26Peace Operations Association (IPOA). The IPOA’s mission is to raise <strong>the</strong> standards of<strong>the</strong> ‘peace and stability operations industry’ and its code of conduct covers humanrights, transparency, accountability, clients, safety, personnel, insurance, control,ethics, rules for <strong>the</strong> use of force, support for international organisations, arms control,partner companies, application and enforcement. 86 IPOA provides staunch support for<strong>the</strong> PMC industry and represents a broad membership of mainly US PMC. Yet, evenin its infancy, <strong>the</strong> association has had to publicly distance itself from <strong>the</strong> problematicreputations of companies such as Blackwater. Blackwater has, in turn, sought torebrand itself with <strong>the</strong> new corporate name of ‘Xe’ (pronounced ‘zee’). 87 The Britishequivalent of IPOA, <strong>the</strong> British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC),was formed in 2006 and aims to promote and regulate UK firms that ‘provide armeddefensive security services’. 88 Australia has no counterpart association, although some<strong>Australian</strong> PMC are members of IPOA and maintain links with BAPSC.Laws of Armed ConflictThe Laws of Armed Conflict, including <strong>the</strong> Geneva Conventions, were generally silenton issues of mercenarism until <strong>the</strong> adoption of <strong>the</strong> Additional Protocols to <strong>the</strong> GenevaConventions in 1977. One early exception, however, covered <strong>the</strong> violation of <strong>the</strong>principle of neutrality, as defined in Article 4 of <strong>the</strong> 1907 Hague V Convention, by <strong>the</strong>active recruitment of mercenaries. 89 Ano<strong>the</strong>r exception arose in <strong>the</strong> Security Councilresolution to remove all mercenaries from <strong>the</strong> Congo in 1961, including <strong>the</strong> UN troopsdeployed against ‘les affreux’. The UN General Assembly also resolved to condemn <strong>the</strong>86 See International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) website: .87 D Hedgpeth, ‘Blackwater sheds name, shifts focus’, The Washington Post, 14 February 2009,accessed 5 January 2010..88 See British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) website: accessed 5 January 2010..89 H McCoubrey and N D White, International Law and Armed Conflict, Dartmouth, Aldershot,England, 1992, p. 300; see ‘Convention Respecting <strong>the</strong> Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers andPersons in <strong>the</strong> Case of War on Land’, Hague, 18 October 1907, International Law Concerning <strong>the</strong>Conflict of Hostilities: Collection of Hague Conventions and Some O<strong>the</strong>r Treaties, InternationalCommittee of <strong>the</strong> Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, Switzerland, 1992, pp. 143–48.
27use of mercenaries to fight movements for national liberation and independence in1968, 1969, 1970 and 1973. 90In 1977, Article 47 of Additional Protocol I denied mercenaries <strong>the</strong> rights ofcombatants and prisoners of war. 91 The aim of <strong>the</strong> Article was to sanction <strong>the</strong> criminalprosecution of those persons identified as mercenaries, although this has had littleeffect in <strong>the</strong> years since its promulgation. The definition of mercenaries applies onlyto persons recruited for a particular armed conflict ra<strong>the</strong>r than non-specific longtermcontracts. The definition also applies only to persons taking part in hostilitiesra<strong>the</strong>r than those acting as advisers, technicians or trainers. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, only personsdesiring private gain, as opposed to those acting for ideological reasons, are includedin <strong>the</strong> definition. Finally, <strong>the</strong> definition applies only to those persons who are notmembers of <strong>the</strong> armed forces of a party to <strong>the</strong> conflict. This is a relatively easy clauseto circumvent through <strong>the</strong> signing of enlistment papers or special appointment. 92Geoffrey Best comments acidly that ‘any mercenary who cannot exclude himself fromthis definition deserves to be shot—and his lawyer with him’. 93The applicability of <strong>the</strong> Article is fur<strong>the</strong>r diminished because it does not apply tocivil wars, one of <strong>the</strong> more frequent reasons for mercenary employment, although itdoes apply to mercenaries involved in operations intended to overthrow legitimategovernments. Some jurists argue that Article 47 violates o<strong>the</strong>r aspects of Protocol Iand that its denial of fundamental rights to mercenaries is ‘inhumane’. 94 The denialof protection by <strong>the</strong> Protocols may also encourage mercenaries to disregard <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r protective articles of <strong>the</strong> Geneva Conventions. 95 Given <strong>the</strong> many qualificationssurrounding <strong>the</strong> definition of mercenaries it is not surprising that <strong>the</strong> Handbook on90 Burchett and Roebuck, The Whores of War, pp. 231–33.91 ‘Mercenaries’, Article 47, Protocol I, Protocols Additional to <strong>the</strong> Geneva Conventions of 12 August1949, Geneva 1977, ICRC, Geneva, Switzerland, 1987, p. 34.92 The PNG government sought to circumvent this article in appointing EO mercenaries ‘specialconstables’. Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, pp. 16–18; Kwakwa, TheInternational Law of Armed Conflict, pp. 107–27.93 G Best, Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of <strong>the</strong> International Law of Armed Conflict,Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1980, pp. 83, 328 (also cited in Kwakwa, The International Lawof Armed Conflict, pp. 111–12).94 See example in I Detter de Lupis, The Law of War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987,p. 118; and Guy Roberts cited in Kwakwa, The International Law of Armed Conflict, p. 124.95 See interviews with mercenaries in S Neales, ‘Dogs of War Go To Hell’, The Age, 30 April 1993, DowJones Interactive.
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