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life under communism, may help to enlarge the outflow and i- ' the problem. Some ASEAN governments may have had this in mind ,' when they set out to hunt their inhumanity, hoping that word would get back that their reocptivencss could not be takcn for ' pnted. However, when the main bsuts brought to a head by the 'f, , story of the boat people are considered, tit room for decision in :, influencing the 'pull' facton appean sleverely limited, i, , Thc fint of these issues ie stability. The link between the flaw of refugees from Indo-China and the inrstnbility of the region ia ':- dear. The muse of this instability is also elmi, although there o r I::% several layers: it is thc conflict between Vietnam and China. If thir . : ; conflict continues, as it shows every likelihood of doing, the result .: ] will be more destruction in Kampuchea, and possibly Laos, anxitty :,, ' , in the ASRAN states, especially Thailand, and increasing military sup- ' port by the USSR i for Vietnam. So when it is sometimes ~uggestad .:, that the flow of refugemi mn only be stopped at the souw, namely .: Vietnam, the aaaenion is only hdf rmr, unleu it is mum to sugee~t I::, that Vietnam ia responsible for its conflict with China and should j! rewlvc it single-handed. The evidence, rather, is thmt the rtsponsi- :I I bility is shared nnd, in prtifular, that each hrs respon~ibility for ::: the flight of the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. The prospect of reconciling Hanoi and Rking is depressingly ji slight. The intensity of their history, their rivalry in Kampucha, 'ti China's deep suspicion of the Soviet Union and the reluctance of 1': the United States to normalize relations with Hanoi make a sharpen- ',I' ing of the contlia a more likely prospect. It is just possible, however, that the rtfugees, by embarrassing everyone, have caused second thoughts about what appesred to be - at the height of the aisis in mid-1979 - a concerted policy on the part of the United Stam, its allies, the MEAN wtcs and China to isolate Vietnam. The ASEAN states in prticular, being on the scene and touchy (some of them) about Chim's role in their region, might discover that their intemD 'I lie in trying to reassure Vitmam, although how, in the prcwnt dire circumstances of the show-down in Kampuchea, this can be don& is nm easily evident. There is an urgent need d statesmanship for,, South-East Asia, Wht we witness instead is a merciless kind of ' statmaft that is bth calloua and precarious. Can nothing be done? One possibility thpt has not been explored I .!. . 1 is for a conference, on the lines of the Geneva conference of 1954, with Kampuchea as the main item on the agendn. Kampucha appcattd, in late 1979, to be almmt at last gasp. Apart from terrible human suffering, civil administration had almost disappeared; thm was a real pro~pect that the nation-state itself would be destroyed, or just di~ppc~. While Vietnam and China art each intent on creating a government in Phnom Fknh that is ttspnsive to thcm, other smtes in the region and, for that matter, in the world, would more likely be happy with a dtlibtrattly neuml Kampuchea. Why should nor a neutral Kampuchea also a ppl to the two superpowen, the USSR and the US? If the Soviet Union's mlculation is that it an back Vietnam successfully in the war with China, as it did in Viemam's war with the United States, it may be mistaken. While it is abundantly me that Vietnam is a defiant nstion and is unlikely tu apitulate to China, it is also me that China is a more difficult advemry than the United Ststa - it is neat at hand, patient and has the means (one of thcm being the Chinese inside Vianam) to keep Hanoi on the boil. Also, it is hard to see what interest the Swiet Union has in a pro- Vietnamw rtgime in Phnom Penh, txccpt to deny China. If Hanoi is successful in Kampuchra, the border with Thailand will harden, creating tensions within ASEAN. As a global power, with an intemt in moving its ships through the straits of South-East Asia (all of them controllable by Indonesia, with assistance from Malaysia and Singapore), the USSR need8 good relations with the MEAN state. It is obvious that some cushioning is needed between Vicmam and Thailand: thc answer could be to take Kampuchea out of the hands of bath or either Peking or Hanoi. Another podbility, of course, is that Thailand could become passive, assuming its historial buffer role, not now beween France and Britain but W een a Vietnamese Indo-China and a non-communist South-East Asia. But while this could happen, it would only be after much more blood has been shed - after, indeed, Vimarn has won out in Kampuchea. The case for a neuml Kampuchea is much more striking on humanitarian grounds, indeed on every ground, In a sense that is almost literal, it is I ax for the preservation of an endangered spies. Hanoi might find some unpleasant resonances in the revival of the 1954 Geneva confmnce, which kame for it m in~arment of 1 98
The Boat EQlopk deceit. Let the confercnce be held elsewhere and a fresh start made: the insmmentalities of that Geneva conference, such as its control and supervisory bodies, are in any case dead. Its co-chairmen were Britain and the Soviet Union: would they again be elected? The need is not to retain the Gcncva lineage - although a sense of continuity is not amiss when dealing with Indo-China - but to bring together those major powers and regional smm who must be aware by now that what is happening in Indo-China is so destructive that no one can expect to '&in from it, and is so dangerous that its effect upon the balmce of war MCI peace cannot be ealcul~ted. The bmt people story puts in another perspective the duty of wtcsmtn, whatever their politics, to act. Political laden must act because people art needltssly suffering. What of America? Throughout this book there has been a vein of criticism of the United States, intended and justified. A blind spot, sometimes enters one country's vision of another: this has happened with America's view of Viemam. It ha5 led since 1945 to one mistake after mother: the decision, after Rmswelt's death, to back the French; the refusal to accept election5 aftcr the Geneva agreements; the military onslaught during the Johnson presidency; the widening of the war into Cambdia during the Nixon-Kissinger rule; the dishonouring of the pledge in 1973 to provide aid of $3.25 billion over five years to Hanoi. Now, under another president, the United States is again following a policy that gives Hanoi no quantr, apparently designed to allow China a free hand in dealing with its troublesome neighbour, ft is difficult to avoid an impression that deep within the strategic mind of Washington is a plan of hostility to Vietnam which, except for a moment when the madness hame intolcrable, the American people have not questioned. The madness is again mounting. America's responsibility for what happened in Indo-China was considerable. Today, by omission and contrivance, it remains considerable. It would be a giant step for the United St~tes - and for the region - if it would change policy on Vietnam, discarding notions of revenge and recognizing that the present conflict is too serious to be allowed to find its own, tragic level. On balance, a realistic prospect is that the conditions that gave rise to the Indo-Chinese cefugecs will continue, which leads to a second consideration: What is the potential pool of refugees dl1 in Viemam? Clearly, it is not a static figure. It will rise and fall mmrdjng to several factors, including the succcss of Hanoi's mearuns of security (or connivana) and economic and social conditions in Vietnam. However, an estimate mn be madt. The Chinese community in Viemam must be considered a potential source. In northern Vietnam, there are probably no more than 30 000 ethnic Chinese left, but in the south there would still be abut one million. lntcrvicws in this book with refugees have shown how sensitive the Chinme community is to pressure and how many of them, now that their busincssefi have been closed down, are living on diminishing wings. Not all the Chinese whtcler-dealers who organized the exodus of I the Hoa in 1978 and 1979 would have left and, however directly or indirectly Hanoi was involved officially in the exodus, corrupt '11 security ofiials undoubtedly remain (and the local Chinese would !,:I know who they are). I,'[ Ihe hard core of Vietnamese anti-communists, like many of thw ' ;1 who left Viemam when ~ecurity arrangements were tight and before Hanoi became engaged in the subterfuge of nssistin~ departure, will not be deterred from leaving by tighter security measures. These, probably numbering sbout 1.5 million, include tho= with close con- nmions with the prtviou~ rtgime in Saigon, especially its armed '1 forces and administmion, and political and religious group who gave it support and are now strongly antitommunist. Among these are the 800 m, including many Carholb, who left northern Vietnam for the south after panition in 1954 and who haw shown an implaable hatility to the present rtgime. They arc unlikely to be encouraged to smy even by an improvement in political, ~ i aor l economic conditions. These two of figures - one million ethnic Chinese and one and a half million counter-mlutionh - amnt for moat of the 7 figure of thm million that Vietnam's mretary of state for foreign affairs, Nguycn Co Thach, suggerotd to Ammian newsmen in Viet- I nam in August 1979, as the numkr of Viemame who might want I to lmve Vicurarn, depending, as he put it, on the politid situation. .I This figure was first aired in conversation with the Swedish del- I egation at the UNHCR Geneva meeting in July 1979 by the deputy foreign minister, Phan Hitn, and, when word got around, Lhe unme ,'l, .I( I I: i
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Grant, Bruce book Penguin Y w JI Pe
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The orher contributors were numerou
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' Th Boat PBopk is succewfuily mmag
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Tk Boat People among the Swth Vietn
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into the South China Sea, That nigh
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TAb Bwt People family were among th
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TAe Boat Pbople Vietnam - lived bey
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The Boat People transport war arran
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i I camp as a backdrop. A thiu man,
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TAB Boar Wuple toiy impul~es of att
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The Boat Bople consider and with em
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The Boat People against Ho Chi Minh
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April cadres' because of the suspic
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The Borai fiople was avoided becaus
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drowned abut ten kilomctres from th
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The Boat Psople esc, Shc left Haiph
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The Boat Bople 700 people. Most of
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The Boat hpk registered freighter,
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Thr Boat People Malaysian authoriti
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Tke BWI &pk and gds. There were woo
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Chapter 4 Exodus Why in 1978 and 19
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The Borrt hople the refugee exodus.
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i % Boar AopL We would have to go t
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administration and co-operativca, m
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The Boat Aopb war nevertheless dram
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wuth in the 1950~. Onc wm Ncurrn Tn
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Page 63 and 64: 7'hs Boat Wloplt mmmt at the NEZ, t
Page 65 and 66: Vietnam chamber of commerce from Ch
Page 67 and 68: The Boat People purchase a veswl fr
Page 69 and 70: few ~cople took much notice and the
Page 71 and 72: The Boat hpk capacity was 700. bter
Page 73 and 74: Tap he had close connections with t
Page 75 and 76: I I The Boat Aopk to dramatize thei
Page 77 and 78: I The Boat f3Zaple cngineer agrecd
Page 79 and 80: The Boat hop18 I there in her ornat
Page 81 and 82: Ths Bwt Psople commerce, which had
Page 83 and 84: Tkb Boat People Vietnamese authorit
Page 85 and 86: The Bwt Aopk The refugee and Kampuc
Page 87 and 88: I Stability referring to the boat p
Page 89 and 90: Stability ling hundrcd~ of thousand
Page 91 and 92: The Bout Peopk after the ww, claime
Page 93 and 94: The Boat People At home, you go out
Page 95 and 96: I Tb Bwt People Meanwhile, Chinn's
Page 97 and 98: The Boas Aople from all that made t
Page 99 and 100: my house by waking the streets and
Page 101 and 102: l%e Bwt fiopk Fifty-one vessels, ca
Page 103 and 104: formulate any opinion beyond 'we ar
Page 105 and 106: I their way uninvited to Jqan, Of t
Page 107 and 108: Tks Boat People uncertain and that
Page 109: Tk Bont People then, finally, invad
Page 113 and 114: Th? Bmt W l e politicians in the wa
Page 115 and 116: The Boat Aople analogy did not fit.
Page 117 and 118: Maps
Page 119 and 120: July August October Dccemkr Januaiy
Page 121 and 122: Cater, Sir Jack 157 Cntholics, 28,
Page 123 and 124: Seng Cheong, I29 ships refugee trad
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