Defence Forces Review 2010

The Niemba Ambush: A Reappraisalbattalion warned his men not to retaliate. 100 The story of the ambush and the response amongstIrish soldiers has been completely tabloidised in a most inaccurate television documentarybroadcast by RTE Factual. 101 It explicitly claimed the average soldier wanted reprisals againstBalubas and implied officers confined troops to barracks to prevent this happening. Evenotherwise commendable academic works contain this falsehood. Unfortunately a senior Irishofficer has contributed to the lack of knowledge surrounding the event. Colonel Doyle claimedthe troops in the sector had been confined to barracks by Commander Scomep, an officer froma foreign contingent, and that Ethiopian soldiers carried out most of the search. 102 The truthis that the first Irish search party, led by Lieutenant Enright, discovered ‘large numbers ofCongolese moving about in the close bush surrounding his position’ and received orders toleave the area. 103 On 9 November battalion HQ dispatched a second search party consistingof 92 men led by Commandant Hogan. 104 Therefore almost every Irish soldier in the sectorparticipated in the second search. The first opportunity for a reprisal came on 9 Novemberwhen a patrol from B Company met a Baluba war party being carried in two lorries alongthe road. Believing there existed a major engagement the Balubas told them they wanted ‘tojoin the fight at Niemba.’ The soldiers told them what happened and they appeared ‘confusedand disappointed’ and the tribesmen returned to their area. 105 A second opportunity for areprisal occurred when an Irish unit moved into Niemba railway station. One hundred Balubasoccupied the station and refused an Irish request to leave. Commandant Hogan decided to‘clear the railway station’ and discussed plans with Commandant McMahon. Then LieutenantEnright handed him a radio message from Commander Scomep ordering:1. Act in accordance with UN Directive – No reprisals.2. Recover bodies and identify.Irish officers abandoned the planning of the operation to take the railway station. 106 One muststate clearly the officers did not plan a reprisal. To conduct an effective search, or to receivereinforcements, securing the station was a sound military objective. Perhaps CommanderScomep sent the message over concerns that Baluba fatalities inflicted during the operation totake the station would appear as a reprisal. In November 1960 UN peacekeeping contingencyplanning had not been developed and it took several months until clarification existed regardingthe use of force to achieve an objective (Security Council resolution taken on 21 February1961). Irish troops withdrew from the station and set up a defensive position protected with‘grenade booby traps’ inwhich ‘Lieutenant Enright displayed a courage and resourcefulnessdeserving of the highest praise.’ 107 However that night at one army camp, a soldier woke up,grabbed his rifle and saw a figure moving in the vegetation. He fired a number of shots and hita fellow soldier named Private Davis who subsequently died of his injuries. An investigationexonerated the soldier on the grounds that ‘in view of the dangerous situation the men wereright in opening fire on the movement which they observed.’ 108100 Irish Times, 11 Nov. 1960101 ‘War Stories: Part One’, RTE One, Broadcast date: 28 March 2008.102 Colonel Doyle, interviewed in Katsumi Ishizuka, Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000, A Study of Irish Motivation, (London,2004), p. 59.103 MA, 33 Inf Batt, Chapter 5, Niemba, Section 183.104 Ibid, Section 183-185. (92 men; 71 soldiers and 21 of a forward command HQ).105 MA, 33 Inf Batt, Chapter 5, Niemba, Section 187.106 Ibid, Section 183-185.107 Ibid, Section 186.108 Ibid, Section 192.21