong>ological environment which un<strong>de</strong>rp<strong>in</strong> the possibilitiesof both policies. Clearly, <strong>de</strong>spite all the literature about globalisationand its post-mo<strong>de</strong>rn social correlates, the nation state is far from be<strong>in</strong>gan obsolete organisational and political entity, and is still a viable elementof collective i<strong>de</strong>ntity construction. In the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom the recenthistory of extend<strong>in</strong>g the political autonomy of Scotland and Wales has,


CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS WITHIN BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM 203if anyth<strong>in</strong>g, highlighted the English national sentiment and ma<strong>de</strong>national i<strong>de</strong>ntities generally more salient with<strong>in</strong> the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom.This, of itself, provi<strong>de</strong>s one vehicle for sensitis<strong>in</strong>g popular feel<strong>in</strong>gsabout both shared i<strong>de</strong>ntities and territorial <strong>in</strong>tegrity. We have seenpo<strong>in</strong>ted questions be<strong>in</strong>g put about the possible cultural criteria forentry to British citizenship, and strong bor<strong>de</strong>r policies have a readyresonance with the wi<strong>de</strong>r population.At the same time, as we noted at the outset, the British have astrong positive self-regard about their own <strong>de</strong>cency. The language oftolerance has been <strong>in</strong>voked to susta<strong>in</strong> both the politics of progressivesocial <strong>in</strong>clusion and the discrim<strong>in</strong>atory bor<strong>de</strong>r policies. In terms of the<strong>in</strong>ternal politics of progressive multiculturalism, the language of tolerancenecessarily places the majority ethnic population <strong>in</strong> a position of flatter<strong>in</strong>gmoral virtue. For as I have argued previously:For tolerance to be necessary, there must be a prior belief that theperson to be tolerated has an <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically un<strong>de</strong>sirable characteristic, orthat they are not fundamentally entitled to the benefits which are tobe allowed them. Those to be tolerated, by <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition, possess somesuch social stigma.Tolerance is the exercise of largesse by the powerful, ultimatelyon behalf of the powerful. It is the generous extension of forbearancetoward someone who is <strong>in</strong>tr<strong>in</strong>sically objectionable or not <strong>de</strong>serv<strong>in</strong>g ofthe privilege be<strong>in</strong>g allowed (HUSBAND, 2000, p. 228).In the context of contemporary multi-ethnic Brita<strong>in</strong>, promot<strong>in</strong>gpositive pluralistic social <strong>in</strong>clusion on the basis of majority tolerancefatally ignores a key reality of British ethnic <strong>de</strong>mography: namely thevery great majority of our m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic population are full Britishcitizens. They do not require the generosity of the majority to allowthem the resources and freedoms they <strong>de</strong>mand. They have these as ofright as citizens. M<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic communities do not seek privilegesgranted by a tolerant majority, they are <strong>de</strong>mand<strong>in</strong>g their rights. As longas large sections of the majority population hang on to the notions ofnational i<strong>de</strong>ntity that ren<strong>de</strong>r m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic citizens as “not quiteBritish” then they will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to have difficulties <strong>in</strong> recognis<strong>in</strong>g therights claims of their m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic neighbours. Perhaps one of thereasons for governmental tentativeness <strong>in</strong> positively assert<strong>in</strong>g thenature and purpose of their multi-ethnic policies is that they are all tooaware of the ambivalent i<strong>de</strong>ological basis of the majority ethniccommunity’s acceptance of their legitimacy.At the same time, <strong>in</strong> the past and currently, we have seen thatrestrictive bor<strong>de</strong>r policies have also been legitimated <strong>in</strong> the name of


204 CHARLES HUSBANDtolerance and a commitment to harmonious community relations.However, it is apparent that such tolerance is regar<strong>de</strong>d as hav<strong>in</strong>g naturallimits. Nation states appear to be very comfortable with the i<strong>de</strong>a thatthere is a natural limit to their tolerance; that they should not bepushed too far <strong>in</strong> the name of equality and <strong>de</strong>cency. BLOMMAERT/VERSCHUEREN (1998), <strong>in</strong> their analysis of the Belgium response toethnic diversity, i<strong>de</strong>ntified the construction of an i<strong>de</strong>a of “the thresholdof tolerance”. This is an i<strong>de</strong>a which <strong>in</strong> its essentials asserts that there isa threshold (a limit) beyond which it is not reasonable to expectmajority populations to cont<strong>in</strong>ue with their “normal” level of tolerance.As, for example, when immigration rates or m<strong>in</strong>ority ethnic numbersbecome too high. In their words:The threshold of tolerance is an objectify<strong>in</strong>g socio-mathematicalconcept that <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>es the conditions un<strong>de</strong>r which the all-<strong>Europe</strong>antolerance and openness may be cancelled without affect<strong>in</strong>g the basicself-image. The <strong>Europe</strong>an does not become <strong>in</strong>tolerant, until thisthreshold is crossed. Just let him or her step back over the samethreshold, i.e. just reduce the number of foreigners aga<strong>in</strong>, and thegood old tolerance will return. In other words, even <strong>in</strong> moments of<strong>in</strong>tolerance the <strong>Europe</strong>an is still tolerant at heart, and the observedbehaviour is completely due to the factual circumstances whichren<strong>de</strong>r it impossible to exercise this essential openness. Needless tosay, the threshold of tolerance is not an exclusively Belgian notion. Itis commonly used <strong>in</strong> other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries (p. 78).The “magic” <strong>in</strong> this use of the notion of a threshold of tolerancelies precisely <strong>in</strong> its ability to <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>e tolerance as an on-go<strong>in</strong>g property ofthe majority, which may regrettably be curtailed due to externalconditions. From this perspective the proper politics of manag<strong>in</strong>gethnic diversity lies <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g the environment <strong>in</strong> which tolerance canreign free. This, of course, may mean Draconian bor<strong>de</strong>r policies exclud<strong>in</strong>gasylum seekers and/or restrictive citizenship criteria. Concretely, policiesthat fly <strong>in</strong> the face of humanitarian engagement with the lives ofothers are ren<strong>de</strong>red mean<strong>in</strong>gful as expressions of concern with <strong>in</strong>ternal“harmonious community relations”. The whole, of course, permeated byan implicit nationalist xenophobia. It is hardly surpris<strong>in</strong>g that governmentsare so aggressively pursu<strong>in</strong>g anti-asylum seeker policies.In a period where Western capitalism has revealed awesome levelsof corruption and fallibility; where the economically comfortable aref<strong>in</strong>ancially neurotic about share values; where home owners have noreason to believe that their endowment policies are likely to fulfil theirstated targets; and where pension schemes emerge as a new variant


CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS WITHIN BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM 205on the South Sea Bubble Corporation, large sections of the populationfeel <strong>de</strong>eply <strong>in</strong>secure. And, <strong>in</strong> a world where active participation <strong>in</strong>politics through the electoral system has almost become a m<strong>in</strong>orityactivity, large swathes of the electorate are <strong>de</strong> facto politicallyirrelevant. In what J.K. GALBRAITH (1992) po<strong>in</strong>tedly called “the cultureof contentment”, governments are likely to shape their policies toservice the anxieties and priorities of this politically salient cohort. Soperhaps aga<strong>in</strong> we can see why the robust claims of secure bor<strong>de</strong>rshave greater political play than progressive policies aimed at secur<strong>in</strong>gequality of rights, and potentially difference of treatment, for m<strong>in</strong>orityethnic citizens.As short term pragmatic politics, this perverse differential pursuit ofparallel politics may be “politically” un<strong>de</strong>rstandable. But, as a collusivere<strong>in</strong>forcement of misgui<strong>de</strong>d majority population values and a <strong>de</strong>nial of thepolitical realities of multi-ethnic Brita<strong>in</strong> this is an irresponsible nurtur<strong>in</strong>gof future troubles.ReferencesAHMED, W.I.U. (1993): (ed.) “Race” and health <strong>in</strong> contemporary Brita<strong>in</strong>.Buck<strong>in</strong>gham: Open University Press.BANTON, M.; HARWOOD, J. (1975): The race concept. London: David & Charles.BARZUN, J. (1965): Race: a study <strong>in</strong> superstition. New York: Harper & Row.BLOMMAERT, J.; VERSCHUEREN, J. (1998): Debat<strong>in</strong>g diversity: analys<strong>in</strong>g the discourseof tolerance. Routledge: London.COLLEY, L. (1992): Britons: forg<strong>in</strong>g the nation. New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress.COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (1999): The Stephen Lawrence enquiry:implications for racial equality. London: CRE http://www.cre.gov.uk.ELLIOT, J.; WALKER, R.; BALSON, G.; CHOUDHERI, S.; HUSBAND, C. (2002): Gett<strong>in</strong>g onaga<strong>in</strong>st the odds: how black and ethnic m<strong>in</strong>ority nurses can progress <strong>in</strong>tolea<strong>de</strong>rship. London: NHS Lea<strong>de</strong>rship Centre, Department of Health.ERIKSEN, T.H. (1995): Small places, large issues. London: Pluto Press.GALBRAITH, J.K. (1992): The culture of contentment. London: S<strong>in</strong>clair-Stevenson.GEDDES, A. (2003): The politics of migration and immigration <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>. London:Sage.GERRISH, K.; HUSBAND, C.; MACKENZIE, J. (1996): Nurs<strong>in</strong>g for a multi-ethnic society.Buck<strong>in</strong>gham: Open University Press.HARGREAVES, A.G. (1995): <strong>Immigration</strong>, “race”, and ethnicity <strong>in</strong> contemporaryFrance. London: Routledge.HARTMANN, P.; HUSBAND, C. (1974): Racism and the mass media. London: Davis-Poynter.HECHTER, M. (1975): Internal colonialism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.


206 CHARLES HUSBANDHOBSBAWN, E.J.; RANGER, T. (1983): The <strong>in</strong>vention of iradition. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.JORDAN, W.D. (1969): White over black. Harmondsworth: Pengu<strong>in</strong>.HUSBAND, C. (1974): (ed.): White media black Brita<strong>in</strong>. London: Arrow Books.HUSBAND, C. (1987): (ed): Race <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>: cont<strong>in</strong>uity and change. London:Hutch<strong>in</strong>son Education.HUSBAND, C. (2000): “Recognis<strong>in</strong>g diversity and <strong>de</strong>velopment skills : the paperrole of transcultural communication”, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>an Journal of Social Work,3(3), pp. 225-234.MASON, D. (1986): “Controversies and cont<strong>in</strong>uities <strong>in</strong> race and ethnic relationstheory”, <strong>in</strong> J. Rex and D. Mason (eds): Theories of race and ethnic relations.pp. 1-19, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.NAZROO, J.Y. (1997): The health of Brita<strong>in</strong>’s ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities. London: PolicyStudies Institute.OMNI, M.; WINANT, H. (1986): Racial formation <strong>in</strong> the United States. New York:Routledge.SHARF, A. (1964): The British press and Jews un<strong>de</strong>r Nazi rule. London: Instituteof Race Relations/Oxford University Press.SOLOMOS, J. (1993): Race and racism <strong>in</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>. Bas<strong>in</strong>gstoke: The Macmillan Press.TAYLOR, C. (1992): Multiculturalism and “the politics of recognition”. Pr<strong>in</strong>cetonNJ: Pr<strong>in</strong>ceton University Press.


Mutual acceptance or rejection? Explor<strong>in</strong>g socialdistance among German, Turkish and ResettleradolescentsJoachim BrüßIntroduction 1S<strong>in</strong>ce German reunification immigration <strong>in</strong>to Germany, and thereactions to immigration, have become more important. 2 The currentpolitical <strong>de</strong>bate on immigration legislation (see BADE/MÜNZ eds. 2002),<strong>in</strong>dicates that the explosive nature of this subject might cont<strong>in</strong>ue forquite some time. Moreover, research on the <strong>in</strong>tegration of immigrantshas repeatedly po<strong>in</strong>ted out that conflicts emerge dur<strong>in</strong>g the process of<strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g immigrants <strong>in</strong>to a host society and that prejudice plays aconsi<strong>de</strong>rable role <strong>in</strong> this respect (see for example BROWN, 1995;DUCKITT, 1992; TREIBEL, 1999; HECKMANN,1992).The social relevance of this subject leads to the question of whether,and to what extent, ethnic prejudice or social distance among adolescentsof various <strong>de</strong>scent can be <strong>de</strong>tected. Can we assume that ma<strong>in</strong>ly youthsof German <strong>de</strong>scent will reject immigrant youths or do these adolescentsreject German youths as well? What are the dom<strong>in</strong>ant patterns ofsocial relations between the immigrant groups? Can acceptance orrejection be found across all areas of social life, or are some attitu<strong>de</strong>sparticularly higlighted? Is it possible that acceptance and tolerance areprevalent <strong>in</strong> the cognitive area but when it comes to emotional1 This paper is based on research fun<strong>de</strong>d by the German Science Foundation (grantno. HE1385/5). Project directors are Prof. Dr. W. Heitmeyer and Dr. R. Möller.2For the most violent expressions compare the <strong>de</strong>velopment of rightw<strong>in</strong>g extremistattacks aga<strong>in</strong>st foreigners s<strong>in</strong>ce 1990 (For <strong>de</strong>tails see the annual reports,Verfassungsschutzberichte, published by the German M<strong>in</strong>istry of the Interior orhttp://www.verfassungsschutz.<strong>de</strong>).


208 JOACHIM BRÜßaspects, coldness and distance are the norm? This empirical field studyattempts to assess the relationships between autochthonous, German,and allochthonous, Turkish (settled) and Resettler (recent) adolescents. 3The ma<strong>in</strong> question is whether and to what extent social distanceamong three ethnic adolescent groups can be revealed and whetheracceptance or rejection <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>es the <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations.Consi<strong>de</strong>rations for the measurement of mutual acceptanceand rejectionThe mutual perceptions among German, Turkish and Resettleradolescents are based on a survey that <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s aspects of prejudiceand social distance aga<strong>in</strong>st dist<strong>in</strong>ct out-groups. In or<strong>de</strong>r to accomplishthis, suggestions ma<strong>de</strong> by DUCKITT (1992), BROWN (1995), and BOBO/HUTCHINGS (1996) have been consulted. The construct acceptanceversus rejection factors <strong>in</strong> emotional and behavioural components,cognitive attitu<strong>de</strong>s and anxieties regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g resources. This<strong>in</strong>strument should be sensitive enough to tap <strong>in</strong>to the differenceseparat<strong>in</strong>g “subtle prejudice” from “blatant prejudice”, as has beenwi<strong>de</strong>ly used <strong>in</strong> American scholarship and research on race relations andprejudice. 4 F<strong>in</strong>ally, the survey must <strong>in</strong>corporate questions appropriate tothe level of adolescents, and they must be applicable for each group<strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the research. These are central requirements for the measurementof mutual perceptions, particularly when consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g that systematicscientific research <strong>in</strong> Germany <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g two or more migrant groups israrely found. Measurement <strong>in</strong>struments that have been primarilyworked out for evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the attitu<strong>de</strong>s of the majority population asfor <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> ALLBUS or Eurobarometer surveys, offered suggestions,but could not be adopted completely.3 In or<strong>de</strong>r to keep the writ<strong>in</strong>g concise and to avoid overly complex analyses,adolescents without a migration background are <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ed as German adolescents.Adolescents with a migration background from Turkey, whose families started to arrive<strong>in</strong> the late 1950s, are <strong>de</strong>scribed as Turkish adolescents. F<strong>in</strong>ally, youths who came withtheir families from the ex-USSR, Romania or Poland s<strong>in</strong>ce the mid 1980s are labelledResettler (Aussiedler) adolescents. In addition, the group of Turkish immigrants can be<strong>de</strong>scribed as settled, whereas the Aussiedler are seen as recent immigrants.4See for <strong>in</strong>stance McCONAHAY (1986), SEARS (1988) or PETTIGREW/MEERTENS(1995). In our case, we do not assume that blatant versus subtle prejudice constitutetwo dist<strong>in</strong>ct dimensions but rather presume that the different responses <strong>in</strong>dicate anassessment cont<strong>in</strong>uum rang<strong>in</strong>g from acceptance to refusal. Nevertheless, research onblatant versus subtle prejudice has worked out pert<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to the procedures ofhow to measure prejudice.


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 209The attitu<strong>de</strong>s regard<strong>in</strong>g the mutual social relations of the three groupscan be <strong>de</strong>picted by us<strong>in</strong>g an overarch<strong>in</strong>g perception cont<strong>in</strong>uum rang<strong>in</strong>gfrom acceptance to rejection. The more often respon<strong>de</strong>nts express warmand favourable feel<strong>in</strong>gs, the more they consi<strong>de</strong>r mutual activities withmembers of the out-group, the more they accept the sociality of the outgroupand the less they are afraid of resource anxieties, we will classifythese attitu<strong>de</strong>s as acceptance of out-group members. In the opposite casewe will speak of rejection aga<strong>in</strong>st the out-group and that overlaps withaspects of prejudice.Social scientists <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>e prejudice as comparatively rigid attitu<strong>de</strong>s andrejection of other <strong>in</strong>dividuals and groups. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to BROWN (1995)prejudice is regar<strong>de</strong>d as a) the hold<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>de</strong>rogatory social attitu<strong>de</strong>s orcognitive beliefs, b) the expression of negative affect, and c) the displayof hostile and discrim<strong>in</strong>atory behaviour toward members of a group onaccount of their membership of that group.In addition to this, BOBO/HUTCHINGS (1996) note with reference toBLUMER (1958) that prejudice or hostilities between social groups arenot only based on <strong>in</strong>dividually learned emotions and convictions but arealso historically grown and carry a collective assessment of groupposition with them. Ethnic prejudice is then to be un<strong>de</strong>rstood as achallenge for group position, and prejudice is used as a means ofma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and secur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tegrity and position of a dom<strong>in</strong>ant socialgroup.From the <strong>in</strong>dividual perspective, prejudices are social attitu<strong>de</strong>s,acquired and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed through an <strong>in</strong>teraction of external <strong>in</strong>fluences(e.g. socialisation, culture), usual psychological functions (e.g. perceptionand categorisation), and through the personality structure of the<strong>in</strong>dividual. From a social perspective, prejudice is conveyed via the role“that prejudice played <strong>in</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g the society’s racial caste system”(KATZ, 1991: p. 127). In this regard establish<strong>in</strong>g and support<strong>in</strong>g grouppositions is of paramount importance and <strong>in</strong>tergroup comparisons play acentral role.Favour<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>group and/or the out-group?S<strong>in</strong>ce this study will <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> categories for ethnic i<strong>de</strong>ntity, the analysiswill also use theoretical assumptions of Social I<strong>de</strong>ntity Theory. In thistheory, accord<strong>in</strong>g to TAJFEL/TURNER (1986), <strong>in</strong>dividuals strive for a positivesocial i<strong>de</strong>ntity which they ga<strong>in</strong> from favourable <strong>in</strong>tergroup comparisons.Experiments based on m<strong>in</strong>imal group research <strong>de</strong>signs have consistentlyshown that the effect of categorisation not only results <strong>in</strong> dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>g


210 JOACHIM BRÜß<strong>in</strong>-group and out-group, but also that preferences for the <strong>in</strong>-group areexpressed (TAJFEL, 1982). For this reason, a favour<strong>in</strong>g of the <strong>in</strong>-groupseems <strong>in</strong>evitable. Although this does not mean that <strong>in</strong>-group favour<strong>in</strong>gautomatically goes with rejection of the out-group, it is assumed that<strong>in</strong>dividuals are prone to such behaviour.Based on results of several scientific studies on <strong>in</strong>tergroup comparisons,HINKLE/BROWN (1990) robustly f<strong>in</strong>d that the same group shows apreference for the <strong>in</strong>-group and for the out-group as well as show<strong>in</strong>g nopreference for a particular group. This is a clear <strong>in</strong>dication of a <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nceon context and of the possibility of crossed categorisations for thecomparisons <strong>in</strong> question. Results of their analysis <strong>in</strong>dicate that the acceptanceor rejection of out-groups is based on status. That is, lower status groupsdo not necessarily refuse out-groups with higher status.An explanation for this is offered by Social Dom<strong>in</strong>ance Theory.SIDANIUS/PRATTO (1999) stress different potentials for and realisationsof social dom<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>in</strong> a society that itself is structured as systems ofgroup-based social hierarchies. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to them, the psyche of subord<strong>in</strong>atesreflects not only the <strong>de</strong>sire for positive regard and belong<strong>in</strong>gbut also their group’s <strong>in</strong>ferior position, just as the psyche of dom<strong>in</strong>antsmirrors their privileged position <strong>in</strong> society. The asymmetry hypothesisthen posits, because <strong>in</strong>-group favouritism may be easier for and morevaluable to dom<strong>in</strong>ants, that <strong>in</strong>-group favouritism will be stronger amongdom<strong>in</strong>ants than among subord<strong>in</strong>ates. Tak<strong>in</strong>g status <strong>in</strong>to account, thisimplies that <strong>in</strong>-group favouritism is most prevalent among groups thathave equal or greater status than the out-group. In contrast, out-groupfavouritism occurs more often when the out-group has higher statusand when the social status hierarchy is perceived to be both legitimateand stable. Thus, Sidanius and Pratto help to expla<strong>in</strong> the differences <strong>in</strong>favouritism by stat<strong>in</strong>g that, “both <strong>in</strong>-group favoritism on the part ofdom<strong>in</strong>ants and out-group favoritism on the part of subord<strong>in</strong>ates wouldseem to help ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the system of group-based <strong>in</strong>equality” (1999, p.230). Thus, <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to un<strong>de</strong>rstand the group status for this study it isnecessary to evaluate the social participation of our target groups.Evaluat<strong>in</strong>g the status of the groupsThe socio-economic background of the adolescents <strong>in</strong>dicates arelative <strong>de</strong>privation for the Turkish adolescents regard<strong>in</strong>g education andparents’ occupational status. In comparison with Resettler and Germanparents, Turkish parents do not often have a profession, though <strong>in</strong> somecases they have completed vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. Less frequently they


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 211have a technical diploma or even a university <strong>de</strong>gree. For the mothersof Resettler adolescents it is important to note that they have less oftencompleted vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dustry or adm<strong>in</strong>istration. On the otherhand, they more often have a technical diploma or a university <strong>de</strong>greethan mothers of Turkish or German adolescents.Regard<strong>in</strong>g current job status, Turkish parents work less often <strong>in</strong> fullorpart-time jobs <strong>in</strong> comparison with Resettler and German parents.Fathers of Turkish youths work more frequently <strong>in</strong> part-time jobs, and aremore often retired or unemployed than fathers of German and Resettleradolescents. Mothers of Turkish youths work less often <strong>in</strong> part-timejobs and are more often home-makers than mothers of German andResettler adolescents.The relative <strong>de</strong>privation of families of Turkish <strong>de</strong>scent does not meanthat they are entirely exclu<strong>de</strong>d from social participation. But regard<strong>in</strong>gtheir socio-economic background, the command of a comparativelylower amount of resources has to be taken <strong>in</strong>to account, especially whensocial participation <strong>in</strong> the labour market is concerned. Consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g socialposition, this means that Turkish adolescents have a lower amount ofresources and thus have less chance of social participation. In comparison,the positions of German and Resettler adolescents are well advanced.This difference is even more substantial when political participationis taken <strong>in</strong>to consi<strong>de</strong>ration. Resettler families are given German citizenshipas soon as they enter the country after hav<strong>in</strong>g proved that they areResettlers and not Russian or Polish immigrants. In contrast, Turkishadolescents have to apply for citizenship if they wish to participatedirectly <strong>in</strong> politics, for <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>in</strong> elections or for certa<strong>in</strong> political oradm<strong>in</strong>istrative posts.Hence, the ascribed social status will be based on consi<strong>de</strong>rations ofrealised social participation of the three groups. The group with higherstatus is able to realise a higher amount of social participation measuredby the average school education of the adolescents and by qualificationand job type of their parents. Migrants of Turkish <strong>de</strong>scent are still the mostdisadvantaged group amongst the guest-worker population, account<strong>in</strong>gfor a comparatively high unemployment rate. Compare for example thestatistics for Spanish, Greek, Italian and Turkish adolescents (Beauftragte<strong>de</strong>r Bun<strong>de</strong>sregierung für Auslän<strong>de</strong>rfragen, 2000). However, changes <strong>in</strong>school education <strong>in</strong> the German state of North Rh<strong>in</strong>e-Westphalia (NRW)<strong>in</strong>dicate that the gap between Resettler and Turkish adolescents is gett<strong>in</strong>gsmaller. The majority of these youths still attend the Hauptschule, but aten<strong>de</strong>ncy for Turkish adolescents to switch from the Hauptschule to theGesamtschule, and for the Resettlers from the Hauptschule to theRealschule, can be observed. But the proportion of those who attend


212 JOACHIM BRÜßthe Gymnasium is still low <strong>in</strong> comparison with German adolescents.Some scholars argue that this is an <strong>in</strong>dication of <strong>in</strong>stitutional racism <strong>in</strong>Germany (e.g. GOMOLLA/RADTKE, 2002).Tak<strong>in</strong>g this together, it is reasonable to categorise the group ofGerman adolescents as members of the dom<strong>in</strong>ant group with highstatus. The group of Resettler adolescents will cautiously be regar<strong>de</strong>das subord<strong>in</strong>ates hav<strong>in</strong>g a medium status. The group of Turkishadolescents are classified as subord<strong>in</strong>ates with low status given thecomparatively low amount of realised social participation. 5 S<strong>in</strong>ce statusserves as an additional relevant category for the analysis of <strong>in</strong>tergroupdifferences, it will be discussed later to what extent the basicassumption of Social I<strong>de</strong>ntity and of Social Dom<strong>in</strong>ance Theory can becorroborated across all three groups <strong>in</strong> this field study. But before that,the mo<strong>de</strong>l specification for the analysis is <strong>in</strong>troduced.Specify<strong>in</strong>g the analysisThe complexity of the <strong>in</strong>strument stems from two sources. In tak<strong>in</strong>gthe criticism by Katz seriously, and <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> the centraldimensions for a measurement of acceptance versus rejection, theconstruct is based on direct and <strong>in</strong>direct evaluations of the out-groups.First, to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the more <strong>in</strong>dividually or directly based relations,cognitive, emotional and behavioural evaluations were sought. On theother hand, <strong>in</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g primarily social or <strong>in</strong>direct relations, questionsdirected toward the social life of the out-groups, as well as perceivedthreats of <strong>de</strong>cl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g resources were asked. Taken together, Figure 1shows the i<strong>de</strong>al type structure for the analysis (for the specific items,see Appendix).For mutual perceptions between German, Turkish and Resettler(Aussiedler) adolescents the follow<strong>in</strong>g hypotheses will be <strong>in</strong>vestigated:Relat<strong>in</strong>g to Social I<strong>de</strong>ntity Theory, across the groups we expect tof<strong>in</strong>d a clear <strong>in</strong>-group preference and a rejection of the out-groups.—For the German adolescents, we expect to f<strong>in</strong>d that they will keepTurkish and Resettler adolescents at a certa<strong>in</strong> distance. Thisassumption corresponds with BLUMER’S (1958) and BOBO’S5 This is not to say that <strong>in</strong>dividuals of any of these groups are per se dom<strong>in</strong>ant orsubord<strong>in</strong>ate or of high versus low status or prestige. The classification is explicitly ma<strong>de</strong>for an <strong>in</strong>tergroup comparison and not meant to be <strong>de</strong>rogatory for <strong>in</strong>dividual membersof the particular groups.


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 213Emotional ReferenceAcceptance /Rejectionof the out-groupBehavioural ReferenceResource anxietiesAttitu<strong>de</strong>s towards SocialityFigure 1The attitu<strong>de</strong> structure for the group comparison(1999) approach of conceptualis<strong>in</strong>g prejudice as a threat togroup position. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this, prejudice and social distanceaim at ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and secur<strong>in</strong>g group position <strong>in</strong> society. Further,from Social I<strong>de</strong>ntity Theory, there should be no <strong>in</strong>centives for apositive dist<strong>in</strong>ction for German adolescents if they accept membersof migrant groups. Thus, this might lead to a rejection of theout-groups.—For the adolescents with a migration background, the ma<strong>in</strong>assumption refers to a strong reason for migration <strong>in</strong> general: theexpectation, or the wish, to improve one’s liv<strong>in</strong>g conditions. Thus,the answers from Turkish and Resettler adolescents are expectedto be more friendly and accept<strong>in</strong>g of German youths rather thanexpress<strong>in</strong>g an attitu<strong>de</strong> of rejection. In this case, out-group approvalcan <strong>in</strong>dicate membership with<strong>in</strong> the receiv<strong>in</strong>g society and thisshould support a positive social i<strong>de</strong>ntity. Thus, for the two groupswith lower social status we do not expect a refusal of the outgroupwith higher status.—For social relations among immigrants, we expect a slight butsubstantial rejection of the “settled” group (<strong>in</strong> this case the Turkishyouth) by the “recent” migrant group (here the Aussiedler adolescents)because of the particular conditions un<strong>de</strong>r which theResettlers came to Germany. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to classical research onmigration (BOGARDUS, 1930), the opposite would be a standardassumption. Un<strong>de</strong>r equal conditions, the newcomers would tryto climb up the social lad<strong>de</strong>r and the established groups mightuse prejudice and social distance to prevent or retard their socialmobility. In our case, we cannot speak of equal conditions. Becauseof the political and governmental support for the Resettlers, we


214 JOACHIM BRÜßassume that they express prejudice and social distance aga<strong>in</strong>stthe Turkish adolescents <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> their privileges. Moreover,it is to be expected that Resettler adolescents may i<strong>de</strong>ntifymore closely with the German youth, provid<strong>in</strong>g an additionalreason to distance themselves from Turkish adolescents. 6 F<strong>in</strong>ally,consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g differences <strong>in</strong> group status Social Dom<strong>in</strong>ance Theoryassumes that the Resettler adolescents <strong>in</strong> particular will reject thelower and accept the higher status group <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>the <strong>in</strong>tergroup structure.Before we report on the results, a brief <strong>de</strong>scription of methods andsample structure will provi<strong>de</strong> a better un<strong>de</strong>rstand<strong>in</strong>g of the scale of thestudy.MethodsSample selectionThe population for this study consists of all pupils <strong>in</strong> the 10 th gra<strong>de</strong>(aged 16 to 17) who went to one of the four ma<strong>in</strong> state school types(Hauptschulen, Realschulen, Gesamtschulen and Gymnasien) 7 <strong>in</strong> NRWdur<strong>in</strong>g 2001. This means that all pupils who come from a German,Turkish or Resettler family background <strong>in</strong> 54 urban and rural areas <strong>in</strong>NRW belong to the target population. The selected sample encompassesadolescents from these three ethnic groups from 24 urban and ruralareas, with a comparatively high proportion of youths com<strong>in</strong>g from aTurkish and Resettler background. The fieldwork was conducted <strong>in</strong> theseareas, with roughly 69,200 German, 5,200 Turkish and 8,400 Resettleradolescents be<strong>in</strong>g potential respon<strong>de</strong>nts.FieldworkIn prepar<strong>in</strong>g the actual fieldwork we asked all state schools <strong>in</strong> the24 urban and rural areas to participate. Those schools that agreed toparticipate received <strong>in</strong>formation for all the pupils <strong>in</strong> the 10 th gra<strong>de</strong>, as6 This seems particularly valid for the Aussiedler from the former Soviet Union, whowere separated as so called Volks<strong>de</strong>utsche (ethnic Germans) from the former rul<strong>in</strong>g regime.This will have led to a stronger i<strong>de</strong>ntification with the adolescents of German <strong>de</strong>scent s<strong>in</strong>cetheir ethnic i<strong>de</strong>ntity was not fully recognised <strong>in</strong> their former country and now they are ableand possibly will<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>de</strong>velop the notion of a match<strong>in</strong>g member- and citizenship.7Hauptschulen are regar<strong>de</strong>d as the least challeng<strong>in</strong>g schools <strong>in</strong> comparison with theGymnasien, where attendance normally leads to further studies at universities.


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 215well as material <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>g their parents about the study. The <strong>in</strong>formationwas distributed <strong>in</strong> class and those pupils who wished to participatereturned a letter of agreement. For the actual data collection, pupilsreceived a questionnaire plus a small reward. In other cases, more often<strong>in</strong> the Hauptschulen, head teachers told us early on that the fieldworkshould take place <strong>in</strong> the schools, otherwise there was a high probabilitythat questionnaires would not be returned. In these schools the surveyswere conducted <strong>in</strong> the classrooms. Of those 15,400 pupils who agreed toparticipate <strong>in</strong> the study (18.6 % of potential respon<strong>de</strong>nts), 60 % completedthe survey at home and 40 % were surveyed at school. The subsequentsurveys <strong>in</strong> this longitud<strong>in</strong>al study —last year and over the com<strong>in</strong>gyears— are self-report surveys.The sample and its distributionThe result<strong>in</strong>g sample (72.7 % of those who <strong>de</strong>clared participation),the IKG-Youth-Panel 2001, is composed of 6,055 German, 1,652 Turkishand 3,539 Resettler adolescents. This large number of participants isnecessary as some respon<strong>de</strong>nts will not participate throughout thecomplete survey period of six years, panel mortality must be taken <strong>in</strong>toaccount. The subgroups of immigrant youths must be large enough forcomparative analyses, hence the over-sampl<strong>in</strong>g for them.The distribution of pupils accord<strong>in</strong>g to school attendance showsthat the sample <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>s fewer adolescents from Gesamtschulen acrossall groups and fewer migrant youths from the Gymnasium comparedwith the population distribution. Regard<strong>in</strong>g German adolescents, whilethere are too many pupils from the Hauptschule there are too few fromthe Gymnasium <strong>in</strong> our sample. In addition, the gen<strong>de</strong>r distribution isunbalanced. 8In or<strong>de</strong>r to match the sampl<strong>in</strong>g distribution with the population,the analysis was weighted to adjust for gen<strong>de</strong>r and school attendance<strong>in</strong> relation to the distribution <strong>in</strong> the population. Turkish and Resettleradolescents are classified accord<strong>in</strong>g to their migration background, notonly their citizenship. The classification is based on responses to questionsabout the pupils’ <strong>de</strong>scent (e.g. place of birth, passport) as well as <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g8 Particularly for the Turkish and the Resettler adolescents, the proportion of womenis too high consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the normal <strong>de</strong>mographic situation. For the German youths thegen<strong>de</strong>r distribution is appropriate. The comb<strong>in</strong>ation of this distribution shows specificallythat female migrants <strong>in</strong> the Gymnasium are over-represented while male migrant pupilsfrom the Gesamtschule are un<strong>de</strong>r-represented. Concern<strong>in</strong>g the German adolescentsthere are too many male pupils from the Hauptschule <strong>in</strong> the sample.


216 JOACHIM BRÜß<strong>in</strong>formation on the parents’ background and on the languages spoken <strong>in</strong>the household. The weights calculated range from 0.41 for femaleResettler adolescents from the Gymnasium (n = 457) to 1.89 for maleTurkish adolescents from the Gesamtschule (n = 119).ResultsThis section <strong>de</strong>scribes and compares the <strong>in</strong>terethnic attitu<strong>de</strong>s forthe three groups. Because of the very large sample size, all significancetests for differences <strong>in</strong> means and variances are carried out for an errorprobability of p < 0.01.Look<strong>in</strong>g for the general sentimentTo beg<strong>in</strong> with, the overall emotional relations toward the particulargroups are analysed with the help of a feel<strong>in</strong>g barometer. Respon<strong>de</strong>ntswere asked how they felt toward the out-groups and answers weremarked on a 5 po<strong>in</strong>t scale, from “very negative” (–2) to “very positive”(+2). A first glance, compar<strong>in</strong>g the values <strong>in</strong> the diagonal with those <strong>in</strong> theoff-diagonal, clearly shows that the <strong>in</strong>-group assessments are frequentlyl<strong>in</strong>ked with more positive feel<strong>in</strong>gs than out-group assessments (seeTable 1). This f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g corroborates Tajfel’s (1981) basic hypothesis ofSocial I<strong>de</strong>ntity Theory, that <strong>in</strong> a group comparison the preference isgiven to one’s own group. Despite this, the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>dicate that wecannot completely corroborate a general out-group rejection based onresponses to the feel<strong>in</strong>g barometer.Table 1Average Responses to the Feel<strong>in</strong>g Barometer aGeneral feel<strong>in</strong>gs German Turkish Resettleradolescents adolescents adolescentsToward German youth m = 1.26 a m = 0.90 m = 1.00Toward Turkish youth m = –0.24 m = 1.36 m = –0.26Toward Resettler youth m = 0.18 m = 0.41 m = 1.19aThe means are based on a 5-po<strong>in</strong>t scale with <strong>in</strong>dicators at the extremes, labelled (–2)for a “very negative” and (+2) for a “very positive” feel<strong>in</strong>g.German adolescents n = 6,055Turkish adolescents n = 1,652Resettler adolescents n = 3,539Source: IKG Youth Panel 2001


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 217On average, feel<strong>in</strong>gs toward the German adolescents are quitepositive and warm. In contrast, German adolescents do not express suchwarm feel<strong>in</strong>gs toward migrant youth, rather they rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>different.This corresponds closely with assumptions of Social Dom<strong>in</strong>ance Theorys<strong>in</strong>ce the dom<strong>in</strong>ant group expresses closeness with the <strong>in</strong>-group butkeeps the subord<strong>in</strong>ate or the lower status groups at a certa<strong>in</strong> distance.Turkish adolescents receive the worst evaluations from German andResettler adolescents. At the same time, they have the highest <strong>in</strong>-groupvalues, though this is not related to a general out-group rejection. Turkishadolescents just express positive and warm feel<strong>in</strong>gs more often towardthe <strong>in</strong>-group than toward the out-groups. In other words, the group withthe lowest status expresses strong <strong>in</strong>-group feel<strong>in</strong>gs but also showsdist<strong>in</strong>ct <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ations to be on good terms with the higher status group.In comparison with this, the Resettler adolescents show the largestdifferences <strong>in</strong> their feel<strong>in</strong>gs toward the out-groups. General feel<strong>in</strong>gstoward the German adolescents are nearly as warm and positive asfeel<strong>in</strong>gs toward their own group. In contrast, emotional expressions ofResettlers toward the Turkish adolescents are much col<strong>de</strong>r and moredistant, thus we <strong>de</strong>tect a ten<strong>de</strong>ncy for emotional rejection. Corroborat<strong>in</strong>gthe asymmetry hypothesis of Social Dom<strong>in</strong>ance Theory, the mediumstatus group ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s the social hierarchy by express<strong>in</strong>g closenesswith the dom<strong>in</strong>ant group but distance from the low status group.Focus<strong>in</strong>g on the group-specific attitu<strong>de</strong> structuresFor a more <strong>de</strong>tailed analysis, 9 items provi<strong>de</strong>d the necessary complexityfor measur<strong>in</strong>g acceptance versus rejection across groups. Four majordimensions of mutual evaluations are used for the <strong>in</strong>tergroup comparisons.These are:—The emotional factor comb<strong>in</strong>es two evaluations that a) they liketo be together with youths of the out-group with b) the generalfeel<strong>in</strong>gs toward the out-group.—The behavioural factor consists of three assessments that a) theywould lend someth<strong>in</strong>g to members of the out-group, b) theywould share personal problems with members of the out-group,and c) they would <strong>in</strong>vite out-group members to a party.—Resource anxieties are based on two propositions, a) that liv<strong>in</strong>gconditions <strong>in</strong> the neighbourhood will be more difficult and b)there will be fewer options for vocational tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g if more outgroupmembers live <strong>in</strong> the area.


218 JOACHIM BRÜß—An evaluation of the social life of the out-group (its sociality)encompasses two items, a) that they like the way that out-groupmembers <strong>de</strong>al with each other, and b) that members of the outgroupare open-m<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>d and friendly toward others.Analys<strong>in</strong>g the attitu<strong>de</strong> structuresOn the whole, answers from German adolescents (GA) <strong>in</strong>dicate amore friendly and welcom<strong>in</strong>g attitu<strong>de</strong> toward the Resettler (RA) thantoward the Turkish adolescents (TA). This is particularly highlighted by anemotional acceptance <strong>in</strong>stead of an emotional rejection (26 % vs. 14 %;m = 0.11 w/RA, m = –0.30 w/TA; t = –23,1) 9 , a less frequent rejection ofthe sociality of the Resettler than the Turkish adolescents (34 % vs. 47 %;m = –0.38 w/RA, m = –0.65 w/TA; t = –16,6), and a significantly strongerdisapproval regard<strong>in</strong>g resource anxieties favour<strong>in</strong>g the Resettler and notthe Turkish adolescents (47 % vs. 39 %; m = –0.53 w/RA, m = –0.32w/TA; t = 10,2).Table 2Average approval and disapproval <strong>in</strong> the attitu<strong>de</strong> structure aDisapproval and German Turkish Resettlerapproval of: b adolescents adolescents adolescentsRegard<strong>in</strong>g: w/ TA w/ RA w/ GA w/ RA w/ GA w/ TA—Emotional acceptance –0.30 0.11 0.91 0.28 1.00 –0.37—Behavioural acceptance –0.01 0.22 0.68 0.05 0.85 –0.27—Resource anxieties –0.32 –0.53 –1.12 –0.83 –1.15 –0.45—Evaluations towardout-group sociality –0.65 –0.38 –0.14 –0.13 –0.03 –0.52aMeans are based on a scale rang<strong>in</strong>g from –2 for “strong disapproval” to +2 for “strongapproval”.bNon-significant mean differences (p > 0.01) are pr<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong> italicsGA: German adolescents n = 6,055TA: Turkish adolescents n = 1,652RA: Resettler adolescents n = 3,539Source: IKG Youth Panel 20019 See also Table 4, Appendix for more <strong>in</strong>formation on responses <strong>in</strong> per cent. For themean differences, two-tailed t-tests were carried out. Degrees of freedom for Germanrespon<strong>de</strong>nts are df = 12,108, for the Turkish group df = 3,302 and for the Resettlergroup df = 7,076.


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 219The comparison for the views of Turkish adolescents corroborates thatthey tend to have better relations with the German than with theResettler adolescents. In particular, Turkish youths significantly more oftenexpress emotional closeness toward German than toward Resettleradolescents (62 % vs. 33 %; m = 0.91 w/GA, m = 0.28 w/RA; t = 18.9).Moreover, Turkish youths more often approve activities with German thanwith Resettler adolescents (61 % vs. 37 %; m = 0.68 w/GA, m = 0.05w/RA; t = 16.9). And f<strong>in</strong>ally, Turkish youths disagree with resourceanxieties, and this more strongly regard<strong>in</strong>g German than Resettleradolescents (71 % vs. 56 %; m = –1.12 w/GA, m = –0.83 w/RA; t = –8.8).The most pronounced differences are revealed for the Resettleradolescents. Their answers clearly favour the German adolescents andkeep the Turkish adolescents at a dist<strong>in</strong>ct distance. This is highlighted bytheir responses to the emotional factor (66 % vs. 14 %; m = 1.00 w/GA,m = –0.37 w/TA; t = 62.4) as well as the reply to the behavioural aspects<strong>in</strong> their relationship (67 % vs. 28 %; m = 0.85 w/GA, m = –0.27 w/TA;t = 43.2). Moreover, resource anxieties are far more rejected <strong>in</strong> relation toGerman than to Turkish adolescents (71 % vs. 42 %; m = –1.15 w/GA,m = –0.45 w/TA; t = –31.1). In or<strong>de</strong>r to complete the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs, Resettleradolescents tend to reject the sociality of Turkish youths whereas theyexpress <strong>in</strong>difference toward the German youths (41 % vs. 19 %;m = –0.53 w/TA, m = –0.02 w/GA; t = 24.1).Who is <strong>in</strong> and who is out? Compar<strong>in</strong>g the attitu<strong>de</strong> structuresSummaris<strong>in</strong>g the results for the group-specific attitu<strong>de</strong> structures itis justified to argue that migrant adolescents express approval towardGerman youths very often regard<strong>in</strong>g the emotional and behaviouralacceptance of the relationships. In comparison to this, Germanadolescents rema<strong>in</strong> more distant toward the out-groups. But they alsoreject evaluations stress<strong>in</strong>g resource anxieties. Concern<strong>in</strong>g Germanyouth, migrant adolescents on average clearly reject resource anxieties.The <strong>in</strong>tergroup relations of the migrant youths are characterised byless <strong>in</strong>terethnic proximity than with German adolescents. Particularlyfor the emotional and behavioural aspects Turkish and Resettleradolescents are more <strong>in</strong> favour of relations with German adolescents,than they are with those to each other. Turkish youths tend to rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>different toward Resettler adolescents, whereas for them a ten<strong>de</strong>ncyfor rejection of Turkish youths can be observed.For acceptance and rejection on the whole it appears to be thecase that German adolescents are wi<strong>de</strong>ly accepted by the migrant


220 JOACHIM BRÜßyouths. In contrast, Turkish migrants seem to be rejected or at least keptat a certa<strong>in</strong> distance by German as well as by Resettler adolescents. TheResettler adolescents obta<strong>in</strong> slightly better evaluations from the Germanyouths and they tend to reject Turkish adolescents. Hence Resettleradolescents do not seem threatened by social marg<strong>in</strong>alisation, whereasTurkish adolescents might run the risk of becom<strong>in</strong>g marg<strong>in</strong>alised.Summary and conclusionAt the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g we asked whether and to what extent acceptanceor rejection among adolescents of different <strong>de</strong>scent could be <strong>de</strong>tectedand analysed. Can we assume that predom<strong>in</strong>antly German adolescentsexert social distance aga<strong>in</strong>st the two migrant groups or can rejectionalso be found for the migrants aga<strong>in</strong>st the German youths or betweenthemselves? Additionally, we also sought to f<strong>in</strong>d out what attitu<strong>de</strong>dimensions <strong>in</strong> particular are characterised by acceptance or rejection.The mutual evaluations of social proximity/distance can be summarised:—The evaluations of adolescents with a migration background arefriendly and accept<strong>in</strong>g toward the German youths regard<strong>in</strong>g theemotional and behavioural aspects <strong>in</strong> the relations. But <strong>in</strong>contrast, this is not fully the case for the notions of the Germanadolescents regard<strong>in</strong>g the two migrant out-groups. Hence therelations between allochthonous and autochthonous adolescentsare characterised by social proximity whereas for the reverse casea relation of social distance is observed.—The comparison between the attitu<strong>de</strong> structures of the twomigrant groups reveals that German adolescents show a ten<strong>de</strong>ncytoward social proximity regard<strong>in</strong>g the Resettler youths. The relationwith Turkish adolescents seems to be <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed by socialdistance.—Turkish adolescents experience social distance from German andfrom Resettler youths. This is particularly expressed by less approvalwith notions of emotional and behavioural attitu<strong>de</strong>s.—The aspect of social life (sociality) of the German adolescents isassessed ambiguously by the migrant adolescents. In contrast,the German adolescents specifically reject the sociality of Turkishyouth, and to a certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>gree also disapprove of sociality of theResettler adolescents.—On the whole, resource anxieties are most frequently dismissed,<strong>in</strong> particular by Turkish adolescents. However, German as well as


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 221Resettler adolescents, though slightly less, do not reject resourceanxieties aga<strong>in</strong>st Turkish youths very strongly.L<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g empirical f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs with theoretical consi<strong>de</strong>rations, it is nowpossible to agree that Blumer’s approach to expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g prejudice us<strong>in</strong>ggroup positions with<strong>in</strong> a society offers good guidance. The two groupswho face possible threats <strong>in</strong> their group position, <strong>in</strong> our case Germanand Resettler adolescents, have expressed their views that match ourtheoretical assumptions. On average, they show a certa<strong>in</strong> amount ofsocial distance toward the group with lower status, represented <strong>in</strong> thiscase by the Turkish adolescents. This group, possess<strong>in</strong>g a weak groupposition, reveals only limited reservations aga<strong>in</strong>st the out-groups. It ismore appropriate to say that Turkish adolescents comb<strong>in</strong>e a dist<strong>in</strong>ct <strong>in</strong>groupfavouritism with friendly and warm evaluations toward the twoout-groups.Consi<strong>de</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g the ma<strong>in</strong> hypothesis of Social I<strong>de</strong>ntity Theory, anextension regard<strong>in</strong>g social context seems necessary. This was alreadysuggested <strong>in</strong> the paper by HINKLE/BROWN (1990). It is not true <strong>in</strong> allcases, that <strong>in</strong>-group favouritism is accompanied by a general out-grouprejection. Specifically, the group with the strongest <strong>in</strong>-group bias,Turkish adolescents, do not express themselves accord<strong>in</strong>g to the basictheoretical assumption. They may express some reservation but thatcannot be seen as an out-group rejection per se.Aga<strong>in</strong>st the background of status consi<strong>de</strong>rations our results show thatthe group with lowest <strong>in</strong>tergroup status, with on average less well-realisedsocial participation, <strong>in</strong> this case Turkish adolescents, express more oftenthan the other groups friendl<strong>in</strong>ess and acceptance toward the out-groups.In contrast to this, the answers of the group with medium status andcomparatively well realised social participation, here Resettler adolescents,are split for the out-groups. Regard<strong>in</strong>g the German adolescents, <strong>in</strong> ourstudy the high status group, Resettler youths express dist<strong>in</strong>ct acceptanceand approval whereas the group with lesser amount of realised socialparticipation is rejected and kept at a certa<strong>in</strong> distance. Although therejection is not overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly strong, it is dist<strong>in</strong>ct. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the high statusgroup, <strong>in</strong> this case the German adolescents, expresses a certa<strong>in</strong> amountof social distance toward the two out-groups and to a somewhat largerextent aga<strong>in</strong>st the Turkish than aga<strong>in</strong>st the Resettler youths. Thesef<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs corroborate a general assumption of Social Dom<strong>in</strong>ance Theorythat groups with lower social status tend not to discrim<strong>in</strong>ate aga<strong>in</strong>stgroups with higher status. Moreover, SIDANIUS/PRATTO (1999) claim forgroups <strong>in</strong> between, that they tend to discrim<strong>in</strong>ate aga<strong>in</strong>st those withlower but accept those with higher status. In both cases groups are


222 JOACHIM BRÜßapparently prone to accept the given social hierarchy and or<strong>de</strong>r and areengaged <strong>in</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g this. As we could see with f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs for theGerman, Turkish and Resettler adolescents, this pattern could beexam<strong>in</strong>ed regard<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terethnic evaluations. Plus, recall<strong>in</strong>g the fact theTurkish adolescents have been liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Germany much longer thanResettler adolescents, it is the ascribed social status backed by means ofsocial participation that <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>es the <strong>in</strong>tergroup sett<strong>in</strong>g. Given the currentlegislation <strong>in</strong> Germany and the low proportion of naturalised migrantsfrom Turkey, the status distribution is likely to cont<strong>in</strong>ue. But it rema<strong>in</strong>s tobe seen whether the <strong>in</strong>terethnic relations, the revealed structure of mutualacceptance or rejection, will be stable over time as well.ReferencesALLPORT G. W. (1979): The Nature of Prejudice. Addison-Wesley, Read<strong>in</strong>g, MA.BADE K. J.; MÜNZ R. eds (2002): Migrationsreport 2002. Campus, Frankfurt amMa<strong>in</strong>.BEAUFTRAGTE DER BUNDESREGIERUNG FÜR AUSLÄNDERFRAGEN (2002): Daten und Faktenzur Auslän<strong>de</strong>rsituation. Selbstverlag, Berl<strong>in</strong>.BLUMER H. (1958): “Race prejudice as a sense of group position.” In The PacificSociological Review, 1, p. 3-7.BOBO L. D. (1999): “Prejudice as group position: Microfoundations of asociological approach to racism and race relations.” In Journal of SocialIssues, 55, p. 445-472.BOBO L. D.; HUTCHINGS V. L. (1996): “Perceptions of racial group competition:Extend<strong>in</strong>g Blumer’s theory of group position to a multiracial socialcontext.” In American Sociological Review, 61, p. 951-972.BOGARDUS E. S. (1925): “Measur<strong>in</strong>g social distance.” In Journal of AppliedSociology, 9, p. 299-308.BOGARDUS E. S. (1930): “A race-relation cycle.” In American Journal of Sociology,35, p. 612-617.BREWER M. B.; HO H. K.; LEE J. Y.; MILLER N. (1987) “Social i<strong>de</strong>ntity and socialdistance among Hong Kong schoolchildren.” In Personality and SocialPsychology Bullet<strong>in</strong>, 13, p. 156-165.BROWN R. (1995) Prejudice. Its Social Psychology. Blackwell, Oxford UK,Cambridge MA.DUCKITT J. (1992) The Social Psychology of Prejudice. Praeger, New York, London.GOMOLLA M.; RADTKE F. O. (2002) Institutionelle Diskrim<strong>in</strong>ierung: Die Herstellungethnischer Differenz <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>r Schule. Leske & Budrich, Opla<strong>de</strong>n.HECKMANN F. (1992) Ethnische M<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>rheiten, Volk und Nation: Soziologie<strong>in</strong>terethnischer Beziehungen. Enke, Stuttgart.HEWSTONE M.; ISLAM M. R.; JUDD C. M. (1993) “Mo<strong>de</strong>ls of crossed categorizationand <strong>in</strong>tergroup relations.” In Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,64, p. 779-793.


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 223HINKLE S.; BROWN R. (1990) “Intergroup comparisons and social i<strong>de</strong>ntity: Somel<strong>in</strong>ks and lacunae.” In Social I<strong>de</strong>ntity Theory. Constructive and CriticalAdvances, ed. M. A. Hogg and D. Abrams. Harvester Wheatsheaf: New York,p. 49-70.KATZ I. (1991) “Gordon Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice.” In Political Psychology,12, p. 125-157.McCONAHAY J. B. (1986) “Mo<strong>de</strong>rn Racism, ambivalence, and the mo<strong>de</strong>rnracism scale.” In Prejudice, Discrim<strong>in</strong>ation, and Racism, ed. S. L. Gaertnerand J. F. Dovidio. Aca<strong>de</strong>mic Press; Orlando, FL, p. 91-125.PARK, R. E. (1924) “The concept of social distance.” In Journal of AppliedSociology, 8, p. 339-344.PETTIGREW T. F.; MEERTENS R. W. (1995) “Subtle and blatant prejudice <strong>in</strong> Western<strong>Europe</strong>.” <strong>Europe</strong>an Journal of Social Psychology, 25, p. 57-75.SEARS D. O. (1988) “Symbolic Racism.” In Elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g Racism: Profiles <strong>in</strong>Controversy, ed. P. A. Katz and D. A. Taylor. Plenum, New York, p. 53-84.SIDANIUS J.; PRATTO F. (1999) Social Dom<strong>in</strong>ance: An <strong>in</strong>tergroup theory of socialhierarchy and oppression. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.TAJFEL H. (1981) Human groups and social categories. Cambridge Univ. Press,Cambridge, UK.TAJFEL H. (1982) “Social psychology of <strong>in</strong>tergroup relations.” In Annual Reviewof Psychology, 33, p. 1-39.TAJFEL H.; TURNER J. C. (1986) “The social i<strong>de</strong>ntity theory of <strong>in</strong>tergroup behaviour.”In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. W. G. Aust<strong>in</strong> and G. A. Worchel.Nelson-Hall, Chicago, p. 7-24.TREIBEL A. (1999) Migration <strong>in</strong> mo<strong>de</strong>rnen Gesellschaften: Soziale Folgen vonE<strong>in</strong>wan<strong>de</strong>rung und Gastarbeit. Juventa, We<strong>in</strong>heim.


224 JOACHIM BRÜßAppendixTable 3Items and <strong>in</strong>dices measur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terethnic attitu<strong>de</strong>sIndicesEmotional FactorBehavioural FactorResource AnxietiesEvaluations towardout-group socialityItems a1. I enjoy be<strong>in</strong>g with () youths. b2. What is your general feel<strong>in</strong>g toward () youths. c1. I would share my problems with a () youth.2. I could imag<strong>in</strong>e lend<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g to a () youth(e.g. my bike, clothes, roller skates).3. I would <strong>in</strong>vite them to a party.1. In our neighbourhood, the more () youths liv<strong>in</strong>gthere the more difficult it becomes.2. There will be fewer opportunities for vocationaltra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g if more of them live here.1. I like how () youths get along with one another.2. () youths are open-m<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>d toward others.abcOrd<strong>in</strong>al 5 po<strong>in</strong>t scales were used to tap the answers, rang<strong>in</strong>g from “strongly agree”to “strongly disagree”.Brackets are replaced <strong>in</strong> the questionnaire by the particular group name.The extremes for this question were labelled “very negative” to “very positive”.Source: Questionnaire for the IKG-Youth-Panel 2001.


MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION? EXPLORING SOCIAL DISTANCE AMONG... 225Table 4Approval and disapproval with<strong>in</strong> the attitu<strong>de</strong> structure 10Approval with German Turkish Resettlerthe attitu<strong>de</strong>s adolescents adolescents adolescentsw/ TA w/ RA w/ GA w/ RA w/ GA w/ TA—Emotional factor 14% 26% 62% 33% 66% 14%—Behavioural factor 37% 44% 61% 37% 67% 28%—Resource anxieties 18% 13% 4% 7% 2% 14%—Evaluations towardout-group sociality 7% 9% 17% 14% 17% 8%Disapproval with German Turkish Resettlerthe attitu<strong>de</strong>s adolescents adolescents adolescentsw/ TA w/ RA w/ GA w/ RA w/ GA w/ TA—Emotional factor 32% 18% 5% 17% 3% 38%—Behavioural factor 36% 28% 14% 32% 10% 45%—Resource anxieties 39% 47% 71% 56% 71% 42%—Evaluations towardout-group sociality 47% 34% 25% 22% 19% 41%GA: German adolescents n = 6,055TA: Turkish adolescents n = 1,652RA: Resettler adolescents n = 3,539Source: IKG Youth Panel 2001.10 Indices are reco<strong>de</strong>d by divid<strong>in</strong>g the scale <strong>in</strong>to three equal parts. Thus, answers areseparated <strong>in</strong>to approval (+2 to +0,67), <strong>in</strong>difference (+0,66 to –0,66), and disapproval(–0,67 to –2).


Vot<strong>in</strong>g rights for third country nationals <strong>in</strong> Vienna:a new step towards <strong>de</strong>mocratic participation <strong>in</strong> Austria?Catr<strong>in</strong> PekariIntroductionAustrian migration policies have been of public <strong>in</strong>terest s<strong>in</strong>ce 2000,when the coalition between the ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei,People’s Party) and the FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich, FreedomParty) came to power. A lot has been said s<strong>in</strong>ce then about racist andxenophobic ten<strong>de</strong>ncies, 1 and <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed the <strong>de</strong>velopments at the nationallevel, especially the implementation of the “treaty for <strong>in</strong>tegration”(Integrationsvertrag), 2 have raised some new concerns.Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g these facts, it seems that recently some progresshas been ma<strong>de</strong> at the local level when <strong>in</strong> December 2002 the prov<strong>in</strong>cialparliament of Vienna <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to grant vot<strong>in</strong>g rights to third countrynationals. 3 However, these vot<strong>in</strong>g rights are strictly local, allow<strong>in</strong>g third1 The <strong>Europe</strong>an Union assigned t <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt experts to evaluate the “commitmentof the Austrian government to the common <strong>Europe</strong>an values, <strong>in</strong> particular concern<strong>in</strong>gthe rights of refugees, m<strong>in</strong>orities and immigrants” and the “evolution of the politicalnature of the FPÖ”; see Ahtisaari, Martti/Frowe<strong>in</strong>, Jochen/Oreja, Marcel<strong>in</strong>o: Report,adopted <strong>in</strong> Paris on 8 September 2000. Their conclusion was that common <strong>Europe</strong>anvalues were not violated, although concerns rema<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> some respects.2The so called treaty for <strong>in</strong>tegration is part of the amend<strong>in</strong>g law No 126/2002which changes certa<strong>in</strong> provisions of the Alien Act (Frem<strong>de</strong>ngesetz) 1997, the AsylumAct (Asylgesetz) 1997 and the Alien Labour Act (Auslän<strong>de</strong>rbeschäftigungsgesetz). It<strong>in</strong>troduces compulsory language courses for most third country nationals; if such alanguage course is not successfully completed with<strong>in</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> time period,prolongation of the resi<strong>de</strong>nce permit can be refused. The provision entered <strong>in</strong>to forceon 1 January 2003.3See Resolution of the Viennese Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Parliament concern<strong>in</strong>g the amendmentof the Constitution of the City of Vienna and the Viennese Electoral Regulation,December 2002.


228 CATRIN PEKARIcountry nationals to participate <strong>in</strong> the election for the representatives oftheir municipal district, whereas they are still exclu<strong>de</strong>d from the electionsto the city council. Furthermore, their right to stand as a candidate isrestricted <strong>in</strong>sofar as they can neither be elected to the office of the chiefrepresentative (Bezirksvorsteher) nor to that of the head of the WorksCommittee (Bauausschuss). These restrictions are necessary due to someprovisions <strong>in</strong> constitutional law. In this paper I will expla<strong>in</strong> the legalsituation and legal obstacles to third country nationals’ vot<strong>in</strong>g rightsand discuss the arguments for and aga<strong>in</strong>st political participation ofnon-citizens.Local, prov<strong>in</strong>cial, national: vot<strong>in</strong>g rights with<strong>in</strong> the Austrianfe<strong>de</strong>ral systemAustria is a <strong>de</strong>mocratic republic established as a fe<strong>de</strong>ral state, butthe legislative and executive power of the n<strong>in</strong>e prov<strong>in</strong>ces is ratherlimited compared to that of the fe<strong>de</strong>ral <strong>in</strong>stitutions. Elections take placeat three levels: national, prov<strong>in</strong>cial and local, whereas <strong>in</strong> some of thebigger cities the local level can be subdivi<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong>to elections to the citycouncil and to the representation of the municipal districts. Additionally,referenda, petitions and plebiscites exist as <strong>in</strong>struments of direct<strong>de</strong>mocracy.Vot<strong>in</strong>g rights for all these levels are <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong>ed by the Fe<strong>de</strong>ralConstitution. It clearly states that the participation <strong>in</strong> political <strong>de</strong>cisionmak<strong>in</strong>gprocesses is restricted to Austrian citizens. 4 The only exceptionsare the elections for the representatives of a municipal district; as theyare not explicitly mentioned <strong>in</strong> the constitution, it seems possible toallow the participation of third country nationals <strong>in</strong> this case.It was argued, however, that this is not true because the <strong>in</strong>terpretationof the constitution has to be homogeneous <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to preclu<strong>de</strong> theformation of different groups of voters for different elections. This impliesthat an <strong>in</strong>dividual exclu<strong>de</strong>d from the elections to the city council by theConstitution for nationality reasons cannot vote <strong>in</strong> municipal districtelections either, even though this case is not mentioned <strong>in</strong> the Constitution.Now that Austria has became a member state of the <strong>Europe</strong>anUnion, this argument is no longer tenable. The implementation ofCouncil Directive 94/80/EC, lay<strong>in</strong>g down the participation of citizens ofEU member states <strong>in</strong> local elections <strong>in</strong> the state where they are4 For the national level, the relevant provision is Art. 25 of the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Constitution,for the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level it is Art. 95 and for the local Art. 117.


VOTING RIGHTS FOR THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN VIENNA... 229resi<strong>de</strong>nt, has already changed the group of eligible voters consi<strong>de</strong>rably.Although it could be said that with regard to the elections to the<strong>Europe</strong>an parliament the homogeneity of the constitution has not beenviolated <strong>in</strong>sofar as no Austrian elections are concerned, the fact rema<strong>in</strong>sthat they form a different group of voters s<strong>in</strong>ce they are <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong>local, but exclu<strong>de</strong>d from prov<strong>in</strong>cial and national elections.There seems to be no obvious reason why the i<strong>de</strong>a of homogeneityshould be applied for third country nationals any longer, reserv<strong>in</strong>gvot<strong>in</strong>g rights at the local level to citizens of EU member states. Thisargument has a specific relevance <strong>in</strong> Austria, where the resi<strong>de</strong>nt populationof third country nationals is much higher than that of resi<strong>de</strong>nts from otherEU member states.For all other forms of political participation of third country nationals,at the national and prov<strong>in</strong>cial level as well as with regard to city councilelections, amend<strong>in</strong>g laws to the relevant constitutional provisions (Art.25, 95 and 117 of the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Constitution) would be necessary. Suchlaws could be passed <strong>in</strong> Parliament only with a two-thirds majority, ands<strong>in</strong>ce it is not entirely clear if that would mean a change to the Constitution<strong>in</strong> toto, the question might be subject to an obligatory plebiscite 5too. After the last elections to the National Council <strong>in</strong> November 2002,negotiations for the new governments are still un<strong>de</strong>r way, but s<strong>in</strong>cethere is a lack of political will <strong>in</strong> almost all political parties at the nationallevel to overcome the constitutional obstacles for a vot<strong>in</strong>g right adaptedto the concept of <strong>de</strong>nizenship rather than to that of citizenship, arevaluation of the situation can probably not be expected with<strong>in</strong> thenear future.So, with little expectation of changes at the fe<strong>de</strong>ral level, alternativesare left only at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial level. The municipalities themselves, notwithstand<strong>in</strong>gtheir important role with<strong>in</strong> the fe<strong>de</strong>ral system, have mereexecutive and no legislative power. It is therefore up to the Prov<strong>in</strong>cialParliaments to <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> upon the legislation concern<strong>in</strong>g vot<strong>in</strong>g rights notonly at the prov<strong>in</strong>cial, but also at the municipal level. S<strong>in</strong>ce they arebound by fe<strong>de</strong>ral constitutional law, for the reasons discussed abovethey have no way of enact<strong>in</strong>g regulations grant<strong>in</strong>g vot<strong>in</strong>g rights tothird country nationals for elections to the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Parliaments or tothe city councils.What rema<strong>in</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> their competence is to guarantee the <strong>in</strong>clusionof third country nationals at the most local level, the elections for the5 The Constitution requires an obligatory plebiscite whenever an amend<strong>in</strong>g lawmeans a change <strong>in</strong> toto. Such a plebiscite was held on 12 June 1994 for the approval ofAustria’s entry <strong>in</strong>to the EU.


230 CATRIN PEKARIrepresentatives of the <strong>de</strong>centralised adm<strong>in</strong>istrative offices of the municipaldistricts. Due to historical reasons, this form of local governance is ofrelevance primarily <strong>in</strong> Vienna, while equivalents <strong>in</strong> other major Austriancities do not show the same dist<strong>in</strong>ctive features. In rural areas, similar<strong>in</strong>stitutions with elected representatives do not exist; the political <strong>de</strong>cisionsare entirely left to the city council, and appo<strong>in</strong>ted, not elected officialsare <strong>in</strong> charge of most executive agendas. 6The new legislation <strong>in</strong> Vienna concern<strong>in</strong>g vot<strong>in</strong>g rightsfor third country nationalsThe city of Vienna, capital of Austria, has a unique position with<strong>in</strong>the Austrian fe<strong>de</strong>ral system, because it is not only a municipality, butalso one of the n<strong>in</strong>e prov<strong>in</strong>ces with its own Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Parliament andGovernment. The Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Parliament is at the same time the citycouncil, the Prov<strong>in</strong>cial Government has a dual function as town senate,and the Governor of the Prov<strong>in</strong>ce of Vienna is also the Mayor of the City.In December 2002, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial parliament <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to grant vot<strong>in</strong>grights to third country nationals for the elections to the representatives ofthe municipal districts.Such a representation is established <strong>in</strong> every one of the 23 Viennesedistricts, whereas the number of members <strong>de</strong>pends on the populationof the district, vary<strong>in</strong>g between 40 and 60. The elected representativeselect among them the chief representative and his/her <strong>de</strong>puties and themembers of the edificial, the environmental and the f<strong>in</strong>ancial board.The field of activities of the municipal offices is rather limited. They canco-<strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> or propose issues related to <strong>in</strong>frastructure, traffic, socialmeasures and other <strong>in</strong>itiatives which are of direct relevance for theirdistrict. However, they have a long tradition and an important role toplay <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>teraction between the city adm<strong>in</strong>istration and the<strong>in</strong>habitants.The orig<strong>in</strong>al proposal for this legislation, which has not entered <strong>in</strong>toforce yet, was ma<strong>de</strong> by the SPÖ (Sozial<strong>de</strong>mokratische Partei Österreich,Social Democratic Party), which is the current governmental party <strong>in</strong>Vienna, represent<strong>in</strong>g the mayor as well as the majority <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>cialparliament. The Green Party (Die Grünen) supported the proposal,while the Freedom Party and the People’s Party voted aga<strong>in</strong>st it.6 These adm<strong>in</strong>istrative units are the Bezirkshauptmannschaften, led by a districtcommisioner. In chartered towns (Statutarstädte) the mayor is <strong>in</strong> charge of a districtcommissioner’s functions.


VOTING RIGHTS FOR THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN VIENNA... 231In or<strong>de</strong>r to enable third country nationals to vote <strong>in</strong> local electionfor the representatives of a municipal district, changes to two prov<strong>in</strong>ciallaws were necessary: firstly to the Constitution of the City of Vienna(Wiener Stadtverfassung), secondly to the Viennese Municipal ElectoralRegulation (Wiener Geme<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>wahlordnung).The most important amendment is that of § 16 (2) 2 of the ElectoralRegulation, stat<strong>in</strong>g that non-Austrian and non-EU citizens who havebeen legally resi<strong>de</strong>nt <strong>in</strong> Vienna for at least five years, are over 16 yearsof age and are not exclu<strong>de</strong>d from the right to vote due to other reasonscan participate <strong>in</strong> the elections for the representatives of a municipaldistrict. Regard<strong>in</strong>g the right to stand as a candidate, § 42 refers to §16, mean<strong>in</strong>g that everybody who has the right to vote can be elected,too, with the restriction that the m<strong>in</strong>imum age here is not 16, but 18.The other amendments to the Electoral Regulation ma<strong>in</strong>ly refer tonecessary organisational changes such as the <strong>in</strong>troduction of a specificstatistical evi<strong>de</strong>nce of voters (§§ 19a, 19b).The second law which was amen<strong>de</strong>d, the Constitution of the cityof Vienna, makes an important restriction to the rights granted <strong>in</strong> theElectoral Regulation <strong>in</strong> § 61b (3), s<strong>in</strong>ce it restricts the right to stand as acandidate for third country nationals <strong>in</strong>sofar as it exclu<strong>de</strong>s them fromcerta<strong>in</strong> positions. They cannot be elected as the chief representative ofa municipal district nor as his/her <strong>de</strong>puty. Furthermore, accord<strong>in</strong>g to §66b (5), they are not allowed to become a member of the WorksCommittee. The reason for these restrictions is the constitutional regulationof Art. 2 of the Fundamental Laws (Staatsgrundgesetz) which limits theaccess to public service to citizens. The positions of the chief representativeof a municipal district and his/her <strong>de</strong>puties as well as the membership(or even substitutive membership) <strong>in</strong> the Works Committee fall <strong>in</strong>to thiscategory of restricted public service because they <strong>in</strong>volve specific taskswhich belong to the core area of public adm<strong>in</strong>istration.For citizens of the EU, however, this constitutional obstacle hasbeen <strong>de</strong>rogated by the implementation of Council Directive 94/80/EC:they have the same right to stand as a candidate <strong>in</strong> all municipalelections as Austrian citizens. As already mentioned with regard to theparticipation <strong>in</strong> elections to the city councils, which take place withthe participation of EU citizens, but without a right to vote for thirdcountry nationals, aga<strong>in</strong> it can be questioned if this discrim<strong>in</strong>ation isjustified. The <strong>de</strong>cision on who should be <strong>in</strong> charge of the representationof a district is up to the people liv<strong>in</strong>g there, and, given the factthat for EU citizens the prerequisite of the Austrian citizenship does notexist, it is not clear why there should be no free choice among allcandidates.


232 CATRIN PEKARIEven if seen from a historical perspective, the provision seems to bediscrim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a rather unfair way: The orig<strong>in</strong>al purpose of Art. 2 ofthe Fundamental Laws was to ensure loyalty of public servants when<strong>de</strong>cid<strong>in</strong>g issues of direct political relevance, but s<strong>in</strong>ce the loyalty of adistrict’s chief representative should be to the district, it is not sure ifthe Austrian or EU citizenship is <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>ed a necessary requirement. The<strong>de</strong>cisions to be ma<strong>de</strong> at this very most local level have little to do withconcerns at the national level.Tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to account the political situation <strong>in</strong> Austria, however, it seemsunlikely that the necessary steps for a constitutional amendment at thefe<strong>de</strong>ral level will be taken by the Parliament with<strong>in</strong> the near future; still,discussion on this po<strong>in</strong>t is urgently nee<strong>de</strong>d.Arguments for third country nationals’ vot<strong>in</strong>g rights at the local levelThe ma<strong>in</strong> argument for the participation of third country nationals<strong>in</strong> elections is the necessity to give all those who are affected bypolitical <strong>de</strong>cision-mak<strong>in</strong>g processes the chance to <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> who shouldrepresent them. This <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>ition exclu<strong>de</strong>s per se tourists and other noncitizenswithout any <strong>in</strong>tention of rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the host country, but arguesfor the <strong>in</strong>clusion of long-term resi<strong>de</strong>nts. In a time of mass migration, notall long-term resi<strong>de</strong>nts are citizens. Therefore, citizenship as a prerequisitefor vot<strong>in</strong>g rights can open a rather huge gap between those who areable to participate and those who are not —while both groups areequally affected by political <strong>de</strong>cisions. This is true especially <strong>in</strong> Viennawhere the percentage of the foreign resi<strong>de</strong>nt population reaches 33 %<strong>in</strong> at least one municipal district and more than 25 % <strong>in</strong> 4 districts,whereas the lowest number of third country nationals <strong>in</strong> a district is stillabove 7 %. 7 This leads to the conclusion that, even though restrictedvot<strong>in</strong>g rights at the national level may be justified because of the needto show a certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tention to fully belong to a country’s society as acitizen, this argument makes little sense at the local level.The number of elected representatives <strong>in</strong> a municipal district<strong>de</strong>pends on the whole population of a district —and not, as for the citycouncil, on the number of citizens. This can lead to a further <strong>de</strong>mocratic<strong>de</strong>ficit, because <strong>in</strong> districts with a high percentage of resi<strong>de</strong>nt thirdcountry nationals who are exclu<strong>de</strong>d from the right to vote, a representativeneeds relatively few votes to be elected. At the same time, this7 See Wiener Integrationsfond: MigranntInnen <strong>in</strong> Wien’99, at http://www.wif.wien.at/wif_site/wif_pages/se_ta_03.html. The data refers to the registered resi<strong>de</strong>nt foreignpopulation accord<strong>in</strong>g to the statistical evi<strong>de</strong>nce of the City of Vienna as <strong>in</strong> 1999.


VOTING RIGHTS FOR THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN VIENNA... 233representative should cover the <strong>in</strong>terests both of the citizens —whohad the opportunity to vote for him or her— and the third countrynationals, who did not have this chance.Furthermore, municipal districts are more important than the ratherabstract notion of a state for the i<strong>de</strong>ntification of third country nationalswith the host society. Studies show that third country nationals are notnecessarily immigrat<strong>in</strong>g to a certa<strong>in</strong> country, but rather to a certa<strong>in</strong> townor even municipal district of a town where they f<strong>in</strong>d ethnic communitiesand social networks. 8 The daily rout<strong>in</strong>e of the <strong>in</strong>tegration process —suchas f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g accommodation and work or learn<strong>in</strong>g to un<strong>de</strong>rstand a newlanguage and culture— is of course dom<strong>in</strong>ated by the legal frameworkof the host country, but from an <strong>in</strong>dividual perspective, it may well bethat the <strong>in</strong>fluence of the local community seems more important.Presumably, <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the political process at that level could furtherfacilitate i<strong>de</strong>ntification and <strong>in</strong>tegration also <strong>in</strong> a broa<strong>de</strong>r context.Last but not least, it has to be mentioned that the relative restrictivenessof the provisions for obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Austrian citizenship is a strongargument for participation without citizenship. A regular applicationfor citizenship can be filed only after 10 years of legal resi<strong>de</strong>nce, stillleav<strong>in</strong>g some discretionary power to public authorities, whereas a legalclaim comes <strong>in</strong>to be<strong>in</strong>g only after 30 years. Additionally, dual citizenshipis not permitted. This means that third country nationals are <strong>de</strong> factoexclu<strong>de</strong>d from vot<strong>in</strong>g rights for a long period, even if their <strong>in</strong>tegrationprocess and their i<strong>de</strong>ntification with the host country is already veryadvanced. Participation at the local level might provi<strong>de</strong> some adjustment<strong>in</strong>sofar as third country nationals can at least <strong>in</strong>fluence their directenvironment at an earlier stage.Conclud<strong>in</strong>g remarksThe very specific situation of Vienna as a prov<strong>in</strong>ce and a municipalityas well as the historically important role of the <strong>de</strong>centralised municipaladm<strong>in</strong>istrative offices and their elected representatives are ratherunique phenomena <strong>in</strong> Austria. In Graz, the second largest city, withnearly 10 % foreign resi<strong>de</strong>nts, some discussion on the possibility ofgrant<strong>in</strong>g vot<strong>in</strong>g rights to third country nationals at the local level hasbeen go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> recent years, but no real conclusions have beenreached so far.8 See Bauböck, Ra<strong>in</strong>er: Wessen Stimme zählt? Thesen über <strong>de</strong>mokratische Beteiligung<strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>r E<strong>in</strong>wan<strong>de</strong>rungsgesellschaft, Oktober 2002.


234 CATRIN PEKARIThe Viennese regulation is therefore a particularity <strong>in</strong> the politicallandscape rather than a real breakthrough for Austrian migrationpolicies and its implications for the country as a whole should not beoverestimated. Still, it shows a very positive attitu<strong>de</strong> towards <strong>in</strong>tegration<strong>in</strong> a town where the percentage of the non-Austrian resi<strong>de</strong>nt populationhas reached a significant level. Even if the progress ma<strong>de</strong> is not morethan a very small step —vot<strong>in</strong>g rights only <strong>in</strong> the municipal districts,with restricted rights to stand as a candidate— it <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itely is a step.The only way to reach a positive effect for <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> a broa<strong>de</strong>rcontext would probably be an amendment to Art. 117 of the Constitution<strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to <strong>in</strong>volve third country nationals <strong>in</strong> all local elections. This<strong>in</strong>itiative would not necessarily conflict with higher level vot<strong>in</strong>g rights,where arguments for exclusive, citizenship based vot<strong>in</strong>g rights aremuch stronger. The more directly an <strong>in</strong>dividual is affected by a political<strong>de</strong>cision, the more right one has to participate <strong>in</strong> the process lead<strong>in</strong>g tothat <strong>de</strong>cision. Experiences <strong>in</strong> other member states of the EU —namelyDenmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, F<strong>in</strong>land and Swe<strong>de</strong>n— have clearlyshown that local and partly even prov<strong>in</strong>cial vot<strong>in</strong>g rights for third countrynationals rather enhance than endanger the <strong>de</strong>mocratic stability of acountry.In any case the new law <strong>in</strong> Vienna could be of great importance<strong>in</strong>sofar as it stimulates a discussion <strong>in</strong> Austria on this topic, and it mightbe that some political parties will implement this i<strong>de</strong>a not only at thelocal, but also at the fe<strong>de</strong>ral level.


Women migrants:<strong>in</strong>visible or creative actors?Tr<strong>in</strong>idad L. VicentePopulation movements are clearly one of today’s most strik<strong>in</strong>gsocial phenomena. This is not due to their newness, given that suchmovements have always been part of human history. Rather,population movements <strong>in</strong> recent <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s stand out for their specificfeatures. Follow<strong>in</strong>g CASTLES/MILLER (1998), we can highlight theirgrow<strong>in</strong>g globalisation (ever more countries are affected by theseexpand<strong>in</strong>g population flows —whether as countries of orig<strong>in</strong>, receiv<strong>in</strong>gcountries, or both at once), their acceleration (migrations are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> volume <strong>in</strong> all the ma<strong>in</strong> affected areas), their diversification (reasonsfor emigrat<strong>in</strong>g are ever more varied —economic, political, studies,retirement, etc.— mean<strong>in</strong>g that each receiv<strong>in</strong>g country tends to havedist<strong>in</strong>ct immigrant profiles) and their grow<strong>in</strong>g fem<strong>in</strong>isation (womancurrently comprise almost one half of the world migrant population(United Nations, 2002), with 85 million woman versus 90 million menmigrants). The presence of women <strong>in</strong> migratory flows, however, isquite different <strong>de</strong>pend<strong>in</strong>g on the area un<strong>de</strong>r consi<strong>de</strong>ration. By 2000,female migrants constituted nearly 51 % of all migrants <strong>in</strong> the <strong>de</strong>velopedworld but about 46 % of all <strong>in</strong>ternational migrants <strong>in</strong> <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>gcountries.In most countries <strong>in</strong> Asia, Africa and Oceania more men areemigrants that women, while <strong>in</strong> half the countries on the Americancont<strong>in</strong>ent women make up at least half of the emigrant population, asituation repeated <strong>in</strong> many <strong>Europe</strong>an countries. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to theInternational Organisation for Migration, <strong>in</strong> one third of the receiv<strong>in</strong>gcountries there are more migrant women than men. Women predom<strong>in</strong>ate<strong>in</strong> migratory flows to countries favour<strong>in</strong>g permanent settlement, whilemen are the majority <strong>in</strong> flows to countries favour<strong>in</strong>g labour-basedimmigration (ZLOTNIK, 1995, p. 231).


236 TRINIDAD L. VICENTETable 1Percentage of female migrants among the total number of <strong>in</strong>ternationalmigrants, by major area, 1960-2000Major area 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000WorldMore <strong>de</strong>veloped regionsLess <strong>de</strong>veloped regions<strong>Europe</strong>Northern AmericaCaribbeanLat<strong>in</strong> AmericaNorthern AfricaSub-Saharan AfricaSouthern AsiaEastern and South-eastern AsiaWestern AsiaOceaniaSource: United Nations, 2002.46.647.945.748.549.845.344.749.540.646.346.145.244.447.248.246.348.051.146.146.947.742.146.947.646.646.547.449.445.548.552.646.548.445.843.845.947.047.247.947.950.844.751.751.047.750.244.946.044.448.547.949.148.850.945.752.451.048.950.542.847.244.450.148.350.5Women as protagonists <strong>in</strong> migratory phenomenaThe participation of women has generally been a constant <strong>in</strong>population movements throughout history. Interest<strong>in</strong>gly, one of theearliest researchers <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>ternational migration, RAVENSTEIN (1885),i<strong>de</strong>ntified the presence of women <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational migration flows and thedifferences <strong>in</strong> the migratory behaviour of men and women, un<strong>de</strong>rl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gthe fact that women were not merely <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt be<strong>in</strong>gs and they alsomigrated on their own account for a variety of reasons. 1 Various laterstudies highlighted the greater proportion of women <strong>in</strong> the immigrantpopulation of certa<strong>in</strong> countries such as the US, where the fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e partof the immigrant population was greater than the mascul<strong>in</strong>e from 1930to 1980 (HOUSTON et al., 1984), at which po<strong>in</strong>t the number of maleimmigrants slightly surpassed that of females.1 In RAVENSTEIN’s words (1885, p. 196): “Woman is a greater migrant than man. Thismay surprise those who associate women with domestic life, but the figures of the censusclearly prove it. Nor do women migrate merely from rural districts <strong>in</strong>to the town <strong>in</strong> searchof domestic service, for they migrate quite as frequently <strong>in</strong>to certa<strong>in</strong> manufactur<strong>in</strong>gdistricts, and the workshop is a formidable rival of the kitchen and scullery”. In his wellknownmigratory laws, Ravenste<strong>in</strong> also po<strong>in</strong>ted out that women migrants prefer to moveshorter distances than men, although this is not born out by current evi<strong>de</strong>nce.


WOMEN MIGRANTS: INVISIBLE OR CREATIVE ACTORS? 237Yet, <strong>in</strong> spite of the fact that women have ma<strong>de</strong> up almost half ofthe migrant population for over forty years (1960-2000), most researchfocused on <strong>in</strong>ternational migration has ten<strong>de</strong>d to ignore gen<strong>de</strong>r as arelevant variable <strong>in</strong> analysis. Gen<strong>de</strong>r cont<strong>in</strong>ues to be relegated to thesi<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es of social science research. As a result, much more is knownabout factors related to mascul<strong>in</strong>e 2 immigration than fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the UN (1994), the reasons why the migration ofwomen has been neglected are many, but some stand out:—Migration theory. Because of the important role played by thehuman capital mo<strong>de</strong>l <strong>in</strong> migration theory, the migration literaturehas focused heavily on autonomous or so-called “economic”migration, or migration motivated ostensibly for reasons ofemployment or economic opportunity (or to escape economic<strong>de</strong>privation). Men have been generally more likely than womento report their moves as motivated primarily for economic reasons.—Un<strong>de</strong>restimation of women’s economic activity and labour forceparticipation, which is directly related to the above po<strong>in</strong>t. S<strong>in</strong>cemuch of the economic activity of women is not classified as such<strong>in</strong> standard labour force and other surveys, it is implicitly viewedas irrelevant for migration analysis.—The neglect of women <strong>in</strong> scholarly social science research <strong>in</strong>general (as well as <strong>in</strong> literature, art, politics, etc.). This is due totheir generally lower status and presumably passive, <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ntroles <strong>in</strong> society, which, however, are beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to change <strong>in</strong>much of the <strong>de</strong>velop<strong>in</strong>g countries.—Most research on migration has been carried out by men. This isa fact, though it need not by itself have led to the neglect offemale migrants s<strong>in</strong>ce men as well as women are certa<strong>in</strong>lycapable of study<strong>in</strong>g women’s migration.—Ina<strong>de</strong>quacies <strong>in</strong> exist<strong>in</strong>g data on women’s migration, at both themacro and micro levels, for reasons not unrelated to the above.2 The gen<strong>de</strong>r standpo<strong>in</strong>t also calls for more thorough research <strong>in</strong>to the impact thatmascul<strong>in</strong>e immigration, or immigration of a female member of the family, has on thewomen left beh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> the country of orig<strong>in</strong>. Along these l<strong>in</strong>es, some studies have shownthe large negative effects that men’s immigration has had on the women who stay <strong>in</strong>the country of orig<strong>in</strong>, who <strong>in</strong> some cases are forced to take on still more responsibilitiesfor the material survival of the community. At times, they must also abandon theirhome <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to jo<strong>in</strong> their husband’s family, thereby los<strong>in</strong>g part of their already scarceautonomy. In other cases, meanwhile, immigration by the head of the family hasbrought with it more positive than negative effects. This was the case <strong>in</strong> India, where astudy conclu<strong>de</strong>d that immigration had led to a more favourable attitu<strong>de</strong> towards theeducation of girls as well as boys (SUTCLIFFE, 1999).


238 TRINIDAD L. VICENTEIf data on overall <strong>in</strong>ternational migration is scare, those relativeto the migration of women are even less abundant.Consequently, the sex of migrants has to be <strong>in</strong>ferred from thecategory <strong>in</strong> which they are admitted, assum<strong>in</strong>g, for <strong>in</strong>stance,that spouses are mostly women or that women constitute mostof the migrants <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> occupations, such as nurs<strong>in</strong>g, domesticservice or enterta<strong>in</strong>ment. Lack of <strong>in</strong>formation is hardly conductiveto a more realistic assessment of women’s participation <strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational migration or of their role as migrants (UN, 1995, p.1).The presence of women <strong>in</strong> migratory phenomena began to attractnotice <strong>in</strong> the seventies, especially after the oil crisis of 1973, with thegrowth of more restrictive immigration policies at a national and<strong>in</strong>ternational level. These policies were also aimed at the so-calledstabilisation of the foreign population already present <strong>in</strong> the country.The new migratory policies sought to slow down the arrival of newimmigrants while encourag<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itive return of those want<strong>in</strong>g togo back to their country of orig<strong>in</strong>. They did not, however, similarly impe<strong>de</strong>the entry of close family members of immigrants already established <strong>in</strong>the receiv<strong>in</strong>g countries, <strong>in</strong> a clear attempt to favour social <strong>in</strong>tegrationand avoid social conflict. Many of those who until now have beenregar<strong>de</strong>d as “guest workers” (always represented by the image of anadult work<strong>in</strong>g man who moves to another country for a limited period,leav<strong>in</strong>g his family beh<strong>in</strong>d, with the aim of improv<strong>in</strong>g his and his family’sf<strong>in</strong>ancial situation) have eventually <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to rema<strong>in</strong>, regroup<strong>in</strong>g theirfamilies <strong>in</strong> the host society. In part, this has been a response to the<strong>de</strong>velopment of “Fortress <strong>Europe</strong>” policies. Woman immigrants thusbecame more visible <strong>in</strong> migratory movements, via family reunification. 3However, they have usually cont<strong>in</strong>ued to be regar<strong>de</strong>d as passivesubjects, <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on the men <strong>in</strong> the process. For that reason, <strong>in</strong>most cases women’s roles as economic and social agents, along with3 Accord<strong>in</strong>g to ZLOTNIK (1995), who studied the evolution of migratory flows <strong>in</strong>certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>an countries such as Germany and Belgium between 1960 and 1990,these policies had a great effect on the gen<strong>de</strong>r distribution of the foreign population,although not as substantial as was claimed. Nor did these policies affect differentnational groups <strong>in</strong> each host country <strong>in</strong> the same way. Furthermore, Zlotnik po<strong>in</strong>ts outthat at no time dur<strong>in</strong>g this period was fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e immigration <strong>in</strong> Germany and Belgiumclose to that of mascul<strong>in</strong>e. This fact refutes the generally accepted op<strong>in</strong>ion that femaleimmigration has been dom<strong>in</strong>ant from the time that family reunification became thema<strong>in</strong> vehicle for legal immigration to those countries. However, a look at both countriesshows a change <strong>in</strong> net immigration. Although negative for both men and women, thenumber of men leav<strong>in</strong>g the country dur<strong>in</strong>g the years un<strong>de</strong>r study is substantially higherthan that of women.


WOMEN MIGRANTS: INVISIBLE OR CREATIVE ACTORS? 239their movement dynamics, their settlement gui<strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>es, their own migratoryprojects and the consequences of these for the women themselves andfor their family and social environment have all been downplayed.The discourse on the fem<strong>in</strong>isation of migration <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> can thusbe expla<strong>in</strong>ed not only by a real <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e participation ofpopulation movements, but also by a conceptual open<strong>in</strong>g to fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>eimmigration (OSO, 1998, p. 39-58), although this is obscured <strong>in</strong> theor<strong>de</strong>r of representations by specific reference to a homogeneous collectivema<strong>de</strong> up of the regrouped and <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt “woman immigrant”.There is still much research to be done, but various studies carriedout <strong>in</strong> recent <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s have clearly shown that there is no s<strong>in</strong>gle mo<strong>de</strong>lfor the woman immigrant. Nor do these women share the same reasonsfor mov<strong>in</strong>g from one place to another. Such reasons can <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> thesearch for economic opportunity, family reunification, f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g betteropportunities for their children, the search for greater freedom as wellas personal and social <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce, the spirit of adventure, a <strong>de</strong>sirefor change, escape from situations of domestic or political violence,persecution for gen<strong>de</strong>r-related reasons, etc. The research already donehas also brought to light the notable <strong>in</strong>fluence that a woman’s specificsituation <strong>in</strong> the country of orig<strong>in</strong> has on her <strong>de</strong>cision to emigrate, alongwith the significant <strong>in</strong>fluence of the particular dynamics <strong>in</strong> the <strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ationcountry. These situations, which affect men and women differently, willbe analysed <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g sections.Women <strong>in</strong> the countries of orig<strong>in</strong>The majority presence of women <strong>in</strong> migratory flows <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries hi<strong>de</strong>s important differences accord<strong>in</strong>g to their place of orig<strong>in</strong>and <strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ation. In southern <strong>Europe</strong>an countries (Portugal, Spa<strong>in</strong>, Italyor Greece) which have only recently become magnets for immigration,the mascul<strong>in</strong>e proportion of the foreign population is substantially higherthan <strong>in</strong> other <strong>Europe</strong>an countries with a longer-runn<strong>in</strong>g tradition ofhost<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational migration. Yet at the same time, there is a wi<strong>de</strong>variety of composition by sex of each national group <strong>in</strong> these countries.In Spa<strong>in</strong>, for example, the population of Lat<strong>in</strong> American orig<strong>in</strong> is mostlyfemale (i.e. seven women for every three men among those com<strong>in</strong>gfrom Colombia or the Dom<strong>in</strong>ican Republic). At the same time, menclearly predom<strong>in</strong>ate <strong>in</strong> the population with African orig<strong>in</strong>s (approximatelythree women for every seven men from North Africa, for example).In light of the vary<strong>in</strong>g participation of men and women <strong>in</strong> migratorymovements accord<strong>in</strong>g to orig<strong>in</strong>, we might want to look <strong>in</strong>to the


240 TRINIDAD L. VICENTE<strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g factors. Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g with the situation <strong>in</strong> the societies oforig<strong>in</strong>, we could consi<strong>de</strong>r two ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts —women’s family and socialroles and the emigration regulatory policies that surely condition theirmobility <strong>in</strong> different societies, while expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g why women seem morewill<strong>in</strong>g to emigrate from some places rather than others.A woman’s migratory experience will be heavily <strong>in</strong>fluenced by thepersonal and social conditions from which she comes, as well as by thegoal of her migratory project. One must consi<strong>de</strong>r the socio-structuraland cultural framework to which women migrate, as well as the familystructure and sexual distribution of roles <strong>in</strong> the society of orig<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong>or<strong>de</strong>r to un<strong>de</strong>rstand why some <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong> to emigrate and others not to <strong>in</strong>certa<strong>in</strong> contexts. The <strong>de</strong>cision to lead a migratory project is quitedifferent <strong>in</strong> a society that controls and limits women’s <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncethrough rules, values and customs, restrict<strong>in</strong>g them to the private/reproductive sphere (such as <strong>in</strong> Moroccan society), from that of asociety with looser control over women. Similarly, social and familystructure can also help us to un<strong>de</strong>rstand, because <strong>in</strong> many monogamous,patriarchal families (such as <strong>in</strong> the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es), especially with s<strong>in</strong>gleparentfamilies (such as <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> American countries), a woman’s ma<strong>in</strong>role as child-bearer will lead her to emigrate as a strategy for ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>gand improv<strong>in</strong>g the family unit (GREGORIO, 1998; OSO, 1998).Many contexts <strong>in</strong> the country of orig<strong>in</strong>, with their mechanisms ofcontrol and the subord<strong>in</strong>ation of women, greatly condition the fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>epresence <strong>in</strong> migratory flows. This does not mean, however, that womennever assume a lead<strong>in</strong>g role <strong>in</strong> those flows. The social changes currentlytak<strong>in</strong>g place even <strong>in</strong> the most traditional contexts —nourished bywomen’s <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g access to education, urbanisation processes, thegrow<strong>in</strong>g globalisation of communications and <strong>in</strong>formation and by valuechanges brought on by the emigration of other family members— arego<strong>in</strong>g to stimulate an ever greater number of women to set out ontheir own migratory project <strong>in</strong> or<strong>de</strong>r to f<strong>in</strong>d greater <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce, toescape the social norms reign<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> these family structures (arrangedmarriages, guardianship by the husband’s family, etc.) and to flee fromthe negative op<strong>in</strong>ions suffered <strong>in</strong> their societies aris<strong>in</strong>g from their statusas divorcees, disowned, etc.On the other hand, we must also look at the emigration policies ofthe countries of orig<strong>in</strong>, which <strong>in</strong>fluence the ability of men and womento migrate through promotional, selective or prohibitive rules. Some Asianlabour-export<strong>in</strong>g countries, such as the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es, India, Pakistan orBangla<strong>de</strong>sh, for <strong>in</strong>stance, have attempted to prohibit the emigration ofwork<strong>in</strong>g women, largely ow<strong>in</strong>g to frequent abuse and attacks on theirpersonal dignity <strong>in</strong> the receiv<strong>in</strong>g countries (mostly located <strong>in</strong> or around


WOMEN MIGRANTS: INVISIBLE OR CREATIVE ACTORS? 241the Persian Gulf), which has had a major <strong>in</strong>fluence on the amount andselection of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration. But the implicit views un<strong>de</strong>rly<strong>in</strong>gmany of these policies are —as UN (1995, p.3) remarks— that womenare essentially vulnerable and that their respectability is likely to becompromised by the mere fact that they migrate on their own. Newsappear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the media about cases of women who are exploited,trafficked and ma<strong>de</strong> to prostitute themselves have strengthened thei<strong>de</strong>a that it would be better to stay at home, <strong>in</strong> the society of orig<strong>in</strong>,where they will be protected by the males. There is no <strong>de</strong>ny<strong>in</strong>g that theexploitation and the sexual abuse of women is a major problem thatshould be combated <strong>in</strong> all fronts, but it should not be treated as if it werea problem affect<strong>in</strong>g primarily <strong>in</strong>ternational female migrants. However, wemust also recognise that women’s greater level of vulnerability is theresult of a social gen<strong>de</strong>r construction, which after relegat<strong>in</strong>g women to asecondary status, limits their access to resources and places themprecisely <strong>in</strong> positions of lower status and social prestige. One way to fightaga<strong>in</strong>st this would be to <strong>de</strong>fend equal opportunity both at a national and<strong>in</strong>ternational level —someth<strong>in</strong>g that is still far off.Female migrants <strong>in</strong> the receiv<strong>in</strong>g countriesWe should also note the role played by receiv<strong>in</strong>g country immigrationpolicies <strong>in</strong> the gen<strong>de</strong>r composition of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration. <strong>Europe</strong>animmigration laws and regulations <strong>de</strong>veloped <strong>in</strong> the seventies have left twoma<strong>in</strong> doors open to those from other countries. The first is through work,which is ever more restricted and requires a work permit. The second isthrough family reunification, a popular means used by women immigrants<strong>in</strong> recent <strong>de</strong>ca<strong>de</strong>s for overcom<strong>in</strong>g tighten<strong>in</strong>g bor<strong>de</strong>r controls, althoughtheir migratory reasons are clearly work-related. Meanwhile, we mustavoid mistak<strong>in</strong>g a migratory project with the means of entry, someth<strong>in</strong>gthat can be clearly seen when the woman <strong>in</strong>itiates the migratoryprocess and the husband arrives later through family reunification. 4This “entry status” via family reunification is, however, help<strong>in</strong>g tocreate an image of women as solely <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt immigrants, follow<strong>in</strong>ga naturalised citizen or other immigrant (usually a man) who holds a4 In this case there is general agreement that the man’s <strong>de</strong>sire to work <strong>in</strong> the hostcountry is what lies beh<strong>in</strong>d the <strong>de</strong>cision to reunite the family. Here we are once aga<strong>in</strong>up aga<strong>in</strong>st the stereotypes that view the man as an active subject with the responsibilityfor productive tasks carried out <strong>in</strong> the public sphere, while the women is relegated tothe private sphere —her participation <strong>in</strong> economic activity thus un<strong>de</strong>rvalued.


242 TRINIDAD L. VICENTEresi<strong>de</strong>ncy permit and updated work permit. This latter person iseconomically active, with enough <strong>in</strong>come to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the familymembers reunited <strong>in</strong> the host society. We can see this attitu<strong>de</strong> <strong>in</strong> the<strong>Europe</strong>an Charter on Migrant Worker Rights, which <strong>in</strong> article 17ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s the right of immigrant workers to “br<strong>in</strong>g their wife andchildren”.S<strong>in</strong>ce family reunification is one of the few legal avenues availablefor migration, many women will use this means of access to the hostcountry, a process that will brand them with the status of legalimmigrants who are economically <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on their reunit<strong>in</strong>g agent.They will thus not be regar<strong>de</strong>d as resi<strong>de</strong>nts <strong>in</strong> their own right, at least fora number of years —with far reach<strong>in</strong>g consequences. The <strong>in</strong>stitutional<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncy on the husband’s permit will make the woman’s life onethat takes place <strong>in</strong> the private sphere, break<strong>in</strong>g the equality that existsbetween the married couple before the law. This, <strong>in</strong> turn, will establishand formalise hierarchies and areas of power with<strong>in</strong> the family structure(MESTRE, 2001). For example, this situation will not allow many womento break the family l<strong>in</strong>k through separation —even <strong>in</strong> situations of conflictor domestic violence— s<strong>in</strong>ce that move would place them <strong>in</strong> a situationwhere the risk of be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>de</strong>ported is high and left to the arbitrary <strong>de</strong>cisionof the adm<strong>in</strong>istration (MOROKVASIC, 1991). Moreover, their <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>ncewill even be re<strong>in</strong>forced by the fact that family reunification offers aresi<strong>de</strong>ncy permit without a work permit —at least for a certa<strong>in</strong> period.They will thus be <strong>de</strong>prived of their own economic resources, given thattheir only entry <strong>in</strong>to the workplace, the un<strong>de</strong>rground economy, is <strong>de</strong>emedillegal. This br<strong>in</strong>gs with it the greater risk of suffer<strong>in</strong>g situations ofeconomic exploitation. For all these reasons, recent studies on immigrantwomen <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> still argue that women more often than men are<strong>de</strong>nied full citizenship.Another of the <strong>de</strong>term<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g factors <strong>in</strong> the immigration of womento <strong>Europe</strong>an countries is the economic status of their family memberswho have already emigrated and settled <strong>in</strong> the host country. Thoseearn<strong>in</strong>g lower salaries will have a more difficult time sponsor<strong>in</strong>g theimmigration of their closest relatives, especially when economic solvencyis a necessary requirement for family reunification.On the other hand, the arrival of some groups of women to certa<strong>in</strong><strong>Europe</strong>an societies will be favoured by the migratory networks thathave been established <strong>in</strong> those countries. Such networks <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> thefamily contacts, friendship and neighbourhood relations that act aschannels for <strong>in</strong>formation, resources and all k<strong>in</strong>ds of material and nonmaterialgoods and services that help the immigrant (GREGORIO,1998, p. 34-37). As such, any explanation of the migratory flows <strong>in</strong>to


WOMEN MIGRANTS: INVISIBLE OR CREATIVE ACTORS? 243<strong>Europe</strong> and their composition by sex must take <strong>in</strong>to consi<strong>de</strong>ration suchth<strong>in</strong>gs as the volume, distribution, location and level of settlement ofeach migrant group. All of these features, along with the migratorypolicies, will be key aspects <strong>in</strong> expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the evolution of foreignpopulation flows.The distribution of the sexes with<strong>in</strong> each migrant group <strong>in</strong> each hostsociety represents another important aspect from the gen<strong>de</strong>r perspective.Different studies have shown that many immigrant women have experienceda certa<strong>in</strong> emancipation from their traditional roles, achiev<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce or at least a relaxation <strong>in</strong> the levels of social control appliedto them, <strong>in</strong> spite of the migratory policies of both the host and countryof orig<strong>in</strong>. This is especially true if the women are part of a group <strong>in</strong> whichthey are clearly the majority. Other women, however, will live with<strong>in</strong> areproduction of the family relations and social roles from their countryof orig<strong>in</strong>, especially if they belong to a group with<strong>in</strong> the host countrycharacterised by sexual equality. A third group, meanwhile, will livethrough still greater social control than that which exists <strong>in</strong> their countryof orig<strong>in</strong>. These are the women that enter by means of family reunification,and who represent a clear m<strong>in</strong>ority of their national group. However, awoman’s situation with<strong>in</strong> her family and community environment canchange over time, <strong>de</strong>pend<strong>in</strong>g on her level of success <strong>in</strong> terms of socialand work <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>in</strong> the new <strong>Europe</strong>an context.Female migration and gen<strong>de</strong>red workMa<strong>in</strong>stream migration theory has traditionally seen labour migrationas predom<strong>in</strong>antly male, with women viewed primarily as <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nts(MOROKVASIC, 1984). Yearly data supplied by the OECD show, however,a substantial level of participation by women immigrants <strong>in</strong> the labourmarket <strong>in</strong> the different <strong>Europe</strong>an Union countries. This is all the moreimpressive if we keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that this section of the population oftenf<strong>in</strong>ds its workplace <strong>in</strong> the un<strong>de</strong>rground economy.To date, <strong>Europe</strong>an women have yet to enter the labour marketun<strong>de</strong>r the same conditions as their male counterparts. However, thissituation is much worse still for women immigrants <strong>in</strong> the EU. Theyresi<strong>de</strong> on the bottom of the labour scale, beh<strong>in</strong>d the position held bythe two national groups (men and women), and the group compris<strong>in</strong>gtheir male immigrant companions.Women immigrants <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong> are still mostly limited to the k<strong>in</strong>d ofwork opportunities fall<strong>in</strong>g un<strong>de</strong>r the concept of “women’s work”:domestic work (<strong>in</strong>ternal and external), all k<strong>in</strong>ds of clean<strong>in</strong>g work (offices,


244 TRINIDAD L. VICENTETable 2Participation rate and unemployment rate of nationals and foreigners by sex<strong>in</strong> EU countries 2000-2001 averageParticipation rateUnemployment rateMen Women Men WomenNationals Foreigners Nationals Foreigners Nationals Foreigners Nationals ForeignersBelgiumDenmarkF<strong>in</strong>landFranceGermanyGreeceIrelandItalyLuxembourgNetherlandsNorwayPortugalSpa<strong>in</strong>Swe<strong>de</strong>nU. K.73.384.179.475.178.976.279.274.084.984.679.077.378.083.173.672.471.283.176.677.689.277.079.769.582.181.585.463.175.687.757.076.274.663.364.749.055.947.767.276.864.050.974.268.446.641.053.060.248.650.756.056.257.749.067.265.359.160.355.850.74.63.610.07.17.27.24.11.21.93.73.19.35.55.58.014.212.224.217.113.47.65.12.54.75.38.412.916.19.87.47.04.911.210.77.816.23.81.72.93.45.119.84.64.413.916.57.229.923.911.717.66.23.87.04.59.617.213.07.921.3Source: Sopemi, 2003.Note: Data cover the labour force aged 15 to 64. The data refer to the native and foreignbornpopulations.hotels, etc.), health care, childcare, care of the ill and the el<strong>de</strong>rly,restaurant and bar work (as waitresses, cooks, etc.) sales (street cornersales, etc.), sex shows, prostitution, etc. All of these employment areasoffer an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g amount of jobs, given that local workers tend toavoid them s<strong>in</strong>ce they are so representative of gen<strong>de</strong>r discrim<strong>in</strong>ation.These jobs represent an entrance <strong>in</strong>to the labour market for manyimmigrant women, although they are quite unstable (long workdays,low pay, high safety and health risks, low prestige and social protection,more relaxed control over compliance with contract conditions, parttimejobs, etc.). They are often performed without any contract at all,i.e., <strong>in</strong> the un<strong>de</strong>rground economy. Moreover, they rarely help <strong>in</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>ga woman’s legal 5 status, due to the difficulty <strong>in</strong> obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the relevant5 A work contract or firm job offer is required for obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a work permit orrenewal <strong>in</strong> <strong>Europe</strong>an countries. Moreover, a work permit is often the requirement for aresi<strong>de</strong>ncy permit, which would allow the hol<strong>de</strong>r to emerge from hid<strong>in</strong>g and obta<strong>in</strong> theyearned-for documents.


WOMEN MIGRANTS: INVISIBLE OR CREATIVE ACTORS? 245work permits or renewals. All of this leaves many of these women <strong>in</strong>an obvious situation of exploitation and social exclusion.In addition, limitation to these “typically fem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e” jobs leads tothe professional disqualification of many of a women’s <strong>de</strong>grees, result<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> the wast<strong>in</strong>g of the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and capacities of many women whoarrive with high aca<strong>de</strong>mic and professional cre<strong>de</strong>ntials (VICENTE,2003). At the same time, this process re<strong>in</strong>forces the stereotypes appliedto this group of women (supposedly ma<strong>de</strong> up of illiterates <strong>in</strong>capable ofother k<strong>in</strong>ds of work, with no professional future). In short, these womenwill quite often suffer a k<strong>in</strong>d of double discrim<strong>in</strong>ation —immigrantsand women workers <strong>in</strong> a society that conf<strong>in</strong>es them to badly regar<strong>de</strong>d,badly regulated and badly paid jobs.Domestic work and care of the el<strong>de</strong>rly and children, for example,are common employment sectors for foreign women which havegreatly expan<strong>de</strong>d <strong>in</strong> recent years, especially <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Europe</strong>ancountries which have only recently seen the <strong>in</strong>corporation of nativeborn women <strong>in</strong>to the workplace. These countries still have a low levelof male or government participation <strong>in</strong> these tasks, creat<strong>in</strong>g a situation<strong>in</strong> which this work is quite often carried out <strong>in</strong> the un<strong>de</strong>rground economy.Yet even when the job is legal, applicable law does not always <strong>de</strong>manda written contract, mak<strong>in</strong>g it tremendously difficult to legalise theimmigration status of the foreigners (mostly women) work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> thosejobs. This situation also h<strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>rs the recognisance and protection oflabour rights, s<strong>in</strong>ce most work conditions <strong>in</strong> such jobs (hours, timepresent, salary and percentage of salary discounted for food, boardand ma<strong>in</strong>tenance, etc.) are left to <strong>in</strong>dividual parties (MESTRE, 2001).It would seem that immigrant labour is also becom<strong>in</strong>g more andmore prevalent <strong>in</strong> the sex <strong>in</strong>dustry, particularly prostitution. This isespecially true among certa<strong>in</strong> nationalities which are often i<strong>de</strong>ntifiedwith such activity. Prostitution work is usually i<strong>de</strong>ntified with situationsof exploitation, present<strong>in</strong>g women as victims of human traffick<strong>in</strong>grather than those who have freely immigrated. As such, they needprotection, at least to the extent that they <strong>de</strong>nounce their employers.Many studies, however, are show<strong>in</strong>g that a large number of thewomen work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Europe</strong>an sex <strong>in</strong>dustry are active agents <strong>in</strong>migratory processes, people aware that their job would <strong>in</strong> some waybe related to sex, if not prostitution itself, and who chose this pathgiven the resources and job possibilities with<strong>in</strong> reach (COLECTIVO IOÉ,2001; BONELLI, 2001). In addition, many studies and reports haveshown that traffick<strong>in</strong>g or exploitation is suffered by many womenwork<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> many different sectors apart from the sex <strong>in</strong>dustry. As such,the fight aga<strong>in</strong>st traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>gs, and woman <strong>in</strong> particular,


246 TRINIDAD L. VICENTEmust be applied to many fronts —areas <strong>in</strong> which these people are leftat the mercy of human traffick<strong>in</strong>g networks. This phenomenon mustbe confronted with all means at our disposal.In most cases, work<strong>in</strong>g conditions for woman immigrants are farfrom optimal. Yet as long as host countries offer woman migrants a moreaccessible means of entry (even if this is through family reunification), andbetter job prospects and salaries than their country of orig<strong>in</strong> (althoughthese are clearly stereotyped), women will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to view the migratoryprocess as an attractive option. Consequently, we should rema<strong>in</strong> awareof the economic and social marg<strong>in</strong>alisation caused by these precariousjobs, support<strong>in</strong>g these women with improved and more varie<strong>de</strong>mployment opportunities that will <strong>in</strong> turn allow them to improve theirpersonal, family and social life.Female migration and ethnic boundariesWhen host countries <strong>de</strong>scribe a person as an “immigrant”, we areexternally apply<strong>in</strong>g a negative attribute, a stigma that will rema<strong>in</strong> withthat person forever (even after atta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g citizenship). In fact, this stigmawill cont<strong>in</strong>ue with that person’s <strong>de</strong>scendants, who will be labelled (aga<strong>in</strong>stall semantic logic) “second or third generation immigrants” (DELGADO,2003, p.14). Immigrants, who are frequently referred to as “the others”,have a series of <strong>de</strong>f<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g characteristics. The most noteworthy of theseis that of be<strong>in</strong>g regar<strong>de</strong>d as from another land, of resid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the hostcountry without hav<strong>in</strong>g been <strong>in</strong>vited, of be<strong>in</strong>g poor from the economicperspective and backwards from the cultural, of hav<strong>in</strong>g come from lessmo<strong>de</strong>rnised societies, of represent<strong>in</strong>g a threat to the <strong>in</strong>tegrity of oursociety, etc.All national collectivities are constructed around bor<strong>de</strong>rs (legal/territorial l<strong>in</strong>es) and boundaries (limit l<strong>in</strong>es of collectivities), that <strong>de</strong>l<strong>in</strong>eatei<strong>de</strong>ntities and separate the world <strong>in</strong>to “us” and “them”. The <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gforeign population enter<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Europe</strong> from non-EU countries is, <strong>in</strong> theop<strong>in</strong>ion of many <strong>Europe</strong>an citizens, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g with it a question<strong>in</strong>g of ourwestern culture by those from other civilisations, who reject <strong>in</strong>tegration<strong>in</strong>to our society while adher<strong>in</strong>g to and propagat<strong>in</strong>g the values, customsand cultures of their societies of orig<strong>in</strong> (HUNTINGTON, 1997). With this <strong>in</strong>m<strong>in</strong>d, woman immigrants come to represent “the others” par excellence.Often stereotyped as unemployed immigrants who are economicallyand socially <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt on the male immigrant, these woman mustoften live between paternalism, and rejection by host societies thatperceive and represent them as victims of subord<strong>in</strong>ation to backward


WOMEN MIGRANTS: INVISIBLE OR CREATIVE ACTORS? 247cultural and social practices (such as be<strong>in</strong>g sold <strong>in</strong>to marriage, the useof veils, genital mutilation, imprisonment <strong>in</strong> private quarters, sexual abuse/violence, etc.) that they, <strong>in</strong> turn, transmit to succeed<strong>in</strong>g generations.Similarly, these woman are associated with other social problems suchas traffick<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> human be<strong>in</strong>gs, prostitution, employment <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>humanconditions, etc. Meanwhile, the majority of <strong>Europe</strong>ans believe that thesettlement of foreigners should <strong>de</strong>pend on the job market. Many stillbelieve that it is better for immigrants to give up their native tongue,customs and traditions, while adopt<strong>in</strong>g those of their <strong>Europe</strong>an hostcountry. This is an especially relevant po<strong>in</strong>t if we keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that, asdifferent studies have shown, rejection of cultural diversity and the<strong>de</strong>mand for assimilation serve as an excuse for exclusion. To the extentthat a person does not perfectly assimilate to the new host society (analmost impossible task), he or she can blame no one else for theirmarg<strong>in</strong>alisation apart from themselves —precisely for not “<strong>in</strong>tegrat<strong>in</strong>g”.Yet most of these foreign women will rema<strong>in</strong> among us for a longperiod of time, and more will probably cont<strong>in</strong>ue to arrive. This is an<strong>in</strong>escapable reality that we must accept as a start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t, one thatcompels us to pon<strong>de</strong>r just how they will <strong>in</strong>corporate, or are already<strong>in</strong>corporat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the host societies (to which they already belong).F<strong>in</strong>al remarksFem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e participation <strong>in</strong> migratory flows <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>Europe</strong>an Unioncannot rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>visible. In spite of our relative lack of knowledge aboutfem<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>e migratory processes, we can recognise their heterogeneity andcomplex causes. They may <strong>in</strong>clu<strong>de</strong> situations <strong>in</strong> which the woman playsno role <strong>in</strong> the <strong>de</strong>cision mak<strong>in</strong>g process, as well as others <strong>in</strong> which themigration plann<strong>in</strong>g is done together with other family members (usuallythe husband). In many cases the women are the ma<strong>in</strong> actors, if not thesole, <strong>in</strong><strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt protagonists of these migratory processes. Womenemigrat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Europe</strong>an countries have a wi<strong>de</strong> variety of orig<strong>in</strong>s, i<strong>de</strong>ntities,migratory trajectories, leav<strong>in</strong>g and arrival situations, connections with theorig<strong>in</strong>al and receiv<strong>in</strong>g societies, etc. Moreover, these women’s experiencesdiffer <strong>in</strong> many ways from those of their male companions, due to theirdifferent social situation both <strong>in</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong>al as well as <strong>de</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ationsociety, to vary<strong>in</strong>g divisions of roles as well as to the ethic and sexualdivision of work. For all of these reasons, we must pay greater attentionto the gen<strong>de</strong>r variable <strong>in</strong> the study of <strong>in</strong>ternational migration if wewant to truly extend our knowledge of this complex, current socialphenomenon.


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