case law of the european court of human rights concerning the ...

not, strictly speaking, to correct an actual initial error but to bring the document up to date so as to
reflect the applicant’s present position. Furthermore, numerous courts of first instance and courts of
appeal have already ordered similar insertions in the case of other transsexuals, and the procureur’s
office has hardly ever appealed against such decisions, the great majority of which have now
become final and binding (see paragraph 23 above). The Court of Cassation has adopted a contrary
position in its case-law, but this could change (see paragraph 24 above).
It is true that the applicant underwent the surgical operation abroad, without the benefit of all the
medical and psychological safeguards which are now required in France. The operation nevertheless
involved the irreversible abandonment of the external marks of Miss B.’s original sex. The Court
considers that in the circumstances of the case the applicant’s manifest determination is a factor
which is sufficiently significant to be taken into account, together with other factors, with reference
to Article 8 (art. 8).
(ii) Change of forenames
56. The applicant pointed out that the law of 6 Fructidor Year II (see paragraph 22 above) prohibited
any citizen from bearing a surname or forename other than those recorded on his or her birth
certificate. In the eyes of the law, her forename was therefore Norbert; all her identity documents
(identity card, passport, voting card, etc.), her cheque books and her official correspondence
(telephone accounts, tax demands, etc.) described her by that name. Unlike in the United Kingdom,
whether she could change her forename did not depend on her wishes only; Article 57 of the Civil
Code made this subject to judicial permission and the demonstration of a "legitimate interest"
capable of justifying it (see paragraph 22 above). Miss B. knew of no decision which had regarded
transsexualism as giving rise to such an interest. In any event, the Libourne tribunal de grande
instance and the Bordeaux Court of Appeal had refused to allow her the forenames Lyne Antoinette
(see paragraphs 13-15 above). Finally, the status of informally adopted forenames was highly
uncertain.
The Commission agreed in substance with this argument.
57. The Government maintained, on the other hand, that there was ample favourable case-law on the
point, supported by the public prosecutor’s offices. It merely required that a "neutral" forename such
as Claude, Dominique or Camille was chosen; the applicant had, however, requested forenames
which were exclusively female.
In addition, many people frequently made use of an informally adopted forename ("prénom
d’usage") which differed from that recorded in their birth certificate. The Government conceded,
however, that this practice had no legal validity.
58. The judgments supplied to the Court by the Government do indeed show that non-recognition of
the change of sex does not necessarily prevent the person in question from obtaining a new
forename which will better reflect his or her physical appearance (see paragraph 23 above).
However, this case-law was not settled at the time when the Libourne and Bordeaux courts gave
their rulings. Indeed, it does not appear to be settled even today, as the Court of Cassation has
apparently never had an occasion to confirm it. Moreover, the door it opens is a very narrow one, as
only the few neutral forenames can be chosen. As to informally adopted forenames, they have no
legal status.
To sum up, the Court considers that the refusal to allow the applicant the change of forename
requested by her is also a relevant factor from the point of view of Article 8 (art. 8).
43