PEOPLE

The Bwt Aopk
The refugee and Kampuchean issues exposed within the ASBAN
group fundamentslly different perceptions of Vietnam and China.
These differences occurred not just between AsMN member states,
but also within individual MEAN governments. Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Phitippines had all been inclined - at least at the start of
the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea - to welcome the prosof
a united communist IndeChina at peace with it~lf and strongly
influenced by Viemarn, as a bulwark against the southern extension
of Chinese influence. This thinking was especially common in Indonesia,
where anti-China feeling ran deep, particularly among conservative
leaders in the Muslim community and the military him-
ashy. By the end of 1978, all five MEAN
members had diplomatic
relations of varying degrees of warmth with Vieulam, while relation^
with China were more tentative. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines
had exchanged ambassadors with Peking. Singapore was waiting
for Indonesia, which had suspended diplomatic ties with China
in 1967 after an attempted coup, in which Djakarta believed China
to hrvc been involved, At the end of 1978, Indonesia felt fnr less
suspicious about Vietnam thnn about China. Peking's senior victpremier,
Deng Xiaoping, had just finished a tour of three ASBAN
countries - Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore - during which he
had refused to withdraw Chinese support (admittedly token but
capable of king stepped up) for communist insurgents in South-
East Asia. In contrast, Vietnam's premier, Phsm Van Dong, on a
similar tour a few weeks earlier, had disowned the insurgents
(although, since the communist movements were predominantly
Peking-oriented, Vietnam had few links to break). China's Deng had
also failed to reassure those A~EAN countries with worries about rhe
allegiance of their substantial Chinese minorities that China would
not intervene to protect their rights or influence their behaviour.
Mistrust of China reinforced another trend in official Indonesian
thinking. This was that the sprawling archipelago republic - the
fifth most populous country in the world, overlooking the crossroads
of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, rich in resources, influential in
international affairs, and widr sizable armed forces - was the natural
leader of the ASBAN nations. From there it wa8 only a short step to
the view that there were two logical poles of mutually balancing
influence in South-East Asin - Vietnam and Indonesia.
Stability
Indonesia's foreign minister, Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, in an
interview in the Far Eatern Economic Reorieeu of 15 Dmmber 1978,
said in reply to a question about Soviet influence in Vietnam:
I prefer not to use any term that denotes substwience of Viam m any
country or intimates that Viemam is the proxy of sny counby. I have hod
many convmtions with their Icaders, snd I am lware of their pride and thcu
fean since independence. So the fact that hey have signed a ~aty and have
been obliged to receive aid, is, I think, a result of circumstances, They haw
uied to obtain aaai~unn from other wurces. They have cncouragcd investment
mnd trade [from the west], but not much was forthcoming.
The view from Bangkok was quite different. Hostility knvten
Thailand and Vietnam stretched back for centuries. Without a
buffet between them, Thailand felt exposed and therefore turned to
its ASAN partners for support. Thailand had recendy broken off a
protracted and frustrating series of negotiations with Hanoi over
reparriation of an estimated 60000-70 000 Vietnamese refugees who
had come to Thailand More 1975, most of hem in the late 19409
and carly 1951)s to escape the fighting between the French and he
Vietminh. They were concentrated in nonh-eastern Thailand near
the border with Laos. Having continually had to deal with commu-
nist insurgents in the north-east, some of whom w m thought to lean
towards Hanoi, Thai authorities saw the Vietnamese refugees in
their midst as potential fifth co1umnist~. Bangkok was also worried
that Vietnam might bc tempted to push across the border into Thailand
from westm Kampuchea or Laos to settle a numhr of old
scores - one of them being Thai suppon for the American war in
Vietnam. Thailand had fewer inhibitions about moving closer to 1 !
Peking, Of all the ASEAW state8 with Chinme minorities, it had been
by far the most suceessfu1 in absorbing them into its national life.
Indeed, Peking was seen in Bangkok as r potential protector against !
the Vietnamese, and Thai le~dtrs greeted the news of China's mititnry
incursion into Vietnam, early in 1979, with relief.
In January 1979 ASBAN finally came out with a joint statement
naming Vietnam a8 n source of the refugee problem. This was due
to pressure not only from its two most seriously affected members,
Thailand and Malaysia, but also from its least affected member,
Singapore, Singapore's attitude towards both Vietnam and the 1 I