Command Red Team

CHAPTER III
RED TEAM CHALLENGES
“[An] Important reason to consider alternatives involves the fact that analysts
do not process information entirely ‘objectively’ because of biases in human
perception and judgment.”
“Making Sense of Transnational Threats”
by Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton
The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers
Volume 3, Number 1, October 2004
1. Overview
a. The red team must understand not only the external OE but also the
organizational culture of its parent command.
b. Most of the internal issues that concern the red team derive from the fact that staff
officers are human and staffs are social groups. Many of the subjective cognitive
processes that can hinder analysis and decision making by individual staff officers can
also be manifested by groups of individuals or staffs.
2. Two Environments
a. Commanders, planners, operators, and intelligence analysts consider the OE when
assessing situations and developing military options. The red team assesses the same
political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical, and time
factors as the rest of the staff, but with the specific objective of developing alternative
perspectives and interpretations or ones that challenge their assumptions regarding the
environment.
b. The red team not only needs to understand the problem the staff is
considering, but it also needs to understand two environments: the individual’s
cognitive environment and the organizational culture of the staff. Understanding
these two environments is a necessary prerequisite to the red team’s task of stimulating
critical and creative thought and countering the influence of organizational constraints
that might sway, constrain, or prejudice the staff’s thinking.
c. The internal issues that the red team addresses are inherent to all organizations.
They are the natural, unavoidable consequences of the fact that staff officers are human,
staff agencies are human social groups, and problem solving involves cognitive human
processes. Conscientious staff officers will take affirmative steps to minimize the
potential for these factors to constrain thinking and inhibit analysis. However, even the
most diligent officers can be too close to a problem to see their own hidden assumptions
and biases. As a primary task, the red team is expected to use its independent perspective
and special training to help the staff counter these hidden assumptions and biases.
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