Defence Forces Review 2010

Defence Forces Review 2010by groups whose decision-making procedure required unanimous rather than majority rule. 24Callaway and Esser also find that highly cohesive groups without adequate decision-makingprocedures, exhibit less disagreement and make poorer decisions. 25Janis’s final structural fault pertains to the homogeneity or lack of disparity in socialbackground and ideology among members of a cohesive group. This structural fault decreasesthe likelihood of disparate views being presented and debated within the group. Where thereare moderate differences in social background and ideology among members, they are morelikely to devote their deliberations to exploring alternative solutions, instead of focussing onjust one available option and gravitating towards a premature consensus.McCauley suggests that judgements about group homogeneity are difficult to make becauseof the lack of clear criteria as to what constitutes a common social background or ideology. 26But he states that the group of naval officers involved in Janis’s Pearl Harbour exampleof groupthink did constitute a homogenous group, because of their shared background,education and training. Hewson supports this view by describing the military as: “…afairly homogenous, left brained community that does not strongly value artistic creativity,spontaneity, individualism or imagination.” 27 He suggests that military people tend also tobe self-righteous, and convinced of their purpose and mission, which makes the militaryenvironment a fertile ground for groupthink. Winslow commented on military homogeneityin her research on the Canadian Airborne Regiment where inductees were “…levelled into ahomogeneous group in an effort to suppress individuality, thus encouraging investment in thegroup.” 28Symptoms of GroupthinkJanis’s theory divided his groupthink symptoms (Box C, p.8) into three main types. In Type1, the group overestimates its ability, creating an illusion of invulnerability shared by mostor all group members and encouraging extreme risk taking. The group also manifests anunquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality which could cause the members to ignorethe ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.Kowert opines:The danger is not simply that the presence of like-minded others canreinforce one’s own sense of rectitude and virtuousness far beyondprudence. The mere presence of others is energising in a way that canprompt rash action or even mob behaviour. 29In Type 2, the group tends towards close-mindedness with collective efforts to rationalise inorder to discount warnings or other information that might lead the members to reconsider24 Kameda, T. and Sugimori, S. (1993) ‘Psychological entrapment in group decision making: an assigned decision rule and a groupthink phenomenon’,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65:2, pp. 283-293.25 Callaway, M. and Esser, J. (1984) ‘Groupthink: effects of cohesiveness and problem-solving on group decision making’, Social Behaviour andPersonality, 12, pp. 157-164.26 McCauley, C. (1989) ‘The nature of social influence in groupthink: compliance and internalization’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,57:2, pp. 250-260.27 Hewson, H. (2005) ‘Hive mind and groupthink: The curse of the perfect IPT’, Defence AT & L, Nov-Dec, 33.28 Winslow, D. (1999) ‘Rites of passage and group bonding in the Canadian Airborne’, Armed Forces and Society, 25:3, p. 430.29 Kowert, P. (2002) Groupthink or Deadlock: When do Leaders Learn from their Advisors, Albany, SUNY Press, p. 2.68