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ISOO IT KGB NATO NCSC NDC NISC NRO NSA ODNI OMB ONCI OPM PERSEREC PII PLO PPD PR PSI PSP SAP SCI SF SIT TEE TSA U.S. USCG USMC USS VA Information and Oversight Office information technology Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Soviet Union Intelligence Agency) North Atlantic Treating Organization National Counterintelligence and Security Center National Declassification Center Naval Intelligence Support Center National Reconnaissance Office National Security Agency Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of Management and Budget Office of National Counterintelligence Office of Personnel Management Defense Personnel and Security Research Center Personally Identifiable Information Palestine Liberation Organization presidential policy directive periodic review personnel security investigation Personnel Security Program Special Access Program Sensitive Compartmented Information standard form social identity theory training and education and evaluation of training effectiveness Transportation Security Authority United States United States Coast Guard United States Marine Corps United States ship United States Department of Veterans Affairs xiv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Federal government security-cleared personnel have been disclosing federal government classified national security information, whether to a foreign government or the United States media, at an increasing rate since the 1980s. Can common personal or psychological characteristics or motivations be identified from historical cases that could indicate the likelihood of a current or potential federal employee to disclose national security information without authorization? Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, states, “National defense has required that certain information be maintained in confidence in order to protect our citizens, our democratic institutions, our homeland security and our interactions with foreign nations.” 1 In order to access classified national security information, an individual must have a “need-to-know,” or the need to have access to information to perform official duties. If it is determined he/she has a need to know, that person must undergo a background investigation to determine loyalty, trustworthiness, and reliability, as well as sign U.S. Government Standard Form 312, Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement. Recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information have caused outrage on Capitol Hill and eroded the American peoples’ confidence in the security clearance process. While such recent disclosures by Edward Snowden and Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning highlight recent incidents, there is a history of unauthorized disclosure of classified information going back to our nation’s very beginning. Why do people disclose information with which they have been entrusted? Reasons for unauthorized disclosure range from financial, to “whistle-blowing,” to a desire to change international policy, to sympathy and strong ties with a foreign government. The focus of this research is on the behavioral characteristics that are similar or different between known, studied historical cases of personnel associated with the federal government who have disclosed classified information without authorization. Cases studied include Aldrich Ames, Ana Belen Montes, Chelsea (Bradley) Manning, 1 Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 2 (Jan. 5, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/executive-order-classified-national-security-information, 707. xv
Page 1 and 2: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY,
Page 3 and 4: REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Appr
Page 5 and 6: Approved for public release; distri
Page 7 and 8: ABSTRACT Federal government securit
Page 9 and 10: TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..
Page 11 and 12: LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Overview
Page 13 and 14: LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Behavioral
Page 15: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 19 and 20: of any changes in the personality o
Page 21 and 22: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Dedicated to my hus
Page 23 and 24: I. INTRODUCTION A. THESIS QUESTION
Page 25 and 26: government employees and are expect
Page 27 and 28: • Utilization of “see something
Page 29 and 30: II. LITERATURE REVIEW Recent unauth
Page 31 and 32: E.O. 12968 “establishes a uniform
Page 33 and 34: Under Intelligence Community Direct
Page 35 and 36: classification (confidential, secre
Page 37 and 38: C. FINANCIAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED WI
Page 39 and 40: D. EXAMPLES OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOS
Page 41 and 42: Sulick also looks at the history of
Page 43 and 44: law enforcement to cooperate with O
Page 45 and 46: III. HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY I
Page 47 and 48: all data concerning the manufacture
Page 49 and 50: 12 years until the lowest classific
Page 51 and 52: E.O. 12065 continued automatic decl
Page 53 and 54: Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP
Page 55 and 56: IV. DISCUSSION OF INSIDER THREAT AN
Page 57 and 58: disclosures of Manning and Snowden,
Page 59 and 60: organizational leaders should never
Page 61 and 62: on male psychology. Over 95% of ins
Page 63 and 64: loyalty—one that may prevent a tr
Page 65 and 66: V. THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
Page 67 and 68:
eview all of the information, the
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Foreign Influence Unreported person
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Use of Information Technology Syste
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Program (EAP) or other counseling s
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VI. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY TODAY Upon i
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holders current backgrounds, this t
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in the risk of misconduct. These re
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threat as: respond to discrepancies
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can be more easily verified and col
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VII. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KNOWN
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I seldom drank liquor, only beer an
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occasion being serviced orally.”
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Maas remarks about Ames, “But he
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and her father, Alberto. “To outs
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in Iraq and a resultant questioning
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soldiers and throwing furniture. 24
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2. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty
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was a paranoid schizophrenic underg
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October 2000 that killed 17 America
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The Russian intelligence officers w
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contact procedures with his Russian
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Walker befriended people who admire
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5. Financial Concerns When intervie
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He failed to meet deadlines. He ign
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later admitted “he was corrupted
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damage to U.S.-foreign relations an
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next generation who extend the capa
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VIII. DISCUSSION OF DATA Upon revie
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easons, as did Abu-Jihaad, Manning,
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It can be argued almost every indiv
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Table 1. Behavioral Indicators Foun
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Conclusion 3 Self-reporting changes
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Manning and Edward Snowden. Public
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employees are granted complete priv
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equirement for a clearance. This th
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integrity that enforces responsibil
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X. EPILOGUE Ultimately, the insider
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LIST OF REFERENCES Aftergood, Steve
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Defense Security Service. Roles and
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Herbig, Katherine L., Ray A. Zimmer
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———. Intelligence Community D
Page 151 and 152:
———. Security from within: In
Page 153:
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. Defens
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