Command Red Team

Red Team Activities
i. The following red team techniques, along with those described elsewhere in this
chapter, have proven effective in the production of critical reviews.
(1) ACH. ACH seeks to identify alternative explanations (hypotheses) and
evaluate all evidence that will disprove, rather than confirm, existing hypotheses. ACH
can help overcome cognitive limitations, especially the tendency for new information to
be interpreted in ways that reinforce hidden assumptions and existing paradigms and to
overlook, discount, or misinterpret new information that might contradict preconceived
notions. This technique compares different hypotheses against the supporting evidence
for each. The objective is to evaluate the strength and consistency of the evidence for
each theory in order to judge the strength of each hypothesis. A structured matrix can be
used to simplify a review of the analysis. This systematic examination of the evidence
makes the technique especially useful for deception detection. It can also show when
observed evidence is actually consistent with multiple hypotheses, thus highlighting areas
for future analysis. If ACH suggests that current hypotheses are inconsistent with
available evidence, then the red team should explore the implications of the other
hypotheses that seem more consistent with the facts.
(2) Indicators. The red team should periodically review events and trends
within the OE to identify early signs of fundamental change and provide warning. These
signs may consist of new factors that alter or negate existing paradigms and operating
assumptions, or that alter the relative strengths or relationships between existing factors
within the OE. Indicators may be found in evolving diplomatic or economic conditions,
new governmental or non-governmental organizations, changing social or political
dynamics, rising charismatic leaders, military or paramilitary modernization, new
technologies, etc. The red team may also create lists of observable events or “tipping
points” that may set conditions for or precede a radical change in the situation or OE.
Such lists can be used to sensitize analysts to subtle, incremental, seemingly-unrelated
incidents that could presage dramatic change in the OE. Overall, identifying signposts of
change can reduce the risk of surprise by guarding against “boiling the frog,” the paradox
of expertise, and other biases that can inhibit the ability of an analyst or organization to
recognize impending revolutionary change.
(3) High Impact/Low Probability Analysis. Analysis is used to assess how
rare, random, or unlikely events may have dramatic effects on the OE, and to estimate the
potential scope of such effects. The same analysis can also be used to assess the impact
of localized events or tactical operations on the strategic environment (e.g., videos of
unprofessional behavior by individual Service members that lead to global outrage and
loss of support for US policy). Red teams may assist planners by estimating future high
impact/low probability events that could complicate the execution of a plan or otherwise
have major consequences for future operations. Analysis can help counter complacency
and overconfidence, which may lead staffs and policymakers to unconsciously assume
their plans will be executed exactly as planned, without any interference by the OE, the
adversary, or other relevant actors. High impact/low probability analysis reminds
analysts and planners that there is no guarantee that the adversary will select the plan’s
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