SCHOOL THESIS

IV.
DISCUSSION OF INSIDER THREAT AND UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE
State secrecy versus transparency is part of the growing debate regarding
unauthorized disclosures, especially in light of recent disclosures by Chelsea Manning
and Edward Snowden. Recurring unauthorized disclosures can cause harm by causing
damage to intelligence sources and methods, potential loss of life, a financial cost
associated with the release as well as harm to international alliances
because, if repeated often enough, they will lessen the willingness of local
sources to share sensitive info with American diplomats (and also make
diplomats reluctant to share with each other what they have learned
through their careful cultivated networks of informants). 105
The insider threat “can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism,
unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or
degradation of resources or capabilities.” 106
When it comes to those who commit unauthorized disclosure, several terms are
bantered about: espionage, whistleblower, spy, patriot, and traitor. Regardless what term
is used, it is more important to understand why people choose to spy or disclose sensitive
information with which they have been entrusted. In the case of a spy, Sarbin, Carney,
and Eoyang list several steps a person takes in becoming a spy. The first step is the
opportunity and access to sell or steal classified information and access to a potential
customer. They describe the remaining steps:
Second, the prospect of espionage must occur to the potential spy and not
be dismissed out of hand; the behavior must be ‘available’ or conceivable.
Perhaps in some cases the opportunity comes along first and then the
possibility comes to mind; in others, the idea arises, and then the
opportunity is sought out. But whatever the order, opportunity and idea are
the basic preconditions. Next, the potential spy needs a motive strong
enough to take the risk. Fourth, any inhibitions of conscience must be
overridden. And last, our potential spy must not be prevented by others, in
105 Sagar, Secrets and Leaks, 1.
106 U.S. Department of Defense, The DOD Insider Threat Program, Department of Defense Directive
Number 5205.16 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), §3.b.
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