Defence Forces Review 2010

The Niemba Ambush: A Reappraisalpersonnel. In fact the policy of the 32nd battalion seemed over cautious in relation to thepositive response it received from the native Congolese and Belgian settlers.DisciplineThe army conceded that discipline standards needed to improve for the Congo. Duggan haswritten that the level of discipline in the Congo surpassed domestic standards. 38 HoweverMajor General Vincent Savino claimed that standards in Ireland had been equally as high. 39The 32nd battalion developed a policy that demanded ‘instant obedience’ anything less wouldresult in ‘the need to inflict comparatively heavy punishments.’ In the post-Emergency era thearmy believed that discipline decreased significantly and new standards required the issuingof severe punishments in response to actions which had previously been looked upon as‘trivial offences.’ 40 NCOs received orders to increase their severity to regain ‘the authority andpower over men which they once indisputably wielded.’ 41 Harsh punishments in the Congoinstilled this new discipline and ultimately the army could use repatriation for soldiers who‘demonstrated their unsuitability for overseas service.’ 42 Discipline increased to such intenselevels that of the 758 discipline offences committed by the men of the 32nd battalion, 45%of charges related to absence without leave. However the ‘vast majority of these were shortabsences varying in duration from a few minutes.’ 43 Understandably many soldiers foundit difficult to adapt to this intense level of discipline and suffered ‘bouts of exasperation,depression, and frustration.’ The report recommended ‘a good basic disciplinary training isimperative if these feelings are not to be allowed to find expression in insubordination anddisobedience’ and the need to deal with the ‘lack of leadership and personal example displayedby some of the junior NCOs.’ 44Despite the difficulties which soldiers faced in adapting to what perhaps felt like a new army;repatriation was only used against a single soldier from either the 32nd or the 33rd battalions. 45For the men of 32nd battalion the report noted ‘at no time was there any evidence of panicor fear even when the worst was expected.’ On the contrary the report described the men as‘over daring when caution might be the better choice.’ 46 Four soldiers of the 32nd battalionreceived recommendations for acts of bravery in separate incidents. 47 A self-satisfied 32ndbattalion stated that of over 600 men over a period of six months only 50 convictions arosefor drunkenness. 48 Other disciplinary convictions included three soldiers for ‘loading weaponwithout authority’ and a small number for ‘quitting of arms’, i.e. not having one’s weapon onone’s person. 49 Since the 32nd battalion did not experience any direct threats to personnel thepolicy of ensuring the highest level of discipline possible may have been an apparent overreaction. The 33rd battalion adopted the same measures developed by the 32nd battalion.38 Duggan, (Dublin, 1991), p.251.39 Major General Vincent Savino. Interviewed 8 November 2008.40 MA, Unit History 32nd Inf Batt, Chapter XI, Pre-Congo Discipline.41 Ibid.42 Ibid, Section 7.43 Ibid, Section 4.44 Ibid.45 MA, Unit History 32nd Inf Batt, Chapter IX, Section 3.46 Ibid, Chapter XI, Section 20.47 Ibid.48 Ibid, Section 4.49 MA, Unit History 32nd Inf Batt, Chapter IX, Summary of Disciplinary Offences – 32 Inf Bn.13