21.09.2017 Views

BusinessDay 21 Sep 2017

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Thursday <strong>21</strong> <strong>Sep</strong>tember <strong>2017</strong><br />

10 BUSINESS DAY<br />

C002D5556<br />

COMMENT<br />

CHRISTOPHER AKOR<br />

Chris Akor, a First Class<br />

graduate of Political Science, holds an<br />

MSc in African Studies from the University<br />

of Oxford and is <strong>BusinessDay</strong>’s<br />

Op-Ed Editor<br />

christopher.akor@businessdayonline.com<br />

One of the characteristic<br />

of the Nigerian<br />

state is its resort<br />

to brute force and<br />

deadly violence to<br />

suppress legitimate expression of<br />

frustration and dissent. Remember<br />

Ken Saro Wiwa and his Movement<br />

for the Survival of Ogoni People<br />

(MOSOP)? They tried to press for<br />

“political autonomy to participate<br />

in the affairs of the Republic as a<br />

distinct and separate unit” and the<br />

“right to the control and use of a fair<br />

proportion of economic resources<br />

for Ogoni development” in the<br />

1990s and what was the result? The<br />

Nigerian government responded<br />

to MOSOP’s demand with a brutal<br />

crackdown and, ultimately,<br />

decapitated the leadership of the<br />

group. Many towns in the region<br />

do not even have as much as a<br />

police posts, but security forces –<br />

the army, police and navy – are<br />

constantly deployed to protect oil<br />

installations that dot the region.<br />

Repeating mistakes of the past<br />

These security forces constantly<br />

engage in torture and extra judicial<br />

killings of people in the communities<br />

and are rightly viewed<br />

as henchmen of a distant government<br />

concerned primarily with<br />

securing the oil and gas facilities<br />

and installations scattered across<br />

the regions on which the Nigerian<br />

economy, and more particular,<br />

the Nigerian federation, depends.<br />

Even with the return to democratic<br />

governance in 1999 with the<br />

attendant freedom of expression<br />

it guarantees, the Nigerian state<br />

was still unwilling to listen to any<br />

legitimate agitation and was determined<br />

to employ maximum<br />

force to crush any form of dissent<br />

and protect. Gradually and with<br />

time, non state actors have come<br />

to understand that the only language<br />

the Nigerian government<br />

understands is that of force.<br />

Thus, by 2005, violence became<br />

the chief means by which<br />

power and resources were negotiated<br />

in the Niger Delta region.<br />

Consequently, the loci of power<br />

shifted from community elders<br />

– a group the government and<br />

particularly the multinational<br />

oil companies found expedient<br />

to negotiate with and settle to<br />

quieten agitations – to militant<br />

youth groups who have been<br />

using violent means to successfully<br />

challenge the legitimacy of<br />

the Nigerian state. The only snag<br />

is that when these youth groups<br />

took up arms, the military that is<br />

quick to crush peaceful dissent<br />

and protests, proved incapable of<br />

suppressing them when armed.<br />

I think Nigerians need to be<br />

worried about their armed<br />

forces that, recently, only<br />

specialises in winning battles<br />

involving unarmed civilians<br />

and groups. When they have<br />

faced armed groups, the outcome<br />

hasn’t been flattering<br />

They consequently used the instrumentality<br />

of violence to successfully<br />

threaten the economic survival of<br />

the Nigerian state and consequently<br />

negotiate an amnesty programme,<br />

in 2009, with the Nigerian state,<br />

worth billions of dollars and set the<br />

precedence for violent confrontation<br />

as the only viable means of resolving<br />

disputes with the state.<br />

Almost at the same time the<br />

government was negotiating peace<br />

terms with the dreaded Niger Delta<br />

militants, it unleashed the army<br />

on another extremist but largely<br />

peaceful group – Boko Haram<br />

– actively proselytising in Borno<br />

state. The army and police pursued<br />

a brutal, deadly and illegal crackdown<br />

on the group that peaceful elements<br />

within the group were either<br />

wiped out or lost their voices and<br />

the apostle of extreme violence and<br />

terror – Shiek Ibrahim Shekau – and<br />

his like took over. As usual, the moment<br />

Boko Haram took up arms the<br />

Nigerian army became scarred and<br />

could no longer confront them as it<br />

did when they weren’t armed. The<br />

comment is free<br />

Send 800word comments to comment@businessdayonline.com<br />

Nigerian government has sought<br />

and got various international support,<br />

formed a multilateral force,<br />

and used mercenaries but is still<br />

unable to comprehensively defeat<br />

the insurgency.<br />

But alas, the Nigerian state has<br />

learnt nothing from such bitter<br />

experiences and has continued<br />

to use crude violence and force to<br />

respond to peaceful agitations. For<br />

instance, in December 2015, the<br />

Nigerian Army mercilessly mowed<br />

down close to 500 members of the<br />

Shiite sect in Zaria and destroyed<br />

their leader’s house and shrines<br />

just for blocking the convoy of the<br />

Army Chief. The Human Rights<br />

Watch (HRW) was later to declare<br />

that the Nigerian army unjustifiably<br />

killed more than 300 members<br />

of the Islamic Movement of<br />

Nigeria (IMN) and secretly buried<br />

them. That assertion was later<br />

corroborated by the Kaduna state<br />

government, which even put the<br />

figure of those killed higher than<br />

the HRW. The violence against the<br />

largely peaceful sect has continued<br />

unabated and the leader of the sect<br />

- Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakzaky, his<br />

wife and other members has been<br />

in government detention unlawfully<br />

since their arrest in 2015.<br />

Feeling lucky, the Army has now<br />

extended its murderous crackdown<br />

to the largely peaceful but extremist<br />

Indigenous people of Biafra<br />

(IPOD) group. The unlawful killings<br />

started since last year but have now<br />

intensified with the army’s operation<br />

Python Dance 2. By declaring<br />

a largely peaceful group a terrorist<br />

organisation, proscribing an en-<br />

Don’t lose the plot – agriculture in the right context<br />

tire people’s right to free speech<br />

and association, and deliberately<br />

provoking them to violence, the<br />

Nigerian government is steadily<br />

and quickly pushing the group to<br />

embrace violence. The unspoken<br />

message to these groups that are<br />

continually being massacred and<br />

mowed down by the army is that<br />

peaceful demonstrations or protests<br />

never pay. The only chance<br />

they have of being taken seriously<br />

is by engaging in armed and violent<br />

confrontation with the state. The<br />

only problem is that when these<br />

groups do take up arms, the army<br />

often doesn’t have the capability to<br />

stop them. We have good examples<br />

in the Niger Delta militants and<br />

Boko Haram.<br />

But the government may be<br />

lucky again. Unlike the Niger Delta<br />

militants who had Nigeria by<br />

the balls and the Boko Haram<br />

militants motivated by extremist<br />

ideology, the motivation for<br />

the current Biafran secessionist<br />

movement appears to be largely<br />

economic and is unlikely to survive<br />

a brutal crackdown. However, the<br />

crackdown will be at the expense<br />

of Nigeria’s unity!<br />

Finally, I think Nigerians need<br />

to be worried about their armed<br />

forces that, recently, only specialises<br />

in winning battles involving<br />

unarmed civilians and groups.<br />

When they have faced armed<br />

groups, the outcome hasn’t been<br />

flattering.<br />

Send reactions to:<br />

comment@businessdayonline.com<br />

DAYO ODUWOLE<br />

Oduwole is an Investment Banking<br />

Professional writing in from Lagos.<br />

He writes via: oladayo@cefmr.com<br />

Here is something you’ve<br />

probably not heard regarding<br />

agriculture in<br />

Africa: African farmers<br />

are old. Think about it for a second.<br />

Do you know anyone that owns<br />

a farm? What is the age of this<br />

person? According to the United<br />

Nations Development Programme<br />

(“UNDP”) dataset, the average<br />

Kenyan farmer is 60 years old.<br />

In Nigeria, farmers are about 54<br />

years old. Life expectancy at birth<br />

in Kenya is 62 years and 53 years<br />

in Nigeria, comparing the average<br />

age of farmers to life expectancy<br />

at birth, it is easy to conclude that<br />

African farming has a demographical<br />

problem. A new reality television<br />

show has been airing in East<br />

Africa entitled don’t lose the plot.<br />

It follows the lives of four young<br />

people (two pairs from Tanzania<br />

and Kenya) who have been allotted<br />

one acre of land for agricultural<br />

production and follows their activities<br />

over a nine-month period.<br />

The most profitable farmer at the<br />

end of the show wins an agricultural<br />

investment of $10,000. The<br />

show is supported by various<br />

institutions including the USAID.<br />

The objective of the programme<br />

is showcasing to the youth the<br />

activities involved in agriculture<br />

and perhaps encourage them to<br />

join the profession. The show’s<br />

producers want farming to be<br />

perceived as “cool”. Whether the<br />

most appropriate medium to<br />

achieve this objective is a reality<br />

TV show is to be seen.<br />

A fresh attempt at encouraging<br />

young people to engage in the<br />

profession and adjust the demographical<br />

problem is seemingly<br />

laudable. Demography is however<br />

not the only nor the biggest<br />

problem faced by African governments<br />

with regards to agriculture;<br />

low productivity is a frequently<br />

cited problem in African agriculture.<br />

Dercon and Gollin (2014)<br />

and Gollin et al (2014) show<br />

that agricultural productivity in<br />

Africa is only 28% of non-agricultural<br />

productivity. In effect, if<br />

productivity maximization was<br />

the objective of governments,<br />

agriculture should receive significantly<br />

less resources. In Nigeria,<br />

agriculture accounts for about<br />

30% of employed adults, contrast<br />

with the United States of America<br />

where it only accounts for 1.3% of<br />

available jobs. Similarly, across<br />

the OECD, only a small percentage<br />

of the working populations work<br />

in agriculture. The corollary here<br />

is that a large part of the Nigerian<br />

working population is involved in<br />

a very low productivity sector. This<br />

point should alarm policy framers.<br />

A recent NOI poll in Nigeria<br />

showed that 90% of respondents<br />

held the view that “the agriculture<br />

sector is one of the most viable<br />

means of driving the nation’s economy<br />

positively and pulling it out the<br />

current recession”. Nigeria is now<br />

out of recession but the results of the<br />

poll buttress the nationwide view of<br />

agriculture and its importance in the<br />

economy. Whilst the general population<br />

can hold this view about the<br />

importance of agriculture, should<br />

SSA governments hold a similar<br />

view considering existing empirical<br />

evidence? Has agricultural policy in<br />

SSA already lost the plot?<br />

Agricultural policy in Nigeria like<br />

the rest of sub-Saharan Africa has<br />

revolved around the following four<br />

critical points; food security, poverty<br />

alleviation, economic growth<br />

and development and a balance of<br />

trade. Here is a very important and<br />

closely held secret, several studies<br />

have reviewed the evidence on the<br />

impact of agriculture on growth and<br />

development, the evidence is inconclusive<br />

on whether governmental<br />

focus on agriculture would deliver<br />

economic growth and achieve the<br />

three other critical objectives of<br />

governments. Should these governments<br />

continue to enact policy<br />

experiments in agriculture despite<br />

inconclusive evidence? The simple<br />

answer is NO. In Nigeria, there are<br />

multiple policies and strategies<br />

dealing with different crops, from<br />

rice to tomatoes to palm oil to<br />

cassava. Each policy and directive<br />

centered around the four critical<br />

points earlier mentioned. A critical<br />

home truth per Dercon and Gollin<br />

is that growth in agriculture will<br />

not come in isolation but from<br />

its interaction with the rest of the<br />

economy. A careful assessment<br />

of the relative benefits in each<br />

context of investing resources in<br />

agriculture versus other sectors is<br />

essential but largely lacking across<br />

the SSA region and more importantly<br />

in Nigeria.<br />

The following points remain true<br />

about agriculture in Africa; it remains<br />

the primary source of livelihoods for<br />

many households in sub-Saharan<br />

Africa. Most of these households<br />

operate their own farms; relatively<br />

few people are employed as agricultural<br />

wage workers and farm sizes<br />

are extremely small in most African<br />

production settings, with almost all<br />

land holdings under 5 hectares. In the<br />

UK, average farm size is 54 hectares,<br />

and in the USA, its 169 hectares. With<br />

clear and apparent problems in the<br />

sector it is understandable that the<br />

sector takes up resources from a<br />

policy formulation perspective and<br />

within public discourse.<br />

So, what is the way forward?<br />

Agriculture as private enterprise<br />

is profitable when conducted<br />

appropriately as is evident from<br />

some listed companies on the<br />

Nigerian stock exchange. The role<br />

of government should be restricted<br />

primarily to supporting and promoting<br />

private sector investment<br />

in Agriculture. Land tenor laws<br />

like; the land use act needs urgent<br />

revision to help facilitate easy land<br />

acquisition for agricultural purposes.<br />

More important is how the<br />

agricultural production interacts<br />

with other sectors of the economy.<br />

A concerted effort should be made<br />

to encourage industrial growth as<br />

this will drive demand for agricultural<br />

commodities as a source of<br />

inputs. In 60 years, there have been<br />

over fifteen different government<br />

schemes ranging from Operation<br />

Feed the Nation to the National<br />

Fadama project and several others<br />

in between, showing ineffectiveness<br />

of policy initiatives. These<br />

policies can be contrasted with the<br />

European common agricultural<br />

policy that was enacted in 1962<br />

but has evolved along the way and<br />

remained coherent. The Nigerian<br />

government needs to admit that<br />

its agricultural policies need a<br />

thorough review and perhaps<br />

borrow a leaf from the “Don’t lose<br />

the plot” producers by taking a<br />

single problem and attempting to<br />

solve it. The focus for government<br />

agricultural policy should be how<br />

to grow private sector investment<br />

in agriculture and serve as an input<br />

provider for the industrial sector.<br />

Send reactions to:<br />

comment@businessdayonline.com

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!