SCHOOL THESIS

More documents

Recommendations

Info

unusual and frequent foreign travel, bankruptcy, or treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. The potential of having an employee who might disclose classified information can be reduced if colleagues are able to recognize the potential indicators and are willing to intervene. 396 An individual lacking the coping mechanisms or the support system to deal with stressful life events may become susceptible to committing unauthorized disclosures. The organization and its personnel must make a commitment to uphold social conventions and intervene early when behavioral indicators show an employee may become susceptible to committing a crime. Important factors in instilling organization culture are “group cohesiveness, group incentive (reward) structures, relatively small group size, membership stability and relatively high functional dependence among group members.” 397 While the federal government, as a whole, is certainly not a small group size, those teams who share projects and view the same classified information are. These small groups must unify to establish the overall organizational culture, one to which each employee is bonded. According to a report by PERSEREC, Under internal control systems, the group uses its social influence to regulate members’ work activities. Identification with and loyalty to one’s colleagues are thought to be engendered when a group member sees himself or herself as a pivotal contributor to the group’s outcomes and when the group is viewed by the member to be to be an important source of personal successes. Internal control systems encourage such states by emphasizing personal responsibility to one’s colleagues, and adherence to the work group’s standards for conduct. 398 Recommendation 6 The executive branch should amend E.O. 13589 and add mandatory training for all employees and supervisors as a part of each federal agency’s insider threat program. This will strengthen and mandate training in peer reporting for both employees and enhance supervisors’ abilities to handle such reports. A part of this program must ensure 396 Defense Personnel Security Research Center Espionage and Other Compromises of National Security, iii. 397 Sarbin, Carney, and Eoyang, Citizen Espionage, 172. 398 Ibid., 173. 112
employees are granted complete privacy and anonymity when reporting on a fellow employee’s changed behavior or significant lifestyle changes. Conclusion 7 Until this year, there has been no systematic method to continuously evaluate employee behavior or character changes. E.O. 13467 defines continuous evaluation (CE) as: reviewing the background of an individual who has been determined to be eligible for access to classified information (including additional or new checks of commercial databases, government databases, and other information lawfully available to security officials) at any time during the period of eligibility to determine whether that individual continues to meet the requirements for eligibility for access to classified information. 399 Assessing data automatically derived from credit background checks, social media, personnel records, and self-reporting records, may reveal relevant information, prompting further investigation and enabling agencies to prioritize their efforts on those who appear to have the highest risk. As noted earlier, there are many inaccuracies in obtaining data in the initial clearance process. This could be critical information in granting or not granting a clearance. Recently, the Department of Defense initiated a pilot program that tested the validity of its Automated Continuous Evaluation System (ACES). The test program sampled 3,370 Army service members, civilian employees, and contractor personnel. It discovered that 21.7 percent of the tested population had previously unreported derogatory information that had developed since the last investigation, and three percent had serious derogatory information (for example, financial issues, domestic abuse, drug abuse) that resulted in a revocation or suspension of a security clearance. 400 The frequency of these data checks would allow for a more real-time assessment to better monitor the behavior of any clearance holder and alert security officers for the need to 399 Exec. Order No. 13467. 400 Joe Davidson, “More Frequent Automated Security Clearance Checks Likely in Defense and Other Agencies,” The Federal Diary, March 25, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government/more-frequent-automated-security-clearance- checks-likely-in-defense-and-other-agencies/2014/03/25/6d313b80-b43e-11e3-b899- 20667de76985_story.html 113
Page 1 and 2:
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY,
Page 3 and 4:
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Appr
Page 5 and 6:
Approved for public release; distri
Page 7 and 8:
ABSTRACT Federal government securit
Page 9 and 10:
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..
Page 11 and 12:
LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Overview
Page 13 and 14:
LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Behavioral
Page 15 and 16:
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 17 and 18:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Federal governmen
Page 19 and 20:
of any changes in the personality o
Page 21 and 22:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Dedicated to my hus
Page 23 and 24:
I. INTRODUCTION A. THESIS QUESTION
Page 25 and 26:
government employees and are expect
Page 27 and 28:
• Utilization of “see something
Page 29 and 30:
II. LITERATURE REVIEW Recent unauth
Page 31 and 32:
E.O. 12968 “establishes a uniform
Page 33 and 34:
Under Intelligence Community Direct
Page 35 and 36:
classification (confidential, secre
Page 37 and 38:
C. FINANCIAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED WI
Page 39 and 40:
D. EXAMPLES OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOS
Page 41 and 42:
Sulick also looks at the history of
Page 43 and 44:
law enforcement to cooperate with O
Page 45 and 46:
III. HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY I
Page 47 and 48:
all data concerning the manufacture
Page 49 and 50:
12 years until the lowest classific
Page 51 and 52:
E.O. 12065 continued automatic decl
Page 53 and 54:
Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP
Page 55 and 56:
IV. DISCUSSION OF INSIDER THREAT AN
Page 57 and 58:
disclosures of Manning and Snowden,
Page 59 and 60:
organizational leaders should never
Page 61 and 62:
on male psychology. Over 95% of ins
Page 63 and 64:
loyalty—one that may prevent a tr
Page 65 and 66:
V. THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
Page 67 and 68:
eview all of the information, the
Page 69 and 70:
Foreign Influence Unreported person
Page 71 and 72:
Use of Information Technology Syste
Page 73 and 74:
Program (EAP) or other counseling s
Page 75 and 76:
VI. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY TODAY Upon i
Page 77 and 78:
holders current backgrounds, this t
Page 79 and 80:
in the risk of misconduct. These re
Page 81 and 82:
threat as: respond to discrepancies
Page 83 and 84: can be more easily verified and col
Page 85 and 86: VII. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KNOWN
Page 87 and 88: I seldom drank liquor, only beer an
Page 89 and 90: occasion being serviced orally.”
Page 91 and 92: Maas remarks about Ames, “But he
Page 93 and 94: and her father, Alberto. “To outs
Page 95 and 96: in Iraq and a resultant questioning
Page 97 and 98: soldiers and throwing furniture. 24
Page 99 and 100: 2. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty
Page 101 and 102: was a paranoid schizophrenic underg
Page 103 and 104: October 2000 that killed 17 America
Page 105 and 106: The Russian intelligence officers w
Page 107 and 108: contact procedures with his Russian
Page 109 and 110: Walker befriended people who admire
Page 111 and 112: 5. Financial Concerns When intervie
Page 113 and 114: He failed to meet deadlines. He ign
Page 115 and 116: later admitted “he was corrupted
Page 117 and 118: damage to U.S.-foreign relations an
Page 119 and 120: next generation who extend the capa
Page 121 and 122: VIII. DISCUSSION OF DATA Upon revie
Page 123 and 124: easons, as did Abu-Jihaad, Manning,
Page 125 and 126: It can be argued almost every indiv
Page 127 and 128: Table 1. Behavioral Indicators Foun
Page 129 and 130: IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Page 131 and 132: Conclusion 3 Self-reporting changes
Page 133: Manning and Edward Snowden. Public
Page 137 and 138: equirement for a clearance. This th
Page 139 and 140: integrity that enforces responsibil
Page 141 and 142: X. EPILOGUE Ultimately, the insider
Page 143 and 144: LIST OF REFERENCES Aftergood, Steve
Page 145 and 146: Defense Security Service. Roles and
Page 147 and 148: Herbig, Katherine L., Ray A. Zimmer
Page 149 and 150: ———. Intelligence Community D
Page 151 and 152: ———. Security from within: In
Page 153: INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. Defens
show all

SCHOOL THESIS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?