Defence Forces Review 2010

The Niemba Ambush: A ReappraisalIndian soldiers did not expose incompetent planning by senior Irish officers. During futureUN missions it became normal for different contingents to pool resources and exchangepersonnel. In fact medical personnel from the 32nd battalion transferred to other contingents. 60Furthermore, in ONUC and often in subsequent UN missions, a contingent’s exact role did notclearly emerge until deployment had taken place. This produced many planning difficulties.It is indisputable that even with Indian assistance Irish radio operators in the 33rd battalionhad been stretched to the limit. Throughout the entire six month mission of the 33rd battalionits radio operators worked seven days a week and their shift began at 0730 and ended at 2230.They received a three hour break for lunch and a four hour break for dinner. In an emergencythe radio required constant manning and during the Niemba incident one operator spent over36 continuous hours on his radio. 61 On 9 November in response to the ambush 123 formal and30 voice conversations exchanged between Irish operators. 62 Therefore one must reject theassertion that communications staff or equipment resulted, or in any way contributed, to theambush or the number of fatalities. Quite simply in an emergency the 33rd battalion possessedthe level of communications it needed. Interestingly the 33rd battalion retrospectively ratedthe standard of the Irish operators compared to foreign contingents as ‘below average’ in termsof ‘speed and quality’ but described them as ‘above average in terms of initiative and sense ofresponsibility.’ The report explained this apparent contradiction because other contingents hadbeen ‘over-disciplined’ meaning they would not break protocol even when the circumstancesexcused. The battalion’s report stated that the Irish operators ‘with sufficient training andpractice… would probably develop into first class operators.’ 63 One could even speculate thatIrish operators who self-assessed situations and made decisions, which technically constitutedas acts of insubordination, made the reaction to the Niemba incident swifter. One reason forthis had been the fact that radio operators under specific orders not to transmit signals (or torelay) outside of specified time periods, without clearance from higher authority, technicallydisobeyed orders to accelerate the deployment of the search and rescue teams.When one examines the performance of other contingents, who possessed an abundanceof equipment and operators, it appears that the Irish performed incredibly well under thecircumstances. General McKeown, as commander of all UN contingents in the Congo, satin the perfect position to determine the average standard of communications within differentcontingents. He has written that ‘communications at times were deplorable and frequentlyinaccurate, largely because of the language problem, technical problems and general bad staffwork.’ He has described the average training and equipment of other contingents as ‘one of thevery great headaches we suffered from’ his exasperation at the standard of foreign contingentsmade him assert ‘the only way of finding out what exactly was going on in a particular areawas to go there and find out for oneself.’ 64 Arguably the 33rd battalion possessed one of thebest communications systems within ONUC.60 MA, Unit History 32nd Inf Batt, Chapter XIV. Lessons and Recommendations. Section 5.61 MA, 33 Inf Batt, ‘Signal Section History’, Section 6.62 Ibid, Section 9.63 Ibid, Section 8.64 McKeown, Op cit, pp. 43-47.15