EL SALVADOR

PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC POLITICS
ence of parties are all likely to vary with
the natural ebbs and flows of their electoral
fortunes.
But for the Salvadoran right, ARENA’s
woes amounted to a series of firsts in the
country’s democratic history: the first
time that the right found itself fully in the
opposition at the national level, unable
to exert control over the presidency, the
legislature, or the armed forces; the first
time that fault lines among conservatives
resulted in two major competing political
parties; the first time that the left, backed
by disenchanted empresarios (and, allegedly,
by the Venezuela-sponsored ALBA
consortium), was able to outspend the
business-friendly right; the first time that
conservatives’ oldest and most effective
rallying cry—that, if given the chance, the
Frente would promptly launch a “communist”
revolution in the style of Cuba or
Venezuela—would have to come to terms
with the realities of a largely un-revolutionary
FMLN presidency. In short, ARE-
NA (and the traditional right it embodies)
arguably emerged from 2009 and its
aftermath weaker than ever on at least
four fronts: access to the state, organizational
strength, financial clout and ideological
coherence.
As a result, many observers expected
ARENA to enter a long and challenging
process of adaptation and recovery. A few
went as far as to predict the end of the traditional
right in its current incarnation.
In July 2014, a long-time ARENA insider
(who spoke on the condition of anonymity)
recalled, with biblical flair, that many
within the party leadership had braced
themselves for “years of drought.”
In light of these somber predictions,
what the right has achieved since 2009 is
remarkable. A mere three years after its
first presidential defeat, ARENA won the
2012 departmental and municipal elections
in a landslide, securing more mayoralties
(a total of 116) than the FMLN and
GANA combined (111). Notably, ARENA
carried 9 of the 14 department capitals,
including a second consecutive term in
San Salvador City won by an unprecedented
margin. In the concurrent legislative
elections, ARENA earned both more
Overlooking San Salvador: in the shadow of the ever present volcano.
votes (39.75%) and more seats (33 of 84)
than either GANA (9.6% of the votes and
11 seats) or the FMLN (36.76% of the
vote and 31 seats). Two years later, in the
2014 presidential runoff, ARENA secured
49.89% of the vote, just 6,500 votes shy
of the FMLN. And in 2015, ARENA once
again outperformed its rivals, securing
more mayoralties, more congressional
seats, and a larger share of the vote than
either GANA or the FMLN. Just as important,
the party has recovered much of its
internal cohesion: with a small number of
isolated exceptions (most notably a fiveperson
congressional splinter in 2013),
ARENA had successfully avoided new
schisms or en masse defections since the
original GANA rupture. ARENA, far from
experiencing a political “drought,” has
quickly reclaimed its position as El Salvador’s
most powerful electoral vehicle.
BORROWING FROM THE FMLN’S
PLAYBOOK
To be sure, many of the secrets to
ARENA’s continued electoral strength
are rooted in the party’s long history. The
legacy of the civil war—remembered by
many as a war between the FMLN and
the forces that ARENA embodies today—
has allowed the party to develop a clear
brand and long-lasting voter attachments.
Since its beginnings in the early 1980s,
ARENA has invested in an effective and
professional territorial organization that
now spans every corner of El Salvador.
And the party’s core constituents—traditional
businessmen and their families—
are small, intensely socialized and deeply
loyal.
Other factors have little to do with
ARENA’s leadership. The two consecutive
FMLN governments, stained by lackluster
economic results and soaring homicide
rates, have been mediocre at best. Meanwhile,
GANA has moved sharply to the
political center (serving as the FMLN’s
critical ally in the Legislative Assembly)
and failed to cultivate a competitive electoral
coalition (the party’s support has
evened out at about 9 to 12% of the electorate).
And the Supreme Court, in a landmark
ruling against Unidos por El Salvador—the
five ARENA legislators who
attempted to form a separate congressional
faction in 2013—banned elected officials
from switching parties.
But it is also true that ARENA has
actively—and successfully—pursued
strategies that have allowed it to take
advantage of these circumstances.
Two have been particularly successful:
focusing on local governance and leveraging
civil society.
Alisha Holland, a professor of politics
at Princeton University, has argued that
the FMLN pursued a clear strategy in its
path from the mountains to the presidency.
Unable to stage a realistic presidential
bid in the 1990s, the FMLN chose instead
to focus on winning municipal elections,
slowly building support nationally by
governing well locally. The 2009 elections,
contends Holland, were the culmi-
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