PEOPLE

The Boat hop18
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there in her ornate antebellum southern mansion and king told rhat her
estate was in chaos and the old life m r and saying 'I don't want to think
abut thit todey, I'll think about that tomorrow'? Well, that's how it was then,
in the state department and the Pentagon.
As late as Scpttmkr 1979, senior officials in Washington were
prepared to concede, at least privately, that the administration's strategic
thinking about Viemam's future role in South-East Asia, and
its consquenccs for both the United States and the region as a
whole, was still, in the words of one of them, 'relatively elementary'.
Long-term policy remained hostage to Ameria's uncertainty about
how long Vietnam intended to maintain its forces in Kampuchea,
whether chi^ was planning to teach Vietnam another lesson, and
the new instability of great-powcr rclations in the region since Vietnam's
friendship treaty with the Soviet Union and China's invasion
of Vietnam. The immediate issue was the question of 'normalization':
whether$ and when, the United Statcs should recognize the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, exchange diplomatic reprcscntatives
with it, and lift its ude tmbsrgo. On that issue, American policy
was frozen. On four wpatate occasions during June and July 1979,
senior officials of the Caner administration had wld Vitmarntse
represm~tives in New York and Geneva that the United States was
not prepared to resume negotiations for normalization in the prevail-,
ing cirmmstanccr.
Soon after taking office in January 1977, President C~rrer dcclared
his intention to move, if possible, to normal diplomatic
rclations with Vietnam, By October 1978 Washington and Hanoi
sccmd halfway to an agreement. The United States, with wme reservations,
seemed satisfied that Hanoi would provide a full account
of the fate of American servicemen still Listed as missing in action
in the Vietnam war, and help recover their remains, The Carter
administration had abandoned its inherited opposition to Vietnam's
admission to the United Nations; Hanoi no longer claimed that the
Unitcd States was bound by the Paris accords of 1973 to provide
economic assistance as a precondition to resuming normal relations.
But in November 1978 the United States had tnkm the initiative and
suspended negotiations in cimmstances that fed each side's suspicion
of the other and hardened public and congressional opinion
in America. The official explanation blamed the breakdown on
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Viemam's rccalcitranw: i$ dctmnination to invade Kampuchea, the
dramatic incrwse in the flow of IndoChinae refugees, and Vietnam's
new and disturbing relationship with the Soviet Union. All
this, Richard Holbrmlre, assistant secretary for East Asia and the
Pachie, told the House of Represcntariv~ subcommittee on Asian
and Pacific alTain on 13 June 1979, had compcllad the Unittd States
to draw hack,
Early id the negotiations, Mr Holbrooke wid, the US had told
Vie- that normalizatim dtpended on Vicm's willingncr~s 'to
follow policies supprtive of pce ~nd stability in the region', Even
before Viemam's invasion of Kampuchea, the US had warned Hanoi
that the Pol Pot dgime's 'unpmllcled aimes' would not justify a
Vicmmesc violation of Kampuchea's sovereignity. Hanoi had
claimed its military build-up on the Kampuchcan border wars 'purely
defensive' and had given assuranecs that it had 'no aggressive plans
towards that country' - but it had still gone ahead and invaded Kampuchea,
l3e US had also asked for assurances that Viemnm would follow
an 'independent' foreign policy. It had been told thet the beaty with
the Soviet Union was 'not directed at any third nation', But Soviet
destroyers, submarines and TU-95 long-range reconnaissance aircraft
were now using Viemam's port and base facilities in Da Nang
and Cam Rdn Bay, and that was 'a source of serious concern to us
and to most Asian countries, not only milimrily, but bccaursc of the
dangem to the region of increased great-power rivalry and the consequent
risk of haeasing tensions'.
Also, the US had concludcd that Vietnam had 'embarked on a
delibente effort to rid itself of those elements of society it considers
undesirable', Arnuicans did not wish ,m see Vietn~m force an end
to emigration, but the growing refugee exodus had caused unacecptable
human suffering and 'massive burdens' on rhe other Sourh-East
Asian countries. Hanoi had simply claimed it was 'powcrlcss to coneol
the flight of malcontents who were not willing to work to build
a new Vietnam'.
The counter-theory, promotcd by the critics of the Carter administration's
Vietnam policy (and by Hanoi itself), is that the US deliberately
stalled the negotiations with Hanoi even before Vietnam
invadcd Kampuchea or the flow of refugees reached intolemble