atw - International Journal for Nuclear Power | 10.2020

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Ever since its first issue in 1956, the atw – International Journal for Nuclear Power has been a publisher of specialist articles, background reports, interviews and news about developments and trends from all important sectors of nuclear energy, nuclear technology and the energy industry. Internationally current and competent, the professional journal atw is a valuable source of information.

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Electrifying Transport

– A Global Perspective

Sustainable Finance Initiative

of the EU and Taxonomy –

How Green Is Nuclear?

Nuclear Energy – Reliable,

Safe, Economical and

Always Available to Protect

the Environment


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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

After Corona with Nuclear Energy –

For People and Employment in the EU

Dear Reader, The Corona virus and its direct and indirect consequences and effects continue to accompany us. At

present, nobody can say when our everyday life will return to the normality it had before Corona. Nevertheless, we can,

indeed must, think ahead now about the time after the crisis, and this also applies to energy supply and nuclear energy.

Although Corona had an influence on energy and electricity

demand, due to significantly less economic activity, and in

some states it fell by almost 30 %, this was only a temporary

effect of the comprehensive lockdown and, as an example in

China, energy and electricity consumption are currently

back at the previous year’s level. A look at the long-term

development also reveals the sobering picture that the

continuing steady growth in the world population and

improved supply will lead to an increase in energy requirements

in the future. Studies by the International Energy

Agency (IEA), the BP Energy Outlook, reference scenarios

of the U.S. Energy Administration or ExxonMobil clearly

show this. A look at the development of electricity demand

also points to the obvious paradox that the rather emissionsrelated

electricity demand will grow disproportionately.

A second look at figures and strategies, however, reveals

the complex issue of sector coupling, in which low-emission

primary energies will displace more emission-heavy

energies through power generation in other sectors.

In spring this year, somewhat in the media shadow of the

looming consequences of Corona, the European Commission

published its long-awaited industrial strategy. At a time

when the geopolitical balance of power continues to shift

significantly and economic competition is intensifying,

especially with Asian countries, this strategy aims to

strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and technological

independence. Whether this strategy will be successful also

depends on whether these goals can be brought into harmony

with others, i.e. above all the goal of climate neutrality.

Here nuclear energy can play a key role.

A clean energy supply and the preservation of Europe’s

own competitiveness can be achieved with nuclear energy

and follow the goals of the EU industrial strategy. A secure

supply of electricity, as called for in the industrial strategy,

independent of time and weather, low-carbon and at

competitive prices can be guaranteed with nuclear power.

The role of nuclear energy in the EU’s energy supply

must be recognized as a strategic contribution with appropriate

conclusions: Although the 109 nuclear power plants

currently in operation in the EU with a total net capacity of

109,570 MW represent “only” around 9.5 % of the electricity

generation capacity, they supply around 30 % of the

electricity demand due to their high availability. In the

case of low-emission generation, the share is even 50 %.

In addition to their reliability, nuclear power plants have

the ability to support, indeed guarantee, grid stability

through flexibility. No other low-emission technology has

such high flexibility potential as nuclear power, i.e. nuclear

power plants can feed much more power into the grid in a

short time if other generators are not available, or in the opposite

case they can be shut down to low load in a short time

to make “space in the grid” available for volatile generation.

In addition, nuclear energy also has other economic

and strategic importance for the EU. The European nuclear

industry currently provides around 1 million subsidy-free

jobs and generates a gross domestic product of 450 billion

euros. The sector offers a high level of expertise; according

to a Deloitte report, 47 % of jobs are highly qualified, and

both know-how and the necessary resources are essentially

located in the EU. In addition, nuclear energy not only

includes power generation in the plants themselves, but

also a qualified network, starting with nuclear fuel supply

and disposal, through regulatory authorities, manufacturers,

service providers, research & development and

providing spin-offs for applications in industry, agriculture

and medicine.

In this context, it is also essential to note that nuclear

energy is competitive in a reliable regulatory environment

in the – free – market and thus provides favourable conditions

for all consumers, private and industrial. Here, the

advantages of low-cost energy weigh almost more heavily

than in the production itself, since the entire chain benefits

after the supply.

As part of its industrial strategy, the European Commission

must endeavour to identify industries that are strategic

for Europe as a whole. The benefits of nuclear energy in

terms of emission reduction, affordability and employment

must be recognized if it is to accompany the transformation

of energy supply in Europe. A political framework for this

must be given and implemented in Europe – beyond ideological

demarcations or economic particular interests –

which also includes the unbiased political acceptance of

nuclear energy. If EU states decide to use nuclear energy,

this must be accepted in the rest of the EU, just as nuclearusing

states accept a “no” to nuclear energy.

In view of the financial resources that have been

released or announced as a result of the measures taken by

the EU and the member states to cushion or overcome the

economic consequences of the Corona crisis, there is one

more point to note: These funds can also only be spent

once. Of course, it is also possible to build up any kind of

energy supply. But as the EU already stated in its opening

statement, we are in an intensified global environment and

competition. Too much emphasis on technologies that are

not yet competitive today could then block their future

rather than open the way for them. This also and especially

applies to energy supply. We have known how to deal with

nuclear energy in Europe commercially since 1956, and in

Germany since 1960. Let’s use the experience for a sustainable

Europe that will continue to shape a future worth

living in with reason and innovation. European realities

show that this is not just wishful thinking: The nuclear

power plant extension project Paks 5 & 6 in Hungary is

concrete, and the two 1,200 MW units will start operation

in 2025 and 2026. Objections to planning and construction

via EU legal norms have been rejected by the EU

judiciary. In the Czech Republic, the energy supplier and

nuclear power plant operator ČEZ has submitted an

application for the construction of two additional nuclear

power plant units at the Dukovany site in 2020. And in the

Netherlands, the parliament approved a motion to examine

the market options for nuclear power this September.

Christopher Weßelmann

– Editor in Chief –

467

EDITORIAL

Editorial

After Corona with Nuclear Energy – For People and Employment in the EU


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

EDITORIAL 468

Nach Corona mit Kernenergie – für Menschen

und Beschäftigung in der EU

Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser, der Corona-Virus und seine unmittelbaren und mittelbaren Folgen und Auswirkungen begleiten uns

weiterhin. Niemand kann aktuell sagen, wann es in unserem Alltagsleben wieder eine Normalität wie vor Corona geben wird. Dennoch

kann, ja muss jetzt über die Zeit nach der Krise vorausgedacht werden, und dies betrifft auch die Energieversorgung und die Kernenergie.

Zwar hatte Corona, bedingt durch deutlich weniger Wirtschaftsaktivitäten,

einen Einfluss auf den Energie- und Strombedarf, er sank

in einzelnen Staaten teilweise um fast 30 %, dies war aber ein nur

temporärer Effekt des umfassenden Lockdowns und als Beispiel in

China liegen Energie- und Stromverbrauch aktuell wieder auf

Vorjahresniveau. Auch ein Blick auf die längerfristige Entwicklung

zeigt das nüchterne Bild, dass die weiterhin stetig steigende Weltbevölkerung

und eine bessere Versorgung zukünftig den Energiebedarf

ansteigen lassen. Studien der Internationalen Energieagentur

(IEA), der BP Energy Outlook, Referenzszenarien der U.S. Energy

Administration oder ExxonMobil zeigen dies deutlich auf. Ein Blick

auf die Entwicklung beim Strombedarf verweist zudem auf das

augenscheinliche Paradoxon, dass der eher emissionsbehaftete

Strom bedarf überproportional wachsen wird. Auf den zweiten Blick

von Zahlen und Strategien verbirgt sich dahinter allerdings das

komplexe Thema der Sektorenkopplung, bei der emissionsarme

Primär energien über die Stromerzeugung in anderen Sektoren

stärker emissionslastige Energien verdrängen werden.

Im Frühjahr dieses Jahres, etwas im medialen Schatten der sich

anbahnenden Folgen durch Corona, veröffentlichte die Europäische

Kommission ihre lang erwartete Industriestrategie. Sie zielt im Kern

in einer Zeit sich weiter deutlich verschiebender geopolitischer

Gewichte und einem sich noch verstärkenden wirtschaftlichen

Wettbewerb – vor allem mit Staaten Asiens – auf eine Stärkung der

Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und technologischen Unabhängigkeit Europas

ab. Ob diese Strategie Erfolg haben wird, hängt auch davon ab, ob

diese Ziele in Einklang mit anderen, d. h. vor allem dem Ziel der

Klimaneutralität, gebracht werden können.

Hier kann die Kernenergie eine Schlüsselrolle übernehmen.

Eine saubere Energieversorgung und der Erhalt der eigenen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit

Europas sind mit der Kernenergie zu erreichen

und folgen den Zielen der EU-Industriestrategie. Eine, wie in der

Industrie strategie gefordert, sichere Versorgung mit Elektrizität,

unabhängig von Uhrzeit und Wetter, kohlenstoffarm und zu wettbewerbsfähigen

Preisen kann mit Kernenergie gewährleistet werden.

Die Rolle der Kernenergie in der Energieversorgung der EU muss

als strategischer Beitrag anerkannt werden mit entsprechenden

Schlussfolgerungen: Die aktuell in der EU in Betrieb befindlichen

109 Kernkraftwerke mit einer Gesamtnettoleistung von 109.570 MW

repräsentieren zwar „nur“ rund 9,5 % der Stromerzeugungskapazität,

liefern aber aufgrund ihrer sehr hohen Ver fügbarkeit

rund 30 % des Strombedarfs. Bei der emissionsarmen Erzeugung

liegt der Anteil bei sogar 50 %.

Neben ihrer Verlässlichkeit haben die Kernkraftwerke die Fähigkeit,

die Stromnetzstabilität durch Flexibilität zu unterstützen, ja zu

gewährleisten. Keine andere emissionsarme Technologie hat ein so

hohes Flexibilitätspotenzial wie die Kernenergie, d. h. Kernkraftwerke

können viel mehr Leistung in kurzer Zeit ins Netz einspeisen,

wenn andere Erzeuger nicht verfügbar sind, oder im umgekehrten

Fall auch in kurzer Zeit auf niedrige Last herunter gefahren werden,

um „Platz im Netz“ für volatile Erzeugung bereit zu stellen.

Darüber hinaus hat die Kernenergie für die EU aber auch weitere

wirtschaftliche und strategische Bedeutung. Die europäische

Nuklearindustrie sichert aktuell rund 1 Millionen subventionsfreie

Arbeitsplätze und erwirtschaftet ein Bruttoinlandsprodukt von

450 Milliarden Euro. Der Sektor bietet eine hohe Fachkompetenz,

nach einem Bericht von Deloitte sind 47 % der Arbeitsplätze hoch

qualifiziert, und sowohl Know-how als auch erforderliche Ressourcen

sind im Wesentlichen in der EU angesiedelt. Zudem umfasst die

Kernenergie nicht nur die Stromerzeugung in den Anlagen selbst,

sondern auch ein qualifiziertes Netzwerk, beginnend mit der Kernbrennstoffversorgung

und -entsorgung über Regulierungsbehörden,

Hersteller, Dienstleister, die Forschung & Entwicklung und liefert

Spin-off für Anwendungen in Industrie, Landwirtschaft und Medizin.

Dabei ist noch als ganz wesentlich anzumerken, dass die Kernenergie

in einem verlässlichen regulatorischen Umfeld im – freien –

Markt wettbewerbsfähig ist und so günstige Rahmenbedingungen für

alle Verbraucher, private und Industrie liefert. Hier wiegen die Vorteile

preisgünstiger Energie fast noch stärker als bei der Erzeugung

selbst, da die gesamte Kette nach der Versorgung profitiert.

Im Rahmen ihrer Industriestrategie muss die Europäische Kommission

bestrebt sein, Industrien zu identifizieren, die insgesamt

strategisch für Europa sind. Die Vorteile der Kernenergie in den

Bereichen Emissionsminderung, Preiswürdigkeit und Beschäftigung

müssen anerkannt werden, damit sie den Wandel der Energieversorgung

in Europa mit begleitet. Ein politischer Rahmen muss dazu in

Europa gegeben sein und geschaffen werden – jenseits ideologischer

Abgrenzungen oder wirtschaftlicher Partikularinteressen –, der auch

die unvoreingenommene politische Akzeptanz für die Kernenergie

mit einschließt. Wenn sich Staaten der EU für die Kernenergienutzung

entscheiden, muss dies in der übrigen EU akzeptiert werden,

wie auch Kernenergie nutzende Staaten ein Nein zur Kernenergie

akzeptieren.

Angesichts der durch die Maßnahmen von EU und den Mitgliedsstaaten

zur Abfederung bzw. Überwindung der wirtschaftlichen

Folgen der Corona-Krise eingeleiteten Hilf- und Förderprogramme

freigesetzten oder angekündigten Finanzmittel sei noch auf einen

Punkt verwiesen: Auch diese Mittel lassen sich nur einmal ausgeben.

Natürlich lässt sich damit auch eine beliebige Energieversorgung

aufbauen. Doch wie es die EU schon in ihrem Eingangsstatement

festgestellt hat, befinden wir uns in einem verschärften globalen

Umfeld und Wettbewerb. Zu starke Gewichte auf heute noch nicht

wettbewerbsfähige Technologien können dann ihre Zukunft eher

versperren, als ihnen den Weg in die Zukunft öffnen. Dies gilt auch

und im Besonderen in der Energieversorgung. Mit der Kernenergie

in Europa wissen wir kommerziell seit 1956, in Deutschland seit

1960 umzugehen. Nutzen wir die Erfahrungen für ein zukunftsfähiges

Europa, das mit Vernunft und Innovationen eine weiterhin

lebenswerte Zukunft gestaltet. Das dies nicht reines Wunschdenken

ist, zeigen europäische Realitäten: Das Kernkraftwerkszubauprojekt

Paks 5 & 6 in Ungarn ist konkret, die zwei 1200-MW-Blöcke sollen in

den Jahren 2025 und 2026 den Betrieb aufnehmen. Einwendungen

gegen Planung und Bau via EU-Rechtsnormen wurden von der

EU-Justiz abgewiesen. In der Tschechischen Republik hat der

Energieversorger und Kernkraftwerksbetreiber ČEZ den Antrag auf

Errichtung von zwei weiteren Kernkraftwerksblöcken am Standort

Dukovany in 2020 eingereicht. Und in den Niederlanden hat das

Parlament einem Antrag auf Prüfung der Marktoptionen der Kernenergie

in diesem September zugestimmt.

Christopher Weßelmann

– Chefredakteur –

Editorial

After Corona with Nuclear Energy – For People and Employment in the EU


Kommunikation und

Training für Kerntechnik

Suchen Sie die passende Weiter bildungs maßnahme im Bereich Kerntechnik?

Wählen Sie aus folgenden Themen: Dozent/in Termin/e Ort

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3 Rückbau und Strahlenschutz

In Kooperation mit dem TÜV SÜD Energietechnik GmbH Baden-Württemberg:

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Das Strahlenschutzrecht und

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Berlin

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3 Wissenstransfer und Veränderungsmanagement

Veränderungsprozesse gestalten –

Herausforderungen meistern, Beteiligte gewinnen

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Methoden und praktische Anwendung

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03.03. - 04.03.2021 Berlin

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

470

Issue 10 | 2020

October

CONTENTS

Incorrect text passages were

published in the Operating

Results in issue 8/9 Vol. 65.

Contents

Editorial

After Corona with Nuclear Energy –

For People and Employment in the EU E/G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .467

The corrected report

can be found online:

www.kernd.de/kernd/presse/

pressemitteilungen/

Our apologies!

Cover:

View looking down on Vogtle Unit 3

containment vessel. A power reactor of

1,117 MWe net capacity avoids yearly

CO 2 -emissions amounting to about

10 million (10 6 ) tonnes, during the lifetime

of 60 years 600 million (10 6 ) tonnes

(this corresponds to approx. the yearly total

CO 2 -emissions of the private transport sector in

the EU). ©2020 Georgia Power Company.

Inside Nuclear with NucNet

‘Tumult and Challenge’ as the US Nuclear Energy

Faces Fight to Prosper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472

Did you know...? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .473

Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .474

Feature | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power

Electrifying Transport – A Global Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475

Spotlight on Nuclear Law

A Judgement Regarding Tihange G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481

Energy Policy, Economy and Law

Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy –

How Green Is Nuclear? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482

Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement . . . . . . .485

Environment and Safety

Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489

Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe, Economical and Always Available

to Protect the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492

Are They Ready for Operation? How to Assess

the Control Room System of a New NPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498

Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection in I&C Networks:

Strategic Preparation for the Advent of Information Hiding

based Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504

Research and Innovation

Simulation of Selected BETA Tests

with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS . . . . . . . . . . 509

Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems

with Open Source Code OpenFOAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany

Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518

Report

Nuclear Power World Report 2019. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .521

KTG Inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .525

News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .526

Nuclear Today

Nuclear has a Clear Advantage

on the Post-Pandemic Climate Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530

G

E/G

= German

= English/German

Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513

Contents


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Feature

Major Trends in Energy Policy

and Nuclear Power

471

CONTENTS

475 Electrifying Transport – A Global Perspective

Stefan Ulreich

Energy Policy, Economy and Law

482 Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy –

How Green Is Nuclear?

Nicolas Wendler

485 Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

Henrique Schneider

Environment and Safety

489 Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy

James Conca and Judith Wright

492 Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe, Economical and Always Available

to Protect the Environment

Peter Dyck

498 Are They Ready for Operation?

How to Assess the Control Room System of a New NPP

Rainer Miller, Rodney Leitner, Sina Gierig and Harald Kolrep

Report

521 Nuclear Power World Report 2019

Contents


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

472

INSIDE NUCLEAR WITH NUCNET

‘Tumult and Challenge’ as the US

Nuclear Energy Faces Fight to Prosper

Countries are turning to China and Russia while the US ‘sits on the sidelines’

The US wants to build nuclear power plants that will work on the Moon and Mars, and has put out

a request for ideas from the private sector on how to build a fission surface power system that could

allow humans to live for long periods in harsh space environments.

“The prospect of deploying an advanced reactor to the

lunar surface is as exciting as it is challenging, and

partnering with the most forward-thinking companies in

the private sector and national laboratory system will help

us get there,” said Mr John Wagner, associate laboratory

director of Idaho National Laboratory’s nuclear science

and technology directorate.

While the nuclear industry as a whole remains bullish

about prospects for the next generation of reactors – plants

that can be deployed in space, for the military and in

remote areas – uncertainty surrounds the long-term future

of the traditional, commercial nuclear industry

The US has the largest number of nuclear plants in the

world – 95 in commercial operation providing 20 % of its

electricity generation – but its leadership in the sector is

said by many to be declining as efforts to build a new

generation of large reactors have been plagued by

problems, and aging plants have been retired or closed in

the face of economic, market, and financial pressures.

Only two commercial nuclear plants are under construction

in the US, at Vogtle in Georgia (this compares to 11 in

China and four in Russia). The author of a think-tank report

told NucNet these plants, both Westinghouse AP1000s,

could become the last large-capacity reactors to be built in

the US, with small modular reactors and other Generation

IV advanced reactors taking over as key technologies.

Mr William Magwood, director-general of the Parisbased

Nuclear Energy Agency, said cost is one of the issues

driving the market to consider smaller reactors. He said

compe tition in the nuclear industry – including from China

and Russia – is leading to more choice in terms of reactor

technology, but financing and contract terms are often the

determining issue for many customers, with SMRs

attracting attention because of their affordability, Competition

in the overseas new-build sector from state-backed

corporations in China and Russia is often cited by the

industry as a major impediment to its potential. Energy

secretary Mr Dan Brouillette said many countries of

geopoli tical importance are pursuing nuclear energy for

their domestic electricity needs. Those countries are largely

turning to Chinese and Russian state-owned enterprises for

the technological support needed to build reactors, while

the US sits on the sidelines. “In effect, China and Russia are

gaining geopolitical leverage by exporting nuclear expertise

and building 100-year bilateral relationships,” he said.

There are two elements to the industry’s perceived

woes: an inability to build new, large-megawatt nuclear

plants at home because financing for nuclear can be difficult

to secure; and an inability to compete abroad because

China and Russia can offer project terms backed by their

respective governments. The problem with financing new

nuclear, in essence, is that payback periods are notoriously

long and uncertain. Government-backed enterprises in

China and Russia are in a better position than US private

enterprise to mitigate any uncertainties.

The industry has long argued that electricity markets in

the US should be reformed to recognise the ability of

traditional baseload generation with onsite fuel supplies –

including nuclear power plants – to provide grid resiliency

during extreme events like hurricanes or extreme winter

weather.

A report by the Washington-based think-tank the

Atlantic Council issued a stark warning, arguing that the

US nuclear energy industry is facing a crisis that the Trump

administration must immediately address.

The good news is that the Trump administration recognises

the problem, supports nuclear energy, and sees new

generation nuclear technology such as small modular

reactors as a key part of its energy strategy. The Nuclear

Fuel Working Group report, requested by Mr Trump and

published in April, proposes a series of actions to improve

nuclear power as a baseload source of energy, revive the

uranium industry strengthen American technology

supremacy, and drive US exports of advanced nuclear

reactors and fuel technology.

Last month, in a move welcomed by the nuclear

industry as a boost for export opportunities, the US

International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)

announced it will lift its legacy prohibition on funding

nuclear energy projects, recognising the vast energy needs

of developing countries and the potential of new and

advanced technologies such as small modular reactors and

microreactors in these markets.

Four US nuclear plants have shut down since 2018 (six

since 2013) and at least five more are slated to retire over

the next five years, resulting in a total loss since 2013 of

around 10 GW of generation from the grid.

The Washington-based Nuclear Energy Institute, which

represents the nuclear industry in the US, said the US

electricity grid is enduring “unprecedented tumult and

challenge” because of the loss of thousands and thousands

of megawatts of carbon-free, fuel-secure generation that

nuclear plants represent.

Closing nuclear plants makes electricity prices go up

and is putting emissions reduction targets hopelessly out

of reach, NEI president and chief executive officer Maria

Korsnick said.

The Atlantic Council said the decline of the nuclear

power industry in the US is “an important policy problem”

that is not receiving the attention it deserves. The report

was made public in March 2018, in the same week that

Ohio-based utility FirstEnergy announced plans to permanently

shut down its three nuclear power stations –

Davis-Besse, Perry and Beaver Valley – within the next

three years without some kind of state or federal relief.

Author

NucNet – The Independent Global Nuclear News Agency

Editor responsible for this story: David Dalton

Avenue des Arts 56 2/C

1000 Bruxelles, Belgium

www.nucnet.org

Inside Nuclear with NucNet

‘Tumult and Challenge’ as the US Nuclear Energy Faces Fight to Prosper


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Did you know...?

No Harm to the Environment – Progress and Solutions

in the Management of High-level Radioactive Waste

Recently the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD published

the Report Radioactive Waste Management 2020 with the title

“Management and Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste:

Global Progress and Solutions”. The report is characterized by the

NEA as a policy-level compendium of the current status of

knowledge, technological developments, safety standards, rules

and requirements applicable to evaluating the feasibility of DGRs

(=Deep Geological Repositories). It summarises how the international

scientific community has intensively collaborated to bring

sound arguments and evidence into the debate that SNF/HLW

will not cause harm to either humans or the environment. In this

sense the report relates directly to the current European policy

debate about the evaluation of nuclear energy as a sustainable

low-carbon contributor to the mitigation of climate change or as

harmful to the environment as was pointed out by the NEA

Director- General, Mr William D. Magwood, IV during a NEAwebinar.

(see also the article “Sustainable Finance Initiative of

the EU and Taxonomy – How green is Nuclear?” in this issue of

atw)

In its arguments the NEA points to the long tradition of radiation

protection dating back to the creation of the International

Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), an independent

nongovernmental organisation in 1928 to advance the science of

radiological protection and some 70 year of scientific investigation

and research concerning nuclear waste management. The

ICRP (1998) recommends a maximum radiation exposure of not

more than 0.3 mSv per year for people living near the DGR

( Germany requires 0.1 mSv for unlikely and 0.01 mSv for likely

developments of the DGR). The annual global average dose from

natural background radiation is 2.4 mSv. Concerning the EU/

Euratom, the NEA reminds of the first Basic Safety Standard (BSS)

Directive that was adopted in 1959 to ensure the highest possible

protection of workers and members of the public from exposure

to ionising radiation. The Directive has been amended regularly

and the most recent BSS Directive was adopted in 2014. Concerning

management of nuclear waste at EU level, the Euratom

Waste Directive (Council Directive 2011/70/ EURATOM of 19 July

2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible

and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste) refers

to the Euratom Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection.

Besides regulation the report shows that from the early days

of commercial nuclear power some 70 years ago, the nuclear

sector has responsibly addressed the life cycle of its materials and

their impacts, including the use of advanced technology for waste

management. In all cases i.e. whether spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is

recycled or not, the final disposal of the high-level radioactive

waste (HLW) has been a matter requiring attention. Policy makers

and scientists at the national and international level have been

proposing, studying and implementing the safe disposal of SNF/

HLW. The NEA report demonstrates that the scientific consensus

today, that has developed for more than a half century, is that

DGRs are a safe and effective approach to permanently dispose

of SNF/HLW. Independent national regulators have endorsed

their effectiveness to isolate SNF/HLW from humans and the

environment and the safety principles and technological solutions

for the long-term management of SNF/HLW are well established.

The NEA also points out that the effective and decades long

implementation of safe interim storage in respect of all regulatory

requirements concerning radiation protection, safety, security

and non-proliferation has granted experts the time necessary to

develop robust technical solutions within a democratic and

transparent decision-making process for the final management

of SNF/HLW without the need to rush to disposal. To this end

underground research laboratories (URL) have been constructed

and operated and in situ experiments performed and replicated

in many locations. As a result, there is now a robust basis for the

design and constructability of safe DGRs. The accumulated

scientific results, technological evidence and safety demonstrations

have been presented openly and were critically reviewed by

internationally recognised experts to reach the current level of

maturity. Below you can find a table showing the timeline for

countries further along in the DGR process for SNF/HLW.

Source:

Radioactive Waste

Management 2020

Management and

Disposal of High-Level

Radioactive Waste:

Global Progress and

Solutions, OECD 2020,

NEA No. 7532

For further details

please contact:

Nicolas Wendler

KernD

Robert-Koch-Platz 4

10115 Berlin

Germany

E-mail: presse@

KernD.de

www.KernD.de

DID YOU EDITORIAL KNOW...?

473

Timeline for countries further along in the Deep Geological Repositories (DGR) process

Country Feasibility and

site investigations

begin

Site selected

Begin construction

of underground

Rock Laboratory

Application

submitted

Construction

license

granted

Construction

begin

Total years

prior to

application

Projected

operational

period

Finland 1983 2000 2004 2012 2015 2016 29 100 years

France 1991 1998 2000 2021 (estimate) 2022 (estimate) 30 100 years

Sweden 1976 2009 1990 (Äspö) 2011 Early 2020s

(estimate)

United States

(Yucca)

United States

(WIPP)

1982 1987 1993 (Exploratory

Studies Facility)

34 45 years (routine

operation)

2008 2048 (estimate) 28 100 years or

longer

1955 1974 1979 1981 24 35 years

China 1985 2018 2020 2041 (estimate)

Canada 1978 2023 (estimate) 1982 (AECL) 2028 (estimate) 2032 (estimate) 50 40 years or more

Germany 1965 2031 (estimate) 1986 (Gorleben)

Switzerland 1978 2022 (estimate) 1984 (Grimsel)

1996 (Mont Terri)

Japan 1976 2027 (estimate) 2002 (Mizunami URL)

2005 (Horonobe URL)

2024 (estimate) 2031 (estimate) 46 ~ 30 years

~ 50 years

Did you know...?


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

474

Calendar

2020

This is not a full list. Dates are subject to change.

Please check the listed websites for updates.

CALENDAR

Virtual Meeting 04.11. – 06.11.2020

The Power & Electricity World Africa 2020.

Terrapinn, www.terrapinn.com

08.11. – 12.11.2020

Advancing Geological Repositories

from Concept to Operation. Helsinki, Finland,

OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, www.oecd-nea.org

Virtual Meeting 09.11. – 20.11.2020

International Conference on Radiation Safety:

Improving Radiation Protection in Practice.

IAEA, www.iaea.org

Virtual Meeting 15.11. – 19.11.2020

ANS Winter Meeting and Technology of Fusion

Energy (TOFE 2020). American Nuclear Society,

www.ans.org

18.11. – 19.11.2020

INSC — International Nuclear Supply Chain

Symposium. Munich, Germany, TÜV SÜD,

www.tuvsud.com

23.11. – 25.11.2020

KELI 2020 – Conference for Electrical Engineering,

I&C and IT in generation plants. Bremen, Germany,

VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org

24.11. – 26.11.2020

ICOND 2020 – 9 th International Conference on

Nuclear Decommissioning. Aachen, Germany,

AiNT, www.icond.de

30.11. – 02.12.2020

European Power Strategy & Systems Summit.

Prague, Czech Republic, European Power

Generation, www.europeanpowergeneration.eu

Virtual Meeting 07.12. – 10.12.2020

SAMMI 2020 – Specialist Workshop on Advanced

Measurement Method and Instrumentation

for enhancing Severe Accident Management in

an NPP addressing Emergency, Stabilization and

Long-term Recovery Phases. NEA, www.sammi-2020.org

03.03. – 04.03.2021

Maintenance in Power Plants 2021. Karlsruhe,

Germany, VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org

07.03. – 11.03.2021

WM2021 – Waste Management Symposia.

Phoenix, Arizona, USA, X-CD Technologies,

www.wmsym.org

16.03. – 18.03.2021

EURAD 1 st Annual Event. www.ejp-eurad.eu

17.03. – 19.03.2021

KONTEC 2021 – 15 th International Symposium

“Conditioning of Radioactive Operational &

Decommissioning Wastes”. Dresden, Germany,

atm, www.kontec-symposium.de

23.03. – 26.03.2021

7 th International Conference on Education and

Training in Radiation Protection. Groningen,

Netherlands, FuseNet, www.etrap.net

30.03. – 01.04.2021

PowerGen International. Orlando, Florida, USA,

Clarion Events, www.powergen.com

26.04. – 27.04.2021

AtomExpo 2021. Sochi, Russia, Rosatom,

http://2021.atomexpo.ru/en/

26.04. – 27.04.2021

COP26 – UN Climate Change Conference.

Glascow, Scotland, www.ukcop26.org

26.04. – 30.04.2021

European Nuclear Young Generation Forum

(ENYGF). Tarragona, Spain, ENYGF, www.enygf.org

Postponed to 03.05. – 07.05.2021

ATALANTE 202(0)1. Nimes, France, CEA + Geniors,

www.atalante2020.org

Postponed to 10.05. – 15.05.2021

FEC 2020 – 28 th IAEA Fusion Energy Conference.

Nice, France, IAEA, www.iaea.org

Postponed to 30.08. – 03.09.2021

International Conference on Operational Safety

of Nuclear Power Plants. Beijing, China, IAEA,

www.iaea.org

Postponed to 08.09. – 10.09.2021

3 rd International Conference on Concrete

Sustainability. Prague, Czech Republic, fib,

www.fibiccs.org

08.09. – 10.09.2021

World Nuclear Association Symposium 2021.

London, UK, WNA, www.wna-symposium.org

27.09. – 01.10.2021

NPC 2021 International Conference on Nuclear

Plant Chemistry. Antibes, France, SFEN Société

Française d’Energie Nucléaire,

www.sfen-npc2021.org

Postponed to 07.09. – 10.09.2021

International Forum on Enhancing a Sustainable

Nuclear Supply Chain. Helsinki, Finland, Foratom,

https://events.foratom.org/mstf2020/

Postponed to 30.11. – 02.12.2021

Enlit (former European Utility Week and

POWERGEN Europe). Milano, Italy,

www.powergeneurope.com

Postponed to 2021

The Frédéric Joliot/Otto Hahn Summer School

on Nuclear Reactors “Physics, Fuels and Systems”.

Aix-en-Provence, France, CEA & KIT, www.fjohss.eu

Postponed to 2021

INDEX 2020: International Nuclear Digital

Experience. Paris, France, SFEN,

www.sfen-index2020.org

Postponed to 2021

4 th CORDEL Regional Workshop – Harmonization

to support the operation and new build of NPPs

including SMR. Lyon, France, World Nuclear

Association, www.events.foratom.org

08.12. – 10.12.2020

World Nuclear Exhibition 2020. Paris Nord

Villepinte, France, Gifen,

www.world-nuclear-exhibition.com

Virtual Meeting 17.12. – 18.12.2020

ICNESPP 2020 – 14 th International Conference on

Nuclear Engineering Systems and Power Plants.

WASET, www.waset.org

18.05. – 20.05.2021

Power Uzbekistan 2021 – 15 th Anniversary

International Exhibition on Energy.

Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Iteca Exhibitions,

www.power-uzbekistan.uz

Postponed to 30.05. – 05.06.2021

BEPU2020 – Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty International

Conference, Giardini Naxos. Sicily, Italy,

NINE, www.nineeng.com

2022

2021

24.02. – 26.02.2021

International Power Summit 2021.

Arena International Events Group,

www.arena-international.com

Postponed to 31.05. – 04.06.2021

20 th WCNDT – World Conference on

Non-Destructive Testing. Incheon, Korea,

The Korean Society of Nondestructive Testing,

www.wcndt2020.com

Postponed to 02.06. – 04.06.2021

HTR2020 – 10 th International Conference

on High Temperature Reactor Technology.

Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Indonesian Nuclear Society,

www.htr2020.org

KERNTECHNIK 2022.

Germany, KernD and KTG,

www.kerntechnik.com

Calendar


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Electrifying Transport –

A Global Perspective

Stefan Ulreich

1 Introduction The Paris Agreement aims to achieve climate neutrality i.e. a balance between the

anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and GHG sinks by the mid of this century. Since energy consumption

is responsible for roughly three quarters of the global GHG emissions, there has always been a strong focus on the

related GHG sources. The focus on the climate debate so far has been on electricity generation, but in the last years,

also the future mobility is gaining increasing attention 1 .

The main technology options to achieve climate neutrality

in the transport sector are electrification (electro-mobility,

fuel cells or e-fuels i.e. liquid or gaseous synthetic fuels

produced with electricity) and biomass. The electrification

route is connected with power consumption, i.e. it will

contribute to the Paris climate goal by using climateneutral

electricity production. A third option to achieve

climate-neutral fuels is the combination of classic fossil

fuels with carbon dioxide removal technologies (see

Figure 1).

Apart from technological solutions, also behavioural

changes can induce a reduction of mobility-related

emissions e.g. by using public transport, changes in

global supply chains, new work approaches and digital

communication. However, in the end, this will reduce the

demand for transport, but still necessitates the development

of climate-neutral transport technologies.

2 Transport – current situation

Transport-related CO 2 emissions (in total 8.1 Gt) have a

share of 21 % of the global GHG emissions in 2018. Since

1990 they increased by 77 %. The top-20 transport

emitters incl. International Aviation and International

Shipping are responsible for 82 % of the global transport

emissions. The three biggest transport emitters in 2018

were the United States (1.8 Gt), China (0.94 Gt) and

India (0.29 Gt). The three biggest relative increases in

transport emissions since 1990 took place in China

(780 %), Indonesia (374 %) and India (348 %) 2 .

In 2018, transport-related energy consumption has a

share of 29 % of the global energy consumption (the latter

is 9,938 Mtoe resp. 115,579 TWh resp. 416,104 PJ) 3 . For

comparison, the global electricity consumption in 2018

was 22,135 TWh globally (i.e. 19 % of the global energy

consumption). This clearly indicates the challenge of

electrifying transport as a whole, though for a rigorous

comparison the efficiencies of the respective transport

fuel and the corresponding engines need to be taken

into account. The IPCC mentions in their report an

overall efficiency for mobility of 32 % globally 4 , i.e. for

35,000 TWh energy input a mechanical energy of

11,200 TWh would result. Consequently, for engines with

higher efficiency, the total demand for energy (including

losses) would also decrease tremendously.

| Fig. 1.

Electrification is part of the solution for climate-neutral transport. This does not only include

electro-mobility, but also the production of synthetic fuels using climate-neutral electricity.

The most common power trains are on the right side.

Fossil fuels dominate the fuel mix of global transport

heavily 5 . The current contribution of electricity to transport

globally is less than 2 %.

Transport shows a higher overall energy use for

passengers (60.7 % of total energy consumption for

transport) in contrast to freight (39.3 %). For the modes of

transport, the global picture shows that the light-duty

vehicles are responsible for almost three quarters of the

passenger related energy consumption (72.1 %), air

transport for 16.9 %, bus for 6.3 %, rail for 1.9 % and

2/3-wheeler for 2.7 %. Concerning freight, truck transport

(heavy, medium and light) is responsible for 69.6 % of the

freight related energy consumption, marine for 18.1 % and

rail for 5.5 %.

Transport is very important for society. Firstly, for

economic reasons: transport enables the extension of

value chains across the globe and facilitates international

trade. Secondly, private transport is a human right: Article

13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts

the freedom of movement. Consequently, finding climatefriendly

solutions for transport is of utmost importance in

order to maintain these benefits for human society in a

sustainable way.

475

FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER

1 Weltenergierat Deutschland, Energy for Germany 2020 (Pathways to Climate Neutrality) and Energy for Germany 2018 (Climate Protection in Road Traffic)

2 Calculations based on figures by Crippa, M., Oreggioni, G., Guizzardi, D., Muntean, M., Schaaf, E., Lo Vullo, E., Solazzo, E., Monforti-Ferrario, F., Olivier, J.G.J., Vignati, E., Fossil CO 2 and GHG

emissions of all world countries – 2019 Report, EUR 29849 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019, ISBN 978-92-76-11100-9, doi:10.2760/687800, JRC117610.

3 IEA, World energy balances 2020: Overview, Paris, July 2020.

4 Sims R., R. Schaeffer, F. Creutzig, X. Cruz-Núñez, M. D’Agosto, D. Dimitriu, M. J. Figueroa Meza, L. Fulton, S. Kobayashi, O. Lah, A. McKinnon, P. Newman, M. Ouyang, J. J. Schauer, D. Sperling, and

G. Tiwari, 2014: Transport. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T.

Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

5 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2019 with projections to 2050, September 2019

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 476

| Fig. 2.

Transport-related CO 2 -emissions (2018; based on data by EDGAR).

3 Technology Options

3.1 Transport modes

The various transport modes need different technological

answers to become climate neutral. For light-duty vehicles

(LDVs) i.e. cars, sport-utility vehicles and even small trucks,

battery electric vehicles are one key technology. Furthermore,

fuel-cell electric vehicles and even the classic internal

combustion engine vehicle have the opportunity to become

part of the solution, provided the production of the fuel is

climate-neutral, as is the case with the so-called blue and

green hydrogen. Hence, carbon neutral LDV transport is

ensured by climate-neutral electricity production.

For the freight transport by trucks, ships and trains the

path to climate neutrality is less straightforward. Some

emission reduction will result from the use of biofuels for

trucks and ships and efficiency gains in parallel. A fuel

switch to electricity is a viable option for freight trains and

delivery trucks. Fully electric trucks could also work for a

major part of light and medium-duty trucks with typical

operational distances of up to 200 kilometres per day. For

heavy-duty trucks battery-electric solutions are developed

as well as alternative fuels e.g. hydrogen for fuel cells or

synthetic fuels (also called synfuels or e-fuels) for internal

combustion engines. With PtL-production (Power-to-

Liquid), climate-neutral electricity will then also be the

cornerstone for decarbonized freight transport.

For aviation, there are currently four technology

options under discussion: electric aircrafts, biofuels,

e-fuels and classic fossil fuels combined with carbondioxide-

removal (CDR) technologies. The further technological

development will decide about the winning

technologies and their contribution. Similarly, for international

maritime transport e-fuels and biofuels are

existing solution. In both cases, technical requirements of

the transport mode make e-fuels inevitable.

The driving force for alternative fuels in the transport

sector is no longer the fear, that the world will run out of

fossil fuels like oil and gas, but the requirements of the

Paris agreement to become climate-neutral by the mid of

this century. Apparently, not only electric vehicles will lead

to new demand for electricity by the future climate-neutral

transport – but also the e-fuels. Hence, it is instructive to

look at these fuels in more detail.

3.2 Synthetic fuels

Electrolysis of water produces hydrogen, sometimes called

e-hydrogen. The hydrogen can be used directly in both

gaseous and liquefied form. In motor vehicles, fuel cells

are used in combination with electric motors. Gaseous

hydrogen, which is stored in a pressure tank, is currently

used in cars.

With the so-called methanation the e-hydrogen and

carbon dioxide react to produce methane. Since natural

gas overwhelmingly consists of methane, it can be

completely substituted by e-methane – and the existing

infrastructure for natural gas (pipelines, LNG facilities)

can immediately be used. Since (fossil) natural gas already

serve as a transport fuel for trucks, busses and ships, there

is also the opportunity to blend the natural gas with

e-methane and reach the climate goals in a stepwise

process. Additionally, bio-methane is a second source for

climate-neutral methane. Given the already existing

international gas transport infrastructure, synthetic

methane would immediately allow international optimization

of its production – and increase the security of

supply by offering various sources.

The e-hydrogen can also serve as raw material for

methanol synthesis. Methanol is a fuel on its own or can be

blended with gasoline for internal combustion engine

vehicles. However, also fuel cells can work with methanol.

Methanol is one of the mostly produced organic chemicals

worldwide, i.e. there is also some transport infrastructure

present.

With the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis and the e-hydrogen

as raw material, any petroleum-based fuel can be produced

e.g. kerosene. In comparison with the use of e-hydrogen,

the Fischer-Tropsch fuels would be available for immediate

use in the current transport framework.

Further technologies are DME synthesis (Dimethyl

ether), OME synthesis (Oxymethylene ether) and other

oxygen-containing energy sources as dimethyl carbonate

(DMC) or methyl formate (MeFo).

It should be noted, that synfuels typically have a lower

energy density compared with their conventional fossil

equivalents. For OME it is roughly 50 %, i.e. double the

volume is needed. The production of e-fuels consumes

electricity. In the literature, a broad range of energy

consumption is given, depending on the used technology

and its current efficiency 6 .

Fuel Min Max

Hydrogen 1.23 1.72

Methane 1.54 2.00

Methanol 2.08 2.33

FT-fuels 1.55 2.78

OME 2.70 3.03

DME 1.96 2.22

| Tab. 1.

Electricity consumption in kWh per kWh produced fuel.

The production of synfuels costs additional amounts of

energy in comparison with a battery electric vehicle.

Additionally, the efficiency of internal combustion engines

is typically worse than fuel cells or electrical engines.

These arguments would clearly put EVs in favour. However,

using EVs necessitates regional electricity production

6 Source: FfE, Welche strombasierten Kraftstoffe sind im zukünftigen Energiesystem relevant? (6 th Feb 2019)

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

and grid transport, which often leads to challenges with

regards to social acceptance. Furthermore, it might also

make economic sense to produce the synfuels at sites not

only with high social acceptance for climate-neutral

electricity production but also with excellent conditions

e.g. with high full-load hours for wind or PV generation.

The overall production costs for imported synfuels might

then be lower than local electricity production.

Currently politics in many countries concentrate on

battery solutions for transport, since they view e-liquids

and e-gases as mainly important for the industry sector.

This might change over time, learning how realistic battery

solutions will be for all modes of transport and for all

countries.

Synthetic fuels could also become interesting for use as

fuel for power plants e.g. e-methane for CCGTs, if the goals

for climate-neutral power generation cannot be met in one

country or region due to e.g. missing social acceptance.

4 Global scenarios

4.1 World Energy Scenarios 2019

In its 2019 version of the World Energy Scenarios 7 , the

World Energy Council emphasized, that the total energy

demand for mobility is driven by the dynamic development

of population and GDP growth that is offset by

efficiency improvements. All three scenarios of the WEC –

with their names Unfinished Symphony, Modern Jazz and

Hard Rock – see a co-development of EVs, ICE efficiency,

ride sharing, autonomous vehicles and new modes of

transport is already fundamentally reshaping personal

transport demand. In the two scenarios Unfinished

Symphony and Modern Jazz the energy demand growth is

limited to 2040, based on the rapid price reduction of

EVs, achieving sales price parity with ICEs by 2030. This

development accelerates the penetration of EVs. Commercial

transportation will experience a decreasing energy

intensity due to more efficient engines and a rise in the

use of alternative fuels such as biofuels and hydrogen.

With these changes, by 2040 electricity and hydrogen

capture 10-16 % of total energy consumed by transport in

Unfinished Symphony and Modern Jazz.

The scenario Hard Rock differs notably in that the

weaker global policy coordination of fuel and efficiency

standards and limited technology transfer result in a much

slower uptake of EVs and alternative fuels. Consequently,

the transport sector experiences energy demand growth of

28 %, and oil remains the dominate fuel.

Hydrogen emerges in all three scenarios by 2040 to a

notable extent in the overall energy mix. This is driven by

excess renewable power generation in Modern Jazz or by

security of supply concerns in Hard Rock.

4.2 EIA International Energy Outlook 2019

The EIA reflects in their reference case current trends

especially concerning economic and demographic

development, but does not anticipate future technological

breakthroughs.

Demand for transportation grows in non-OECD

countries and is rather flat in OECD-countries. In non-

OECD, transportation energy demand increases by 77 %

from 2018 to 2050. In OECD countries, the interplay

between improving vehicle fuel efficiency and growing demand

result in a total projected transportation energy use

declining by 1 % from 2018 to 2050. Consequently, by

2050 non-OECD accounts for almost two-third of the

world’s transportation related energy use. Main driver in

non-OECD is the growth in passenger travel. The EIA

reference case starts with a transportation energy demand

of about 35,433 TWh (2018) and ends in 2050 with

49,001 TWh.

The share of transportation fuels from alternative

energy sources increases, but sill oil-based products

dominate the transport fuel mix: Within the transportation

sector, the use of refined petroleum and other liquid

fuels continues to increase through 2050, but its share

decreases from 94 % to about 82 % as alternative fuel use

slowly increases. The primary fuel for transportation is

motor gasoline (including additives as ethanol) and

accounts in 2050 for 32 % of the world’s transportationrelated

energy. Air travel demand continues to rise globally

leading to a doubling of jet fuel consumption from 2018 to

2050.

The fastest growing forms of transportation energy are

natural gas and electricity. The EIA scenario projects an

increase in OECD of LDVs from 3.5 million vehicles (2018)

to 169 million vehicles (2050) and in non-OECD from

2.2 million vehicles (2018) to 260 million vehicles (2050).

Consequently, the share of electricity used in transportation

almost triples, also due to higher electricity use for

rail transport. Nevertheless, transportation accounts for

less than 6 % of total delivered electricity consumption in

2050.

For comparison: the 2050 electricity consumption in

transport of 2,465 TWh is higher than the combined global

wind (1,429.6 TWh) and PV production (724.1 TWh) in

FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 477

| Fig. 3.

The fuel mix for transport in 2060 in the three world energy scenarios.

Also in 2060 fossil fuels will have in the optimistic scenario a high share

in the fuel mix.

| Fig. 4.

The scenario unfinished symphony shows the highest electricity share

for transport. Especially, after 2030 the economics for electric transport

solution improves substantially.

7 World Energy Council, World Energy Scenarios 2019 – Exploring Innovation Pathways to 2040 (London 2019)

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 478

2019 8 . Consequently, also the not very ambitious electrification

of transport in the EIA reference case would

necessitate stronger investments in renewable generation

in order to cover the transport demand by renewables.

Fuel 2018 in TWh Share in % 2050 in TWh Share in %

Motor gasoline 14,181 40.0 % 15,911 32.5 %

Diesel 12,717 35.9 % 13,532 27.6 %

Jet Fuel 3,740 10.6 % 8,616 17.6 %

Residual Fuel Oil 2,362 6.7 % 1,687 3.4 %

Natural Gas 1,583 4.5 % 6,536 13.3 %

Electricity 479 1.4 % 2,465 5.0 %

LPG 248 0.7 % 142 0.3 %

Other Liquids 122 0.3 % 112 0.2 %

Sum 35,433 100.0 % 49,001 100.0 %

| Tab. 2.

EIA reference case evolution of transport fuel consumption between 2018 and 2050.

4.3 BP Energy Outlook 2019

The BP Energy Outlook 2019 9 also emphasizes that the

efficiency gains limits the energy demand in a strongly

growing transport sector. The lion’s share of efficiency

gains will occur in road transport – both passenger and

freight – whereas the efficiency gains in maritime and air

transport are limited. Growth centre for transport in the

BP scenarios is Asia.

In the “Evolving transition”-scenario, oil continues to

be the dominating energy source declining from 94 % to

85 % by 2040. Electricity would provide around 5 % in

2040 (corresponding to 1,725 TWh). This corresponds to a

number of electric vehicles of around 350 million by 2040,

of which around 300 million are passenger cars i.e. 15 % of

all cars. Since electric vehicles will do shared-services

largely, around 24 % of passenger vehicle kilometres are

electric in 2040.

BP also developed a “Lower-carbon transport” scenario

including a large number of measures to reduce carbon

emissions, in order to address climate concerns. These

measures incentivize fuel switching towards electricity

leading to half of the reduction in emissions relative to the

“Evolving transition”-scenario. Due to these measures, the

electrification of vehicle kilometres will increase from

24 % to 37 %. This scenario clearly indicates that legislative

and regulatory activities can have an enormous positive

impact on electrification of transport.

4.4 Shell Sky Scenarios 10

One of the pioneers in scenario work is the oil major Shell.

In 2018, Shell published the Sky scenario illustrating a

pathway for society to achieve the goals of the Paris

Agreement. Transport also plays a key role in this scenario.

Sky describes a very rapid transition where more than half

of global car sales in 2030 are electric, and all passenger

car sales by 2050. Since the whole energy system in this

scenario is based on electricity, the global electricity

consumption will increase to roughly 100,000 TWh per

year. The transport sector in 2050 consumes 7,133 TWh

electricity.

4.5 IEA EV Outlook 2020 11

The IEA report mentioned that in 2010, globally only about

17,000 electric cars were present. However, this figure

increased to 7.2 million electric cars by 2019 – with almost

half of the electric cars in China. IEA considers two

scenarios: Stated Policies Scenario (SPS), incorporating

existing government policies, and the Sustainable

Development Scenario (SDS), which is fully compatible

with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Electric vehicles

play a crucial role to meet the climate goals and to address

local air pollution. Within SDS, the global electric vehicle

stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) increases by 36 %

annually, leading to 245 million vehicles in 2030 i.e. over

30 times above today’s level. Other than two/threewheelers,

growth is strongest for LDVs. The electricity

consumption connected with electric vehicles would be

1,000 TWh globally. In the SPS, the global electric vehicle

stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) reaches nearly

140 million vehicles by 2030 and accounts for 7 % of the

global vehicle fleet. This translates into an electricity

consumption of 550 TWh.

4.6 WEC PtX-roadmap

The Weltenergierat Deutschland addressed the international

aspects of PtX-technologies in a recent report 12 .

The report does not only consider the use of PtX for

transport, but also e.g. for heating and cooling or industry.

The report emphasizes the major advantage of a global

PtX market for synthetic liquid fuels (such as diesel,

heating oil, gasoline, kerosene, methanol) and synthetic

gases (such as hydrogen or methane): they can be fed into

the current energy system with existing infrastructure.

This might be especially interesting in densely populated

areas, where the regional demand for energy is rather

high, but the opportunities are limited to produce climatefriendly

electricity in this region. Consequently, energy

imports will pave the way for a climate-friendly transformation

of the energy system.

The report considers three different scenarios with a

low case (10,000 TWh annual global PtX demand),

reference case (20,000 TWh) and the high case

(41,000 TWh). A rough calculation shows, that an annual

production of 20,000 TWh requires 8,000 GW installed

PtX-capacity.

The biggest export potentials are attached to countries

like e.g. Russia, Canada, US, South Africa, Saudi Arabia or

China.

4.7 Wrap-up of the scenarios

The scenarios show that oil-based transport will have a

substantial share in the next decades, unless very strong

political action will be taken. Since most of the transport

growth will take place in non-OECD, the global picture will

be determined largely by Asia.

Note, that there could also be electricity consumption

due to PtX, which is not made visible in each scenario.

So far, the consideration of electro-mobility concentrated

on the demand for electric energy, not on the load. For

the latter it is assumed, that digitalisation will lead to

situations where simultaneous loading is avoided in order

to maintain the grid stability.

8 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020 (69 th edition), London 2020

9 BP Energy Outlook 2019 edition, London (2019)

10 Shell

11 IEA, Global EV Outlook 2020, Paris (June 2020)

12 Weltenergierat Deutschland, International Aspects of a Power-to-X roadmap,Berlin (2018)

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

| Fig. 5.

The share of electricity in the global transport fuel mix 2030 and 2040.

5 International Development

5.1 G20 Transport Task Group

Within the G20-countries, the Transport Task Group (TTG)

was established to reduce energy demand and environmental

impacts of transport and to enable best practice exchange

among the G20-countries about measures. A strong focus is

put on heavy-duty vehicles. A good overview of the activities

in the G20-countries has been published recently (giz et al.,

Towards Decarbonising Transport 2018 – A Stocktake on

Sectoral Ambition in the G20, November 2018). This

initiative clearly shows, that the transport sector is in the

beginning of a trans formation. Some of the G20-countries

already declared some political targets or published even

laws regarding future transport technologies. The G20

members account for 85 % of the world economy and 75 %

of global trade, consequently they are responsible the lion’s

share of global transport activities.

5.2 Clean Energy Ministerial EV30@30

The Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) initiated a deployment

campaign specifically for electric vehicles. The

initiative targets at least a share of 30 % EVs of the total

vehicle sales by 2030. This initiative concentrates on

electric passenger cars, light commercial vans, buses and

trucks – including BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs.

5.3 CORSIA

For air transport the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction

Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) is in place as

one mean to achieve the industry’s commitment to carbon

neutral growth from 2020 (“CNG2020”). Under CORSIA,

airlines will be required to buy carbon offsets to compensate

for their growth in GHG emissions. These offsets are

generated by carbon reduction projects in developing

countries. All airlines operating international flights are

mandated to monitor their fuel consumption emissions.

Of course, this is only a first step towards a fully carbonneutral

air transport.

5.4 Country examples

The various G20-countries consider various instruments in

order to trigger changes in the transport segment e.g.

technology standards for emissions and/or efficiencies, tax

incentives for purchasing the vehicle and/or the fuels,

technology bans, alternative fuels. For the recently often

announced ICE bans in various jurisdictions, it is still

possible, that this ban will be relaxed, provided synfuels or

biofuels will be used. Other countries have high shares of

biomass-based alternative fuels, making a phase-out of

ICEs rather unlikely – at least in the near and medium term.

| Fig. 6.

Global electricity consumption in transport for 2030 and 2040 in various scenarios.

p Argentina mainly concentrates on biofuels (mandatory

share of 12 %) and on incentivizing public transport.

The interest in electromobility is limited.

p Australia has currently no explicit national policy, but

state policies, that vary strongly. None of these state

policies has a general EV target. However, there is a

strong interest in exporting climate-neutral hydrogen

especially to the Asian markets e.g. Japan.

p Brazil – similar to Argentina – has no explicit electric

vehicle implementation goals, but a mandatory share of

27 % for bioethanol in gasoline and a mandatory share

of 12 % for biodiesel.

p Canada has set zero-emission vehicle targets of 100 %

of new vehicle sales by 2040 with intermediate steps of

10 % ZEV sales by 2025 and 30 % by 2030. In 2019, the

ZEV sales share was 3.5 %. An analysis by the Canadian

government assumes a higher electricity demand of

30 TWh annually by 2040. In parallel, also biomass will

contribute a similar amount of transport energy. Canada

is also a member of CEM EV30@30.

p China is a member of CEM EV30@30 Initiative.

Additionally, China has the target of 25 % sales of

PHEV, BEV, FCEV by 2025. A study by State Grid China

assumes 50 million EVs in China by 2030 with a total

electricity demand of 200 TWh. A recent report from

the Innovation Centre for Energy and Transportation

(iCET) made the first public proposal of a timeline for

the phaseout of petrol and diesel vehicles across China.

According to the Beijing- based thinktank, 2030 is

premature, but an entire phase out could be possible by

2040.

p France has declared a phase-out of ICEVs: no sales of

new cars using petrol and vans using fossil fuels by

2040. In December 2019, France published the Loi

d’Orientation des Mobilités. It aims carbon neutrality of

land transport by 2050. The ramping up of EV cars is

targeted with 500,000 PHEVs and 660,000 BEVs by

2023 and 1.8 million PHEVs and 3 million BEVs by

2028. France is also a member of CEM EV30@30. The

French grid operator RTE expects in a most ambitious

scenario 15.6 million EVs by 2035 with an annual

demand of 48 TWh consumption per year. RTE also

sees the potential benefit of roughly 40 GW storage

capacity by the EV batteries.

p Germany plans to cut its transport related emissions

by 40 % to 42 % by 2030 as part of the Climate Action

Programme 2030. The target is 7 to 10 millions BEVs

and FCEVs by 2030. The German government uses the

assumption, that 1 million EVs consumes 2 TWh of

electricity. Hence, the 2030 target would lead to an

electricity demand between 14 and 20 TWh. For

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 480

comparison, the challenge in air transport is higher: the

German government assumes an energy demand of

270 TWh electricity to produce the needed e-kerosene

based on the 2018 consumption.

p India is a member of CEM EV30@30 and has as such a

rather ambitious target. A variety of forecasts for India

exist ranging between 70 TWh and 100 TWh additional

electricity demand by 2030.

p Indonesia has some targets with regards to biofuel

content of sold fuels, that came under pressure due to

the Covid-19 induced price reductions of crude oil. For

electro-mobility the targets are very modest with a

targeted share of 1 % for EVs and 5 % for hybrids by

2050 and an intermediate target of 2,200 EVs by 2025.

p Italy targets 6 million electrically powered vehicles

including 4 million BEVs.

p Japan is also a member of CEM EV30@30. Japan has

set a target for “next-generation vehicles” to account for

50-70 % of new car sales by 2030, including a target of

20-30 % for BEVs and PHEVs.

p The Republic of Korea targets 430,000 BEVs and

67 000 FCEVs (2022) and a share of 33 % BEV and

FCEV of vehicle sales.

p Mexico is also a member of CEM EV30@30. The

electric vehicle sales should have a ratio of 50 % by

2040 and 100 % by 2050.

p Russia and Saudi Arabia have no dedicated targets for

electromobility.

p South Africa targets more than 2.9 million EVs by

2050. This should be achieved by requirements on the

total annual fleet changes.

p Turkey has no dedicated targets for electromobility.

p The United Kingdom is a member of CEM EV30@30.

However, the UK even wants to overachieve this target

and aims a share of 50 %-70 % of sales with electric

cars. By 2035, no sales of new ICEs will be allowed.

p The United States have no nation-wide programme for

promoting alternative transport fuels. However, there

are 11 federal states aiming for 3.3 million ZEVs (PHEV,

BEV, FCEV) by 2030. Additionally, biofuels play an

important role in the US to deliver lower carbon

emissions in the transport sector.

p Netherlands is also a member of CEM EV30@30. The

National Climate Agreement was announced in 2019

and includes a 30 % reduction in CO 2 emissions from

inland and continental transport. Besides its former

commitment to reach 100 % of ZEVs in new passenger

cars sales by 2030, the government introduced targets

for taxis and FCEVs. By 2025, half of the taxi fleet

should be ZEVs, and by the same year the ambitions

is to have 15,000 FCEVs on the streets, aiming for

300,000 FCEVs by 2030. By 2025, it aims for all new

public bus sales to be electric, preparing for a full stock

of electric buses in public systems by 2030. Further it

aims to deploy 3,000 FCEV heavy-duty vehicles. The

30 to 40 largest municipalities have to implement a

zero-emission zone for freight vehicles (LCVs and

HDVs) by 2025 and long-haul freight has to improve its

CO 2 intensity by 30 % by 2030.

p The Nordic Region (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,

Norway and Sweden) is quite ambitious with regards to

electrification of transport. Norway, Finland and

Sweden are members of the CEM EV30@30. The

estimated power demand to serve the 4 million electric

cars in 2030 is around 9 TWh for the Nordic region.

This is equivalent to about 2-3 % of estimated electricity

demand for the region in 2030. Norway even wants to

reach 100 % zero- emission-vehicle sales by 2025.

Sweden and Denmark want no sales of new diesel or

petrol cars by 2030. Also by 2030, Iceland will no longer

register new diesel and gasoline cars. Denmark targets

1 million electrified vehicles, Finland 250,000 BEVs,

PHEVs or FCEVs.

6 Conclusion

The transport sector needs electricity in order to

decarbonize – and especially carbon-free electricity.

Electricity might serve as primary fuel for transport e.g. for

battery electric vehicles or for catenary vehicles like trains

with overhead supply. Additionally, electricity might also

serve as primary fuel for the production of synfuels e.g.

e-kerosene in order to enter transport modes, where

battery solutions might lead to economic or technical

challenges. In total, this will lead to a higher demand for

climate-neutral electricity. A complete electrification of

transport will lead to an electricity demand in the

magnitude of order of today’s global electricity consumption

i.e. meeting the Paris climate targets will not only pose

the challenge to decarbonize the existing electricity

generation – but also to build the additionally needed

capacities in a climate-neutral manner. To produce the

needed amounts of electricity, the countries choose

various ways: some prefer renewable generation; other

will also consider nuclear power generation. Especially,

the latter solution might become interesting for the

export of hydrogen and other synfuels, provided that

the production costs are economically convincing in

comparison with green hydrogen and green synfuels and

that these imports will find acceptance by the importing

countries.

Author

Prof. Dr. Stefan Ulreich

ulreich@hochschule-bc.de

University of Applied Sciences Biberach

Karlstraße 6-11

88400 Biberach, Germany

Feature

Electrifying Transport – A Global Perspective ı Stefan Ulreich


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Ein Urteil zu Tihange

Christian Raetzke

Im Juniheft 2016 der atw hatte der Verfasser die Frage untersucht, welche rechtlichen Mittel es gibt,

den Betrieb eines (zu recht oder unrecht) für unsicher gehaltenen grenznahen Kernkraftwerks in einem Nachbarland

zu unterbinden. Anlass für diese Fragestellung gab die Kontroverse um die belgischen Reaktoren Tihange-2 und Doel-3.

In ihren Reaktordruckbehältern (RDB) waren Wasserstoffflocken entdeckt worden, die die Frage der strukturellen

Integrität aufwarfen. Nach eingehenden Prüfungen war die belgische Atomaufsicht FANC zu der Überzeugung gelangt,

dass die Sicherheit nicht beeinträchtigt sei, und hatte im November 2015 dem Wiederanfahren zugestimmt.

Wie im erwähnten Beitrag dargestellt, kann man auf der

völkerrechtlichen Ebene wohl nur dann einen Anspruch

auf Einstellung des Betriebes im Nachbarland geltend

machen, wenn eine konkrete Gefahr von dem Kernkraftwerk

ausgeht; bloße Bedenken hinsichtlich des Nach weises

von Sicherheitsreserven, wie sie seinerzeit die RSK in einer

Stellungnahme ausgedrückt hatte, dürften dafür nicht

ausreichen. Deshalb hatte die damalige Bundes umweltministerin

Hendricks auch nur eine Bitte an Belgien gerichtet,

den Betrieb weiter auszusetzen. Immerhin stimmte

Belgien einer engen Zusammenarbeit mit deutschen Experten

zu; im Dezember 2016 trat ein Abkommen zwischen

beiden Ländern in Kraft, mit dem die Deutsch-Belgische

Nuklearkommission gegründet wurde, die seither jährlich

tagt. Ohnehin besteht eine enge Zusammenarbeit, einschließlich

gegenseitiger peer reviews, im Rahmen von

Institutionen wie WENRA und ENSREG.

Neben dieser zwischenstaatlichen, also völkerrechtlichen

Schiene gab es noch eine weitere Option für eine

rechtliche Klärung, die auch genutzt wurde: die Städteregion

Aachen, die Länder NRW und Rheinland-Pfalz

sowie deutsche Privatpersonen beteiligten sich an einer

Klage, die vor dem Gericht erster Instanz (Bezirksgericht)

Brüssel erhoben wurde; weitere Kläger kamen aus den

Niederlanden, aus Luxemburg und aus Belgien selbst.

Beklagt waren der belgische Staat, die FANC und der

Betreiber Engie-Electrabel. Ziel war die Feststellung, dass

die Wiederanfahrzustimmung für Tihange-2 einen rechtswidrigen

Eingriff in die Rechte der Kläger darstellte und

dieser Eingriff durch die Anordnung der Betriebseinstellung

dieses Reaktors wieder rückgängig zu machen sei.

Hier ging es also nicht um Völkerrecht, sondern um die

Anwendung belgischen Rechts – mit der Besonderheit,

dass die Kläger eben auch aus den Nachbarländern kamen.

Aus Sicht eines deutschen Juristen verwundert der

Umstand, dass die Kläger den zivilen und nicht den Verwaltungsrechtsweg

beschritten; wie es scheint, rechneten

sich die Kläger auf diesem Wege größere Chancen aus.

Mit Urteil vom 3. September hat das Gericht nunmehr

die Klage abgewiesen. Die Zuständigkeit des Gerichts

und die Zulässigkeit der Klage wurden zwar bejaht; in

der Sache konnte sich das Gericht jedoch nicht dem

Vor bringen der Kläger anschließen, die Wiederanfahrzustimmung

sei rechtswidrig gewesen.

In seinem Urteil zeichnet das Gericht die Vorgänge

nach, insbesondere die Handlungen der FANC, die mehrere

Gutachten einholte und schließlich, auch nach Auseinandersetzung

mit vereinzelten Gegenmeinungen in den

Beratungsgremien, zu der Überzeugung gelangte, die

Wasserstoffflocken seien bei der Fertigung des RDB Anfang

der 1980er Jahre entstanden, hätten sich seither nicht

vergrößert und stellten insgesamt die Integrität des RDB im

Normalbetrieb und bei Störfällen nicht in Frage. Das

Gericht zieht das amerikanische ASME-Regelwerk heran,

das bei der Fertigung angewendet wurde und auch heute

noch nach belgischem Recht maßgeblich ist, und verweist

auf die dort niedergelegten Regeln zur Bewertung von

Fertigungsfehlern. Letztlich – so das Gericht – sei die

Einschätzung der FANC nachvollziehbar.

Den klägerischen Vortrag, dass auf deutscher Seite

(RSK) im April 2016 ein Vorbehalt gegen die wissenschaftliche

Validierung bestimmter Aussagen formuliert worden

sei und weiter bestehe, nimmt das Gericht nicht zum

Anlass, seine Bewertung zu ändern: die FANC habe die in

der deutschen Stellungnahme herangezogenen Aspekte

bereits vor der Wiederanfahrzustimmung eingehend

untersucht und sei zu einer eigenen Bewertung gekommen,

dass die Sicherheit nachweisbar gewährleistet sei; das sei

nicht zu beanstanden.

Mit Bezug auf einen weiteren Punkt der Klage stellt das

Gericht fest, die FANC habe die Öffentlichkeit ausreichend

informiert; dem klägerischen Vortrag, die Behörde habe

zielgerichtet Informationen zurückgehalten, konnte sich

das Gericht nicht anschließen.

Wie geht es weiter? Gegen das Urteil ist grundsätzlich

Berufung möglich. Allerdings wird Tihange-2 nach

jetzigem Stand ohnehin 2023 stillgelegt. Zumindest eine

beteiligte belgische Umweltorganisation hat daher laut

Presseberichten bereits angekündigt, auf eine Berufung zu

verzichten, da das Berufungsverfahren mindestens zwei

Jahre dauern würde.

Wie ist das Ganze zu bewerten? Gebietskörperschaften

und Privatpersonen aus Nachbarländern hatten die

Gelegenheit, vor einem belgischen Gericht gegen den

Betrieb eines grenznahen belgischen Kernkraftwerks zu

klagen und eine gerichtliche Prüfung zu erreichen. Das ist

gutzuheißen. Dass dabei belgisches Recht Anwendung

findet, ist logisch. Eine Annahme, belgisches Recht sei in

Sicherheitsfragen „weniger streng“ als das deutsche Recht,

wäre vorschnell. Das belgische Atom- und sonstige

Umweltrecht enthält Vorschriften, die ein Höchstmaß an

nuklearer Sicherheit fordern; das ist schon deshalb nicht

überraschend, weil Belgien sich an Euratom-Recht und

insbesondere an die Richtlinie zur nuklearen Sicherheit

halten muss; auch wird man davon ausgehen können, dass

der Gesetzgeber in unserem Nachbarland selbst ein großes

Interesse daran hat, dass nur sichere Kernkraftwerke

betrieben werden.

Das Gericht wiederum ist nach Prüfung des Sachverhalts

zu der Ansicht gekommen, die Wiederanfahrzustimmung

und damit der weitere Betrieb von Tihange-2

sei, gemessen an diesen Vorschriften, rechtmäßig und

nicht zu beanstanden. Damit ist diese Frage mit den

Mitteln eines Rechtsstaats entschieden (vorbehaltlich der

Möglichkeit einer Berufung), und zwar mit dem Ergebnis,

dass die Sicherheit gewährleistet ist. Das ist doch eine gute

Nachricht.

Autor

Rechtsanwalt Dr. Christian Raetzke

Beethovenstraße 19

04107 Leipzig, Deutschland

481

SPOTLIGHT ON NUCLEAR LAW

Spotlight on Nuclear Law

A Judgement Regarding Tihange ı Christian Raetzke


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

482

ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW

Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU

and Taxonomy – How Green Is Nuclear?

Nicolas Wendler

For more than a year since June 2019 a struggle has been ongoing over the treatment of nuclear power in the context

of the Sustainable Finance Initiative of the European Union and particularly in what is called taxonomy, a set of rules

and categorizations to make sustainable finance implementable and operational. The debate of weather to include

nuclear in the taxonomy as sustainable for its huge potential to mitigate climate change or to disregard it for alleged

violation of the “Do no significant harm” (DNSH) principle with regard to other environmental policy objectives will

probably continue till 2021, when the Joint Research Center of the European Union will give its evaluation on the issue

and the European Commission will subsequently take its decision.

Background

In March 2018 the European Commission

published the Commission

action plan on financing sustainable

growth in response to the recommendations

of the High Level Expert

Group Sustainable Finance. Next to

aspects of financial market regulation

and transparency, the elaboration of a

classification system to rate the

sustainability of financial products

was a focus of its work. This classification

system for economic activities

that includes many sectors particularly

of industry next to the energy

sector was called taxonomy in the

context of the sustainable finance

initiative. The European Parliament

agreed to the regulation initiative

(action plan on financing sustainable

growth) subsequently presented by

the European Commission. Additional

demands from the ranks of the parliament

like a taxonomy of nonsustain

able activities (so called

brown- listing) were at this occasion

rejected in the parliamentary committees.

Nevertheless, the modified

proposal of the parliament defined

that investment in coal, gas and

nuclear infrastructures cannot be

considered sustainable.

The birth of the taxonomy

Parallel to the legislative/prelegislative

process a Technical Expert

Group on sustainable finance (TEG)

appointed by the European Commission

in June 2018 worked out a

draft of a sustainability classification

system. This Taxonomy Technical

Report was published in June 2019

and was opened up for a public

consultation by the responsible Directorates

General of the Commission.

In the report of the TEG which was

made up primarily by financial experts

and representatives of NGOs but

hardly by scientific and technical

experts of the concerned industries, it

was decided on nuclear energy, that

the group does not consider itself

capable of a judgement if nuclear

power does inflict significant harm

to the environment. It was recommended

to not include nuclear in the

taxonomy despite the recognition that

nuclear can make a substantial contribution

to the mitigation of climate

change. The rejection was justified

particularly with regard to the issue of

waste management and it was recommended

to come back to the subject of

nuclear power later for in-depth consideration

in other expert groups. This

classification was criticized markedly

in the consultation among other by

the German nuclear industry association

Kerntechnik Deutschland and its

European counterpart FORATOM.

The report was criticized by many

other industries too in the respective

relevant parts.

Why is taxonomy important?

The problem with being excluded

from the category „sustainable“ for all

concerned industries and activities is

that long term financing conditions

might deteriorate. The sustainable

finance initiative stipulates better

conditions for „green“ investment e.g.

lower equity requirements, institutional

investors will develop their

portfolios towards green investments

more and more often and public institutions

or business development

banks will align their decisions on

subsidies, guarantees or loans at

reduced interest rate with the standards

of the green finance regulation of

the EU. So, it seems likely that the

taxonomy will play an important role

in the allocation of budgets in the

context of the so-called Green Deal of

the European Commission till 2030 or

with regard to the funds mobilized for

the green recovery program following

the economic effects of the corona

pandemic. It is possible too that with

the future development of sustainability

rules a negative taxonomy

might be introduced.

Further development 2019

The Council of the European Union

decided its position on taxonomy in

September 2019 and issued a mandate

for the so called trialog negotiations,

an informal conciliation pro cedure

between the European Commission,

the European Parliament and the

Council. Here it was decided as

council position and opposed to the

parliamentary position, to not exclude

nuclear projects from the taxonomy

and thereby from the classification as

sustainable investment.

In the trialog negotiations the

Finnish Council Presidency and the

representatives of the parliament

initially agreed 5 December 2019 on

the introduction of a taxonomy that

shall include such activities that are

in a transition to sustainable production

(transitional) and activities

that can enable others to become

sustain able (enabling) next to sustainable

activities in the proper sense.

Con trary to this agreement the

Energy Policy, Economy and Law

Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy – How Green Is Nuclear? ı Nicolas Wendler


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

representa tives of the UK, France, the

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,

Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and

Slovenia have rejected the proposal

in a meeting of the Permanent Representatives

Com mittee (of member

states) ( COREPER) on 11 December,

because they feared that nuclear

and natural gas projects would be

excluded from sustainable financing

despite the fact that they were not

excluded explicitly in the text.

On 14 December 2019 the Finnish

Presidency presented a new compromise

proposal which was agreed to

by the representatives of member

states on 16 December and representatives

of the European Parliament

on 17 December. In the compromise

only solid fossil fuels are excluded

from taxonomy by seeking to replace

them with other technologies. Concerning

the classification of other

technologies, a technology-neutral

approach is chosen in principle and

the criterium of significant harm for

environmental policy goals or the environment

is specified as to consider

concrete significant and long-term

damages instead of targeting the mere

risk of such damages. The position

of the German government was to

criticize the compromise proposal of

the Finnish presidency, because it did

not rule out that nuclear power could

be classified as ecologically sustainable

which the German government

wanted to achieve but failed to do so

in the Council as happened already in

September.

Legislative decisions

and delegations

In January 2020 the Committee on

Economic and Monetary Affairs and

the Committee on the Environment,

Public Health and Food Safety of the

European Parliament adopted the

compromise on the Establishment of a

framework to facilitate sustainable

investment, the Council did so in

April. The plenary of the European

Parliament adopted the regulation

„Framework to facilitate sustainable

investment“ in June. The fate of

nuclear as sustainable or significantly

harmful to the environment though

will now lie in the hands of the

European Commission who will

decide on taxonomy and cooperates

with a new Platform on sustainable

finance to be appointed by the

Commission and will be supported by

the Member States Expert Group on

sustainable finance which advises

the Commission regarding the work of

the Platform on sustainable finance.

The Commission decides on the

classi fication, i.e. the content of taxonomy

and its development by the way

of technical screening criteria and

technical standards through delegated

acts on the basis of the regulation.

The Commission has to finish this

process for the aspects contribution to

climate change mitigation and do no

significant harm till 31 December

2020 in order for application of the

rules from 1 January 2022.

Stakeholder dialogue

on sustainable finance

Parallel to the legislative procedures

the Commission organized a stakeholder

dialogue on sustainable

finance in March 2020 at the occasion

of the publication of the final reports

of the Technical Expert Group after

the consultation in 2019, the Taxonomy

Technical Report, the Technical

Annex, the Usability guide for the EU

green bond standard and the Handbook

on Climate Benchmarks and

benchmarks’ ESG disclosures. The

stakeholder dialogue that took place

as an online event due to the Covid-19

restrictions had 15.000 participants

from all over the EU and beyond. The

TEG kept up the classification of

nuclear as not being included in the

taxonomy in the final report with the

same arguments as in the preliminary

report. In the stakeholder dialogue it

was recommended by the TEG that

while no drastic changes are to be

expected from the finalization of the

taxonomy by the Commission – such

as e.g. the 100g/kWh CO 2 threshold

for electricity generation technologies

| NPP Grohnde. Source: PreussenElektra GmbH

– the taxonomy should be supplemented

with criteria for the so called

brown taxonomy, i.e. economic

activities that might be harmful to the

environment to a certain degree but

still could contribute to achieving

sustainability goals. Such criteria as

well as social objectives could be

added by the Commission on the

occasion of the regular revisions of the

taxonomy that are supposed to take

place every five years. Also, activities

now considered as sustainable could

fall out of taxo nomy if they would no

longer be relevant. Specifically, on

nuclear, it was stated from the TEG

represen tatives that it is clearly low

carbon, but that the DNSH evaluation

is very challenging so that no evaluation

was possible, but eventually an

evaluation could be elaborated in the

next year. The conclusion was that the

chapter on nuclear is not closed and

the TEG basically asked the Commission

to take over the issue.

Other activities

of the Commission and

EU institutions

From 23 March to 20 April 2020 the

Commission had a public consultation

“Sustainable finance – EU classification

system for green investments”

(Delegated Act) and on 18 June, the

day after the regulation was adopted

by parliament, the Commission called

for applications for participation in

the Platform on sustainable finance.

The platform is supposed to start in

September 2020. On the sidelines of

the sustainable finance/taxonomy

debate in other areas of the larger

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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 484

subject of nuclear in decarbonization

there are mixed signals in Brussels. On

the negative side there is the Council

position on the Just Transition Fund

as part of the Green Deal that shall

alleviate negative economic consequences

of transitions in the energy

sector on a regional level. Here the

Council explicitly excludes even

nuclear decommissioning, not to

mention any positive nuclear activity,

despite the possible consideration

that transferring employees from the

coal sector to nuclear by e.g. nuclear

new build might be an apt and smooth

way of restructuring in both coal

regions and the electricity sector as a

whole. On the positive side there was

the addition of so called “low carbon”

hydrogen in the EU Hydrogen Strategy

adopted by the Commission in July,

generally understood as an opening

for nuclear in a possible future

hydrogen economy.

Evaluation of nuclear

by the Joint Research Centre

Most importantly though, the Commission

decided to appoint the Joint

Research Centre (JRC) as the group of

experts to assess nuclear under the

sustainable finance taxonomy. The

assessment shall be scientifically

rigorous, transparent, balanced and

technology-neutral. The JRC is supposed

to draft a technical report on

the DNSH evaluation of nuclear

power. This report is then to be

reviewed by radiation protection and

waste management experts, as well as

by experts on environmental impacts.

On this basis the Commission will

decide whether nuclear will be

included in the taxonomy for sustainable

finance. The problem is that the

report will not be finalized before

2021 and thus be late for being

considered for the delegated acts

relating to climate mitigation due at

the end of 2020. In this situation

it might be wise to postpone the evaluation

of the energy sector until the

JRC report and the assessment of nuclear

by the Commission, the Platform

and the Member State Expert Group

in order to avoid market distortions.

After all this might not even cause a

delay to the coming into force of the

delegated acts in 2022. The alternative

to possibly revise the delegated acts

almost immediately after establishing

them to eventually introduce nuclear

does not sound convincing in comparison

and might give rise to numerous

allegations of a special treatment of

nuclear by the Commission. It might

be worth mentioning here, that the

obvious and logical decision to have

nuclear evaluated by the Commissions

own experts in the JRC was

promptly followed by accusations of

being “ absurd” and that the JRC could

not possibly make objective decisions

on the matter as articulated in a letter

of the Chairwoman of the Bundestag

Committee on Environmental Protection,

Nature Conservation and

nuclear Safety addressed to Commission

President Ursula von der Leyen,

Vice-President Frans Timmermans

and the German ministers Svenja

Schulze (Environment) and Anja

Karliczek (Research and Education).

Stake-holders and civil society

In terms of civil society activities next

to participation in the consultation

processes from the side of associations,

nuclear societies, pro-nuclear

initiatives, companies and individuals

there have been two open letter initiatives

directed to the Commission, one

from the nuclear societies on initiative

of the Czech Nuclear Society in April

and one from industry and nuclear associations

also addressing the Council

and the European Parliament. Both

emphasized the important role of

nuclear in the current low carbon

generation portfolio in the EU and its

future significance for decarbonization

policies and demanded inclusion

of the nuclear sector in the taxonomy.

They were also addressing other

subjects, such as enabling cost

competitive nuclear power with an

appropriate regulatory framework.

This is in line with recommendations

of the Sustainable Development

Scenario of the International Energy

Agency (IEA) of building at least

15 GW new nuclear per year globally

and a recent study of the Nuclear

Energy Agency of the OECD on cost

reductions for nuclear projects as well

as with the IPCC Special Report on a

global warming of 1.5 °C from 2018

that included a substantial role for

nuclear in most mitigation scenarios.

The NEA also published a new study

“Management and Disposal of High­

Level Radioactive Waste: Global

Progress and Solutions” in 2020 that

is of direct relevance for the dis cussion

of the DNSH-principle with regard to

nuclear in the EU as pointed out by

NEA Director-General William D.

Magwood, IV during a NEA webinar in

July on nuclear financing.

Conclusion

Summarizing it might be said that

there is currently reasonable hope to

have the very unlucky position of the

taxonomy TEG on nuclear revised in

the end, but that it still is an uphill

battle as so often with nuclear. The

future role of nuclear in the sustainable

finance framework of the EU

is a very important indicator for the

general attitude of the European

Union towards nuclear. The discussion

of climate change mitigation vs.

DNSH-principle needs to take account

of the fact that nuclear in general

has very good properties when it

comes to reconcile environmental

concerns with economic and social

concerns being not just low carbon,

but low pollution, resource efficient

and low footprint too as well as

reliable and efficient. The future of

nuclear is also an important test

for cohesion and solidarity within

the Union in broader terms. If the

pro active anti-nuclear states in the

European Union cannot overcome

their hostility and intolerance towards

the quite significant number of

member states that want to pursue

climate policies with an important

role for nuclear power, then it seems

highly unlikely that there will be a

truly coherent and cooperative

climate and decarbonization policy

in the EU in the long run.

Author

Nicolas Wendler

Head of Media Relations and

Political Affairs

nicolas.wendler@kernd.de

KernD

(Kerntechnik Deutschland e.V.)

Robert-Koch-Platz 4

10115 Berlin, Germany

Energy Policy, Economy and Law

Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy – How Green Is Nuclear? ı Nicolas Wendler


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Nuclear Energy in the Article 6

of the Paris Agreement

Henrique Schneider

Introduction: The 1.5 °C Goal in the Paris Agreement and Nuclear Energy According to

its article 2, the Paris Agreement PA aims at, inter alia, “Holding the increase in the global average temperature

to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above

pre­ industrial levels…” [1]. Paragraph 21 of the Decision, the document that explains the general thinking of the

Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC as they adopted the PA in 2015,

“ Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of

global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways.” [2].

This special report, the most recent

issued by the IPCC, is called “Global

warming of 1.5 °C” and was released

during the UNFCCC meeting in

Katowice, Poland, in December 2018.

In its second chapter, it states: “By

mid-century, the majority of primary

energy comes from non-fossil fuels

(i.e., renewables and nuclear energy)

in most 1.5 °C pathways (p.130).”

And: “Nuclear power increases its

share in most 1.5 °C pathways with no

or limited overshoot by 2050, but in

some pathways both the absolute

capacity and share of power from

nuclear generators decrease. There

are large differences in nuclear power

between models and across pathways

[Kim et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2018].

One of the reasons for this variation

is that the future deployment of

nuclear can be constrained by societal

preferences assumed in narratives

underlying the pathways [O’Neill et

al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017b]

(p.131)” [3].

In any case and according to the

IPCC, capping the global temperature

increase to 1.5 °C requires a fast

transition to electricity for energy end

use. The resulting higher electricity

demand has to be met by low-carbon

generation, including nuclear. Nuclear

generation increases, on average by

around 2.5 times by 2050 in the

89 mitigation scenarios considered

by the panel; in some scenarios, it

increases sevenfold [3].

Based on these considerations,

there is a place for nuclear energy in

the PA. The question is, which place?

This paper shows one possible, yet

unexplored place for nuclear energy.

Parties to the PA could use nuclear

energy to cooperate and even to increase

their nationally determined

contributions NDC under Article 6 PA.

Under Article 6 Paragraph 2 PA, short

6.2, nuclear energy could be used in

generating internationally transferred

mitigation outcomes; or as an integrated,

holistic and balanced nonmarket

approach under 6.8. While it

also could be part of the mechanism

under 6.4, this paper interprets

nuclear energy as more compatible

with the spirit of Article 6.2 and

6.8 due to their focus on national

preferences allowing for differentiation

(see below for a more complete

explanation of Article 6).

The remainder of this text is

organized as thus: First, a brief overview

of the PA is provided. Then, the

basic provisions of article 6 as well as

the current state of negotiations is

explained. Based on the logic of the

Paris Agreement, this paper develops

operationalization criteria for incorporating

nuclear energy under the

different paragraphs of Article 6 PA.

A conclusion summarizes the findings

of this discussion.

In terms of novelty, two insights

are developed here. At the same time,

this paper offers a way forward in

the substantiation of article 6 and a

different way of incorporating nuclear

energy into the Paris Agreement –

different from an approach under the

technology mechanism. The issues

identified here can be used for Party

or non-Party submissions to the

ongoing negotiations.

The Paris Agreement

in a nutshell

The most general and relevant

provisions of PA to nuclear energy are

[1]:

p Long-term temperature goal (Art.

2) limiting global temperature

increase to well below 2 °C, while

pursuing efforts to limit the

increase to 1.5 °C.

p Global peaking and “climate

neutrality” (Art. 4).

p Mitigation (Art. 4) establishing

binding commitments by all

Parties to prepare, communicate

and maintain a nationally determined

contribution (NDC) and to

pursue domestic measures to

achieve them.

p Voluntary cooperation/marketand

non-market-based approaches

(Art. 6).

p Adaptation (Art. 7) enhancing

adaptive capacity, strengthening

resilience, and reducing vulnerability

to climate change.

p Loss and damage (Art. 8) averting,

minimizing, and addressing loss

and damage associated with the

adverse effects of climate change,

including extreme weather events

and slow onset events.

p Finance, technology, and capacitybuilding

support (Art. 9, 10 and 11).

The work undertaken so far, has

related nuclear energy to finance,

technology, and capacity building; at

times, it is seen as an instrument of

mitigation, and at times of adaptation

[4]. The advantages of treating

nuclear as such are straightforward.

As a technology, it needs research,

deployment, and finance. Electrification

reduces emissions of greenhouse

gases but also helps adapting to

climatic conditions [5]. The disadvantages

of such a treatment of

nuclear energy are less obvious, but

important, nonetheless. First, the

addressees of these articles are

the Parties to the Agreement, i.e.

sovereign countries. They, however,

do not research, implement, and

deploy technology. Second, because

of the considerable private sector

involvement in nuclear energy, there

are issues of intellectual property IP.

IP remains, however, a contentious

issue, especially in relationship to

Article 10 PA, since this article entails

transference and sharing of technology.

Third, the impact of nuclear

energy as a technology and its

outcomes on climate action can only

be measured with great difficulty.

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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 486

There is an alternative framework

for relating nuclear energy to the PA. It

consists of using it under Article 6, the

market and non-market approaches to

international cooperation. This framework

maintains the advantages of the

“mainstream” treatment of it as just

mentioned. But it also addresses the

disadvantages, especially picking up

on the incentives to private sector

agents and measuring effects and

outcomes. However, there are also

disadvantages. The most important is

the current state of blockage in the

international nego tiations on Article

6. This alternative framework, its

advantages and dis advantages call

for further development.

Article 6

of the Paris Agreement

Article 6 of the PA calls for international

cooperation. Specifically,

its first paragraph reads: “Parties

recognize that some Parties choose to

pursue voluntary cooperation in the

implementation of their nationally

determined contributions to allow for

higher ambition in their mitigation

and adaptation actions and to promote

sustainable development and

environmental integrity.” [1]

Article 6 itself consists of a general

clause and three distinct parts (this

and all subsequent information

based on [6]). The general clause in

paragraph 1 covers all parts of the

Article. Elements of this clause are

the voluntary nature of any cooperation,

the idea that it can extend

to mitigation or adaptation actions, or

the combination of both, as well as

the commitment towards higher

ambition, sustainable development,

and environmental integrity.

The three parts of the Article

following the general clause are the

provisions for the use of “internationally

transferred mitigation

outcomes” ITMOs (paragraphs 2 and

3), the establishment of a “mechanism

to contribute to the mitigation of

greenhouse gas emissions and support

sustainable development” (paragraphs

4 to 7), and the recognition of

the “importance of integrated, holistic

and balanced non-market approaches

being available to Parties to assist

in the implementation of their

nationally determined contributions,

in the context of sustainable development

and poverty eradication, in a

coor dinated and effective manner,

including through, inter alia, mitigation,

adaptation, finance, technology

transfer and capacity-building, as

appropriate” (paragraphs 8 and 9).

Paragraphs 6(2-3) can be conceived

as the “bottom-up” part of

multinational cooperation. While not

explicit in the text of the PA, this is a

market-based instrument (or a

window for such instruments), i.e. its

outcomes can be measured in

equivalents of tons of greenhouse

gases and these equivalents can be

traded between agents. Under these

provisions, Parties to the Agreement

can engage in cooperation on their

own terms. On the one hand, it is

likely that the bodies of the framework

convention will elaborate finergrained

guidance with a semimandatory

character regarding

technical issues such as robust

accounting and transparency; on the

other hand, it is equally likely that

their guidance on the scope of activities

falling under 6(2-3), governance,

environmental integrity and sustainable

development will remain on a

general level. The ultimate goals of

cooperation under 6(2-3) remain

open, since the cooperating Parties or

the cooperation entities set goals

independently from the framework

convention; however, their outcome

seems to be narrowed down to mitigation.

Paragraphs 6(4-7) are the “topdown”

part of multinational cooperation.

While not explicit in the text of

the PA, this mechanism is also marketbased.

Most probably, their outcome

will be a mechanism with centralized

governance and granular rules,

modalities, and procedures, which

will be developed and managed under

the framework convention. Decisions

on which activities, programs, sectors,

or technologies qualify to participate

in the mechanism will most likely

be made by a centralized body. This

mechanism serves towards multiple

goals: mitigating greenhouse gas

emissions, fostering (sustainable)

economic development; and delivering

overall mitigation in global

emissions; it seems, therefore that

there is a necessary mitigation

com ponent as well as – at least –

adaptation co-benefits.

Paragraphs 6(8-9) are the “nonmarket”

component of international

cooperation under Article 6 PA. They

are much more open concerning what

can occur under them and how they

are governed as well. While the other

two parts are more geared towards

mitigation, these paragraphs are

explicit in including adaptation as

well as the public sector. Aside from

questions of accounting and transparency,

much of the common ground

in negotiations is that these paragraphs

do not necessitate further

definitory work under the framework

convention but will develop further

with their continued implementation

“bottom-up”. While still to emerge,

examples of activities under 6.8 lay

in the realms of joint technologydevelopment,

multi- and supranational

coordination of policies, or

additional financing, inter alia. The

goals of these paragraphs can be

mitigation as well as adaptation.

Negotiating and

operationalizing Article 6

While the structure of Article 6 is

given by the PA, its operationalization

requires further negotiations. At the

very least, the guidance to 6.2 and the

rules, modalities, and procedures to

6.4, as mentioned in the PA, must be

decided under the UNFCCC. While

these two sets should have been

produced by 2018, negotiations did

not yield results so far. After the 2019

meeting under the framework

convention Parties decided to continue

negotiating these provisions, the

next possible date for their adoption

is the next meeting, which takes place

in 2021.

In the meanwhile, further ideas

regarding the operationalization of

Article 6 can be developed and

submitted to the negotiations.

Additionally, some Parties decided to

pilot instruments under 6.2 and 6.8.

Examples of the first is Japan’s “Joint

Crediting Mechanism”, Switzerland’s

“Pilots” or the World Bank’s “Transformative

Carbon Asset Facility” [7].

An example of the second is the

“ Adaptation Benefits Mechanism” of

the African Development Bank [8]. As

of yet, little has been developed on the

role of nuclear energy under either.

The mechanism under 6.4, being

global and with a unified set of rules,

modalities, and procedures, cannot be

piloted before the adoption of the

relevant decisions. This is one reason

for this paper to focus on 6.2 and 6.8.

The other reason is that a probable

majority of Parties would like to

continue the “Clean Development

Mechanism” CDM as the mechanism

under 6.4 [9]. Currently, the CDM

does not include nuclear energy.

While this paper discusses the role

that nuclear energy can play under

Article 6, it is important to mention

that some of its instantiations are

taking part outside the UNFCCC. In

the absence of an Article 6 ruleset,

the International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO), which is in the

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| Map of Countries that Joined the Paris Climate Agreement. Source UNFCCC 2017

process of developing a “Carbon

Offsetting and Reduction Scheme

CORSIA” for international aviation,

is defining its own rules for global

emissions trading. A growing

voluntary market is also asserting

itself and establishing standards for

robust accounting in the post 2020

period [10].

Nuclear Energy

under Article 6 PA

Article 6 PA concerns international

cooperation. This paper, therefore,

does not discuss how nuclear energy

can be domestically used for fulfilling

NDCs or increasing NDC ambition.

This paper argues that nuclear energy

can additionally serve as the object of

international cooperation under the

Agreement. This claim is based on a

large number of NDCs being open to

international cooperation, and international

cooperation usually having

a finance-component as well as a

component of technology transfer.

The potential benefits to cooperation

in achieving the NDCs under

Article 6 are large and all parties could

benefit. Potential cost reductions

over independent implementation

of countries’ NDCs total about

250 billion US-Dollar per year in

2030. Cost reductions from cooperative

implementation are achieved

through improved economic efficiency.

If countries are inspired to

invest these cost savings in enhanced

ambition, then Article 6 could facilitate

additional abatement under the

Paris Agreement by 50 percent or

5 GtCO 2 per year in 2030. These

calculations are on the one hand

conservative, i.e. they project the

highest amount of greenhouse-gasreductions

per US-Dollar, which

again, points towards the potential

for inclusion of nuclear energy [11].

For most countries / Parties willing

to consider nuclear energy as an

instrument in climate policy, some

sort of international transfer will be

necessary because of their lack of

financial means and technology, as

well as due to potential for capacitybuilding

regarding grid, energy and

efficiency policies, which comes with

the process of adopting and scaling-up

nuclear energy.

Nuclear Energy under 6(2-3)

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 PA are

likely to enable a diversity of dif ferent

international and multilateral cooperation

mechanisms. This part of Article

6 covers mitigation under a NDC.

Different safeguards apply here, for

example environmental integrity and

sustainable development. The content

of the guidance is still being elaborated.

In any case, for nuclear energy

to fit under these provisions, the

following points need to be addressed

– they are largely based on [12]:

p The use of nuclear energy leads to

mitigation outcomes, which are

within the scope of the country/

Party’s NDC and can be metricized.

p Nuclear energy contributes to

achieving sustainable development

goals (SDG) [4]. In the social

pillar, it contributes towards addressing

needs such as electrification

of economies and households,

leading not only to reduced carbon

dioxide (-equivalent) emissions,

but also to increased comfort,

health-standards, human development

and more. In the economic

pillar, nuclear power contributes to

the security of energy supply, local

employment and technological

development, all of them facets of

accumulation of capital. Furthermore,

it also leads to lower energy

prices which especially benefit

local employment and the poorest

households. The environmental

contribution of nuclear energy is

based on its environmental integrity

as well as diminished impact

on natural ecosystems.

p Nuclear energy is environmentally

integer because in addition to

reducing carbon dioxide (-equivalent)

emissions it impacts less on

different aspects of the ecosystems,

such as land use and wildlife maintaining

biodiversity. This lesser

impact occurs in comparison to

other technologies used at comparable

scale. While there are

concerns about water use and

waste, these can be addressed in

equally integer manner. Similar

concerns regarding environmental

integrity apply to all forms of

energy generation and use.

Some of the strengths in including

nuclear energy under 6(2-3) are the

clear mitigation outcomes it generates

and therefore their relatively easy

metrication. Also, nuclear power

generation faces fewer legitimacyrelated

problems as an instrument for

reducing carbon dioxide (-equivalent)

emissions, especially when compared

to other ways of generating electricity

on a large-scale.

Some of the weaknesses in this

approach are the constraints of

the mechanism per se: The units

generated can only be exchanged

within a multilateral agreement.

Because of the political concerns

involving nuclear power, mitigation

units going back to nuclear energy

face potential political resistance

about being included in a multilateral

trading scheme. The problem of

political resistance is the argument

for including nuclear power under biand

multilateral instruments (6.2)

rather than under global instruments

(6.4).

Another weakness of this approach

is that it reduces nuclear energy

to mitigation. Reducing nuclear

energy to mitigation disregards many

of the social and environmental

advantages it could bring to its

adopters.

Nuclear Energy under 6(8-9)

Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 PA

address a broad scope of actions.

First, it considers adaptation and

mitigation as equal goals that can be

combined. Second, it is open to both,

public and private agents. And third, it

combines mitigation and adaptation

with yet other areas for climateaction,

such as finance, technology

transfer and capacity building, as

deemed appropriate by the individual

country/Party and its eventual

cooperation partners. In any case, for

nuclear energy to fit under these

provisions, the following points need

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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 488

to be addressed – they are largely

based on [4]:

p The use of nuclear energy leads to

mitigation outcomes and adaptation;

it generally is organized as

public-private-partnerships and it

sets in motion flows of finance and

technology, including the mobilization

of local and endogenous

technologies. In this sense, it fulfils

most of the criteria of paragraphs 8

and 9 – criteria that were not

conceived as cumulative but could

be cumulatively fulfilled by nuclear

energy.

p Nuclear energy could contribute

to enabling opportunities for

coordination across instruments

and relevant institutional arrangements.

For example (1): when

deploying or scaling up nuclear

energy, often regulations and

organizations have to be updated,

too; this opens windows for introducing

energy-efficiency, crosssectional

and other provisions into

the market-architecture. Or (2):

when deploying or scaling up

nuclear energy, transformational

opportunities for the local

economy might be identified, such

as reviewing the distribution grid

making it more efficient and less

prone to disturbances, opening

new economic sectors and activities,

or making electrification of

households or mobility possible.

And (3): The adoption of nuclear

energy leads to international

cooperation in matters of finance,

be it as loan guarantee, reducing

market risk, or equity stakes,

among others.

p The implications of nuclear energy

for sustainable development and

environmental integrity, as they

were discussed above in section 3,

also apply here. In fact, it is the

relationship between nuclear

energy and sustainable development

as well as environmental

integrity that makes nuclear

able to combine mitigation and

adaptation. Cumulating different

desiderata of these paragraphs,

nuclear energy could be conceived,

here, as an enabler of strong

sustainability, which allows for

exchange of natural capital for

human and technological capital.

The strengths of this approach are the

openness of paragraph 8 and 9 to the

multifaceted nature of the adoption

and scaling up of nuclear energy. This

corresponds to the open texture of

adaptation [13]. Through this, nuclear

energy can better be understood as an

instrument contributing towards the

achievement of a variety of goals. It especially

enables a strong approach to

sustainability via adaptation. Also,

since it is probable that these paragraphs

will be less the object of further

negotiation under the framework conventions,

their implementation can

occur quicker.

The weakness of treating nuclear

energy here could cause problems due

to the lack of methodologies, especially

for counting and accounting,

comparing, as well as trans parence.

Also, the meaning of the word

“ holistic”, which is featured in the

text of the paragraph, remains little

understood.

Conclusions and Findings

This essay developed a series of

arguments for including nuclear

energy in international cooperation

under Article 6 PA. It took an approach

favoring arguments for including

nuclear energy under paragraphs

( 2-3) and (8-9). The main arguments

favoring nuclear energy are its

efficiency in mitigation and the many

co-benefits in adaptation and sustainable

development.

This paper takes a novel approach

in including nuclear energy under Article

6 PA (rather than under the technology

mechanism). Despite

the challenges associated with its

further negotiation, there are several

advantages in the approach proposed

here. Article 6 foresees two types of

activities that rely on the preferences

of the participating Parties; additionally,

under Article 6, outcomes,

especially regarding mitigation, can

be measured more easily.

The difficulties with this approach

should not be understated. The

ongoing negotiation of Article 6 is an

apparent one but could be circumvented

especially due to the bi- or

multinational deployment of 6.2 and

6.8. Additionally, the IPCC cautions

potential frictions of using nuclear

energy within the framework of

sustainable development. Finally,

there are challenges emerging out of

the novelty of this approach. On the

other hand, as Gene Roddenberry put

it: “It isn’t all over; everything has not

been invented; the human adventure

is just beginning.”

References

[1] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(2015): Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.

[2] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(2015): Decision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement,

FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.

[3] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018): Special

Report: Warming of 1.5°, Mitigation Pathways Compatible

with 1.5 °C in the Context of Sustainable Development. In:

Global Warming of 1.5 °C. An IPCC Special Report on the

impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial

levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways,

in the context of strengthening the global response to the

threat of climate change, sustainable development, and

efforts to eradicate poverty. IPCC .

[4] International Atomic Energy Agency (2016): Nuclear Power

and the Paris Agreement.

[5] Petti, D., et al. (2018): The future of nuclear energy in a

carbon-constrained world. Massachusetts Institute of

Technology Energy Initiative (MITEI).

[6] Asian Development Bank (2018): Decoding Article 6 of the

Paris Agreement.

[7] Greiner, S., Chagas, T., Krämer, N., Michaelowa, A., Brescia, D.

and Hoch, S. (2019): Moving towards next generation carbon

markets. Observations from Article 6 pilots. 2nd ed., Climate

Focus and Perspectives, Amsterdam/Freiburg.

[8] Hoch, S., Friedmann, V. and Michaelowa, A. (2018):

Mobilising private-sector investment to mitigate climate

change in Africa. Stockholm Environment Institute.

[9] Obergassel, W.; Arens, C., Hermwille, L., Kreibich, N.,

Mersmann, F., Ott, H. E. and Wang-Helmreich, H. (2017):

Setting Sails for Troubled Waters. An Assessment of the

Marrakech Climate Conference (Conference Report). Wuppertal:

Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy.

[10] Schneider, L., Michaelowa, A., Broekhoff, D., Espelage, A. and

Siemons A. (2019): Lessons learned from the first round of

applications by carbon-offsetting programs for eligibility

under CORSIA. Öko-Institut e.V., Perspectives Climate Group

and Stockholm Environment Institute.

[11] Edmonds, J., Forrister, D., Clarke, L., de Clara, S., and

Munnings, C. (2019): The economic potential of article 6 of

the Paris Agreement and implementation challenges.

[12] Schneider, H. (2019): The Role of Carbon Markets in the Paris

Agreement: Mitigation and Development: In: Sequeira, T., and

Reis, L. (Eds.). Climate Change and Global Development.

Springer, Cham, pp. 109-132.

[13] International Atomic Energy Agency (2016): Nuclear Power

and Sustainable Development.

[14] Lesnikowski, A., et al. (2017): What does the Paris Agreement

mean for adaptation? In: Climate Policy 17(7), pp. 825-831.

Author

Prof. Dr. Henrique Schneider

h.schneider@sgv-usam.ch

Swiss federation of small and

medium enterprises sgv

Schwarztorstrasse 26

3001 Bern, Switzerland

Energy Policy, Economy and Law

Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement ı Henrique Schneider


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Any Green New Deal

Needs Nuclear Energy

James Conca and Judith Wright

United States congressional members rolled out their “Green New Deal” in 2019 that calls for a rapid

shift to carbon-free energy. As laid out by Rep. Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Markey (D-MA), the Deal calls for

some drastic measures to cut carbon emissions across the economy, from electricity generation to transportation to

agriculture to building efficiencies.

But the roll-out hiccupped a bit on the

role of nuclear energy.

At first, the proposal called for

phasing out all nuclear plants and not

building any new ones. They also

released a fact sheet nixing the

possibility of building new nuclear

power plants. Then they backed off

and referred to future energy sources

as clean, renewable, and zero-emission,

which allows nuclear back in.

Every true expert on this subject

knows we need all non-fossil fuel

energy sources, including nuclear, in

order to reduce our carbon emissions

in time to reign in the worst effects of

global warming (Figure 1). To not

increase, or to eliminate, even one

would be to fail, especially with

respect to nuclear or hydro which

have been the only sources to significantly

compete with fossil fuels in

global generation.

Clearing Confusion

on Nuclear Energy

The Intergovernmental Panel on

Climate Change, the International

Energy Agency, the UN Sustainable

Solutions Network and the Global

Commission on the Economy and

Climate argue for a tripling of nuclear

energy by mid-century, requiring over

1,000 new reactors, or 10,000 SMRs,

to help stabilize global anthropogenic

carbon emissions at near-zero.

Even more persuasive, four of

the world’s top climate scientists,

Dr. James Hansen, Dr. Tom Wigley,

Dr. Ken Caldeira and Dr. Kerry

Emanuel, have shown that renewables

alone cannot meet the goal of

decarbonizing the world economy.

The four scientists outlined how

only a combined strategy of employing

all the major sustainable clean

energy options, including renewables

and nuclear, and efficiency and

conser vation, can prevent the worst

effects of climate change by the end of

this century. Even the Union of

Concerned Scientists recently said

we need nuclear to address global

warming.

Although everyone has focused on

the Green in the Green New Deal, it

really is as much about the New Deal

part – the social issues of economic

equality, jobs and social nets – as in

updating Roosevelt’s original New

Deal that brought the United States

out of the Great Depression. The Green

New Deal aims to create jobs and boost

the economy, rework our farming

practices, and provide living wages,

family leave, and health care for all.

Arguably, you can’t achieve environmental

harmony without addressing

human suffering and poverty. This

dynamic tension between human

survival and environmental sustainability

is what led to our species’

explosion in energy use beginning

with coal and it’s continued increase

to at least 2050. Answering the

question – Do you want to eradicate

global poverty or save the planet? – is

not an easy one, but there is only one

answer - Both.

But most discussions have focused

on the Green part of the Deal. Ocasio-

Cortez has stated that we should go

carbon-neutral in 10 years. While that

is not scientifically possible, it is the

type of goal that needs to be set in

order to make any difference at all in

the time frame we do have – about 20

years.

Presently, America is 64 % fossil fuel

in electricity generation, but 87 %

fossil fuel if you add in transportation

which is dominated by petroleum.

After 14 years of carbon emission

decline as we replaced coal plants with

gas plants, our emissions began to rise

again in 2018 because of increased

gasoline and diesel use, as well as just

increased economic output. The global

pandemic has caused some oscillation,

but emissions will begin increasing

again when we recover from the pandemic

and its economic aftermath.

What would a plan of action

for nuclear look like?

The only energy plan for generation

that has any hope of achieving any of

the goals we need, in the time frame

| Fig. 1.

Life-cycle emissions for each energy source. To achieve any type of green

new deal, all four of the energy on the right must be replaced by a

combination of all sources on the left, not a cherry-picked few. IPCC/EN

we need them, is some form of the

following:

p stop building any new fossil fuel

plants.

p stop closing existing nuclear power

plants that have been relicensed as

safe by the NRC, which is almost all

remaining reactors in the United

States. Crying that a penny or a

euro a kWh is just too much for the

world to bear is insane under the

urgent need and the huge cost to

decarbonize. And every time we

close nuclear, carbon emissions go

up.

p build as many wind turbines as

possible and site them along

Tornado Alley first, where they

produce the most power per MW

installed (Figure 2). Putting

them most anywhere else is selfdefeating,

costs more and wastes

steel.

p put rooftop solar on all new

buildings, first in areas that average

at least 200 sunny days per year,

again to make the steel used go

farther (Figure 3, Gagnon et al.,

2016).

p build new small modular reactors

as fast as possible to load-follow, or

buffer, the renewables, instead of

building new natural gas plants.

SMRs cannot melt down and all the

other scary things have been fixed.

489

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY

Environment and Safety

Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy ı James Conca and Judith Wright


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 490

* The average wind

speeds indicated on

this map are modelderived

estimates that

may not represent the

true wind resource at

any given location.

Small terrain features,

vegetation, buildings,

and atmospheric

effects may cause the

wind speed to depart

from the map

estimates. Expert

advice should be

sought in placing

wind turbines and

estimating their

energy production.

| Fig. 2.

A map of wind resources in the United States clearly showing Tornado Alley

where capacity factors for wind exceed 45 %. Al other areas average about

30 %. Tornado Alley is so windy even migratory birds avoid I completely.

NREL WINDExchamge

Source: Wind resource estimates developed by AWS Truepower, LLC.*

We haven’t been idle in the last

30 years. Nuclear can also be sited

anywhere, especially in areas

where other renewables are not

efficient or possible.

p follow the new plan by the National

Hydropower Association and the

Department of Energy, to double

hydropower over the 20 years,

adding 60 GW by 2030, without

building a single new dam. As it

turns out, only 3 % of American

dams generate electricity, so

electrifying existing dams that

presently do not produce power,

uprating the others to produce

more power, and emplacing

pumped- hydro storage will do

a lot (Figure 4).

p secure sources of Li, Co, Fe and

other metals needed to build the

alternatives, especially to build the

batteries for enough fully electric

vehicles to replace oil. Material

needs are critical. Wind and solar

take an extraordinary amount of

steel per MW installed (Figure 5).

p build a fleet of 200 million fully

electric vehicles by 2040 that will

significantly reduce our use of oil –

much fewer will not sufficiently

drop our consumption – and place

100,000 charging stations along all

roadways that will be necessary to

service such a national fleet.

p streamline the process to site and

approve high-voltage transmission

lines. We cannot install this much

renewables without them. And

make the grid “smart.” Simple but

costly.

In America, this plan will require

500,000 additional MW wind turbines,

200 new nuclear reactors (or

2,000 small modular reactors that are

especially ideal for load-following

renewables and providing baseload

power), 800 billion kWhs/year from

new solar, and 600 billion kWhs/year

from new hydro.

For the World, it would take

4,000,000 new MW of wind

turbines (13 trillion kWhs/year),

1,400,000 MW new nuclear reactors

(11 trillion kWhs/year), 2,200,000

MW of new solar (7 trillion kWhs/

year), and 1,100,000 new MW of

hydro while properly maintaining

| Fig. 3.

A map of solar resources in the United States. Capacity factors for solar

exceed 30 % in areas in red and orange. All other areas average less

than 30 % and as low as 10%. Alaska is blue to green and Hawaii is yellow

to red. The National Solar Radiation Data Base (NSRDB)

existing hydro (9 trillion kWhs/yr). Of

course, physiographic issues need to

be addressed to site appropriate

sources with locations, just like in the

United States. If you’re country does

not have steep enough rivers you

won’t have much hydro.

We should certainly pursue other

alternatives like tidal and wave energy

as fast as possible but they will not be

developed enough to contribute much

by 2040.

We will need to keep those natural

gas plants that have been built after

2000 as they are needed for flexibility

until we build enough nuclear and

hydro. But we need to stop building

new gas plants. This is probably the

most difficult thing to achieve because

regulators, state legislators, and banks

love them.

Natural gas has long been touted as

a bridge fuel to a non-fossil future

beyond this century. But that is

nonsense. We don’t have a century.

And if so many new gas plants are

built, especially to load-follow wind

and solar, then we lock ourselves into

gas for a long, long time. No one is

** Note: This map has

been generalized for

cartographic purposes

and some streams

associated with

non-powered dams

are not displayed.

| Fig. 4.

The locations of dams in the United States that do not produce electricity.

These can be powered, which would double our hydropower generation

without building a single new dam. ORNL **

| Fig. 5.

Materials needed to install energy systems are highly variable with source.

Renewables require many times the amount of steel and/or concrete than

thermal sources. Wind requires the most of everything. Data from DOE and

UC Berkeley normalized to capacity factor. Data from UC Berkeley.

Environment and Safety

Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy ı James Conca and Judith Wright


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

going to decommission or destroy a

relatively new gas plant.

On the other hand, gas plants can

be refurbished to small modular

reactors relatively easily, just as coal

plants can be refurbished to gas plants

relatively easily.

It should be noted that we have

more natural gas than any country in

the world, and gas plants are so easy

to build and maintain. For that matter,

we have more oil and coal than any

country in the world, which makes

any plan to eliminate fossil fuels

extremely difficult from a sociopolitical

standpoint.

Unfortunately, the hurdles to new

nuclear power, and to nuclear waste

disposal, are all political and ideological,

and stem from intentional

misrepresentations over 50 years.

New nuclear designs, like NuScale’s

SMR out of Oregon, are as safe as one

can make any generator, even wind.

And we know what to do with nuclear

waste, we just aren’t allowed to do it

(Conca, 2017).

In the 1970s and 80s, incorrect

predictions of energy needs in the

following decades, cost overruns from

continual changes in regulatory and

manufacturing requirements as well

as subcontractors, the inability to

standardize reactor designs (except

for France), warped market forces

from the deregulation of most energy

markets, and the rise of anti-nuclear

ideologies, all led to the halt of new

nuclear builds in America and the

world. Even though nuclear has been

the overwhelming source of clean

power for the last 40 years and has

the lowest deathprint of any energy

source, even renewables (Table 1).

It comes down to a

sociopolitical decision

In order to achieve a successful Green

New Deal, the public has to decide

what they fear most - the anti-nuclear

mythology or the existential threat of

global warming. Scientists can only

lead the public to potential solutions,

we can’t make them think.

The amount of wind and solar

required by this plan needs to be put

into perspective. We presently have

about 90,000 MW of wind turbines

that generate about 260 billion kWhs

per year, and we have been building

them as fast as possible for over ten

years.

To build 500,000 more MW of

turbines over the next 10 to 20 years in

just the U.S., is really pushing our

manufacturing side and will take more

steel than we could possible produce

Energy Source

over that time frame. Wind turbines

take 450 tons of steel per MW. Solar

takes about 360 tons of steel per MW.

To emplace the amount of wind and

solar in the Green New Deal described

above, would take 1.6 billion tons

of steel (Figure 5). It would take

11 billion tons for the world to achieve

a similar decarbo nization.

Since the total annual global output

of steel is only 1.6 billion tons, we

would be very dependent on China,

India and Japan for that much steel,

and would require them to either

produce many times as much as they

do now, or use less than half of what

they use now. Either way, it will take

substantial global economic agreements

to be accepted by all nations

Our track record with huge global

economic agreements has not been

good. It needs to be better or we will

fail.

Links

Links are listed in order of appearance in the text and

active as of September 14, 2020

| https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/

| https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060120029/print

| https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5729035/Green-

New-Deal-FAQ.pdf

| https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov/sites/ocasio-cortez.house.gov/

files/Resolution%20on%20a%20Green%20New%20Deal.pdf

| http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/

| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/12/15/pariscop21-and-the-urgent-need-for-more-nuclear-energy/

#32febc9ae384

| https://www-legacy.dge.carnegiescience.edu/labs/caldeiralab/

MediaAlertParis.html

| https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/cost-nuclear-power/

retirements#.XAAs0a3MxGX

| https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/new-deal.asp

| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2018/06/27/

ans-all-energy-forum-brings-a-sobering-analysis-to-energyand-climate-plans/#5d7cf4ec3953

| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2019/01/16/u-sco2-emissions-rise-as-nuclear-power-plants-close/

#3f5237d97034

| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/07/19/

wind-turbines-could-rule-tornado-alley/#648178abcd3e

Mortality Rate (deaths per trillion kWh)

Coal – global average 100,000 (41 % of global electricity)

Coal – China 170,000 (75 % of China’s electricity)

Coal – U.S. 10,000 (32 % of U.S. electricity)

Oil – global average 36,000 (33 % of global energy, 4 % of global electricity)

Natural Gas – global average 4,000 (22 % of global electricity)

Biofuel/Biomass – global average 24,000 (21 % of global energy)

Solar – global average 440 (


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 492

Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe,

Economical and Always Available

to Protect the Environment

Peter Dyck

Introduction The commercial use of nuclear energy (NE) was initially linked to the great expectation of generating

enormous quantities of cheap electricity. Various technologies were therefore developed, starting with reactors based

on natural uranium. Many countries, however, concentrated on reactors with enriched uranium to achieve even higher

power densities. Nuclear power plants worldwide were designed and constructed on this basis. At that time in Germany,

for example, the SPD in particular campaigned for around 50 nuclear power plants.

Mainly in western countries, the

emphasis was placed on high safety

standards from the very outset. As

time went by these standards were

raised higher and higher. Naturally,

the consequence was further increases

in specific costs. Increasing the capacity

and thus the size of the plants was

seen as an initial solution to reducing

them. There were also repeated

demands for inherently safe plants.

Different approaches and concepts,

such as Generation III, Generation

III+ and Generation IV, brought this

goal closer and closer.

In the 2000s, the construction

of new nuclear power plants was also

influenced by another aspect, namely

the reduction of CO 2 emissions from

electricity generation. The reason for

this was the conviction that CO 2

released by humans would contribute

massively to global warming. It quickly

became clear, however, that the socalled

renewable energies (wind and

solar energy), which were promoted

from 2000 onwards, could only supply

weather-dependent power and were

not sustainable with respect to the

entire electricity system. Permanent

back-up provided by fossil fuel or

nuclear power are required. In

Germany, these back-up systems were

made more expensive due to the

prio ritization rule of the Renewable

Energy Sources Act. The renewable

energies were unable to contribute to

grid stability, not to mention the costs.

It is therefore impossible to provide a

secure power supply for industrialized

countries with wind turbines (off and

on-shore) and photovoltaic installations.

These and other serious disadvantages

were the trigger that

brought the focus of interest in various

countries firmly back to nuclear

energy.

SMRs (small modular reactors,

Generation IV) are now being developed

as a near inherently safe design

concept for small countries and a

decentralized power supply. They

include gas-cooled (He) reactors with

up to 300 MW installed capacity. The

idea is based on a uniform design, a

standard approval procedure and

standardized components, combined

with a reduction in costs. In each case,

the plants can be adjusted to the

demand (electricity, sea water desalination,

process heat) by constructing

several modules. They would be

particularly suitable for use in

combination with renewable energies

as they can be switched on and off

quickly.

The dual fluid reactor (DFR) is

emerging as a new development. This

reactor works with a liquid fuel

mixture and a metal coolant. As a fast

breeder reactor, it can fission all

uranium and plutonium isotopes as

well as all transuranic elements and

breed fissile material. In each case, the

fission products are separated and

sent for ultimate waste disposal, while

transmutation is still carried out for a

number of isotopes. This results in

significantly lower requirements for

the proof of long-term safety of a deep

geological repository of some 500 to

1,000 years instead of one million

years. In this way, it is also possible to

use spent nuclear fuels from light

water reactors (LWR). As a result, an

enormous amount of fissile material

is available, especially since Th-232

could also be used. The policy adopted

by many countries of choosing longterm

interim storage for their spent

fuel assemblies is now proving to have

been right.

Current situation

A number of the many nuclear power

plants that were built in the early

years have already ceased operation.

Either because the design or size of

the plant did not meet economic

requirements, or because technical

problems made decommissioning

appear advisable, or because the plant

had simply reached the end of its

service life.

The reactor accidents of Three

Mile Island (1979, in Block II) and

Chernobyl (1986, Block IV), which

resulted in the decommissioning of

nuclear power plants, had an additional

impact. In Italy, it was even

decided to abandon the nuclear

energy supply completely.

Further shutdowns followed the

tsunami in Japan due to the problems

associated with it, such as failure of

the electricity supply and oxyhydrogen

gas explosions in the old,

poorly secured Fukushima reactors.

Thereupon, in Germany, for example,

eight reactors were forced to shut

down for political reasons. At the

same time, the decision was also

taken to phase out nuclear energy

completely by 2022. The three most

modern rectors Isar 2, Emsland and

Neckarwestheim 2 will be shut down

for decommissioning at the end of

2022. In other countries, on the other

hand, safety systems were reassessed

and, where necessary, upgraded.

With its “international best practices

in the ageing management of

nuclear power plants”, the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

supports its member states in extending

the service life of nuclear power

plants by a further 20 to 40 years

while continuing to guarantee the

highest possible level of safety. [1]

The IAEA coordinates collaboration

between the member states in order to

adopt best practices. The program

deals with the physical aging of

systems, structures and components

as well as technical progress. It also

incorporates the results of the Electric

Power Research Institute (EPRI),

which cooperates with the IAEA.

Recently, however, new nuclear

power plants have been commissioned

Environment and Safety

Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe, Economical and Always Available to Protect the Environment ı Peter Dyck


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

| Fig. 1.

Global power generation from NPPs since 1956.

(Source: VGB Facts & Figures I Electricity Generation 2020/2021)

again in various countries, particularly

in Russia, Asia (China, India,

Pakistan, etc.) and in the United Arab

Emirates.

The current situation shows that

the nuclear power plants in operation

(32 countries operate nuclear power

plants) are distributed relatively

unevenly across the globe. Measured

in terms of the share of nuclear energy

in total national power generation,

France is the most important country

in the world with around 72 percent

and the United States still is it with

regard to the number of power

reactors operated.

One special case is module

designed as a floating nuclear power

plant – Akademik Lomonosov – with

two prototype reactors of 38 MW

electrical output (MWe) and 150 MW

thermal output (MWth). These

“ floating reactors” were taken to

the port town of Pevek, in the far

north of Russia, where they will

replace the Bilibino power plant. [2]

Oil 193.03 33.1 %

Coal 157.86 27.0 %

Natural gas 141.45 24.2 %

Hydropower 37.66 6.4 %

Renewable

energy

Nuclear

energy

Looking at the total primary energy

consumed worldwide, the following

picture emerges: Total consumption in

2019 was around 583.9 exajoules or

around 162,324 TWh, broken down

by energy source as shown in Table 2.

On average, it can be expected that

around 25% of primary energy is used

for electricity generation.

Global electricity generation in

2018 stood at some 26.600 TWh,

64 percent of which was generated

USA 95 Pakistan 5

France 56 Slovakia 4

China 49 Finland 4

Russia 38 Hungary 4

Japan 33 Switzerland 4

South Korea 24 Argentina 3

India 22 Bulgaria 2

Canada 19 Mexico 2

Ukraine 15 Romania 2

United Kingdom 15 Brazil 2

Belgium 7 South Africa 2

Sweden 7 Slovenia 1

Spain 7 Iran 1

Germany 6 Armenia 1

Czech Republic 6 Netherlands 1

25.83 4.4 %

24.16 4.1 %

Other 4.71 0.8 %

| Tab. 2.

Consumption in exajoules, 2019,

various energy sources [3].

| Tab. 1.

Number of nuclear power plants operated worldwide; status mid-2020 [3].

with the fossil fuels coal, natural gas

and oil while 36 percent was generated

low-carbon: 16.2 percent hydropower,

10.1 percent nuclear power

and 9.8 percent with wind and solar

power, biomass, waste, geothermal

energy and tidal power.

The following picture Figure 2

emerges for Germany, where primary

energy consumption has fallen sharply

since 1990.

Nuclear power plants

under construction

In contrast to Germany and Switzerland,

the dominant nuclear energy

countries continue to invest in this

resource-saving and environmentally

friendly technology. For example,

52 nuclear power plants were under

construction worldwide in mid-2020.

There are sound reasons for the

construction of new nuclear power

plants:

a) nuclear power plants from the

boom of the 1970s will be

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 493

1990 2019*

5.228 PJ

35 %

2.304 PJ

15 %

Total 14.905

Petajoule

1.668 PJ

11 %

199

1 %

3.201 PJ

21 %

2.306 PJ

15 %

Hard Coal

Brown Coal

Mineral Oil

Gas

Nuclear Energy

Renewables and

other energy sources 2

4.519 PJ

35 %

3.200 PJ

25 %

Total 12.815

Petajoule

820 PJ

6 %

1.170 PJ

9 %

1.886 PJ

15 %

1.134 PJ

9 %

86 PJ

0,7 %

Hard Coal

Brown Coal

Mineral Oil

Gas

Nuclear Energy

Renewables

Other energy sources 2

| Fig. 2.

Primary energy consumption 1 by energy sources, FRG, cf. 1990 with 2019.

1

Calculations based on the efficiency approach; 2 Until 1999 renewable energies with other energy sources, separate recording from 2000 on other energy

sources are: non-renewable waste, heat and foreign trade balance from district heating and electricity; * preliminary information;

Source: for 1990 Federal Environment Agency based on AG Energiebilanzen, Evaluation tables for the energy balance for the Federal Republic of Germany

1990 to 2018 as of 10/2018; for 2019 Federal Environment Agency based on AG Energiebilanzen, primary energy consumption as of 12/2019

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 494

approaching the end of their economic

service life in the foreseeable

future,

b) replacing them must be tackled in

good time,

c) the demand for power is constantly

increasing worldwide, especially in

populous emerging countries, such

as Brazil, China or India, which

have been showing high economic

growth for years. According to the

estimates of the American Energy

Information Administration (EIA),

global electricity demand is expected

to increase by 59 % by 2040

by comparison with 2016, and by

as much as 200 % in India,

d) the price stability of nuclear

energy, which, unlike fossil fuels,

hardly depends on the price of the

fuel, makes nuclear energy particularly

economically projectable,

e) renewable energies (wind power,

solar power) are not fully controllable

and also often do not produce

in a consumer-oriented way,

f) climate protection and dwindling

fossil resources speak in favour

of practically carbon-free, environmentally

friendly nuclear energy,

g) fossil fuels pollute the atmosphere

with CO 2 , for example, unless

sequestration (storage of CO 2 ) is

chosen,

h) environmentally friendly options

such as nuclear energy are therefore

urgently needed. [4]

Russia has 13 VVER-1000 and three

state-of-the-art VVER-1200 connected

to the grid and another five

VVER- 1200 under construction. Two

each at the Baltic and Kursk locations

and one at the Leningrad location. In

addition, 10 RBMK-1000 reactors

(Chernobyl type), five VVER-440, two

fast breeder reactors (FBR), one

BN-600 and one BN-800 are in operation.

There are also research reactors,

reactors on icebreakers, in submarines,

and a floating nuclear power

plant.

China entered the nuclear energy

market late. The country did not put

its first nuclear power plant into

opera tion until the early 1990s.

By now, 49 nuclear power plants

supply the Chinese Republic with

electricity (status mid-2020), with

some 350 TWh in 2019. They account

for a 5 % share in China’s power mix.

10 further nuclear power plants are

under construction.

China has commissioned the

world’s first two EPR-1750, the largest

nuclear power plants in the world,

in Taishan. In addition, the China

Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), a

| Fig. 3.

Overview of nuclear power plant locations in Russia (©World Nuclear Association).

| Fig. 4.

Overview of nuclear power plant locations in China (©World Nuclear Association).

| Fig. 5.

Overview of nuclear power plant locations in India (©World Nuclear Association).

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breeder reactor that forms the basis

for the development of a commercial

breeder reactor, is operated in a

suburb of Beijing. [6]

India has 22 nuclear power plants

in operation with installed capacities

between 160 and 500 MWe, two

VVER-1000 and a small breeder

reactor. One fast breeder reactor with

500 MWe, four PHWRs (Pressurized

Heavy-Water Reactors) with 700 MWe

and two VVER-1000 are under

construction. [1]

There is also construction activity

in South Korea (four reactors)

and Bangladesh which is currently

building its first two nuclear power

plants.

Several Central and Eastern

European countries (Slovakia/

Mochovce, Poland/Zarnowiec, Hungary/Paks,

Belarus/Ostrovets, Slovenia/Krsko,

Czech Republic/Dukovany

and Temelin, etc.) continue to focus

on nuclear energy. They want to

reduce their dependence on coal and

natural gas imports or replace their

existing nuclear power plants with

new, state-of-the-art facilities. In

Slovakia, for example, in addition to

Mochovce, there are currently two

Russian reactors under construction.

It is also worth noting that the

United Arab Emirates (UAE), which

has large oil reserves and solar energy,

is banking also on nuclear energy for

the future. In the summer of 2012,

they began construction of the first of

4 Korean-designed nuclear power

plant (PWR) units. The first plant has

already become critical and started

producing electricity in 2020. All four

reactors should be in operation by

2023.

Turkey has also decided to embark

on using nuclear energy. The country’s

first nuclear power plant has been

under construction on the Akkuyu site

on the Mediterranean coast since

Argentina 1 USA 2

Brazil 1 China 10

Finland 1 Bangladesh 2

France 1 Turkey 1

India 7 UAE 4

Iran 1 Belarus 2

Pakistan 2 Japan 2

Russia 4 South Korea 2

Slovakia 2 Taiwan 4

United

Kingdom

2

| Tab. 3.

Number of nuclear power plants under

construction worldwide (status mid-2020) [3].

| Fig. 6.

Schedule for Generation IV plants [6].

April 2018. Four further units are

planned in the north on the Sinop site.

The USA operates 95 reactor units

with a capacity of around 94 GWe and

promotes all forms of low-carbon

energy, including the construction of

one of the two new nuclear power

plants at the Vogtle site in Georgia.

The USA also supports the development

of SMR, a modular concept of

significantly space-saving design and

partially new technology with the

goal of inherent safety.

Many of the more than 160 nuclear

power plants currently under

construc tion or in planning worldwide

belong to Generation III. In the

coming years, these advanced reactor

types will modernize the fleet of

Generation II nuclear power plants in

many countries and replace fossil

power plants. In many cases, the

Generation III reactor systems are a

further development of the reliable

Generation II reactor types.

In addition to greater efficiency

due to a lower uranium requirement

per kWh and improved cost-effectiveness

due to standardized and modular

construction methods, these reactor

types offer even greater safety as a

result of technical innovations.

Gene ration III safety means that, even

in the event of serious accidents, any

serious impacts are limited to the

plant itself.

The next step in development

are the plants of Generation IV. The

reactor concepts include:

p Gas-cooled fast reactors

p Very-high-temperature gas reactors

p Sodium-cooled fast reactors

p Lead-cooled fast reactors

p Supercritical water-cooled reactors

p Molten salt reactors

The Generation IV reactors will be so

safe and reliable that, in the event of

an accident within the plant, there

will be no need to evacuate the

population in the vicinity of the power

plant. In case of power failures and a

failure of the core cooling systems,

there will be sufficient time to repair

and restore the cooling systems.

The safety concept will be efficient,

reliable and economical.

Future plans –

Russia and Asia are focusing

on nuclear energy

Russia, China and India are pursuing

ambitious expansion projects.

Russia [2] wants to commission

two new plants a year so that it can

export more natural gas to Western

Europe at good prices. The country

holds a leading position in the

development and operation of

FBRs. It operates two sodium-cooled

reactors – the BN-600 and BN-800.

In parallel, Rosatom is developing

another reactor generation (Generation

VI) with new technology, a

Pb-cooled FBR with liquid fuel.

China [5] has an enormous

demand for electricity due to its large

population, emerging economy and

industrialisation. In addition to an

extensive program to build new coalfired

power plants to meet demand

in the short to medium term, the

previously moderate development of

nuclear energy has accelerated considerably.

The aim is to reduce air

pollution and CO 2 emissions. As a

result, there are three dozen nuclear

power plants at an advanced stage of

planning. The overall plan is to have

around 300 GWe connected to the

grid by 2050 to meet the huge energy

demand. This is an important part of a

secure power supply with carbon-free

energy.

India, which currently only produces

some 40 TWh from nuclear

energy, has set itself an extremely

ambitious target. It is planning to

connect 470 GWe of nuclear energy to

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 496

the grid by 2050. The aim is to become

less dependent on coal. In addition,

the rapidly growing population

requires more and more electric

power.

In Finland, preparations are

under way for the construction of

another nuclear power plant.

The country wants to reduce its

dependence on Russian electricity

supplies.

At the beginning of 2008, the

British government decided to

replace nuclear power plants that had

already been in operation for a long

time with new ones. The UK is therefore

currently planning to build a

good 16 GWe of new nuclear capacity

at eight already selected sites. This

would double the NE electricity share

from around 20 percent today to over

40 percent. This approach is explicitly

intended to reduce dependence on

fossil fuels and their environmentally

harmful emissions.

In 2007, Romania commissioned

its newest nuclear power plant

( Cernavoda-2, a Canadian Candu

heavy water reactor). The country

plans to build two units of the same

type with Chinese support over the

next few years.

| Fig. 7.

New construction projects and announcements in Europe (©VGB).

* without photovoltaic, oil: no projects.

Serious consideration is being

given to the construction of new

nuclear power plants in Bulgaria

and Lithuania. Lithuania is currently

without nuclear energy following the

decommissioning of its two RBMK

reactors, but urgently needs new

power plants. The Czech Republic

has launched the planned new build

project for the Dukovany site and

Poland plans to start using nuclear

power with the target of building

6 to 9 GWe nuclear installed capacity.

Hungary also wants to build new

nuclear power plants. It has therefore

concluded an agreement with Russia

for the construction of two units in

2014 already.

Iran commissioned its first nuclear

power plant in 2011. The country

wants to build more reactors with

Russian support. Russian reactors

are also to be built in Egypt, which

does not currently operate any nuclear

power plants.

Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and

South Africa are currently preparing

to expand their existing nuclear

power plant fleets. In Argentina, the

country’s third nuclear power plant

went on line at the beginning of

2014. Brazil’s third nuclear power

China 44 United

Kingdom

Russia 24 Romania 2

India 14 Uzbekistan 2

Poland 6 Finland 1

Egypt 4 Argentina 1

South

Korea

2

4 Bulgaria 1

USA 3 Iran 1

Turkey 2 Japan 1

Ukraine 2 Pakistan 1

Hungary 2 Czech

Republic

| Tab. 4.

Number of planned nuclear reactors

worldwide (status mid-2020) [3].

1

plant is scheduled to start generating

electricity in the 20s.

As in many other countries, a large

number of conventional power plants

are still being planned in Europe.

This will lead to further CO 2 emissions.

If the goal is to achieve a secure

power supply, then the only way to

prevent them is by using nuclear

power plants.

Advanced reactors

Among the advanced pressurized

water reactors (PWR) is the AP1000

(Advanced Passive Plant) with an

installed capacity of approx. 1100 MW

offered by the US company Westinghouse.

Reactors of this type are

already in operation in China. Further

construction projects are currently

underway in the USA.

In Belarus, Russia is building the

first reactor of its latest Generation

III+ series abroad.

Three systems of this type are

already in operation in Russia, two in

Novovoronezh NPP and one in

Leningrad NPP. Another reactor of

this Generation III+ type became

critical in July, the Leningrad NPP

Unit 6.

Finland, Hungary, Turkey, Bangladesh

and Egypt have also chosen

this Generation III+ reactor type of

Russian design.

China [5] has various development

and demonstration projects:

p CDFR (China Demonstration Fast

Reactor)/a fast reactor

p CEFR (China Experimental Fast

Reactor)/an advanced fast reactor

p To increase the proportion of

uranium use and reduce the

amount of hazardous waste, the

intention is to build FBRs that

breed fissile material. At the

same time, PWRs are being

developed whose fuel cycle is

based on the material from the fast

reactors. The aim is to implement

this on an industrial scale by

2025-2030.

| Fig. 8.

Generation III+ from the USA, the AP1000, photo: NRC.

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List of abbreviations

| Fig. 9.

Akademik Lomonosov on the way to its place of use [3].

p FBRs with a higher breeding rate

are a further step.

An additional line of development

is the SMRs (Small Modular

Reactors), Generation IV reactors

which can be adjusted to the needs

of the relevant country or region.

These are stan dardized plants that

are assembled in the factory and

delivered as a whole unit (modular

system).

One example of this is the

Academik Lomonosov reactors that

are mounted on a ship and will supply

power and heat in the port town of

Pevek, near the Arctic Circle.

Further plans envisage pebble-bed

reactors with a capacity of approx.

250 to 350 MWe, which can be

used both for power generation and

sea water desalination or for process

heat.

South Africa has plans to build 10

such plants with this type of reactor.

Rolls Royce is planning to build

mini reactors, prefabricated in

factories, which should be cheaper

and safer than large plants. It should

be possible to transport these mini

reactors by road. The first reactor is

scheduled to go into operation in the

United Kingdom in 2029. [7]

CAREM, a CNEA (Comisión Nacional

de Energía Atómica) project in

Argentina, is yet another project.

Nuscale in the US plans to build

50 megawatt modules. There is a SMR

development project in Canada too.

Work is underway at the Siberian

Chemical Combine site in Russia on a

complex with the BREST-300 fast

reactor as a demonstration plant and a

reprocessing plant. [2]

The BREST-300 reactor will

become important for closing the

fuel cycle.

p The reprocessing plant has been

simplified compared to the original

design and will only separate the

fissile material, while the complex

and expensive process of separating

uranium, plutonium and all

other actinides (transuranium

elements) will be abandoned.

p A mixture of these materials will

be used in the fuel of the

BREST-300 reactor. High purity of

the fuel in terms of fissile material

will no longer be important.

This process will protect uranium

deposits.

p Great importance is attached, however,

to the purity of the separated

separated fission products which,

as far as possible, is to be used for

the production of isotopes for

medical purposes or is to be

disposed of. With this and withrecycling

of the fissile material,

the amount of radiotoxic substances

will be greatly reduced

and the decay times shortened.

The advantage of implementing U,

Pu and transuranium elements in a

molten salt reactor like it is developed

by TerraPower of Bill Gates and in the

dual-fluid configuration in Germany is

that there is no need to manufacture

any fuel assemblies. In addition, the

reactor need not be shut down for fuel

reloading, since the fissile material can

be fed continuously. Furthermore, the

fission products can be removed continuously

during operation. Fusible

cutouts shall ensure inherent safety.

In conclusion it can be recognized

that many nations including the

largest ones count on nuclear energy

for electricity generation and

that significant advances in reactor

technology are not the exception but

the rule.

FRG

CO2

DFR

PWR

RE

EPR

GWe

He

NE

NPP

MW

MWe

MWth

FBR

SMR

TWh

= Federal Republic of Germany

= carbon dioxide

= dual fluid reactor

= pressurized water reactor

= renewable energy (a buzzword)

= European pressurized reactor

= gigawatt electrical

= helium

= nuclear energy

= nuclear power plant

= megawatt

= megawatt electrical

= megawatt thermal

= fast breeder reactor

= small modular reactor

= terawatt hours

VVER =, RBMK =, BN = Russian reactor types

References

[1] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

[2] SNF MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIA: STATUS AND FUTURE

DEVELOPMENT

A.V. KHAPERSKAYA

State Corporation “ROSATOM”, Moscow,

the Russian Federation O.V. KRYUKOV

State Corporation “ROSATOM”, Moscow,

the Russian Federation

K.V. IVANOV

State Corporation “ROSATOM”, Moscow,

the Russian Federation

[3] Wikipedia

[4] Prof. Dr. P von Dierkes, Kaprun

[5] The Strategy of Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Its Back-end

R&D Activities

Ye Guoan, WangJian, ZhengWeifang, HeHui, ZhangHua

China Institue of Atomic Energy (CIAE) 249-28 June, 2019,

IAEA

[6] Nucleopedia .org

[7] Rolls-Royce Nuclear

Author

Dipl.-Phys. Peter Dyck

Former Unit Head for 'Spent Fuel

Storage' at IAEA Wien

Nuclear Consultant for Licencing

and Transport for Spent Fuel and

High Level Waste

dyck.fo@t-online.de

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 498

Are They Ready for Operation?

How to Assess the Control Room System

of a New NPP

Rainer Miller, Rodney Leitner, Sina Gierig and Harald Kolrep

1 Introduction The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant with two boiling water reactors in operation is located on

the southern west coast of Finland. The plant is operated by the public Finnish energy company TVO. Since 2005, Areva

and Siemens have been constructing Unit 3 (OL3) as a pressurized water reactor of the EPR construction line. OL3 is in

the commissioning phase and the first fuel loading is planned for autumn of 2020.

The EPR is a generation III+ pressurized

water reactor with an electrical

output of 1,600 MW. It is

equipped with a fully digital control

system (Process Information and

Control System, PICS). During normal

operation the plant is controlled

from the control room via computer

screens. Each ope rator has eight

screens at his disposal, the content of

which he can choose freely. At a

central location in the main control

room three large displays can be

observed by all operators.

A back-up system with conventional

control panels and partly analogue

displays and control elements is provided

as a safety measure (Safety

Infor mation and Control System,

SICS) in case of incidents (e.g. in case

of failure of the software for the digital

control)

The standard operating concept of

OL3 is conceived for a shift staffing of

three operators: turbine operator

(TO), reactor operator (RO) and shift

supervisor (SSV). In case of incidents

or major malfunctions, the shift team

can call an additional safety engineer

(SE), who is on call, to support the

control room crew. In this case, the

SE is responsible for the continuous

monitoring of essential safety functions

and safety-critical parameters

(safety function monitoring) in order

to relieve the shift team of these

monitoring tasks.

Figure 1 shows the full scope

simulator of the main control room

of OL3; the control panel on the

left of the control room is the SICS.

The shift supervisor sits at the

table on the right in the foreground,

the turbine operator at the table

on the back right and the reactor

operator at the table on the back

left.

With the aim to demonstrate, that

within the control room all requirements

related to Human Factors

aspects of the operations are satisfactorily

achieved, the plant supplier of

OL3 has planned a final human factors

test of the capabilities of the ‘control

room’ system before fuel loading.

The “Integrated Final Control Room

System Validation (ISV)” has been

performed in 2019.

The following aspects were considered

as control room system for the

ISV:

p trained plant operators (crew)

p the operating manual defining the

operational tasks of the crew,

p the integrated main human

machine interfaces (HMI), most

notably the Process Information

and Control System (PICS) as well

as the Safety Information and

Control System (SICS), but also

the fire alarm panel,

p and the environment as given by

the main control room (MCR) and

the remote shutdown station

(RSS).

To ensure the independence of the

ISV, the planning and implementation

of the ISV was outsourced to external

consultants. The HFC Human-Factors-

Consult GmbH formed a consortium

with MTO Safety GmbH for the study.

Engineers, psychologists, and human

factors specialists are represented in

the consortium. The composition of

the consortium guaranteed great

experience with validation studies

(HFC) as well as practical experience

from nuclear operations and safety

(MTO Safety).

This article describes the planning

and execution of the ISV, i.e. the

aspects examined in the test and the

methods used to measure the relevant

variables. Hands-on experience from

the execution of the validation is also

reported.

| Fig. 1.

Full scope simulator of the main control room of OL3.

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

2 Planning and

preparation of the study

The preparation for the ISV started

in 2015 with the definition of relevant

aspects to be analysed. The choice

of these aspects was based on human

factors requirements which in turn

have been derived by considering

the relevant standards and regulations

within the domain of controls

rooms in general and more specifically

nuclear power plant control rooms.

The standards considered include

among others the IEC 1771 [1] and

IEC 60964 [2]. The Finnish regulation

YVL 5.5 [3] has to be considered for

the main control room and manmachine

interfaces in the control

room and their validation. Furthermore

NUREG 0711 [4] provides

additional guidance.

Based on the literature, a total

of six aspects were identified that

were to be investigated in the ISV.

These aspects are: task performance,

human errors, situation awareness,

com munication, coordination and

mental workload.

2.1 Scenarios

The six aspects should be examined in

different operating conditions. For this

purpose, four scenarios were defined

which varied in content, difficulty and

complexity and which cover a wide

range of conceivable operating conditions,

from normal operation to

emergency operations. For each of the

four scenarios, a target path with an

expected sequence of specified control

tasks or switching actions was defined.

using the ‘strategy flow charts’ (SFC)

of the operating manual. In the OL3

operating manual, strategies for different

states of the plant (e.g. normal

operation, start up, abnormal operations

etc.) are described in the

SFC, whereas tasks are described in

‘ detailed instruction modules’ (DIM).

For different states of the plant spe cific

SFCs describes the sequence of tasks

(DIMs) and necessary actions in the

form of flowcharts. The target path for

a scenario thus contained a sequence

of DIMs in one or more SFCs which

had to be processed (see Figure 2 for

an example of a SFC with target path).

Each scenario was planned to be

carried out three times within the ISV,

using a different shift crew each time.

The individual run of one scenario by

one crew is called ‘trial’. This resulted

in a balanced test plan of 12 trials

(4 scenarios x 3 trials). One trial was

carried out per day.

The scenarios covered normal

operation (scenario A), abnormal

operation (scenario B) and emer gency

operation (scenarios C and D). A plant

start-up (from reactor critical up to

25 % nuclear power) with a periodic

test of the criticality behaviour of the

core (which was supported by a

reactor physicist), was included in

scenario A.

Otherwise, the four scenarios A to

D included numerous unexpected

disturbances and additional tasks,

e.g.:

1. unavailability of components,

problems with components (e.g.

vibration of the turbine, vibration

of a reactor coolant pump), fire

alarm in a diesel building, smoke in

the main control room which

caused the crew to move to the

remote shutdown station.

2. Problems with digital controls:

Failure of workstations, failure of

the electronic OM, complete loss of

the PICS, and combinations of

these problems.

3. The daily load of the shift crews:

short-term requests from the network

operator to reduce power,

communication requirements such

as repeated telephone calls from

the management, asking for the

status of certain activities, a

shift takeover, and communication

requirements with regulatory body

and plant management during

incidents etc.

With the exception of the start-up

scenario A, all scenarios started with a

short phase of normal operation

(about 20 min). The scenarios were

planned with a length of three to six

hours. However, during the execution

it turned out that especially the

start-up scenario A took much longer

(up to nine hours).

2.2 Aspects investigated

Six aspects were identified which

should be investigated in the ISV: task

performance, human error, situation

awareness, communication, coordination

and operator mental workload.

These aspects were operationalized

using one or more testing instruments

and one or more variables each.

Pass/fail criteria were defined in

advance for each variable. If these

criteria were not met, the trial was

considered failed. In order to increase

the reliability of the measurement of

the variables, subjective assessments

and the collection of qualitative data

(e.g. collection of the subjective

assessments of the crew members)

were avoided as far as possible and an

attempt was made to develop clear

criteria for the measurement of all

variables. The operationalization of

the aspects is precisely described in

section 3.

2.3 Equipment

The scenarios were executed in the

full scope simulator (FSS) of OL3. In

the FSS the main control room (MCR)

and the remote shutdown station

(RSS) are simulated. Both rooms can

be observed from an observation

room through a one-way mirrored

window. All information displayed

on the screens in the MCR and RSS

are also available on screens in the

observation room.

A special paper-based “observation

tool” (see section 4) was developed

for the observation and data collection

within the ISV. Questionnaires to

assess situation awareness, coordination

and workload were prepared on

mobile tablet computers.

Audio and video recordings were

used as backup for the data acquisition

with the observation tool.

For the video recordings of the crews’

actions, the four cameras permanently

installed in the FSS were used

(three cameras in the MCR, one in the

RSS). In addition, the SICS panel and

the screens of the operators were

recorded with three mobile video

cameras.

2.4 Participants

The scenarios were carried out with

shift crews from OL3. A total of six

trained and licensed crews was available

for the ISV. Each crew participated

in two different trials.

The crews were not aware of the

test plan. They didn’t know the total

number of scenarios in the test plan,

nor did they know which scenario

they would be working on. All test

participants had to declare in writing

that they would not pass on any information

about the courses of the test or

details of the scenarios.

Three Human Factors Experts from

the HFC/MTO Safety consortium

served as observers for the ISV. Three

simulator trainers with thorough

knowledge of the OL3 procedures and

operational manual were asked to

observe and evaluate task performance

and human error. Each simulator

trainer was assigned to one

of the operators as an observer. An

additional expert from TVO was

responsible to simulate the external

communication of the operators via

telephone. He answered operators’

phone calls to the plant management,

network operator, maintenance department

etc.

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 500

2.5 Procedure

Before crews started their first

scenario, they were introduced to the

ISV, they provided written consent not

to give any information on scenarios

to anyone not involved during the day.

The crews then practiced handling the

tablet computers: They filled in the

questionnaires assessing the situation

awareness and coordination on a

test basis and practiced the workload

rating. The tablet computers were

then taken to the work places of the

operators.

In each trial before the simulation

was started, all crew members were

provided with two sheets. The first

contained all information on the

starting conditions for the scenario,

such as actual nuclear power and

unavailable components. The second

sheet was provided for notes concerning

any occurring inconsistencies

during the subsequent trial, e.g. in the

OM or on displays.

The simulation started when the

operators had settled in at their work

places. The trial then followed the

predefined target path.

Workload was assessed every

20 minutes using the operators’ tablet

computers at the work stations.

For each scenario at three predetermined

moments the simulation

was briefly stopped. During these

“freezes” the crews had to take their

tablets and leave the FSS for about

10 minutes. In an adjacent room,

the tablet computers were used to

collect data on situation awareness

and coordination. After the freezes,

the operators went back to their

workplaces and the simulation was

resumed.

The trials ended at predefined

DIMs or plant states. After each trial, a

systematic debriefing was carried out

in the FSS, in which the test crews

were asked about specific behavioural

patterns and give their feedback

on any inconsistencies concerning

the OM or other system parts. The

debriefing then continued without

the operators to initially evaluate

task performance and human error

together with all observers.

3 Measurement

of variables

3.1 Task performance

Task performance was the primary

evaluation aspect. It considered the

correctness and completeness with

which the shift crews fulfilled their

tasks. To determine the task performance,

global success criteria (which

were valid for all scenarios), scenario

specific success criteria and task performance

key nodes were defined.

Success criteria

At the end of a scenario it was evaluated

whether the following three

global success criteria were met:

(1) no unforeseen escalation of

the scenario, (2) no damage of major

equipment during the scenario,

(3) and no relevant delay during

the scenario should be caused by

behaviour of the crew. In addition,

three to five scenario specific success

criteria were defined for each scenario.

Task performance key nodes

Furthermore, four to eight critical

points or decisions in the process were

identified (‘key nodes’) for each

scenario to evaluate the task performance.

The expected behaviour at

these key nodes was predefined.

An example of a key node and

related scenario specific success

criteria: During scenario B, an alarm

occurred at a seal of a reactor coolant

pump (RCP). The crew was expected

to make the decision to manually shut

down the RCP before an automatic

shutdown occurred. The task performance

key node here is “manual

trip of the RCP”. The two scenario

specific success criteria associated

with this problem are “After trip

of reactor coolant pump: start

decreasing the power to 0 %” and

“No attempt to restart the RCP”.

The generic assessment questions

as to task performance were:

p Does the crew behave as expected

at the task performance key nodes?

p Are pre-defined scenario-specific

success criteria reached?

p Are the global success criteria

reached?

Data collection was done during the

simulator sessions by observers for

key node performance criteria and

after the session during debriefing for

scenario-specific and global success

criteria. Data collection was done by

operational experts and by human

factors experts. If one of the success

criteria was not met, the scenario trial

was considered failed.

3.2 Human error

Based on a phenotype-oriented

approach of human errors, errors of

omission and errors of commission

were identified based on direct observation

of the operators' be haviours

and related to the predefined target

path for the scenario. If an operator deliberately

deviates from specifications,

e.g. from the OM, then this is not

evaluated as an error, but as a deviation

(and thus a topic of task performance

and not of human error). Beside the

occurrence of errors, we observed

whether the errors were detected by

the operators and whether they were

corrected. If an error was discovered

and corrected in due time, it was not

used for the evaluation of the pass/fail

criteria.

If errors occurred that were not

detected and not corrected, the

severity of these errors was classified

by the validation team as high,

medium, or low. The impact of each

error was evaluated case by case,

with focus on the probability of

con sequences before the error was

detected and corrected, and the

consequences of the error on plant

safety and integrity.

No errors with high severity

should have been left undetected and

uncorrected by the shift team. The

amount of errors with medium and

low severity, which were not detected

and not corrected had to be evaluated

by the validation team if it was

acceptable. For the evaluation of

acceptability, the length of a scenario,

the number of tasks and the type of

operating procedure (NOP, AOP, EOP)

had to be taken into account.

3.3 Situation awareness

In safety research, the concept of

situation awareness was developed to

describe the adequate understanding

of the present state and the foreseeable

future as a prerequisite for any

safe operation. Its assessment is either

focused on an individual’s situation

awareness or on the shared situation

awareness between two or more

agents, from which one can anticipate

important future states. For the

ISV, the concept of shared situation

awareness was adopted, meaning that

situation awareness was ensured as

soon as at least one member of the

crew was aware of the present state

and was able to act accordingly. To

assess situation awareness, a multimethod

approach was adopted:

Method 1 – SAGAT

A comprehensive and well-established

method for the assessment is the

Situation Awareness Global Assessment

Technique (SAGAT) [5] which

allows for a real-time assessment by

freezing a simulated environment and

in the freeze ask agents about their

understanding of the situation.

After the questioning, the answers

obtained in the test are compared

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with the “correct” answers, which

were determined in advance. For the

ISV, we have decided to ask what the

relevant process aspects or process

parameters are in the current situation

and how these parameters will

change in the near future. Furthermore,

we have asked the crews about

their own tasks in the near future and

the goal of these tasks.

Due to the possible complexity

of processes, e.g. during incident

situations, it was clear that using free

test answers in the situation awareness

probes could lead large diversity

of answers which could impair an

appropriate assessment of their correctness.

This multitude of possible

answers might prevent any meaningful

evaluation.

Therefore a multiple choice test for

situation awareness was designed as

follows. Operators were asked for

process parameters or important

aspects which were relevant for the

decision on further procedures at the

moment of the simulator freeze. In

order to predefine the correct answers

for the freezes, we asked three experts

(2 simulator trainers and one process

engineer) independently of each

other, to specify in the freeze situations

which process aspects and

parameters are relevant for decisions

om future tasks and objectives in that

moment of the scenario. For some

cases, the experts had different views

on the relevant parameters. The final

set of offered parameters in the freezes

was based the highest degree of agreement

between the three experts.

For each freeze, six process para meters/aspects

were offered in a multiplechoice

test, three of which were correct

and three were incorrect. The incorrect

paramters/aspects (so-called “distractors”)

should not be obviously irrelevant

– then the test would be too easy.

But they should also not be too similar

to the relevant parameters either –

then the test would be too difficult. The

evaluation showed that we succeeded

in achieving a good level of difficulty

for the choices offered, but unfortunately

not in all cases.

Method 2 – Questions about own

tasks and colleagues’ tasks

During freezes, questions were asked

about future tasks and their objectives

(“When the current task is completed,

which will be your next task and its

objective”). These questions had to be

answered with regard to the own

tasks as well as with regard to the

tasks of the colleagues in the shift

crew (open-ended questions).

Method 3 – Status reports and

team briefings

A third method to assess situation

awareness was based on analysing

the content and thoroughness of

team briefs and status reports

which are a genuine element of the

team inter action in the control room.

Status reports were understood here

as summarized short descriptions

( mostly carried out by the SSV) of the

operational status of the plant or the

status of the most important parameters

and operating conditions.

Status reports were triggered by

external requests of the management

as part of the scenarios, when the

safety engineer entered the control

room, or at shift changes. Team briefs

were requested at strategy changes, or

before starting safety critical actions.

During status reports, the relevant

plant parameters and deviations from

normal operation at that time were

expected to be reported.

Procedure of the measurement

during freezes

During the three freezes, TO, RO and

SSV left their workplaces and moved

to an area outside the simulator. They

were then asked about (a) relevant

process parameters/aspects in the

present situation (multiple-choice:

choose at least three most important

parameters out of six parameters

given and rank order them according

to their importance for the present

situation), (b) the expected development

of these parameters (multiplechoice:

quick/slow decrease or

increase or no change). TO, RO and

SSV answered the questions presented

to them on a tablet computer

with keyboard in written form without

consulting their team members.

Their answers were compared against

the expected answers (based on

experts’ agreement) concerning the

relevant process parameters, tasks

and objectives. (situation awareness

measurement – Method 1).

Afterwards the operators were

asked about their current task

and their next task (coordination

measurement, see 3.5) as well as the

current task and the next task of

their colleagues, and the objectives

of the tasks (situation awareness

measurement – Method 2).

3.4 Communication

To evaluate communication, we have

identified between 13 and 31 measurement

points in each scenario

where communication was expected

to be important.

For these measuring points we

defined which content of communication

was expected (content of

communication) and what type of

communication was expected (quality

of communication). As for the quality

of communication, we distinguished,

between 2-way communication, 3-way

communication, briefing etc. For each

of these communication types, observable

behaviours were defined in order

to assess the quality of communication,

e.g. if the communication was

given in “face-to-face” manner, if

the receiver showed attention or if

the receiver showed a reaction or

expressed or showed understanding.

Both, content und quality of communication

were included in the

observation tool (see section 4) and

were checked by the observers during

a scenario trial.

At relevant points in the scenarios

the quality of communication was

evaluated not only according to

observable criteria, but also using an

overall assessment of the communication

process. A subjective assessment

by the observers was used here (rating

of poor, average or good).

3.5 Coordination

A satisfactory coordination was characterized

by the fact that all operators

knew what their colleagues were

doing (task awareness). For example,

the SSV should know which tasks TO

and RO are performing, the TO should

know which task the RO is performing,

and so on.

Data for coordination were col lected

via questionnaires during freezes.

After the questions concerning situation

awareness, questions for task

awareness of the operators (“Which

task is performed by your colleague

RO/TO/SSV?”) followed.

3.6 Workload

For workload assessment we used the

Bedford Workload Scale [6]. It is a

unidimensional scale that ranks

whether it was possible to complete

the task, if workload was tolerable for

the task, and if workload was satisfactory

without reduction. The scale

uses the concept of spare capacity to

define the levels of workload. A short

explanation of the scale before the

beginning of the scenario allowed

the operators to use it properly and to

rate their workload within seconds.

This allowed repeated measurements

of subjective workload during the

scenarios without too much intrusion

into the primary task. The workload

rating was announced via loudspeaker

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 502

| Fig. 2.

Observation tool to structure the data collection and directly document the results during the Integrated Final Control Room System

Validation (ISV).

every 20 minutes and the self assessment

of workload was performed

immediately without stopping the

scenario.

4 Observation Tool

A special observation tool was developed

to structure the data collection

and directly document the results

during the ISV. This observation tool

was a printed document in book form

in DIN A3 format. For the observation

always the left and right sides were

used simultaneously.

The left page of the tool is divided

into three parts (see Figure 2). In the

upper part of the left page there is a

table for the recording of human

errors. Below the human error table is

as second table in which workload

measurements is to reported with

simulator time and DIM executed. On

the lower part of the left side is a

graphical presentation (flow chart) of

DIMs, which contains the correct path

(marked in red). The graphic contains

additional markers for additional

tasks: markers for simulation freezes

(measurement of situation awareness),

markers for task performance

key nodes and markers for communication

points.

On the right page, the tasks (DIMs)

of the different crew members (TO,

RO, SSV) and all other measurements

are noted. The DIMs are marked in different

colours: yellow for the SSV,

green for the RO and blue for the TO.

Additional measurements of situation

awareness and task performance are

marked in grey. For situation awareness

the column “comment/content”

shows what is expected to be included

in the communication of the crew. The

observers fill in whether these expectations

were met. The same applies to

task performance, where the observer

rate whether defined important tasks

have been completed. The communication

is also rated in the tool. The

simulator time should be entered for

each observation.

5 Experiences

5.1 Methodological approach

Already in the conception of the

study, an attempt was made to avoid

subjective evaluations of behaviour as

far as possible in order to make the

results robust against subjective influences.

This concept has proved highly

successful in the subsequent evaluation,

as a large part of the data was

collected quantitatively and was

therefore easy to evaluate. For the

important variables, (task performance,

situation awareness, communication)

the evaluation was based on

several different methods. This significantly

increased the validity of the

assessment.

In all subjective measurements,

several experts always assessed the

same aspects. In the event of any discrepancies

between them, these were

discussed (e.g. during debriefing) in

order to produce a uniform picture.

The integrated observation tool

was used to document the measurements

which were not recorded

by tablet computer. The tool was

extremely useful for the execution

and evaluation of the ISV and for the

observers’ tasks. With the help of the

observation tool, the course of the

scenario could be followed and it was

used to identify the measuring points

and to document the measurement

results immediately in writing. After

a scenario trial the tool was used

to structure the debriefing. For this

purpose, all pages of the tool were

systematically reviewed, the notes of

the individual observers were queried

and these results were documented

in the observation tools of the HFC

observers. Following the test execution

in the ISV, the tool was used as

test documentation for evaluation.

Here, too, the great usefulness of the

tool was demonstrated, as all observation

results are clearly summarized

in one document.

5.2 Validity

Investigations with behavioural observation

of this kind depend on the

simulation being as realistic as

possible. Only then conclusions can be

drawn from the behaviour in the test

situation to the behaviour in real

situations. With two exceptions, the

behaviour of the crews showed no

signs that a realistic simulation would

not have been successful.

In scenario C the crew is led by a

phone call to the decision to evacuate

the main control room (MCR) and

switch to the remote shutdown station

(RSS). During the trials of scenario C

there were some difficulties to induce

a common understanding of the

dangerousness of the situation. The

crews interpreted the situation more

or less problematically and therefore

wanted to leave the MCR in some

cases very quickly or not at all. An

additional limiting factor to validity

could be the realization of the move

to the RSS, because the evacuation

of the MCR and the move to the

RSS were not simulated realistically.

Although both rooms are present in

the full scope simulator (FSS), their

spatial arrangement does not correspond

to reality (in the FSS, the RSS

is right next to the MCR, with direct

access from the MCR; in reality, the

locations are separated). The move to

RSS was simulated mainly by the shift

waiting in front of the FSS door.

Compliance with certain standards for

the evacuation of the MCR was a key

node in this scenario. The unrealistic

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test environment for the evacuation

considering spatial arrangements as

well as lack of certain plant systems

and equipment could have facilitated

some of the key node failures which

appeared in scenario C. But how

strongly the failures and errors observed

in scenario C is related to the

limited realism of the move to the RSS

can only be assumed.

It became apparent in the ISV

that the members of the shift teams

were sometimes unclear about what

behaviour was expected of them. One

possible limitation of the validity of

the ISV is that it is not certain for every

observed behaviour whether this

behaviour would be shown in the

same way outside the test situation of

the ISV.

5.3 Measurement of situation

awareness

In retrospect, the measurement of

situation awareness turned out to

be the measurement with the most

problems.

One reason for the problems was

the simple question of what time

frame to think of when we ask in the

situation awareness questionnaire

“when the current task will be completed,

what will be the next task?”

Does this question refer to a period

of 1 minute, 10 minutes, 1 hour?

This was interpreted differently by

the crew members, which affected

the content of the answers. It

became apparent that it is absolutely

necessary to clarify such questions

clearly in the instruction before the

test starts.

Furthermore, the questions regarding

the ‘next task’ were answered

very differently in same cases. On the

one hand on a very low level of detail

(“power increase up to 5 %”), on

the other hand on a very high level

of detail (“start LAC14 AP001”). Both

answers were correct, but it was

difficult to assess whether the different

operators really had an identical

understanding of their tasks.

Another critical point in the

measurements was the exactly identical

position of the simulation freezes

in the respective trials. If the freeze

is only slightly shifted on the time

axis, then this can influence the

question of the relevant parameters

and process aspects and their assumed

course.

specifically for ISV has shown to be

very successful.

The tool for observation and

documentation, developed especially

for ISVs, has proven to be very

successful. Especially the approach

to capture as many assessments as

possible directly and synchronously

was very feasible and highly efficient.

Therefore the necessity to use audio

or video recordings was minimized.

The study also showed that –

especially for the survey of situation

awareness - careful preparation is

necessary to achieve reliable results.

This includes, in particular, the

provision of clear written instructions

for the participants.

References

[1] IEC 1771 (1995). Nuclear Power Plants – Main Control Room –

Verification and Validation of Design. IEC, Geneva.

[2] IEC 60964 (1989). Design of Nuclear Power Plants. IEC,

Geneva.

[3] YVL Guide 5.5 (2002). Instrumentation Systems and

Components at Nuclear Facilities.

[4] NUREG 0711 (2912). Human Factors Engineering Program

Review Model – Rev. 3. NUREG, Brookhaven NY.

[5] Endsley, M. R. (1995). Measurement of Situation Awareness in

Dynamic Systems. Human Factors, 37 (1), 65-84.

[6] Roscoe, A. & Ellis, G. (1990). A Subjective Rating Scale for

Assessing Pilot Workload in Flight: A Decade of Practical Use.

Royal Aerospace Establishment, Farnborough.

Authors

Rainer Miller

miller@mto-safety.de

MTO Safety GmbH

Gethsemanestr. 4

10437 Berlin, Germany

Dr. Rodney Leitner

Sina Gierig

Dr. Harald Kolrep

HFC Human-Factors-Consult GmbH

Köpenicker Str. 325

12555 Berlin, Germany

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 503

6 Conclusion

Apart from a few detailed problems in

recording situation awareness the

combination of methods developed

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 504

Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection

in I&C Networks: Strategic Preparation

for the Advent of Information Hiding

based Attacks

Kevin Lamshöft, Tom Neubert, Mathias Lange, Robert Altschaffel, Mario Hildebrandt, Yongdian Ding,

Claus Vielhauer and Jana Dittmann

Planned entry for

1 Introduction Nowadays, there are a lot of defense mechanisms to secure IT-systems

against Cyber attacks. Thus, Cyber attacks have to be more sophisticated than they used to be in

order to stay undetected as long as possible and to bypass defense mechanisms. As a result, current

threats frequently use steganographic techniques to hide malicious functions in a harmless looking

carrier. In [1] an attack for Siemens S7 Simatic Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) is

presented, where the control logic of the PLC is modified while the source code which the PLC presents the engineering

station is retained. As a result, the PLCs functionality is different from the control logic presented to the engineering

station. Furthermore, steganographic techniques are frequently used to hide information in media files.

The work in this paper

has been funded by

the German Federal

Ministry for Economic

Affairs and Energy

(BMWi, Stealth-

Szenarien, Grant No.

1501589A, 1501589B

and 1501589C)

within the scope of

the German Reactor-

Safety-Research-

Program.

This document was

produced with the

financial assistance of

the European Union.

The views expressed

herein can in no way

be taken to reflect the

official opinion of the

European Union.

In [2] BlackBerry Threat Researchers

discovered hidden malicious code in

WAV audio files, where the files were

coupled with a loader component for

decoding and executing malicious

content secretly. Additionally, image

steganography is used in [3] to obfuscate

network traffic. The article [4]

shows how image steganography is

used to hide malicious JavaScript

code in PDF files. In addition, network

traffic is a well-known carrier for

steganography to embed hidden communication.

The work [5] presents

for example a technique which uses

the DNS protocol as steganographic

carrier. However, Industrial Control

Systems (ICS) control essential process

control functions in Nuclear

Power Plants (NPP). They rely on sensors

(collecting information about the

physical process), computing units

(PLCs) and actuators (implementing

the commands issued by the computing

units) and the communication

between these components. These

ICS form complex communication

networks with differing security

require ments. As computer systems,

ICS are target of attacks [10, 11, 12,

13]. These attacks aim at data exfiltration

(an attacker gaining unauthorized

access to data) or data infiltration (an

attacker manipulating digital assets).

In previous work, we evaluated

common protocols found in ICS

environments, like Modbus/TCP and

OPC UA in regards to steganographic

channels. In [27] we take a deeper

look at Modbus/TCP and describe

various methods for hiding information

in ICS networks. In [26] we

propose a method for OPC UA based

hidden channel attacks. In [25] we

provide a broader view on how information

hiding become a novel threat

for nuclear security. Even though

there are various common security

measures like firewalls and IDS, which

can detect and partially mitigate a

broad range of attacks, they still lack

the ability to detect attacks which rely

on information hiding properly. Here,

more complex detection measures are

required. However, since ICS networks

and the employed infrastructure

is different from IT, this carries

different implications for the detection

of attacks as well. This paper aims

at using the specific properties

of ICS networks and protocols in

order to improve the detection of

attacks employing information hiding

measures. After describing the basics

of network information hiding in

Chapter 2, we demonstrate in Chapter

3 how it can be generally applied to

I&C environments and described and

modeled as a kill chain. Chapter 3

concludes with details on how two

common hiding patterns can be

applied to ICS protocols. In Chapter 4

we briefly describe the shortcomings

of common IDSs and apply recommendations

for anomaly detection

to a model factory in order to motivate

further research in this field –

especially the need for developing reliable

detection methods regarding

information hiding based attacks in

this specific domain. Chapter 5 concludes

our findings and gives an outlook

on future research.

2 Network Information

Hiding

Network Information Hiding is only

one subtopic of many in the field of

information hiding and steganography.

Recent research, which also

has implications for I&C communication,

include the pattern based

taxonomy of Wendzel et al. [17] and

its later extension [16], which we

use in this paper to formally describe

potential information hiding based

attacks. A survey of network steganography

and its techniques is presented

in [6]. Information Hiding in the

Internet Protocol has been shown for

the Internet Protocol v4 (IPv4) [19]

as well as the application of covert

channels to IPv6 in real world scenarios

[18]. In order to evaluate

whether rule-based IDS systems

are appropriate to detect covert

channels in ICS protocols, we use

the extended pattern based taxonomy

by Mazurczyk et al. [16], which

is originally introduced by Wendzel

et al. in 2015 [17]. Hidden channels

in network communication can be

differentiated in storage and timing

channels. The pattern based taxonomy

is an approach to define

general patterns, which are used for

infor mation hiding. The extended

taxo nomy is based on the analysis

of over one hundred information

hiding techniques, and unifies them

into 18 general patterns, of which

are 8 based on packet or flow

timings (timing channel), and 6 on

modification of data of a packet or

flow (storage channel). By this, it is

possible to describe covert channels

in different protocols in a unified

way. We use these patterns in a

reversed way to evaluate if those

patterns can be detected in

common configured rule-based IDS

systems.

Environment and Safety

Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection in I&C Networks: Strategic Preparation for the Advent of Information Hiding based Attacks ı

Kevin Lamshöft, Tom Neubert, Mathias Lange, Robert Altschaffel, Mario Hildebrandt, Yongdian Ding, Claus Vielhauer and Jana Dittmann


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

3 Information Hiding

as a Novel Threat

for I&C environments

In this chapter, we show how network

information hiding can be applied to

the specifics of ICS networks and

describe an exemplary attack scenario

as well as how two generic patterns

can be applied to ICS protocols. In this

paper we focus on information hiding

by modification of existing communication

in a given target network.

As stated in Chapter 2, two categories

of hidden channels can be distinguished

for network information

hiding: timing channels, which modulate

the temporal behavior of a packet

flow and storage channels which

modify contents of specific packets

to embed a secret message or information.

To illustrate the purpose and

functionality of information hiding a

common scenario is the so-called

Prisoners’ Problem where a sender

(usually called Alice) and a receiver

(usually called Bob) are imprisoned in

different cells. This scenario includes

the possibility for Alice to send

messages to Bob, with the limitation

that a warden is able to see and read

the communication. Therefore, the

aim of Alice and Bob is to hide the

actual information within the communication

that is observed by the

warden [15]. In the context of

Industrial Control Systems, Alice and

Bob are usually OT components, for

example PLCs, Human-Machine-

Interfaces (HMI) and Engineering

Workstations, or network elements

like switches, hubs and firewalls.

Based on this assumption, we can

differentiate between active, passive

and hybrid information hiding (see

[27]). When the embedding and

retrieval takes place at the originating

entities (e.g. a PLC and HMI) of

the communication, this is considered

as active hiding, whereas passive

embedding and retrieval takes place

on intermediaries, like switches and

firewalls. The mix between those

two are considered as hybrids. For

the successful use of information

hiding in (ICS) networks we can

define three requirements that need

to be addressed (see [27]): cover

plausibility, protocol-compliance and

warden-compliance. Cover plausibility

refers to the use of cover channels

or objects which are plausible within

the usual, realistic and expected communication

flow and behavior of the

target system. A covert channel is

considered protocol-compliant, when

a modification of a packet or packet

flow does not break the specified

protocol in a way the recipient would

not receive, accept or process the

packet. The warden-compliance can

be differentiated in three levels (based

on probabilities): (1) the message is

hidden in a way that a potential

warden has no knowledge of the

existence of a hidden message (inconspicuous),

(2) the warden has

a suspicion that there is a hidden

message but cannot access it and (3)

the warden can identify and access

but not reconstruct the hidden

message.

3.1 Kill Chain & Exemplary

Attack Scenario

Unfortunately, current defense

mechanisms lack effective measures

against novel attack scenarios with

steganographic techniques. In order

to defend I&C environments an

attack modeling can help to understand

and comprehend attacks with

steganographic techniques to elaborate

protective security mechanisms.

One way to do so, is to use the

Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain

by Hutchings et al. [7]. The Kill Chain

is a 7-stage-model (Reconnaissance

(1), Weaponization (2), Delivery (3),

Exploitation (4), Installation (5),

Command & Control (6) and Action

on Objectives (7)) developed by the

U.S. company Lockheed Martin

Corporation and is briefly described

in [7]. It is developed to analyze

cyber-attacks (especially advanced

persistent threats) and to derive

security mechanisms along all phases

of the attack modeling. Furthermore,

attack indicators can be elaborated

based on the Kill Chain attack modeling.

The Kill Chain is described as a

“chain” because an interruption of

the “chain” will stop the entire attack

process. So, an attacker has to go

through the entire Kill Chain to reach

their goals and a defender can stop an

attack on every phase.

3.1.1 Attack Scenario

In this work, we design a fictional and

exemplary attack scenario which

could take place in an I&C environment.

We conduct Kill Chain attack

modelling in order to demonstrate

how the modelling works for attacks

with steganographic techniques in I&C

environments and how it could reveal

security vulnerabilities. Furthermore,

security mechanisms can be elaborated

based on the attack modelling.

The fictional attack scenario is based

on the BSI-CS 005E Top 4 scenario [8]

and the MITRE ATT&CK® Framework

for ICS. For our exemplary scenario

we assume that the firmware of a

PLC is corrupted via a supply chain

attack or modified by an inside threat

(e.g. third-party contractors). The corrupted

firmware enables the ability to

embed hidden information into the

data which is sent to the plant historian.

The retrie val takes place on the

workstation of the analyst who has

access to the plant historian’s data.

By this procedure, it is possible to

exfiltrate valuable information from

higher security levels.

3.1.2 Kill Chain Attack Modelling

In this section, we model the introduced

attack vector with the Kill

Chain and propose security mechanisms

and attack indicators based

on the modelling. The modelling is

visualized in Figure 1. In Phase 1

( Reconnaissance) the attacker has to

gain information on the network

infrastructure. Common scenarios

are social engineering, insiders, and

targeted attacks e.g. on document

servers. To mitigate Phase 1 awareness

for social engineering can be

improved by special trainings of

the employees. During Phase 2

( Weaponization) the development of

the ( manipulated) firmware and the

receiving tool takes place. In Phase 2,

defenders cannot directly prevent the

attack, but comparable attacks which

include steganographic techniques

can be analyzed and evaluated.

The 3 rd Phase (Delivery) brings the

malware developed in Phase 2 to the

I&C environment. In this scenario, the

PLC gets manipulated before it is

delivered to the plant. The tool for

receiving could be delivered by

removable devices (e.g. by utilizing

common steganographic methods to

avoid detection) or developed in-situ

by the employee which has access to

the data historian. To stop the attack

in Phase 3 all delivery vectors need to

be monitored closely and mitigated

by structural defensive measures.

Phase 4 (Exploitation) takes place

by delivery and installation of the

infected PLC as well as the installation

of the receiving tool via USB or in-situ

development. To prevent the attack,

defensive methods against supply

chain attacks need to be implemented

(e.g. code reviews). Phase 5 (Installation)

is done with delivery of the PLC

or triggered by time or certain events

(logic bomb). The installation of the

receiving tool takes place on the data

analysts’ workstation. The malware

might be detected by anti-virus-software.

During Phase 6 (Command &

Control) the usual network traffic

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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 506

| Fig. 1.

Kill Chain model of the exemplary attack scenario.

from the PLC to historian is misused to

hide information within this data

which is then stored on the historian.

Detection approaches for Phase 6 are

discussed in Chapter 4.2 and in Chapter

5. In Phase 7 the hidden information

is extracted from the historian

and exfiltrated by the data analyst.

Screening, device control, and logging

mechanisms might mitigate the exfiltration.

3.2 Exemplary Generic Hidden

Channels in ICS protocols

To illustrate the threat and applicability

of hidden communication we

describe two hidden channel patterns

that are applicable to most ICS protocols

and could be part of the

previously described attack scenario:

(1) Payload Modulation and (2) Inter-

Packet Timing Modulation. Even

though there is a large variety of

different protocols, that are used in

ICS environments, most of them share

certain inherent characteristics that

can be (mis-)used for information

hiding. A common example is the

periodic transmission of sensor data

of a PLC to another entity in a specific

timing interval. Independently from

the used protocol a potential adversary

can encode a hidden message by

manipulating those timings, e.g. by

delaying certain packets for a given

amount of time. This can be done in

an active way (e.g. on the PLC and

receiving entity), in a passive way by

network elements or in a hybrid form.

For example, a compromised PLC can

delay responses to embed a single bit

into one packet, whereas a network

element (e.g. a switch) can observe

and calculate those delays to decode

the hidden message of the PLC. This

pattern is called Inter-Packet Timing

Modulation [16]. Another common

scenario is the transmission of sensor

data or high-resolution set points,

e.g. temperatures. Depending on the

resolution, the payload modulation

pattern [16] can be used by altering

the least significant bit (LSB) of sensor

data to encode a hidden message. In

high resolution readings, such modifications

alter the sensor data only

slightly, and therefore do not have

impact on the controlled (physical)

process while being unnoticeable for

humans.

4 Strategic Preparation &

Anomaly Detection

In this chapter we briefly describe the

limitations of common IDS systems

regarding the detectability of information

hiding in ICS networks and

apply, as a first step, measures of

anomaly detection to a real-world ICS

demonstrator.

4.1 Limitations of common IDS

systems

Different security measures are in

use in the domain of information

technology. Some of these measures

are also applied in the domain of ICS.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)

collect data from either the network

(network-based IDS) or from the

computer systems within a network

(host-based IDS). This data is checked

for the signatures of known attacks

or suspicious behavior patterns.

Anomaly detection is the reversal of

an IDS. While an IDS looks for known

patterns of malicious behavior, an

anomaly detection detects unusual

behavior (see [9] for more details).

In order to achieve this, an IDS needs

to have a model of normal behavior.

Usually, anomaly detection learns

this usual behavior during a training

phase.

Common Intrusion Detection Systems,

like Snort [20] and Suricata

[21] use signatures of known patterns

or suspicious behavior patterns to

detect potential attacks. For the

example of Modbus/TCP there are

several rulesets for Snort and

Suricata [22, 23]. For example, the

Quickdraw Rule Set [22] defines

certain IP(-ranges), that are allowed

to communicate with each other. The

rule set also checks for known attack

patterns, e.g. denial of service attacks.

Other rule sets, e.g. [23] are built

upon the Modbus/TCP specification

and test against any violations.

As described in Chapter 3, these

pro cedures are mainly testing for

protocol- compliance. Since many

information hiding based attacks,

e.g. the exemplary attacks of chapter

3.2, can be performed within the

limits protocol-compliance, those IDS

systems are not able to detect the

hidden communication. Especially the

category of timing-based channels

are not detectable by those means

without further extensions. However,

certain storage channels, for example

the use of unused fields, are detectable

by those systems, if specific

rules, that check against those known

signatures, are available.

Due to these limitations, we are

going in the opposite direction by

using anomaly detection as a first

step towards detecting information

hiding in I&C environments. As a first

starting point we use the BSI CS 134E

recommendations [9] and evaluate

how they could be applied to real

world scenario.

4.2 Applying the BSI CS 134E

two a real world scenario

For an anomaly detection it is important

to filter data in a targeted and efficient

way. This requires a selection of

processes and procedures. For these

analysis criteria are defined so that

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

the Security Information and Event

Management (SIEM) can determine

the normal state. This is used as a

reference for future analyses. Over a

longer period of time, an image of the

normal state is generated during a

training phase in an uncompromised

I&C system. Thus, the SIEM can store

data of events, such as cycle times of

processes or DHCP requests from

known devices in the network, in

order to evaluate future events with

this data. Therefore, a decision is

made whether the event is cate gorized

as an anomaly. In order to specifi cally

detect anomalies, a SIEM system at

the University of Applied Sciences

Magdeburg-Stendal is integrated into

a model factory to evaluate different

attacks and their detection levels. The

model factory represents the production

process of a complete filling

plant with different production

sections including distillery. Various

system data of the sections of the

model factory are logged, then

centrally analyzed and interpreted in

SIEM. Figure 2 shows an example of

where and which data could be

collected, based on the proposals of

the BSI [9]. Three mechanisms shall

be used: logging, network access

control (NAC) and netflow analysis.

Logging data can be collected directly

at the PLCs of the individual sections

of the model factory, such as at the

distillery or during the filling process.

Process data (sensor values, frequency,

cycle times, ...), access to the

PLCs (user, time, ...) and ICS protocol

data (unusual error messages, faulty

data packets, ...) are logged. Further

information is available on intelligent,

manageable switches. These provide

logging data about network activities

(device logins, DHCP requests, data

packets from unknown devices, ...).

Permanent communication between

the switches and the NAC server automatically

detects the devices currently

connected to the network. Intruders

can be immediately identified, moved

to quarantine zones or logically separated

from the network. In addition to

this feature, the devices can also be

checked for security guidelines for

devices within the network, such as

the latest firmware version, software

installed on the devices and others.

The investigation is rounded off by

the integration of a netflow analysis.

In addition to the possibilities of

monitoring and optimized display,

this offers network behavior anomaly

detection, as well as real-time DDoS

detections and application performance

monitoring.

The presentation of the results can

be user-specific, the spectrum ranges

from a traffic light system to detailed

reports. The difficulty with the detection

of hidden channels lies in the fact

that the data is hidden in usual user

data and transported over normal

network traffic and is not detected

with the previous control routines

because it does not appear to be an

anomaly. The big challenge is to

identify the right indicators and tools

for hidden channel attacks or to

develop them if necessary. In this

way, an intelligent linking of the analysis

mechanisms can contribute to a

more efficient plausibility control of

the transmitted data in I&C systems

and thus improve IT security. Still,

even by applying those measures, a

reliable detection of previously

unknown hidden channels remains a

challenge.

5 Conclusion

Based on the findings of chapter 4

we have to adjust our detection

approaches in future work. For future

detection approaches, we are planning

to design detection approaches

based on machine learning. For our

machine learning based detection

approaches, we will design a comprehensible

feature space with handcrafted

features. Approaches based on

machine learning have to be trained

with representative training data of

an I&C environment. Therefore, we

will set up our own fictitious reference

facility to acquire representative network

traffic and consequently training

and test data. When training and test

data is available, we will extract the

handcrafted feature spaces from the

data and train a classifier which

should be able to detect steganographic

or abnormal network traffic.

Therefore, One-Class-Classifier or

Two-Class-Classifier could be trained.

For a One-Class-Classifier we train

only the target class with known-good

network traffic to detect outliers of

this class. For a Two-Class-Classifier

we need to train one class with

known-good network traffic and

one class with abnormal or steganographic

network traffic, then the

classifier decides if test data belongs

to known-good class or the class with

abnormal network traffic. Thus, we

need to generate steganographic

network traffic to build a Two-Class­

Classifier. In this paper, we showed

the emergence of information hiding

as a new threat for I&C environments

and the limitations of common

IDS systems against such attacks.

Anomaly detection based systems

need to be adapted and extended in

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 507

| Fig. 2.

Presentation of data logging with inclusion of I&C components of the model factory at PLC level.

Environment and Safety

Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection in I&C Networks: Strategic Preparation for the Advent of Information Hiding based Attacks

ı Kevin Lamshöft, Tom Neubert, Mathias Lange, Robert Altschaffel, Mario Hildebrandt, Yongdian Ding, Claus Vielhauer and Jana Dittmann


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 508

order to accurately and reliably detect

such novel attack patterns for this

specific domain. In the future,

machine learning based approaches

will be further investigated as a

possible solution for the detection

and mitigation of information hiding

based attacks in I&C environments.

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[3] z3roTrust: “ScarCruft APT Malware Uses Image Steganography”

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media/EISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5.pdf (23/05/2018),

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[12] N. Falliere, L. O Murchu, E. Chien: “W32.Stuxnet Dossier”,

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dossier.pdf(18/05/2018), 2011.

[13] Ralf Spenneberg, Maik Brüggemann, Hendrik Schwartke:

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www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-

Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-ThePLC-wp.

pdf (23/05/2018), 2016.

[14] S. Gallagher: “Vulnerable industrial controls directly connected

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(23/05/2018), 2018.

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[16] Mazurczyk, Wojciech, Steffen Wendzel, and Krzysztof Cabaj.

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Lange, Matthias; Szemkus, Martin; Neubert, Tom; Vielhauer,

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[Konferenz: 3. International Conference on Nuclear Security,

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[26] Hildebrandt, Mario; Lamshöft, Kevin; Dittmann, Jana;

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PapersOnLine. Berlin, Germany.

Authors

Kevin Lamshöft

kevin.lamshoeft@ovgu.de

Robert Altschaffel

Mario Hildebrandt

Jana Dittmann

Otto-von-Guericke University

Magdeburg

ITI Research Group on Multimedia

and Security

University Square 2

39106 Magdeburg, Germany

Tom Neubert

Claus Vielhauer

Brandenburg University of Applied

Sciences

Department of Informatics &

Media

Magdeburger Straße 50

14770 Brandenburg an der Havel,

Germany

Mathias Lange

Yongdian Ding

Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal

University of Applied Sciences

Institute for Electrical Engineering

Breitscheidstr. 2

39114 Magdeburg, Germany

Environment and Safety

Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection in I&C Networks: Strategic Preparation for the Advent of Information Hiding based Attacks ı

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the

Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS

Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch

Introduction In a hypothetical severe accident in a light water reactor (LWR) the failure of

decay heat removal might lead to the destruction of the reactor core. After the reactor pressure

vessel has melted through, the molten core of the reactor reaches the concrete basement. This leads

to a Molten Core – Concrete Interaction, in which the melting of the concrete starts. In order to

assess the safety and the development of the so-called fourth phase of a core decomposition

accident, the consequences of such an interaction are of great interest.

MCCI is mainly associated with the

following three issues, that threaten

the integrity of the containment. First,

the pressure build-up in the containment

up to overpressure failure

caused by the release of non-condensable

H 2 during the decomposition

of the concrete. Secondly, the

composition of the containment

atmosphere, resulting from releases of

gases and aerosols, can potentially

lead to accumulation of hydrogen

with a subsequent possible hydrogen

combustion. And thirdly, the propagation

of the melt front as a consequence

of the erosion of the concrete basement.

How strong the presented

issues are, depends on several parameters,

for example the composition

of the concrete, composition of the

melt and the decay heat. The BETA

experiments (BETA stands for the

German BETon-Schmelze-Anlage)

performed at KIT (Karlsruhe Institute

of Technology) are to be investigated

here. The experiments cover a wide

range of temperatures and power

rates typical in accident conditions for

different compositions of concrete

and melt. Two big test series were

conducted at the KIT. The first series

from 1984 to 1986 included 19

experiments, which consist of four

different parts and the second from

1990 to 1992 included 6 more experiments

in two parts [ALS95]. The

validation work presented focuses,

due to the large number of experiments,

on the BETA test series with

silicate concrete and shows simulations

with the severe accident analysis

code COCOSYS 3.0 in AC 2 2019. An

objective of the simulations con ducted

is the analysis and assessment of the

code capabilities to simulate the most

relevant phenomena related in particular

to concrete erosion. For the

first part of the simulations, an input

deck was created. It considers the

recommended values for the effective

heat transfer coefficient [SPE12] and

the decomposition enthalpy and temperature

of the respective com position

of the concrete. In the second part of

the simulations, the effective heat

transfer coefficient was adjusted separately

for each experiment to develop

a correlation between heating power

and the effective heat transfer coefficient.

In this first step the cor relation

is initially only valid for the BETA experiments.

The correlation must be

tested in further work on alternative

independent experiments that are not

part of this work.

The following work will give an

overview of the most important information

about the BETA facility, test

| Fig. 1.

BETA Test Facility [ALL07].

Planned entry for

conduct, as well as the cocosys modelling

approach. After this description,

some selected results regarding erosion,

as well as a correlation between

the heating power and the effective

heat transfer coefficient will be presented.

BETA facility and test conduct

The BETA test facility depicted in

Figure 1, consists mainly of a concrete

crucible containing the melt, which

simulates the reactors basement

sufficiently. The height of the crucible

is 280 cm and the diameter is 108 cm.

The diameter of the cavern of 38 cm

has been selected so that the gas

This work is funded

by the German

Federal Ministry of

Economic Affairs and

Energy under grant

number 1501568 on

the basis of a decision

by the German

Bundestag.

The simulations are

performed with the

code version

COCOSYS V3.0,

developed by GRS.

509

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION

Research and Innovation

Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 510

Test Melt Power [kW] Remarks

V1.5

V1.6

V1.7

V1.8

V1.9

V2.1

V2.2

V2.3

V5.1

V5.2

V5.3

300 kg Steel + 50 kg Oxide

300 kg Steel + 50 kg Oxide

300 kg Steel + 80 kg Oxide

350 kg Steel + 130 kg Oxide

350 kg Steel + 130 kg Oxide

300 kg Steel + 130 kg Oxide

300 kg Steel + 100 kg Oxide

300 kg Steel + 100 kg Oxide

| Tab. 1.

BETA Experiments [ALS95].

300 kg Steel

+ 50 kg Oxide

+ 80 kg Zr

450

1000

1700

1900

400 - 200

120 - 150

400 - 1000

600 - 200

400

200

800

release and the heat transfer at the

bottom are not influenced by the vertical

walls [ALS86]. With a height of

175 cm of the cavern a maximum axial

erosion of 105 cm and a maximum

radial erosion of 35 cm are possible.

In the BETA test series, the melt,

which was generated by a thermite

reaction, typically consists of 300 kg

of a metal phase and 150 kg of an

oxide phase [CRA13]. The metallic

composition of iron, nickel and

chromium is typical for a reactor case.

Zirconium is added in some experiments

in order to be able to assess its

influence in a hypothetical severe

accident. The oxide melt is made of

aluminium oxide to which, depending

on the purpose of the experiment, calcium

oxide and/or silicon oxide is

added. This allows the melt to be

simulated in a very realistic way, both

from the chemical and the physical

point of view. [ALS86]

The melt is then poured into the

concrete crucible. The temperature of

the melt at the beginning of interaction

ranges from 2,000 K to 2,200 K.

Using an induction coil enclosing

the concrete, the melt is heated electrically

with a net heating capacity

of up to 2,500 kW. As a result, an

extremely high heat flow from the

melt to the concrete is possible. Due to

the heating method, heating is only

possible in the metallic melt, which

dominates the MCCI process. The

densities of the used oxide and metal

melt correspond to a typical ratio for a

very long MCCI phase in a reactor case

after a few days. The different MCCI

phases are reproduced in BETA by a

series of experiments at various power

and temperature levels. In addition,

depending on the purpose of the

experiment, the initial composition of

the melt and the type of concrete are

varied.

The V1 series studied the MCCI

of siliceous concrete and very high

Siliceous concrete

Siliceous concrete

Siliceous concrete

Siliceous concrete

Siliceous concrete, CaO added

Siliceous concrete

Siliceous concrete, CaO added

Siliceous concrete, CaO added

Siliceous concrete, Zr added

Siliceous concrete, Zr and

Fission Product Mock-ups added

heating power, while the V2 series

used lower heating power. In the V3

series, limestone and LCS concrete

was used. The V4.1 test studied

the effect of a larger crucible and

zirco nium addition. In V5 series,

zirconium and fission product mockups

were added to the melt, and in

V6.1 there was a water pool behind

the concrete sidewall. Further and

more detailed information about the

experiments considered here can be

found in Table 1.

The measurement of the progression

of the melt, as well as the temperature

of the melt, is possible via

an instrumentation in the crucible

with 110 equally distributed thermocouples.

Additional temperature

measuring lances, introduced from

above into the melt, measure the temperatures

of the metal melt and the

oxide melt in dependence of time.

Filter samples are used to analyse all

gases evolved by the melt for their

composition and containing aerosols.

[ALS86]

Modelling approach

with COCOSYS V3.0

For the modelling of the BETA experiments,

the concrete cavern must first

be defined. Its geometrical data can be

found in the test descriptions. For the

respective structures, in addition to

the type of structure, the heat conduction

model and heat transfer

model for the left and right areas of

the zones must be selected. This part

of the modelling has been taken from

investigations already performed.

[AGE18]

The implementation of the MCCI

interaction is done with some margin

over some parameters. In addition to

the failure time of the RPV, the

required material data from the

material database, the solidus and

liquidus temperature of the melt and

the geometry information of the

cavity, the composition of the concrete

must be specified. Changes in the

composition of the concrete always

involve a change in density, the

enthalpy of decomposition and the

decomposition temperature of the

concrete. These values, especially the

decomposition enthalpy, can often

only be determined experimentally

[PEE83]. Therefore, the decomposition

enthalpy is determined using

comparable concrete compositions

[ALS92]. However, not all components

of the concrete can be considered

because some material data

is missing in the material data

bank (MDB). Accordingly, the simulated

components are extrapolated

to 100 %. The influence of the

missing components can be neglected

because of the very low mass

fraction.

After that, the melt is to be defined

and since it is stratified, metal and

oxide must be defined separately.

Starting from the initial temperature,

which is identical in both phases, the

respective constituents need to be

specified. In addition, in the metallic

layer, the introduced heating power of

the inductive heating method is

dependent on the time, over which

the decay heat is simulated. In the

experiments, the planned inductive

heating was never continuously introduced

into the melt, since in the

experiments dispersion of oxide and

melt was observed. Due to the dispersion,

the power could not be transmitted

constantly. The individual metallic

phases became too small and this influenced

the effectiveness of the coil.

Therefore, the energy in the melt

measured during the experiment is

entered into the melt. It was not always

possible to keep the heating period

of all experiments identical. For

example, very high heat outputs could

only be maintained for a short period

of 500 s (V1.5), whereas, in experiments

with low heat outputs (V2.1),

heating could be maintained for more

than 6,000 s. What follows is that a

comparison of the experiments with

each other is possible only in the phases

continuous heating.

Another important factor in the

modelling of both layers is the effective

heat transfer coefficient (HTC),

which is given in the simulations via

HEFF and has a great influence on the

concrete erosion [SPE18]. The factor

determines, in addition to the decomposition

temperature, the total

heat transfer of the melt to the concrete.

The decomposition temperature

determines the interface temperature

Research and Innovation

Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

between melt and concrete. In this

investigation a decomposition temperature

of 1523 K is assumed, whereby

ongoing investigations suggest a

value of approx. 1800 K [FOI19]. The

HTC must be defined for each layer

upwards, to the side, and downwards.

Also, between the two layers, a heat

transfer must be determined. In

metallic layers, HTC is always higher

than in oxide layers. This can be

explained by the higher conductivity

of the metal compared to oxides. The

first approach is that the coefficient

determines the total heat, without

individual effects, such as the crusting

of the melt or the mixing of the

melt by the released gas. A different

approach would be to calculate these

effects separately.

The investigations here only relate

to the experiments with silicate

concrete, which are the experiments

of the series V1.x, V2.x and V5.x. The

values recommended by GRS for

HEFF are shown in Figure 2.

The first simulations are performed

with these values for HEFF. In a

second set of simulations, HEFF is

adjusted separately for each experiment

using a parameter variation and

adjusted to the measured erosion.

The parameters that best represent

the measured erosion are shown in

Figure 5 and will be evaluated and

the end of this work. The results

of both simulations are presented

and compared in this work. Also, a

possible relationship between the

heat output and the effective heat

coefficient is shown.

| Fig. 2.

Recommended values of the effective heat transfer, the decomposition enthalpy and the decomposition

temperature for siliceous concrete. [SPE12] [ALS92] [ALS95]

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 511

Simulation results

Before the results adapted to the

erosion are shown, it is first of all

advisable to present the simulated

erosion of the initial simulations. This

provides a better overview over the

improvements.

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the

axial erosions of the experiments

and their simulations with silicate

concrete, without additives in the

melt. As already described above, the

experiments can only be compared

with each other during periods of

simultaneous heating. Therefore, only

the first 1,000 s of the experiments are

shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.

The figures show the effective

measured heating capacities, as the

planned heating capacities could not

always be achieved or maintained.

Starting with V2.1 with an effective

heating capacity of approx. 140 kW,

the level is rising up to V1.8 with a

heating capacity of 1,900 kW.

| Fig. 3.

Simulation results with recommended values for HEFF of the axial erosion of siliceous concrete without addition into the melt.

| Fig. 4.

Simulation results with adjusted values for HEFF of the axial erosion of siliceous concrete without addition into the melt.

Research and Innovation

Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 512

| Fig. 5.

Correlation between the adjusted HEFF and the heating power for the axial and radial erosion of the BETA experiments

with siliceous concrete without and with addition of zirconium in the melt.

In the simulations with the initial

modelling (Figure 3), the axial

erosion in V2.1 is clearly underestimated,

whereas in V1.6 – V1.8 it is

over estimated. The erosion can be

re presented well only in case of V1.5.

In the experiments with higher

heat output, in particular, the strong

erosion rate at the beginning cannot

be reproduced by the simulation.

With increasing heating power,

the difference in the early phase

between experiment and simulation

becomes more and more apparent.

V1.8 stands out because neither the

erosion depth nor the consistently

high erosion speed can be simulated

with the recommended values

[SPE12].

The axial erosions of the adjusted

simulations are shown in Figure 4.

The adaption is only done on the

effective heat transfer coefficients

as previously explained, while the

decomposition temperature and decomposition

enthalpy stay constant.

The variation of HEFF better simulates

erosion in all experiments. The

initial strong increase cannot be

improved only by adjusting HEFF.

However, the course of the erosion in

the further experiment is reproduced

much better.

In order to be able to evaluate a

possible connection between the heat

input and adjusted HEFF, the two

variables are plotted against each

other shown in Figure 5. This connection

is separated between the

value of HEFF in the axial and radial

directions. The radial values are

significantly smaller than those for

the axial direction due to the lower

radial erosion. Using the drawn

regression curves for the silicate

concrete in Figure 5, the relationship

between the heating power and the

effective heat transfer coefficient

can be better represented. It can be

seen that a higher heat output results

in a higher effective heat transfer

coefficient.

This relationship might be explained

by an increased movement

of the melt, which then leads to an

improved heat transfer between melt

and concrete. The higher velocity of

the melt is, amongst other things,

due to the greater erosion volume at

higher heat output. Due to the larger

erosion volume, a higher gas release,

which additionally sets the melt

in motion, can be assumed. The

described effect has a greater influence

on the axial direction, relative to

the radial direction. In addition to the

simulations with silicate concrete

without additions in the melt, the

variation was also carried out on the

experiments with additionally added

zirconium to the melt (V5.1 – V5.3).

The corresponding values are also

shown in Figure 5. They are higher

than the values for the axial

erosion in the simulations for silicate

concrete without additives in the

melt. Zir co nium causes an exothermic

chemical oxidation reaction and

introduces more energy into the

melt, which can be equated with

an additional heat input. This results

in a higher erosion of the concrete,

compared to the experiments without

zirconium with the same heat input.

The higher erosion, in turn, leads to

an additional movement of the melt.

Thereby the heat transfer from the

melt to the concrete is improved.

This improvement is reflected in

an increased value for HEFF, as

seen in Figure 5. The influence

of zirconium in the melt shows

a differentiated behaviour for radial

erosion. In contrast to the adjusted

parameter in the axial direction, it

decreases in the radial direction

compared to the base simulation.

From this, as expected, it can be

concluded that the heat output is

not the only influencing parameter

responsible for the heat transfer

between melt and concrete.

Conclusion

The results for the erosion investigated

here show that COCOSYS V3.0

is able to simulate the presented

BETA experiments. It is possible to

map erosion depths and gradients.

Deviations can be recognized only at

high heating power and the associated

high erosion rates at the beginning

of MCCI. For this effect, there is still

potential for development.

The investigations have also shown

that the recommended modelling

of a melt-concrete interaction, with

constant heat transfer coefficients

HEFF, between melt and concrete, at

different heat outputs, is not optimal

yet. Increasing heating power results

in higher heat transfer coefficients.

However, this is not solely dependent

on the heating power, as the influence

of zirconium in the melt has shown.

In the adjusted simulations, HEFF

increases in the axial direction

with the addition of zirconium in

the melt, whereas HEFF decreases

in the radial direction. There must

be other para meters that have an

influence on the heat transfer between

melt and concrete. These include

the release of gas by the decomposition

of the concrete, the crusting

by the soli dification of the melt, as

well as the temperature between the

melt and the concrete. Specifically,

the decompo sition temperature of the

concrete is currently being investigated

with the MOCKA experiments

[FOI19].

First of all, the correlation between

the effective heat coefficient and

the heating power needs to be

tested and described in more

detail with in dependent experiments

with similar concrete composition.

The heat transfer coefficient is not

constant during MCCI and it is recommended

to develop a correlation

Research and Innovation

Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

where the heat transfer is recalculated

during the interaction, to consider

the effect of a variable decay heat,

for example. This requires further

investigation in order to identify as

many influencing parameters as

possible and to incor porate them

into the correlation.

References

[AGE18] K. Agethen, M. Hoffmann, M.K. Koch: Analyse und

Bewertung der COCOSYS-Modellbasis zu Ex-Vessel

Phänomenen während MCCI. Technischer Fachbericht

zum Forschungsvorhaben BMWi 1501512, AG Plant

Simulation and Safety, Ruhr-Universität Bochum,

2018, PSSTR3.

[ALS86] H. Alsmeyer, C. Adelhelm, H.-G. Dillmann, J. Foit, M.

Heinle, W. Ratajczak, H. Schneider, G. Schumacher,

A. Skokan, S. Stiefel, W. Tromm; BETA experiments on

melt-concrete interaction: the role of Zirconium and

the potential sump water contact during melt-down

accidents. Bd. 154. 61-68 No. 1. DOI: 10.1016/

0029-5493(94)00898-9. – Nuclear Engineering und

Design, 1986, S. 61–68.

[ALS92] H. Alsmeyer: Proceedings of the Second OECD (NEA)

CSNI Specialist Meeting on Molten Core Debris-

Concrete Interactions, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in

collaboration with Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe,

April 1992, NEA/CSNI/R(92)10.

[ALS95] H. Alsmeyer, G. Cenerino, E. Cordfunke, D. Fioravanti,

M. Fischer, J. Folt, L. Howe, M. Huntelaar, S. Locatelli,

F. Parozzi, J. Szabo, B. Turland, M. Vidard, D. Wegener;

Molten corium/concrete interaction and corium

coolability - A state of the art report. (EUR16649),

European Commision - Nuclear Science und

Technology, 1995.

[ALL07] H.-J. Allelein, S. Arndt, W. Klein-Heßling, K. Neu, N.

Reinke, S. Schwarz, B. Schwinges, C. Spengler,

G. Weber: Intensivierte Validierung der

Rechenprogramme COCOSYS und ASTEC, Final Report,

November 2007, GRS-A-3330.

[CRA13] M. Cranga, C. Spengler, K. Atkhen, S. Bechta,

P. Bottomley, P. Dejardin, A. Fargette, M. Fischer,

J.J. Foit, R. Gencheva, P. Grudev, E. Guyez, J.F. Haquet,

C. Journeau, G. Langrock, B. Michel, C. Mun, G. Ratel,

T. Sevon, B. Spindler: State-of-the-Art-Report on MCCI

in dry conditions: Analysis of experiments, modelling

and reactor applications, IRSN, August 2013, PSN-

RES/SAG/2013-00076.

[FOI19] J.J. Foit, T. Cron, B. Fluhrer: Melt/Concrete Interface

Temperature relevant to MCCI Process, Karlsruhe

Institute of Technology (KIT), The 9 th European Review

Meeting on Severe Accident Research (ERMSAR2019),

March 2019

[PEE83] M. Peehs, R. Höpfl, B. Gather, R. Blachnik: Die

integrale Schmelzeenthalpie von Reaktorbeton

als thermophysikalische Eingangsgröße von

Unfallfolgemoedellen des hypothetischen

Kernschmelzeunfalls, Journal of Nuclear Materials 118

p. 206-213, 1983.

[SPE12] C. Spengler, S. Arndt, J. Arndt, J. Bakalov, S. Band,

J. Eckel, W. Klein-Hessling, H. Nowack, M. Pelzer,

N. Reinke, J. Sievers, M. Sonnenkalb, G.Weber;

Weiterentwicklung der Rechenprogramme COCOSYS

and ASTEC – Abschlussbericht. (GRS – A – 3654),

Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS)

mbH, 2012.

[SPE18] C. Spengler et al., “Uncertainty and Sensitivity

Analyses in Support of Model Development and

Validation of the Containment Module COCOSYS

of the AC2 Code - Application for Molten Corium/

Conrete Interaction (MCCI),” in Proceedings of

NUTHOS-12, Qingdao, China, 2018.

Authors

Maximilian Hoffmann

maximilian.hoffmann@pss.rub.de

Prof. Marco K. Koch

Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Plant Simulation and Safety Group

Universitätsstraße 150

44801 Bochum, Germany

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ISSN 1431-5254

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 513


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 514

Planned entry for

This work is funded

by the German

Federal Ministry of

Economic Affairs and

Energy under grant

number 1501579 on

the basis of a decision

by the German

Bundestag.

The simulations are

performed with the

code version Open-

FOAM-v7 developed

by the OpenFOAM

Foundation.

Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems

with Open Source Code OpenFOAM

Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch

Water hammer phenomena can

generally be divided into two main

parts, the direct and the indirect

phenomena. For the direct water

hammer phenomena, a shock wave

is induced due to the sudden deceleration

of a fluid leading to a local

rise in pressure. The shock wave then

travels through the pipe system and

effects like wave reflection, interference,

superposition are to be

concerned. Furthermore, the valve

closure time as well as the deformation

of the pipe influences the quality

and quantity of the shock wave. On

the other hand, the indirect water

hammer is induced when a local

pressure drop below vapor pressure

leads to evaporation and creation of

steam bubbles. When the pressure

rises again above vapor pressure and

especially big steam bubbles implode

the surrounding water is rapidly

accelerated causing a secondary shock

wave once a sudden deceleration

occurs at impact. [LUE13]

To gain sufficient knowledge of the

important physical effects regarding a

water hammer phenomena detailed

CFD analysis are performed using

the open source code OpenFOAM.

Effects like propagation of shock

waves, cavitation and fluid structure

interaction will be included in the

code as there is no default capability

to model such phenomena. [GRE19]

In order to test the applicability of

the default code as well as the newly

implemented cavitation model two

water hammer experiments at the test

facility “Heißdampfreaktor” (HDR)

will be modelled under simplified

conditions. The implementation of

the cavitation model basis within

the Volume of Fluid (VOF) based,

fully compressible, multi fluid solver

compressibleMultiphaseInterFoam is

described also discussing model

strength, restrictions and weaknesses.

The simulation results for the two

experiments will be compared with

and without cavitation model in order

Introduction During a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in certain types of boiling water

reactors the continuous undersupply of cooling water eventually leads to the degradation of the

reactor core. In order to prevent such an accident, the loss of cooling water is prevented through

fast closing valves in the cooling circuit. However, the valve closing process can induce a so called

water hammer phenomena in the pipe systems which can damage structures within the cooling

circuit. [GIO04]

to qualify and quantify the cavitation

influence during the water hammer

phenomena. At the end potential code

improvements and upcoming work is

shortly presented.

Model basis and cavitation

model implementation

The Volume of Fluid (VOF) based

solver compressibleMultiphaseInter-

Foam is fully compressible as density

can be computed with multiple accessible

equations of state (EOS) also

regarding thermal effects. The

interface tracking method between

multiple non mixable fluids allows for

a detailed representation of interface

motion including surface tension

effects. However, the mesh resolution

at the interface needs to be very

high in order to give accurate results

leading to high computational costs

for complex multiphase flows. In

general, this method is used for free

surface flows or in combination with

so called mixture models to model the

free surface of bigger bubbles within a

continuous fluid. In this study the

VOF method is used to model the free

surface between water and steam in

the upper RDB as well as macroscopic

cavitation effects in the check valve

region and in the pipe system as mass

transfer across the interface is well

described for this method. [WAR13]

[GRE19]

In order to model the water

hammer experiments without temperature

driven phase change in the

upper RPV (Figure 3) a continuous

non-condensable steam phase a g

(eq. 3) is considered. For the pressure

driven phase change a mass transfer

term

regarding the

condensation rate and vaporization

rate is added to the continuity

equation for water a l (eq. 1)

and condensable steam a v (eq. 2)

[YU17]:


(1)



(2)

(3)

Using the expansion of the convection

term

and expressing the time

plus the advective derivative

as the resulting set of equations

can be summed to formulate the

velocity divergence as [YU17]


(4)

With equation 4 and an artificial

compression Term C to keep interfaces

sharp the final set of transport

equations can be expressed as [YU17]

[GRE19]:




(5)

(6)

(7)

Similarly the pressure equation is

modified by subtracting the source

term from the incompressible

part leading to following formulation

Research and Innovation

Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems with Open Source Code OpenFOAM ı Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

of the pressure equation with the

compressibility Ψ: [YU17] [GRE19]

compressible:

incompressible:


(8)

A more detailed description can be

found in the paper of Yu et al [YU17].

In order to ensure boundedness of

the volume phase fractions (values

between 0 and 1) and mass conservation

(∑a i=1) the transport equations

are solved using “Multidimensional

Universal Limiter with Explicit Solution”

(MULES) accredited to Henry

Weller and well described in San tiagos

PhD thesis [SAN13]. MULES requires

any source terms S(α i) to be linearized

in the form [SAN13]

(9)

resulting in different formulations for

each phase. The mass transfer rates

for condensation and vaporization

across the respective interface are

given with the Kunz cavitation model

as follows [KUN99] [YU17] [GRE19]:


(10)

(11)

If vapor pressure p v is smaller than

lokal pressure p the vaporization

rate is


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 516

| Fig. 3.

HDR test facility modelling approach.

Modelling approach

with OpenFOAM-v7

During the modelling of the HDR test

facility with OpenFOAM-v7 dif ferent

aspects concerning initial and boundary

conditions, meshing process,

equation of state (EOS) and overall

simulation parameters where optimized

to a point where simulation

stability, computation time as well

as result quality are in reasonable

equilibrium.

The meshing process revealed that

it is necessary to model the whole

cooling circuit as only modelling the

part between break nozzle and RPV

results in unneglectable deviation of

the pressure dynamics. Furthermore,

making a well-structured hexahedral

mesh with the commercial program

ANSYS ICEM (Figure 3) instead an

unstructured hexahedral mesh with

snappyHexMesh significantly improves

simulation stability as well as result

quality.

In order to model the check valve,

the boundary condition activeBaffle­

Velocity was modified so closure times

can be modelled according to the

user’s demands. As an alternative a

dynamic mesh approach can be

implemented using a fixed wall in a

rotating area to close off the pipe

| Fig. 4.

Simulation results for the damped check valve implementation.

diameter. However, this approach

increases the computation time while

lowering the simulation stability

without improving the result quality.

In terms of boundary conditions, it

leads to much better simulation

stability to apply saturation pressure

at the break nozzle (Figure 3)

instead of atmospheric pressure as

atmospheric pressure is much lower

than vapor pressure for the experiments.

This approach also allows for

a better comparison between before

and after applying a cavitation model.

Initial condition wise system

pressure is applied to the whole

domain while water temperature is set

to 220 °C and non-condensable steam

at the RPV top is set to saturation

temperature at 285 °C (Figure 3).

Applying stationary operation state

flow conditions does not influence the

simulation results compared to a zero

velocity initialization.

To capture pressure driven density

variations of water and steam linear

equations of state are used for both

phases neglecting non-linear change

of state variables. For steam the ideal

gas equation [GRE19]


(13)

is applied with R g as the special gas

constant. To compute the density

variation for water the stiffened EOS

(perfectFluid) [GRE19]


(14)

is used where p 0 is a reference density

and the so called fluid ‘constant’ R f

can be evaluated with the relationship

[GRE19]


(15)

where c is the speed of sound. Using

real gas equations like the approach

from Peng and Robinson is possible

in OpenFOAM but results in higher

computation times. However, in

literature deviation up to 30 % are

described when using linear EOS

especially for gases at high pressure

[SIR17]. In future work the influence

of non-linear change of state variables

will be conducted. In order to model

turbulence, the SST k-ω-model from

Wilcox is used.

Simulation results

The pressure evaluation at measurement

position for the damped check

valve implementation (Figure 4)

shows good results with cavitation

modelling (red) while without cavitation

modelling larger deviation

compared to the experiment data

(black) occur. After detonating the

burst disk (0.0 s) the reflection behavior

of the pressure balance wave

between the break nozzle and the RPV

(0.0-0.1 s) is in decent agreement to

the experimental data for both simulations.

While the timing of the pressure

peak (0.1 s) is in good comparison

to the experimental data the peak

is overshot without cavitation modelling

(150 bar). Applying cavitation,

the pressure peak decreases towards

the experimental value at 120 bar

improving the results as cavitation

effects at the check valve are considered

(Figure 5). After the pressure

peak the pressure decrease is undershot

and the low frequent pressure

amplitude is not modelled with either

simulation approach leading to deviations

to the experimental data. In the

report of KIT strong pipe oscillation

are mentioned after the pressure peak

which can influence fluid properties.

For the non-damped check

valve implementation (Figure 6), the

pressure peak (0.09 s) is overshot

Research and Innovation

Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems with Open Source Code OpenFOAM ı Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

| Fig. 5.

Cavitation effects at the check valve.

without (green) and with cavitation

modelling (red) at around 320 bar

compared to 250 bar measured during

the experiment (black). This overestimation

is caused by deviation

between real density and computed

density according to the perfectFluid

EOS. It is therefore necessary to

implement either a better EOS for

high pressure ranges at high temperatures

or use a fitting polynomial

based on material properties to

improve the peak quantity. After the

initial pressure peak vapor pressure

is reached at measurement point

resulting in evaporation between

check valve and RPV (Figure 7)

leading to a delayed second pressure

peak at 0.2 s. If no cavitation model

is used the delay is not captured

accordingly leading to an earlier

second peak at 0.15 s while pressure

drops near 0 bar. Applying the Kunz

cavitation model the timing of the

second peak fits the experimental

data very well while the peak amplitude

is underestimated at 160 bar

compared to 190 bar. This further

leads to a different frequency and

amplitude of the following cavitation

influenced three pressure peaks

(0.25 to 0.4 s). A scaling of the empirical

condensation and vaporization

constants (eq. 10, 11) will probably

improve the results in this regard.

Looking at the well captured fifth

pressure increase (0.45 s, red) as well

as the upcoming reflection behavior

(0.45 to 0.9 s) an overestimation of

the frequency occurs. This deviation

can be explained with either missing

fluid structure interaction effects or

from inaccuracies resulting from the

perfectFluid EOS.

Conclusion

The implementation of the Kunz

cavitation model for a multi fluid, fully

compressible VOF approach improves

the simulation results of the HDR test

facility showing that cavi tation effects

influence the water hammer phenomena

significantly. Especially for the

non-damped check valve implementation

the dynamic pressure changes

are in much better agreement to the

experimental data as macro cavitation

in the pipe section between check

valve and RPV is considered.

However, deviations of pressure

amplitude still persist for high pressure

peaks suggesting an improvement

of the density calculation. As the

perfectFluid EOS assumes a constant

sonic speed pressure dependent compressibility

changes are neglected. In

order to capture effects of fluid

structure interaction during the water

hammer phenomena further development

concerning the coupling interface

preCICE [BUN16] between

OpenFOAM-v7 and CalculiX [DHO18]

will be done.

The goal is to develop an

OpenFOAM-v7 solver specialized to

accurately model water hammer

phenomena regarding high pressure

changes, cavitation effects as well as

fluid structure interaction for different

systems.

References

[BRA19] Bratfisch, C.; Stahlberg, G.; Koch, M.K.: Simulation von

Druckstoßphänomenen in kerntechnischen Anlagen

mit ATHLET, Technical report regarding BMWi

research project 1501522, January 2019, PSS-TR-6.

[BUN16] Bungartz, H.J. et Al.: preCICE – A fully parallel library

for multiphysics surface coupling, Research article,

Computer & Fluids Volume 141 p. 250-258,

December 2016.

[DHO18] Dhondt, G.: CalculiX CrunchiX USER’S MANUAL

version 2.14, April 2018.

[GIO04] Giot, M. et al.: TWO-PHASE FLOW WATER HAMMER

TRANSIENTS AND INDUCED LOADS ON MATERIALS

AND STRUCTURES OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

(WAHALoads). Technical report, 2004.

[GRE19] Greenshields, C. J.: OpenFOAM User Guide version 7.

The OpenFOAM Foundation, 2019.

[HDR81] KIT: HDR Sicherheitsprogramm – Untersuchungen

an einem Speisewasserrückschlagventil NW 350

bei Bruch einer Reaktorkühlmittelleitung.

Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KIT), 1981.

| Fig. 6.

Simulation results for the non-damped check valve implementation.

[KUN99] Kunz, R.F. et. Al.: A Preconditioned Navier-Stokes

Method for Two-Phase Flows with Application to

Cavitation Prediction, American Institute of

Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 1999.

[LUE13] Lüdecke, H. J. et al.: KSB Know-how, Band 1 Der

Druckstoß. KSB Aktiengesellschaft, Halle (Saale),

2013.

[SAN13] Santiago, M.D.: An Extended Mixture Model for the

Simultaneous Treatment of Short and Long Scale

Interfaces, PhD thesis, Universidad Nacional del

Litoral, 2013.

[SIR17]

Sirignano, W.A.: Compressible flow at high pressure

with linear equation of state, research article,

Cambridge University Press, December 2017.

[VAL99] Valencia, L.; Bacher, H. P.: Rückbau des Heißdampfreaktors

in Kahl am Main bei Aschaffenburg,

Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KIT), 1999.

[WAR13] Wardle, K.E.; Weller, H.G.: Hybrid Multiphase CFD

Solver for Coupled Dispersed/Segregated Flows in

Liquid-Liquid Extraction, International Journal of

Chemical Engineering, Research Article, 2013.

[YU17]

| Fig. 7.

Cavitation effects at the pipe section between check valve and RPV.

Authors

Yu, H.; Goldsworthy, L.; Brandner, P. A.; Garaniya, V.:

Applied Mathematical Modelling 45 – Development

of a compressible multiphase cavitation approach for

diesel spray modelling p. 705-727. ELSEVIER, 2017.

Paul Fuchs

paul.fuchs@pss.rub.de

Prof. Marco K. Koch

Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Plant Simulation and Safety Group

Universitätsstraße 150

44801 Bochum, Germany

RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 517

Research and Innovation

Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems with Open Source Code OpenFOAM ı Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

518

60 YEARS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN GERMANY

Note: This article

summarises previous

articles published in

atw about the start

of nuclear power in

Germany.

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany –

Starting with First Criticality

at the VAK, Kahl

Christopher Weßelmann

On 13 November 1960, 60 years ago, the reactor core of the “Kahl Experimental Nuclear Power Plant” on the

Main reaches first criticality. This event marked a milestone in the history of energy supply in Germany, then the Federal

Republic of Germany. Three years after a reactor in Germany reached first criticality for the first time ever – the Munich

Research Reactor (FRM) in Garching near Munich was critically operated on 31 October 1957 – a nuclear power plant

for electricity generation was commissioned. In the following years up to 1988, 35 further plants for electricity

generation followed, some of which covered up to one third of the electricity demand in Germany and avoided up to

150 million tonnes of CO 2 -emissions per year, among others.

Among others, the Geneva Atomic

Energy Conference in August 1955 is

mentioned as the birth of nuclear

energy in Germany. There, the

German delegation of officials and

scientists sent to Geneva became

aware of the enormous importance of

civil nuclear energy development in

the meantime and of the backlog that

the Federal Republic of Germany was

lagging behind. Two months after the

Geneva Conference, the German

Federal Ministry for Nuclear Affairs

was founded.

The first specific actions were then

cooperation agreements with the USA

and Great Britain in February and July

1956, and the elaboration of a draft

for an Atomic Energy Act, which,

however, fails at first, in July 1957, due

to the lack of a two-thirds majority

for the intended amendment of the

German “Grundgesetz”.

1956 is also the year in which

the first major research centres were

founded in the Federal Republic

of Germany. The KFA Jülich was

founded in February 1956, the GKSS

in Geesthacht in April and the KfK in

Karlsruhe in July.

In December 1957 – in the meantime,

Prof. S. Balke had become

minister, to whom nuclear energy in

Germany owes much – the Atomic

Commission adopted the first nuclear

programme, the so-called 500 MW

programme, which aimed at the

construction of experimental reactors

with this overall scope. Among the

types it already mentions the heavy

water reactor and the light water

reactor, the high-temperature reactor

and other advanced reactor lines

and is visibly struggling with the

variety of types of reactor lines. The

programme saw the role of the state in

coordi nating individual projects and

pro viding financial start-up aid in all

cases where the financial risk to

industry appeared to be unacceptably

high.

The VAK project

The first nuclear power plant in the

Federal Republic of Germany, the Kahl

experimental nuclear power plant,

was financed and operated by the

Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk

AG and the Bayernwerk AG. It

was build by AEG as prime contractor

with the participation of numerous

companies, mainly the US General

Electric, on a purely com mercial basis.

At that time there was a significant

difference in this respect compared to

smaller or larger nuclear power plants

built abroad. While there, the state

had provided a con siderable part of

the necessary funds either by full

financing or by con siderable participation

and thus assumed a corresponding

financial risk, the first

step in the Federal Republic was

reserved for the private sector.

When the nuclear power pioneer

Heinrich Mandel ordered the experimental

power plant from AEG in 1958,

the mood for using this energy

source was different from today:

the Minister of Atomic Energy Franz

Josef Strauß described the peaceful

use of nuclear energy as the same

turning point in human history as

the invention of fire. Politicians

were euphoric about nuclear energy

across all parties, while power plant

operators were rather reserved.

Fossil fuels were available in abundance

and at low cost, so the

operators were reluctant to bow

to the political desire to invest in

this new, complex and therefore

expensive energy technology.

On 13 November 1960, the VAK

was the first German nuclear power

plant to achieve first criticality. As

planned, the plant was shut down on

25 November 1985. In order to

maintain the experimental character

| Fig. 1.

Construction of the „Versuchsatomkraftwerk Kahl“ (VAK), Germany, (June 1958 to November 1960).

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany – Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl ı Christopher Weßelmann


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

also beyond the operating phase,

the plant operators agreed in advance

to completely dismantle the VAK up to

the “greenfield site” immediately

after the end of operation. This

became official on 17 May 2010 with

the release of the plant from the

scope of application of the Atomic

Energy Act and the permission for

demolition according to conventional

building law.

Construction and

commissioning

VAK was completed in only 29 months

of construction time (cf. Figure 1).

After completion of all tests and zero

power tests (first partial licence

of 8 November 1960), the first 29

fuel elements could be loaded in

the reactor on 11 November 1960

accor ding to a previously determined

site plan.

On 13 November 1960, the VAK

was commissioned as the first German

nuclear power plant, it reached first

criticality and was thus one of then

12 plants worldwide (cf. Table 1).

The boiling water reactor of American

design was designed for an electrical

output of 16,000 kilowatts

(16,000 kWe).

On 17 June 1961, after the

synchronisation of VAK with the grid,

the first electricity generated from

nuclear energy in the Federal Republic

of Germany was fed into the public

grid.

Initially, a series of systematic

measurements were carried out

during the first continuous operation.

These dealt, e.g., with the neutron

flux distribution in the core and the

natural circulation in the reactor.

Thus, the core design procedures

were confirmed in an experimental

way in order to further develop them

in the following years and use them

for the design of further plants.

Initial troubles, which inevitably

occur when a new technology is used

for the first time, were a challenge

for the engineers and technicians

on site. In the relatively small

experimental plant (cf. Figure 2),

the effort required to solve these

initial problems has been usually

manage able, but the knowledge

gained was invaluable for later largescale

plants.

In the conventional field, experience

was gained in the use of the

saturated steam turbine, which had

been rather unusual until then.

Numerous backfitting measures

during operation showed early on

that a nuclear power plant can

Country Power plant Power

in MWe

(number of

reactors)

Federal Republic

of Germany

France

Great Britain

| Tab. 1.

Nuclear power plants in operation towards the end of 1961 and their electricity generation

(if available, alphabetical order of the countries).

| Fig. 2.

Outline and ground plan of the VAK.

Kahl 15 (1) 20,000

Marcoule G1

Marcoule G2

Marcoule G3

Calder Hall

Chapelcross

5 (1)

32 (1)

32 (1)

152 (4)

152 (4)

Soviet Union Obninsk 5 (1)

USA

EWC

Vallecitos

Shippingport

Dresden

Yankee

5 (1)

5 (1)

160 (1)

186 (1)

136 (1)

Electricity generation

until 1 November 1961

in MWh

-

2,470,000

-

4,800

256,600

459,000

700,000

519

60 YEARS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN GERMANY

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany – Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl ı Christopher Weßelmann


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

520

VAK Kahl

Operator: VAK GmbH (RWE 80 %, E.ON 20 %)

Milestones:

p Start of construction June 1958

60 YEARS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN GERMANY

| Fig. 3.

The control room of the VAK, 1961.

| Fig. 4.

Decommissioning of the VAK, reactor building, 2005.

| Fig. 5.

„Green field“ of the former VAK site, September 2010.

p First criticality 13 November 1960

p First grid connection 17 June 1961

p Cost of new build (1960) 34 Mio. DM (about 17 Mio. EUR,

without adjustment of inflation)

p Scheduled final shut-down 25 November 1985

Technical data:

Boiling water reactor with 16 MW electrical and 60 MW thermal capacity

p Net electricity supply to grid 2.1 billion (109) kWh

p Time availability 69,9 %

p Operation time 149,050 hours

p Number of fuel elements 361

p Number of operating periods 24

Employees:

At start-up about 75 permanent staff; during peak periods up to 123 employees

| Tab. 2.

VAK Kahl: Some facts about build and operation.

continuously keep pace with the

increasing safety requirements.

During its 25 years of operation,

the VAK proved to be a valuable

test facility (Figure 3). The most

important contributions to the testing

were made by the VAK in the areas

of material and fuel element testing.

The aim of the materials testing

was to find out how materials for reactor

pressure vessels change as a result

of permanent irradiation. For this

purpose, material samples were

brought close to the core and thus

exposed to a much higher radiation

power in defined operating times

than would be the case in actual use.

By means of these practical and

anticipatory irradiation programmes,

reliable statements on the suitability

of the individual materials could

be made after subsequent material

analyses – important findings for the

construction of the following nuclear

power plant generation.

As a test facility for fuel elements,

the VAK made probably the most

important contribution to the further

development of nuclear technology.

A total of 50 different types of fuel elements

were used and put through

their paces. For example, mixed oxide

fuel elements (MOX; nuclear fuel

made of uranium and plutonium)

were tested for the first time and fuel

elements for the later hot steam

reactor were tested. With the results

of these tests, basic calculation

methods for fuel element planning

and reactor operation could be

developed which are in principle still

used today.

The training of the required personnel

posed a particular challenge.

In Germany, there were no nuclear

power plants and also not yet the

simulators that are common today.

Therefore, the first team was sent to

the Vallecitos nuclear power plant,

USA, where they were deployed,

among others, in shift operation.

Thus, the basis was established which

was continuously expanded in the

first years with the help of American

consultants.

In order to maintain the experimental

character of the VAK beyond

the operating phase, RWE and

Bayern werk agreed in advance

that the VAK should be completely

dis mantled to the “greenfield site”

immediately after the end of operation

(Table 2). This dismantling

was intended to restore the original

condition of the terrain with the proof

that no inadmissible radioactivity is

still present on the plant site. At

that time, there was no comparable

decommissioning project worldwide,

so that here, too, new ground was

broken (Figure 4).

The overall decommissioning

was then carried out by a company

specialised in this field and the use

of heavy demolition machines. In

September 2010, this work was

completed on schedule with the

construction of the “greenfield site”

(Figure 5).

Author

Dipl.-Ing. Christopher Weßelmann

Editor in Chief, atw

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany

60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany – Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl ı Christopher Weßelmann


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Nuclear Power World Report 2019

At the end of the year 2019, there were 443 nuclear power plant units in 31 countries in operation* worldwide.

This means that the number of units dropped by 9 units to the key date of the previous year (31 December 2018:

452, -9 units, -2.0 %) (compare Figure 1) due to the commissioning of 4 new plants, and the final decommissioning of

13 plants. Of these 13 plants, which have been shut-down, 5 plants – all in Japan – have been in long-term shutdown

since the year 2011. In the following are the values given on 31 December 2019 and change compared to the previous

year as a percentage in brackets. There were 54 (53, +2.0 %) nuclear power plant units under construction in 19 (19)

countries, in other words, 1 more than on the previous year’s key date. The available total gross capacity 1) of the nuclear

plants operating amounted to 419,916 MWe (425,332 MWe, -1.3 %) and the total net capacity to 397,350 MWe

(402,584 MWe, -1.3 %). This equates to an decrease of 5,416 MWe gross and 5,234 MWe net. The additional capacity

results mainly from newly defined nominal capacities of operating plants (compare Table 1 and Figures 1 to 3).

As of the year 2018 the base for all capacities, in particular for the U.S. nuclear power plant units, are the nameplate

data. Due to cooling water conditions (higher or lower cooling water temperatures with respect to design capacity)

actual gross and net capacities may vary by plus or minus 3 % of the nameplate (design) capacity. In some countries the

lower capacity value is used for capacity data due to its relevance for system services.

521

REPORT

In the year 2019, the nuclear power plant units Taishan 2

(PWR, type: EPR-1750, 1,750 MWe gross and 1,660 MWe

net capacity) and Yangjiang 6 (PWR, type: ACPR-1000,

1,080 MWe gross and 1,000 MWe net capacity) in China,

Shin-Kori 4 (PWR, type: APR-1400, 1,400 MWe gross and

1,340 MWe net capacity) in the Repubilc of Korea, and

Novovoronezh 2-2 (PWR, type: VVER V-392M, 1,200 MWe

gross and 1,115 MWe net capacity) in Russia reached first

criticality, were connected to the grid for the first time

and put into commercial operation. No further nuclear

power plant reached first criticality only for the first time

in 2019.

In 2019 no additional nuclear power plant unit resumed

operations after long-term shutdown. In Japan 9 of 33

nuclear power plants are currently in operation. They were

restarted between 2015 and 2018 after lay-up operations

respectively to the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in

2011. E.g. in Canada in total 6 units were restarted after

more than 10 years of lay-up operations respectively. In the

course of the liberalisation of the Canadian electricity

market in the mid-1990s, the operator at the time Ontario

Hydro ascertained insufficient competitive capacity in

the market environment for 4 units at the site Bruce

with around 3,100 MW as well as for 4 others at the site

Pickering with approximately 1,850 MW. That is the reason

why the 8 CANDU units Bruce A1 to Bruce A4 and

Pickering 1 to Pickering 4 were disconnected from the

grid and removed from commercial operations between

1995 and 1997. Pickering 1 and Pickering 4 were

re-commissioned in 2003 and 2005 by the new operator

Ontario Power Generation due to changes in the market

and after a retrofitting program. Bruce 3 and Bruce 4 were

re-commissioned at the end of 2003/beginning of 2004.

With the re-commissioning of both units Bruce A-1 and

Bruce A-2 in 2012, the operator of the site BrucePower has

completed his investment program successfully. The site is

intended to secure the power supply in the region in the

long-term during the coming decades. With a gross

capacity of approximately von 6,740 MWe Bruce is also the

nuclear power site with highest output worldwide.

Currently both operators discuss an operational lifetime

for the plants of 80 years.

Country In operation Under construction

Number

Capacity

gross

[MWe]

net

[MWe]

Number

Capacity

gross

[MWe]

net

[MWe]

Net nuclear

electricity

production

[TWh]

Nuclear

share

total

[%]

Argentina 3 1 750 1 627 1 29 25 7.90 5.90

Armenia 1 408 376 0 0 0 2.03 27.80

Bangladesh 0 0 0 2 2 400 2 160 - -

Belarus 0 0 0 2 2 388 2 218 - -

Belgium 7 6 220 5 937 0 0 0 41.40 47.60

Brazil 2 1 990 1 884 1 1 300 1 245 15.22 2.70

Bulgaria 2 2 000 1 906 0 0 0 15.87 37.50

Canada 19 14 385 13 517 0 0 0 94.85 14.90

China [1] 48 48 158 44 954 11 11 339 10 442 330.12 4.90

Czech Republic 6 4 133 3 925 0 0 0 28.58 35.20

Finland 4 2 860 2 752 1 1 720 1 600 22.91 34.70

France 58 65 880 63 130 1 1 720 1 630 382.40 70.60

Germany [2] 6 8 545 8 113 0 0 0 70.98 10.50

Hungary 4 2 000 1 889 0 0 0 15.41 49.20

India 22 6 780 6 219 7 5 300 4 824 40.74 3.20

Iran, Islamic Republic of [3] 1 1 000 915 1 1 057 974 5.87 1.80

Japan [4] 33 33 283 31 931 2 2 760 2 650 65.68 7.50

Korea, Republic of [5] 24 24 210 23 157 4 5 600 5 360 138.81 26.20

Mexico 2 1 640 1 560 0 0 0 10.88 5.50

Report

Nuclear Power World Report 2019


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

522

Country In operation Under construction

Number

Capacity

gross

[MWe]

net

[MWe]

Number

Capacity

gross

[MWe]

net

[MWe]

Net nuclear

electricity

production

[TWh]

Nuclear

share

total

[%]

REPORT

Netherlands, The 1 515 482 0 0 0 3.70 3.10

Pakistan 5 1 467 1 355 2 2 200 2 028 9.07 6.60

Romania 2 1 412 1 305 0 0 0 10.37 18.50

Russia [6] 38 31 535 29 557 6 4 930 4 585 195.54 19.70

Slovak Republic 4 1 950 1 816 2 942 880 14.28 53.90

Slovenia 1 727 696 0 0 0 5.53 37.00

South Africa 2 1 940 1 860 0 0 0 13.61 6.70

Spain 7 7 398 7 121 0 0 0 55.86 21.40

Sweden [7] 7 7 743 7 498 0 0 0 64.43 34.00

Switzerland [8] 4 3 095 2 960 0 0 0 25.37 23.90

Taiwan, China [9] 4 4 577 4 424 2 2 712 2 630 31.15 13.40

Turkey 0 0 0 1 1 200 1 114

Ukraine 15 13 818 13 090 0 0 0 78.14 53.90

United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 4 5 600 5 380 - -

United Kingdom [10] 15 10 366 9 361 2 3 440 3 260 51.03 15.60

United States of America [11] 96 108 131 102 033 2 2 500 2 230 809.36 19.70

Total 443 419 916 397 350 54 59 137 55 235 2657.10 11.00

| Tab. 1.

Nuclear power plant units worldwide in operation and under construction (set date: 31 December 2019), nuclear electricity production and share of nuclear power of total electricity

production in 2019 [Source: plant operators, IAEO, atw].

[1] China: 2 units, start of operation, 2 units start of new build; [2] Germany: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [3] Iran: 1 unit start of new build; [4] Japan: 5 units permanently shut-down;

[5] Korea, Republic of: 1 unit, start of operation; 1 unit permanently shut-down; [6] Russia: : 1 unit, start of operation, 1 unit permanently shut-down, 1 unit start of new build;

[7] Sweden: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [8] Switzerland: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [9] Taiwan, China: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [10] United Kingdom: 1 unit start of new build;

[11] United States of America: 2 units shut-down

Mexico 2

Canada 19

USA 96 |2

Slovak Republic 4|2

Czech Republic 6 Hungary 4

Finland 4|1

Slovenia 1

Sweden 7

Belarus -|2

Netherlands 1

United Kingdom 15|2

Russia 38|6

Belgium 7

Germany 6

Switzerland 4

France 58|1

Spain 7

Ukraine 15

Romania 2

Bulgaria 2

Armenia 1

Turkey 1

Iran 1|1

UAE -|4

Pakistan 5|2

China 48|11

Bangladesh |1

Rep. Korea 24|4

Japan 33|2

Taiwan, China 4|2

India 22|7

Brazil 2|1

Argentina 3|1

South Africa 2

Nuclear power plant units in operation: 443, location with units ( first number)

Nuclear power plant units under construction: 54, location with units ( second number)

| Fig. 1.

World map nuclear power plants in operation and under construction at the end of 2019. As of: 31.12.2019, 12 p.m. atw, 10/2020

Worldwide 13 nuclear power units were definitively

taken out of commission in 2019: Germany, Philippsburg 2

(BWR, first criticality 1984); Japan Fukushima Daini 1

(BWR, first criticality 1981), Fukushima Daini 2 (BWR,

first criticality 1983), Fukushima Daini 3 (BWR, first

criticality 1984), Fukushima Daini 4 (BWR, first criticality

1986), Genkai 2 (BWR, first criticality 1980); Republic of

Korea: Wolsong 1 (Candu, first criticality 1982); Russia:

Bilibinsk 1 (LWGR, first criticality 1973); Sweden:

Ringhals 2 (PWR, first criticality 1973); Switzerland

Mühleberg (BWR, first criticality 1971), Taiwan, China:

Chinshan 2 (BWR, first criticality 1977); USA: Pilgrim 1

(BWR, first criticality 1972), Three Mile Island 1 (BWR,

first criticality 1974) (Table 2). In Japan, 5 plants have

been declared finally shutdown in 2019 subsequent in the

year 2020.

Report

Nuclear Power World Report 2019


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

There were 54 (53, +0.5 %) plants with 59,137 MWe

gross and 55,235 MWe net capacity under construction

worldwide at the end of the last year 2019. That means

that in comparison to the figure of the previous year,

there was 1 nuclear power unit more under construction

worldwide, since 5 projects have been newly started and

4 plants have attained first criticality. No project was

suspended in 2019.

Work started for the first units Taipingling 1 (PWR HPR

1000, 1,200 MWe gross and 1,116 MWe net capacity) and

Zhangzhou 1 (PWR HPR 1000, 1,212 MWe gross and 1,126

MWe net capacity) in China, the second unit Bushehr 2

(PWR VVER V-510K, 1,057 MWe gross and 974 MWe net

capacity) in the Iran, Kursk 2-2 (PWR VVER V-1000 AES-92

1,255 MWe gross and 1,175 MWe net capacity) in Russia,

and Hinkley Point C-2 (PWR EPR-1750, 1,750 MWe gross

and 1,630 MWe net capacity) in the United Kingdom.

Active construction projects (numbers in brackets) listed

are: Argentina (1), Bangladesh (2), Belarus (2), Brazil (1),

China (11), Finland (1), France (1), India (7), Japan (2),

Republic of Korea (4), Pakistan (2), Russia (6), Slovak

Republic (2), Taiwan (2), Turkey (1), the United Arab

Emirates (4), the United Kingdom (2), and the USA (2).

Worldwide there were about 200 projects (200,

+-0.0 %) in the concrete planning or application phase

at the turn of the year 2019/2020. In addition, there

are a further approx. 100 (100,0 %) declarations of intent

by companies or government offices in other countries.

523

REPORT

Station name Country Reactor type Capacity

gross

[MWe]

Capacity

net

[MWe]

Operator/

Owner

Supplier

Construction start/

First criticality/

Long-term shutdown

1 st Criticality, 1 st Grid connection and Start of commercial operation in 2019 Construction date

Taishan 2 China EPR 1.750 1.660 CGNPG Framatome 2010

Yangjiang 6 China ACPR-1000 1.080 1.000 GNPJVC CNNC 2013

Shin-Kori 4 Korea APR-1400 1.400 1.340 KHNPC Doosan/CE 2009

Novovoronezh 2-2 Russia VVER V-392M 1.200 1.115 Rosatom Rosatom 2009

1 st Grid connection and Start of commercial operation in 2019

- - - - - - - -

1 st Criticality and 1 st Grid connection in 2019 Construction date

- - - - - - - -

1 st Criticality in 2019, only Construction date

- - - - - - - -

Restart after long-term shutdown in 2019

Long-term shutdown

- - - - - - - -

Construction starts (first concrete in 2019)

Construction start

Taipingling 1 China HPR 1000 1.200 1.116 CGN NP CNNC 2019

Zhangzhou 1 China HPR 1000 1.212 1.126 CNNP GZE CNNC 2019

Bushehr 2 Iran VVER-1000

AES-92

1.057 974 NPP&DI Atomenergoexport

Kursk 2-2 Russia VVER V-510K 1.255 1.175 Rosatom Rosatom 2019

Hinkley Point C-2 United Kingdom EPR-1750 1.720 1.630 EDF/Joint V. Framatome 2019

Permanent shutdowns in 2019

| Tab. 2.

Nuclear power plant units commissioned in 2019 (first criticality, first grid connection, and start of commercial operation), restart after long-term shutdown, start of construction,

permanent shutdowns, long-term shutdowns and cancellation of projects (in brackets: original start of construction if project was suspended for a longer period).

2019

First criticality

Philippsburg 2 Germany PWR 1.468 1.402 EnBW KK KWU 1984

Fukushima Daini 1 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Toshiba 1981

Fukushima Daini 2 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Hitachi 1983

Fukushima Daini 3 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Toshiba 1984

Fukushima Daini 4 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Hitachi 1986

Genkai 2 Japan PWR 559 529 Kyushu EP MHI 1980

Wolsong 1 Korea, Rep. Candu 685 657 KHNPC AECL 1982

Bilibinsk 1 Russia LWGR 12 11 Rosatom Rosatom 1973

Ringhals 2 Sweden PWR 963 852 Ringhals AB ABB Atom 1973

Mühleberg Switzerland BWR 390 373 BWK GE 1971

Chinshan 2 Taiwan, China BWR 636 604 Taiwan Pow. GE 1977

Pilgrim 1 USA BWR 712 677 Entergy GE 1972

Three Mile Island 1 USA PWR 1.021 976 Exelon B&W 1974

Long-term shutdowns in 2019

First criticality

- - - - - - - -

Project finally suspended in 2019

Construction start

- - - - - - - -

Report

Nuclear Power World Report 2019


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Nuclear power plant units in operation [-]

500

Installed nuclear power plant capacity worldwide [gross, GW = 10 3 MW]

450

524

400

400

300

300

REPORT

200

100

200

100

0

1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

2010 2015 2019

Year

| Fig. 2.

Development of the number of nuclear power plants in operations from 1956 to 2019.

0

1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

2010 2015

Year

| Fig. 3.

Development of the gross nuclear power plant capacity in operation from 1956 to 2019.

2019

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Looking at the structural impact of the incidents in Japan

and Fukushima on 11 March 2011, it can be ascertained

that, in the meantime, they do not have an effect on the

number of new construction project and plans worldwide,

with the exception of political reactions in Germany, Italy

and Switzerland.

The development of the number of the commercially

operated nuclear power plants worldwide, in addition to

the available gross nuclear power plant capacity is depicted

in Figure 2 and Figure 3 for the years 1956 to 2019 (1956:

year of commissioning the first commercial nuclear power

plant, Calder Hall 1, in Great Britain. The first nucleargenerated

electricity occurred on 20 December 1951 in the

US-American Experimental Breeder Reactor EBR-1.) Also

worth noting is the continued capacity increase (Figure 3)

in the 1980s, as the nuclear power plants, ordered due the

impact of the first oil crisis at the beginning and end of the

1970s, started operations with high capacities per plant

averaging 1,000 MWe. Worldwide and in Germany, the

commissioning of the nuclear power unit Biblis A in 1974

with 1,225 MWe gross represented an important milestone

in the development of high-capacity plants, which were

from the beginning designed also technically for a longer

operating period of several decades – previously, the pilot

plants were also built with the focus on technical feasibility

and practicability. Since about 1993, a developmental

stagnation can be observed with the number of nuclear

power plants and capacity and this is due, on the one hand

to the decommissioning of older, prototypical and no

longer profitable plants in the USA, Europe and the GUS

Electricity production in nuclear power plants [TWh = 10 9 kWh/a]

3,000

Unit capability factor [%]

1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

2010 2015

Year

| Fig. 4.

Development of the nuclear electricity production and plant availability from 1956 to 2019.

100

80

60

40

20

0

2019

states and, on the other, the compensatory expansion of

capacities in the Asian region and capacity increases

of operating plants. Since the mid-1990s, remarkable

increases in capacity have been achieved. With further

optimised turbines alone, an increase in capacity of around

5 % can be gained without increasing the reactor capacity.

If a construction measure also makes increasing the

thermal reactor capacity possible, then the generating

capacity in countries such as Mexico, Sweden, the Slovak

Republic, the USA and Hungary that are already approved

and realised would increase by around 20 %. Until the

end of this decade, a cumulated capacity increase totalling

8,000 MW is estimated. This equates to the new construction

of about 6 large nuclear power units. In the USA alone,

capacity increases totalling approx. 10,000 MWe net have

been realised or approved, a further 700 MWe currently to

be realised until 2020 have been applied for.

With the 443 operating plants at the end of 2019, there

were 9 units less in operation than in the hitherto record

year 2018 with 452 nuclear power plants.

The nuclear power plants worldwide have achieved

a approx. 1 % higher result in 2019 compared to the

previous year in the net electricity generation with

approx. 2,657 billion (109) kWh (2,632 billion kWh,

provision details and calculations, cf. Table 1 and

Figure 4). In Japan, with the exception of 9 reactor units,

all other 24 plants were not connected to the grid for the

whole year. The previous best result of nuclear electricity

production accounted for 2,658 billion kWh in 2006. Good

operating results were reported from the power plants in

Belgium, China, Finland, Germany, Russia, Switzerland

and the USA.

The overall operational reliability of the plants is

underlined by the average mean availability for work of all

nuclear power plants worldwide (cf. Figure 4). Their

average had increased since the mid 1990s. The strong

decrease in availability at the beginning of the 1990s is due

to the large drop in the availability of plants in the East

European states and the GUS states, whose operating data

were included consistently in the statistics for the first

time. The long-term cessation of individual profitable

nuclear power plant, and the quasi whole nuclear power

park of Japan as of 2011, also influence the lower average

availability in the years 2006 to 2009. Since 2011 the

availability is slightly increasing with the commissioning

of nuclear power plants in lay-up operation.

The Top Ten nuclear power plants in power generation

(net) 2019 are: (1) Taishan-1, China, 11.952 TWh;

(2) Civaux-1, France, 11.608 TWh; (3) Peach Bottom-2,

USA, 11.534 TWh; (4) South Texas-1, USA, 11.515 TWh;

Report

Nuclear Power World Report 2019


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

(5) Palo Verde-2, USA, 11.434 TWh; (6) Isar-2, Germany,

11.375 TWh; (7) Chooz B-1, France, 11.128 TWh;

(8) Susquehanna-1, USA, 11.105 TWh; (9) Grand Gulf-1,

USA, 11.032 TWh; (10) Nine Mile Point-2, USA,

10.993 TWh.

Worldwide around 84,099 billion (10 9 ) kWh net

electricity have cumulatively been produced in nuclear

power plants since electricity was first generated from

nuclear power. The experience in the nuclear power plant

operations amount to approx. 17,250 reactor years.

Regarding climate protection, nuclear power plants

have avoided about 2.40 billion (10 9 ) t carbon dioxide

emisisons 2)

in 2019. The emissions avoided through

nuclear energy correspond to some 6 % of the current

annual emissions worldwide of CO 2 , in the meanwhile

over, approx. 35 billion tons. The emissions avoided

each year through nuclear power are distinctly higher

than the worldwide reduction targets contained in the

existing international protocols and agreements on climate

protection (Kyoto protocol) for the period 2008 to 2012!

* The atw lists nuclear power plants as “operating” as the time when

first criticality was attained as a “nuclear” criterion. Other sources

refer to the 1st power generation or the start of commercial

operation. Nuclear power plants are no longer listed as “operating”

when a long-term cessation , i.e. over several years, has been

decided. Should the operator possess a valid framework operating

approval or no application for the definitive cessation of the operating

plant has been submitted, then the operating status is listed as

“ lay-up”. (cf. Spain and Japan).

1) The data for gross and net capacities have been revised with

reference to “nameplate” data as from 2019 (in particular data for

U.S: nuclear power plant units, source: U.S. EIA)

2) The CO 2 reduction factor is based on the average worldwide CO 2

emissions of fossile-fired power plants in countries with NPPs in

operation.

525

KTG INSIDE

Inside

Herzlichen Glückwunsch!

Die KTG gratuliert ihren Mitgliedern sehr herzlich zum Geburtstag

und wünscht ihnen weiterhin alles Gute!

November 2020

45 Jahre | 1975

07. Gregor Beger, Radebeul

55 Jahre | 1965

24. Dipl.-Ing. Angelika Lenz, Krefeld

60 Jahre | 1960

01. Burkhard Hartmann, Schefflenz

77 Jahre | 1943

25. Dr. Holger Teichel, Hemmingen

29. Kurt Frischengruber, Langensendelbach

83 Jahre | 1937

08. Dr. Hartmut Bilger, Ettlingen

19. Dr. Ulrich Tillessen, Waldshut-Tiengen

26. Dr. Armin Hermann, Brugg/ CH

84 Jahre | 1936

10. Dipl.-Ing. Stefan Beliczey,

Bergisch Gladbach

20. Dipl.-Ing. Dieter Scholz, Glashütten

85 Jahre | 1935

13. Dr. Aleksandar Stojadinovic, Köln

Nachträgliche

Geburtstagsnennungen:

Oktober 2020

75 Jahre | 1945

22. Michael Schulz, Wesel

Wenn Sie künftig eine

Erwähnung Ihres

Geburtstages in der

atw wünschen, teilen

Sie dies bitte der KTG-

Geschäftsstelle mit.

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78 Jahre | 1942

10. Dipl.-Ing. Harald Klinkert, Ründeroth

79 Jahre | 1941

09. Dr. Gotthart Stein, Bonn

80 Jahre | 1940

14. Ing. Uwe Siekmann, Bergisch Gladbach

81 Jahre | 1939

22. Dr. Heinz Koinig, Enzersdorf/ AT

28. Dr. Karl-Heinz Blank, Mannheim

82 Jahre | 1938

19. Dr. Friedrich Reiss, Ketsch

86 Jahre | 1934

03. Dipl.-Phys. Hans-Christoph Breest,

St. Augustin

21. Dr. Werner Rudloff, Uttenreuth

26. Dipl.-Ing. Peter Ruße, Dortmund

88 Jahre | 1932

29. Dipl.-Ing. Karl F. Schlupp, Essen

90 Jahre | 1930

24. Dr. Urban Cleve, Dortmund

91 Jahre | 1929

09. Dipl.-Ing. Amandus Brandstetter,

Köln

Verantwortlich

für den Inhalt:

Die Autoren.

Lektorat:

Natalija Cobanov,

Kerntechnische

Gesellschaft e. V.

(KTG)

Robert-Koch-Platz 4

10115 Berlin

T: +49 30 498555-50

F: +49 30 498555-51

E-Mail:

natalija.cobanov@

ktg.org

www.ktg.org

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

526

NEWS

Top

IAEA Report: nuclear power

to continue to play key role

in low-carbon electricity

production

(iaea) The International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) has released its

latest projections for energy, electricity

and nuclear power trends through

2050. Compared with the previous

year, the 2020 projections are largely

unchanged. Under the high case

scenario, IAEA analysts expect an

increase of global nuclear electrical

generating capacity by 82 % to

715 GW. Under the low case scenario,

it will fall by 7 % to 363 GW.

“The latest IAEA annual projections

show that nuclear power will

continue to play a key role in the

world’s low-carbon energy mix, with

global nuclear electrical capacity seen

nearly doubling by 2050 in our high

case scenario. Climate change mitigation

remains a key potential driver

for maintaining and expanding the

use of nuclear power,” IAEA Director

General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

The 40 th edition of Energy, Electricity

and Nuclear Power Estimates

for the Period up to 2050 provides

detailed global trends in nuclear

power by region. The report presents

its projections for nuclear electrical

generating capacity as low and high

estimates. They reflect different

scenarios for the worldwide deployment

of this low carbon energy source.

From 2019 to 2050, global electricity

generation is expected to more

than double, exceeding nuclear generation

capacity growth also in the

high case scenario. Therefore, IAEA

experts expect the share of nuclear

power amongst all sources of electricity

to remain either stable or decline.

In 2019 nuclear power generated

10.4 % of global electricity.

According to the report, immediate

and concerted action is required for

nuclear power to reach a share of

@

REFERENCE DATA SERIES No. 1

2020 Edition

Energy, Electricity and

Nuclear Power Estimates

for the Period up to 2050

11 % in electricity production by

2050, as seen in the high case

sce nario. In the low case scenario,

the share of nuclear energy relative

to global electricity production could

decline to about 6 %.

Operating Results June 2020

Plant name Country Nominal

capacity

Type

gross

[MW]

net

[MW]

Operating

time

generator

[h]

Energy generated, gross

[MWh]

Month Year Since

commissioning

Time availability

[%]

Energy availability

[%] *) Energy utilisation

[%] *)

Month Year Month Year Month Year

OL1 Olkiluoto 1) BWR FI 910 880 543 477 444 3 525 453 272 990 923 75.38 90.99 72.64 87.46 72.08 87.75

OL2 Olkiluoto 1) BWR FI 910 880 720 650 282 3 738 736 263 102 821 100.00 93.86 100.00 93.12 98.17 93.06

KCB Borssele 1) PWR NL 512 484 339 165 638 1 969 845 169 951 279 50.94 88.98 44.36 87.84 44.98 88.25

KKB 1 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 720 272 924 1 348 059 131 656 879 100.00 80.74 100.00 80.46 99.74 81.13

KKB 2 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 720 270 809 1 661 200 138 957 983 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.89 98.98 100.15

KKG Gösgen 1,2,4,7) PWR CH 1060 1010 303 283 006 4 153 577 326 269 812 42.01 90.44 38.03 89.74 37.08 89.73

CNT-I Trillo 1,2) PWR ES 1066 1003 251 250 709 3 612 870 259 360 896 34.82 81.62 32.42 80.69 32.32 77.03

Dukovany B1 PWR CZ 500 473 720 350 616 2 170 129 118 054 312 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.93 97.39 99.39

Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 720 347 907 2 155 425 113 198 744 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.92 96.64 98.71

Dukovany B3 PWR CZ 500 473 720 348 654 988 528 111 240 264 100.00 46.83 100.00 46.04 96.85 45.27

Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 720 352 998 1 678 379 112 385 337 100.00 77.01 99.96 76.93 98.06 76.87

Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 720 774 754 2 931 378 124 846 191 100.00 62.22 99.95 61.05 99.45 62.04

Temelin B2 1) PWR CZ 1080 1030 285 302 944 4 326 302 121 808 920 39.58 90.04 39.38 89.98 38.89 91.56

Doel 1 2) PWR BE 454 433 529 226 167 226 167 137 962 226 73.49 12.12 67.61 11.15 67.10 11.06

Doel 2 PWR BE 454 433 720 321 607 325 967 136 661 437 100.00 17.47 97.01 16.56 95.33 16.28

Doel 3 PWR BE 1056 1006 720 714 069 4 651 160 267 762 811 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 93.18 100.38

Doel 4 2) PWR BE 1084 1033 118 119 451 4 114 121 273 752 396 16.34 86.21 15.77 85.81 15.00 85.49

Tihange 1 2) PWR BE 1009 962 0 0 0 307 547 424 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tihange 2 PWR BE 1055 1008 720 739 997 4 555 332 262 609 850 100.00 100.00 99.95 99.90 98.24 99.82

Tihange 3 2) PWR BE 1089 1038 147 153 673 4 096 335 284 658 911 20.48 86.89 20.06 86.80 19.68 86.65

Plant name

Type

Nominal

capacity

gross

[MW]

net

[MW]

Operating

time

generator

[h]

Energy generated, gross

[MWh]

Time availability

[%]

Energy availability Energy utilisation

[%] *) [%] *)

Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year

commissioning

KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 720 967 463 5 677 362 366 398 384 100.00 100.00 93.63 94.08 90.45 87.48

KKE Emsland DWR 1406 1335 720 1 000 319 5 258 429 362 858 630 100.00 87.60 99.99 87.45 98.82 85.63

KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 720 968 304 4 477 268 392 752 114 100.00 89.32 99.71 89.16 93.46 71.24

KRB C Gundremmingen 1) SWR 1344 1288 293 382 829 4 675 047 345 998 599 40.69 80.98 39.84 79.67 39.20 79.05

KKI-2 Isar DWR 1485 1410 720 1 015 144 6 133 793 371 896 262 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99 94.47 94.13

GKN-II Neckarwestheim 1,2,4) DWR 1400 1310 448 590 200 5 546 700 345 784 944 62.19 93.77 62.19 93.75 58.54 90.82

News


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Commitments made under the

2016 Paris Agreement on climate

change and other initiatives could

support nuclear power development,

provided the necessary energy policies

and market designs are established to

facilitate investments in dispatchable,

low carbon technologies. Furthermore,

nuclear power could provide

solutions for electricity consumption

growth, air quality concerns, the

security of energy supply and price

volatility of other fuels.

The report lays out that about two

thirds of nuclear power reactors have

been in operation for over 30 years,

highlighting the need for significant

new nuclear capacity to offset retirements.

Uncertainty remains regarding

the replacement of the large number

of reactors scheduled to be retired

around 2030 and beyond, particularly

in North America and Europe. Ageing

management programmes and long

term operation are being imple mented

for an increasing number of reactors.

Operating Results July 2020

Since it was first published 40 years

ago, the IAEA projections have been

continually refined to reflect an evolving

global energy context. Over the

past decade, nuclear power development

has remained within the range of

projections described in prior editions.

| www.iaea.org (202621420)

World

FORATOM underlines key

role of nuclear in achieving

ambitious climate targets

(foratom) FORATOM welcomes the

European Commission’s proposal to

increase its 2030 CO 2 emission reduction

target to at least 55 %. This is

essential if the EU is to achieve carbon

neutrality by 2050. The nuclear sector

stands ready to play its part by providing

a stable supply of low-carbon

electricity, as well as other energy

carriers (e.g. hydrogen).

In terms of decarbonising the

electricity sector, FORATOM has

identified two challenges: ensuring

security of supply and costs.

“It is clear that by supporting an

energy mix which combines both

nuclear power and variable renewables,

the EU will have access to a

low-carbon supply of electricity, 24/7”

states Yves Desbazeille, FORATOM

Director General. “Such a combination

will contribute not only ensuring

security of supply, but also keeping the

costs of the transition to a minimum”.

According to the conclusions of

an FTI-CL Energy Consulting study

commissioned by FORATOM (“Pathways

to 2050: role of nuclear in a

low-carbon Europe”), Europe could

save more than 440 bn € between

2020 and 2050 by supporting a 25 %

share of nuclear in the 2050 electricity

mix. Customers would save around

350 bn € in costs, with 90 % of these

savings occuring before 2035 thanks

primarily to the life-time extension of

*)

Net-based values

(Czech and Swiss

nuclear power

plants gross-based)

1)

Refueling

2)

Inspection

3)

Repair

4)

Stretch-outoperation

5)

Stretch-inoperation

6)

Hereof traction supply

7)

Incl. steam supply

BWR: Boiling

Water Reactor

PWR: Pressurised

Water Reactor

Source: VGB

527

NEWS

Plant name Country Nominal

capacity

Type

gross

[MW]

net

[MW]

Operating

time

generator

[h]

Energy generated, gross

[MWh]

Month Year Since

commissioning

Time availability

[%]

Energy availability

[%] *) Energy utilisation

[%] *)

Month Year Month Year Month Year

OL1 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 744 674 376 4 199 829 273 665 299 100.00 92.30 100.00 89.28 98.52 89.32

OL2 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 744 667 275 4 406 011 263 770 096 100.00 94.75 99.93 94.11 97.49 93.70

KCB Borssele PWR NL 512 484 653 321 983 2 291 828 170 273 262 86.84 88.67 86.91 87.70 84.42 87.69

KKB 1 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 744 273 800 1 621 859 131 930 679 100.00 83.55 100.00 83.30 96.72 83.40

KKB 2 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 744 271 729 1 932 929 139 229 712 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.90 96.00 99.55

KKG Gösgen 7) PWR CH 1060 1010 744 775 109 4 928 686 327 044 921 100.00 91.83 99.99 91.23 98.28 90.97

CNT-I Trillo PWR ES 1066 1003 744 782 497 4 395 367 260 143 393 100.00 84.29 100.00 83.50 97.80 80.05

Dukovany B1 PWR CZ 500 473 744 360 826 2 530 955 118 415 138 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.94 97.00 99.04

Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 738 349 089 2 504 515 113 547 833 99.19 99.88 97.88 99.62 93.84 98.00

Dukovany B3 PWR CZ 500 473 744 359 231 1 347 758 111 599 495 100.00 54.57 100.00 53.89 96.57 52.74

Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 744 363 372 2 041 751 112 748 708 100.00 80.36 100.00 80.29 97.68 79.90

Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 744 799 584 3 730 962 125 645 775 100.00 67.72 99.97 66.72 99.33 67.47

Temelin B2 1) PWR CZ 1080 1030 0 0 4 326 302 121 808 920 0 76.93 0 76.88 0 78.23

Doel 1 PWR BE 454 433 744 345 072 571 238 138 307 298 100.00 24.91 99.95 24.07 99.44 23.93

Doel 2 PWR BE 454 433 744 342 203 668 170 137 003 640 100.00 29.49 99.07 28.80 98.25 28.44

Doel 3 2) PWR BE 1056 1006 403 357 244 5 008 404 268 120 054 54.22 93.34 53.92 93.29 44.82 92.30

Doel 4 PWR BE 1084 1033 694 719 111 4 833 232 274 471 507 93.31 87.24 89.61 86.36 87.39 85.77

Tihange 1 2) PWR BE 1009 962 0 0 0 307 547 424 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tihange 2 PWR BE 1055 1008 540 541 079 5 096 411 263 150 929 72.61 96.01 70.66 95.64 69.41 95.39

Tihange 3 2) PWR BE 1089 1038 0 0 4 096 335 284 658 911 0 74.24 0 74.16 0 74.04

Plant name

Type

Nominal

capacity

gross

[MW]

net

[MW]

Operating

time

generator

[h]

Energy generated, gross

[MWh]

Time availability

[%]

Energy availability Energy utilisation

[%] *) [%] *)

Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year

commissioning

KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 744 988 479 6 665 841 367 386 864 100.00 100.00 94.31 94.11 89.33 87.75

KKE Emsland DWR 1406 1335 744 1 025 986 6 284 415 363 884 616 100.00 89.40 100.00 89.28 98.07 87.44

KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 744 995 246 5 472 514 393 747 360 100.00 90.87 98.98 90.59 92.93 74.40

KRB C Gundremmingen 1) SWR 1344 1288 494 618 401 5 293 448 346 617 000 66.36 78.85 62.62 77.19 61.35 76.47

KKI-2 Isar 1,2) DWR 1485 1410 240 332 429 6 466 222 372 228 691 32.27 90.14 31.41 90.01 29.91 84.78

GKN-II Neckarwestheim 1,2) DWR 1400 1310 373 508 100 6 054 800 346 293 044 50.13 87.42 48.87 87.21 48.87 84.71

News


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

528

NEWS

existing nuclear reactors as well as the

construction of new ones. Furthermore,

around bn 90 € could also be

saved in relation to the additional

Transmission and Distribution grid

costs needed to accommodate the

new solar and wind capacity, if ever

built, which would replace the lost

nuclear capacity.

“It should be noted that the transition

is not just about saving costs, it’s

also about ensuring economic growth

and jobs” adds Mr Desbazeille. “Here

nuclear plays an important role as it

currently sustains more than 1 million

jobs in the EU-27. By 2050, this figure

could rise to 1.2 million”.

The European nuclear industry

stands ready to play its part in helping

the EU to decarbonise. To do this, EU

policy must treat all technologies in the

same way. As highlighted by several

Member States at the end of 2019, if

they are to progress towards such

ambitious targets then they must have

the freedom to include low- carbon

nuclear within their energy mix.

The European Atomic Forum

( FORATOM) is the Brussels-based trade

association for the nuclear energy

industry in Europe. The membership of

FORATOM is made up of 15 national

nuclear associations and through these

associations, FORATOM represents

nearly 3,000 European companies

working in the industry and supporting

around 1,100,000 jobs.

| www.foratom.org (202621426)

NEI: Small reactor design

approval is a big deal

for carbon-free energy

(nei) In a step forward for carbon-free

energy innovation, the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission moved closer

to licensing a small modular reactor

(SMR) by issuing a final safety evaluation

report (FSER).

New nuclear technology moves

closer to becoming a reality

With this announcement, NuScale

Power LLC – which submitted its SMR

design for approval in 2017 – is on the

verge of getting NRC endorsement for

a fundamentally new concept in

reactor design and a plant that is

radically simpler.

At a time when reducing carbon

emissions has never been more urgent,

the announcement moves an important

new carbon-free technology

towards commercialization, so it can

provide electricity around the world.

In practical terms, the FSER makes

it easier for a U.S. utility to develop the

NuScale power plant. It also functions

as an American seal of approval for

countries around the world that are

looking for a flexible, appropriately

sized carbon-free power producer that

can be installed with relatively little

on-site construction and little local

regulatory experience.

NuScale is planning to supply its

first SMR plant in eastern Idaho, for

Utah Associated Municipal Power

Systems (UAMPS) and has exploratory

agreements with companies in

Canada, Romania, the Czech Republic

and Jordan.

“This is a significant milestone not

only for NuScale, but also for the entire

U.S. nuclear sector and the other advanced

nuclear technologies that will

follow,” said NuScale Chairman and

Chief Executive Officer John Hopkins.

NRC meets innovation in design

with innovation in regulation

With this announcement, NRC staff is

independently verifying the com pany’s

own safety analysis, which says that

the design meets all applicable standards.

“Applicable” is an important

detail here, because the staff is agreeing

that some of the requirements

that the agency imposes on existing

reactors simply don’t apply here.

For example, the SMR design

doesn’t need any emergency water

supplies for safety – instead relying on

natural forces for cooling – so there is

a whole complex of tanks, pumps,

valves and piping that don’t need to be

built, inspected, tested and evaluated.

Furthermore, there is no need for

an extensive system of emergency

diesel generators that are carefully

maintained at current plants in order

to operate those pumps and valves;

and finally, the inherent safety features

of the design will keep the reactor safe

in case of mechanical malfunction,

without action by control room operators.

Operators will be trained and

available, as at all reactors, but the

system is passively safe.

There are several steps remaining

in the regulatory process, including

public comment; however, the FSER

demonstrates that the NRC can

success fully evaluate an innovative

design that breaks with many of the

old assumptions about nuclear energy.

A regulator that can facilitate innovation

is essential to the future of nuclear

technology.

NuScale’s progress is a major

win for advanced nuclear and

the climate

There are a lot of good ideas emerging

from new reactor developers, and

NuScale’s SMR is poised to be the first

radical rethinking of reactor design

approved by the Commission in many

years. It is a positive sign for NuScale,

for UAMPS and the advanced reactor

industry as a whole.

As this innovative design moves from

concept to reality, it signals a new era

of advanced nuclear technology that

will be essential in meeting carbonfree

energy goals across the country

and making electricity more accessible

for all.

| www.nei.org (202621431)

Company News

Framatome partners

with ADAGOS to bring

artificial intelligence to the

nuclear energy industry

(fraatome) Framatome signed an

exclusive partnership agreement with

Adagos to bring advanced, parsimonious

artificial intelligence technology

to the nuclear energy industry. Adagos’

NeurEco architecture introduces a

third-generation neural network to

solve large and complex problems

using fewer computational and data

resources compared to pre vious

generations.

“Artificial intelligence is a game

changer for advancing technologies

and increasing the competitiveness

and efficiency of the nuclear energy

industry now and in the decades to

come,” said Catherine Cornand,

senior executive vice president of the

Installed Base Business Unit at

Framatome. “This partnership will

allow us to provide new digital solutions

for our customers worldwide,

contributing to reliable, economical,

low-carbon electricity.”.

Neural networks analyze data and

information in a way that mimics the

human brain. NeurEco addresses

common challenges to artificial intelligence

and deep-learning technology.

Its new neural network approach

based on parsimony reduces resources

such as the amount of learning data,

energy consumption, size of neural

network, requested memory and

computing time required to implement

deep-learning methods. It

generates new types of parsimonious

neural networks that provide answers

to non- linear questions while minimizing

resource size and complexity.

The NeurEco technology provides

robust solutions to historical challenges

to applying artificial intelligence

in the nuclear energy industry.

News


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

Uranium

Prize range: Spot market [USD*/lb(US) U 3O 8]

140.00

) 1

Uranium prize range: Spot market [USD*/lb(US) U 3O 8]

140.00

) 1

120.00

120.00

529

100.00

100.00

80.00

80.00

60.00

40.00

20.00

Yearly average prices in real USD, base: US prices (1982 to1984) *

60.00

40.00

20.00

NEWS

0.00

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Year

* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year

Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020

* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020

| Uranium spot market prices from 1980 to 2020 and from 2009 to 2020. The price range is shown.

In years with U.S. trade restrictions the unrestricted uranium spot market price is shown.

Separative work: Spot market price range [USD*/kg UTA]

Conversion: Spot conversion price range [USD*/kgU]

180.00

26.00

) 1 ) 1

160.00

140.00

0.00

24.00

22.00

20.00

Jan. 2009

Jan. 2010

Jan. 2011

Jan. 2012

Jan. 2013

Jan. 2014

Jan. 2015

Jan. 2016

Jan. 2017

Jan. 2018

Jan. 2019

Jan. 2020

Jan. 2021

120.00

18.00

16.00

100.00

14.00

80.00

12.00

10.00

60.00

8.00

40.00

6.00

20.00

4.00

2.00

0.00

0.00

Jan. 2009

Jan. 2010

Jan. 2011

Jan. 2012

Jan. 2013

Jan. 2014

* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year

Jan. 2015

Jan. 2016

Jan. 2017

Jan. 2018

Jan. 2019

Jan. 2020

Jan. 2021

Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020

Jan. 2009

Jan. 2010

Jan. 2011

Jan. 2012

Jan. 2013

Jan. 2014

* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year

Jan. 2015

Jan. 2016

Jan. 2017

Jan. 2018

Jan. 2019

Jan. 2020

Jan. 2021

Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020

| Separative work and conversion market price ranges from 2009 to 2020. The price range is shown.

)1

In December 2009 Energy Intelligence changed the method of calculation for spot market prices. The change results in virtual price leaps.

* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bilder/Figures: atw 2020

Calculation times for non-linear fields

such as neutronics and computational

fluid designs can be reduced from

days to a few minutes, and the generated

metamodel provides more

information on the output. Sensitivity

studies are raised to the next level

with extensive results verses one for

consideration. Calculation files are

several hundred times smaller and can

be compressed and decompressed

infinitely, saving time and money for

operators.

“This partnership combines

Framatome’s engineering expertise

and Adagos’ cutting-edge technology

to automate and resolve complex

issues,” said Alexis Marincic, senior

executive vice president of the Engineering

and Design Authority at Framatome.

“Together, we share a commitment

to provide the nuclear industry

with an unprecedented, high-quality,

innovative solution that transforms

data and drives performance for our

customers’ daily operations.”

Located in Toulouse, France, Adagos

is a computer software provider that

specializes in neural network advancements

for the health, automotive and

energy industries. The Silicon Review

recognized Adagos as one of the 50 best

companies to watch in 2020.

| www.framatome.com (202621437)

Market data

(All information is supplied without

guarantee.)

Nuclear Fuel Supply

Market Data

Information in current (nominal)

U.S.-$. No inflation adjustment of

prices on a base year. Separative work

data for the formerly “secondary

market”. Uranium prices [US-$/lb

U 3 O 8 ; 1 lb = 453.53 g; 1 lb U 3 O 8 =

0.385 kg U]. Conversion prices [US-$/

kg U], Separative work [US-$/SWU

(Separative work unit)].

2017

p Uranium: 19.25–26.50

p Conversion: 4.50–6.75

p Separative work: 39.00–50.00

2018

p Uranium: 21.75–29.20

p Conversion: 6.00–14.50

p Separative work: 34.00–42.00

2019

January to June 2019

p Uranium: 23.90–29.10

p Conversion: 13.50–18.00

p Separative work: 41.00–49.00

July to December 2019

p Uranium: 24.50–26.25

p Conversion: 18.00–23.00

p Separative work: 47.00–52.00

2020

January 2020

p Uranium: 24.10–24.90

p Conversion: 22.00–23.00

p Separative work: 48.00–51.00

February 2020

p Uranium: 24.25–25.00

p Conversion: 22.00–23.00

p Separative work: 45.00–53.00

March 2020

p Uranium: 23.05–27.40

p Conversion: 21.50–23.50

p Separative work: 45.00–52.00

April 2020

p Uranium: 27.50–34.00

p Conversion: 21.50–23.50

p Separative work: 45.00–52.00

May 2020

p Uranium: 33.50–34.50

p Conversion: 21.50–23.50

p Separative work: 48.00–52.00

June 2020

p Uranium: 33.00–33.50

p Conversion: 21.50–23.50

p Separative work: 49.00–52.00

July 2020

p Uranium: 32.50–33.20

p Conversion: 21.50–23.50

p Separative work: 50.50–53.50

| Source: Energy Intelligence

www.energyintel.com

News


atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October

530

NUCLEAR TODAY

John Shepherd is

editor-in-chief of

New Energy 360 and

WorldBatteryNews.com.

Sources:

NASA report on China:

https://bbc.in/2F5nhzc

Launch of Natrium:

https://bit.ly/3i1DUtP

IEA analysis:

https://bit.ly/326yU1n

Nuclear has a Clear Advantage

on the Post-Pandemic Climate Agenda

As we all start out on the road to what is now referred to as the ‘new normal’ – a world that will have to get on with life

in the shadow of Covid-19 for some time to come – what better opportunity to take stock of how we have been caring for

ourselves and our environment and to think about what we could do better.

It’s hard to talk about ‘emerging from the pandemic’ when

so many countries still have a major public health battle on

their hands’. However, prolonged hibernation is not an

option. The world must collectively pick itself up from the

awful impact of what has happened and move on.

But it cannot mean a return to ‘business as usual’

and that is to be welcomed. Our industrial activities in

particular are under greater scrutiny now more than ever,

as a result of the pandemic.

The lockdowns much of the world experienced in

recent months saw cars disappear from the roads, public

transportation halted and major industries reduced to a

flicker of activity or idled completely. However, while

economies suffered, ecology flourished – most noticeably

in terms of the reduction in carbon emissions and the

positive impact on air quality across the developing and

developed nations.

In India, data published in the journal ‘Joule’ showed

an increase in output of more than 8% from solar installations

in Delhi after that country’s first mandatory

lockdown in March. That might not sound like much,

but experts point out that if a solar company expected to

get a 2 % profit margin out of their planned 100 % panel

output, and suddenly they are getting an output of 108 %,

that means their margin has increased fivefold, from 2 %

to 10 %.

In the UK, at one point during the spring lockdown,

renewable electricity sources were providing almost 70 %

of Britain’s electricity, according to ‘Drax Electric Insight’.

In late May, nuclear power and renewables together

produced 90 % of Britain’s electricity, leaving just 2.8 GW

to come from fossil fuels, Drax reported.

Satellite images of China, published by the US space

agency NASA, showed what the agency said was a dramatic

decline in pollution levels that was “at least partly” due to

the economic slowdown prompted by the pandemic.

So, despite the deadly consequences of the pandemic,

the ‘positive impact’ of Covid-19 on the environment

should be regarded as an environmental wake-up call.

Nuclear power generation is among industrialised

activities that can thrive without choking our atmosphere.

The nuclear industry now has an opportunity to seize the

moment and burnish its environmental credentials further.

Now is the time to reach out directly to the general public

and restate nuclear’s ability to flourish as part of an

increasingly renewables-rich energy landscape.

There is everything to play for and the logic,

evidence – and most importantly the science – are on the

side of nuclear energy.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA),

while the existing nuclear fleet remains the world’s second

most important low-carbon source of electricity, new

nuclear construction is not on track with the agency’s

Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS).

The IEA projected in 2019 that, according to current

trends, nuclear capacity in 2040 would amount to

455 GW – “well below the SDS level of 601 GW”. The IEA

said additional lifetime extensions and a doubling of the

annual rate of capacity additions was required.

IEA executive director Fatih Birol was unambiguous:

“Alongside renewables, energy efficiency and other

innovative technologies, nuclear can make a significant

contribution to achieving sustainable energy goals and

enhancing energy security.”

The IEA is not an organisation that might be classed as

a ‘typical suspect’ when it comes to support for nuclear.

The agency simply points out the obvious, guided by the

science, and urges countries to “keep their options open”.

The IEA also recognises the value of supporting innovative

new reactor designs, such as small modular reactors.

In turn, as the IEA correctly points out, these advances in

technology can actually help the integration of more wind

and solar capacity into electricity systems.

And as readers of this journal will know, there are

advances in nuclear technology that can support the clean

energy transition that are attracting investment.

One example is the ‘Natrium’ concept, launched in the

US recently by TerraPower and GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy.

The concept features a sodium fast reactor combined with

a molten salt energy storage system that the partners say

will allow more than five hours of energy storage. The

hope is that the technology could be commercialised by

the end of this decade.

In the UK, EDF is looking into the prospects for

low- carbon hydrogen production by electrolysis using

nuclear-generated electricity. Hydrogen is widely seen as a

potential contributor to a future, cleaner fuel mix, for

transport.

Returning to my earlier point, encouraging a new public

relations offensive by the nuclear industry, how might this

be achieved?

A grassroots approach would be a great start. Nuclear

energy associations and utilities could look at reviving

the popular ‘town twinning’ schemes that were so active in

the 1980s and 1990s, but focusing on cities or regions

that host nuclear power plants or research facilities.

These communities could be encouraged to exchange

experiences of the beneficial impact the plants have had on

the respective communities – and to eventually be able,

pandemic restrictions permitting, to organise reciprocal

visits.

I recollect such a scheme was launched some time ago

in Europe by mayors of cities that hosted nuclear facilities.

What better time to breathe new life into that initiative?

The people who work within, or live alongside nuclear

facilities, understand the benefits of the technology and

are among the best ‘ambassadors’ for the industry in our

new, more climate-conscious world. Let their voices be

heard.

Author

John Shepherd

Nuclear Today

Nuclear has a Clear Advantage on the Post-Pandemic Climate Agenda ı John Shepherd


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