case law of the european court of human rights concerning the ...

expressly laid down in the case law at all. Above all, the system did not for the time being afford
sufficient safeguards against various possible abuses. For example, the categories of people liable to
have their telephones tapped by judicial order and the nature of the offences which might give rise to
such an order were nowhere defined. Nothing obliged a judge to set a limit on the duration of
telephone tapping. Similarly unspecified were the procedure for drawing up the summary reports
containing intercepted conversations; the precautions to be taken in order to communicate the
recordings intact and in their entirety for possible inspection by the judge (who could hardly verify
the number and length of the original tapes on the spot) and by the defence; and the circumstances in
which recordings might be or had to be erased or the tapes be destroyed, in particular where an
accused had been discharged by an investigating judge or acquitted by a court. The information
provided by the Government on these various points showed at best the existence of a practice, but a
practice lacking the necessary regulatory control in the absence of legislation or case law.
In short, French law, written and unwritten, did not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and
manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities. This was truer still
at the material times, so that the applicants had not enjoyed the minimum degree of protection to
which citizens were entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society. The Court therefore held
that there had been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
[See paragraphs 32-36 of the Kruslin judgment and point 1 of its operative provisions; and
paragraphs 31-35 of the Huvig judgment and point 1 of its operative provisions.]
B. Purpose and necessity of the interference
The Court, like the Commission, did not consider it necessary to review compliance with the other
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8.
[See paragraph 37 of the Kruslin judgment and paragraph 36 of Huvig judgment.]
II. Article 50 of the Convention
A. Kruslin case
The applicant claimed, firstly, compensation in the amount of 1,000,000 French francs (FRF) in
respect of his fifteen-year prison sentence. He also sought reimbursement of FRF 70,000 in respect
of lawyer's fees and expenses in the national proceedings. He made no claim for the proceedings at
Strasbourg, as the Commission and the Court had granted him legal aid. The Government and the
Delegate of the Commission expressed no opinion on the matter.
The Court considered that the finding that there been a breach of Article 8 afforded Mr Kruslin
sufficient just satisfaction for the alleged damage and that it was accordingly unnecessary to award
pecuniary compensation.
[See paragraphs 38-39 of the judgment and point 2 of the operative provisions]
As to the costs and expenses, theCourt held that France was to pay the applicant the sum of FRF 20,000
which he had sought in respect of one set of national proceedings. It dismissed the remainder of his
claims.
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