BusinessDay 21 Sep 2017
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Thursday <strong>21</strong> <strong>Sep</strong>tember <strong>2017</strong><br />
10 BUSINESS DAY<br />
C002D5556<br />
COMMENT<br />
CHRISTOPHER AKOR<br />
Chris Akor, a First Class<br />
graduate of Political Science, holds an<br />
MSc in African Studies from the University<br />
of Oxford and is <strong>BusinessDay</strong>’s<br />
Op-Ed Editor<br />
christopher.akor@businessdayonline.com<br />
One of the characteristic<br />
of the Nigerian<br />
state is its resort<br />
to brute force and<br />
deadly violence to<br />
suppress legitimate expression of<br />
frustration and dissent. Remember<br />
Ken Saro Wiwa and his Movement<br />
for the Survival of Ogoni People<br />
(MOSOP)? They tried to press for<br />
“political autonomy to participate<br />
in the affairs of the Republic as a<br />
distinct and separate unit” and the<br />
“right to the control and use of a fair<br />
proportion of economic resources<br />
for Ogoni development” in the<br />
1990s and what was the result? The<br />
Nigerian government responded<br />
to MOSOP’s demand with a brutal<br />
crackdown and, ultimately,<br />
decapitated the leadership of the<br />
group. Many towns in the region<br />
do not even have as much as a<br />
police posts, but security forces –<br />
the army, police and navy – are<br />
constantly deployed to protect oil<br />
installations that dot the region.<br />
Repeating mistakes of the past<br />
These security forces constantly<br />
engage in torture and extra judicial<br />
killings of people in the communities<br />
and are rightly viewed<br />
as henchmen of a distant government<br />
concerned primarily with<br />
securing the oil and gas facilities<br />
and installations scattered across<br />
the regions on which the Nigerian<br />
economy, and more particular,<br />
the Nigerian federation, depends.<br />
Even with the return to democratic<br />
governance in 1999 with the<br />
attendant freedom of expression<br />
it guarantees, the Nigerian state<br />
was still unwilling to listen to any<br />
legitimate agitation and was determined<br />
to employ maximum<br />
force to crush any form of dissent<br />
and protect. Gradually and with<br />
time, non state actors have come<br />
to understand that the only language<br />
the Nigerian government<br />
understands is that of force.<br />
Thus, by 2005, violence became<br />
the chief means by which<br />
power and resources were negotiated<br />
in the Niger Delta region.<br />
Consequently, the loci of power<br />
shifted from community elders<br />
– a group the government and<br />
particularly the multinational<br />
oil companies found expedient<br />
to negotiate with and settle to<br />
quieten agitations – to militant<br />
youth groups who have been<br />
using violent means to successfully<br />
challenge the legitimacy of<br />
the Nigerian state. The only snag<br />
is that when these youth groups<br />
took up arms, the military that is<br />
quick to crush peaceful dissent<br />
and protests, proved incapable of<br />
suppressing them when armed.<br />
I think Nigerians need to be<br />
worried about their armed<br />
forces that, recently, only<br />
specialises in winning battles<br />
involving unarmed civilians<br />
and groups. When they have<br />
faced armed groups, the outcome<br />
hasn’t been flattering<br />
They consequently used the instrumentality<br />
of violence to successfully<br />
threaten the economic survival of<br />
the Nigerian state and consequently<br />
negotiate an amnesty programme,<br />
in 2009, with the Nigerian state,<br />
worth billions of dollars and set the<br />
precedence for violent confrontation<br />
as the only viable means of resolving<br />
disputes with the state.<br />
Almost at the same time the<br />
government was negotiating peace<br />
terms with the dreaded Niger Delta<br />
militants, it unleashed the army<br />
on another extremist but largely<br />
peaceful group – Boko Haram<br />
– actively proselytising in Borno<br />
state. The army and police pursued<br />
a brutal, deadly and illegal crackdown<br />
on the group that peaceful elements<br />
within the group were either<br />
wiped out or lost their voices and<br />
the apostle of extreme violence and<br />
terror – Shiek Ibrahim Shekau – and<br />
his like took over. As usual, the moment<br />
Boko Haram took up arms the<br />
Nigerian army became scarred and<br />
could no longer confront them as it<br />
did when they weren’t armed. The<br />
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Nigerian government has sought<br />
and got various international support,<br />
formed a multilateral force,<br />
and used mercenaries but is still<br />
unable to comprehensively defeat<br />
the insurgency.<br />
But alas, the Nigerian state has<br />
learnt nothing from such bitter<br />
experiences and has continued<br />
to use crude violence and force to<br />
respond to peaceful agitations. For<br />
instance, in December 2015, the<br />
Nigerian Army mercilessly mowed<br />
down close to 500 members of the<br />
Shiite sect in Zaria and destroyed<br />
their leader’s house and shrines<br />
just for blocking the convoy of the<br />
Army Chief. The Human Rights<br />
Watch (HRW) was later to declare<br />
that the Nigerian army unjustifiably<br />
killed more than 300 members<br />
of the Islamic Movement of<br />
Nigeria (IMN) and secretly buried<br />
them. That assertion was later<br />
corroborated by the Kaduna state<br />
government, which even put the<br />
figure of those killed higher than<br />
the HRW. The violence against the<br />
largely peaceful sect has continued<br />
unabated and the leader of the sect<br />
- Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakzaky, his<br />
wife and other members has been<br />
in government detention unlawfully<br />
since their arrest in 2015.<br />
Feeling lucky, the Army has now<br />
extended its murderous crackdown<br />
to the largely peaceful but extremist<br />
Indigenous people of Biafra<br />
(IPOD) group. The unlawful killings<br />
started since last year but have now<br />
intensified with the army’s operation<br />
Python Dance 2. By declaring<br />
a largely peaceful group a terrorist<br />
organisation, proscribing an en-<br />
Don’t lose the plot – agriculture in the right context<br />
tire people’s right to free speech<br />
and association, and deliberately<br />
provoking them to violence, the<br />
Nigerian government is steadily<br />
and quickly pushing the group to<br />
embrace violence. The unspoken<br />
message to these groups that are<br />
continually being massacred and<br />
mowed down by the army is that<br />
peaceful demonstrations or protests<br />
never pay. The only chance<br />
they have of being taken seriously<br />
is by engaging in armed and violent<br />
confrontation with the state. The<br />
only problem is that when these<br />
groups do take up arms, the army<br />
often doesn’t have the capability to<br />
stop them. We have good examples<br />
in the Niger Delta militants and<br />
Boko Haram.<br />
But the government may be<br />
lucky again. Unlike the Niger Delta<br />
militants who had Nigeria by<br />
the balls and the Boko Haram<br />
militants motivated by extremist<br />
ideology, the motivation for<br />
the current Biafran secessionist<br />
movement appears to be largely<br />
economic and is unlikely to survive<br />
a brutal crackdown. However, the<br />
crackdown will be at the expense<br />
of Nigeria’s unity!<br />
Finally, I think Nigerians need<br />
to be worried about their armed<br />
forces that, recently, only specialises<br />
in winning battles involving<br />
unarmed civilians and groups.<br />
When they have faced armed<br />
groups, the outcome hasn’t been<br />
flattering.<br />
Send reactions to:<br />
comment@businessdayonline.com<br />
DAYO ODUWOLE<br />
Oduwole is an Investment Banking<br />
Professional writing in from Lagos.<br />
He writes via: oladayo@cefmr.com<br />
Here is something you’ve<br />
probably not heard regarding<br />
agriculture in<br />
Africa: African farmers<br />
are old. Think about it for a second.<br />
Do you know anyone that owns<br />
a farm? What is the age of this<br />
person? According to the United<br />
Nations Development Programme<br />
(“UNDP”) dataset, the average<br />
Kenyan farmer is 60 years old.<br />
In Nigeria, farmers are about 54<br />
years old. Life expectancy at birth<br />
in Kenya is 62 years and 53 years<br />
in Nigeria, comparing the average<br />
age of farmers to life expectancy<br />
at birth, it is easy to conclude that<br />
African farming has a demographical<br />
problem. A new reality television<br />
show has been airing in East<br />
Africa entitled don’t lose the plot.<br />
It follows the lives of four young<br />
people (two pairs from Tanzania<br />
and Kenya) who have been allotted<br />
one acre of land for agricultural<br />
production and follows their activities<br />
over a nine-month period.<br />
The most profitable farmer at the<br />
end of the show wins an agricultural<br />
investment of $10,000. The<br />
show is supported by various<br />
institutions including the USAID.<br />
The objective of the programme<br />
is showcasing to the youth the<br />
activities involved in agriculture<br />
and perhaps encourage them to<br />
join the profession. The show’s<br />
producers want farming to be<br />
perceived as “cool”. Whether the<br />
most appropriate medium to<br />
achieve this objective is a reality<br />
TV show is to be seen.<br />
A fresh attempt at encouraging<br />
young people to engage in the<br />
profession and adjust the demographical<br />
problem is seemingly<br />
laudable. Demography is however<br />
not the only nor the biggest<br />
problem faced by African governments<br />
with regards to agriculture;<br />
low productivity is a frequently<br />
cited problem in African agriculture.<br />
Dercon and Gollin (2014)<br />
and Gollin et al (2014) show<br />
that agricultural productivity in<br />
Africa is only 28% of non-agricultural<br />
productivity. In effect, if<br />
productivity maximization was<br />
the objective of governments,<br />
agriculture should receive significantly<br />
less resources. In Nigeria,<br />
agriculture accounts for about<br />
30% of employed adults, contrast<br />
with the United States of America<br />
where it only accounts for 1.3% of<br />
available jobs. Similarly, across<br />
the OECD, only a small percentage<br />
of the working populations work<br />
in agriculture. The corollary here<br />
is that a large part of the Nigerian<br />
working population is involved in<br />
a very low productivity sector. This<br />
point should alarm policy framers.<br />
A recent NOI poll in Nigeria<br />
showed that 90% of respondents<br />
held the view that “the agriculture<br />
sector is one of the most viable<br />
means of driving the nation’s economy<br />
positively and pulling it out the<br />
current recession”. Nigeria is now<br />
out of recession but the results of the<br />
poll buttress the nationwide view of<br />
agriculture and its importance in the<br />
economy. Whilst the general population<br />
can hold this view about the<br />
importance of agriculture, should<br />
SSA governments hold a similar<br />
view considering existing empirical<br />
evidence? Has agricultural policy in<br />
SSA already lost the plot?<br />
Agricultural policy in Nigeria like<br />
the rest of sub-Saharan Africa has<br />
revolved around the following four<br />
critical points; food security, poverty<br />
alleviation, economic growth<br />
and development and a balance of<br />
trade. Here is a very important and<br />
closely held secret, several studies<br />
have reviewed the evidence on the<br />
impact of agriculture on growth and<br />
development, the evidence is inconclusive<br />
on whether governmental<br />
focus on agriculture would deliver<br />
economic growth and achieve the<br />
three other critical objectives of<br />
governments. Should these governments<br />
continue to enact policy<br />
experiments in agriculture despite<br />
inconclusive evidence? The simple<br />
answer is NO. In Nigeria, there are<br />
multiple policies and strategies<br />
dealing with different crops, from<br />
rice to tomatoes to palm oil to<br />
cassava. Each policy and directive<br />
centered around the four critical<br />
points earlier mentioned. A critical<br />
home truth per Dercon and Gollin<br />
is that growth in agriculture will<br />
not come in isolation but from<br />
its interaction with the rest of the<br />
economy. A careful assessment<br />
of the relative benefits in each<br />
context of investing resources in<br />
agriculture versus other sectors is<br />
essential but largely lacking across<br />
the SSA region and more importantly<br />
in Nigeria.<br />
The following points remain true<br />
about agriculture in Africa; it remains<br />
the primary source of livelihoods for<br />
many households in sub-Saharan<br />
Africa. Most of these households<br />
operate their own farms; relatively<br />
few people are employed as agricultural<br />
wage workers and farm sizes<br />
are extremely small in most African<br />
production settings, with almost all<br />
land holdings under 5 hectares. In the<br />
UK, average farm size is 54 hectares,<br />
and in the USA, its 169 hectares. With<br />
clear and apparent problems in the<br />
sector it is understandable that the<br />
sector takes up resources from a<br />
policy formulation perspective and<br />
within public discourse.<br />
So, what is the way forward?<br />
Agriculture as private enterprise<br />
is profitable when conducted<br />
appropriately as is evident from<br />
some listed companies on the<br />
Nigerian stock exchange. The role<br />
of government should be restricted<br />
primarily to supporting and promoting<br />
private sector investment<br />
in Agriculture. Land tenor laws<br />
like; the land use act needs urgent<br />
revision to help facilitate easy land<br />
acquisition for agricultural purposes.<br />
More important is how the<br />
agricultural production interacts<br />
with other sectors of the economy.<br />
A concerted effort should be made<br />
to encourage industrial growth as<br />
this will drive demand for agricultural<br />
commodities as a source of<br />
inputs. In 60 years, there have been<br />
over fifteen different government<br />
schemes ranging from Operation<br />
Feed the Nation to the National<br />
Fadama project and several others<br />
in between, showing ineffectiveness<br />
of policy initiatives. These<br />
policies can be contrasted with the<br />
European common agricultural<br />
policy that was enacted in 1962<br />
but has evolved along the way and<br />
remained coherent. The Nigerian<br />
government needs to admit that<br />
its agricultural policies need a<br />
thorough review and perhaps<br />
borrow a leaf from the “Don’t lose<br />
the plot” producers by taking a<br />
single problem and attempting to<br />
solve it. The focus for government<br />
agricultural policy should be how<br />
to grow private sector investment<br />
in agriculture and serve as an input<br />
provider for the industrial sector.<br />
Send reactions to:<br />
comment@businessdayonline.com