Command Red Team

Red Team Challenges
(2) Confirmation Bias. There is a natural human tendency for analysts to see
what they expect to see; to actively, but selectively, search for information that confirms
their beliefs; to interpret new information in ways that reinforce their hidden assumptions
and existing paradigms; and to overlook, discount, or misinterpret information that might
contradict their preconceived notions. Analysis can be compromised when analysts see
what they expect to see, and the impact of analytical products can be degraded when
consumers hear what they expect to hear. One red team role is to propose tests to
validate or invalidate such hidden assumptions. Encouraging analysts and decision
makers to re-evaluate their biases is one of the more difficult red team tasks, requiring
tact and patience.
(3) Status Quo Bias. Analysts, staff officers, and decision makers often
unconsciously assume that the future must resemble the past, that current trends will
continue indefinitely without change, or that conditions may slowly evolve at a
convenient, manageable pace. The potential for fundamental, revolutionary change may
be dismissed without a rigorous examination of visible indicators of change. The red
team may help counter this “status quo bias” by promoting analysis of competing
hypotheses (ACH), “what if?” analysis (also known as “backcasting”), exploration of
signposts of change, or similar techniques.
(4) Fighting the Plan. After an individual or group has worked to produce an
assessment or plan, there is a natural resistance to seeing and accepting reasons to revise
the completed product. The conditions or situation that the original product was based on
may have changed, but the authors may be predisposed to dismiss evidence that their
work needs to be re-accomplished. This sunk cost bias could devolve into efforts to
promote work that has been overcome by events or to execute plans regardless of new
conditions and requirements. Critical reviews may help highlight mismatches between
existing products and the actual environment.
(5) Paradox of Expertise. The more an individual or organization is invested
in a particular conceptual framework that has worked for them in the past, the more
difficult it will be for them to accept new evidence that does not fit into that framework.
This can leave the individual or staff vulnerable to missing early indications of radical
change or misinterpreting the current situation. Key assumptions checks may help
uncover inconsistencies in a conceptual framework, but it will often take time and
patience to persuade an experienced staff officer to abandon familiar assumptions that
have been successful in the past.
“We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive.”
Richards J. Heuer
“Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,” 1999
(6) Mirror Imaging. A common error is to unconsciously assume that the
thinking and actions of an adversary or other actor are based on the same values, cultural
imperatives, doctrines, perceptions, operational requirements, and limiting factors that
guide friendly decisions. A psychological drive for coherence often causes individuals to
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