EL SALVADOR

EL SALVADOR
nation of this careful game plan.
Between 2009 and 2014, ARENA
adopted an accelerated version of the
FMLN’s winning strategy. In 2009, as his
party struggled elsewhere, mayoral candidate
Norman Quijano—a dentist who had
served five terms in the Legislative Assembly—won
a surprise victory for ARENA
in San Salvador. Like his campaign, Quijano’s
popular tenure at the helm of the
nation’s capital was defined by two traits.
First, its relentless focus on addressing the
tangible, everyday problems of local constituents.
And second, its quiet indifference
toward ARENA’s traditional symbols,
leaders and ideological commitments.
In the 2012 local elections—the first
since the painful defeats of 2009—ARE-
NA formulated much of its campaign
around the Quijano model. In speeches
and campaign platforms, candidates
promised effective, results-oriented governance
and quietly distanced themselves
from the traditional party brand. ARENA
incumbents touted their tangible achievements
and carefully avoided partisan
attacks; challengers attempted to unseat
the FMLN by pointing to San Salvador
as a model of what they had to offer. A
beaming Quijano, now the symbol of good
governance, appeared on TV spots across
the country flanked by his party’s local
candidates. The strategy was a resounding
success: it is, at least in part, what enabled
ARENA to win the election by a landslide.
Quijano, who was comfortably reelected
in San Salvador over the son of an
FMLN wartime commander, quickly
became ARENA’s de facto 2014 presidential
candidate. After an impressive showing,
he went on to lose the election to then-
Vice President Salvador Sánchez Cerén by
fewer than 6,500 votes.
In addition to its focus on local governance,
ARENA has embraced a second
trademark of the FMLN: leveraging civil
society to frame broader issues and rally
widespread support at the national level.
Since 2009, two groups of right-leaning
organizations have played an increasingly
visible role in Salvadoran politics.
First, professional organizations, with the
country’s two most powerful and politically
active business groups—the National
Private Business Association (ANEP) and
the Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce
(Camarasal)—intensifying their advocacy
of free markets and democratic “institutionality.”
And second, a new wave of movimientos
ciudadanos that have focused
on democratic consolidation more generally.
They include the Movimiento 300 (a
group of young professionals with strong
ties to ARENA) and, perhaps most visibly,
the sprawling Aliados por la Democracia
(a coalition of 126 organizations led by
ANEP).
As many of their leaders are quick to
point out, these organizations and movements
are not ARENA. Nor are most of
them formally affiliated with the party in
any way. At the very least, however, the
party has benefited from these groups
indirectly: when civil society rallies popular
opposition to actions that are closely
identified with the FMLN, it is ARENA
that tends to reap the electoral and political
benefits. And for some groups, collaboration
with ARENA is more intentional:
the Movimiento 300, for example, has
periodically provided the party with both
campaign funding and fresh leadership.
THE REAL CHALLENGE: INTERNAL
REFORM
These strategies have helped ARENA
remain an electoral powerhouse. Yet there
is more to parties than elections, and
many of the difficulties that emerged in
2009—internal turmoil and ideological
outdatedness, for example—continue to
plague ARENA. In particular, the party
must still fully address what may be its
most important (and most challenging)
task: changing the way it makes internal
decisions.
At first glance, ARENA may appear
surprisingly democratic. Its statutes
establish that virtually any member of the
party is free to compete for a nomination
to elected office, both external (e.g. the
Legislative Assembly) and internal (e.g.
party president). Nominees are chosen
from among the candidates by the party’s
General Assembly, a multitudinous body
that serves as “the supreme authority”
within the party.
In practice, the General Assembly has
often served a less ambitious purpose:
to validate and legitimize the decisions
of the National Executive Committee
(COENA), a fifteen-member board that
serves as ARENA’s “maximum body for
direction and administration.” COENA
is responsible not only for presenting
potential candidates before the General
Assembly, but also for appointing most
of its delegates. Whoever controls the
Executive Committee, in short, controls
the whole party.
In the past, COENA often served as a
useful mechanism for different currents
within the party to participate in critical
decision-making. But as the Salvadoran
right becomes ever less monolithic, competition
for COENA is sure to become
increasingly destabilizing: even as I write
these words, three of ARENA’s most visible
leaders—Norman Quijano, the sitting
party president Jorge Velado, and
the former party vice president Ernesto
Muyshondt—are locked in an unspoken
struggle for control over the executive
committee. If ARENA wants to avoid
another GANA, it must further democratize
its decision-making process.
Doing so will inevitably require the
party to address campaign finance. ARE-
NA has continued to rely overwhelmingly
on the contributions of a small number
of wealthy supporters. Reformists within
ARENA should prioritize a funding overhaul
because doing so could strengthen
their negotiating position vis-à-vis these
traditional donors and make meaningful
internal reforms more sustainable in the
lon run. If designed and executed properly,
a recent proposal to introduce membership
fees (yet another tactic pioneered
by the FMLN) would be a good first step.
Manuel Andrés Meléndez is a
Research Fellow at the Salvadoran
Foundation for Economic and Social
Development (FUSADES). He was born
and raised in San Salvador and holds
an A.B. in Government from Harvard
University. Follow him on
Twitter at @manuelmelendezs.
18 ReVista SPRING 2016 PHOTO OPPOSITE PAGE BY MAURO ARIAS @MAUROARIASFOTO