RUSSIA THE EURASIAN CUSTOMS UNION AND THE EU COOPERATION STAGNATION OR RIVALRY?

FOCUS GROUP RESULTS
which had been successfully resolved by the neighbouring
countries during their process of integration with the EU.
Other risks may be divided into two groups.
(1) Political – according to many focus group participants,
Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union will result in loss
of national sovereignty – the main political and strategic
economic decisions will be taken in Moscow, Ukraine’s
relations with the EU will deteriorate.
• Political dependence on Russia (Zhytomyr)
• Tension with Europe. Russia will be able to place its TMD systems
at the Polish border, which is an EU member (Kharkiv)
• They have a dictator, and we will have the same (Donetsk)
• They still wage a war there, with Chechnya… I do not want it…
(Donetsk)
• When the Russians come, the Russian language will be treated as
the main one (Lviv)
At the same time, it should be noted that adherents of
accession to the Customs Union admit the existence of threats
to the national sovereignty and democracy, but express no
interest in preserving sovereignty or strengthening democracy
in the country:
• Ukraine has never been politically independent. Every busybody
used to sell it.
• How can one lose something nonexistent? It [sovereignty] is
absent anyway (Simferopol)
• Loss of sovereignty is not bad (Donetsk)
• Democracy is nothing but a fiction, what are you talking about?
It is all rubbish.
• Maybe if there is a bit less freedom of speech but a bit more bread
and butter, people will not feel worse (Kharkiv)
• Does anyone need democracy? In Russia, nobody complains. In
Belarus, nobody complains, too. Despite the totalitarian system.
(Simferopol)
(2) Economic: increasing economic dependence on
Russia; reduction of the Ukrainian state budget and the
Pension Fund revenues (i.e., the curtailment of social
programmes) due to the redistribution of customs proceeds.
Some participants expressed fears that some industries and
competitive enterprises, not wanted by Russia, might be
curtailed:
• Customs duties collected on the border are distributed not quite
fairly there. As far as I remember, 70% goes to Russia, 20% –
to Belarus and 10% – to Kazakhstan. The figures are incomparable.
(Kharkiv)
• They will suck more blood from Ukraine than it gets (Zhytomyr)
• Everything will be stocked with Russian produce (Donetsk)
• Maybe a few more plants will be closed ( Donetsk)
Effects of accession for some social groups. Similar
to discussions about the effects of joining the EU, many
participants expected no personal benefit from accession
to the Customs Union:
• Nothing will change for ordinary people. Everything will stay the
way it is (Kyiv)
• Nothing will change unless the system is changed here (Simferopol)
• After joining the Customs Union we will see no change whatsoever
(Zhytomyr)
However, the participants of focus groups which were
more inclined to join the Customs Union (e.g., Simferopol)
expected a better life for most of the population.
The Simferopol focus group also discussed the possible
effect of the EU/СU on their lives by looking at the
Crimean tourism related activities and expressed hopes that
investments from the Customs Union and Russia, in particular,
would contribute to the development of tourism business.
• Moderator: if, say, Ukraine joins the Customs Union, what social
groups will win from that, in the first place?
• The middle class.
• Probably, the state servants.
• Public servants, teachers, physicians will benefit.
• Pensions will go up, because they are higher in Russia (Simferopol)
• Business, say, medium and small (Kharkiv).
• I guess that those [companies] that were engaged [in cooperation]
with Russia will win. The rest will win nothing (Zhytomyr)
• Maybe we will have a lower unemployment rate among the youths,
if we join the Customs Union and find new markets (Lviv)
• Representatives of agriculture will benefit from joining the Customs
Union (Kyiv)
• Russian investments will help the tourism business improve
[prices will go down and services will improve]. They [Russian
businessmen] already own land, assets and hotels, but they are
not allowed to develop all that (Simferopol)
Regional specifics
Focus group discussions in different regions revealed
differences in positions of residents of different regions.
The participants themselves had reported of those differences,
noting regional specifics of foreign policy preferences of
Ukrainian citizens.
The participants said that none of the integration options
would remove that problem and unite the country. On the
contrary, they suggested that choosing one option could
aggravate the existing differences. Also, a lot will depend on
the conduct by Ukrainian leadership and politicians: they can
either mitigate or aggravate regional differences.
• West Ukraine will always be against Ukraine’s accession to the
Customs Union.
• And we will always be against the EU.
• Anyway, differences among regions will grow.
• However, the majority will accept any choice calmly. Our people
will not revolt. Everyone will agree (Simferopol)
CONCLUSIONS
The discussions showed that economic incentives
play a major role in reasoning the need for joining the
EU and the Customs Union alike. Meanwhile, adherents
of an integration with the EU tend to associate economic
efficiency of the EU mainly with innovative development,
while adherents of the Customs Union – with the idea
of “restoring what had been lost”: economic ties among
former Soviet republics, a return to low prices for energy
resources.
While the proponents of the EU integration stress the
importance of high democratic standards in Ukraine,
to the adherents of accession to the Customs Union
democratic development is much less important than
prosperity.
The participants tended to focus not on the advantages
but on the shortcomings of different lines of
integration (with the EU or the Customs Union).
Alongside the vocal support for a specific integration
path even the adherents of accession to those unions
expressed concerns that Ukraine would be an unequal
partner, “used” by other countries (by wealthy Western
European states in the EU; by Russia – in the Customs
Union) for own political and economic interests.
The preference for one or another integration
trajectory is largely attributed to the mistrust in Ukraine’s
ability to solve its social, economic, political problems
independently. This is primarily related to the low level of
trust in the Ukrainian political elite that, according to an
overwhelming majority of participants, is not interested
in positive changes. Those changes may be encouraged
after joining an international union. These hopes were
more often reported by the proponents of accession
to the EU.
On the other hand, mistrust in the Ukrainian
leadership also gives rise to pessimism of many participants
about the success of any integration, since,
according to respondents, the Ukrainian authorities tend
only to proclaim one or another policy (foreign policy)
course and are not interested in its implementation that
will benefit the lives of ordinary citizens.
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RAZUMKOV CENTRE • NATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENCE • №4-5, 2013 • 103