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20children are actually sent into potential combat situations. And <strong>the</strong>y are aptto view <strong>the</strong>ir wounding or death as an outrageous scandal, ra<strong>the</strong>r than anoccupational hazard. 73In response to <strong>the</strong> diminishing ability of <strong>the</strong> great powers to employ <strong>the</strong>ir armedforces as a consequence of <strong>the</strong> need to minimise casualties, Luttwak examines two‘ra<strong>the</strong>r improbable’ solutions. Significantly, both solutions involve <strong>the</strong> use of hiredsoldiers, one based on <strong>the</strong> Gurkha model and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r based on <strong>the</strong> French ForeignLegion. 74 William Shawcross has also argued that <strong>the</strong> United Nations requires a militarycapability, noting that a force of ‘... 5000 well-led soldiers could have saved <strong>the</strong> lives ofthousands of Tutsi victims of <strong>the</strong> Rwanda genocide in 1994’. 75The casualties suffered by Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have provenboth painful for <strong>the</strong>ir families and politically difficult for <strong>the</strong>ir governments. As a result,casualty minimisation is now a feature of modern armed conflict. ADF troops operatingin Iraq, for example, were constrained by orders that placed so-called ‘force protection’above <strong>the</strong> requirement to achieve any given mission. PMC are no less reluctant to suffercasualties, but <strong>the</strong>ir losses are less visible to <strong>the</strong> general public. Robert Young estimatesthat, by <strong>the</strong> spring of 2006, <strong>the</strong> toll of US PMC killed in Iraq had reached 314, a figurethat has continued to rise. 76Fifth, PMC are generally not constrained by formal military tactics, techniques andprocedures. For this reason, <strong>the</strong>y may be more capable of achieving strategic resultswith relatively small tactical forces. Some examples of this at <strong>the</strong> tactical level include<strong>the</strong> successful motorised charges of Hoare and Callan while, at <strong>the</strong> operational level,EO used helicopters to dominate entire provinces. While more traditional militarydoctrine tends to frown on <strong>the</strong>se risky techniques, PMC are able to innovate and maycomplete <strong>the</strong>ir missions far more efficiently.Sixth, relative perceptions of insecurity are increasing and, as a result, securityorganisations are proliferating. Martin van Creveld predicts that low intensity conflictwill eventually replace traditional inter-state conflict and that <strong>the</strong> task of defending73 E N Luttwak, ‘Where are <strong>the</strong> Great Powers? At Home with <strong>the</strong> Kids’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4,July/August 1994, p. 25.74 Ibid., p. 28.75 W Shawcross, ‘In Praise of Sandline’, The Spectator, 1 August 1998, p. 16.76 R Young, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in <strong>the</strong> War on Terror, Crown, New York, 2006, p. 339.

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