PEOPLE

The h r People
According to one authoritative mrce, the committee's conclusion,
Pmounttd to 1 recommendation not to do anything abut Vietnam,
but not to be seen to be doing nothing'.
If America's immediate Vietnam policy was effectively in limbo,
paralpcd by political inhibitions and Hanoi's pcmivcd inbansigence,
its long-term strategy was equaHy uncertain. There was, however,
brd agreement among policy-muken in the stare dtpamnent,
the Pmtagon and the national security council that nvo options were
available. The fYst was co-option: to entice Vietnam into thc South-
East Asian community by a combination of incentives and penaltids
comparable to those propostd by Edward Kennedy: 'In response to
positive steps by Viemam, Japan could resume its suspended assistance
and the US could make exceptions to our current trade
embargo, In the event of continued confrontation [with China] and
conflict [in Ind~China] WE could increase our economic and military
assistance to key ASBAN states and they could cut political and
other relations .with Hanoi.' This meant, effectively, that unless the
US or one of its allies (Japan or ASEAN) took the initiative (and bat
was improbable, perhaps impermissible, until after the 1980 prcsidential
election), Ameria would be confined to a policy of reaction.
It could only wait for a hint of compromise or o sign of repentance
from Hanoi.
The second option was coercion: a deliberate strategy of 'queezing'
Vietnam by every means available to compel it to take a more
cospative position on Kampuchea and the refugee problem and
to back away from the Soviet Union. It might even be possible to
create the conditions for a change of leadership in Hanoi. Victnam,
was thought, especially by defence and nationrl sccuriry analysts, to
be susceptible to such a strategy. Its economy was in a steady decline.
Domestic prduction was dropping, the country was importing 20
per cent of its rice and the transport sysrem seemed on the point of
collapse. The danger was that coercion might consolidarc the present
leadenhip and drive it closer to Moscow.
To a degree rhe US was already engaged in a strategy of coercion,
simply by withholding recognition md maintaining its trade
embargo. Moreover, urged on by some of the MEAN states (especially
Thailand, the country most immediately vulnerable to Vietnamese
pressure), it had actively encouraged other governments ro cur their
Stability
aid to Vietnam (Japan and Australia were mmong those who hnd
rcspondcd) and had Id the campaign to choke &funds for Viemam
from international lending institutions like the World Bonk and the
International Development Association,
But, as mote than one defence sacurity otkial was quick to point
out, it was China that was doing the serious squeezing - by maintaining
the threat of another military intervention. The gcneml expcctation
in Washington was that if China did go into Vieham again,
its intentions would be, as one defence official said, 'therapeutic nor
pdagogic - not to teach Vicmam another leason, but to get rid of
Le Duan (secremry general of the Viemamese communist party] and
he Russians'. The possibility of another Chinese military action in
Viemam was the cause of considerable strategic ambivalence in
Washington, In the state dcpmmcnt, in particular, there was serious
concern that it wwld prompt Russian intewcnrion and develop into
a major regional conflict, But there were some officials, especially
in rhe Pentagon, who were willing to contemplate that risk and positively
welcomed the prospect of the Chinese 'hammering' the Vietnamese,
even if (especially if, in the case of the more forthright) the
Russians b ame involved.
* * *
The vim from Moscow was that the refugee problem reflected the
refusal of the US and China to accept the 'mlity' of the new Vietnam.
In the Sovia view, the refugee problem was simply a continuation
of the Vietnam war, stamd by the French, taken over by the
Americans and now being carried on by the Chinese. The US and
China carried the primary responsibility for what had happened and
was happening and the solution lay with these two countries rather
than with Vietnam. The boat people as such did not greatly concern
Moscow, as they were unlikely to seek helm in the Soviet Union.
The politial effccr of the exdus from Vietnam, however, was of
great interest to Soviet policy-makers. Some such exodus over a Iong
period was inevitable, given the fact that nearly two decades of
Amerian occupation of south Vietnam had created an artificially
consumer-oriented society: thme who had become accustomed to it
were unlikely to feel happy or secure in an ~usterely communist
Vietnamese society. Bcset with a severe economic crisis, the