Journalist’s TradeGovernor Gray Davis addresses delegates at the California Democratic Party Conventionwith Lt. Governor Cruz Bustamante (to Davis’s right, gesturing), also a candidate forgovernor. Photo by Ciro Cesar/La Opinión.reau in Sacramento.Money spent on presidential andcongressional races attracts interestfrom national media, campaign financereform advocates, and academic researchers.But stakes are high in thestates, as reflected by the findings ofThe Institute on Money in State Politics,based in Helena, Montana, whichcounted $1.54 billion spent on campaignsfor governor, lieutenant governor,and legislative candidates in 2002,up from $1.03 billion in 1998.In California, the campaigns for legislativeseats and statewide offices routinelycost a combined $200 million ormore. Cumulative campaign spendingtopped $500 million in 1998, whenCalifornians elected Davis as governorand decided several high-priced ballotinitiatives. There is, in short, no way toreport fully on state government—orelections to it—without tracking theflow of money. In many instances,money is at the confluence of politicsand policy.Starting in 1999, when Davis tookoffice, I began building an Excel databaseconsisting of his donors. By thetime he left office, the file containedalmost 12,000 entries. I could sort donorsby name, city and state of residence,date of donation, and amountgiven. The file includes informationabout the donor’s employer and industryor interest, ranging from healthcare, gambling, entertainment and telecommunicationsto labor and statecontractors. There were several subclassifications.Within labor, for example,there are state employee unions,firefighter and police unions, buildingtrades and others.Using this accumulated data, mycolleagues and I could write about thenumber of donors from outside thestate who gave to Davis and how manyappointees on boards and commissionswere donors and how much they contributed.This enabled me to report inthe Times, with some authority, that 23percent of Davis’s donations came fromorganized labor. I could readily seethat $175,000 was contributed in 2003from the Mercury Insurance Group,but it’s one thing to know that Mercurygave $175,000 to Davis this year and$270,000 since 1999. It’s another thingto know that in 2003, Mercury sponsoredlegislation beneficial to its business,and Davis signed the bill beforeleaving office. Davis’s aides and Mercurydenied any connection betweentheir contribution and his signature.In his first term, as Davis was raisingmore than $70 million, fundraisingbecame a focus of much of the newscoverage of his administration. Thiswas particularly true in the 2002 electionyear. Newspapers reported thathe offered to meet with students at the<strong>University</strong> of California, Berkeley, whodonated $100, and that his administrationauthorized an oil refinery to dumpdioxin in the San Francisco Bay afterthe refinery owner donated $70,500.The Times reported that he decidedagainst regulating the dietary supplement,Ephedra, after a manufacturergave him $150,000. After the San FranciscoChronicle reported that Davissolicited a one million dollar donationfrom the California Teachers Association,the Times reported that Davisrequested the money during a meetingin the governor’s Capitol office. Davisnarrowly survived the 2002 re-electionagainst businessman Bill Simon, Jr. Buttales of Davis’s fundraising exploitsserved to increase his vulnerability tothe recall. “[Davis] has two ears andtwo eyes and knows that he was hurt inthe 2002 campaign by the perceptionsthat he was a nonstop fundraiser,”Davis’s chief political adviser GarrySouth said at a forum analyzing therecall campaign, hosted by the Instituteof Governmental Studies at the<strong>University</strong> of California, Berkeley.Tracking CampaignFundraisingIn California, retail politics is a quaintconcept. Statewide candidates don’thold barbecues or shake hands outsidefactory gates. As a rule, local televisionnews provides little original campaigncoverage. Statewide candidates generallyseek to influence the 15.4 millionregistered voters by spending two milliondollars each week or so on televisionspots. The recall seemed different.News organizations—includinglocal TV—showed intense interest, inpart because Arnold Schwarzeneggerwas running but also because therehad never been a recall of a sittingCalifornia governor.Given this level of media attentionbeing paid to the campaign, politicalexperts believed there would be lessneed to raise large sums. From thestart, they were wrong. Political gadflyTed Costa proposed the recall last De-62 <strong>Nieman</strong> Reports / Winter 2003
California Recallcember, shortly after Davis narrowlywon reelection. Most experts doubtthat Costa would have gathered therequisite 900,000 valid signatures ofregistered voters to place the recall onthe ballot without the infusion of twomillion dollars by multimillionaire RepresentativeDarrell Issa (R-Calif.). Issapaid petition circulators one dollar to$1.25 per signature and funded a directmail petition drive. Altogether, hewas responsible for 1.3 million of the2.1 million signatures gathered in thedrive, according to consultant DavidGilliard, who oversaw Issa’s petitiondrive. Issa had planned to use the recallto launch his run to replace Davis,until Schwarzenegger muscled himaside.During the recall, the public hadmore access to fundraising informationthan in any past election. CaliforniaSecretary of State Kevin Shelley’soffice expanded its Web site, making iteasier to search for donors and downloadlists of contributors. Like Lay, theSacramento lobbyist who knitted togethera Web site to track recall money,California Common Cause set up aWeb site allowing the public to conductmore detailed searches. The Timesand other papers published chartsshowing the amounts raised by eachmajor candidate.But as the campaign took shape,Proposition 34’s infirmities becameapparent. The California Fair PoliticalPractices Commission, which interpretsand enforces state campaign financelaw, carved some loopholes. Candidatesfound others:• There were no caps on donations tocommittees established to supportor oppose the recall, or on donationsto and spending by independentcommittees established to supportor oppose candidates.• The Proposition 34 provision restrictingdonors to giving candidates nomore than $21,200 did not apply tothe recall target, Davis. In his failedattempt to beat the recall, Davis acceptedat least 70 separate donationsof more than $21,200; he received46 separate donations of$100,000 or more.• While Proposition 34 barred candidatesfrom loaning themselves morethan $100,000, candidates couldtake out bank loans, so long as theterms were generally available tothe public. Schwarzenegger used thisloophole to borrow $4.5 million, atfour percent interest.Upon announcing his candidacy,Schwarzenegger portrayed himself as apolitical outsider who wanted to shakeup the establishment. He proclaimedas he entered the race that he wouldaccept no campaign contributions. Hequickly withdrew that pledge, sayinghe wouldn’t raise money from “specialinterests,” which he defined as publicemployee unions and Indian tribes thatown casinos. In both instances, hewould be in a position of negotiatingwith them. “I take money from [the]little grocery store, or the little shoestore or the guy that owns the realestate company or something like that,”Schwarzenegger explained. “But mostof my contributions, 90 percent ofthem, are just from regular people.”As it turned out, Schwarzeneggerled all other candidates in the moneyrace. He gave himself and borrowed$10 million and raised $11.9 millionfrom outsiders. I have begun buildinga new database on the new governor’scontributors. It shows that much ofSchwarzenegger’s money came fromlongtime Republican donors, many ofwhom will have interests in legislationand decisions made by the governorand his administration. He took moneyfrom farm interests, insurance companies,the financial services industry andmanufacturers, all of which have lobbyistsin Sacramento. Real estate anddevelopment interests, which are affectedby state environmental regulationsand various fees, accounted for14 percent of the nearly 12 million heraised.One of the hottest policy <strong>issue</strong>s inthe recall campaign involved the vehiclelicense fee, also called the car tax.After presiding over its decrease in1999, Davis tripled the fee in an attemptto help erase what was a $38billion budget deficit. Car dealers haddonated a combined $450,000 to Davisduring his first term. But in the recall,after the car tax was increased, theirmoney flowed to Schwarzenegger.Schwarzenegger promised to roll backthe car tax, thereby shaving the cost ofnew and used cars. Car dealers accountedfor $500,000 in donations tothe new governor. Bert Boeckmann,who owns car dealerships that haddonated to Davis in his first term, helpedarrange a fundraiser for Schwarzeneggerin the recall. Boeckmann told myreporting partner, Joel Rubin, that therewere many reasons why car dealerssupported the new governor, but “thecar tax was one of the <strong>issue</strong>s that wasvery strong.”Tracking money was an essentialpart of covering the recall race or, indeed,any campaign. The flow of moneyin the recall likely affected the fate of atleast one major candidate, Lt. GovernorCruz Bustamante. But reportingon the influence of money on politicsshouldn’t end when the voting does. Itought to be integral to governmentreporting in off years. Reporters mayfind that Internet disclosure of campaignmoney will help, though thepromise of Internet disclosure doesn’tyet match reality in many states. Groupssuch as the Institute on Money in StatePolitics also can assist.Reporters can make their own jobseasier by taking time to maintain an upto-dateand searchable database. To besure, there’s not always a direct linebetween donations and decisions.Honest reporting on the doings in astate house or city hall should includeinstances when politicians make decisionsthat appear to be in conflict withthe interest of their patrons. Still, inalmost any story about legislative andadministrative <strong>issue</strong>s, a few paragraphsdescribing the donations from the affectedinterests can provide added edgeand give readers insight into the workingsof their government. ■Dan Morain is a staff writer for theLos Angeles Times based in Sacramento.dan.morain@latimes.com<strong>Nieman</strong> Reports / Winter 2003 63