SCHOOL THESIS

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Brian Regan, Bryan Underwood, Greg William Bergersen, Hassan Abu-Jihaad (Paul R. Hall), Robert Hanssen, John Walker, Jonathon Pollard and Edward Snowden. Selection is based on unauthorized disclosure since the 1980s, including 1985—referred to as the “year of the spy.” Upon review of existing data, the prevalent behavioral characteristic of the cases (10 out of 11 cases) is one of a disgruntled employee (ideology/disillusionment/loyalty). A disgruntled employee becomes the largest concern of insider threat, one who is willing to compromise his or her feelings of loyalty to the organization and the nation for a myriad of reasons. While personal security background investigations review information from the present to up to 10 years prior, Thus, Studies of espionage based on personal interviews with offenders suggest a pattern in which personal disruptions or crises precede, or “trigger,” an individual’s decision to commit espionage. Crises could be positive or negative, and include divorce, death, starting a new relationship, or exhibiting radically changed behavior. Commentators have speculated that if help or timely intervention had been offered in these cases, the crime might have been averted. 2 Assessing the quality of a person’s moral development at an early life stage may be irrelevant to the context of later action when unforeseen events create a condition of personal strain for which trust violation would be a possible resolution. 3 There is no way to determine how many potential spies or persons bent on disclosing classified information were eliminated through the vetting of data collected during the initial security clearance request process. What is depicted in this thesis is the result of employees who passed the screening process and were fully trusted to perform their duties. The conclusion to be drawn from this is two-fold. First, first- and second-line managers of employees who have access to classified information must be keenly aware 2 Katherine L. Herbig, Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007, Department of Defense Technical Report 08–05 (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2008), http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr08-05.pdf, xi. 3 Theodore R. Sarbin, Ralph M. Carney, and Carson Eoyang, eds. Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 119. xvi
of any changes in the personality of their employees. They must go beyond simply giving work assignments and grading results. They have to be able to read slight changes in attitude, performance, personality, and be prepared to make tough decisions about taking positive action when nuances, however slight, are detected. Because intellect and ego play an important part in employee performance, the manager must be trained to deal with employees whose behavior is outside the norm in those regards. Second, managers must, on a regular basis, encourage all employees to be mindful of personality or lifestyle changes of fellow employees and provide a protected avenue for them to discuss fellow employee behavior. “See something, say something” is a phrase that belongs in the work place and applies to both personality and material things. Recognizing and dealing with disgruntled employees might just prevent or mitigate unauthorized disclosure. Disgruntlement leads to changes in ideology, disillusionment with one’s organization, and ultimately may change national loyalty; the predominant factors of which supervisors must be aware. A continuing evaluation system fits hand in glove with managerial awareness of and peer recognition of behavioral or drastic character changes in employees. Formally, there is nothing between the initial screening process and a periodic review (after five or 10 years depending on the classification level). A continuing evaluation system would retrieve real-time data from a variety of sources to determine those employees whose lifestyle or behavior might have changed. Finally, the government must institute a process of routinely reviewing classified positions to determine those positions that no longer have security clearances required. The fewer classified positions, the fewer employees have access to classified information. That lessens the opportunity for unauthorized disclosure and drastically reduces the strain on the entire security clearance process. xvii
Page 1 and 2: NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY,
Page 3 and 4: REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Appr
Page 5 and 6: Approved for public release; distri
Page 7 and 8: ABSTRACT Federal government securit
Page 9 and 10: TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..
Page 11 and 12: LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Overview
Page 13 and 14: LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Behavioral
Page 15 and 16: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Page 17: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Federal governmen
Page 21 and 22: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Dedicated to my hus
Page 23 and 24: I. INTRODUCTION A. THESIS QUESTION
Page 25 and 26: government employees and are expect
Page 27 and 28: • Utilization of “see something
Page 29 and 30: II. LITERATURE REVIEW Recent unauth
Page 31 and 32: E.O. 12968 “establishes a uniform
Page 33 and 34: Under Intelligence Community Direct
Page 35 and 36: classification (confidential, secre
Page 37 and 38: C. FINANCIAL CONCERNS IDENTIFIED WI
Page 39 and 40: D. EXAMPLES OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOS
Page 41 and 42: Sulick also looks at the history of
Page 43 and 44: law enforcement to cooperate with O
Page 45 and 46: III. HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY I
Page 47 and 48: all data concerning the manufacture
Page 49 and 50: 12 years until the lowest classific
Page 51 and 52: E.O. 12065 continued automatic decl
Page 53 and 54: Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP
Page 55 and 56: IV. DISCUSSION OF INSIDER THREAT AN
Page 57 and 58: disclosures of Manning and Snowden,
Page 59 and 60: organizational leaders should never
Page 61 and 62: on male psychology. Over 95% of ins
Page 63 and 64: loyalty—one that may prevent a tr
Page 65 and 66: V. THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
Page 67 and 68: eview all of the information, the
Page 69 and 70:
Foreign Influence Unreported person
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Use of Information Technology Syste
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Program (EAP) or other counseling s
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VI. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY TODAY Upon i
Page 77 and 78:
holders current backgrounds, this t
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in the risk of misconduct. These re
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threat as: respond to discrepancies
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can be more easily verified and col
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VII. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KNOWN
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I seldom drank liquor, only beer an
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occasion being serviced orally.”
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Maas remarks about Ames, “But he
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and her father, Alberto. “To outs
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in Iraq and a resultant questioning
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soldiers and throwing furniture. 24
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2. Ideology/Disillusionment/Loyalty
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was a paranoid schizophrenic underg
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October 2000 that killed 17 America
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The Russian intelligence officers w
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contact procedures with his Russian
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Walker befriended people who admire
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5. Financial Concerns When intervie
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He failed to meet deadlines. He ign
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later admitted “he was corrupted
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damage to U.S.-foreign relations an
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next generation who extend the capa
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VIII. DISCUSSION OF DATA Upon revie
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easons, as did Abu-Jihaad, Manning,
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It can be argued almost every indiv
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Table 1. Behavioral Indicators Foun
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Conclusion 3 Self-reporting changes
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Manning and Edward Snowden. Public
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employees are granted complete priv
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equirement for a clearance. This th
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integrity that enforces responsibil
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X. EPILOGUE Ultimately, the insider
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LIST OF REFERENCES Aftergood, Steve
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Defense Security Service. Roles and
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Herbig, Katherine L., Ray A. Zimmer
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———. Intelligence Community D
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———. Security from within: In
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INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 1. Defens
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SCHOOL THESIS

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