Fisheries in the Pacific

The other side of large-scale, no-take, marine protected areas in the Pacific Ocean
the historical character of traditional fishing zones and the legitimate and sovereign
nature of their presence. The conflict in April 2014 between Vietnam and China
was emblematic of this: China authorized one of its companies to conduct an
offshore oil and gas exploration campaign in a contested area; Vietnamese fishing
vessels put up opposition to the effort; and both sides were supported by their
fisheries control and coast guard vessels. The conflict went so far as to ramming
attempts and Chinese merchant communities in Vietnam suffered abuse.
Even in this type of situation, it is difficult to believe that the Vietnamese fishing
vessels had received government orders to deliberately oppose the Chinese offshore oil
and gas operation. The fishermen are effectively able to anticipate the economic consequence
for themselves if they are denied access to fishing zones. They are not necessarily working
in partnership with their State or its government administration. 27 At most, State
authorities guarantee them a form of protection at sea or monitor their movements.
The geostrategic interests of States in the core of the Asia-Pacific maritime pivot
overlap with the private geostrategic interest of fishing fleets. Both public and private
actors use “hard power” types of open conflict actions.
In the second belt of Western Pacific islands, the positions of the Chinese
government are more moderate concerning armed boardings resulting from IUU
activities of their vessels, for example in the territorial waters of Palau. China in
contrast relies on diplomatic efforts to obtain peaceful resolutions to conflict,
compatible with its joint economic development interests. IUU activities of fishers
there disrupt Chinese diplomatic efforts.
At the level of the approaches to the pivot, the Chinese government encourages
the economic development of fishing activities through investments in infrastructure.
It also encourages private Chinese investment in the fishing sector of sympathetic
countries located in these areas.
In response to these Chinese government efforts, there has been significant activity
on the part of private American charitable trusts to encourage the creation of largescale
MPAs and of no-take shark sanctuaries. Historically, the lobbying campaigns
of these trusts initially targeted two areas, the Chagos Islands on the Indian Ocean
side, and the Mariana Islands and Palau on the Pacific side, resulting in the effective
creation of no-take areas. These actions were part of “soft power”, or more precisely,
“smart power”, 28 mixing State diplomatic influence (here the USA against China)
with the influence of nongovernmental actors (here, the American charitable trusts)
in line with the American Global Development Policy doctrine of 2010.
From the perspective of the Asia-Pacific maritime pivot, for both China and
America there is a dichotomy between the core and the approaches of the pivot for
27. See for example the news article entitled, “Chinese Fishermen in Troubled Waters” published in
October 2014 in The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/chinese-fishermen-in-troubled-waters/
(Accessed on July 9, 2015).
28. “Smart power” consists of a combination of “soft power” and “hard power” strategies.
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