atw - International Journal for Nuclear Power | 10.2020

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2020
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Electrifying Transport
– A Global Perspective
Sustainable Finance Initiative
of the EU and Taxonomy –
How Green Is Nuclear?
Nuclear Energy – Reliable,
Safe, Economical and
Always Available to Protect
the Environment

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
After Corona with Nuclear Energy –
For People and Employment in the EU
Dear Reader, The Corona virus and its direct and indirect consequences and effects continue to accompany us. At
present, nobody can say when our everyday life will return to the normality it had before Corona. Nevertheless, we can,
indeed must, think ahead now about the time after the crisis, and this also applies to energy supply and nuclear energy.
Although Corona had an influence on energy and electricity
demand, due to significantly less economic activity, and in
some states it fell by almost 30 %, this was only a temporary
effect of the comprehensive lockdown and, as an example in
China, energy and electricity consumption are currently
back at the previous year’s level. A look at the long-term
development also reveals the sobering picture that the
continuing steady growth in the world population and
improved supply will lead to an increase in energy requirements
in the future. Studies by the International Energy
Agency (IEA), the BP Energy Outlook, reference scenarios
of the U.S. Energy Administration or ExxonMobil clearly
show this. A look at the development of electricity demand
also points to the obvious paradox that the rather emissionsrelated
electricity demand will grow disproportionately.
A second look at figures and strategies, however, reveals
the complex issue of sector coupling, in which low-emission
primary energies will displace more emission-heavy
energies through power generation in other sectors.
In spring this year, somewhat in the media shadow of the
looming consequences of Corona, the European Commission
published its long-awaited industrial strategy. At a time
when the geopolitical balance of power continues to shift
significantly and economic competition is intensifying,
especially with Asian countries, this strategy aims to
strengthen Europe’s competitiveness and technological
independence. Whether this strategy will be successful also
depends on whether these goals can be brought into harmony
with others, i.e. above all the goal of climate neutrality.
Here nuclear energy can play a key role.
A clean energy supply and the preservation of Europe’s
own competitiveness can be achieved with nuclear energy
and follow the goals of the EU industrial strategy. A secure
supply of electricity, as called for in the industrial strategy,
independent of time and weather, low-carbon and at
competitive prices can be guaranteed with nuclear power.
The role of nuclear energy in the EU’s energy supply
must be recognized as a strategic contribution with appropriate
conclusions: Although the 109 nuclear power plants
currently in operation in the EU with a total net capacity of
109,570 MW represent “only” around 9.5 % of the electricity
generation capacity, they supply around 30 % of the
electricity demand due to their high availability. In the
case of low-emission generation, the share is even 50 %.
In addition to their reliability, nuclear power plants have
the ability to support, indeed guarantee, grid stability
through flexibility. No other low-emission technology has
such high flexibility potential as nuclear power, i.e. nuclear
power plants can feed much more power into the grid in a
short time if other generators are not available, or in the opposite
case they can be shut down to low load in a short time
to make “space in the grid” available for volatile generation.
In addition, nuclear energy also has other economic
and strategic importance for the EU. The European nuclear
industry currently provides around 1 million subsidy-free
jobs and generates a gross domestic product of 450 billion
euros. The sector offers a high level of expertise; according
to a Deloitte report, 47 % of jobs are highly qualified, and
both know-how and the necessary resources are essentially
located in the EU. In addition, nuclear energy not only
includes power generation in the plants themselves, but
also a qualified network, starting with nuclear fuel supply
and disposal, through regulatory authorities, manufacturers,
service providers, research & development and
providing spin-offs for applications in industry, agriculture
and medicine.
In this context, it is also essential to note that nuclear
energy is competitive in a reliable regulatory environment
in the – free – market and thus provides favourable conditions
for all consumers, private and industrial. Here, the
advantages of low-cost energy weigh almost more heavily
than in the production itself, since the entire chain benefits
after the supply.
As part of its industrial strategy, the European Commission
must endeavour to identify industries that are strategic
for Europe as a whole. The benefits of nuclear energy in
terms of emission reduction, affordability and employment
must be recognized if it is to accompany the transformation
of energy supply in Europe. A political framework for this
must be given and implemented in Europe – beyond ideological
demarcations or economic particular interests –
which also includes the unbiased political acceptance of
nuclear energy. If EU states decide to use nuclear energy,
this must be accepted in the rest of the EU, just as nuclearusing
states accept a “no” to nuclear energy.
In view of the financial resources that have been
released or announced as a result of the measures taken by
the EU and the member states to cushion or overcome the
economic consequences of the Corona crisis, there is one
more point to note: These funds can also only be spent
once. Of course, it is also possible to build up any kind of
energy supply. But as the EU already stated in its opening
statement, we are in an intensified global environment and
competition. Too much emphasis on technologies that are
not yet competitive today could then block their future
rather than open the way for them. This also and especially
applies to energy supply. We have known how to deal with
nuclear energy in Europe commercially since 1956, and in
Germany since 1960. Let’s use the experience for a sustainable
Europe that will continue to shape a future worth
living in with reason and innovation. European realities
show that this is not just wishful thinking: The nuclear
power plant extension project Paks 5 & 6 in Hungary is
concrete, and the two 1,200 MW units will start operation
in 2025 and 2026. Objections to planning and construction
via EU legal norms have been rejected by the EU
judiciary. In the Czech Republic, the energy supplier and
nuclear power plant operator ČEZ has submitted an
application for the construction of two additional nuclear
power plant units at the Dukovany site in 2020. And in the
Netherlands, the parliament approved a motion to examine
the market options for nuclear power this September.
Christopher Weßelmann
– Editor in Chief –
467
EDITORIAL
Editorial
After Corona with Nuclear Energy – For People and Employment in the EU

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
EDITORIAL 468
Nach Corona mit Kernenergie – für Menschen
und Beschäftigung in der EU
Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser, der Corona-Virus und seine unmittelbaren und mittelbaren Folgen und Auswirkungen begleiten uns
weiterhin. Niemand kann aktuell sagen, wann es in unserem Alltagsleben wieder eine Normalität wie vor Corona geben wird. Dennoch
kann, ja muss jetzt über die Zeit nach der Krise vorausgedacht werden, und dies betrifft auch die Energieversorgung und die Kernenergie.
Zwar hatte Corona, bedingt durch deutlich weniger Wirtschaftsaktivitäten,
einen Einfluss auf den Energie- und Strombedarf, er sank
in einzelnen Staaten teilweise um fast 30 %, dies war aber ein nur
temporärer Effekt des umfassenden Lockdowns und als Beispiel in
China liegen Energie- und Stromverbrauch aktuell wieder auf
Vorjahresniveau. Auch ein Blick auf die längerfristige Entwicklung
zeigt das nüchterne Bild, dass die weiterhin stetig steigende Weltbevölkerung
und eine bessere Versorgung zukünftig den Energiebedarf
ansteigen lassen. Studien der Internationalen Energieagentur
(IEA), der BP Energy Outlook, Referenzszenarien der U.S. Energy
Administration oder ExxonMobil zeigen dies deutlich auf. Ein Blick
auf die Entwicklung beim Strombedarf verweist zudem auf das
augenscheinliche Paradoxon, dass der eher emissionsbehaftete
Strom bedarf überproportional wachsen wird. Auf den zweiten Blick
von Zahlen und Strategien verbirgt sich dahinter allerdings das
komplexe Thema der Sektorenkopplung, bei der emissionsarme
Primär energien über die Stromerzeugung in anderen Sektoren
stärker emissionslastige Energien verdrängen werden.
Im Frühjahr dieses Jahres, etwas im medialen Schatten der sich
anbahnenden Folgen durch Corona, veröffentlichte die Europäische
Kommission ihre lang erwartete Industriestrategie. Sie zielt im Kern
in einer Zeit sich weiter deutlich verschiebender geopolitischer
Gewichte und einem sich noch verstärkenden wirtschaftlichen
Wettbewerb – vor allem mit Staaten Asiens – auf eine Stärkung der
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und technologischen Unabhängigkeit Europas
ab. Ob diese Strategie Erfolg haben wird, hängt auch davon ab, ob
diese Ziele in Einklang mit anderen, d. h. vor allem dem Ziel der
Klimaneutralität, gebracht werden können.
Hier kann die Kernenergie eine Schlüsselrolle übernehmen.
Eine saubere Energieversorgung und der Erhalt der eigenen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit
Europas sind mit der Kernenergie zu erreichen
und folgen den Zielen der EU-Industriestrategie. Eine, wie in der
Industrie strategie gefordert, sichere Versorgung mit Elektrizität,
unabhängig von Uhrzeit und Wetter, kohlenstoffarm und zu wettbewerbsfähigen
Preisen kann mit Kernenergie gewährleistet werden.
Die Rolle der Kernenergie in der Energieversorgung der EU muss
als strategischer Beitrag anerkannt werden mit entsprechenden
Schlussfolgerungen: Die aktuell in der EU in Betrieb befindlichen
109 Kernkraftwerke mit einer Gesamtnettoleistung von 109.570 MW
repräsentieren zwar „nur“ rund 9,5 % der Stromerzeugungskapazität,
liefern aber aufgrund ihrer sehr hohen Ver fügbarkeit
rund 30 % des Strombedarfs. Bei der emissionsarmen Erzeugung
liegt der Anteil bei sogar 50 %.
Neben ihrer Verlässlichkeit haben die Kernkraftwerke die Fähigkeit,
die Stromnetzstabilität durch Flexibilität zu unterstützen, ja zu
gewährleisten. Keine andere emissionsarme Technologie hat ein so
hohes Flexibilitätspotenzial wie die Kernenergie, d. h. Kernkraftwerke
können viel mehr Leistung in kurzer Zeit ins Netz einspeisen,
wenn andere Erzeuger nicht verfügbar sind, oder im umgekehrten
Fall auch in kurzer Zeit auf niedrige Last herunter gefahren werden,
um „Platz im Netz“ für volatile Erzeugung bereit zu stellen.
Darüber hinaus hat die Kernenergie für die EU aber auch weitere
wirtschaftliche und strategische Bedeutung. Die europäische
Nuklearindustrie sichert aktuell rund 1 Millionen subventionsfreie
Arbeitsplätze und erwirtschaftet ein Bruttoinlandsprodukt von
450 Milliarden Euro. Der Sektor bietet eine hohe Fachkompetenz,
nach einem Bericht von Deloitte sind 47 % der Arbeitsplätze hoch
qualifiziert, und sowohl Know-how als auch erforderliche Ressourcen
sind im Wesentlichen in der EU angesiedelt. Zudem umfasst die
Kernenergie nicht nur die Stromerzeugung in den Anlagen selbst,
sondern auch ein qualifiziertes Netzwerk, beginnend mit der Kernbrennstoffversorgung
und -entsorgung über Regulierungsbehörden,
Hersteller, Dienstleister, die Forschung & Entwicklung und liefert
Spin-off für Anwendungen in Industrie, Landwirtschaft und Medizin.
Dabei ist noch als ganz wesentlich anzumerken, dass die Kernenergie
in einem verlässlichen regulatorischen Umfeld im – freien –
Markt wettbewerbsfähig ist und so günstige Rahmenbedingungen für
alle Verbraucher, private und Industrie liefert. Hier wiegen die Vorteile
preisgünstiger Energie fast noch stärker als bei der Erzeugung
selbst, da die gesamte Kette nach der Versorgung profitiert.
Im Rahmen ihrer Industriestrategie muss die Europäische Kommission
bestrebt sein, Industrien zu identifizieren, die insgesamt
strategisch für Europa sind. Die Vorteile der Kernenergie in den
Bereichen Emissionsminderung, Preiswürdigkeit und Beschäftigung
müssen anerkannt werden, damit sie den Wandel der Energieversorgung
in Europa mit begleitet. Ein politischer Rahmen muss dazu in
Europa gegeben sein und geschaffen werden – jenseits ideologischer
Abgrenzungen oder wirtschaftlicher Partikularinteressen –, der auch
die unvoreingenommene politische Akzeptanz für die Kernenergie
mit einschließt. Wenn sich Staaten der EU für die Kernenergienutzung
entscheiden, muss dies in der übrigen EU akzeptiert werden,
wie auch Kernenergie nutzende Staaten ein Nein zur Kernenergie
akzeptieren.
Angesichts der durch die Maßnahmen von EU und den Mitgliedsstaaten
zur Abfederung bzw. Überwindung der wirtschaftlichen
Folgen der Corona-Krise eingeleiteten Hilf- und Förderprogramme
freigesetzten oder angekündigten Finanzmittel sei noch auf einen
Punkt verwiesen: Auch diese Mittel lassen sich nur einmal ausgeben.
Natürlich lässt sich damit auch eine beliebige Energieversorgung
aufbauen. Doch wie es die EU schon in ihrem Eingangsstatement
festgestellt hat, befinden wir uns in einem verschärften globalen
Umfeld und Wettbewerb. Zu starke Gewichte auf heute noch nicht
wettbewerbsfähige Technologien können dann ihre Zukunft eher
versperren, als ihnen den Weg in die Zukunft öffnen. Dies gilt auch
und im Besonderen in der Energieversorgung. Mit der Kernenergie
in Europa wissen wir kommerziell seit 1956, in Deutschland seit
1960 umzugehen. Nutzen wir die Erfahrungen für ein zukunftsfähiges
Europa, das mit Vernunft und Innovationen eine weiterhin
lebenswerte Zukunft gestaltet. Das dies nicht reines Wunschdenken
ist, zeigen europäische Realitäten: Das Kernkraftwerkszubauprojekt
Paks 5 & 6 in Ungarn ist konkret, die zwei 1200-MW-Blöcke sollen in
den Jahren 2025 und 2026 den Betrieb aufnehmen. Einwendungen
gegen Planung und Bau via EU-Rechtsnormen wurden von der
EU-Justiz abgewiesen. In der Tschechischen Republik hat der
Energieversorger und Kernkraftwerksbetreiber ČEZ den Antrag auf
Errichtung von zwei weiteren Kernkraftwerksblöcken am Standort
Dukovany in 2020 eingereicht. Und in den Niederlanden hat das
Parlament einem Antrag auf Prüfung der Marktoptionen der Kernenergie
in diesem September zugestimmt.
Christopher Weßelmann
– Chefredakteur –
Editorial
After Corona with Nuclear Energy – For People and Employment in the EU

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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
470
Issue 10 | 2020
October
CONTENTS
Incorrect text passages were
published in the Operating
Results in issue 8/9 Vol. 65.
Contents
Editorial
After Corona with Nuclear Energy –
For People and Employment in the EU E/G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .467
The corrected report
can be found online:
www.kernd.de/kernd/presse/
pressemitteilungen/
Our apologies!
Cover:
View looking down on Vogtle Unit 3
containment vessel. A power reactor of
1,117 MWe net capacity avoids yearly
CO 2 -emissions amounting to about
10 million (10 6 ) tonnes, during the lifetime
of 60 years 600 million (10 6 ) tonnes
(this corresponds to approx. the yearly total
CO 2 -emissions of the private transport sector in
the EU). ©2020 Georgia Power Company.
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
‘Tumult and Challenge’ as the US Nuclear Energy
Faces Fight to Prosper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
Did you know...? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .473
Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .474
Feature | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
Electrifying Transport – A Global Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
Spotlight on Nuclear Law
A Judgement Regarding Tihange G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy –
How Green Is Nuclear? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement . . . . . . .485
Environment and Safety
Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe, Economical and Always Available
to Protect the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492
Are They Ready for Operation? How to Assess
the Control Room System of a New NPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection in I&C Networks:
Strategic Preparation for the Advent of Information Hiding
based Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
Research and Innovation
Simulation of Selected BETA Tests
with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS . . . . . . . . . . 509
Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems
with Open Source Code OpenFOAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany
Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
Report
Nuclear Power World Report 2019. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .521
KTG Inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .525
News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .526
Nuclear Today
Nuclear has a Clear Advantage
on the Post-Pandemic Climate Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530
G
E/G
= German
= English/German
Imprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
Contents

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Feature
Major Trends in Energy Policy
and Nuclear Power
471
CONTENTS
475 Electrifying Transport – A Global Perspective
Stefan Ulreich
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
482 Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy –
How Green Is Nuclear?
Nicolas Wendler
485 Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Henrique Schneider
Environment and Safety
489 Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy
James Conca and Judith Wright
492 Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe, Economical and Always Available
to Protect the Environment
Peter Dyck
498 Are They Ready for Operation?
How to Assess the Control Room System of a New NPP
Rainer Miller, Rodney Leitner, Sina Gierig and Harald Kolrep
Report
521 Nuclear Power World Report 2019
Contents

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
472
INSIDE NUCLEAR WITH NUCNET
‘Tumult and Challenge’ as the US
Nuclear Energy Faces Fight to Prosper
Countries are turning to China and Russia while the US ‘sits on the sidelines’
The US wants to build nuclear power plants that will work on the Moon and Mars, and has put out
a request for ideas from the private sector on how to build a fission surface power system that could
allow humans to live for long periods in harsh space environments.
“The prospect of deploying an advanced reactor to the
lunar surface is as exciting as it is challenging, and
partnering with the most forward-thinking companies in
the private sector and national laboratory system will help
us get there,” said Mr John Wagner, associate laboratory
director of Idaho National Laboratory’s nuclear science
and technology directorate.
While the nuclear industry as a whole remains bullish
about prospects for the next generation of reactors – plants
that can be deployed in space, for the military and in
remote areas – uncertainty surrounds the long-term future
of the traditional, commercial nuclear industry
The US has the largest number of nuclear plants in the
world – 95 in commercial operation providing 20 % of its
electricity generation – but its leadership in the sector is
said by many to be declining as efforts to build a new
generation of large reactors have been plagued by
problems, and aging plants have been retired or closed in
the face of economic, market, and financial pressures.
Only two commercial nuclear plants are under construction
in the US, at Vogtle in Georgia (this compares to 11 in
China and four in Russia). The author of a think-tank report
told NucNet these plants, both Westinghouse AP1000s,
could become the last large-capacity reactors to be built in
the US, with small modular reactors and other Generation
IV advanced reactors taking over as key technologies.
Mr William Magwood, director-general of the Parisbased
Nuclear Energy Agency, said cost is one of the issues
driving the market to consider smaller reactors. He said
compe tition in the nuclear industry – including from China
and Russia – is leading to more choice in terms of reactor
technology, but financing and contract terms are often the
determining issue for many customers, with SMRs
attracting attention because of their affordability, Competition
in the overseas new-build sector from state-backed
corporations in China and Russia is often cited by the
industry as a major impediment to its potential. Energy
secretary Mr Dan Brouillette said many countries of
geopoli tical importance are pursuing nuclear energy for
their domestic electricity needs. Those countries are largely
turning to Chinese and Russian state-owned enterprises for
the technological support needed to build reactors, while
the US sits on the sidelines. “In effect, China and Russia are
gaining geopolitical leverage by exporting nuclear expertise
and building 100-year bilateral relationships,” he said.
There are two elements to the industry’s perceived
woes: an inability to build new, large-megawatt nuclear
plants at home because financing for nuclear can be difficult
to secure; and an inability to compete abroad because
China and Russia can offer project terms backed by their
respective governments. The problem with financing new
nuclear, in essence, is that payback periods are notoriously
long and uncertain. Government-backed enterprises in
China and Russia are in a better position than US private
enterprise to mitigate any uncertainties.
The industry has long argued that electricity markets in
the US should be reformed to recognise the ability of
traditional baseload generation with onsite fuel supplies –
including nuclear power plants – to provide grid resiliency
during extreme events like hurricanes or extreme winter
weather.
A report by the Washington-based think-tank the
Atlantic Council issued a stark warning, arguing that the
US nuclear energy industry is facing a crisis that the Trump
administration must immediately address.
The good news is that the Trump administration recognises
the problem, supports nuclear energy, and sees new
generation nuclear technology such as small modular
reactors as a key part of its energy strategy. The Nuclear
Fuel Working Group report, requested by Mr Trump and
published in April, proposes a series of actions to improve
nuclear power as a baseload source of energy, revive the
uranium industry strengthen American technology
supremacy, and drive US exports of advanced nuclear
reactors and fuel technology.
Last month, in a move welcomed by the nuclear
industry as a boost for export opportunities, the US
International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
announced it will lift its legacy prohibition on funding
nuclear energy projects, recognising the vast energy needs
of developing countries and the potential of new and
advanced technologies such as small modular reactors and
microreactors in these markets.
Four US nuclear plants have shut down since 2018 (six
since 2013) and at least five more are slated to retire over
the next five years, resulting in a total loss since 2013 of
around 10 GW of generation from the grid.
The Washington-based Nuclear Energy Institute, which
represents the nuclear industry in the US, said the US
electricity grid is enduring “unprecedented tumult and
challenge” because of the loss of thousands and thousands
of megawatts of carbon-free, fuel-secure generation that
nuclear plants represent.
Closing nuclear plants makes electricity prices go up
and is putting emissions reduction targets hopelessly out
of reach, NEI president and chief executive officer Maria
Korsnick said.
The Atlantic Council said the decline of the nuclear
power industry in the US is “an important policy problem”
that is not receiving the attention it deserves. The report
was made public in March 2018, in the same week that
Ohio-based utility FirstEnergy announced plans to permanently
shut down its three nuclear power stations –
Davis-Besse, Perry and Beaver Valley – within the next
three years without some kind of state or federal relief.
Author
NucNet – The Independent Global Nuclear News Agency
Editor responsible for this story: David Dalton
Avenue des Arts 56 2/C
1000 Bruxelles, Belgium
www.nucnet.org
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
‘Tumult and Challenge’ as the US Nuclear Energy Faces Fight to Prosper

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Did you know...?
No Harm to the Environment – Progress and Solutions
in the Management of High-level Radioactive Waste
Recently the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the OECD published
the Report Radioactive Waste Management 2020 with the title
“Management and Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste:
Global Progress and Solutions”. The report is characterized by the
NEA as a policy-level compendium of the current status of
knowledge, technological developments, safety standards, rules
and requirements applicable to evaluating the feasibility of DGRs
(=Deep Geological Repositories). It summarises how the international
scientific community has intensively collaborated to bring
sound arguments and evidence into the debate that SNF/HLW
will not cause harm to either humans or the environment. In this
sense the report relates directly to the current European policy
debate about the evaluation of nuclear energy as a sustainable
low-carbon contributor to the mitigation of climate change or as
harmful to the environment as was pointed out by the NEA
Director- General, Mr William D. Magwood, IV during a NEAwebinar.
(see also the article “Sustainable Finance Initiative of
the EU and Taxonomy – How green is Nuclear?” in this issue of
atw)
In its arguments the NEA points to the long tradition of radiation
protection dating back to the creation of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), an independent
nongovernmental organisation in 1928 to advance the science of
radiological protection and some 70 year of scientific investigation
and research concerning nuclear waste management. The
ICRP (1998) recommends a maximum radiation exposure of not
more than 0.3 mSv per year for people living near the DGR
( Germany requires 0.1 mSv for unlikely and 0.01 mSv for likely
developments of the DGR). The annual global average dose from
natural background radiation is 2.4 mSv. Concerning the EU/
Euratom, the NEA reminds of the first Basic Safety Standard (BSS)
Directive that was adopted in 1959 to ensure the highest possible
protection of workers and members of the public from exposure
to ionising radiation. The Directive has been amended regularly
and the most recent BSS Directive was adopted in 2014. Concerning
management of nuclear waste at EU level, the Euratom
Waste Directive (Council Directive 2011/70/ EURATOM of 19 July
2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible
and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste) refers
to the Euratom Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection.
Besides regulation the report shows that from the early days
of commercial nuclear power some 70 years ago, the nuclear
sector has responsibly addressed the life cycle of its materials and
their impacts, including the use of advanced technology for waste
management. In all cases i.e. whether spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is
recycled or not, the final disposal of the high-level radioactive
waste (HLW) has been a matter requiring attention. Policy makers
and scientists at the national and international level have been
proposing, studying and implementing the safe disposal of SNF/
HLW. The NEA report demonstrates that the scientific consensus
today, that has developed for more than a half century, is that
DGRs are a safe and effective approach to permanently dispose
of SNF/HLW. Independent national regulators have endorsed
their effectiveness to isolate SNF/HLW from humans and the
environment and the safety principles and technological solutions
for the long-term management of SNF/HLW are well established.
The NEA also points out that the effective and decades long
implementation of safe interim storage in respect of all regulatory
requirements concerning radiation protection, safety, security
and non-proliferation has granted experts the time necessary to
develop robust technical solutions within a democratic and
transparent decision-making process for the final management
of SNF/HLW without the need to rush to disposal. To this end
underground research laboratories (URL) have been constructed
and operated and in situ experiments performed and replicated
in many locations. As a result, there is now a robust basis for the
design and constructability of safe DGRs. The accumulated
scientific results, technological evidence and safety demonstrations
have been presented openly and were critically reviewed by
internationally recognised experts to reach the current level of
maturity. Below you can find a table showing the timeline for
countries further along in the DGR process for SNF/HLW.
Source:
Radioactive Waste
Management 2020
Management and
Disposal of High-Level
Radioactive Waste:
Global Progress and
Solutions, OECD 2020,
NEA No. 7532
For further details
please contact:
Nicolas Wendler
KernD
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin
Germany
E-mail: presse@
KernD.de
www.KernD.de
DID YOU EDITORIAL KNOW...?
473
Timeline for countries further along in the Deep Geological Repositories (DGR) process
Country Feasibility and
site investigations
begin
Site selected
Begin construction
of underground
Rock Laboratory
Application
submitted
Construction
license
granted
Construction
begin
Total years
prior to
application
Projected
operational
period
Finland 1983 2000 2004 2012 2015 2016 29 100 years
France 1991 1998 2000 2021 (estimate) 2022 (estimate) 30 100 years
Sweden 1976 2009 1990 (Äspö) 2011 Early 2020s
(estimate)
United States
(Yucca)
United States
(WIPP)
1982 1987 1993 (Exploratory
Studies Facility)
34 45 years (routine
operation)
2008 2048 (estimate) 28 100 years or
longer
1955 1974 1979 1981 24 35 years
China 1985 2018 2020 2041 (estimate)
Canada 1978 2023 (estimate) 1982 (AECL) 2028 (estimate) 2032 (estimate) 50 40 years or more
Germany 1965 2031 (estimate) 1986 (Gorleben)
Switzerland 1978 2022 (estimate) 1984 (Grimsel)
1996 (Mont Terri)
Japan 1976 2027 (estimate) 2002 (Mizunami URL)
2005 (Horonobe URL)
2024 (estimate) 2031 (estimate) 46 ~ 30 years
~ 50 years
Did you know...?

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
474
Calendar
2020
This is not a full list. Dates are subject to change.
Please check the listed websites for updates.
CALENDAR
Virtual Meeting 04.11. – 06.11.2020
The Power & Electricity World Africa 2020.
Terrapinn, www.terrapinn.com
08.11. – 12.11.2020
Advancing Geological Repositories
from Concept to Operation. Helsinki, Finland,
OECD, Nuclear Energy Agency, www.oecd-nea.org
Virtual Meeting 09.11. – 20.11.2020
International Conference on Radiation Safety:
Improving Radiation Protection in Practice.
IAEA, www.iaea.org
Virtual Meeting 15.11. – 19.11.2020
ANS Winter Meeting and Technology of Fusion
Energy (TOFE 2020). American Nuclear Society,
www.ans.org
18.11. – 19.11.2020
INSC — International Nuclear Supply Chain
Symposium. Munich, Germany, TÜV SÜD,
www.tuvsud.com
23.11. – 25.11.2020
KELI 2020 – Conference for Electrical Engineering,
I&C and IT in generation plants. Bremen, Germany,
VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org
24.11. – 26.11.2020
ICOND 2020 – 9 th International Conference on
Nuclear Decommissioning. Aachen, Germany,
AiNT, www.icond.de
30.11. – 02.12.2020
European Power Strategy & Systems Summit.
Prague, Czech Republic, European Power
Generation, www.europeanpowergeneration.eu
Virtual Meeting 07.12. – 10.12.2020
SAMMI 2020 – Specialist Workshop on Advanced
Measurement Method and Instrumentation
for enhancing Severe Accident Management in
an NPP addressing Emergency, Stabilization and
Long-term Recovery Phases. NEA, www.sammi-2020.org
03.03. – 04.03.2021
Maintenance in Power Plants 2021. Karlsruhe,
Germany, VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org
07.03. – 11.03.2021
WM2021 – Waste Management Symposia.
Phoenix, Arizona, USA, X-CD Technologies,
www.wmsym.org
16.03. – 18.03.2021
EURAD 1 st Annual Event. www.ejp-eurad.eu
17.03. – 19.03.2021
KONTEC 2021 – 15 th International Symposium
“Conditioning of Radioactive Operational &
Decommissioning Wastes”. Dresden, Germany,
atm, www.kontec-symposium.de
23.03. – 26.03.2021
7 th International Conference on Education and
Training in Radiation Protection. Groningen,
Netherlands, FuseNet, www.etrap.net
30.03. – 01.04.2021
PowerGen International. Orlando, Florida, USA,
Clarion Events, www.powergen.com
26.04. – 27.04.2021
AtomExpo 2021. Sochi, Russia, Rosatom,
http://2021.atomexpo.ru/en/
26.04. – 27.04.2021
COP26 – UN Climate Change Conference.
Glascow, Scotland, www.ukcop26.org
26.04. – 30.04.2021
European Nuclear Young Generation Forum
(ENYGF). Tarragona, Spain, ENYGF, www.enygf.org
Postponed to 03.05. – 07.05.2021
ATALANTE 202(0)1. Nimes, France, CEA + Geniors,
www.atalante2020.org
Postponed to 10.05. – 15.05.2021
FEC 2020 – 28 th IAEA Fusion Energy Conference.
Nice, France, IAEA, www.iaea.org
Postponed to 30.08. – 03.09.2021
International Conference on Operational Safety
of Nuclear Power Plants. Beijing, China, IAEA,
www.iaea.org
Postponed to 08.09. – 10.09.2021
3 rd International Conference on Concrete
Sustainability. Prague, Czech Republic, fib,
www.fibiccs.org
08.09. – 10.09.2021
World Nuclear Association Symposium 2021.
London, UK, WNA, www.wna-symposium.org
27.09. – 01.10.2021
NPC 2021 International Conference on Nuclear
Plant Chemistry. Antibes, France, SFEN Société
Française d’Energie Nucléaire,
www.sfen-npc2021.org
Postponed to 07.09. – 10.09.2021
International Forum on Enhancing a Sustainable
Nuclear Supply Chain. Helsinki, Finland, Foratom,
https://events.foratom.org/mstf2020/
Postponed to 30.11. – 02.12.2021
Enlit (former European Utility Week and
POWERGEN Europe). Milano, Italy,
www.powergeneurope.com
Postponed to 2021
The Frédéric Joliot/Otto Hahn Summer School
on Nuclear Reactors “Physics, Fuels and Systems”.
Aix-en-Provence, France, CEA & KIT, www.fjohss.eu
Postponed to 2021
INDEX 2020: International Nuclear Digital
Experience. Paris, France, SFEN,
www.sfen-index2020.org
Postponed to 2021
4 th CORDEL Regional Workshop – Harmonization
to support the operation and new build of NPPs
including SMR. Lyon, France, World Nuclear
Association, www.events.foratom.org
08.12. – 10.12.2020
World Nuclear Exhibition 2020. Paris Nord
Villepinte, France, Gifen,
www.world-nuclear-exhibition.com
Virtual Meeting 17.12. – 18.12.2020
ICNESPP 2020 – 14 th International Conference on
Nuclear Engineering Systems and Power Plants.
WASET, www.waset.org
18.05. – 20.05.2021
Power Uzbekistan 2021 – 15 th Anniversary
International Exhibition on Energy.
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Iteca Exhibitions,
www.power-uzbekistan.uz
Postponed to 30.05. – 05.06.2021
BEPU2020 – Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty International
Conference, Giardini Naxos. Sicily, Italy,
NINE, www.nineeng.com
2022
2021
24.02. – 26.02.2021
International Power Summit 2021.
Arena International Events Group,
www.arena-international.com
Postponed to 31.05. – 04.06.2021
20 th WCNDT – World Conference on
Non-Destructive Testing. Incheon, Korea,
The Korean Society of Nondestructive Testing,
www.wcndt2020.com
Postponed to 02.06. – 04.06.2021
HTR2020 – 10 th International Conference
on High Temperature Reactor Technology.
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Indonesian Nuclear Society,
www.htr2020.org
KERNTECHNIK 2022.
Germany, KernD and KTG,
www.kerntechnik.com
Calendar

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Electrifying Transport –
A Global Perspective
Stefan Ulreich
1 Introduction The Paris Agreement aims to achieve climate neutrality i.e. a balance between the
anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and GHG sinks by the mid of this century. Since energy consumption
is responsible for roughly three quarters of the global GHG emissions, there has always been a strong focus on the
related GHG sources. The focus on the climate debate so far has been on electricity generation, but in the last years,
also the future mobility is gaining increasing attention 1 .
The main technology options to achieve climate neutrality
in the transport sector are electrification (electro-mobility,
fuel cells or e-fuels i.e. liquid or gaseous synthetic fuels
produced with electricity) and biomass. The electrification
route is connected with power consumption, i.e. it will
contribute to the Paris climate goal by using climateneutral
electricity production. A third option to achieve
climate-neutral fuels is the combination of classic fossil
fuels with carbon dioxide removal technologies (see
Figure 1).
Apart from technological solutions, also behavioural
changes can induce a reduction of mobility-related
emissions e.g. by using public transport, changes in
global supply chains, new work approaches and digital
communication. However, in the end, this will reduce the
demand for transport, but still necessitates the development
of climate-neutral transport technologies.
2 Transport – current situation
Transport-related CO 2 emissions (in total 8.1 Gt) have a
share of 21 % of the global GHG emissions in 2018. Since
1990 they increased by 77 %. The top-20 transport
emitters incl. International Aviation and International
Shipping are responsible for 82 % of the global transport
emissions. The three biggest transport emitters in 2018
were the United States (1.8 Gt), China (0.94 Gt) and
India (0.29 Gt). The three biggest relative increases in
transport emissions since 1990 took place in China
(780 %), Indonesia (374 %) and India (348 %) 2 .
In 2018, transport-related energy consumption has a
share of 29 % of the global energy consumption (the latter
is 9,938 Mtoe resp. 115,579 TWh resp. 416,104 PJ) 3 . For
comparison, the global electricity consumption in 2018
was 22,135 TWh globally (i.e. 19 % of the global energy
consumption). This clearly indicates the challenge of
electrifying transport as a whole, though for a rigorous
comparison the efficiencies of the respective transport
fuel and the corresponding engines need to be taken
into account. The IPCC mentions in their report an
overall efficiency for mobility of 32 % globally 4 , i.e. for
35,000 TWh energy input a mechanical energy of
11,200 TWh would result. Consequently, for engines with
higher efficiency, the total demand for energy (including
losses) would also decrease tremendously.
| Fig. 1.
Electrification is part of the solution for climate-neutral transport. This does not only include
electro-mobility, but also the production of synthetic fuels using climate-neutral electricity.
The most common power trains are on the right side.
Fossil fuels dominate the fuel mix of global transport
heavily 5 . The current contribution of electricity to transport
globally is less than 2 %.
Transport shows a higher overall energy use for
passengers (60.7 % of total energy consumption for
transport) in contrast to freight (39.3 %). For the modes of
transport, the global picture shows that the light-duty
vehicles are responsible for almost three quarters of the
passenger related energy consumption (72.1 %), air
transport for 16.9 %, bus for 6.3 %, rail for 1.9 % and
2/3-wheeler for 2.7 %. Concerning freight, truck transport
(heavy, medium and light) is responsible for 69.6 % of the
freight related energy consumption, marine for 18.1 % and
rail for 5.5 %.
Transport is very important for society. Firstly, for
economic reasons: transport enables the extension of
value chains across the globe and facilitates international
trade. Secondly, private transport is a human right: Article
13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts
the freedom of movement. Consequently, finding climatefriendly
solutions for transport is of utmost importance in
order to maintain these benefits for human society in a
sustainable way.
475
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER
1 Weltenergierat Deutschland, Energy for Germany 2020 (Pathways to Climate Neutrality) and Energy for Germany 2018 (Climate Protection in Road Traffic)
2 Calculations based on figures by Crippa, M., Oreggioni, G., Guizzardi, D., Muntean, M., Schaaf, E., Lo Vullo, E., Solazzo, E., Monforti-Ferrario, F., Olivier, J.G.J., Vignati, E., Fossil CO 2 and GHG
emissions of all world countries – 2019 Report, EUR 29849 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019, ISBN 978-92-76-11100-9, doi:10.2760/687800, JRC117610.
3 IEA, World energy balances 2020: Overview, Paris, July 2020.
4 Sims R., R. Schaeffer, F. Creutzig, X. Cruz-Núñez, M. D’Agosto, D. Dimitriu, M. J. Figueroa Meza, L. Fulton, S. Kobayashi, O. Lah, A. McKinnon, P. Newman, M. Ouyang, J. J. Schauer, D. Sperling, and
G. Tiwari, 2014: Transport. In: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T.
Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
5 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2019 with projections to 2050, September 2019
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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 476
| Fig. 2.
Transport-related CO 2 -emissions (2018; based on data by EDGAR).
3 Technology Options
3.1 Transport modes
The various transport modes need different technological
answers to become climate neutral. For light-duty vehicles
(LDVs) i.e. cars, sport-utility vehicles and even small trucks,
battery electric vehicles are one key technology. Furthermore,
fuel-cell electric vehicles and even the classic internal
combustion engine vehicle have the opportunity to become
part of the solution, provided the production of the fuel is
climate-neutral, as is the case with the so-called blue and
green hydrogen. Hence, carbon neutral LDV transport is
ensured by climate-neutral electricity production.
For the freight transport by trucks, ships and trains the
path to climate neutrality is less straightforward. Some
emission reduction will result from the use of biofuels for
trucks and ships and efficiency gains in parallel. A fuel
switch to electricity is a viable option for freight trains and
delivery trucks. Fully electric trucks could also work for a
major part of light and medium-duty trucks with typical
operational distances of up to 200 kilometres per day. For
heavy-duty trucks battery-electric solutions are developed
as well as alternative fuels e.g. hydrogen for fuel cells or
synthetic fuels (also called synfuels or e-fuels) for internal
combustion engines. With PtL-production (Power-to-
Liquid), climate-neutral electricity will then also be the
cornerstone for decarbonized freight transport.
For aviation, there are currently four technology
options under discussion: electric aircrafts, biofuels,
e-fuels and classic fossil fuels combined with carbondioxide-
removal (CDR) technologies. The further technological
development will decide about the winning
technologies and their contribution. Similarly, for international
maritime transport e-fuels and biofuels are
existing solution. In both cases, technical requirements of
the transport mode make e-fuels inevitable.
The driving force for alternative fuels in the transport
sector is no longer the fear, that the world will run out of
fossil fuels like oil and gas, but the requirements of the
Paris agreement to become climate-neutral by the mid of
this century. Apparently, not only electric vehicles will lead
to new demand for electricity by the future climate-neutral
transport – but also the e-fuels. Hence, it is instructive to
look at these fuels in more detail.
3.2 Synthetic fuels
Electrolysis of water produces hydrogen, sometimes called
e-hydrogen. The hydrogen can be used directly in both
gaseous and liquefied form. In motor vehicles, fuel cells
are used in combination with electric motors. Gaseous
hydrogen, which is stored in a pressure tank, is currently
used in cars.
With the so-called methanation the e-hydrogen and
carbon dioxide react to produce methane. Since natural
gas overwhelmingly consists of methane, it can be
completely substituted by e-methane – and the existing
infrastructure for natural gas (pipelines, LNG facilities)
can immediately be used. Since (fossil) natural gas already
serve as a transport fuel for trucks, busses and ships, there
is also the opportunity to blend the natural gas with
e-methane and reach the climate goals in a stepwise
process. Additionally, bio-methane is a second source for
climate-neutral methane. Given the already existing
international gas transport infrastructure, synthetic
methane would immediately allow international optimization
of its production – and increase the security of
supply by offering various sources.
The e-hydrogen can also serve as raw material for
methanol synthesis. Methanol is a fuel on its own or can be
blended with gasoline for internal combustion engine
vehicles. However, also fuel cells can work with methanol.
Methanol is one of the mostly produced organic chemicals
worldwide, i.e. there is also some transport infrastructure
present.
With the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis and the e-hydrogen
as raw material, any petroleum-based fuel can be produced
e.g. kerosene. In comparison with the use of e-hydrogen,
the Fischer-Tropsch fuels would be available for immediate
use in the current transport framework.
Further technologies are DME synthesis (Dimethyl
ether), OME synthesis (Oxymethylene ether) and other
oxygen-containing energy sources as dimethyl carbonate
(DMC) or methyl formate (MeFo).
It should be noted, that synfuels typically have a lower
energy density compared with their conventional fossil
equivalents. For OME it is roughly 50 %, i.e. double the
volume is needed. The production of e-fuels consumes
electricity. In the literature, a broad range of energy
consumption is given, depending on the used technology
and its current efficiency 6 .
Fuel Min Max
Hydrogen 1.23 1.72
Methane 1.54 2.00
Methanol 2.08 2.33
FT-fuels 1.55 2.78
OME 2.70 3.03
DME 1.96 2.22
| Tab. 1.
Electricity consumption in kWh per kWh produced fuel.
The production of synfuels costs additional amounts of
energy in comparison with a battery electric vehicle.
Additionally, the efficiency of internal combustion engines
is typically worse than fuel cells or electrical engines.
These arguments would clearly put EVs in favour. However,
using EVs necessitates regional electricity production
6 Source: FfE, Welche strombasierten Kraftstoffe sind im zukünftigen Energiesystem relevant? (6 th Feb 2019)
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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
and grid transport, which often leads to challenges with
regards to social acceptance. Furthermore, it might also
make economic sense to produce the synfuels at sites not
only with high social acceptance for climate-neutral
electricity production but also with excellent conditions
e.g. with high full-load hours for wind or PV generation.
The overall production costs for imported synfuels might
then be lower than local electricity production.
Currently politics in many countries concentrate on
battery solutions for transport, since they view e-liquids
and e-gases as mainly important for the industry sector.
This might change over time, learning how realistic battery
solutions will be for all modes of transport and for all
countries.
Synthetic fuels could also become interesting for use as
fuel for power plants e.g. e-methane for CCGTs, if the goals
for climate-neutral power generation cannot be met in one
country or region due to e.g. missing social acceptance.
4 Global scenarios
4.1 World Energy Scenarios 2019
In its 2019 version of the World Energy Scenarios 7 , the
World Energy Council emphasized, that the total energy
demand for mobility is driven by the dynamic development
of population and GDP growth that is offset by
efficiency improvements. All three scenarios of the WEC –
with their names Unfinished Symphony, Modern Jazz and
Hard Rock – see a co-development of EVs, ICE efficiency,
ride sharing, autonomous vehicles and new modes of
transport is already fundamentally reshaping personal
transport demand. In the two scenarios Unfinished
Symphony and Modern Jazz the energy demand growth is
limited to 2040, based on the rapid price reduction of
EVs, achieving sales price parity with ICEs by 2030. This
development accelerates the penetration of EVs. Commercial
transportation will experience a decreasing energy
intensity due to more efficient engines and a rise in the
use of alternative fuels such as biofuels and hydrogen.
With these changes, by 2040 electricity and hydrogen
capture 10-16 % of total energy consumed by transport in
Unfinished Symphony and Modern Jazz.
The scenario Hard Rock differs notably in that the
weaker global policy coordination of fuel and efficiency
standards and limited technology transfer result in a much
slower uptake of EVs and alternative fuels. Consequently,
the transport sector experiences energy demand growth of
28 %, and oil remains the dominate fuel.
Hydrogen emerges in all three scenarios by 2040 to a
notable extent in the overall energy mix. This is driven by
excess renewable power generation in Modern Jazz or by
security of supply concerns in Hard Rock.
4.2 EIA International Energy Outlook 2019
The EIA reflects in their reference case current trends
especially concerning economic and demographic
development, but does not anticipate future technological
breakthroughs.
Demand for transportation grows in non-OECD
countries and is rather flat in OECD-countries. In non-
OECD, transportation energy demand increases by 77 %
from 2018 to 2050. In OECD countries, the interplay
between improving vehicle fuel efficiency and growing demand
result in a total projected transportation energy use
declining by 1 % from 2018 to 2050. Consequently, by
2050 non-OECD accounts for almost two-third of the
world’s transportation related energy use. Main driver in
non-OECD is the growth in passenger travel. The EIA
reference case starts with a transportation energy demand
of about 35,433 TWh (2018) and ends in 2050 with
49,001 TWh.
The share of transportation fuels from alternative
energy sources increases, but sill oil-based products
dominate the transport fuel mix: Within the transportation
sector, the use of refined petroleum and other liquid
fuels continues to increase through 2050, but its share
decreases from 94 % to about 82 % as alternative fuel use
slowly increases. The primary fuel for transportation is
motor gasoline (including additives as ethanol) and
accounts in 2050 for 32 % of the world’s transportationrelated
energy. Air travel demand continues to rise globally
leading to a doubling of jet fuel consumption from 2018 to
2050.
The fastest growing forms of transportation energy are
natural gas and electricity. The EIA scenario projects an
increase in OECD of LDVs from 3.5 million vehicles (2018)
to 169 million vehicles (2050) and in non-OECD from
2.2 million vehicles (2018) to 260 million vehicles (2050).
Consequently, the share of electricity used in transportation
almost triples, also due to higher electricity use for
rail transport. Nevertheless, transportation accounts for
less than 6 % of total delivered electricity consumption in
2050.
For comparison: the 2050 electricity consumption in
transport of 2,465 TWh is higher than the combined global
wind (1,429.6 TWh) and PV production (724.1 TWh) in
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 477
| Fig. 3.
The fuel mix for transport in 2060 in the three world energy scenarios.
Also in 2060 fossil fuels will have in the optimistic scenario a high share
in the fuel mix.
| Fig. 4.
The scenario unfinished symphony shows the highest electricity share
for transport. Especially, after 2030 the economics for electric transport
solution improves substantially.
7 World Energy Council, World Energy Scenarios 2019 – Exploring Innovation Pathways to 2040 (London 2019)
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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 478
2019 8 . Consequently, also the not very ambitious electrification
of transport in the EIA reference case would
necessitate stronger investments in renewable generation
in order to cover the transport demand by renewables.
Fuel 2018 in TWh Share in % 2050 in TWh Share in %
Motor gasoline 14,181 40.0 % 15,911 32.5 %
Diesel 12,717 35.9 % 13,532 27.6 %
Jet Fuel 3,740 10.6 % 8,616 17.6 %
Residual Fuel Oil 2,362 6.7 % 1,687 3.4 %
Natural Gas 1,583 4.5 % 6,536 13.3 %
Electricity 479 1.4 % 2,465 5.0 %
LPG 248 0.7 % 142 0.3 %
Other Liquids 122 0.3 % 112 0.2 %
Sum 35,433 100.0 % 49,001 100.0 %
| Tab. 2.
EIA reference case evolution of transport fuel consumption between 2018 and 2050.
4.3 BP Energy Outlook 2019
The BP Energy Outlook 2019 9 also emphasizes that the
efficiency gains limits the energy demand in a strongly
growing transport sector. The lion’s share of efficiency
gains will occur in road transport – both passenger and
freight – whereas the efficiency gains in maritime and air
transport are limited. Growth centre for transport in the
BP scenarios is Asia.
In the “Evolving transition”-scenario, oil continues to
be the dominating energy source declining from 94 % to
85 % by 2040. Electricity would provide around 5 % in
2040 (corresponding to 1,725 TWh). This corresponds to a
number of electric vehicles of around 350 million by 2040,
of which around 300 million are passenger cars i.e. 15 % of
all cars. Since electric vehicles will do shared-services
largely, around 24 % of passenger vehicle kilometres are
electric in 2040.
BP also developed a “Lower-carbon transport” scenario
including a large number of measures to reduce carbon
emissions, in order to address climate concerns. These
measures incentivize fuel switching towards electricity
leading to half of the reduction in emissions relative to the
“Evolving transition”-scenario. Due to these measures, the
electrification of vehicle kilometres will increase from
24 % to 37 %. This scenario clearly indicates that legislative
and regulatory activities can have an enormous positive
impact on electrification of transport.
4.4 Shell Sky Scenarios 10
One of the pioneers in scenario work is the oil major Shell.
In 2018, Shell published the Sky scenario illustrating a
pathway for society to achieve the goals of the Paris
Agreement. Transport also plays a key role in this scenario.
Sky describes a very rapid transition where more than half
of global car sales in 2030 are electric, and all passenger
car sales by 2050. Since the whole energy system in this
scenario is based on electricity, the global electricity
consumption will increase to roughly 100,000 TWh per
year. The transport sector in 2050 consumes 7,133 TWh
electricity.
4.5 IEA EV Outlook 2020 11
The IEA report mentioned that in 2010, globally only about
17,000 electric cars were present. However, this figure
increased to 7.2 million electric cars by 2019 – with almost
half of the electric cars in China. IEA considers two
scenarios: Stated Policies Scenario (SPS), incorporating
existing government policies, and the Sustainable
Development Scenario (SDS), which is fully compatible
with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Electric vehicles
play a crucial role to meet the climate goals and to address
local air pollution. Within SDS, the global electric vehicle
stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) increases by 36 %
annually, leading to 245 million vehicles in 2030 i.e. over
30 times above today’s level. Other than two/threewheelers,
growth is strongest for LDVs. The electricity
consumption connected with electric vehicles would be
1,000 TWh globally. In the SPS, the global electric vehicle
stock (excluding two/three-wheelers) reaches nearly
140 million vehicles by 2030 and accounts for 7 % of the
global vehicle fleet. This translates into an electricity
consumption of 550 TWh.
4.6 WEC PtX-roadmap
The Weltenergierat Deutschland addressed the international
aspects of PtX-technologies in a recent report 12 .
The report does not only consider the use of PtX for
transport, but also e.g. for heating and cooling or industry.
The report emphasizes the major advantage of a global
PtX market for synthetic liquid fuels (such as diesel,
heating oil, gasoline, kerosene, methanol) and synthetic
gases (such as hydrogen or methane): they can be fed into
the current energy system with existing infrastructure.
This might be especially interesting in densely populated
areas, where the regional demand for energy is rather
high, but the opportunities are limited to produce climatefriendly
electricity in this region. Consequently, energy
imports will pave the way for a climate-friendly transformation
of the energy system.
The report considers three different scenarios with a
low case (10,000 TWh annual global PtX demand),
reference case (20,000 TWh) and the high case
(41,000 TWh). A rough calculation shows, that an annual
production of 20,000 TWh requires 8,000 GW installed
PtX-capacity.
The biggest export potentials are attached to countries
like e.g. Russia, Canada, US, South Africa, Saudi Arabia or
China.
4.7 Wrap-up of the scenarios
The scenarios show that oil-based transport will have a
substantial share in the next decades, unless very strong
political action will be taken. Since most of the transport
growth will take place in non-OECD, the global picture will
be determined largely by Asia.
Note, that there could also be electricity consumption
due to PtX, which is not made visible in each scenario.
So far, the consideration of electro-mobility concentrated
on the demand for electric energy, not on the load. For
the latter it is assumed, that digitalisation will lead to
situations where simultaneous loading is avoided in order
to maintain the grid stability.
8 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020 (69 th edition), London 2020
9 BP Energy Outlook 2019 edition, London (2019)
10 Shell
11 IEA, Global EV Outlook 2020, Paris (June 2020)
12 Weltenergierat Deutschland, International Aspects of a Power-to-X roadmap,Berlin (2018)
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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
| Fig. 5.
The share of electricity in the global transport fuel mix 2030 and 2040.
5 International Development
5.1 G20 Transport Task Group
Within the G20-countries, the Transport Task Group (TTG)
was established to reduce energy demand and environmental
impacts of transport and to enable best practice exchange
among the G20-countries about measures. A strong focus is
put on heavy-duty vehicles. A good overview of the activities
in the G20-countries has been published recently (giz et al.,
Towards Decarbonising Transport 2018 – A Stocktake on
Sectoral Ambition in the G20, November 2018). This
initiative clearly shows, that the transport sector is in the
beginning of a trans formation. Some of the G20-countries
already declared some political targets or published even
laws regarding future transport technologies. The G20
members account for 85 % of the world economy and 75 %
of global trade, consequently they are responsible the lion’s
share of global transport activities.
5.2 Clean Energy Ministerial EV30@30
The Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) initiated a deployment
campaign specifically for electric vehicles. The
initiative targets at least a share of 30 % EVs of the total
vehicle sales by 2030. This initiative concentrates on
electric passenger cars, light commercial vans, buses and
trucks – including BEVs, PHEVs and FCEVs.
5.3 CORSIA
For air transport the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction
Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) is in place as
one mean to achieve the industry’s commitment to carbon
neutral growth from 2020 (“CNG2020”). Under CORSIA,
airlines will be required to buy carbon offsets to compensate
for their growth in GHG emissions. These offsets are
generated by carbon reduction projects in developing
countries. All airlines operating international flights are
mandated to monitor their fuel consumption emissions.
Of course, this is only a first step towards a fully carbonneutral
air transport.
5.4 Country examples
The various G20-countries consider various instruments in
order to trigger changes in the transport segment e.g.
technology standards for emissions and/or efficiencies, tax
incentives for purchasing the vehicle and/or the fuels,
technology bans, alternative fuels. For the recently often
announced ICE bans in various jurisdictions, it is still
possible, that this ban will be relaxed, provided synfuels or
biofuels will be used. Other countries have high shares of
biomass-based alternative fuels, making a phase-out of
ICEs rather unlikely – at least in the near and medium term.
| Fig. 6.
Global electricity consumption in transport for 2030 and 2040 in various scenarios.
p Argentina mainly concentrates on biofuels (mandatory
share of 12 %) and on incentivizing public transport.
The interest in electromobility is limited.
p Australia has currently no explicit national policy, but
state policies, that vary strongly. None of these state
policies has a general EV target. However, there is a
strong interest in exporting climate-neutral hydrogen
especially to the Asian markets e.g. Japan.
p Brazil – similar to Argentina – has no explicit electric
vehicle implementation goals, but a mandatory share of
27 % for bioethanol in gasoline and a mandatory share
of 12 % for biodiesel.
p Canada has set zero-emission vehicle targets of 100 %
of new vehicle sales by 2040 with intermediate steps of
10 % ZEV sales by 2025 and 30 % by 2030. In 2019, the
ZEV sales share was 3.5 %. An analysis by the Canadian
government assumes a higher electricity demand of
30 TWh annually by 2040. In parallel, also biomass will
contribute a similar amount of transport energy. Canada
is also a member of CEM EV30@30.
p China is a member of CEM EV30@30 Initiative.
Additionally, China has the target of 25 % sales of
PHEV, BEV, FCEV by 2025. A study by State Grid China
assumes 50 million EVs in China by 2030 with a total
electricity demand of 200 TWh. A recent report from
the Innovation Centre for Energy and Transportation
(iCET) made the first public proposal of a timeline for
the phaseout of petrol and diesel vehicles across China.
According to the Beijing- based thinktank, 2030 is
premature, but an entire phase out could be possible by
2040.
p France has declared a phase-out of ICEVs: no sales of
new cars using petrol and vans using fossil fuels by
2040. In December 2019, France published the Loi
d’Orientation des Mobilités. It aims carbon neutrality of
land transport by 2050. The ramping up of EV cars is
targeted with 500,000 PHEVs and 660,000 BEVs by
2023 and 1.8 million PHEVs and 3 million BEVs by
2028. France is also a member of CEM EV30@30. The
French grid operator RTE expects in a most ambitious
scenario 15.6 million EVs by 2035 with an annual
demand of 48 TWh consumption per year. RTE also
sees the potential benefit of roughly 40 GW storage
capacity by the EV batteries.
p Germany plans to cut its transport related emissions
by 40 % to 42 % by 2030 as part of the Climate Action
Programme 2030. The target is 7 to 10 millions BEVs
and FCEVs by 2030. The German government uses the
assumption, that 1 million EVs consumes 2 TWh of
electricity. Hence, the 2030 target would lead to an
electricity demand between 14 and 20 TWh. For
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 479
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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 480
comparison, the challenge in air transport is higher: the
German government assumes an energy demand of
270 TWh electricity to produce the needed e-kerosene
based on the 2018 consumption.
p India is a member of CEM EV30@30 and has as such a
rather ambitious target. A variety of forecasts for India
exist ranging between 70 TWh and 100 TWh additional
electricity demand by 2030.
p Indonesia has some targets with regards to biofuel
content of sold fuels, that came under pressure due to
the Covid-19 induced price reductions of crude oil. For
electro-mobility the targets are very modest with a
targeted share of 1 % for EVs and 5 % for hybrids by
2050 and an intermediate target of 2,200 EVs by 2025.
p Italy targets 6 million electrically powered vehicles
including 4 million BEVs.
p Japan is also a member of CEM EV30@30. Japan has
set a target for “next-generation vehicles” to account for
50-70 % of new car sales by 2030, including a target of
20-30 % for BEVs and PHEVs.
p The Republic of Korea targets 430,000 BEVs and
67 000 FCEVs (2022) and a share of 33 % BEV and
FCEV of vehicle sales.
p Mexico is also a member of CEM EV30@30. The
electric vehicle sales should have a ratio of 50 % by
2040 and 100 % by 2050.
p Russia and Saudi Arabia have no dedicated targets for
electromobility.
p South Africa targets more than 2.9 million EVs by
2050. This should be achieved by requirements on the
total annual fleet changes.
p Turkey has no dedicated targets for electromobility.
p The United Kingdom is a member of CEM EV30@30.
However, the UK even wants to overachieve this target
and aims a share of 50 %-70 % of sales with electric
cars. By 2035, no sales of new ICEs will be allowed.
p The United States have no nation-wide programme for
promoting alternative transport fuels. However, there
are 11 federal states aiming for 3.3 million ZEVs (PHEV,
BEV, FCEV) by 2030. Additionally, biofuels play an
important role in the US to deliver lower carbon
emissions in the transport sector.
p Netherlands is also a member of CEM EV30@30. The
National Climate Agreement was announced in 2019
and includes a 30 % reduction in CO 2 emissions from
inland and continental transport. Besides its former
commitment to reach 100 % of ZEVs in new passenger
cars sales by 2030, the government introduced targets
for taxis and FCEVs. By 2025, half of the taxi fleet
should be ZEVs, and by the same year the ambitions
is to have 15,000 FCEVs on the streets, aiming for
300,000 FCEVs by 2030. By 2025, it aims for all new
public bus sales to be electric, preparing for a full stock
of electric buses in public systems by 2030. Further it
aims to deploy 3,000 FCEV heavy-duty vehicles. The
30 to 40 largest municipalities have to implement a
zero-emission zone for freight vehicles (LCVs and
HDVs) by 2025 and long-haul freight has to improve its
CO 2 intensity by 30 % by 2030.
p The Nordic Region (Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden) is quite ambitious with regards to
electrification of transport. Norway, Finland and
Sweden are members of the CEM EV30@30. The
estimated power demand to serve the 4 million electric
cars in 2030 is around 9 TWh for the Nordic region.
This is equivalent to about 2-3 % of estimated electricity
demand for the region in 2030. Norway even wants to
reach 100 % zero- emission-vehicle sales by 2025.
Sweden and Denmark want no sales of new diesel or
petrol cars by 2030. Also by 2030, Iceland will no longer
register new diesel and gasoline cars. Denmark targets
1 million electrified vehicles, Finland 250,000 BEVs,
PHEVs or FCEVs.
6 Conclusion
The transport sector needs electricity in order to
decarbonize – and especially carbon-free electricity.
Electricity might serve as primary fuel for transport e.g. for
battery electric vehicles or for catenary vehicles like trains
with overhead supply. Additionally, electricity might also
serve as primary fuel for the production of synfuels e.g.
e-kerosene in order to enter transport modes, where
battery solutions might lead to economic or technical
challenges. In total, this will lead to a higher demand for
climate-neutral electricity. A complete electrification of
transport will lead to an electricity demand in the
magnitude of order of today’s global electricity consumption
i.e. meeting the Paris climate targets will not only pose
the challenge to decarbonize the existing electricity
generation – but also to build the additionally needed
capacities in a climate-neutral manner. To produce the
needed amounts of electricity, the countries choose
various ways: some prefer renewable generation; other
will also consider nuclear power generation. Especially,
the latter solution might become interesting for the
export of hydrogen and other synfuels, provided that
the production costs are economically convincing in
comparison with green hydrogen and green synfuels and
that these imports will find acceptance by the importing
countries.
Author
Prof. Dr. Stefan Ulreich
ulreich@hochschule-bc.de
University of Applied Sciences Biberach
Karlstraße 6-11
88400 Biberach, Germany
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Electrifying Transport – A Global Perspective ı Stefan Ulreich

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Ein Urteil zu Tihange
Christian Raetzke
Im Juniheft 2016 der atw hatte der Verfasser die Frage untersucht, welche rechtlichen Mittel es gibt,
den Betrieb eines (zu recht oder unrecht) für unsicher gehaltenen grenznahen Kernkraftwerks in einem Nachbarland
zu unterbinden. Anlass für diese Fragestellung gab die Kontroverse um die belgischen Reaktoren Tihange-2 und Doel-3.
In ihren Reaktordruckbehältern (RDB) waren Wasserstoffflocken entdeckt worden, die die Frage der strukturellen
Integrität aufwarfen. Nach eingehenden Prüfungen war die belgische Atomaufsicht FANC zu der Überzeugung gelangt,
dass die Sicherheit nicht beeinträchtigt sei, und hatte im November 2015 dem Wiederanfahren zugestimmt.
Wie im erwähnten Beitrag dargestellt, kann man auf der
völkerrechtlichen Ebene wohl nur dann einen Anspruch
auf Einstellung des Betriebes im Nachbarland geltend
machen, wenn eine konkrete Gefahr von dem Kernkraftwerk
ausgeht; bloße Bedenken hinsichtlich des Nach weises
von Sicherheitsreserven, wie sie seinerzeit die RSK in einer
Stellungnahme ausgedrückt hatte, dürften dafür nicht
ausreichen. Deshalb hatte die damalige Bundes umweltministerin
Hendricks auch nur eine Bitte an Belgien gerichtet,
den Betrieb weiter auszusetzen. Immerhin stimmte
Belgien einer engen Zusammenarbeit mit deutschen Experten
zu; im Dezember 2016 trat ein Abkommen zwischen
beiden Ländern in Kraft, mit dem die Deutsch-Belgische
Nuklearkommission gegründet wurde, die seither jährlich
tagt. Ohnehin besteht eine enge Zusammenarbeit, einschließlich
gegenseitiger peer reviews, im Rahmen von
Institutionen wie WENRA und ENSREG.
Neben dieser zwischenstaatlichen, also völkerrechtlichen
Schiene gab es noch eine weitere Option für eine
rechtliche Klärung, die auch genutzt wurde: die Städteregion
Aachen, die Länder NRW und Rheinland-Pfalz
sowie deutsche Privatpersonen beteiligten sich an einer
Klage, die vor dem Gericht erster Instanz (Bezirksgericht)
Brüssel erhoben wurde; weitere Kläger kamen aus den
Niederlanden, aus Luxemburg und aus Belgien selbst.
Beklagt waren der belgische Staat, die FANC und der
Betreiber Engie-Electrabel. Ziel war die Feststellung, dass
die Wiederanfahrzustimmung für Tihange-2 einen rechtswidrigen
Eingriff in die Rechte der Kläger darstellte und
dieser Eingriff durch die Anordnung der Betriebseinstellung
dieses Reaktors wieder rückgängig zu machen sei.
Hier ging es also nicht um Völkerrecht, sondern um die
Anwendung belgischen Rechts – mit der Besonderheit,
dass die Kläger eben auch aus den Nachbarländern kamen.
Aus Sicht eines deutschen Juristen verwundert der
Umstand, dass die Kläger den zivilen und nicht den Verwaltungsrechtsweg
beschritten; wie es scheint, rechneten
sich die Kläger auf diesem Wege größere Chancen aus.
Mit Urteil vom 3. September hat das Gericht nunmehr
die Klage abgewiesen. Die Zuständigkeit des Gerichts
und die Zulässigkeit der Klage wurden zwar bejaht; in
der Sache konnte sich das Gericht jedoch nicht dem
Vor bringen der Kläger anschließen, die Wiederanfahrzustimmung
sei rechtswidrig gewesen.
In seinem Urteil zeichnet das Gericht die Vorgänge
nach, insbesondere die Handlungen der FANC, die mehrere
Gutachten einholte und schließlich, auch nach Auseinandersetzung
mit vereinzelten Gegenmeinungen in den
Beratungsgremien, zu der Überzeugung gelangte, die
Wasserstoffflocken seien bei der Fertigung des RDB Anfang
der 1980er Jahre entstanden, hätten sich seither nicht
vergrößert und stellten insgesamt die Integrität des RDB im
Normalbetrieb und bei Störfällen nicht in Frage. Das
Gericht zieht das amerikanische ASME-Regelwerk heran,
das bei der Fertigung angewendet wurde und auch heute
noch nach belgischem Recht maßgeblich ist, und verweist
auf die dort niedergelegten Regeln zur Bewertung von
Fertigungsfehlern. Letztlich – so das Gericht – sei die
Einschätzung der FANC nachvollziehbar.
Den klägerischen Vortrag, dass auf deutscher Seite
(RSK) im April 2016 ein Vorbehalt gegen die wissenschaftliche
Validierung bestimmter Aussagen formuliert worden
sei und weiter bestehe, nimmt das Gericht nicht zum
Anlass, seine Bewertung zu ändern: die FANC habe die in
der deutschen Stellungnahme herangezogenen Aspekte
bereits vor der Wiederanfahrzustimmung eingehend
untersucht und sei zu einer eigenen Bewertung gekommen,
dass die Sicherheit nachweisbar gewährleistet sei; das sei
nicht zu beanstanden.
Mit Bezug auf einen weiteren Punkt der Klage stellt das
Gericht fest, die FANC habe die Öffentlichkeit ausreichend
informiert; dem klägerischen Vortrag, die Behörde habe
zielgerichtet Informationen zurückgehalten, konnte sich
das Gericht nicht anschließen.
Wie geht es weiter? Gegen das Urteil ist grundsätzlich
Berufung möglich. Allerdings wird Tihange-2 nach
jetzigem Stand ohnehin 2023 stillgelegt. Zumindest eine
beteiligte belgische Umweltorganisation hat daher laut
Presseberichten bereits angekündigt, auf eine Berufung zu
verzichten, da das Berufungsverfahren mindestens zwei
Jahre dauern würde.
Wie ist das Ganze zu bewerten? Gebietskörperschaften
und Privatpersonen aus Nachbarländern hatten die
Gelegenheit, vor einem belgischen Gericht gegen den
Betrieb eines grenznahen belgischen Kernkraftwerks zu
klagen und eine gerichtliche Prüfung zu erreichen. Das ist
gutzuheißen. Dass dabei belgisches Recht Anwendung
findet, ist logisch. Eine Annahme, belgisches Recht sei in
Sicherheitsfragen „weniger streng“ als das deutsche Recht,
wäre vorschnell. Das belgische Atom- und sonstige
Umweltrecht enthält Vorschriften, die ein Höchstmaß an
nuklearer Sicherheit fordern; das ist schon deshalb nicht
überraschend, weil Belgien sich an Euratom-Recht und
insbesondere an die Richtlinie zur nuklearen Sicherheit
halten muss; auch wird man davon ausgehen können, dass
der Gesetzgeber in unserem Nachbarland selbst ein großes
Interesse daran hat, dass nur sichere Kernkraftwerke
betrieben werden.
Das Gericht wiederum ist nach Prüfung des Sachverhalts
zu der Ansicht gekommen, die Wiederanfahrzustimmung
und damit der weitere Betrieb von Tihange-2
sei, gemessen an diesen Vorschriften, rechtmäßig und
nicht zu beanstanden. Damit ist diese Frage mit den
Mitteln eines Rechtsstaats entschieden (vorbehaltlich der
Möglichkeit einer Berufung), und zwar mit dem Ergebnis,
dass die Sicherheit gewährleistet ist. Das ist doch eine gute
Nachricht.
Autor
Rechtsanwalt Dr. Christian Raetzke
Beethovenstraße 19
04107 Leipzig, Deutschland
481
SPOTLIGHT ON NUCLEAR LAW
Spotlight on Nuclear Law
A Judgement Regarding Tihange ı Christian Raetzke

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
482
ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW
Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU
and Taxonomy – How Green Is Nuclear?
Nicolas Wendler
For more than a year since June 2019 a struggle has been ongoing over the treatment of nuclear power in the context
of the Sustainable Finance Initiative of the European Union and particularly in what is called taxonomy, a set of rules
and categorizations to make sustainable finance implementable and operational. The debate of weather to include
nuclear in the taxonomy as sustainable for its huge potential to mitigate climate change or to disregard it for alleged
violation of the “Do no significant harm” (DNSH) principle with regard to other environmental policy objectives will
probably continue till 2021, when the Joint Research Center of the European Union will give its evaluation on the issue
and the European Commission will subsequently take its decision.
Background
In March 2018 the European Commission
published the Commission
action plan on financing sustainable
growth in response to the recommendations
of the High Level Expert
Group Sustainable Finance. Next to
aspects of financial market regulation
and transparency, the elaboration of a
classification system to rate the
sustainability of financial products
was a focus of its work. This classification
system for economic activities
that includes many sectors particularly
of industry next to the energy
sector was called taxonomy in the
context of the sustainable finance
initiative. The European Parliament
agreed to the regulation initiative
(action plan on financing sustainable
growth) subsequently presented by
the European Commission. Additional
demands from the ranks of the parliament
like a taxonomy of nonsustain
able activities (so called
brown- listing) were at this occasion
rejected in the parliamentary committees.
Nevertheless, the modified
proposal of the parliament defined
that investment in coal, gas and
nuclear infrastructures cannot be
considered sustainable.
The birth of the taxonomy
Parallel to the legislative/prelegislative
process a Technical Expert
Group on sustainable finance (TEG)
appointed by the European Commission
in June 2018 worked out a
draft of a sustainability classification
system. This Taxonomy Technical
Report was published in June 2019
and was opened up for a public
consultation by the responsible Directorates
General of the Commission.
In the report of the TEG which was
made up primarily by financial experts
and representatives of NGOs but
hardly by scientific and technical
experts of the concerned industries, it
was decided on nuclear energy, that
the group does not consider itself
capable of a judgement if nuclear
power does inflict significant harm
to the environment. It was recommended
to not include nuclear in the
taxonomy despite the recognition that
nuclear can make a substantial contribution
to the mitigation of climate
change. The rejection was justified
particularly with regard to the issue of
waste management and it was recommended
to come back to the subject of
nuclear power later for in-depth consideration
in other expert groups. This
classification was criticized markedly
in the consultation among other by
the German nuclear industry association
Kerntechnik Deutschland and its
European counterpart FORATOM.
The report was criticized by many
other industries too in the respective
relevant parts.
Why is taxonomy important?
The problem with being excluded
from the category „sustainable“ for all
concerned industries and activities is
that long term financing conditions
might deteriorate. The sustainable
finance initiative stipulates better
conditions for „green“ investment e.g.
lower equity requirements, institutional
investors will develop their
portfolios towards green investments
more and more often and public institutions
or business development
banks will align their decisions on
subsidies, guarantees or loans at
reduced interest rate with the standards
of the green finance regulation of
the EU. So, it seems likely that the
taxonomy will play an important role
in the allocation of budgets in the
context of the so-called Green Deal of
the European Commission till 2030 or
with regard to the funds mobilized for
the green recovery program following
the economic effects of the corona
pandemic. It is possible too that with
the future development of sustainability
rules a negative taxonomy
might be introduced.
Further development 2019
The Council of the European Union
decided its position on taxonomy in
September 2019 and issued a mandate
for the so called trialog negotiations,
an informal conciliation pro cedure
between the European Commission,
the European Parliament and the
Council. Here it was decided as
council position and opposed to the
parliamentary position, to not exclude
nuclear projects from the taxonomy
and thereby from the classification as
sustainable investment.
In the trialog negotiations the
Finnish Council Presidency and the
representatives of the parliament
initially agreed 5 December 2019 on
the introduction of a taxonomy that
shall include such activities that are
in a transition to sustainable production
(transitional) and activities
that can enable others to become
sustain able (enabling) next to sustainable
activities in the proper sense.
Con trary to this agreement the
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy – How Green Is Nuclear? ı Nicolas Wendler

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
representa tives of the UK, France, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and
Slovenia have rejected the proposal
in a meeting of the Permanent Representatives
Com mittee (of member
states) ( COREPER) on 11 December,
because they feared that nuclear
and natural gas projects would be
excluded from sustainable financing
despite the fact that they were not
excluded explicitly in the text.
On 14 December 2019 the Finnish
Presidency presented a new compromise
proposal which was agreed to
by the representatives of member
states on 16 December and representatives
of the European Parliament
on 17 December. In the compromise
only solid fossil fuels are excluded
from taxonomy by seeking to replace
them with other technologies. Concerning
the classification of other
technologies, a technology-neutral
approach is chosen in principle and
the criterium of significant harm for
environmental policy goals or the environment
is specified as to consider
concrete significant and long-term
damages instead of targeting the mere
risk of such damages. The position
of the German government was to
criticize the compromise proposal of
the Finnish presidency, because it did
not rule out that nuclear power could
be classified as ecologically sustainable
which the German government
wanted to achieve but failed to do so
in the Council as happened already in
September.
Legislative decisions
and delegations
In January 2020 the Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs and
the Committee on the Environment,
Public Health and Food Safety of the
European Parliament adopted the
compromise on the Establishment of a
framework to facilitate sustainable
investment, the Council did so in
April. The plenary of the European
Parliament adopted the regulation
„Framework to facilitate sustainable
investment“ in June. The fate of
nuclear as sustainable or significantly
harmful to the environment though
will now lie in the hands of the
European Commission who will
decide on taxonomy and cooperates
with a new Platform on sustainable
finance to be appointed by the
Commission and will be supported by
the Member States Expert Group on
sustainable finance which advises
the Commission regarding the work of
the Platform on sustainable finance.
The Commission decides on the
classi fication, i.e. the content of taxonomy
and its development by the way
of technical screening criteria and
technical standards through delegated
acts on the basis of the regulation.
The Commission has to finish this
process for the aspects contribution to
climate change mitigation and do no
significant harm till 31 December
2020 in order for application of the
rules from 1 January 2022.
Stakeholder dialogue
on sustainable finance
Parallel to the legislative procedures
the Commission organized a stakeholder
dialogue on sustainable
finance in March 2020 at the occasion
of the publication of the final reports
of the Technical Expert Group after
the consultation in 2019, the Taxonomy
Technical Report, the Technical
Annex, the Usability guide for the EU
green bond standard and the Handbook
on Climate Benchmarks and
benchmarks’ ESG disclosures. The
stakeholder dialogue that took place
as an online event due to the Covid-19
restrictions had 15.000 participants
from all over the EU and beyond. The
TEG kept up the classification of
nuclear as not being included in the
taxonomy in the final report with the
same arguments as in the preliminary
report. In the stakeholder dialogue it
was recommended by the TEG that
while no drastic changes are to be
expected from the finalization of the
taxonomy by the Commission – such
as e.g. the 100g/kWh CO 2 threshold
for electricity generation technologies
| NPP Grohnde. Source: PreussenElektra GmbH
– the taxonomy should be supplemented
with criteria for the so called
brown taxonomy, i.e. economic
activities that might be harmful to the
environment to a certain degree but
still could contribute to achieving
sustainability goals. Such criteria as
well as social objectives could be
added by the Commission on the
occasion of the regular revisions of the
taxonomy that are supposed to take
place every five years. Also, activities
now considered as sustainable could
fall out of taxo nomy if they would no
longer be relevant. Specifically, on
nuclear, it was stated from the TEG
represen tatives that it is clearly low
carbon, but that the DNSH evaluation
is very challenging so that no evaluation
was possible, but eventually an
evaluation could be elaborated in the
next year. The conclusion was that the
chapter on nuclear is not closed and
the TEG basically asked the Commission
to take over the issue.
Other activities
of the Commission and
EU institutions
From 23 March to 20 April 2020 the
Commission had a public consultation
“Sustainable finance – EU classification
system for green investments”
(Delegated Act) and on 18 June, the
day after the regulation was adopted
by parliament, the Commission called
for applications for participation in
the Platform on sustainable finance.
The platform is supposed to start in
September 2020. On the sidelines of
the sustainable finance/taxonomy
debate in other areas of the larger
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 484
subject of nuclear in decarbonization
there are mixed signals in Brussels. On
the negative side there is the Council
position on the Just Transition Fund
as part of the Green Deal that shall
alleviate negative economic consequences
of transitions in the energy
sector on a regional level. Here the
Council explicitly excludes even
nuclear decommissioning, not to
mention any positive nuclear activity,
despite the possible consideration
that transferring employees from the
coal sector to nuclear by e.g. nuclear
new build might be an apt and smooth
way of restructuring in both coal
regions and the electricity sector as a
whole. On the positive side there was
the addition of so called “low carbon”
hydrogen in the EU Hydrogen Strategy
adopted by the Commission in July,
generally understood as an opening
for nuclear in a possible future
hydrogen economy.
Evaluation of nuclear
by the Joint Research Centre
Most importantly though, the Commission
decided to appoint the Joint
Research Centre (JRC) as the group of
experts to assess nuclear under the
sustainable finance taxonomy. The
assessment shall be scientifically
rigorous, transparent, balanced and
technology-neutral. The JRC is supposed
to draft a technical report on
the DNSH evaluation of nuclear
power. This report is then to be
reviewed by radiation protection and
waste management experts, as well as
by experts on environmental impacts.
On this basis the Commission will
decide whether nuclear will be
included in the taxonomy for sustainable
finance. The problem is that the
report will not be finalized before
2021 and thus be late for being
considered for the delegated acts
relating to climate mitigation due at
the end of 2020. In this situation
it might be wise to postpone the evaluation
of the energy sector until the
JRC report and the assessment of nuclear
by the Commission, the Platform
and the Member State Expert Group
in order to avoid market distortions.
After all this might not even cause a
delay to the coming into force of the
delegated acts in 2022. The alternative
to possibly revise the delegated acts
almost immediately after establishing
them to eventually introduce nuclear
does not sound convincing in comparison
and might give rise to numerous
allegations of a special treatment of
nuclear by the Commission. It might
be worth mentioning here, that the
obvious and logical decision to have
nuclear evaluated by the Commissions
own experts in the JRC was
promptly followed by accusations of
being “ absurd” and that the JRC could
not possibly make objective decisions
on the matter as articulated in a letter
of the Chairwoman of the Bundestag
Committee on Environmental Protection,
Nature Conservation and
nuclear Safety addressed to Commission
President Ursula von der Leyen,
Vice-President Frans Timmermans
and the German ministers Svenja
Schulze (Environment) and Anja
Karliczek (Research and Education).
Stake-holders and civil society
In terms of civil society activities next
to participation in the consultation
processes from the side of associations,
nuclear societies, pro-nuclear
initiatives, companies and individuals
there have been two open letter initiatives
directed to the Commission, one
from the nuclear societies on initiative
of the Czech Nuclear Society in April
and one from industry and nuclear associations
also addressing the Council
and the European Parliament. Both
emphasized the important role of
nuclear in the current low carbon
generation portfolio in the EU and its
future significance for decarbonization
policies and demanded inclusion
of the nuclear sector in the taxonomy.
They were also addressing other
subjects, such as enabling cost
competitive nuclear power with an
appropriate regulatory framework.
This is in line with recommendations
of the Sustainable Development
Scenario of the International Energy
Agency (IEA) of building at least
15 GW new nuclear per year globally
and a recent study of the Nuclear
Energy Agency of the OECD on cost
reductions for nuclear projects as well
as with the IPCC Special Report on a
global warming of 1.5 °C from 2018
that included a substantial role for
nuclear in most mitigation scenarios.
The NEA also published a new study
“Management and Disposal of High­
Level Radioactive Waste: Global
Progress and Solutions” in 2020 that
is of direct relevance for the dis cussion
of the DNSH-principle with regard to
nuclear in the EU as pointed out by
NEA Director-General William D.
Magwood, IV during a NEA webinar in
July on nuclear financing.
Conclusion
Summarizing it might be said that
there is currently reasonable hope to
have the very unlucky position of the
taxonomy TEG on nuclear revised in
the end, but that it still is an uphill
battle as so often with nuclear. The
future role of nuclear in the sustainable
finance framework of the EU
is a very important indicator for the
general attitude of the European
Union towards nuclear. The discussion
of climate change mitigation vs.
DNSH-principle needs to take account
of the fact that nuclear in general
has very good properties when it
comes to reconcile environmental
concerns with economic and social
concerns being not just low carbon,
but low pollution, resource efficient
and low footprint too as well as
reliable and efficient. The future of
nuclear is also an important test
for cohesion and solidarity within
the Union in broader terms. If the
pro active anti-nuclear states in the
European Union cannot overcome
their hostility and intolerance towards
the quite significant number of
member states that want to pursue
climate policies with an important
role for nuclear power, then it seems
highly unlikely that there will be a
truly coherent and cooperative
climate and decarbonization policy
in the EU in the long run.
Author
Nicolas Wendler
Head of Media Relations and
Political Affairs
nicolas.wendler@kernd.de
KernD
(Kerntechnik Deutschland e.V.)
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin, Germany
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Sustainable Finance Initiative of the EU and Taxonomy – How Green Is Nuclear? ı Nicolas Wendler

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Nuclear Energy in the Article 6
of the Paris Agreement
Henrique Schneider
Introduction: The 1.5 °C Goal in the Paris Agreement and Nuclear Energy According to
its article 2, the Paris Agreement PA aims at, inter alia, “Holding the increase in the global average temperature
to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above
pre­ industrial levels…” [1]. Paragraph 21 of the Decision, the document that explains the general thinking of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC as they adopted the PA in 2015,
“ Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of
global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways.” [2].
This special report, the most recent
issued by the IPCC, is called “Global
warming of 1.5 °C” and was released
during the UNFCCC meeting in
Katowice, Poland, in December 2018.
In its second chapter, it states: “By
mid-century, the majority of primary
energy comes from non-fossil fuels
(i.e., renewables and nuclear energy)
in most 1.5 °C pathways (p.130).”
And: “Nuclear power increases its
share in most 1.5 °C pathways with no
or limited overshoot by 2050, but in
some pathways both the absolute
capacity and share of power from
nuclear generators decrease. There
are large differences in nuclear power
between models and across pathways
[Kim et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2018].
One of the reasons for this variation
is that the future deployment of
nuclear can be constrained by societal
preferences assumed in narratives
underlying the pathways [O’Neill et
al., 2017; van Vuuren et al., 2017b]
(p.131)” [3].
In any case and according to the
IPCC, capping the global temperature
increase to 1.5 °C requires a fast
transition to electricity for energy end
use. The resulting higher electricity
demand has to be met by low-carbon
generation, including nuclear. Nuclear
generation increases, on average by
around 2.5 times by 2050 in the
89 mitigation scenarios considered
by the panel; in some scenarios, it
increases sevenfold [3].
Based on these considerations,
there is a place for nuclear energy in
the PA. The question is, which place?
This paper shows one possible, yet
unexplored place for nuclear energy.
Parties to the PA could use nuclear
energy to cooperate and even to increase
their nationally determined
contributions NDC under Article 6 PA.
Under Article 6 Paragraph 2 PA, short
6.2, nuclear energy could be used in
generating internationally transferred
mitigation outcomes; or as an integrated,
holistic and balanced nonmarket
approach under 6.8. While it
also could be part of the mechanism
under 6.4, this paper interprets
nuclear energy as more compatible
with the spirit of Article 6.2 and
6.8 due to their focus on national
preferences allowing for differentiation
(see below for a more complete
explanation of Article 6).
The remainder of this text is
organized as thus: First, a brief overview
of the PA is provided. Then, the
basic provisions of article 6 as well as
the current state of negotiations is
explained. Based on the logic of the
Paris Agreement, this paper develops
operationalization criteria for incorporating
nuclear energy under the
different paragraphs of Article 6 PA.
A conclusion summarizes the findings
of this discussion.
In terms of novelty, two insights
are developed here. At the same time,
this paper offers a way forward in
the substantiation of article 6 and a
different way of incorporating nuclear
energy into the Paris Agreement –
different from an approach under the
technology mechanism. The issues
identified here can be used for Party
or non-Party submissions to the
ongoing negotiations.
The Paris Agreement
in a nutshell
The most general and relevant
provisions of PA to nuclear energy are
[1]:
p Long-term temperature goal (Art.
2) limiting global temperature
increase to well below 2 °C, while
pursuing efforts to limit the
increase to 1.5 °C.
p Global peaking and “climate
neutrality” (Art. 4).
p Mitigation (Art. 4) establishing
binding commitments by all
Parties to prepare, communicate
and maintain a nationally determined
contribution (NDC) and to
pursue domestic measures to
achieve them.
p Voluntary cooperation/marketand
non-market-based approaches
(Art. 6).
p Adaptation (Art. 7) enhancing
adaptive capacity, strengthening
resilience, and reducing vulnerability
to climate change.
p Loss and damage (Art. 8) averting,
minimizing, and addressing loss
and damage associated with the
adverse effects of climate change,
including extreme weather events
and slow onset events.
p Finance, technology, and capacitybuilding
support (Art. 9, 10 and 11).
The work undertaken so far, has
related nuclear energy to finance,
technology, and capacity building; at
times, it is seen as an instrument of
mitigation, and at times of adaptation
[4]. The advantages of treating
nuclear as such are straightforward.
As a technology, it needs research,
deployment, and finance. Electrification
reduces emissions of greenhouse
gases but also helps adapting to
climatic conditions [5]. The disadvantages
of such a treatment of
nuclear energy are less obvious, but
important, nonetheless. First, the
addressees of these articles are
the Parties to the Agreement, i.e.
sovereign countries. They, however,
do not research, implement, and
deploy technology. Second, because
of the considerable private sector
involvement in nuclear energy, there
are issues of intellectual property IP.
IP remains, however, a contentious
issue, especially in relationship to
Article 10 PA, since this article entails
transference and sharing of technology.
Third, the impact of nuclear
energy as a technology and its
outcomes on climate action can only
be measured with great difficulty.
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 486
There is an alternative framework
for relating nuclear energy to the PA. It
consists of using it under Article 6, the
market and non-market approaches to
international cooperation. This framework
maintains the advantages of the
“mainstream” treatment of it as just
mentioned. But it also addresses the
disadvantages, especially picking up
on the incentives to private sector
agents and measuring effects and
outcomes. However, there are also
disadvantages. The most important is
the current state of blockage in the
international nego tiations on Article
6. This alternative framework, its
advantages and dis advantages call
for further development.
Article 6
of the Paris Agreement
Article 6 of the PA calls for international
cooperation. Specifically,
its first paragraph reads: “Parties
recognize that some Parties choose to
pursue voluntary cooperation in the
implementation of their nationally
determined contributions to allow for
higher ambition in their mitigation
and adaptation actions and to promote
sustainable development and
environmental integrity.” [1]
Article 6 itself consists of a general
clause and three distinct parts (this
and all subsequent information
based on [6]). The general clause in
paragraph 1 covers all parts of the
Article. Elements of this clause are
the voluntary nature of any cooperation,
the idea that it can extend
to mitigation or adaptation actions, or
the combination of both, as well as
the commitment towards higher
ambition, sustainable development,
and environmental integrity.
The three parts of the Article
following the general clause are the
provisions for the use of “internationally
transferred mitigation
outcomes” ITMOs (paragraphs 2 and
3), the establishment of a “mechanism
to contribute to the mitigation of
greenhouse gas emissions and support
sustainable development” (paragraphs
4 to 7), and the recognition of
the “importance of integrated, holistic
and balanced non-market approaches
being available to Parties to assist
in the implementation of their
nationally determined contributions,
in the context of sustainable development
and poverty eradication, in a
coor dinated and effective manner,
including through, inter alia, mitigation,
adaptation, finance, technology
transfer and capacity-building, as
appropriate” (paragraphs 8 and 9).
Paragraphs 6(2-3) can be conceived
as the “bottom-up” part of
multinational cooperation. While not
explicit in the text of the PA, this is a
market-based instrument (or a
window for such instruments), i.e. its
outcomes can be measured in
equivalents of tons of greenhouse
gases and these equivalents can be
traded between agents. Under these
provisions, Parties to the Agreement
can engage in cooperation on their
own terms. On the one hand, it is
likely that the bodies of the framework
convention will elaborate finergrained
guidance with a semimandatory
character regarding
technical issues such as robust
accounting and transparency; on the
other hand, it is equally likely that
their guidance on the scope of activities
falling under 6(2-3), governance,
environmental integrity and sustainable
development will remain on a
general level. The ultimate goals of
cooperation under 6(2-3) remain
open, since the cooperating Parties or
the cooperation entities set goals
independently from the framework
convention; however, their outcome
seems to be narrowed down to mitigation.
Paragraphs 6(4-7) are the “topdown”
part of multinational cooperation.
While not explicit in the text of
the PA, this mechanism is also marketbased.
Most probably, their outcome
will be a mechanism with centralized
governance and granular rules,
modalities, and procedures, which
will be developed and managed under
the framework convention. Decisions
on which activities, programs, sectors,
or technologies qualify to participate
in the mechanism will most likely
be made by a centralized body. This
mechanism serves towards multiple
goals: mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions, fostering (sustainable)
economic development; and delivering
overall mitigation in global
emissions; it seems, therefore that
there is a necessary mitigation
com ponent as well as – at least –
adaptation co-benefits.
Paragraphs 6(8-9) are the “nonmarket”
component of international
cooperation under Article 6 PA. They
are much more open concerning what
can occur under them and how they
are governed as well. While the other
two parts are more geared towards
mitigation, these paragraphs are
explicit in including adaptation as
well as the public sector. Aside from
questions of accounting and transparency,
much of the common ground
in negotiations is that these paragraphs
do not necessitate further
definitory work under the framework
convention but will develop further
with their continued implementation
“bottom-up”. While still to emerge,
examples of activities under 6.8 lay
in the realms of joint technologydevelopment,
multi- and supranational
coordination of policies, or
additional financing, inter alia. The
goals of these paragraphs can be
mitigation as well as adaptation.
Negotiating and
operationalizing Article 6
While the structure of Article 6 is
given by the PA, its operationalization
requires further negotiations. At the
very least, the guidance to 6.2 and the
rules, modalities, and procedures to
6.4, as mentioned in the PA, must be
decided under the UNFCCC. While
these two sets should have been
produced by 2018, negotiations did
not yield results so far. After the 2019
meeting under the framework
convention Parties decided to continue
negotiating these provisions, the
next possible date for their adoption
is the next meeting, which takes place
in 2021.
In the meanwhile, further ideas
regarding the operationalization of
Article 6 can be developed and
submitted to the negotiations.
Additionally, some Parties decided to
pilot instruments under 6.2 and 6.8.
Examples of the first is Japan’s “Joint
Crediting Mechanism”, Switzerland’s
“Pilots” or the World Bank’s “Transformative
Carbon Asset Facility” [7].
An example of the second is the
“ Adaptation Benefits Mechanism” of
the African Development Bank [8]. As
of yet, little has been developed on the
role of nuclear energy under either.
The mechanism under 6.4, being
global and with a unified set of rules,
modalities, and procedures, cannot be
piloted before the adoption of the
relevant decisions. This is one reason
for this paper to focus on 6.2 and 6.8.
The other reason is that a probable
majority of Parties would like to
continue the “Clean Development
Mechanism” CDM as the mechanism
under 6.4 [9]. Currently, the CDM
does not include nuclear energy.
While this paper discusses the role
that nuclear energy can play under
Article 6, it is important to mention
that some of its instantiations are
taking part outside the UNFCCC. In
the absence of an Article 6 ruleset,
the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), which is in the
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| Map of Countries that Joined the Paris Climate Agreement. Source UNFCCC 2017
process of developing a “Carbon
Offsetting and Reduction Scheme
CORSIA” for international aviation,
is defining its own rules for global
emissions trading. A growing
voluntary market is also asserting
itself and establishing standards for
robust accounting in the post 2020
period [10].
Nuclear Energy
under Article 6 PA
Article 6 PA concerns international
cooperation. This paper, therefore,
does not discuss how nuclear energy
can be domestically used for fulfilling
NDCs or increasing NDC ambition.
This paper argues that nuclear energy
can additionally serve as the object of
international cooperation under the
Agreement. This claim is based on a
large number of NDCs being open to
international cooperation, and international
cooperation usually having
a finance-component as well as a
component of technology transfer.
The potential benefits to cooperation
in achieving the NDCs under
Article 6 are large and all parties could
benefit. Potential cost reductions
over independent implementation
of countries’ NDCs total about
250 billion US-Dollar per year in
2030. Cost reductions from cooperative
implementation are achieved
through improved economic efficiency.
If countries are inspired to
invest these cost savings in enhanced
ambition, then Article 6 could facilitate
additional abatement under the
Paris Agreement by 50 percent or
5 GtCO 2 per year in 2030. These
calculations are on the one hand
conservative, i.e. they project the
highest amount of greenhouse-gasreductions
per US-Dollar, which
again, points towards the potential
for inclusion of nuclear energy [11].
For most countries / Parties willing
to consider nuclear energy as an
instrument in climate policy, some
sort of international transfer will be
necessary because of their lack of
financial means and technology, as
well as due to potential for capacitybuilding
regarding grid, energy and
efficiency policies, which comes with
the process of adopting and scaling-up
nuclear energy.
Nuclear Energy under 6(2-3)
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 6 PA are
likely to enable a diversity of dif ferent
international and multilateral cooperation
mechanisms. This part of Article
6 covers mitigation under a NDC.
Different safeguards apply here, for
example environmental integrity and
sustainable development. The content
of the guidance is still being elaborated.
In any case, for nuclear energy
to fit under these provisions, the
following points need to be addressed
– they are largely based on [12]:
p The use of nuclear energy leads to
mitigation outcomes, which are
within the scope of the country/
Party’s NDC and can be metricized.
p Nuclear energy contributes to
achieving sustainable development
goals (SDG) [4]. In the social
pillar, it contributes towards addressing
needs such as electrification
of economies and households,
leading not only to reduced carbon
dioxide (-equivalent) emissions,
but also to increased comfort,
health-standards, human development
and more. In the economic
pillar, nuclear power contributes to
the security of energy supply, local
employment and technological
development, all of them facets of
accumulation of capital. Furthermore,
it also leads to lower energy
prices which especially benefit
local employment and the poorest
households. The environmental
contribution of nuclear energy is
based on its environmental integrity
as well as diminished impact
on natural ecosystems.
p Nuclear energy is environmentally
integer because in addition to
reducing carbon dioxide (-equivalent)
emissions it impacts less on
different aspects of the ecosystems,
such as land use and wildlife maintaining
biodiversity. This lesser
impact occurs in comparison to
other technologies used at comparable
scale. While there are
concerns about water use and
waste, these can be addressed in
equally integer manner. Similar
concerns regarding environmental
integrity apply to all forms of
energy generation and use.
Some of the strengths in including
nuclear energy under 6(2-3) are the
clear mitigation outcomes it generates
and therefore their relatively easy
metrication. Also, nuclear power
generation faces fewer legitimacyrelated
problems as an instrument for
reducing carbon dioxide (-equivalent)
emissions, especially when compared
to other ways of generating electricity
on a large-scale.
Some of the weaknesses in this
approach are the constraints of
the mechanism per se: The units
generated can only be exchanged
within a multilateral agreement.
Because of the political concerns
involving nuclear power, mitigation
units going back to nuclear energy
face potential political resistance
about being included in a multilateral
trading scheme. The problem of
political resistance is the argument
for including nuclear power under biand
multilateral instruments (6.2)
rather than under global instruments
(6.4).
Another weakness of this approach
is that it reduces nuclear energy
to mitigation. Reducing nuclear
energy to mitigation disregards many
of the social and environmental
advantages it could bring to its
adopters.
Nuclear Energy under 6(8-9)
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 PA
address a broad scope of actions.
First, it considers adaptation and
mitigation as equal goals that can be
combined. Second, it is open to both,
public and private agents. And third, it
combines mitigation and adaptation
with yet other areas for climateaction,
such as finance, technology
transfer and capacity building, as
deemed appropriate by the individual
country/Party and its eventual
cooperation partners. In any case, for
nuclear energy to fit under these
provisions, the following points need
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ENERGY POLICY, ECONOMY AND LAW 488
to be addressed – they are largely
based on [4]:
p The use of nuclear energy leads to
mitigation outcomes and adaptation;
it generally is organized as
public-private-partnerships and it
sets in motion flows of finance and
technology, including the mobilization
of local and endogenous
technologies. In this sense, it fulfils
most of the criteria of paragraphs 8
and 9 – criteria that were not
conceived as cumulative but could
be cumulatively fulfilled by nuclear
energy.
p Nuclear energy could contribute
to enabling opportunities for
coordination across instruments
and relevant institutional arrangements.
For example (1): when
deploying or scaling up nuclear
energy, often regulations and
organizations have to be updated,
too; this opens windows for introducing
energy-efficiency, crosssectional
and other provisions into
the market-architecture. Or (2):
when deploying or scaling up
nuclear energy, transformational
opportunities for the local
economy might be identified, such
as reviewing the distribution grid
making it more efficient and less
prone to disturbances, opening
new economic sectors and activities,
or making electrification of
households or mobility possible.
And (3): The adoption of nuclear
energy leads to international
cooperation in matters of finance,
be it as loan guarantee, reducing
market risk, or equity stakes,
among others.
p The implications of nuclear energy
for sustainable development and
environmental integrity, as they
were discussed above in section 3,
also apply here. In fact, it is the
relationship between nuclear
energy and sustainable development
as well as environmental
integrity that makes nuclear
able to combine mitigation and
adaptation. Cumulating different
desiderata of these paragraphs,
nuclear energy could be conceived,
here, as an enabler of strong
sustainability, which allows for
exchange of natural capital for
human and technological capital.
The strengths of this approach are the
openness of paragraph 8 and 9 to the
multifaceted nature of the adoption
and scaling up of nuclear energy. This
corresponds to the open texture of
adaptation [13]. Through this, nuclear
energy can better be understood as an
instrument contributing towards the
achievement of a variety of goals. It especially
enables a strong approach to
sustainability via adaptation. Also,
since it is probable that these paragraphs
will be less the object of further
negotiation under the framework conventions,
their implementation can
occur quicker.
The weakness of treating nuclear
energy here could cause problems due
to the lack of methodologies, especially
for counting and accounting,
comparing, as well as trans parence.
Also, the meaning of the word
“ holistic”, which is featured in the
text of the paragraph, remains little
understood.
Conclusions and Findings
This essay developed a series of
arguments for including nuclear
energy in international cooperation
under Article 6 PA. It took an approach
favoring arguments for including
nuclear energy under paragraphs
( 2-3) and (8-9). The main arguments
favoring nuclear energy are its
efficiency in mitigation and the many
co-benefits in adaptation and sustainable
development.
This paper takes a novel approach
in including nuclear energy under Article
6 PA (rather than under the technology
mechanism). Despite
the challenges associated with its
further negotiation, there are several
advantages in the approach proposed
here. Article 6 foresees two types of
activities that rely on the preferences
of the participating Parties; additionally,
under Article 6, outcomes,
especially regarding mitigation, can
be measured more easily.
The difficulties with this approach
should not be understated. The
ongoing negotiation of Article 6 is an
apparent one but could be circumvented
especially due to the bi- or
multinational deployment of 6.2 and
6.8. Additionally, the IPCC cautions
potential frictions of using nuclear
energy within the framework of
sustainable development. Finally,
there are challenges emerging out of
the novelty of this approach. On the
other hand, as Gene Roddenberry put
it: “It isn’t all over; everything has not
been invented; the human adventure
is just beginning.”
References
[1] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(2015): Paris Agreement, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.
[2] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(2015): Decision 1/CP.21 Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1.
[3] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018): Special
Report: Warming of 1.5°, Mitigation Pathways Compatible
with 1.5 °C in the Context of Sustainable Development. In:
Global Warming of 1.5 °C. An IPCC Special Report on the
impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial
levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways,
in the context of strengthening the global response to the
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and
efforts to eradicate poverty. IPCC .
[4] International Atomic Energy Agency (2016): Nuclear Power
and the Paris Agreement.
[5] Petti, D., et al. (2018): The future of nuclear energy in a
carbon-constrained world. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Energy Initiative (MITEI).
[6] Asian Development Bank (2018): Decoding Article 6 of the
Paris Agreement.
[7] Greiner, S., Chagas, T., Krämer, N., Michaelowa, A., Brescia, D.
and Hoch, S. (2019): Moving towards next generation carbon
markets. Observations from Article 6 pilots. 2nd ed., Climate
Focus and Perspectives, Amsterdam/Freiburg.
[8] Hoch, S., Friedmann, V. and Michaelowa, A. (2018):
Mobilising private-sector investment to mitigate climate
change in Africa. Stockholm Environment Institute.
[9] Obergassel, W.; Arens, C., Hermwille, L., Kreibich, N.,
Mersmann, F., Ott, H. E. and Wang-Helmreich, H. (2017):
Setting Sails for Troubled Waters. An Assessment of the
Marrakech Climate Conference (Conference Report). Wuppertal:
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy.
[10] Schneider, L., Michaelowa, A., Broekhoff, D., Espelage, A. and
Siemons A. (2019): Lessons learned from the first round of
applications by carbon-offsetting programs for eligibility
under CORSIA. Öko-Institut e.V., Perspectives Climate Group
and Stockholm Environment Institute.
[11] Edmonds, J., Forrister, D., Clarke, L., de Clara, S., and
Munnings, C. (2019): The economic potential of article 6 of
the Paris Agreement and implementation challenges.
[12] Schneider, H. (2019): The Role of Carbon Markets in the Paris
Agreement: Mitigation and Development: In: Sequeira, T., and
Reis, L. (Eds.). Climate Change and Global Development.
Springer, Cham, pp. 109-132.
[13] International Atomic Energy Agency (2016): Nuclear Power
and Sustainable Development.
[14] Lesnikowski, A., et al. (2017): What does the Paris Agreement
mean for adaptation? In: Climate Policy 17(7), pp. 825-831.
Author
Prof. Dr. Henrique Schneider
h.schneider@sgv-usam.ch
Swiss federation of small and
medium enterprises sgv
Schwarztorstrasse 26
3001 Bern, Switzerland
Energy Policy, Economy and Law
Nuclear Energy in the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement ı Henrique Schneider

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Any Green New Deal
Needs Nuclear Energy
James Conca and Judith Wright
United States congressional members rolled out their “Green New Deal” in 2019 that calls for a rapid
shift to carbon-free energy. As laid out by Rep. Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Markey (D-MA), the Deal calls for
some drastic measures to cut carbon emissions across the economy, from electricity generation to transportation to
agriculture to building efficiencies.
But the roll-out hiccupped a bit on the
role of nuclear energy.
At first, the proposal called for
phasing out all nuclear plants and not
building any new ones. They also
released a fact sheet nixing the
possibility of building new nuclear
power plants. Then they backed off
and referred to future energy sources
as clean, renewable, and zero-emission,
which allows nuclear back in.
Every true expert on this subject
knows we need all non-fossil fuel
energy sources, including nuclear, in
order to reduce our carbon emissions
in time to reign in the worst effects of
global warming (Figure 1). To not
increase, or to eliminate, even one
would be to fail, especially with
respect to nuclear or hydro which
have been the only sources to significantly
compete with fossil fuels in
global generation.
Clearing Confusion
on Nuclear Energy
The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, the International
Energy Agency, the UN Sustainable
Solutions Network and the Global
Commission on the Economy and
Climate argue for a tripling of nuclear
energy by mid-century, requiring over
1,000 new reactors, or 10,000 SMRs,
to help stabilize global anthropogenic
carbon emissions at near-zero.
Even more persuasive, four of
the world’s top climate scientists,
Dr. James Hansen, Dr. Tom Wigley,
Dr. Ken Caldeira and Dr. Kerry
Emanuel, have shown that renewables
alone cannot meet the goal of
decarbonizing the world economy.
The four scientists outlined how
only a combined strategy of employing
all the major sustainable clean
energy options, including renewables
and nuclear, and efficiency and
conser vation, can prevent the worst
effects of climate change by the end of
this century. Even the Union of
Concerned Scientists recently said
we need nuclear to address global
warming.
Although everyone has focused on
the Green in the Green New Deal, it
really is as much about the New Deal
part – the social issues of economic
equality, jobs and social nets – as in
updating Roosevelt’s original New
Deal that brought the United States
out of the Great Depression. The Green
New Deal aims to create jobs and boost
the economy, rework our farming
practices, and provide living wages,
family leave, and health care for all.
Arguably, you can’t achieve environmental
harmony without addressing
human suffering and poverty. This
dynamic tension between human
survival and environmental sustainability
is what led to our species’
explosion in energy use beginning
with coal and it’s continued increase
to at least 2050. Answering the
question – Do you want to eradicate
global poverty or save the planet? – is
not an easy one, but there is only one
answer - Both.
But most discussions have focused
on the Green part of the Deal. Ocasio-
Cortez has stated that we should go
carbon-neutral in 10 years. While that
is not scientifically possible, it is the
type of goal that needs to be set in
order to make any difference at all in
the time frame we do have – about 20
years.
Presently, America is 64 % fossil fuel
in electricity generation, but 87 %
fossil fuel if you add in transportation
which is dominated by petroleum.
After 14 years of carbon emission
decline as we replaced coal plants with
gas plants, our emissions began to rise
again in 2018 because of increased
gasoline and diesel use, as well as just
increased economic output. The global
pandemic has caused some oscillation,
but emissions will begin increasing
again when we recover from the pandemic
and its economic aftermath.
What would a plan of action
for nuclear look like?
The only energy plan for generation
that has any hope of achieving any of
the goals we need, in the time frame
| Fig. 1.
Life-cycle emissions for each energy source. To achieve any type of green
new deal, all four of the energy on the right must be replaced by a
combination of all sources on the left, not a cherry-picked few. IPCC/EN
we need them, is some form of the
following:
p stop building any new fossil fuel
plants.
p stop closing existing nuclear power
plants that have been relicensed as
safe by the NRC, which is almost all
remaining reactors in the United
States. Crying that a penny or a
euro a kWh is just too much for the
world to bear is insane under the
urgent need and the huge cost to
decarbonize. And every time we
close nuclear, carbon emissions go
up.
p build as many wind turbines as
possible and site them along
Tornado Alley first, where they
produce the most power per MW
installed (Figure 2). Putting
them most anywhere else is selfdefeating,
costs more and wastes
steel.
p put rooftop solar on all new
buildings, first in areas that average
at least 200 sunny days per year,
again to make the steel used go
farther (Figure 3, Gagnon et al.,
2016).
p build new small modular reactors
as fast as possible to load-follow, or
buffer, the renewables, instead of
building new natural gas plants.
SMRs cannot melt down and all the
other scary things have been fixed.
489
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY
Environment and Safety
Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy ı James Conca and Judith Wright

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 490
* The average wind
speeds indicated on
this map are modelderived
estimates that
may not represent the
true wind resource at
any given location.
Small terrain features,
vegetation, buildings,
and atmospheric
effects may cause the
wind speed to depart
from the map
estimates. Expert
advice should be
sought in placing
wind turbines and
estimating their
energy production.
| Fig. 2.
A map of wind resources in the United States clearly showing Tornado Alley
where capacity factors for wind exceed 45 %. Al other areas average about
30 %. Tornado Alley is so windy even migratory birds avoid I completely.
NREL WINDExchamge
Source: Wind resource estimates developed by AWS Truepower, LLC.*
We haven’t been idle in the last
30 years. Nuclear can also be sited
anywhere, especially in areas
where other renewables are not
efficient or possible.
p follow the new plan by the National
Hydropower Association and the
Department of Energy, to double
hydropower over the 20 years,
adding 60 GW by 2030, without
building a single new dam. As it
turns out, only 3 % of American
dams generate electricity, so
electrifying existing dams that
presently do not produce power,
uprating the others to produce
more power, and emplacing
pumped- hydro storage will do
a lot (Figure 4).
p secure sources of Li, Co, Fe and
other metals needed to build the
alternatives, especially to build the
batteries for enough fully electric
vehicles to replace oil. Material
needs are critical. Wind and solar
take an extraordinary amount of
steel per MW installed (Figure 5).
p build a fleet of 200 million fully
electric vehicles by 2040 that will
significantly reduce our use of oil –
much fewer will not sufficiently
drop our consumption – and place
100,000 charging stations along all
roadways that will be necessary to
service such a national fleet.
p streamline the process to site and
approve high-voltage transmission
lines. We cannot install this much
renewables without them. And
make the grid “smart.” Simple but
costly.
In America, this plan will require
500,000 additional MW wind turbines,
200 new nuclear reactors (or
2,000 small modular reactors that are
especially ideal for load-following
renewables and providing baseload
power), 800 billion kWhs/year from
new solar, and 600 billion kWhs/year
from new hydro.
For the World, it would take
4,000,000 new MW of wind
turbines (13 trillion kWhs/year),
1,400,000 MW new nuclear reactors
(11 trillion kWhs/year), 2,200,000
MW of new solar (7 trillion kWhs/
year), and 1,100,000 new MW of
hydro while properly maintaining
| Fig. 3.
A map of solar resources in the United States. Capacity factors for solar
exceed 30 % in areas in red and orange. All other areas average less
than 30 % and as low as 10%. Alaska is blue to green and Hawaii is yellow
to red. The National Solar Radiation Data Base (NSRDB)
existing hydro (9 trillion kWhs/yr). Of
course, physiographic issues need to
be addressed to site appropriate
sources with locations, just like in the
United States. If you’re country does
not have steep enough rivers you
won’t have much hydro.
We should certainly pursue other
alternatives like tidal and wave energy
as fast as possible but they will not be
developed enough to contribute much
by 2040.
We will need to keep those natural
gas plants that have been built after
2000 as they are needed for flexibility
until we build enough nuclear and
hydro. But we need to stop building
new gas plants. This is probably the
most difficult thing to achieve because
regulators, state legislators, and banks
love them.
Natural gas has long been touted as
a bridge fuel to a non-fossil future
beyond this century. But that is
nonsense. We don’t have a century.
And if so many new gas plants are
built, especially to load-follow wind
and solar, then we lock ourselves into
gas for a long, long time. No one is
** Note: This map has
been generalized for
cartographic purposes
and some streams
associated with
non-powered dams
are not displayed.
| Fig. 4.
The locations of dams in the United States that do not produce electricity.
These can be powered, which would double our hydropower generation
without building a single new dam. ORNL **
| Fig. 5.
Materials needed to install energy systems are highly variable with source.
Renewables require many times the amount of steel and/or concrete than
thermal sources. Wind requires the most of everything. Data from DOE and
UC Berkeley normalized to capacity factor. Data from UC Berkeley.
Environment and Safety
Any Green New Deal Needs Nuclear Energy ı James Conca and Judith Wright

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
going to decommission or destroy a
relatively new gas plant.
On the other hand, gas plants can
be refurbished to small modular
reactors relatively easily, just as coal
plants can be refurbished to gas plants
relatively easily.
It should be noted that we have
more natural gas than any country in
the world, and gas plants are so easy
to build and maintain. For that matter,
we have more oil and coal than any
country in the world, which makes
any plan to eliminate fossil fuels
extremely difficult from a sociopolitical
standpoint.
Unfortunately, the hurdles to new
nuclear power, and to nuclear waste
disposal, are all political and ideological,
and stem from intentional
misrepresentations over 50 years.
New nuclear designs, like NuScale’s
SMR out of Oregon, are as safe as one
can make any generator, even wind.
And we know what to do with nuclear
waste, we just aren’t allowed to do it
(Conca, 2017).
In the 1970s and 80s, incorrect
predictions of energy needs in the
following decades, cost overruns from
continual changes in regulatory and
manufacturing requirements as well
as subcontractors, the inability to
standardize reactor designs (except
for France), warped market forces
from the deregulation of most energy
markets, and the rise of anti-nuclear
ideologies, all led to the halt of new
nuclear builds in America and the
world. Even though nuclear has been
the overwhelming source of clean
power for the last 40 years and has
the lowest deathprint of any energy
source, even renewables (Table 1).
It comes down to a
sociopolitical decision
In order to achieve a successful Green
New Deal, the public has to decide
what they fear most - the anti-nuclear
mythology or the existential threat of
global warming. Scientists can only
lead the public to potential solutions,
we can’t make them think.
The amount of wind and solar
required by this plan needs to be put
into perspective. We presently have
about 90,000 MW of wind turbines
that generate about 260 billion kWhs
per year, and we have been building
them as fast as possible for over ten
years.
To build 500,000 more MW of
turbines over the next 10 to 20 years in
just the U.S., is really pushing our
manufacturing side and will take more
steel than we could possible produce
Energy Source
over that time frame. Wind turbines
take 450 tons of steel per MW. Solar
takes about 360 tons of steel per MW.
To emplace the amount of wind and
solar in the Green New Deal described
above, would take 1.6 billion tons
of steel (Figure 5). It would take
11 billion tons for the world to achieve
a similar decarbo nization.
Since the total annual global output
of steel is only 1.6 billion tons, we
would be very dependent on China,
India and Japan for that much steel,
and would require them to either
produce many times as much as they
do now, or use less than half of what
they use now. Either way, it will take
substantial global economic agreements
to be accepted by all nations
Our track record with huge global
economic agreements has not been
good. It needs to be better or we will
fail.
Links
Links are listed in order of appearance in the text and
active as of September 14, 2020
| https://energyeducation.ca/encyclopedia/
| https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060120029/print
| https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5729035/Green-
New-Deal-FAQ.pdf
| https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov/sites/ocasio-cortez.house.gov/
files/Resolution%20on%20a%20Green%20New%20Deal.pdf
| http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/
| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/12/15/pariscop21-and-the-urgent-need-for-more-nuclear-energy/
#32febc9ae384
| https://www-legacy.dge.carnegiescience.edu/labs/caldeiralab/
MediaAlertParis.html
| https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-power/cost-nuclear-power/
retirements#.XAAs0a3MxGX
| https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/new-deal.asp
| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2018/06/27/
ans-all-energy-forum-brings-a-sobering-analysis-to-energyand-climate-plans/#5d7cf4ec3953
| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2019/01/16/u-sco2-emissions-rise-as-nuclear-power-plants-close/
#3f5237d97034
| https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/07/19/
wind-turbines-could-rule-tornado-alley/#648178abcd3e
Mortality Rate (deaths per trillion kWh)
Coal – global average 100,000 (41 % of global electricity)
Coal – China 170,000 (75 % of China’s electricity)
Coal – U.S. 10,000 (32 % of U.S. electricity)
Oil – global average 36,000 (33 % of global energy, 4 % of global electricity)
Natural Gas – global average 4,000 (22 % of global electricity)
Biofuel/Biomass – global average 24,000 (21 % of global energy)
Solar – global average 440 (

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 492
Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe,
Economical and Always Available
to Protect the Environment
Peter Dyck
Introduction The commercial use of nuclear energy (NE) was initially linked to the great expectation of generating
enormous quantities of cheap electricity. Various technologies were therefore developed, starting with reactors based
on natural uranium. Many countries, however, concentrated on reactors with enriched uranium to achieve even higher
power densities. Nuclear power plants worldwide were designed and constructed on this basis. At that time in Germany,
for example, the SPD in particular campaigned for around 50 nuclear power plants.
Mainly in western countries, the
emphasis was placed on high safety
standards from the very outset. As
time went by these standards were
raised higher and higher. Naturally,
the consequence was further increases
in specific costs. Increasing the capacity
and thus the size of the plants was
seen as an initial solution to reducing
them. There were also repeated
demands for inherently safe plants.
Different approaches and concepts,
such as Generation III, Generation
III+ and Generation IV, brought this
goal closer and closer.
In the 2000s, the construction
of new nuclear power plants was also
influenced by another aspect, namely
the reduction of CO 2 emissions from
electricity generation. The reason for
this was the conviction that CO 2
released by humans would contribute
massively to global warming. It quickly
became clear, however, that the socalled
renewable energies (wind and
solar energy), which were promoted
from 2000 onwards, could only supply
weather-dependent power and were
not sustainable with respect to the
entire electricity system. Permanent
back-up provided by fossil fuel or
nuclear power are required. In
Germany, these back-up systems were
made more expensive due to the
prio ritization rule of the Renewable
Energy Sources Act. The renewable
energies were unable to contribute to
grid stability, not to mention the costs.
It is therefore impossible to provide a
secure power supply for industrialized
countries with wind turbines (off and
on-shore) and photovoltaic installations.
These and other serious disadvantages
were the trigger that
brought the focus of interest in various
countries firmly back to nuclear
energy.
SMRs (small modular reactors,
Generation IV) are now being developed
as a near inherently safe design
concept for small countries and a
decentralized power supply. They
include gas-cooled (He) reactors with
up to 300 MW installed capacity. The
idea is based on a uniform design, a
standard approval procedure and
standardized components, combined
with a reduction in costs. In each case,
the plants can be adjusted to the
demand (electricity, sea water desalination,
process heat) by constructing
several modules. They would be
particularly suitable for use in
combination with renewable energies
as they can be switched on and off
quickly.
The dual fluid reactor (DFR) is
emerging as a new development. This
reactor works with a liquid fuel
mixture and a metal coolant. As a fast
breeder reactor, it can fission all
uranium and plutonium isotopes as
well as all transuranic elements and
breed fissile material. In each case, the
fission products are separated and
sent for ultimate waste disposal, while
transmutation is still carried out for a
number of isotopes. This results in
significantly lower requirements for
the proof of long-term safety of a deep
geological repository of some 500 to
1,000 years instead of one million
years. In this way, it is also possible to
use spent nuclear fuels from light
water reactors (LWR). As a result, an
enormous amount of fissile material
is available, especially since Th-232
could also be used. The policy adopted
by many countries of choosing longterm
interim storage for their spent
fuel assemblies is now proving to have
been right.
Current situation
A number of the many nuclear power
plants that were built in the early
years have already ceased operation.
Either because the design or size of
the plant did not meet economic
requirements, or because technical
problems made decommissioning
appear advisable, or because the plant
had simply reached the end of its
service life.
The reactor accidents of Three
Mile Island (1979, in Block II) and
Chernobyl (1986, Block IV), which
resulted in the decommissioning of
nuclear power plants, had an additional
impact. In Italy, it was even
decided to abandon the nuclear
energy supply completely.
Further shutdowns followed the
tsunami in Japan due to the problems
associated with it, such as failure of
the electricity supply and oxyhydrogen
gas explosions in the old,
poorly secured Fukushima reactors.
Thereupon, in Germany, for example,
eight reactors were forced to shut
down for political reasons. At the
same time, the decision was also
taken to phase out nuclear energy
completely by 2022. The three most
modern rectors Isar 2, Emsland and
Neckarwestheim 2 will be shut down
for decommissioning at the end of
2022. In other countries, on the other
hand, safety systems were reassessed
and, where necessary, upgraded.
With its “international best practices
in the ageing management of
nuclear power plants”, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
supports its member states in extending
the service life of nuclear power
plants by a further 20 to 40 years
while continuing to guarantee the
highest possible level of safety. [1]
The IAEA coordinates collaboration
between the member states in order to
adopt best practices. The program
deals with the physical aging of
systems, structures and components
as well as technical progress. It also
incorporates the results of the Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI),
which cooperates with the IAEA.
Recently, however, new nuclear
power plants have been commissioned
Environment and Safety
Nuclear Energy – Reliable, Safe, Economical and Always Available to Protect the Environment ı Peter Dyck

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
| Fig. 1.
Global power generation from NPPs since 1956.
(Source: VGB Facts & Figures I Electricity Generation 2020/2021)
again in various countries, particularly
in Russia, Asia (China, India,
Pakistan, etc.) and in the United Arab
Emirates.
The current situation shows that
the nuclear power plants in operation
(32 countries operate nuclear power
plants) are distributed relatively
unevenly across the globe. Measured
in terms of the share of nuclear energy
in total national power generation,
France is the most important country
in the world with around 72 percent
and the United States still is it with
regard to the number of power
reactors operated.
One special case is module
designed as a floating nuclear power
plant – Akademik Lomonosov – with
two prototype reactors of 38 MW
electrical output (MWe) and 150 MW
thermal output (MWth). These
“ floating reactors” were taken to
the port town of Pevek, in the far
north of Russia, where they will
replace the Bilibino power plant. [2]
Oil 193.03 33.1 %
Coal 157.86 27.0 %
Natural gas 141.45 24.2 %
Hydropower 37.66 6.4 %
Renewable
energy
Nuclear
energy
Looking at the total primary energy
consumed worldwide, the following
picture emerges: Total consumption in
2019 was around 583.9 exajoules or
around 162,324 TWh, broken down
by energy source as shown in Table 2.
On average, it can be expected that
around 25% of primary energy is used
for electricity generation.
Global electricity generation in
2018 stood at some 26.600 TWh,
64 percent of which was generated
USA 95 Pakistan 5
France 56 Slovakia 4
China 49 Finland 4
Russia 38 Hungary 4
Japan 33 Switzerland 4
South Korea 24 Argentina 3
India 22 Bulgaria 2
Canada 19 Mexico 2
Ukraine 15 Romania 2
United Kingdom 15 Brazil 2
Belgium 7 South Africa 2
Sweden 7 Slovenia 1
Spain 7 Iran 1
Germany 6 Armenia 1
Czech Republic 6 Netherlands 1
25.83 4.4 %
24.16 4.1 %
Other 4.71 0.8 %
| Tab. 2.
Consumption in exajoules, 2019,
various energy sources [3].
| Tab. 1.
Number of nuclear power plants operated worldwide; status mid-2020 [3].
with the fossil fuels coal, natural gas
and oil while 36 percent was generated
low-carbon: 16.2 percent hydropower,
10.1 percent nuclear power
and 9.8 percent with wind and solar
power, biomass, waste, geothermal
energy and tidal power.
The following picture Figure 2
emerges for Germany, where primary
energy consumption has fallen sharply
since 1990.
Nuclear power plants
under construction
In contrast to Germany and Switzerland,
the dominant nuclear energy
countries continue to invest in this
resource-saving and environmentally
friendly technology. For example,
52 nuclear power plants were under
construction worldwide in mid-2020.
There are sound reasons for the
construction of new nuclear power
plants:
a) nuclear power plants from the
boom of the 1970s will be
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 493
1990 2019*
5.228 PJ
35 %
2.304 PJ
15 %
Total 14.905
Petajoule
1.668 PJ
11 %
199
1 %
3.201 PJ
21 %
2.306 PJ
15 %
Hard Coal
Brown Coal
Mineral Oil
Gas
Nuclear Energy
Renewables and
other energy sources 2
4.519 PJ
35 %
3.200 PJ
25 %
Total 12.815
Petajoule
820 PJ
6 %
1.170 PJ
9 %
1.886 PJ
15 %
1.134 PJ
9 %
86 PJ
0,7 %
Hard Coal
Brown Coal
Mineral Oil
Gas
Nuclear Energy
Renewables
Other energy sources 2
| Fig. 2.
Primary energy consumption 1 by energy sources, FRG, cf. 1990 with 2019.
1
Calculations based on the efficiency approach; 2 Until 1999 renewable energies with other energy sources, separate recording from 2000 on other energy
sources are: non-renewable waste, heat and foreign trade balance from district heating and electricity; * preliminary information;
Source: for 1990 Federal Environment Agency based on AG Energiebilanzen, Evaluation tables for the energy balance for the Federal Republic of Germany
1990 to 2018 as of 10/2018; for 2019 Federal Environment Agency based on AG Energiebilanzen, primary energy consumption as of 12/2019
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 494
approaching the end of their economic
service life in the foreseeable
future,
b) replacing them must be tackled in
good time,
c) the demand for power is constantly
increasing worldwide, especially in
populous emerging countries, such
as Brazil, China or India, which
have been showing high economic
growth for years. According to the
estimates of the American Energy
Information Administration (EIA),
global electricity demand is expected
to increase by 59 % by 2040
by comparison with 2016, and by
as much as 200 % in India,
d) the price stability of nuclear
energy, which, unlike fossil fuels,
hardly depends on the price of the
fuel, makes nuclear energy particularly
economically projectable,
e) renewable energies (wind power,
solar power) are not fully controllable
and also often do not produce
in a consumer-oriented way,
f) climate protection and dwindling
fossil resources speak in favour
of practically carbon-free, environmentally
friendly nuclear energy,
g) fossil fuels pollute the atmosphere
with CO 2 , for example, unless
sequestration (storage of CO 2 ) is
chosen,
h) environmentally friendly options
such as nuclear energy are therefore
urgently needed. [4]
Russia has 13 VVER-1000 and three
state-of-the-art VVER-1200 connected
to the grid and another five
VVER- 1200 under construction. Two
each at the Baltic and Kursk locations
and one at the Leningrad location. In
addition, 10 RBMK-1000 reactors
(Chernobyl type), five VVER-440, two
fast breeder reactors (FBR), one
BN-600 and one BN-800 are in operation.
There are also research reactors,
reactors on icebreakers, in submarines,
and a floating nuclear power
plant.
China entered the nuclear energy
market late. The country did not put
its first nuclear power plant into
opera tion until the early 1990s.
By now, 49 nuclear power plants
supply the Chinese Republic with
electricity (status mid-2020), with
some 350 TWh in 2019. They account
for a 5 % share in China’s power mix.
10 further nuclear power plants are
under construction.
China has commissioned the
world’s first two EPR-1750, the largest
nuclear power plants in the world,
in Taishan. In addition, the China
Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), a
| Fig. 3.
Overview of nuclear power plant locations in Russia (©World Nuclear Association).
| Fig. 4.
Overview of nuclear power plant locations in China (©World Nuclear Association).
| Fig. 5.
Overview of nuclear power plant locations in India (©World Nuclear Association).
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breeder reactor that forms the basis
for the development of a commercial
breeder reactor, is operated in a
suburb of Beijing. [6]
India has 22 nuclear power plants
in operation with installed capacities
between 160 and 500 MWe, two
VVER-1000 and a small breeder
reactor. One fast breeder reactor with
500 MWe, four PHWRs (Pressurized
Heavy-Water Reactors) with 700 MWe
and two VVER-1000 are under
construction. [1]
There is also construction activity
in South Korea (four reactors)
and Bangladesh which is currently
building its first two nuclear power
plants.
Several Central and Eastern
European countries (Slovakia/
Mochovce, Poland/Zarnowiec, Hungary/Paks,
Belarus/Ostrovets, Slovenia/Krsko,
Czech Republic/Dukovany
and Temelin, etc.) continue to focus
on nuclear energy. They want to
reduce their dependence on coal and
natural gas imports or replace their
existing nuclear power plants with
new, state-of-the-art facilities. In
Slovakia, for example, in addition to
Mochovce, there are currently two
Russian reactors under construction.
It is also worth noting that the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), which
has large oil reserves and solar energy,
is banking also on nuclear energy for
the future. In the summer of 2012,
they began construction of the first of
4 Korean-designed nuclear power
plant (PWR) units. The first plant has
already become critical and started
producing electricity in 2020. All four
reactors should be in operation by
2023.
Turkey has also decided to embark
on using nuclear energy. The country’s
first nuclear power plant has been
under construction on the Akkuyu site
on the Mediterranean coast since
Argentina 1 USA 2
Brazil 1 China 10
Finland 1 Bangladesh 2
France 1 Turkey 1
India 7 UAE 4
Iran 1 Belarus 2
Pakistan 2 Japan 2
Russia 4 South Korea 2
Slovakia 2 Taiwan 4
United
Kingdom
2
| Tab. 3.
Number of nuclear power plants under
construction worldwide (status mid-2020) [3].
| Fig. 6.
Schedule for Generation IV plants [6].
April 2018. Four further units are
planned in the north on the Sinop site.
The USA operates 95 reactor units
with a capacity of around 94 GWe and
promotes all forms of low-carbon
energy, including the construction of
one of the two new nuclear power
plants at the Vogtle site in Georgia.
The USA also supports the development
of SMR, a modular concept of
significantly space-saving design and
partially new technology with the
goal of inherent safety.
Many of the more than 160 nuclear
power plants currently under
construc tion or in planning worldwide
belong to Generation III. In the
coming years, these advanced reactor
types will modernize the fleet of
Generation II nuclear power plants in
many countries and replace fossil
power plants. In many cases, the
Generation III reactor systems are a
further development of the reliable
Generation II reactor types.
In addition to greater efficiency
due to a lower uranium requirement
per kWh and improved cost-effectiveness
due to standardized and modular
construction methods, these reactor
types offer even greater safety as a
result of technical innovations.
Gene ration III safety means that, even
in the event of serious accidents, any
serious impacts are limited to the
plant itself.
The next step in development
are the plants of Generation IV. The
reactor concepts include:
p Gas-cooled fast reactors
p Very-high-temperature gas reactors
p Sodium-cooled fast reactors
p Lead-cooled fast reactors
p Supercritical water-cooled reactors
p Molten salt reactors
The Generation IV reactors will be so
safe and reliable that, in the event of
an accident within the plant, there
will be no need to evacuate the
population in the vicinity of the power
plant. In case of power failures and a
failure of the core cooling systems,
there will be sufficient time to repair
and restore the cooling systems.
The safety concept will be efficient,
reliable and economical.
Future plans –
Russia and Asia are focusing
on nuclear energy
Russia, China and India are pursuing
ambitious expansion projects.
Russia [2] wants to commission
two new plants a year so that it can
export more natural gas to Western
Europe at good prices. The country
holds a leading position in the
development and operation of
FBRs. It operates two sodium-cooled
reactors – the BN-600 and BN-800.
In parallel, Rosatom is developing
another reactor generation (Generation
VI) with new technology, a
Pb-cooled FBR with liquid fuel.
China [5] has an enormous
demand for electricity due to its large
population, emerging economy and
industrialisation. In addition to an
extensive program to build new coalfired
power plants to meet demand
in the short to medium term, the
previously moderate development of
nuclear energy has accelerated considerably.
The aim is to reduce air
pollution and CO 2 emissions. As a
result, there are three dozen nuclear
power plants at an advanced stage of
planning. The overall plan is to have
around 300 GWe connected to the
grid by 2050 to meet the huge energy
demand. This is an important part of a
secure power supply with carbon-free
energy.
India, which currently only produces
some 40 TWh from nuclear
energy, has set itself an extremely
ambitious target. It is planning to
connect 470 GWe of nuclear energy to
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 496
the grid by 2050. The aim is to become
less dependent on coal. In addition,
the rapidly growing population
requires more and more electric
power.
In Finland, preparations are
under way for the construction of
another nuclear power plant.
The country wants to reduce its
dependence on Russian electricity
supplies.
At the beginning of 2008, the
British government decided to
replace nuclear power plants that had
already been in operation for a long
time with new ones. The UK is therefore
currently planning to build a
good 16 GWe of new nuclear capacity
at eight already selected sites. This
would double the NE electricity share
from around 20 percent today to over
40 percent. This approach is explicitly
intended to reduce dependence on
fossil fuels and their environmentally
harmful emissions.
In 2007, Romania commissioned
its newest nuclear power plant
( Cernavoda-2, a Canadian Candu
heavy water reactor). The country
plans to build two units of the same
type with Chinese support over the
next few years.
| Fig. 7.
New construction projects and announcements in Europe (©VGB).
* without photovoltaic, oil: no projects.
Serious consideration is being
given to the construction of new
nuclear power plants in Bulgaria
and Lithuania. Lithuania is currently
without nuclear energy following the
decommissioning of its two RBMK
reactors, but urgently needs new
power plants. The Czech Republic
has launched the planned new build
project for the Dukovany site and
Poland plans to start using nuclear
power with the target of building
6 to 9 GWe nuclear installed capacity.
Hungary also wants to build new
nuclear power plants. It has therefore
concluded an agreement with Russia
for the construction of two units in
2014 already.
Iran commissioned its first nuclear
power plant in 2011. The country
wants to build more reactors with
Russian support. Russian reactors
are also to be built in Egypt, which
does not currently operate any nuclear
power plants.
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and
South Africa are currently preparing
to expand their existing nuclear
power plant fleets. In Argentina, the
country’s third nuclear power plant
went on line at the beginning of
2014. Brazil’s third nuclear power
China 44 United
Kingdom
Russia 24 Romania 2
India 14 Uzbekistan 2
Poland 6 Finland 1
Egypt 4 Argentina 1
South
Korea
2
4 Bulgaria 1
USA 3 Iran 1
Turkey 2 Japan 1
Ukraine 2 Pakistan 1
Hungary 2 Czech
Republic
| Tab. 4.
Number of planned nuclear reactors
worldwide (status mid-2020) [3].
1
plant is scheduled to start generating
electricity in the 20s.
As in many other countries, a large
number of conventional power plants
are still being planned in Europe.
This will lead to further CO 2 emissions.
If the goal is to achieve a secure
power supply, then the only way to
prevent them is by using nuclear
power plants.
Advanced reactors
Among the advanced pressurized
water reactors (PWR) is the AP1000
(Advanced Passive Plant) with an
installed capacity of approx. 1100 MW
offered by the US company Westinghouse.
Reactors of this type are
already in operation in China. Further
construction projects are currently
underway in the USA.
In Belarus, Russia is building the
first reactor of its latest Generation
III+ series abroad.
Three systems of this type are
already in operation in Russia, two in
Novovoronezh NPP and one in
Leningrad NPP. Another reactor of
this Generation III+ type became
critical in July, the Leningrad NPP
Unit 6.
Finland, Hungary, Turkey, Bangladesh
and Egypt have also chosen
this Generation III+ reactor type of
Russian design.
China [5] has various development
and demonstration projects:
p CDFR (China Demonstration Fast
Reactor)/a fast reactor
p CEFR (China Experimental Fast
Reactor)/an advanced fast reactor
p To increase the proportion of
uranium use and reduce the
amount of hazardous waste, the
intention is to build FBRs that
breed fissile material. At the
same time, PWRs are being
developed whose fuel cycle is
based on the material from the fast
reactors. The aim is to implement
this on an industrial scale by
2025-2030.
| Fig. 8.
Generation III+ from the USA, the AP1000, photo: NRC.
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List of abbreviations
| Fig. 9.
Akademik Lomonosov on the way to its place of use [3].
p FBRs with a higher breeding rate
are a further step.
An additional line of development
is the SMRs (Small Modular
Reactors), Generation IV reactors
which can be adjusted to the needs
of the relevant country or region.
These are stan dardized plants that
are assembled in the factory and
delivered as a whole unit (modular
system).
One example of this is the
Academik Lomonosov reactors that
are mounted on a ship and will supply
power and heat in the port town of
Pevek, near the Arctic Circle.
Further plans envisage pebble-bed
reactors with a capacity of approx.
250 to 350 MWe, which can be
used both for power generation and
sea water desalination or for process
heat.
South Africa has plans to build 10
such plants with this type of reactor.
Rolls Royce is planning to build
mini reactors, prefabricated in
factories, which should be cheaper
and safer than large plants. It should
be possible to transport these mini
reactors by road. The first reactor is
scheduled to go into operation in the
United Kingdom in 2029. [7]
CAREM, a CNEA (Comisión Nacional
de Energía Atómica) project in
Argentina, is yet another project.
Nuscale in the US plans to build
50 megawatt modules. There is a SMR
development project in Canada too.
Work is underway at the Siberian
Chemical Combine site in Russia on a
complex with the BREST-300 fast
reactor as a demonstration plant and a
reprocessing plant. [2]
The BREST-300 reactor will
become important for closing the
fuel cycle.
p The reprocessing plant has been
simplified compared to the original
design and will only separate the
fissile material, while the complex
and expensive process of separating
uranium, plutonium and all
other actinides (transuranium
elements) will be abandoned.
p A mixture of these materials will
be used in the fuel of the
BREST-300 reactor. High purity of
the fuel in terms of fissile material
will no longer be important.
This process will protect uranium
deposits.
p Great importance is attached, however,
to the purity of the separated
separated fission products which,
as far as possible, is to be used for
the production of isotopes for
medical purposes or is to be
disposed of. With this and withrecycling
of the fissile material,
the amount of radiotoxic substances
will be greatly reduced
and the decay times shortened.
The advantage of implementing U,
Pu and transuranium elements in a
molten salt reactor like it is developed
by TerraPower of Bill Gates and in the
dual-fluid configuration in Germany is
that there is no need to manufacture
any fuel assemblies. In addition, the
reactor need not be shut down for fuel
reloading, since the fissile material can
be fed continuously. Furthermore, the
fission products can be removed continuously
during operation. Fusible
cutouts shall ensure inherent safety.
In conclusion it can be recognized
that many nations including the
largest ones count on nuclear energy
for electricity generation and
that significant advances in reactor
technology are not the exception but
the rule.
FRG
CO2
DFR
PWR
RE
EPR
GWe
He
NE
NPP
MW
MWe
MWth
FBR
SMR
TWh
= Federal Republic of Germany
= carbon dioxide
= dual fluid reactor
= pressurized water reactor
= renewable energy (a buzzword)
= European pressurized reactor
= gigawatt electrical
= helium
= nuclear energy
= nuclear power plant
= megawatt
= megawatt electrical
= megawatt thermal
= fast breeder reactor
= small modular reactor
= terawatt hours
VVER =, RBMK =, BN = Russian reactor types
References
[1] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
[2] SNF MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIA: STATUS AND FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT
A.V. KHAPERSKAYA
State Corporation “ROSATOM”, Moscow,
the Russian Federation O.V. KRYUKOV
State Corporation “ROSATOM”, Moscow,
the Russian Federation
K.V. IVANOV
State Corporation “ROSATOM”, Moscow,
the Russian Federation
[3] Wikipedia
[4] Prof. Dr. P von Dierkes, Kaprun
[5] The Strategy of Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Its Back-end
R&D Activities
Ye Guoan, WangJian, ZhengWeifang, HeHui, ZhangHua
China Institue of Atomic Energy (CIAE) 249-28 June, 2019,
IAEA
[6] Nucleopedia .org
[7] Rolls-Royce Nuclear
Author
Dipl.-Phys. Peter Dyck
Former Unit Head for 'Spent Fuel
Storage' at IAEA Wien
Nuclear Consultant for Licencing
and Transport for Spent Fuel and
High Level Waste
dyck.fo@t-online.de
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 498
Are They Ready for Operation?
How to Assess the Control Room System
of a New NPP
Rainer Miller, Rodney Leitner, Sina Gierig and Harald Kolrep
1 Introduction The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant with two boiling water reactors in operation is located on
the southern west coast of Finland. The plant is operated by the public Finnish energy company TVO. Since 2005, Areva
and Siemens have been constructing Unit 3 (OL3) as a pressurized water reactor of the EPR construction line. OL3 is in
the commissioning phase and the first fuel loading is planned for autumn of 2020.
The EPR is a generation III+ pressurized
water reactor with an electrical
output of 1,600 MW. It is
equipped with a fully digital control
system (Process Information and
Control System, PICS). During normal
operation the plant is controlled
from the control room via computer
screens. Each ope rator has eight
screens at his disposal, the content of
which he can choose freely. At a
central location in the main control
room three large displays can be
observed by all operators.
A back-up system with conventional
control panels and partly analogue
displays and control elements is provided
as a safety measure (Safety
Infor mation and Control System,
SICS) in case of incidents (e.g. in case
of failure of the software for the digital
control)
The standard operating concept of
OL3 is conceived for a shift staffing of
three operators: turbine operator
(TO), reactor operator (RO) and shift
supervisor (SSV). In case of incidents
or major malfunctions, the shift team
can call an additional safety engineer
(SE), who is on call, to support the
control room crew. In this case, the
SE is responsible for the continuous
monitoring of essential safety functions
and safety-critical parameters
(safety function monitoring) in order
to relieve the shift team of these
monitoring tasks.
Figure 1 shows the full scope
simulator of the main control room
of OL3; the control panel on the
left of the control room is the SICS.
The shift supervisor sits at the
table on the right in the foreground,
the turbine operator at the table
on the back right and the reactor
operator at the table on the back
left.
With the aim to demonstrate, that
within the control room all requirements
related to Human Factors
aspects of the operations are satisfactorily
achieved, the plant supplier of
OL3 has planned a final human factors
test of the capabilities of the ‘control
room’ system before fuel loading.
The “Integrated Final Control Room
System Validation (ISV)” has been
performed in 2019.
The following aspects were considered
as control room system for the
ISV:
p trained plant operators (crew)
p the operating manual defining the
operational tasks of the crew,
p the integrated main human
machine interfaces (HMI), most
notably the Process Information
and Control System (PICS) as well
as the Safety Information and
Control System (SICS), but also
the fire alarm panel,
p and the environment as given by
the main control room (MCR) and
the remote shutdown station
(RSS).
To ensure the independence of the
ISV, the planning and implementation
of the ISV was outsourced to external
consultants. The HFC Human-Factors-
Consult GmbH formed a consortium
with MTO Safety GmbH for the study.
Engineers, psychologists, and human
factors specialists are represented in
the consortium. The composition of
the consortium guaranteed great
experience with validation studies
(HFC) as well as practical experience
from nuclear operations and safety
(MTO Safety).
This article describes the planning
and execution of the ISV, i.e. the
aspects examined in the test and the
methods used to measure the relevant
variables. Hands-on experience from
the execution of the validation is also
reported.
| Fig. 1.
Full scope simulator of the main control room of OL3.
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2 Planning and
preparation of the study
The preparation for the ISV started
in 2015 with the definition of relevant
aspects to be analysed. The choice
of these aspects was based on human
factors requirements which in turn
have been derived by considering
the relevant standards and regulations
within the domain of controls
rooms in general and more specifically
nuclear power plant control rooms.
The standards considered include
among others the IEC 1771 [1] and
IEC 60964 [2]. The Finnish regulation
YVL 5.5 [3] has to be considered for
the main control room and manmachine
interfaces in the control
room and their validation. Furthermore
NUREG 0711 [4] provides
additional guidance.
Based on the literature, a total
of six aspects were identified that
were to be investigated in the ISV.
These aspects are: task performance,
human errors, situation awareness,
com munication, coordination and
mental workload.
2.1 Scenarios
The six aspects should be examined in
different operating conditions. For this
purpose, four scenarios were defined
which varied in content, difficulty and
complexity and which cover a wide
range of conceivable operating conditions,
from normal operation to
emergency operations. For each of the
four scenarios, a target path with an
expected sequence of specified control
tasks or switching actions was defined.
using the ‘strategy flow charts’ (SFC)
of the operating manual. In the OL3
operating manual, strategies for different
states of the plant (e.g. normal
operation, start up, abnormal operations
etc.) are described in the
SFC, whereas tasks are described in
‘ detailed instruction modules’ (DIM).
For different states of the plant spe cific
SFCs describes the sequence of tasks
(DIMs) and necessary actions in the
form of flowcharts. The target path for
a scenario thus contained a sequence
of DIMs in one or more SFCs which
had to be processed (see Figure 2 for
an example of a SFC with target path).
Each scenario was planned to be
carried out three times within the ISV,
using a different shift crew each time.
The individual run of one scenario by
one crew is called ‘trial’. This resulted
in a balanced test plan of 12 trials
(4 scenarios x 3 trials). One trial was
carried out per day.
The scenarios covered normal
operation (scenario A), abnormal
operation (scenario B) and emer gency
operation (scenarios C and D). A plant
start-up (from reactor critical up to
25 % nuclear power) with a periodic
test of the criticality behaviour of the
core (which was supported by a
reactor physicist), was included in
scenario A.
Otherwise, the four scenarios A to
D included numerous unexpected
disturbances and additional tasks,
e.g.:
1. unavailability of components,
problems with components (e.g.
vibration of the turbine, vibration
of a reactor coolant pump), fire
alarm in a diesel building, smoke in
the main control room which
caused the crew to move to the
remote shutdown station.
2. Problems with digital controls:
Failure of workstations, failure of
the electronic OM, complete loss of
the PICS, and combinations of
these problems.
3. The daily load of the shift crews:
short-term requests from the network
operator to reduce power,
communication requirements such
as repeated telephone calls from
the management, asking for the
status of certain activities, a
shift takeover, and communication
requirements with regulatory body
and plant management during
incidents etc.
With the exception of the start-up
scenario A, all scenarios started with a
short phase of normal operation
(about 20 min). The scenarios were
planned with a length of three to six
hours. However, during the execution
it turned out that especially the
start-up scenario A took much longer
(up to nine hours).
2.2 Aspects investigated
Six aspects were identified which
should be investigated in the ISV: task
performance, human error, situation
awareness, communication, coordination
and operator mental workload.
These aspects were operationalized
using one or more testing instruments
and one or more variables each.
Pass/fail criteria were defined in
advance for each variable. If these
criteria were not met, the trial was
considered failed. In order to increase
the reliability of the measurement of
the variables, subjective assessments
and the collection of qualitative data
(e.g. collection of the subjective
assessments of the crew members)
were avoided as far as possible and an
attempt was made to develop clear
criteria for the measurement of all
variables. The operationalization of
the aspects is precisely described in
section 3.
2.3 Equipment
The scenarios were executed in the
full scope simulator (FSS) of OL3. In
the FSS the main control room (MCR)
and the remote shutdown station
(RSS) are simulated. Both rooms can
be observed from an observation
room through a one-way mirrored
window. All information displayed
on the screens in the MCR and RSS
are also available on screens in the
observation room.
A special paper-based “observation
tool” (see section 4) was developed
for the observation and data collection
within the ISV. Questionnaires to
assess situation awareness, coordination
and workload were prepared on
mobile tablet computers.
Audio and video recordings were
used as backup for the data acquisition
with the observation tool.
For the video recordings of the crews’
actions, the four cameras permanently
installed in the FSS were used
(three cameras in the MCR, one in the
RSS). In addition, the SICS panel and
the screens of the operators were
recorded with three mobile video
cameras.
2.4 Participants
The scenarios were carried out with
shift crews from OL3. A total of six
trained and licensed crews was available
for the ISV. Each crew participated
in two different trials.
The crews were not aware of the
test plan. They didn’t know the total
number of scenarios in the test plan,
nor did they know which scenario
they would be working on. All test
participants had to declare in writing
that they would not pass on any information
about the courses of the test or
details of the scenarios.
Three Human Factors Experts from
the HFC/MTO Safety consortium
served as observers for the ISV. Three
simulator trainers with thorough
knowledge of the OL3 procedures and
operational manual were asked to
observe and evaluate task performance
and human error. Each simulator
trainer was assigned to one
of the operators as an observer. An
additional expert from TVO was
responsible to simulate the external
communication of the operators via
telephone. He answered operators’
phone calls to the plant management,
network operator, maintenance department
etc.
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 500
2.5 Procedure
Before crews started their first
scenario, they were introduced to the
ISV, they provided written consent not
to give any information on scenarios
to anyone not involved during the day.
The crews then practiced handling the
tablet computers: They filled in the
questionnaires assessing the situation
awareness and coordination on a
test basis and practiced the workload
rating. The tablet computers were
then taken to the work places of the
operators.
In each trial before the simulation
was started, all crew members were
provided with two sheets. The first
contained all information on the
starting conditions for the scenario,
such as actual nuclear power and
unavailable components. The second
sheet was provided for notes concerning
any occurring inconsistencies
during the subsequent trial, e.g. in the
OM or on displays.
The simulation started when the
operators had settled in at their work
places. The trial then followed the
predefined target path.
Workload was assessed every
20 minutes using the operators’ tablet
computers at the work stations.
For each scenario at three predetermined
moments the simulation
was briefly stopped. During these
“freezes” the crews had to take their
tablets and leave the FSS for about
10 minutes. In an adjacent room,
the tablet computers were used to
collect data on situation awareness
and coordination. After the freezes,
the operators went back to their
workplaces and the simulation was
resumed.
The trials ended at predefined
DIMs or plant states. After each trial, a
systematic debriefing was carried out
in the FSS, in which the test crews
were asked about specific behavioural
patterns and give their feedback
on any inconsistencies concerning
the OM or other system parts. The
debriefing then continued without
the operators to initially evaluate
task performance and human error
together with all observers.
3 Measurement
of variables
3.1 Task performance
Task performance was the primary
evaluation aspect. It considered the
correctness and completeness with
which the shift crews fulfilled their
tasks. To determine the task performance,
global success criteria (which
were valid for all scenarios), scenario
specific success criteria and task performance
key nodes were defined.
Success criteria
At the end of a scenario it was evaluated
whether the following three
global success criteria were met:
(1) no unforeseen escalation of
the scenario, (2) no damage of major
equipment during the scenario,
(3) and no relevant delay during
the scenario should be caused by
behaviour of the crew. In addition,
three to five scenario specific success
criteria were defined for each scenario.
Task performance key nodes
Furthermore, four to eight critical
points or decisions in the process were
identified (‘key nodes’) for each
scenario to evaluate the task performance.
The expected behaviour at
these key nodes was predefined.
An example of a key node and
related scenario specific success
criteria: During scenario B, an alarm
occurred at a seal of a reactor coolant
pump (RCP). The crew was expected
to make the decision to manually shut
down the RCP before an automatic
shutdown occurred. The task performance
key node here is “manual
trip of the RCP”. The two scenario
specific success criteria associated
with this problem are “After trip
of reactor coolant pump: start
decreasing the power to 0 %” and
“No attempt to restart the RCP”.
The generic assessment questions
as to task performance were:
p Does the crew behave as expected
at the task performance key nodes?
p Are pre-defined scenario-specific
success criteria reached?
p Are the global success criteria
reached?
Data collection was done during the
simulator sessions by observers for
key node performance criteria and
after the session during debriefing for
scenario-specific and global success
criteria. Data collection was done by
operational experts and by human
factors experts. If one of the success
criteria was not met, the scenario trial
was considered failed.
3.2 Human error
Based on a phenotype-oriented
approach of human errors, errors of
omission and errors of commission
were identified based on direct observation
of the operators' be haviours
and related to the predefined target
path for the scenario. If an operator deliberately
deviates from specifications,
e.g. from the OM, then this is not
evaluated as an error, but as a deviation
(and thus a topic of task performance
and not of human error). Beside the
occurrence of errors, we observed
whether the errors were detected by
the operators and whether they were
corrected. If an error was discovered
and corrected in due time, it was not
used for the evaluation of the pass/fail
criteria.
If errors occurred that were not
detected and not corrected, the
severity of these errors was classified
by the validation team as high,
medium, or low. The impact of each
error was evaluated case by case,
with focus on the probability of
con sequences before the error was
detected and corrected, and the
consequences of the error on plant
safety and integrity.
No errors with high severity
should have been left undetected and
uncorrected by the shift team. The
amount of errors with medium and
low severity, which were not detected
and not corrected had to be evaluated
by the validation team if it was
acceptable. For the evaluation of
acceptability, the length of a scenario,
the number of tasks and the type of
operating procedure (NOP, AOP, EOP)
had to be taken into account.
3.3 Situation awareness
In safety research, the concept of
situation awareness was developed to
describe the adequate understanding
of the present state and the foreseeable
future as a prerequisite for any
safe operation. Its assessment is either
focused on an individual’s situation
awareness or on the shared situation
awareness between two or more
agents, from which one can anticipate
important future states. For the
ISV, the concept of shared situation
awareness was adopted, meaning that
situation awareness was ensured as
soon as at least one member of the
crew was aware of the present state
and was able to act accordingly. To
assess situation awareness, a multimethod
approach was adopted:
Method 1 – SAGAT
A comprehensive and well-established
method for the assessment is the
Situation Awareness Global Assessment
Technique (SAGAT) [5] which
allows for a real-time assessment by
freezing a simulated environment and
in the freeze ask agents about their
understanding of the situation.
After the questioning, the answers
obtained in the test are compared
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with the “correct” answers, which
were determined in advance. For the
ISV, we have decided to ask what the
relevant process aspects or process
parameters are in the current situation
and how these parameters will
change in the near future. Furthermore,
we have asked the crews about
their own tasks in the near future and
the goal of these tasks.
Due to the possible complexity
of processes, e.g. during incident
situations, it was clear that using free
test answers in the situation awareness
probes could lead large diversity
of answers which could impair an
appropriate assessment of their correctness.
This multitude of possible
answers might prevent any meaningful
evaluation.
Therefore a multiple choice test for
situation awareness was designed as
follows. Operators were asked for
process parameters or important
aspects which were relevant for the
decision on further procedures at the
moment of the simulator freeze. In
order to predefine the correct answers
for the freezes, we asked three experts
(2 simulator trainers and one process
engineer) independently of each
other, to specify in the freeze situations
which process aspects and
parameters are relevant for decisions
om future tasks and objectives in that
moment of the scenario. For some
cases, the experts had different views
on the relevant parameters. The final
set of offered parameters in the freezes
was based the highest degree of agreement
between the three experts.
For each freeze, six process para meters/aspects
were offered in a multiplechoice
test, three of which were correct
and three were incorrect. The incorrect
paramters/aspects (so-called “distractors”)
should not be obviously irrelevant
– then the test would be too easy.
But they should also not be too similar
to the relevant parameters either –
then the test would be too difficult. The
evaluation showed that we succeeded
in achieving a good level of difficulty
for the choices offered, but unfortunately
not in all cases.
Method 2 – Questions about own
tasks and colleagues’ tasks
During freezes, questions were asked
about future tasks and their objectives
(“When the current task is completed,
which will be your next task and its
objective”). These questions had to be
answered with regard to the own
tasks as well as with regard to the
tasks of the colleagues in the shift
crew (open-ended questions).
Method 3 – Status reports and
team briefings
A third method to assess situation
awareness was based on analysing
the content and thoroughness of
team briefs and status reports
which are a genuine element of the
team inter action in the control room.
Status reports were understood here
as summarized short descriptions
( mostly carried out by the SSV) of the
operational status of the plant or the
status of the most important parameters
and operating conditions.
Status reports were triggered by
external requests of the management
as part of the scenarios, when the
safety engineer entered the control
room, or at shift changes. Team briefs
were requested at strategy changes, or
before starting safety critical actions.
During status reports, the relevant
plant parameters and deviations from
normal operation at that time were
expected to be reported.
Procedure of the measurement
during freezes
During the three freezes, TO, RO and
SSV left their workplaces and moved
to an area outside the simulator. They
were then asked about (a) relevant
process parameters/aspects in the
present situation (multiple-choice:
choose at least three most important
parameters out of six parameters
given and rank order them according
to their importance for the present
situation), (b) the expected development
of these parameters (multiplechoice:
quick/slow decrease or
increase or no change). TO, RO and
SSV answered the questions presented
to them on a tablet computer
with keyboard in written form without
consulting their team members.
Their answers were compared against
the expected answers (based on
experts’ agreement) concerning the
relevant process parameters, tasks
and objectives. (situation awareness
measurement – Method 1).
Afterwards the operators were
asked about their current task
and their next task (coordination
measurement, see 3.5) as well as the
current task and the next task of
their colleagues, and the objectives
of the tasks (situation awareness
measurement – Method 2).
3.4 Communication
To evaluate communication, we have
identified between 13 and 31 measurement
points in each scenario
where communication was expected
to be important.
For these measuring points we
defined which content of communication
was expected (content of
communication) and what type of
communication was expected (quality
of communication). As for the quality
of communication, we distinguished,
between 2-way communication, 3-way
communication, briefing etc. For each
of these communication types, observable
behaviours were defined in order
to assess the quality of communication,
e.g. if the communication was
given in “face-to-face” manner, if
the receiver showed attention or if
the receiver showed a reaction or
expressed or showed understanding.
Both, content und quality of communication
were included in the
observation tool (see section 4) and
were checked by the observers during
a scenario trial.
At relevant points in the scenarios
the quality of communication was
evaluated not only according to
observable criteria, but also using an
overall assessment of the communication
process. A subjective assessment
by the observers was used here (rating
of poor, average or good).
3.5 Coordination
A satisfactory coordination was characterized
by the fact that all operators
knew what their colleagues were
doing (task awareness). For example,
the SSV should know which tasks TO
and RO are performing, the TO should
know which task the RO is performing,
and so on.
Data for coordination were col lected
via questionnaires during freezes.
After the questions concerning situation
awareness, questions for task
awareness of the operators (“Which
task is performed by your colleague
RO/TO/SSV?”) followed.
3.6 Workload
For workload assessment we used the
Bedford Workload Scale [6]. It is a
unidimensional scale that ranks
whether it was possible to complete
the task, if workload was tolerable for
the task, and if workload was satisfactory
without reduction. The scale
uses the concept of spare capacity to
define the levels of workload. A short
explanation of the scale before the
beginning of the scenario allowed
the operators to use it properly and to
rate their workload within seconds.
This allowed repeated measurements
of subjective workload during the
scenarios without too much intrusion
into the primary task. The workload
rating was announced via loudspeaker
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 502
| Fig. 2.
Observation tool to structure the data collection and directly document the results during the Integrated Final Control Room System
Validation (ISV).
every 20 minutes and the self assessment
of workload was performed
immediately without stopping the
scenario.
4 Observation Tool
A special observation tool was developed
to structure the data collection
and directly document the results
during the ISV. This observation tool
was a printed document in book form
in DIN A3 format. For the observation
always the left and right sides were
used simultaneously.
The left page of the tool is divided
into three parts (see Figure 2). In the
upper part of the left page there is a
table for the recording of human
errors. Below the human error table is
as second table in which workload
measurements is to reported with
simulator time and DIM executed. On
the lower part of the left side is a
graphical presentation (flow chart) of
DIMs, which contains the correct path
(marked in red). The graphic contains
additional markers for additional
tasks: markers for simulation freezes
(measurement of situation awareness),
markers for task performance
key nodes and markers for communication
points.
On the right page, the tasks (DIMs)
of the different crew members (TO,
RO, SSV) and all other measurements
are noted. The DIMs are marked in different
colours: yellow for the SSV,
green for the RO and blue for the TO.
Additional measurements of situation
awareness and task performance are
marked in grey. For situation awareness
the column “comment/content”
shows what is expected to be included
in the communication of the crew. The
observers fill in whether these expectations
were met. The same applies to
task performance, where the observer
rate whether defined important tasks
have been completed. The communication
is also rated in the tool. The
simulator time should be entered for
each observation.
5 Experiences
5.1 Methodological approach
Already in the conception of the
study, an attempt was made to avoid
subjective evaluations of behaviour as
far as possible in order to make the
results robust against subjective influences.
This concept has proved highly
successful in the subsequent evaluation,
as a large part of the data was
collected quantitatively and was
therefore easy to evaluate. For the
important variables, (task performance,
situation awareness, communication)
the evaluation was based on
several different methods. This significantly
increased the validity of the
assessment.
In all subjective measurements,
several experts always assessed the
same aspects. In the event of any discrepancies
between them, these were
discussed (e.g. during debriefing) in
order to produce a uniform picture.
The integrated observation tool
was used to document the measurements
which were not recorded
by tablet computer. The tool was
extremely useful for the execution
and evaluation of the ISV and for the
observers’ tasks. With the help of the
observation tool, the course of the
scenario could be followed and it was
used to identify the measuring points
and to document the measurement
results immediately in writing. After
a scenario trial the tool was used
to structure the debriefing. For this
purpose, all pages of the tool were
systematically reviewed, the notes of
the individual observers were queried
and these results were documented
in the observation tools of the HFC
observers. Following the test execution
in the ISV, the tool was used as
test documentation for evaluation.
Here, too, the great usefulness of the
tool was demonstrated, as all observation
results are clearly summarized
in one document.
5.2 Validity
Investigations with behavioural observation
of this kind depend on the
simulation being as realistic as
possible. Only then conclusions can be
drawn from the behaviour in the test
situation to the behaviour in real
situations. With two exceptions, the
behaviour of the crews showed no
signs that a realistic simulation would
not have been successful.
In scenario C the crew is led by a
phone call to the decision to evacuate
the main control room (MCR) and
switch to the remote shutdown station
(RSS). During the trials of scenario C
there were some difficulties to induce
a common understanding of the
dangerousness of the situation. The
crews interpreted the situation more
or less problematically and therefore
wanted to leave the MCR in some
cases very quickly or not at all. An
additional limiting factor to validity
could be the realization of the move
to the RSS, because the evacuation
of the MCR and the move to the
RSS were not simulated realistically.
Although both rooms are present in
the full scope simulator (FSS), their
spatial arrangement does not correspond
to reality (in the FSS, the RSS
is right next to the MCR, with direct
access from the MCR; in reality, the
locations are separated). The move to
RSS was simulated mainly by the shift
waiting in front of the FSS door.
Compliance with certain standards for
the evacuation of the MCR was a key
node in this scenario. The unrealistic
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test environment for the evacuation
considering spatial arrangements as
well as lack of certain plant systems
and equipment could have facilitated
some of the key node failures which
appeared in scenario C. But how
strongly the failures and errors observed
in scenario C is related to the
limited realism of the move to the RSS
can only be assumed.
It became apparent in the ISV
that the members of the shift teams
were sometimes unclear about what
behaviour was expected of them. One
possible limitation of the validity of
the ISV is that it is not certain for every
observed behaviour whether this
behaviour would be shown in the
same way outside the test situation of
the ISV.
5.3 Measurement of situation
awareness
In retrospect, the measurement of
situation awareness turned out to
be the measurement with the most
problems.
One reason for the problems was
the simple question of what time
frame to think of when we ask in the
situation awareness questionnaire
“when the current task will be completed,
what will be the next task?”
Does this question refer to a period
of 1 minute, 10 minutes, 1 hour?
This was interpreted differently by
the crew members, which affected
the content of the answers. It
became apparent that it is absolutely
necessary to clarify such questions
clearly in the instruction before the
test starts.
Furthermore, the questions regarding
the ‘next task’ were answered
very differently in same cases. On the
one hand on a very low level of detail
(“power increase up to 5 %”), on
the other hand on a very high level
of detail (“start LAC14 AP001”). Both
answers were correct, but it was
difficult to assess whether the different
operators really had an identical
understanding of their tasks.
Another critical point in the
measurements was the exactly identical
position of the simulation freezes
in the respective trials. If the freeze
is only slightly shifted on the time
axis, then this can influence the
question of the relevant parameters
and process aspects and their assumed
course.
specifically for ISV has shown to be
very successful.
The tool for observation and
documentation, developed especially
for ISVs, has proven to be very
successful. Especially the approach
to capture as many assessments as
possible directly and synchronously
was very feasible and highly efficient.
Therefore the necessity to use audio
or video recordings was minimized.
The study also showed that –
especially for the survey of situation
awareness - careful preparation is
necessary to achieve reliable results.
This includes, in particular, the
provision of clear written instructions
for the participants.
References
[1] IEC 1771 (1995). Nuclear Power Plants – Main Control Room –
Verification and Validation of Design. IEC, Geneva.
[2] IEC 60964 (1989). Design of Nuclear Power Plants. IEC,
Geneva.
[3] YVL Guide 5.5 (2002). Instrumentation Systems and
Components at Nuclear Facilities.
[4] NUREG 0711 (2912). Human Factors Engineering Program
Review Model – Rev. 3. NUREG, Brookhaven NY.
[5] Endsley, M. R. (1995). Measurement of Situation Awareness in
Dynamic Systems. Human Factors, 37 (1), 65-84.
[6] Roscoe, A. & Ellis, G. (1990). A Subjective Rating Scale for
Assessing Pilot Workload in Flight: A Decade of Practical Use.
Royal Aerospace Establishment, Farnborough.
Authors
Rainer Miller
miller@mto-safety.de
MTO Safety GmbH
Gethsemanestr. 4
10437 Berlin, Germany
Dr. Rodney Leitner
Sina Gierig
Dr. Harald Kolrep
HFC Human-Factors-Consult GmbH
Köpenicker Str. 325
12555 Berlin, Germany
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 503
6 Conclusion
Apart from a few detailed problems in
recording situation awareness the
combination of methods developed
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 504
Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection
in I&C Networks: Strategic Preparation
for the Advent of Information Hiding
based Attacks
Kevin Lamshöft, Tom Neubert, Mathias Lange, Robert Altschaffel, Mario Hildebrandt, Yongdian Ding,
Claus Vielhauer and Jana Dittmann
Planned entry for
1 Introduction Nowadays, there are a lot of defense mechanisms to secure IT-systems
against Cyber attacks. Thus, Cyber attacks have to be more sophisticated than they used to be in
order to stay undetected as long as possible and to bypass defense mechanisms. As a result, current
threats frequently use steganographic techniques to hide malicious functions in a harmless looking
carrier. In [1] an attack for Siemens S7 Simatic Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) is
presented, where the control logic of the PLC is modified while the source code which the PLC presents the engineering
station is retained. As a result, the PLCs functionality is different from the control logic presented to the engineering
station. Furthermore, steganographic techniques are frequently used to hide information in media files.
The work in this paper
has been funded by
the German Federal
Ministry for Economic
Affairs and Energy
(BMWi, Stealth-
Szenarien, Grant No.
1501589A, 1501589B
and 1501589C)
within the scope of
the German Reactor-
Safety-Research-
Program.
This document was
produced with the
financial assistance of
the European Union.
The views expressed
herein can in no way
be taken to reflect the
official opinion of the
European Union.
In [2] BlackBerry Threat Researchers
discovered hidden malicious code in
WAV audio files, where the files were
coupled with a loader component for
decoding and executing malicious
content secretly. Additionally, image
steganography is used in [3] to obfuscate
network traffic. The article [4]
shows how image steganography is
used to hide malicious JavaScript
code in PDF files. In addition, network
traffic is a well-known carrier for
steganography to embed hidden communication.
The work [5] presents
for example a technique which uses
the DNS protocol as steganographic
carrier. However, Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) control essential process
control functions in Nuclear
Power Plants (NPP). They rely on sensors
(collecting information about the
physical process), computing units
(PLCs) and actuators (implementing
the commands issued by the computing
units) and the communication
between these components. These
ICS form complex communication
networks with differing security
require ments. As computer systems,
ICS are target of attacks [10, 11, 12,
13]. These attacks aim at data exfiltration
(an attacker gaining unauthorized
access to data) or data infiltration (an
attacker manipulating digital assets).
In previous work, we evaluated
common protocols found in ICS
environments, like Modbus/TCP and
OPC UA in regards to steganographic
channels. In [27] we take a deeper
look at Modbus/TCP and describe
various methods for hiding information
in ICS networks. In [26] we
propose a method for OPC UA based
hidden channel attacks. In [25] we
provide a broader view on how information
hiding become a novel threat
for nuclear security. Even though
there are various common security
measures like firewalls and IDS, which
can detect and partially mitigate a
broad range of attacks, they still lack
the ability to detect attacks which rely
on information hiding properly. Here,
more complex detection measures are
required. However, since ICS networks
and the employed infrastructure
is different from IT, this carries
different implications for the detection
of attacks as well. This paper aims
at using the specific properties
of ICS networks and protocols in
order to improve the detection of
attacks employing information hiding
measures. After describing the basics
of network information hiding in
Chapter 2, we demonstrate in Chapter
3 how it can be generally applied to
I&C environments and described and
modeled as a kill chain. Chapter 3
concludes with details on how two
common hiding patterns can be
applied to ICS protocols. In Chapter 4
we briefly describe the shortcomings
of common IDSs and apply recommendations
for anomaly detection
to a model factory in order to motivate
further research in this field –
especially the need for developing reliable
detection methods regarding
information hiding based attacks in
this specific domain. Chapter 5 concludes
our findings and gives an outlook
on future research.
2 Network Information
Hiding
Network Information Hiding is only
one subtopic of many in the field of
information hiding and steganography.
Recent research, which also
has implications for I&C communication,
include the pattern based
taxonomy of Wendzel et al. [17] and
its later extension [16], which we
use in this paper to formally describe
potential information hiding based
attacks. A survey of network steganography
and its techniques is presented
in [6]. Information Hiding in the
Internet Protocol has been shown for
the Internet Protocol v4 (IPv4) [19]
as well as the application of covert
channels to IPv6 in real world scenarios
[18]. In order to evaluate
whether rule-based IDS systems
are appropriate to detect covert
channels in ICS protocols, we use
the extended pattern based taxonomy
by Mazurczyk et al. [16], which
is originally introduced by Wendzel
et al. in 2015 [17]. Hidden channels
in network communication can be
differentiated in storage and timing
channels. The pattern based taxonomy
is an approach to define
general patterns, which are used for
infor mation hiding. The extended
taxo nomy is based on the analysis
of over one hundred information
hiding techniques, and unifies them
into 18 general patterns, of which
are 8 based on packet or flow
timings (timing channel), and 6 on
modification of data of a packet or
flow (storage channel). By this, it is
possible to describe covert channels
in different protocols in a unified
way. We use these patterns in a
reversed way to evaluate if those
patterns can be detected in
common configured rule-based IDS
systems.
Environment and Safety
Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection in I&C Networks: Strategic Preparation for the Advent of Information Hiding based Attacks ı
Kevin Lamshöft, Tom Neubert, Mathias Lange, Robert Altschaffel, Mario Hildebrandt, Yongdian Ding, Claus Vielhauer and Jana Dittmann

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
3 Information Hiding
as a Novel Threat
for I&C environments
In this chapter, we show how network
information hiding can be applied to
the specifics of ICS networks and
describe an exemplary attack scenario
as well as how two generic patterns
can be applied to ICS protocols. In this
paper we focus on information hiding
by modification of existing communication
in a given target network.
As stated in Chapter 2, two categories
of hidden channels can be distinguished
for network information
hiding: timing channels, which modulate
the temporal behavior of a packet
flow and storage channels which
modify contents of specific packets
to embed a secret message or information.
To illustrate the purpose and
functionality of information hiding a
common scenario is the so-called
Prisoners’ Problem where a sender
(usually called Alice) and a receiver
(usually called Bob) are imprisoned in
different cells. This scenario includes
the possibility for Alice to send
messages to Bob, with the limitation
that a warden is able to see and read
the communication. Therefore, the
aim of Alice and Bob is to hide the
actual information within the communication
that is observed by the
warden [15]. In the context of
Industrial Control Systems, Alice and
Bob are usually OT components, for
example PLCs, Human-Machine-
Interfaces (HMI) and Engineering
Workstations, or network elements
like switches, hubs and firewalls.
Based on this assumption, we can
differentiate between active, passive
and hybrid information hiding (see
[27]). When the embedding and
retrieval takes place at the originating
entities (e.g. a PLC and HMI) of
the communication, this is considered
as active hiding, whereas passive
embedding and retrieval takes place
on intermediaries, like switches and
firewalls. The mix between those
two are considered as hybrids. For
the successful use of information
hiding in (ICS) networks we can
define three requirements that need
to be addressed (see [27]): cover
plausibility, protocol-compliance and
warden-compliance. Cover plausibility
refers to the use of cover channels
or objects which are plausible within
the usual, realistic and expected communication
flow and behavior of the
target system. A covert channel is
considered protocol-compliant, when
a modification of a packet or packet
flow does not break the specified
protocol in a way the recipient would
not receive, accept or process the
packet. The warden-compliance can
be differentiated in three levels (based
on probabilities): (1) the message is
hidden in a way that a potential
warden has no knowledge of the
existence of a hidden message (inconspicuous),
(2) the warden has
a suspicion that there is a hidden
message but cannot access it and (3)
the warden can identify and access
but not reconstruct the hidden
message.
3.1 Kill Chain & Exemplary
Attack Scenario
Unfortunately, current defense
mechanisms lack effective measures
against novel attack scenarios with
steganographic techniques. In order
to defend I&C environments an
attack modeling can help to understand
and comprehend attacks with
steganographic techniques to elaborate
protective security mechanisms.
One way to do so, is to use the
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain
by Hutchings et al. [7]. The Kill Chain
is a 7-stage-model (Reconnaissance
(1), Weaponization (2), Delivery (3),
Exploitation (4), Installation (5),
Command & Control (6) and Action
on Objectives (7)) developed by the
U.S. company Lockheed Martin
Corporation and is briefly described
in [7]. It is developed to analyze
cyber-attacks (especially advanced
persistent threats) and to derive
security mechanisms along all phases
of the attack modeling. Furthermore,
attack indicators can be elaborated
based on the Kill Chain attack modeling.
The Kill Chain is described as a
“chain” because an interruption of
the “chain” will stop the entire attack
process. So, an attacker has to go
through the entire Kill Chain to reach
their goals and a defender can stop an
attack on every phase.
3.1.1 Attack Scenario
In this work, we design a fictional and
exemplary attack scenario which
could take place in an I&C environment.
We conduct Kill Chain attack
modelling in order to demonstrate
how the modelling works for attacks
with steganographic techniques in I&C
environments and how it could reveal
security vulnerabilities. Furthermore,
security mechanisms can be elaborated
based on the attack modelling.
The fictional attack scenario is based
on the BSI-CS 005E Top 4 scenario [8]
and the MITRE ATT&CK® Framework
for ICS. For our exemplary scenario
we assume that the firmware of a
PLC is corrupted via a supply chain
attack or modified by an inside threat
(e.g. third-party contractors). The corrupted
firmware enables the ability to
embed hidden information into the
data which is sent to the plant historian.
The retrie val takes place on the
workstation of the analyst who has
access to the plant historian’s data.
By this procedure, it is possible to
exfiltrate valuable information from
higher security levels.
3.1.2 Kill Chain Attack Modelling
In this section, we model the introduced
attack vector with the Kill
Chain and propose security mechanisms
and attack indicators based
on the modelling. The modelling is
visualized in Figure 1. In Phase 1
( Reconnaissance) the attacker has to
gain information on the network
infrastructure. Common scenarios
are social engineering, insiders, and
targeted attacks e.g. on document
servers. To mitigate Phase 1 awareness
for social engineering can be
improved by special trainings of
the employees. During Phase 2
( Weaponization) the development of
the ( manipulated) firmware and the
receiving tool takes place. In Phase 2,
defenders cannot directly prevent the
attack, but comparable attacks which
include steganographic techniques
can be analyzed and evaluated.
The 3 rd Phase (Delivery) brings the
malware developed in Phase 2 to the
I&C environment. In this scenario, the
PLC gets manipulated before it is
delivered to the plant. The tool for
receiving could be delivered by
removable devices (e.g. by utilizing
common steganographic methods to
avoid detection) or developed in-situ
by the employee which has access to
the data historian. To stop the attack
in Phase 3 all delivery vectors need to
be monitored closely and mitigated
by structural defensive measures.
Phase 4 (Exploitation) takes place
by delivery and installation of the
infected PLC as well as the installation
of the receiving tool via USB or in-situ
development. To prevent the attack,
defensive methods against supply
chain attacks need to be implemented
(e.g. code reviews). Phase 5 (Installation)
is done with delivery of the PLC
or triggered by time or certain events
(logic bomb). The installation of the
receiving tool takes place on the data
analysts’ workstation. The malware
might be detected by anti-virus-software.
During Phase 6 (Command &
Control) the usual network traffic
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ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 506
| Fig. 1.
Kill Chain model of the exemplary attack scenario.
from the PLC to historian is misused to
hide information within this data
which is then stored on the historian.
Detection approaches for Phase 6 are
discussed in Chapter 4.2 and in Chapter
5. In Phase 7 the hidden information
is extracted from the historian
and exfiltrated by the data analyst.
Screening, device control, and logging
mechanisms might mitigate the exfiltration.
3.2 Exemplary Generic Hidden
Channels in ICS protocols
To illustrate the threat and applicability
of hidden communication we
describe two hidden channel patterns
that are applicable to most ICS protocols
and could be part of the
previously described attack scenario:
(1) Payload Modulation and (2) Inter-
Packet Timing Modulation. Even
though there is a large variety of
different protocols, that are used in
ICS environments, most of them share
certain inherent characteristics that
can be (mis-)used for information
hiding. A common example is the
periodic transmission of sensor data
of a PLC to another entity in a specific
timing interval. Independently from
the used protocol a potential adversary
can encode a hidden message by
manipulating those timings, e.g. by
delaying certain packets for a given
amount of time. This can be done in
an active way (e.g. on the PLC and
receiving entity), in a passive way by
network elements or in a hybrid form.
For example, a compromised PLC can
delay responses to embed a single bit
into one packet, whereas a network
element (e.g. a switch) can observe
and calculate those delays to decode
the hidden message of the PLC. This
pattern is called Inter-Packet Timing
Modulation [16]. Another common
scenario is the transmission of sensor
data or high-resolution set points,
e.g. temperatures. Depending on the
resolution, the payload modulation
pattern [16] can be used by altering
the least significant bit (LSB) of sensor
data to encode a hidden message. In
high resolution readings, such modifications
alter the sensor data only
slightly, and therefore do not have
impact on the controlled (physical)
process while being unnoticeable for
humans.
4 Strategic Preparation &
Anomaly Detection
In this chapter we briefly describe the
limitations of common IDS systems
regarding the detectability of information
hiding in ICS networks and
apply, as a first step, measures of
anomaly detection to a real-world ICS
demonstrator.
4.1 Limitations of common IDS
systems
Different security measures are in
use in the domain of information
technology. Some of these measures
are also applied in the domain of ICS.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
collect data from either the network
(network-based IDS) or from the
computer systems within a network
(host-based IDS). This data is checked
for the signatures of known attacks
or suspicious behavior patterns.
Anomaly detection is the reversal of
an IDS. While an IDS looks for known
patterns of malicious behavior, an
anomaly detection detects unusual
behavior (see [9] for more details).
In order to achieve this, an IDS needs
to have a model of normal behavior.
Usually, anomaly detection learns
this usual behavior during a training
phase.
Common Intrusion Detection Systems,
like Snort [20] and Suricata
[21] use signatures of known patterns
or suspicious behavior patterns to
detect potential attacks. For the
example of Modbus/TCP there are
several rulesets for Snort and
Suricata [22, 23]. For example, the
Quickdraw Rule Set [22] defines
certain IP(-ranges), that are allowed
to communicate with each other. The
rule set also checks for known attack
patterns, e.g. denial of service attacks.
Other rule sets, e.g. [23] are built
upon the Modbus/TCP specification
and test against any violations.
As described in Chapter 3, these
pro cedures are mainly testing for
protocol- compliance. Since many
information hiding based attacks,
e.g. the exemplary attacks of chapter
3.2, can be performed within the
limits protocol-compliance, those IDS
systems are not able to detect the
hidden communication. Especially the
category of timing-based channels
are not detectable by those means
without further extensions. However,
certain storage channels, for example
the use of unused fields, are detectable
by those systems, if specific
rules, that check against those known
signatures, are available.
Due to these limitations, we are
going in the opposite direction by
using anomaly detection as a first
step towards detecting information
hiding in I&C environments. As a first
starting point we use the BSI CS 134E
recommendations [9] and evaluate
how they could be applied to real
world scenario.
4.2 Applying the BSI CS 134E
two a real world scenario
For an anomaly detection it is important
to filter data in a targeted and efficient
way. This requires a selection of
processes and procedures. For these
analysis criteria are defined so that
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the Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) can determine
the normal state. This is used as a
reference for future analyses. Over a
longer period of time, an image of the
normal state is generated during a
training phase in an uncompromised
I&C system. Thus, the SIEM can store
data of events, such as cycle times of
processes or DHCP requests from
known devices in the network, in
order to evaluate future events with
this data. Therefore, a decision is
made whether the event is cate gorized
as an anomaly. In order to specifi cally
detect anomalies, a SIEM system at
the University of Applied Sciences
Magdeburg-Stendal is integrated into
a model factory to evaluate different
attacks and their detection levels. The
model factory represents the production
process of a complete filling
plant with different production
sections including distillery. Various
system data of the sections of the
model factory are logged, then
centrally analyzed and interpreted in
SIEM. Figure 2 shows an example of
where and which data could be
collected, based on the proposals of
the BSI [9]. Three mechanisms shall
be used: logging, network access
control (NAC) and netflow analysis.
Logging data can be collected directly
at the PLCs of the individual sections
of the model factory, such as at the
distillery or during the filling process.
Process data (sensor values, frequency,
cycle times, ...), access to the
PLCs (user, time, ...) and ICS protocol
data (unusual error messages, faulty
data packets, ...) are logged. Further
information is available on intelligent,
manageable switches. These provide
logging data about network activities
(device logins, DHCP requests, data
packets from unknown devices, ...).
Permanent communication between
the switches and the NAC server automatically
detects the devices currently
connected to the network. Intruders
can be immediately identified, moved
to quarantine zones or logically separated
from the network. In addition to
this feature, the devices can also be
checked for security guidelines for
devices within the network, such as
the latest firmware version, software
installed on the devices and others.
The investigation is rounded off by
the integration of a netflow analysis.
In addition to the possibilities of
monitoring and optimized display,
this offers network behavior anomaly
detection, as well as real-time DDoS
detections and application performance
monitoring.
The presentation of the results can
be user-specific, the spectrum ranges
from a traffic light system to detailed
reports. The difficulty with the detection
of hidden channels lies in the fact
that the data is hidden in usual user
data and transported over normal
network traffic and is not detected
with the previous control routines
because it does not appear to be an
anomaly. The big challenge is to
identify the right indicators and tools
for hidden channel attacks or to
develop them if necessary. In this
way, an intelligent linking of the analysis
mechanisms can contribute to a
more efficient plausibility control of
the transmitted data in I&C systems
and thus improve IT security. Still,
even by applying those measures, a
reliable detection of previously
unknown hidden channels remains a
challenge.
5 Conclusion
Based on the findings of chapter 4
we have to adjust our detection
approaches in future work. For future
detection approaches, we are planning
to design detection approaches
based on machine learning. For our
machine learning based detection
approaches, we will design a comprehensible
feature space with handcrafted
features. Approaches based on
machine learning have to be trained
with representative training data of
an I&C environment. Therefore, we
will set up our own fictitious reference
facility to acquire representative network
traffic and consequently training
and test data. When training and test
data is available, we will extract the
handcrafted feature spaces from the
data and train a classifier which
should be able to detect steganographic
or abnormal network traffic.
Therefore, One-Class-Classifier or
Two-Class-Classifier could be trained.
For a One-Class-Classifier we train
only the target class with known-good
network traffic to detect outliers of
this class. For a Two-Class-Classifier
we need to train one class with
known-good network traffic and
one class with abnormal or steganographic
network traffic, then the
classifier decides if test data belongs
to known-good class or the class with
abnormal network traffic. Thus, we
need to generate steganographic
network traffic to build a Two-Class­
Classifier. In this paper, we showed
the emergence of information hiding
as a new threat for I&C environments
and the limitations of common
IDS systems against such attacks.
Anomaly detection based systems
need to be adapted and extended in
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 507
| Fig. 2.
Presentation of data logging with inclusion of I&C components of the model factory at PLC level.
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ı Kevin Lamshöft, Tom Neubert, Mathias Lange, Robert Altschaffel, Mario Hildebrandt, Yongdian Ding, Claus Vielhauer and Jana Dittmann

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY 508
order to accurately and reliably detect
such novel attack patterns for this
specific domain. In the future,
machine learning based approaches
will be further investigated as a
possible solution for the detection
and mitigation of information hiding
based attacks in I&C environments.
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[13] Ralf Spenneberg, Maik Brüggemann, Hendrik Schwartke:
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Authors
Kevin Lamshöft
kevin.lamshoeft@ovgu.de
Robert Altschaffel
Mario Hildebrandt
Jana Dittmann
Otto-von-Guericke University
Magdeburg
ITI Research Group on Multimedia
and Security
University Square 2
39106 Magdeburg, Germany
Tom Neubert
Claus Vielhauer
Brandenburg University of Applied
Sciences
Department of Informatics &
Media
Magdeburger Straße 50
14770 Brandenburg an der Havel,
Germany
Mathias Lange
Yongdian Ding
Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal
University of Applied Sciences
Institute for Electrical Engineering
Breitscheidstr. 2
39114 Magdeburg, Germany
Environment and Safety
Novel Challenges for Anomaly Detection in I&C Networks: Strategic Preparation for the Advent of Information Hiding based Attacks ı
Kevin Lamshöft, Tom Neubert, Mathias Lange, Robert Altschaffel, Mario Hildebrandt, Yongdian Ding, Claus Vielhauer and Jana Dittmann

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Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the
Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS
Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch
Introduction In a hypothetical severe accident in a light water reactor (LWR) the failure of
decay heat removal might lead to the destruction of the reactor core. After the reactor pressure
vessel has melted through, the molten core of the reactor reaches the concrete basement. This leads
to a Molten Core – Concrete Interaction, in which the melting of the concrete starts. In order to
assess the safety and the development of the so-called fourth phase of a core decomposition
accident, the consequences of such an interaction are of great interest.
MCCI is mainly associated with the
following three issues, that threaten
the integrity of the containment. First,
the pressure build-up in the containment
up to overpressure failure
caused by the release of non-condensable
H 2 during the decomposition
of the concrete. Secondly, the
composition of the containment
atmosphere, resulting from releases of
gases and aerosols, can potentially
lead to accumulation of hydrogen
with a subsequent possible hydrogen
combustion. And thirdly, the propagation
of the melt front as a consequence
of the erosion of the concrete basement.
How strong the presented
issues are, depends on several parameters,
for example the composition
of the concrete, composition of the
melt and the decay heat. The BETA
experiments (BETA stands for the
German BETon-Schmelze-Anlage)
performed at KIT (Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology) are to be investigated
here. The experiments cover a wide
range of temperatures and power
rates typical in accident conditions for
different compositions of concrete
and melt. Two big test series were
conducted at the KIT. The first series
from 1984 to 1986 included 19
experiments, which consist of four
different parts and the second from
1990 to 1992 included 6 more experiments
in two parts [ALS95]. The
validation work presented focuses,
due to the large number of experiments,
on the BETA test series with
silicate concrete and shows simulations
with the severe accident analysis
code COCOSYS 3.0 in AC 2 2019. An
objective of the simulations con ducted
is the analysis and assessment of the
code capabilities to simulate the most
relevant phenomena related in particular
to concrete erosion. For the
first part of the simulations, an input
deck was created. It considers the
recommended values for the effective
heat transfer coefficient [SPE12] and
the decomposition enthalpy and temperature
of the respective com position
of the concrete. In the second part of
the simulations, the effective heat
transfer coefficient was adjusted separately
for each experiment to develop
a correlation between heating power
and the effective heat transfer coefficient.
In this first step the cor relation
is initially only valid for the BETA experiments.
The correlation must be
tested in further work on alternative
independent experiments that are not
part of this work.
The following work will give an
overview of the most important information
about the BETA facility, test
| Fig. 1.
BETA Test Facility [ALL07].
Planned entry for
conduct, as well as the cocosys modelling
approach. After this description,
some selected results regarding erosion,
as well as a correlation between
the heating power and the effective
heat transfer coefficient will be presented.
BETA facility and test conduct
The BETA test facility depicted in
Figure 1, consists mainly of a concrete
crucible containing the melt, which
simulates the reactors basement
sufficiently. The height of the crucible
is 280 cm and the diameter is 108 cm.
The diameter of the cavern of 38 cm
has been selected so that the gas
This work is funded
by the German
Federal Ministry of
Economic Affairs and
Energy under grant
number 1501568 on
the basis of a decision
by the German
Bundestag.
The simulations are
performed with the
code version
COCOSYS V3.0,
developed by GRS.
509
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
Research and Innovation
Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch

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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 510
Test Melt Power [kW] Remarks
V1.5
V1.6
V1.7
V1.8
V1.9
V2.1
V2.2
V2.3
V5.1
V5.2
V5.3
300 kg Steel + 50 kg Oxide
300 kg Steel + 50 kg Oxide
300 kg Steel + 80 kg Oxide
350 kg Steel + 130 kg Oxide
350 kg Steel + 130 kg Oxide
300 kg Steel + 130 kg Oxide
300 kg Steel + 100 kg Oxide
300 kg Steel + 100 kg Oxide
| Tab. 1.
BETA Experiments [ALS95].
300 kg Steel
+ 50 kg Oxide
+ 80 kg Zr
450
1000
1700
1900
400 - 200
120 - 150
400 - 1000
600 - 200
400
200
800
release and the heat transfer at the
bottom are not influenced by the vertical
walls [ALS86]. With a height of
175 cm of the cavern a maximum axial
erosion of 105 cm and a maximum
radial erosion of 35 cm are possible.
In the BETA test series, the melt,
which was generated by a thermite
reaction, typically consists of 300 kg
of a metal phase and 150 kg of an
oxide phase [CRA13]. The metallic
composition of iron, nickel and
chromium is typical for a reactor case.
Zirconium is added in some experiments
in order to be able to assess its
influence in a hypothetical severe
accident. The oxide melt is made of
aluminium oxide to which, depending
on the purpose of the experiment, calcium
oxide and/or silicon oxide is
added. This allows the melt to be
simulated in a very realistic way, both
from the chemical and the physical
point of view. [ALS86]
The melt is then poured into the
concrete crucible. The temperature of
the melt at the beginning of interaction
ranges from 2,000 K to 2,200 K.
Using an induction coil enclosing
the concrete, the melt is heated electrically
with a net heating capacity
of up to 2,500 kW. As a result, an
extremely high heat flow from the
melt to the concrete is possible. Due to
the heating method, heating is only
possible in the metallic melt, which
dominates the MCCI process. The
densities of the used oxide and metal
melt correspond to a typical ratio for a
very long MCCI phase in a reactor case
after a few days. The different MCCI
phases are reproduced in BETA by a
series of experiments at various power
and temperature levels. In addition,
depending on the purpose of the
experiment, the initial composition of
the melt and the type of concrete are
varied.
The V1 series studied the MCCI
of siliceous concrete and very high
Siliceous concrete
Siliceous concrete
Siliceous concrete
Siliceous concrete
Siliceous concrete, CaO added
Siliceous concrete
Siliceous concrete, CaO added
Siliceous concrete, CaO added
Siliceous concrete, Zr added
Siliceous concrete, Zr and
Fission Product Mock-ups added
heating power, while the V2 series
used lower heating power. In the V3
series, limestone and LCS concrete
was used. The V4.1 test studied
the effect of a larger crucible and
zirco nium addition. In V5 series,
zirconium and fission product mockups
were added to the melt, and in
V6.1 there was a water pool behind
the concrete sidewall. Further and
more detailed information about the
experiments considered here can be
found in Table 1.
The measurement of the progression
of the melt, as well as the temperature
of the melt, is possible via
an instrumentation in the crucible
with 110 equally distributed thermocouples.
Additional temperature
measuring lances, introduced from
above into the melt, measure the temperatures
of the metal melt and the
oxide melt in dependence of time.
Filter samples are used to analyse all
gases evolved by the melt for their
composition and containing aerosols.
[ALS86]
Modelling approach
with COCOSYS V3.0
For the modelling of the BETA experiments,
the concrete cavern must first
be defined. Its geometrical data can be
found in the test descriptions. For the
respective structures, in addition to
the type of structure, the heat conduction
model and heat transfer
model for the left and right areas of
the zones must be selected. This part
of the modelling has been taken from
investigations already performed.
[AGE18]
The implementation of the MCCI
interaction is done with some margin
over some parameters. In addition to
the failure time of the RPV, the
required material data from the
material database, the solidus and
liquidus temperature of the melt and
the geometry information of the
cavity, the composition of the concrete
must be specified. Changes in the
composition of the concrete always
involve a change in density, the
enthalpy of decomposition and the
decomposition temperature of the
concrete. These values, especially the
decomposition enthalpy, can often
only be determined experimentally
[PEE83]. Therefore, the decomposition
enthalpy is determined using
comparable concrete compositions
[ALS92]. However, not all components
of the concrete can be considered
because some material data
is missing in the material data
bank (MDB). Accordingly, the simulated
components are extrapolated
to 100 %. The influence of the
missing components can be neglected
because of the very low mass
fraction.
After that, the melt is to be defined
and since it is stratified, metal and
oxide must be defined separately.
Starting from the initial temperature,
which is identical in both phases, the
respective constituents need to be
specified. In addition, in the metallic
layer, the introduced heating power of
the inductive heating method is
dependent on the time, over which
the decay heat is simulated. In the
experiments, the planned inductive
heating was never continuously introduced
into the melt, since in the
experiments dispersion of oxide and
melt was observed. Due to the dispersion,
the power could not be transmitted
constantly. The individual metallic
phases became too small and this influenced
the effectiveness of the coil.
Therefore, the energy in the melt
measured during the experiment is
entered into the melt. It was not always
possible to keep the heating period
of all experiments identical. For
example, very high heat outputs could
only be maintained for a short period
of 500 s (V1.5), whereas, in experiments
with low heat outputs (V2.1),
heating could be maintained for more
than 6,000 s. What follows is that a
comparison of the experiments with
each other is possible only in the phases
continuous heating.
Another important factor in the
modelling of both layers is the effective
heat transfer coefficient (HTC),
which is given in the simulations via
HEFF and has a great influence on the
concrete erosion [SPE18]. The factor
determines, in addition to the decomposition
temperature, the total
heat transfer of the melt to the concrete.
The decomposition temperature
determines the interface temperature
Research and Innovation
Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
between melt and concrete. In this
investigation a decomposition temperature
of 1523 K is assumed, whereby
ongoing investigations suggest a
value of approx. 1800 K [FOI19]. The
HTC must be defined for each layer
upwards, to the side, and downwards.
Also, between the two layers, a heat
transfer must be determined. In
metallic layers, HTC is always higher
than in oxide layers. This can be
explained by the higher conductivity
of the metal compared to oxides. The
first approach is that the coefficient
determines the total heat, without
individual effects, such as the crusting
of the melt or the mixing of the
melt by the released gas. A different
approach would be to calculate these
effects separately.
The investigations here only relate
to the experiments with silicate
concrete, which are the experiments
of the series V1.x, V2.x and V5.x. The
values recommended by GRS for
HEFF are shown in Figure 2.
The first simulations are performed
with these values for HEFF. In a
second set of simulations, HEFF is
adjusted separately for each experiment
using a parameter variation and
adjusted to the measured erosion.
The parameters that best represent
the measured erosion are shown in
Figure 5 and will be evaluated and
the end of this work. The results
of both simulations are presented
and compared in this work. Also, a
possible relationship between the
heat output and the effective heat
coefficient is shown.
| Fig. 2.
Recommended values of the effective heat transfer, the decomposition enthalpy and the decomposition
temperature for siliceous concrete. [SPE12] [ALS92] [ALS95]
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 511
Simulation results
Before the results adapted to the
erosion are shown, it is first of all
advisable to present the simulated
erosion of the initial simulations. This
provides a better overview over the
improvements.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the
axial erosions of the experiments
and their simulations with silicate
concrete, without additives in the
melt. As already described above, the
experiments can only be compared
with each other during periods of
simultaneous heating. Therefore, only
the first 1,000 s of the experiments are
shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
The figures show the effective
measured heating capacities, as the
planned heating capacities could not
always be achieved or maintained.
Starting with V2.1 with an effective
heating capacity of approx. 140 kW,
the level is rising up to V1.8 with a
heating capacity of 1,900 kW.
| Fig. 3.
Simulation results with recommended values for HEFF of the axial erosion of siliceous concrete without addition into the melt.
| Fig. 4.
Simulation results with adjusted values for HEFF of the axial erosion of siliceous concrete without addition into the melt.
Research and Innovation
Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 512
| Fig. 5.
Correlation between the adjusted HEFF and the heating power for the axial and radial erosion of the BETA experiments
with siliceous concrete without and with addition of zirconium in the melt.
In the simulations with the initial
modelling (Figure 3), the axial
erosion in V2.1 is clearly underestimated,
whereas in V1.6 – V1.8 it is
over estimated. The erosion can be
re presented well only in case of V1.5.
In the experiments with higher
heat output, in particular, the strong
erosion rate at the beginning cannot
be reproduced by the simulation.
With increasing heating power,
the difference in the early phase
between experiment and simulation
becomes more and more apparent.
V1.8 stands out because neither the
erosion depth nor the consistently
high erosion speed can be simulated
with the recommended values
[SPE12].
The axial erosions of the adjusted
simulations are shown in Figure 4.
The adaption is only done on the
effective heat transfer coefficients
as previously explained, while the
decomposition temperature and decomposition
enthalpy stay constant.
The variation of HEFF better simulates
erosion in all experiments. The
initial strong increase cannot be
improved only by adjusting HEFF.
However, the course of the erosion in
the further experiment is reproduced
much better.
In order to be able to evaluate a
possible connection between the heat
input and adjusted HEFF, the two
variables are plotted against each
other shown in Figure 5. This connection
is separated between the
value of HEFF in the axial and radial
directions. The radial values are
significantly smaller than those for
the axial direction due to the lower
radial erosion. Using the drawn
regression curves for the silicate
concrete in Figure 5, the relationship
between the heating power and the
effective heat transfer coefficient
can be better represented. It can be
seen that a higher heat output results
in a higher effective heat transfer
coefficient.
This relationship might be explained
by an increased movement
of the melt, which then leads to an
improved heat transfer between melt
and concrete. The higher velocity of
the melt is, amongst other things,
due to the greater erosion volume at
higher heat output. Due to the larger
erosion volume, a higher gas release,
which additionally sets the melt
in motion, can be assumed. The
described effect has a greater influence
on the axial direction, relative to
the radial direction. In addition to the
simulations with silicate concrete
without additions in the melt, the
variation was also carried out on the
experiments with additionally added
zirconium to the melt (V5.1 – V5.3).
The corresponding values are also
shown in Figure 5. They are higher
than the values for the axial
erosion in the simulations for silicate
concrete without additives in the
melt. Zir co nium causes an exothermic
chemical oxidation reaction and
introduces more energy into the
melt, which can be equated with
an additional heat input. This results
in a higher erosion of the concrete,
compared to the experiments without
zirconium with the same heat input.
The higher erosion, in turn, leads to
an additional movement of the melt.
Thereby the heat transfer from the
melt to the concrete is improved.
This improvement is reflected in
an increased value for HEFF, as
seen in Figure 5. The influence
of zirconium in the melt shows
a differentiated behaviour for radial
erosion. In contrast to the adjusted
parameter in the axial direction, it
decreases in the radial direction
compared to the base simulation.
From this, as expected, it can be
concluded that the heat output is
not the only influencing parameter
responsible for the heat transfer
between melt and concrete.
Conclusion
The results for the erosion investigated
here show that COCOSYS V3.0
is able to simulate the presented
BETA experiments. It is possible to
map erosion depths and gradients.
Deviations can be recognized only at
high heating power and the associated
high erosion rates at the beginning
of MCCI. For this effect, there is still
potential for development.
The investigations have also shown
that the recommended modelling
of a melt-concrete interaction, with
constant heat transfer coefficients
HEFF, between melt and concrete, at
different heat outputs, is not optimal
yet. Increasing heating power results
in higher heat transfer coefficients.
However, this is not solely dependent
on the heating power, as the influence
of zirconium in the melt has shown.
In the adjusted simulations, HEFF
increases in the axial direction
with the addition of zirconium in
the melt, whereas HEFF decreases
in the radial direction. There must
be other para meters that have an
influence on the heat transfer between
melt and concrete. These include
the release of gas by the decomposition
of the concrete, the crusting
by the soli dification of the melt, as
well as the temperature between the
melt and the concrete. Specifically,
the decompo sition temperature of the
concrete is currently being investigated
with the MOCKA experiments
[FOI19].
First of all, the correlation between
the effective heat coefficient and
the heating power needs to be
tested and described in more
detail with in dependent experiments
with similar concrete composition.
The heat transfer coefficient is not
constant during MCCI and it is recommended
to develop a correlation
Research and Innovation
Simulation of Selected BETA Tests with the Severe Accident Analysis Code COCOSYS ı Maximilian Hoffmann and Marco K. Koch

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
where the heat transfer is recalculated
during the interaction, to consider
the effect of a variable decay heat,
for example. This requires further
investigation in order to identify as
many influencing parameters as
possible and to incor porate them
into the correlation.
References
[AGE18] K. Agethen, M. Hoffmann, M.K. Koch: Analyse und
Bewertung der COCOSYS-Modellbasis zu Ex-Vessel
Phänomenen während MCCI. Technischer Fachbericht
zum Forschungsvorhaben BMWi 1501512, AG Plant
Simulation and Safety, Ruhr-Universität Bochum,
2018, PSSTR3.
[ALS86] H. Alsmeyer, C. Adelhelm, H.-G. Dillmann, J. Foit, M.
Heinle, W. Ratajczak, H. Schneider, G. Schumacher,
A. Skokan, S. Stiefel, W. Tromm; BETA experiments on
melt-concrete interaction: the role of Zirconium and
the potential sump water contact during melt-down
accidents. Bd. 154. 61-68 No. 1. DOI: 10.1016/
0029-5493(94)00898-9. – Nuclear Engineering und
Design, 1986, S. 61–68.
[ALS92] H. Alsmeyer: Proceedings of the Second OECD (NEA)
CSNI Specialist Meeting on Molten Core Debris-
Concrete Interactions, OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in
collaboration with Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe,
April 1992, NEA/CSNI/R(92)10.
[ALS95] H. Alsmeyer, G. Cenerino, E. Cordfunke, D. Fioravanti,
M. Fischer, J. Folt, L. Howe, M. Huntelaar, S. Locatelli,
F. Parozzi, J. Szabo, B. Turland, M. Vidard, D. Wegener;
Molten corium/concrete interaction and corium
coolability - A state of the art report. (EUR16649),
European Commision - Nuclear Science und
Technology, 1995.
[ALL07] H.-J. Allelein, S. Arndt, W. Klein-Heßling, K. Neu, N.
Reinke, S. Schwarz, B. Schwinges, C. Spengler,
G. Weber: Intensivierte Validierung der
Rechenprogramme COCOSYS und ASTEC, Final Report,
November 2007, GRS-A-3330.
[CRA13] M. Cranga, C. Spengler, K. Atkhen, S. Bechta,
P. Bottomley, P. Dejardin, A. Fargette, M. Fischer,
J.J. Foit, R. Gencheva, P. Grudev, E. Guyez, J.F. Haquet,
C. Journeau, G. Langrock, B. Michel, C. Mun, G. Ratel,
T. Sevon, B. Spindler: State-of-the-Art-Report on MCCI
in dry conditions: Analysis of experiments, modelling
and reactor applications, IRSN, August 2013, PSN-
RES/SAG/2013-00076.
[FOI19] J.J. Foit, T. Cron, B. Fluhrer: Melt/Concrete Interface
Temperature relevant to MCCI Process, Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology (KIT), The 9 th European Review
Meeting on Severe Accident Research (ERMSAR2019),
March 2019
[PEE83] M. Peehs, R. Höpfl, B. Gather, R. Blachnik: Die
integrale Schmelzeenthalpie von Reaktorbeton
als thermophysikalische Eingangsgröße von
Unfallfolgemoedellen des hypothetischen
Kernschmelzeunfalls, Journal of Nuclear Materials 118
p. 206-213, 1983.
[SPE12] C. Spengler, S. Arndt, J. Arndt, J. Bakalov, S. Band,
J. Eckel, W. Klein-Hessling, H. Nowack, M. Pelzer,
N. Reinke, J. Sievers, M. Sonnenkalb, G.Weber;
Weiterentwicklung der Rechenprogramme COCOSYS
and ASTEC – Abschlussbericht. (GRS – A – 3654),
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS)
mbH, 2012.
[SPE18] C. Spengler et al., “Uncertainty and Sensitivity
Analyses in Support of Model Development and
Validation of the Containment Module COCOSYS
of the AC2 Code - Application for Molten Corium/
Conrete Interaction (MCCI),” in Proceedings of
NUTHOS-12, Qingdao, China, 2018.
Authors
Maximilian Hoffmann
maximilian.hoffmann@pss.rub.de
Prof. Marco K. Koch
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Plant Simulation and Safety Group
Universitätsstraße 150
44801 Bochum, Germany
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 513

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 514
Planned entry for
This work is funded
by the German
Federal Ministry of
Economic Affairs and
Energy under grant
number 1501579 on
the basis of a decision
by the German
Bundestag.
The simulations are
performed with the
code version Open-
FOAM-v7 developed
by the OpenFOAM
Foundation.
Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems
with Open Source Code OpenFOAM
Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch
Water hammer phenomena can
generally be divided into two main
parts, the direct and the indirect
phenomena. For the direct water
hammer phenomena, a shock wave
is induced due to the sudden deceleration
of a fluid leading to a local
rise in pressure. The shock wave then
travels through the pipe system and
effects like wave reflection, interference,
superposition are to be
concerned. Furthermore, the valve
closure time as well as the deformation
of the pipe influences the quality
and quantity of the shock wave. On
the other hand, the indirect water
hammer is induced when a local
pressure drop below vapor pressure
leads to evaporation and creation of
steam bubbles. When the pressure
rises again above vapor pressure and
especially big steam bubbles implode
the surrounding water is rapidly
accelerated causing a secondary shock
wave once a sudden deceleration
occurs at impact. [LUE13]
To gain sufficient knowledge of the
important physical effects regarding a
water hammer phenomena detailed
CFD analysis are performed using
the open source code OpenFOAM.
Effects like propagation of shock
waves, cavitation and fluid structure
interaction will be included in the
code as there is no default capability
to model such phenomena. [GRE19]
In order to test the applicability of
the default code as well as the newly
implemented cavitation model two
water hammer experiments at the test
facility “Heißdampfreaktor” (HDR)
will be modelled under simplified
conditions. The implementation of
the cavitation model basis within
the Volume of Fluid (VOF) based,
fully compressible, multi fluid solver
compressibleMultiphaseInterFoam is
described also discussing model
strength, restrictions and weaknesses.
The simulation results for the two
experiments will be compared with
and without cavitation model in order
Introduction During a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in certain types of boiling water
reactors the continuous undersupply of cooling water eventually leads to the degradation of the
reactor core. In order to prevent such an accident, the loss of cooling water is prevented through
fast closing valves in the cooling circuit. However, the valve closing process can induce a so called
water hammer phenomena in the pipe systems which can damage structures within the cooling
circuit. [GIO04]
to qualify and quantify the cavitation
influence during the water hammer
phenomena. At the end potential code
improvements and upcoming work is
shortly presented.
Model basis and cavitation
model implementation
The Volume of Fluid (VOF) based
solver compressibleMultiphaseInter-
Foam is fully compressible as density
can be computed with multiple accessible
equations of state (EOS) also
regarding thermal effects. The
interface tracking method between
multiple non mixable fluids allows for
a detailed representation of interface
motion including surface tension
effects. However, the mesh resolution
at the interface needs to be very
high in order to give accurate results
leading to high computational costs
for complex multiphase flows. In
general, this method is used for free
surface flows or in combination with
so called mixture models to model the
free surface of bigger bubbles within a
continuous fluid. In this study the
VOF method is used to model the free
surface between water and steam in
the upper RDB as well as macroscopic
cavitation effects in the check valve
region and in the pipe system as mass
transfer across the interface is well
described for this method. [WAR13]
[GRE19]
In order to model the water
hammer experiments without temperature
driven phase change in the
upper RPV (Figure 3) a continuous
non-condensable steam phase a g
(eq. 3) is considered. For the pressure
driven phase change a mass transfer
term
regarding the
condensation rate and vaporization
rate is added to the continuity
equation for water a l (eq. 1)
and condensable steam a v (eq. 2)
[YU17]:
(1)
(2)
(3)
Using the expansion of the convection
term
and expressing the time
plus the advective derivative
as the resulting set of equations
can be summed to formulate the
velocity divergence as [YU17]
(4)
With equation 4 and an artificial
compression Term C to keep interfaces
sharp the final set of transport
equations can be expressed as [YU17]
[GRE19]:
(5)
(6)
(7)
Similarly the pressure equation is
modified by subtracting the source
term from the incompressible
part leading to following formulation
Research and Innovation
Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems with Open Source Code OpenFOAM ı Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
of the pressure equation with the
compressibility Ψ: [YU17] [GRE19]
compressible:
incompressible:
(8)
A more detailed description can be
found in the paper of Yu et al [YU17].
In order to ensure boundedness of
the volume phase fractions (values
between 0 and 1) and mass conservation
(∑a i=1) the transport equations
are solved using “Multidimensional
Universal Limiter with Explicit Solution”
(MULES) accredited to Henry
Weller and well described in San tiagos
PhD thesis [SAN13]. MULES requires
any source terms S(α i) to be linearized
in the form [SAN13]
(9)
resulting in different formulations for
each phase. The mass transfer rates
for condensation and vaporization
across the respective interface are
given with the Kunz cavitation model
as follows [KUN99] [YU17] [GRE19]:
(10)
(11)
If vapor pressure p v is smaller than
lokal pressure p the vaporization
rate is

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 516
| Fig. 3.
HDR test facility modelling approach.
Modelling approach
with OpenFOAM-v7
During the modelling of the HDR test
facility with OpenFOAM-v7 dif ferent
aspects concerning initial and boundary
conditions, meshing process,
equation of state (EOS) and overall
simulation parameters where optimized
to a point where simulation
stability, computation time as well
as result quality are in reasonable
equilibrium.
The meshing process revealed that
it is necessary to model the whole
cooling circuit as only modelling the
part between break nozzle and RPV
results in unneglectable deviation of
the pressure dynamics. Furthermore,
making a well-structured hexahedral
mesh with the commercial program
ANSYS ICEM (Figure 3) instead an
unstructured hexahedral mesh with
snappyHexMesh significantly improves
simulation stability as well as result
quality.
In order to model the check valve,
the boundary condition activeBaffle­
Velocity was modified so closure times
can be modelled according to the
user’s demands. As an alternative a
dynamic mesh approach can be
implemented using a fixed wall in a
rotating area to close off the pipe
| Fig. 4.
Simulation results for the damped check valve implementation.
diameter. However, this approach
increases the computation time while
lowering the simulation stability
without improving the result quality.
In terms of boundary conditions, it
leads to much better simulation
stability to apply saturation pressure
at the break nozzle (Figure 3)
instead of atmospheric pressure as
atmospheric pressure is much lower
than vapor pressure for the experiments.
This approach also allows for
a better comparison between before
and after applying a cavitation model.
Initial condition wise system
pressure is applied to the whole
domain while water temperature is set
to 220 °C and non-condensable steam
at the RPV top is set to saturation
temperature at 285 °C (Figure 3).
Applying stationary operation state
flow conditions does not influence the
simulation results compared to a zero
velocity initialization.
To capture pressure driven density
variations of water and steam linear
equations of state are used for both
phases neglecting non-linear change
of state variables. For steam the ideal
gas equation [GRE19]
(13)
is applied with R g as the special gas
constant. To compute the density
variation for water the stiffened EOS
(perfectFluid) [GRE19]
(14)
is used where p 0 is a reference density
and the so called fluid ‘constant’ R f
can be evaluated with the relationship
[GRE19]
(15)
where c is the speed of sound. Using
real gas equations like the approach
from Peng and Robinson is possible
in OpenFOAM but results in higher
computation times. However, in
literature deviation up to 30 % are
described when using linear EOS
especially for gases at high pressure
[SIR17]. In future work the influence
of non-linear change of state variables
will be conducted. In order to model
turbulence, the SST k-ω-model from
Wilcox is used.
Simulation results
The pressure evaluation at measurement
position for the damped check
valve implementation (Figure 4)
shows good results with cavitation
modelling (red) while without cavitation
modelling larger deviation
compared to the experiment data
(black) occur. After detonating the
burst disk (0.0 s) the reflection behavior
of the pressure balance wave
between the break nozzle and the RPV
(0.0-0.1 s) is in decent agreement to
the experimental data for both simulations.
While the timing of the pressure
peak (0.1 s) is in good comparison
to the experimental data the peak
is overshot without cavitation modelling
(150 bar). Applying cavitation,
the pressure peak decreases towards
the experimental value at 120 bar
improving the results as cavitation
effects at the check valve are considered
(Figure 5). After the pressure
peak the pressure decrease is undershot
and the low frequent pressure
amplitude is not modelled with either
simulation approach leading to deviations
to the experimental data. In the
report of KIT strong pipe oscillation
are mentioned after the pressure peak
which can influence fluid properties.
For the non-damped check
valve implementation (Figure 6), the
pressure peak (0.09 s) is overshot
Research and Innovation
Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems with Open Source Code OpenFOAM ı Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
| Fig. 5.
Cavitation effects at the check valve.
without (green) and with cavitation
modelling (red) at around 320 bar
compared to 250 bar measured during
the experiment (black). This overestimation
is caused by deviation
between real density and computed
density according to the perfectFluid
EOS. It is therefore necessary to
implement either a better EOS for
high pressure ranges at high temperatures
or use a fitting polynomial
based on material properties to
improve the peak quantity. After the
initial pressure peak vapor pressure
is reached at measurement point
resulting in evaporation between
check valve and RPV (Figure 7)
leading to a delayed second pressure
peak at 0.2 s. If no cavitation model
is used the delay is not captured
accordingly leading to an earlier
second peak at 0.15 s while pressure
drops near 0 bar. Applying the Kunz
cavitation model the timing of the
second peak fits the experimental
data very well while the peak amplitude
is underestimated at 160 bar
compared to 190 bar. This further
leads to a different frequency and
amplitude of the following cavitation
influenced three pressure peaks
(0.25 to 0.4 s). A scaling of the empirical
condensation and vaporization
constants (eq. 10, 11) will probably
improve the results in this regard.
Looking at the well captured fifth
pressure increase (0.45 s, red) as well
as the upcoming reflection behavior
(0.45 to 0.9 s) an overestimation of
the frequency occurs. This deviation
can be explained with either missing
fluid structure interaction effects or
from inaccuracies resulting from the
perfectFluid EOS.
Conclusion
The implementation of the Kunz
cavitation model for a multi fluid, fully
compressible VOF approach improves
the simulation results of the HDR test
facility showing that cavi tation effects
influence the water hammer phenomena
significantly. Especially for the
non-damped check valve implementation
the dynamic pressure changes
are in much better agreement to the
experimental data as macro cavitation
in the pipe section between check
valve and RPV is considered.
However, deviations of pressure
amplitude still persist for high pressure
peaks suggesting an improvement
of the density calculation. As the
perfectFluid EOS assumes a constant
sonic speed pressure dependent compressibility
changes are neglected. In
order to capture effects of fluid
structure interaction during the water
hammer phenomena further development
concerning the coupling interface
preCICE [BUN16] between
OpenFOAM-v7 and CalculiX [DHO18]
will be done.
The goal is to develop an
OpenFOAM-v7 solver specialized to
accurately model water hammer
phenomena regarding high pressure
changes, cavitation effects as well as
fluid structure interaction for different
systems.
References
[BRA19] Bratfisch, C.; Stahlberg, G.; Koch, M.K.: Simulation von
Druckstoßphänomenen in kerntechnischen Anlagen
mit ATHLET, Technical report regarding BMWi
research project 1501522, January 2019, PSS-TR-6.
[BUN16] Bungartz, H.J. et Al.: preCICE – A fully parallel library
for multiphysics surface coupling, Research article,
Computer & Fluids Volume 141 p. 250-258,
December 2016.
[DHO18] Dhondt, G.: CalculiX CrunchiX USER’S MANUAL
version 2.14, April 2018.
[GIO04] Giot, M. et al.: TWO-PHASE FLOW WATER HAMMER
TRANSIENTS AND INDUCED LOADS ON MATERIALS
AND STRUCTURES OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
(WAHALoads). Technical report, 2004.
[GRE19] Greenshields, C. J.: OpenFOAM User Guide version 7.
The OpenFOAM Foundation, 2019.
[HDR81] KIT: HDR Sicherheitsprogramm – Untersuchungen
an einem Speisewasserrückschlagventil NW 350
bei Bruch einer Reaktorkühlmittelleitung.
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KIT), 1981.
| Fig. 6.
Simulation results for the non-damped check valve implementation.
[KUN99] Kunz, R.F. et. Al.: A Preconditioned Navier-Stokes
Method for Two-Phase Flows with Application to
Cavitation Prediction, American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 1999.
[LUE13] Lüdecke, H. J. et al.: KSB Know-how, Band 1 Der
Druckstoß. KSB Aktiengesellschaft, Halle (Saale),
2013.
[SAN13] Santiago, M.D.: An Extended Mixture Model for the
Simultaneous Treatment of Short and Long Scale
Interfaces, PhD thesis, Universidad Nacional del
Litoral, 2013.
[SIR17]
Sirignano, W.A.: Compressible flow at high pressure
with linear equation of state, research article,
Cambridge University Press, December 2017.
[VAL99] Valencia, L.; Bacher, H. P.: Rückbau des Heißdampfreaktors
in Kahl am Main bei Aschaffenburg,
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KIT), 1999.
[WAR13] Wardle, K.E.; Weller, H.G.: Hybrid Multiphase CFD
Solver for Coupled Dispersed/Segregated Flows in
Liquid-Liquid Extraction, International Journal of
Chemical Engineering, Research Article, 2013.
[YU17]
| Fig. 7.
Cavitation effects at the pipe section between check valve and RPV.
Authors
Yu, H.; Goldsworthy, L.; Brandner, P. A.; Garaniya, V.:
Applied Mathematical Modelling 45 – Development
of a compressible multiphase cavitation approach for
diesel spray modelling p. 705-727. ELSEVIER, 2017.
Paul Fuchs
paul.fuchs@pss.rub.de
Prof. Marco K. Koch
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Plant Simulation and Safety Group
Universitätsstraße 150
44801 Bochum, Germany
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 517
Research and Innovation
Water Hammer Simulation in Pipe Systems with Open Source Code OpenFOAM ı Paul Fuchs and Marco K. Koch

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
518
60 YEARS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN GERMANY
Note: This article
summarises previous
articles published in
atw about the start
of nuclear power in
Germany.
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany –
Starting with First Criticality
at the VAK, Kahl
Christopher Weßelmann
On 13 November 1960, 60 years ago, the reactor core of the “Kahl Experimental Nuclear Power Plant” on the
Main reaches first criticality. This event marked a milestone in the history of energy supply in Germany, then the Federal
Republic of Germany. Three years after a reactor in Germany reached first criticality for the first time ever – the Munich
Research Reactor (FRM) in Garching near Munich was critically operated on 31 October 1957 – a nuclear power plant
for electricity generation was commissioned. In the following years up to 1988, 35 further plants for electricity
generation followed, some of which covered up to one third of the electricity demand in Germany and avoided up to
150 million tonnes of CO 2 -emissions per year, among others.
Among others, the Geneva Atomic
Energy Conference in August 1955 is
mentioned as the birth of nuclear
energy in Germany. There, the
German delegation of officials and
scientists sent to Geneva became
aware of the enormous importance of
civil nuclear energy development in
the meantime and of the backlog that
the Federal Republic of Germany was
lagging behind. Two months after the
Geneva Conference, the German
Federal Ministry for Nuclear Affairs
was founded.
The first specific actions were then
cooperation agreements with the USA
and Great Britain in February and July
1956, and the elaboration of a draft
for an Atomic Energy Act, which,
however, fails at first, in July 1957, due
to the lack of a two-thirds majority
for the intended amendment of the
German “Grundgesetz”.
1956 is also the year in which
the first major research centres were
founded in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The KFA Jülich was
founded in February 1956, the GKSS
in Geesthacht in April and the KfK in
Karlsruhe in July.
In December 1957 – in the meantime,
Prof. S. Balke had become
minister, to whom nuclear energy in
Germany owes much – the Atomic
Commission adopted the first nuclear
programme, the so-called 500 MW
programme, which aimed at the
construction of experimental reactors
with this overall scope. Among the
types it already mentions the heavy
water reactor and the light water
reactor, the high-temperature reactor
and other advanced reactor lines
and is visibly struggling with the
variety of types of reactor lines. The
programme saw the role of the state in
coordi nating individual projects and
pro viding financial start-up aid in all
cases where the financial risk to
industry appeared to be unacceptably
high.
The VAK project
The first nuclear power plant in the
Federal Republic of Germany, the Kahl
experimental nuclear power plant,
was financed and operated by the
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk
AG and the Bayernwerk AG. It
was build by AEG as prime contractor
with the participation of numerous
companies, mainly the US General
Electric, on a purely com mercial basis.
At that time there was a significant
difference in this respect compared to
smaller or larger nuclear power plants
built abroad. While there, the state
had provided a con siderable part of
the necessary funds either by full
financing or by con siderable participation
and thus assumed a corresponding
financial risk, the first
step in the Federal Republic was
reserved for the private sector.
When the nuclear power pioneer
Heinrich Mandel ordered the experimental
power plant from AEG in 1958,
the mood for using this energy
source was different from today:
the Minister of Atomic Energy Franz
Josef Strauß described the peaceful
use of nuclear energy as the same
turning point in human history as
the invention of fire. Politicians
were euphoric about nuclear energy
across all parties, while power plant
operators were rather reserved.
Fossil fuels were available in abundance
and at low cost, so the
operators were reluctant to bow
to the political desire to invest in
this new, complex and therefore
expensive energy technology.
On 13 November 1960, the VAK
was the first German nuclear power
plant to achieve first criticality. As
planned, the plant was shut down on
25 November 1985. In order to
maintain the experimental character
| Fig. 1.
Construction of the „Versuchsatomkraftwerk Kahl“ (VAK), Germany, (June 1958 to November 1960).
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany – Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl ı Christopher Weßelmann

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
also beyond the operating phase,
the plant operators agreed in advance
to completely dismantle the VAK up to
the “greenfield site” immediately
after the end of operation. This
became official on 17 May 2010 with
the release of the plant from the
scope of application of the Atomic
Energy Act and the permission for
demolition according to conventional
building law.
Construction and
commissioning
VAK was completed in only 29 months
of construction time (cf. Figure 1).
After completion of all tests and zero
power tests (first partial licence
of 8 November 1960), the first 29
fuel elements could be loaded in
the reactor on 11 November 1960
accor ding to a previously determined
site plan.
On 13 November 1960, the VAK
was commissioned as the first German
nuclear power plant, it reached first
criticality and was thus one of then
12 plants worldwide (cf. Table 1).
The boiling water reactor of American
design was designed for an electrical
output of 16,000 kilowatts
(16,000 kWe).
On 17 June 1961, after the
synchronisation of VAK with the grid,
the first electricity generated from
nuclear energy in the Federal Republic
of Germany was fed into the public
grid.
Initially, a series of systematic
measurements were carried out
during the first continuous operation.
These dealt, e.g., with the neutron
flux distribution in the core and the
natural circulation in the reactor.
Thus, the core design procedures
were confirmed in an experimental
way in order to further develop them
in the following years and use them
for the design of further plants.
Initial troubles, which inevitably
occur when a new technology is used
for the first time, were a challenge
for the engineers and technicians
on site. In the relatively small
experimental plant (cf. Figure 2),
the effort required to solve these
initial problems has been usually
manage able, but the knowledge
gained was invaluable for later largescale
plants.
In the conventional field, experience
was gained in the use of the
saturated steam turbine, which had
been rather unusual until then.
Numerous backfitting measures
during operation showed early on
that a nuclear power plant can
Country Power plant Power
in MWe
(number of
reactors)
Federal Republic
of Germany
France
Great Britain
| Tab. 1.
Nuclear power plants in operation towards the end of 1961 and their electricity generation
(if available, alphabetical order of the countries).
| Fig. 2.
Outline and ground plan of the VAK.
Kahl 15 (1) 20,000
Marcoule G1
Marcoule G2
Marcoule G3
Calder Hall
Chapelcross
5 (1)
32 (1)
32 (1)
152 (4)
152 (4)
Soviet Union Obninsk 5 (1)
USA
EWC
Vallecitos
Shippingport
Dresden
Yankee
5 (1)
5 (1)
160 (1)
186 (1)
136 (1)
Electricity generation
until 1 November 1961
in MWh
-
2,470,000
-
4,800
256,600
459,000
700,000
519
60 YEARS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN GERMANY
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany – Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl ı Christopher Weßelmann

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
520
VAK Kahl
Operator: VAK GmbH (RWE 80 %, E.ON 20 %)
Milestones:
p Start of construction June 1958
60 YEARS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN GERMANY
| Fig. 3.
The control room of the VAK, 1961.
| Fig. 4.
Decommissioning of the VAK, reactor building, 2005.
| Fig. 5.
„Green field“ of the former VAK site, September 2010.
p First criticality 13 November 1960
p First grid connection 17 June 1961
p Cost of new build (1960) 34 Mio. DM (about 17 Mio. EUR,
without adjustment of inflation)
p Scheduled final shut-down 25 November 1985
Technical data:
Boiling water reactor with 16 MW electrical and 60 MW thermal capacity
p Net electricity supply to grid 2.1 billion (109) kWh
p Time availability 69,9 %
p Operation time 149,050 hours
p Number of fuel elements 361
p Number of operating periods 24
Employees:
At start-up about 75 permanent staff; during peak periods up to 123 employees
| Tab. 2.
VAK Kahl: Some facts about build and operation.
continuously keep pace with the
increasing safety requirements.
During its 25 years of operation,
the VAK proved to be a valuable
test facility (Figure 3). The most
important contributions to the testing
were made by the VAK in the areas
of material and fuel element testing.
The aim of the materials testing
was to find out how materials for reactor
pressure vessels change as a result
of permanent irradiation. For this
purpose, material samples were
brought close to the core and thus
exposed to a much higher radiation
power in defined operating times
than would be the case in actual use.
By means of these practical and
anticipatory irradiation programmes,
reliable statements on the suitability
of the individual materials could
be made after subsequent material
analyses – important findings for the
construction of the following nuclear
power plant generation.
As a test facility for fuel elements,
the VAK made probably the most
important contribution to the further
development of nuclear technology.
A total of 50 different types of fuel elements
were used and put through
their paces. For example, mixed oxide
fuel elements (MOX; nuclear fuel
made of uranium and plutonium)
were tested for the first time and fuel
elements for the later hot steam
reactor were tested. With the results
of these tests, basic calculation
methods for fuel element planning
and reactor operation could be
developed which are in principle still
used today.
The training of the required personnel
posed a particular challenge.
In Germany, there were no nuclear
power plants and also not yet the
simulators that are common today.
Therefore, the first team was sent to
the Vallecitos nuclear power plant,
USA, where they were deployed,
among others, in shift operation.
Thus, the basis was established which
was continuously expanded in the
first years with the help of American
consultants.
In order to maintain the experimental
character of the VAK beyond
the operating phase, RWE and
Bayern werk agreed in advance
that the VAK should be completely
dis mantled to the “greenfield site”
immediately after the end of operation
(Table 2). This dismantling
was intended to restore the original
condition of the terrain with the proof
that no inadmissible radioactivity is
still present on the plant site. At
that time, there was no comparable
decommissioning project worldwide,
so that here, too, new ground was
broken (Figure 4).
The overall decommissioning
was then carried out by a company
specialised in this field and the use
of heavy demolition machines. In
September 2010, this work was
completed on schedule with the
construction of the “greenfield site”
(Figure 5).
Author
Dipl.-Ing. Christopher Weßelmann
Editor in Chief, atw
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany
60 Years of Nuclear Power in Germany – Starting with First Criticality at the VAK, Kahl ı Christopher Weßelmann

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Nuclear Power World Report 2019
At the end of the year 2019, there were 443 nuclear power plant units in 31 countries in operation* worldwide.
This means that the number of units dropped by 9 units to the key date of the previous year (31 December 2018:
452, -9 units, -2.0 %) (compare Figure 1) due to the commissioning of 4 new plants, and the final decommissioning of
13 plants. Of these 13 plants, which have been shut-down, 5 plants – all in Japan – have been in long-term shutdown
since the year 2011. In the following are the values given on 31 December 2019 and change compared to the previous
year as a percentage in brackets. There were 54 (53, +2.0 %) nuclear power plant units under construction in 19 (19)
countries, in other words, 1 more than on the previous year’s key date. The available total gross capacity 1) of the nuclear
plants operating amounted to 419,916 MWe (425,332 MWe, -1.3 %) and the total net capacity to 397,350 MWe
(402,584 MWe, -1.3 %). This equates to an decrease of 5,416 MWe gross and 5,234 MWe net. The additional capacity
results mainly from newly defined nominal capacities of operating plants (compare Table 1 and Figures 1 to 3).
As of the year 2018 the base for all capacities, in particular for the U.S. nuclear power plant units, are the nameplate
data. Due to cooling water conditions (higher or lower cooling water temperatures with respect to design capacity)
actual gross and net capacities may vary by plus or minus 3 % of the nameplate (design) capacity. In some countries the
lower capacity value is used for capacity data due to its relevance for system services.
521
REPORT
In the year 2019, the nuclear power plant units Taishan 2
(PWR, type: EPR-1750, 1,750 MWe gross and 1,660 MWe
net capacity) and Yangjiang 6 (PWR, type: ACPR-1000,
1,080 MWe gross and 1,000 MWe net capacity) in China,
Shin-Kori 4 (PWR, type: APR-1400, 1,400 MWe gross and
1,340 MWe net capacity) in the Repubilc of Korea, and
Novovoronezh 2-2 (PWR, type: VVER V-392M, 1,200 MWe
gross and 1,115 MWe net capacity) in Russia reached first
criticality, were connected to the grid for the first time
and put into commercial operation. No further nuclear
power plant reached first criticality only for the first time
in 2019.
In 2019 no additional nuclear power plant unit resumed
operations after long-term shutdown. In Japan 9 of 33
nuclear power plants are currently in operation. They were
restarted between 2015 and 2018 after lay-up operations
respectively to the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in
2011. E.g. in Canada in total 6 units were restarted after
more than 10 years of lay-up operations respectively. In the
course of the liberalisation of the Canadian electricity
market in the mid-1990s, the operator at the time Ontario
Hydro ascertained insufficient competitive capacity in
the market environment for 4 units at the site Bruce
with around 3,100 MW as well as for 4 others at the site
Pickering with approximately 1,850 MW. That is the reason
why the 8 CANDU units Bruce A1 to Bruce A4 and
Pickering 1 to Pickering 4 were disconnected from the
grid and removed from commercial operations between
1995 and 1997. Pickering 1 and Pickering 4 were
re-commissioned in 2003 and 2005 by the new operator
Ontario Power Generation due to changes in the market
and after a retrofitting program. Bruce 3 and Bruce 4 were
re-commissioned at the end of 2003/beginning of 2004.
With the re-commissioning of both units Bruce A-1 and
Bruce A-2 in 2012, the operator of the site BrucePower has
completed his investment program successfully. The site is
intended to secure the power supply in the region in the
long-term during the coming decades. With a gross
capacity of approximately von 6,740 MWe Bruce is also the
nuclear power site with highest output worldwide.
Currently both operators discuss an operational lifetime
for the plants of 80 years.
Country In operation Under construction
Number
Capacity
gross
[MWe]
net
[MWe]
Number
Capacity
gross
[MWe]
net
[MWe]
Net nuclear
electricity
production
[TWh]
Nuclear
share
total
[%]
Argentina 3 1 750 1 627 1 29 25 7.90 5.90
Armenia 1 408 376 0 0 0 2.03 27.80
Bangladesh 0 0 0 2 2 400 2 160 - -
Belarus 0 0 0 2 2 388 2 218 - -
Belgium 7 6 220 5 937 0 0 0 41.40 47.60
Brazil 2 1 990 1 884 1 1 300 1 245 15.22 2.70
Bulgaria 2 2 000 1 906 0 0 0 15.87 37.50
Canada 19 14 385 13 517 0 0 0 94.85 14.90
China [1] 48 48 158 44 954 11 11 339 10 442 330.12 4.90
Czech Republic 6 4 133 3 925 0 0 0 28.58 35.20
Finland 4 2 860 2 752 1 1 720 1 600 22.91 34.70
France 58 65 880 63 130 1 1 720 1 630 382.40 70.60
Germany [2] 6 8 545 8 113 0 0 0 70.98 10.50
Hungary 4 2 000 1 889 0 0 0 15.41 49.20
India 22 6 780 6 219 7 5 300 4 824 40.74 3.20
Iran, Islamic Republic of [3] 1 1 000 915 1 1 057 974 5.87 1.80
Japan [4] 33 33 283 31 931 2 2 760 2 650 65.68 7.50
Korea, Republic of [5] 24 24 210 23 157 4 5 600 5 360 138.81 26.20
Mexico 2 1 640 1 560 0 0 0 10.88 5.50
Report
Nuclear Power World Report 2019

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
522
Country In operation Under construction
Number
Capacity
gross
[MWe]
net
[MWe]
Number
Capacity
gross
[MWe]
net
[MWe]
Net nuclear
electricity
production
[TWh]
Nuclear
share
total
[%]
REPORT
Netherlands, The 1 515 482 0 0 0 3.70 3.10
Pakistan 5 1 467 1 355 2 2 200 2 028 9.07 6.60
Romania 2 1 412 1 305 0 0 0 10.37 18.50
Russia [6] 38 31 535 29 557 6 4 930 4 585 195.54 19.70
Slovak Republic 4 1 950 1 816 2 942 880 14.28 53.90
Slovenia 1 727 696 0 0 0 5.53 37.00
South Africa 2 1 940 1 860 0 0 0 13.61 6.70
Spain 7 7 398 7 121 0 0 0 55.86 21.40
Sweden [7] 7 7 743 7 498 0 0 0 64.43 34.00
Switzerland [8] 4 3 095 2 960 0 0 0 25.37 23.90
Taiwan, China [9] 4 4 577 4 424 2 2 712 2 630 31.15 13.40
Turkey 0 0 0 1 1 200 1 114
Ukraine 15 13 818 13 090 0 0 0 78.14 53.90
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 4 5 600 5 380 - -
United Kingdom [10] 15 10 366 9 361 2 3 440 3 260 51.03 15.60
United States of America [11] 96 108 131 102 033 2 2 500 2 230 809.36 19.70
Total 443 419 916 397 350 54 59 137 55 235 2657.10 11.00
| Tab. 1.
Nuclear power plant units worldwide in operation and under construction (set date: 31 December 2019), nuclear electricity production and share of nuclear power of total electricity
production in 2019 [Source: plant operators, IAEO, atw].
[1] China: 2 units, start of operation, 2 units start of new build; [2] Germany: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [3] Iran: 1 unit start of new build; [4] Japan: 5 units permanently shut-down;
[5] Korea, Republic of: 1 unit, start of operation; 1 unit permanently shut-down; [6] Russia: : 1 unit, start of operation, 1 unit permanently shut-down, 1 unit start of new build;
[7] Sweden: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [8] Switzerland: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [9] Taiwan, China: 1 unit permanently shut-down; [10] United Kingdom: 1 unit start of new build;
[11] United States of America: 2 units shut-down
Mexico 2
Canada 19
USA 96 |2
Slovak Republic 4|2
Czech Republic 6 Hungary 4
Finland 4|1
Slovenia 1
Sweden 7
Belarus -|2
Netherlands 1
United Kingdom 15|2
Russia 38|6
Belgium 7
Germany 6
Switzerland 4
France 58|1
Spain 7
Ukraine 15
Romania 2
Bulgaria 2
Armenia 1
Turkey 1
Iran 1|1
UAE -|4
Pakistan 5|2
China 48|11
Bangladesh |1
Rep. Korea 24|4
Japan 33|2
Taiwan, China 4|2
India 22|7
Brazil 2|1
Argentina 3|1
South Africa 2
Nuclear power plant units in operation: 443, location with units ( first number)
Nuclear power plant units under construction: 54, location with units ( second number)
| Fig. 1.
World map nuclear power plants in operation and under construction at the end of 2019. As of: 31.12.2019, 12 p.m. atw, 10/2020
Worldwide 13 nuclear power units were definitively
taken out of commission in 2019: Germany, Philippsburg 2
(BWR, first criticality 1984); Japan Fukushima Daini 1
(BWR, first criticality 1981), Fukushima Daini 2 (BWR,
first criticality 1983), Fukushima Daini 3 (BWR, first
criticality 1984), Fukushima Daini 4 (BWR, first criticality
1986), Genkai 2 (BWR, first criticality 1980); Republic of
Korea: Wolsong 1 (Candu, first criticality 1982); Russia:
Bilibinsk 1 (LWGR, first criticality 1973); Sweden:
Ringhals 2 (PWR, first criticality 1973); Switzerland
Mühleberg (BWR, first criticality 1971), Taiwan, China:
Chinshan 2 (BWR, first criticality 1977); USA: Pilgrim 1
(BWR, first criticality 1972), Three Mile Island 1 (BWR,
first criticality 1974) (Table 2). In Japan, 5 plants have
been declared finally shutdown in 2019 subsequent in the
year 2020.
Report
Nuclear Power World Report 2019

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
There were 54 (53, +0.5 %) plants with 59,137 MWe
gross and 55,235 MWe net capacity under construction
worldwide at the end of the last year 2019. That means
that in comparison to the figure of the previous year,
there was 1 nuclear power unit more under construction
worldwide, since 5 projects have been newly started and
4 plants have attained first criticality. No project was
suspended in 2019.
Work started for the first units Taipingling 1 (PWR HPR
1000, 1,200 MWe gross and 1,116 MWe net capacity) and
Zhangzhou 1 (PWR HPR 1000, 1,212 MWe gross and 1,126
MWe net capacity) in China, the second unit Bushehr 2
(PWR VVER V-510K, 1,057 MWe gross and 974 MWe net
capacity) in the Iran, Kursk 2-2 (PWR VVER V-1000 AES-92
1,255 MWe gross and 1,175 MWe net capacity) in Russia,
and Hinkley Point C-2 (PWR EPR-1750, 1,750 MWe gross
and 1,630 MWe net capacity) in the United Kingdom.
Active construction projects (numbers in brackets) listed
are: Argentina (1), Bangladesh (2), Belarus (2), Brazil (1),
China (11), Finland (1), France (1), India (7), Japan (2),
Republic of Korea (4), Pakistan (2), Russia (6), Slovak
Republic (2), Taiwan (2), Turkey (1), the United Arab
Emirates (4), the United Kingdom (2), and the USA (2).
Worldwide there were about 200 projects (200,
+-0.0 %) in the concrete planning or application phase
at the turn of the year 2019/2020. In addition, there
are a further approx. 100 (100,0 %) declarations of intent
by companies or government offices in other countries.
523
REPORT
Station name Country Reactor type Capacity
gross
[MWe]
Capacity
net
[MWe]
Operator/
Owner
Supplier
Construction start/
First criticality/
Long-term shutdown
1 st Criticality, 1 st Grid connection and Start of commercial operation in 2019 Construction date
Taishan 2 China EPR 1.750 1.660 CGNPG Framatome 2010
Yangjiang 6 China ACPR-1000 1.080 1.000 GNPJVC CNNC 2013
Shin-Kori 4 Korea APR-1400 1.400 1.340 KHNPC Doosan/CE 2009
Novovoronezh 2-2 Russia VVER V-392M 1.200 1.115 Rosatom Rosatom 2009
1 st Grid connection and Start of commercial operation in 2019
- - - - - - - -
1 st Criticality and 1 st Grid connection in 2019 Construction date
- - - - - - - -
1 st Criticality in 2019, only Construction date
- - - - - - - -
Restart after long-term shutdown in 2019
Long-term shutdown
- - - - - - - -
Construction starts (first concrete in 2019)
Construction start
Taipingling 1 China HPR 1000 1.200 1.116 CGN NP CNNC 2019
Zhangzhou 1 China HPR 1000 1.212 1.126 CNNP GZE CNNC 2019
Bushehr 2 Iran VVER-1000
AES-92
1.057 974 NPP&DI Atomenergoexport
Kursk 2-2 Russia VVER V-510K 1.255 1.175 Rosatom Rosatom 2019
Hinkley Point C-2 United Kingdom EPR-1750 1.720 1.630 EDF/Joint V. Framatome 2019
Permanent shutdowns in 2019
| Tab. 2.
Nuclear power plant units commissioned in 2019 (first criticality, first grid connection, and start of commercial operation), restart after long-term shutdown, start of construction,
permanent shutdowns, long-term shutdowns and cancellation of projects (in brackets: original start of construction if project was suspended for a longer period).
2019
First criticality
Philippsburg 2 Germany PWR 1.468 1.402 EnBW KK KWU 1984
Fukushima Daini 1 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Toshiba 1981
Fukushima Daini 2 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Hitachi 1983
Fukushima Daini 3 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Toshiba 1984
Fukushima Daini 4 Japan BWR 1.100 1.067 Tepco GE/Hitachi 1986
Genkai 2 Japan PWR 559 529 Kyushu EP MHI 1980
Wolsong 1 Korea, Rep. Candu 685 657 KHNPC AECL 1982
Bilibinsk 1 Russia LWGR 12 11 Rosatom Rosatom 1973
Ringhals 2 Sweden PWR 963 852 Ringhals AB ABB Atom 1973
Mühleberg Switzerland BWR 390 373 BWK GE 1971
Chinshan 2 Taiwan, China BWR 636 604 Taiwan Pow. GE 1977
Pilgrim 1 USA BWR 712 677 Entergy GE 1972
Three Mile Island 1 USA PWR 1.021 976 Exelon B&W 1974
Long-term shutdowns in 2019
First criticality
- - - - - - - -
Project finally suspended in 2019
Construction start
- - - - - - - -
Report
Nuclear Power World Report 2019

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Nuclear power plant units in operation [-]
500
Installed nuclear power plant capacity worldwide [gross, GW = 10 3 MW]
450
524
400
400
300
300
REPORT
200
100
200
100
0
1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
2010 2015 2019
Year
| Fig. 2.
Development of the number of nuclear power plants in operations from 1956 to 2019.
0
1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
2010 2015
Year
| Fig. 3.
Development of the gross nuclear power plant capacity in operation from 1956 to 2019.
2019
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
Looking at the structural impact of the incidents in Japan
and Fukushima on 11 March 2011, it can be ascertained
that, in the meantime, they do not have an effect on the
number of new construction project and plans worldwide,
with the exception of political reactions in Germany, Italy
and Switzerland.
The development of the number of the commercially
operated nuclear power plants worldwide, in addition to
the available gross nuclear power plant capacity is depicted
in Figure 2 and Figure 3 for the years 1956 to 2019 (1956:
year of commissioning the first commercial nuclear power
plant, Calder Hall 1, in Great Britain. The first nucleargenerated
electricity occurred on 20 December 1951 in the
US-American Experimental Breeder Reactor EBR-1.) Also
worth noting is the continued capacity increase (Figure 3)
in the 1980s, as the nuclear power plants, ordered due the
impact of the first oil crisis at the beginning and end of the
1970s, started operations with high capacities per plant
averaging 1,000 MWe. Worldwide and in Germany, the
commissioning of the nuclear power unit Biblis A in 1974
with 1,225 MWe gross represented an important milestone
in the development of high-capacity plants, which were
from the beginning designed also technically for a longer
operating period of several decades – previously, the pilot
plants were also built with the focus on technical feasibility
and practicability. Since about 1993, a developmental
stagnation can be observed with the number of nuclear
power plants and capacity and this is due, on the one hand
to the decommissioning of older, prototypical and no
longer profitable plants in the USA, Europe and the GUS
Electricity production in nuclear power plants [TWh = 10 9 kWh/a]
3,000
Unit capability factor [%]
1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
2010 2015
Year
| Fig. 4.
Development of the nuclear electricity production and plant availability from 1956 to 2019.
100
80
60
40
20
0
2019
states and, on the other, the compensatory expansion of
capacities in the Asian region and capacity increases
of operating plants. Since the mid-1990s, remarkable
increases in capacity have been achieved. With further
optimised turbines alone, an increase in capacity of around
5 % can be gained without increasing the reactor capacity.
If a construction measure also makes increasing the
thermal reactor capacity possible, then the generating
capacity in countries such as Mexico, Sweden, the Slovak
Republic, the USA and Hungary that are already approved
and realised would increase by around 20 %. Until the
end of this decade, a cumulated capacity increase totalling
8,000 MW is estimated. This equates to the new construction
of about 6 large nuclear power units. In the USA alone,
capacity increases totalling approx. 10,000 MWe net have
been realised or approved, a further 700 MWe currently to
be realised until 2020 have been applied for.
With the 443 operating plants at the end of 2019, there
were 9 units less in operation than in the hitherto record
year 2018 with 452 nuclear power plants.
The nuclear power plants worldwide have achieved
a approx. 1 % higher result in 2019 compared to the
previous year in the net electricity generation with
approx. 2,657 billion (109) kWh (2,632 billion kWh,
provision details and calculations, cf. Table 1 and
Figure 4). In Japan, with the exception of 9 reactor units,
all other 24 plants were not connected to the grid for the
whole year. The previous best result of nuclear electricity
production accounted for 2,658 billion kWh in 2006. Good
operating results were reported from the power plants in
Belgium, China, Finland, Germany, Russia, Switzerland
and the USA.
The overall operational reliability of the plants is
underlined by the average mean availability for work of all
nuclear power plants worldwide (cf. Figure 4). Their
average had increased since the mid 1990s. The strong
decrease in availability at the beginning of the 1990s is due
to the large drop in the availability of plants in the East
European states and the GUS states, whose operating data
were included consistently in the statistics for the first
time. The long-term cessation of individual profitable
nuclear power plant, and the quasi whole nuclear power
park of Japan as of 2011, also influence the lower average
availability in the years 2006 to 2009. Since 2011 the
availability is slightly increasing with the commissioning
of nuclear power plants in lay-up operation.
The Top Ten nuclear power plants in power generation
(net) 2019 are: (1) Taishan-1, China, 11.952 TWh;
(2) Civaux-1, France, 11.608 TWh; (3) Peach Bottom-2,
USA, 11.534 TWh; (4) South Texas-1, USA, 11.515 TWh;
Report
Nuclear Power World Report 2019

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
(5) Palo Verde-2, USA, 11.434 TWh; (6) Isar-2, Germany,
11.375 TWh; (7) Chooz B-1, France, 11.128 TWh;
(8) Susquehanna-1, USA, 11.105 TWh; (9) Grand Gulf-1,
USA, 11.032 TWh; (10) Nine Mile Point-2, USA,
10.993 TWh.
Worldwide around 84,099 billion (10 9 ) kWh net
electricity have cumulatively been produced in nuclear
power plants since electricity was first generated from
nuclear power. The experience in the nuclear power plant
operations amount to approx. 17,250 reactor years.
Regarding climate protection, nuclear power plants
have avoided about 2.40 billion (10 9 ) t carbon dioxide
emisisons 2)
in 2019. The emissions avoided through
nuclear energy correspond to some 6 % of the current
annual emissions worldwide of CO 2 , in the meanwhile
over, approx. 35 billion tons. The emissions avoided
each year through nuclear power are distinctly higher
than the worldwide reduction targets contained in the
existing international protocols and agreements on climate
protection (Kyoto protocol) for the period 2008 to 2012!
* The atw lists nuclear power plants as “operating” as the time when
first criticality was attained as a “nuclear” criterion. Other sources
refer to the 1st power generation or the start of commercial
operation. Nuclear power plants are no longer listed as “operating”
when a long-term cessation , i.e. over several years, has been
decided. Should the operator possess a valid framework operating
approval or no application for the definitive cessation of the operating
plant has been submitted, then the operating status is listed as
“ lay-up”. (cf. Spain and Japan).
1) The data for gross and net capacities have been revised with
reference to “nameplate” data as from 2019 (in particular data for
U.S: nuclear power plant units, source: U.S. EIA)
2) The CO 2 reduction factor is based on the average worldwide CO 2
emissions of fossile-fired power plants in countries with NPPs in
operation.
525
KTG INSIDE
Inside
Herzlichen Glückwunsch!
Die KTG gratuliert ihren Mitgliedern sehr herzlich zum Geburtstag
und wünscht ihnen weiterhin alles Gute!
November 2020
45 Jahre | 1975
07. Gregor Beger, Radebeul
55 Jahre | 1965
24. Dipl.-Ing. Angelika Lenz, Krefeld
60 Jahre | 1960
01. Burkhard Hartmann, Schefflenz
77 Jahre | 1943
25. Dr. Holger Teichel, Hemmingen
29. Kurt Frischengruber, Langensendelbach
83 Jahre | 1937
08. Dr. Hartmut Bilger, Ettlingen
19. Dr. Ulrich Tillessen, Waldshut-Tiengen
26. Dr. Armin Hermann, Brugg/ CH
84 Jahre | 1936
10. Dipl.-Ing. Stefan Beliczey,
Bergisch Gladbach
20. Dipl.-Ing. Dieter Scholz, Glashütten
85 Jahre | 1935
13. Dr. Aleksandar Stojadinovic, Köln
Nachträgliche
Geburtstagsnennungen:
Oktober 2020
75 Jahre | 1945
22. Michael Schulz, Wesel
Wenn Sie künftig eine
Erwähnung Ihres
Geburtstages in der
atw wünschen, teilen
Sie dies bitte der KTG-
Geschäftsstelle mit.
KTG Inside
78 Jahre | 1942
10. Dipl.-Ing. Harald Klinkert, Ründeroth
79 Jahre | 1941
09. Dr. Gotthart Stein, Bonn
80 Jahre | 1940
14. Ing. Uwe Siekmann, Bergisch Gladbach
81 Jahre | 1939
22. Dr. Heinz Koinig, Enzersdorf/ AT
28. Dr. Karl-Heinz Blank, Mannheim
82 Jahre | 1938
19. Dr. Friedrich Reiss, Ketsch
86 Jahre | 1934
03. Dipl.-Phys. Hans-Christoph Breest,
St. Augustin
21. Dr. Werner Rudloff, Uttenreuth
26. Dipl.-Ing. Peter Ruße, Dortmund
88 Jahre | 1932
29. Dipl.-Ing. Karl F. Schlupp, Essen
90 Jahre | 1930
24. Dr. Urban Cleve, Dortmund
91 Jahre | 1929
09. Dipl.-Ing. Amandus Brandstetter,
Köln
Verantwortlich
für den Inhalt:
Die Autoren.
Lektorat:
Natalija Cobanov,
Kerntechnische
Gesellschaft e. V.
(KTG)
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin
T: +49 30 498555-50
F: +49 30 498555-51
E-Mail:
natalija.cobanov@
ktg.org
www.ktg.org
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atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
526
NEWS
Top
IAEA Report: nuclear power
to continue to play key role
in low-carbon electricity
production
(iaea) The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) has released its
latest projections for energy, electricity
and nuclear power trends through
2050. Compared with the previous
year, the 2020 projections are largely
unchanged. Under the high case
scenario, IAEA analysts expect an
increase of global nuclear electrical
generating capacity by 82 % to
715 GW. Under the low case scenario,
it will fall by 7 % to 363 GW.
“The latest IAEA annual projections
show that nuclear power will
continue to play a key role in the
world’s low-carbon energy mix, with
global nuclear electrical capacity seen
nearly doubling by 2050 in our high
case scenario. Climate change mitigation
remains a key potential driver
for maintaining and expanding the
use of nuclear power,” IAEA Director
General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.
The 40 th edition of Energy, Electricity
and Nuclear Power Estimates
for the Period up to 2050 provides
detailed global trends in nuclear
power by region. The report presents
its projections for nuclear electrical
generating capacity as low and high
estimates. They reflect different
scenarios for the worldwide deployment
of this low carbon energy source.
From 2019 to 2050, global electricity
generation is expected to more
than double, exceeding nuclear generation
capacity growth also in the
high case scenario. Therefore, IAEA
experts expect the share of nuclear
power amongst all sources of electricity
to remain either stable or decline.
In 2019 nuclear power generated
10.4 % of global electricity.
According to the report, immediate
and concerted action is required for
nuclear power to reach a share of
@
REFERENCE DATA SERIES No. 1
2020 Edition
Energy, Electricity and
Nuclear Power Estimates
for the Period up to 2050
11 % in electricity production by
2050, as seen in the high case
sce nario. In the low case scenario,
the share of nuclear energy relative
to global electricity production could
decline to about 6 %.
Operating Results June 2020
Plant name Country Nominal
capacity
Type
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Month Year Since
commissioning
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Month Year Month Year
OL1 Olkiluoto 1) BWR FI 910 880 543 477 444 3 525 453 272 990 923 75.38 90.99 72.64 87.46 72.08 87.75
OL2 Olkiluoto 1) BWR FI 910 880 720 650 282 3 738 736 263 102 821 100.00 93.86 100.00 93.12 98.17 93.06
KCB Borssele 1) PWR NL 512 484 339 165 638 1 969 845 169 951 279 50.94 88.98 44.36 87.84 44.98 88.25
KKB 1 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 720 272 924 1 348 059 131 656 879 100.00 80.74 100.00 80.46 99.74 81.13
KKB 2 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 720 270 809 1 661 200 138 957 983 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.89 98.98 100.15
KKG Gösgen 1,2,4,7) PWR CH 1060 1010 303 283 006 4 153 577 326 269 812 42.01 90.44 38.03 89.74 37.08 89.73
CNT-I Trillo 1,2) PWR ES 1066 1003 251 250 709 3 612 870 259 360 896 34.82 81.62 32.42 80.69 32.32 77.03
Dukovany B1 PWR CZ 500 473 720 350 616 2 170 129 118 054 312 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.93 97.39 99.39
Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 720 347 907 2 155 425 113 198 744 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.92 96.64 98.71
Dukovany B3 PWR CZ 500 473 720 348 654 988 528 111 240 264 100.00 46.83 100.00 46.04 96.85 45.27
Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 720 352 998 1 678 379 112 385 337 100.00 77.01 99.96 76.93 98.06 76.87
Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 720 774 754 2 931 378 124 846 191 100.00 62.22 99.95 61.05 99.45 62.04
Temelin B2 1) PWR CZ 1080 1030 285 302 944 4 326 302 121 808 920 39.58 90.04 39.38 89.98 38.89 91.56
Doel 1 2) PWR BE 454 433 529 226 167 226 167 137 962 226 73.49 12.12 67.61 11.15 67.10 11.06
Doel 2 PWR BE 454 433 720 321 607 325 967 136 661 437 100.00 17.47 97.01 16.56 95.33 16.28
Doel 3 PWR BE 1056 1006 720 714 069 4 651 160 267 762 811 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 93.18 100.38
Doel 4 2) PWR BE 1084 1033 118 119 451 4 114 121 273 752 396 16.34 86.21 15.77 85.81 15.00 85.49
Tihange 1 2) PWR BE 1009 962 0 0 0 307 547 424 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tihange 2 PWR BE 1055 1008 720 739 997 4 555 332 262 609 850 100.00 100.00 99.95 99.90 98.24 99.82
Tihange 3 2) PWR BE 1089 1038 147 153 673 4 096 335 284 658 911 20.48 86.89 20.06 86.80 19.68 86.65
Plant name
Type
Nominal
capacity
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability Energy utilisation
[%] *) [%] *)
Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year
commissioning
KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 720 967 463 5 677 362 366 398 384 100.00 100.00 93.63 94.08 90.45 87.48
KKE Emsland DWR 1406 1335 720 1 000 319 5 258 429 362 858 630 100.00 87.60 99.99 87.45 98.82 85.63
KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 720 968 304 4 477 268 392 752 114 100.00 89.32 99.71 89.16 93.46 71.24
KRB C Gundremmingen 1) SWR 1344 1288 293 382 829 4 675 047 345 998 599 40.69 80.98 39.84 79.67 39.20 79.05
KKI-2 Isar DWR 1485 1410 720 1 015 144 6 133 793 371 896 262 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99 94.47 94.13
GKN-II Neckarwestheim 1,2,4) DWR 1400 1310 448 590 200 5 546 700 345 784 944 62.19 93.77 62.19 93.75 58.54 90.82
News

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Commitments made under the
2016 Paris Agreement on climate
change and other initiatives could
support nuclear power development,
provided the necessary energy policies
and market designs are established to
facilitate investments in dispatchable,
low carbon technologies. Furthermore,
nuclear power could provide
solutions for electricity consumption
growth, air quality concerns, the
security of energy supply and price
volatility of other fuels.
The report lays out that about two
thirds of nuclear power reactors have
been in operation for over 30 years,
highlighting the need for significant
new nuclear capacity to offset retirements.
Uncertainty remains regarding
the replacement of the large number
of reactors scheduled to be retired
around 2030 and beyond, particularly
in North America and Europe. Ageing
management programmes and long
term operation are being imple mented
for an increasing number of reactors.
Operating Results July 2020
Since it was first published 40 years
ago, the IAEA projections have been
continually refined to reflect an evolving
global energy context. Over the
past decade, nuclear power development
has remained within the range of
projections described in prior editions.
| www.iaea.org (202621420)
World
FORATOM underlines key
role of nuclear in achieving
ambitious climate targets
(foratom) FORATOM welcomes the
European Commission’s proposal to
increase its 2030 CO 2 emission reduction
target to at least 55 %. This is
essential if the EU is to achieve carbon
neutrality by 2050. The nuclear sector
stands ready to play its part by providing
a stable supply of low-carbon
electricity, as well as other energy
carriers (e.g. hydrogen).
In terms of decarbonising the
electricity sector, FORATOM has
identified two challenges: ensuring
security of supply and costs.
“It is clear that by supporting an
energy mix which combines both
nuclear power and variable renewables,
the EU will have access to a
low-carbon supply of electricity, 24/7”
states Yves Desbazeille, FORATOM
Director General. “Such a combination
will contribute not only ensuring
security of supply, but also keeping the
costs of the transition to a minimum”.
According to the conclusions of
an FTI-CL Energy Consulting study
commissioned by FORATOM (“Pathways
to 2050: role of nuclear in a
low-carbon Europe”), Europe could
save more than 440 bn € between
2020 and 2050 by supporting a 25 %
share of nuclear in the 2050 electricity
mix. Customers would save around
350 bn € in costs, with 90 % of these
savings occuring before 2035 thanks
primarily to the life-time extension of
*)
Net-based values
(Czech and Swiss
nuclear power
plants gross-based)
1)
Refueling
2)
Inspection
3)
Repair
4)
Stretch-outoperation
5)
Stretch-inoperation
6)
Hereof traction supply
7)
Incl. steam supply
BWR: Boiling
Water Reactor
PWR: Pressurised
Water Reactor
Source: VGB
527
NEWS
Plant name Country Nominal
capacity
Type
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Month Year Since
commissioning
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Month Year Month Year
OL1 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 744 674 376 4 199 829 273 665 299 100.00 92.30 100.00 89.28 98.52 89.32
OL2 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 744 667 275 4 406 011 263 770 096 100.00 94.75 99.93 94.11 97.49 93.70
KCB Borssele PWR NL 512 484 653 321 983 2 291 828 170 273 262 86.84 88.67 86.91 87.70 84.42 87.69
KKB 1 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 744 273 800 1 621 859 131 930 679 100.00 83.55 100.00 83.30 96.72 83.40
KKB 2 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 744 271 729 1 932 929 139 229 712 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.90 96.00 99.55
KKG Gösgen 7) PWR CH 1060 1010 744 775 109 4 928 686 327 044 921 100.00 91.83 99.99 91.23 98.28 90.97
CNT-I Trillo PWR ES 1066 1003 744 782 497 4 395 367 260 143 393 100.00 84.29 100.00 83.50 97.80 80.05
Dukovany B1 PWR CZ 500 473 744 360 826 2 530 955 118 415 138 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.94 97.00 99.04
Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 738 349 089 2 504 515 113 547 833 99.19 99.88 97.88 99.62 93.84 98.00
Dukovany B3 PWR CZ 500 473 744 359 231 1 347 758 111 599 495 100.00 54.57 100.00 53.89 96.57 52.74
Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 744 363 372 2 041 751 112 748 708 100.00 80.36 100.00 80.29 97.68 79.90
Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 744 799 584 3 730 962 125 645 775 100.00 67.72 99.97 66.72 99.33 67.47
Temelin B2 1) PWR CZ 1080 1030 0 0 4 326 302 121 808 920 0 76.93 0 76.88 0 78.23
Doel 1 PWR BE 454 433 744 345 072 571 238 138 307 298 100.00 24.91 99.95 24.07 99.44 23.93
Doel 2 PWR BE 454 433 744 342 203 668 170 137 003 640 100.00 29.49 99.07 28.80 98.25 28.44
Doel 3 2) PWR BE 1056 1006 403 357 244 5 008 404 268 120 054 54.22 93.34 53.92 93.29 44.82 92.30
Doel 4 PWR BE 1084 1033 694 719 111 4 833 232 274 471 507 93.31 87.24 89.61 86.36 87.39 85.77
Tihange 1 2) PWR BE 1009 962 0 0 0 307 547 424 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tihange 2 PWR BE 1055 1008 540 541 079 5 096 411 263 150 929 72.61 96.01 70.66 95.64 69.41 95.39
Tihange 3 2) PWR BE 1089 1038 0 0 4 096 335 284 658 911 0 74.24 0 74.16 0 74.04
Plant name
Type
Nominal
capacity
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability Energy utilisation
[%] *) [%] *)
Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year
commissioning
KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 744 988 479 6 665 841 367 386 864 100.00 100.00 94.31 94.11 89.33 87.75
KKE Emsland DWR 1406 1335 744 1 025 986 6 284 415 363 884 616 100.00 89.40 100.00 89.28 98.07 87.44
KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 744 995 246 5 472 514 393 747 360 100.00 90.87 98.98 90.59 92.93 74.40
KRB C Gundremmingen 1) SWR 1344 1288 494 618 401 5 293 448 346 617 000 66.36 78.85 62.62 77.19 61.35 76.47
KKI-2 Isar 1,2) DWR 1485 1410 240 332 429 6 466 222 372 228 691 32.27 90.14 31.41 90.01 29.91 84.78
GKN-II Neckarwestheim 1,2) DWR 1400 1310 373 508 100 6 054 800 346 293 044 50.13 87.42 48.87 87.21 48.87 84.71
News

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
528
NEWS
existing nuclear reactors as well as the
construction of new ones. Furthermore,
around bn 90 € could also be
saved in relation to the additional
Transmission and Distribution grid
costs needed to accommodate the
new solar and wind capacity, if ever
built, which would replace the lost
nuclear capacity.
“It should be noted that the transition
is not just about saving costs, it’s
also about ensuring economic growth
and jobs” adds Mr Desbazeille. “Here
nuclear plays an important role as it
currently sustains more than 1 million
jobs in the EU-27. By 2050, this figure
could rise to 1.2 million”.
The European nuclear industry
stands ready to play its part in helping
the EU to decarbonise. To do this, EU
policy must treat all technologies in the
same way. As highlighted by several
Member States at the end of 2019, if
they are to progress towards such
ambitious targets then they must have
the freedom to include low- carbon
nuclear within their energy mix.
The European Atomic Forum
( FORATOM) is the Brussels-based trade
association for the nuclear energy
industry in Europe. The membership of
FORATOM is made up of 15 national
nuclear associations and through these
associations, FORATOM represents
nearly 3,000 European companies
working in the industry and supporting
around 1,100,000 jobs.
| www.foratom.org (202621426)
NEI: Small reactor design
approval is a big deal
for carbon-free energy
(nei) In a step forward for carbon-free
energy innovation, the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission moved closer
to licensing a small modular reactor
(SMR) by issuing a final safety evaluation
report (FSER).
New nuclear technology moves
closer to becoming a reality
With this announcement, NuScale
Power LLC – which submitted its SMR
design for approval in 2017 – is on the
verge of getting NRC endorsement for
a fundamentally new concept in
reactor design and a plant that is
radically simpler.
At a time when reducing carbon
emissions has never been more urgent,
the announcement moves an important
new carbon-free technology
towards commercialization, so it can
provide electricity around the world.
In practical terms, the FSER makes
it easier for a U.S. utility to develop the
NuScale power plant. It also functions
as an American seal of approval for
countries around the world that are
looking for a flexible, appropriately
sized carbon-free power producer that
can be installed with relatively little
on-site construction and little local
regulatory experience.
NuScale is planning to supply its
first SMR plant in eastern Idaho, for
Utah Associated Municipal Power
Systems (UAMPS) and has exploratory
agreements with companies in
Canada, Romania, the Czech Republic
and Jordan.
“This is a significant milestone not
only for NuScale, but also for the entire
U.S. nuclear sector and the other advanced
nuclear technologies that will
follow,” said NuScale Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer John Hopkins.
NRC meets innovation in design
with innovation in regulation
With this announcement, NRC staff is
independently verifying the com pany’s
own safety analysis, which says that
the design meets all applicable standards.
“Applicable” is an important
detail here, because the staff is agreeing
that some of the requirements
that the agency imposes on existing
reactors simply don’t apply here.
For example, the SMR design
doesn’t need any emergency water
supplies for safety – instead relying on
natural forces for cooling – so there is
a whole complex of tanks, pumps,
valves and piping that don’t need to be
built, inspected, tested and evaluated.
Furthermore, there is no need for
an extensive system of emergency
diesel generators that are carefully
maintained at current plants in order
to operate those pumps and valves;
and finally, the inherent safety features
of the design will keep the reactor safe
in case of mechanical malfunction,
without action by control room operators.
Operators will be trained and
available, as at all reactors, but the
system is passively safe.
There are several steps remaining
in the regulatory process, including
public comment; however, the FSER
demonstrates that the NRC can
success fully evaluate an innovative
design that breaks with many of the
old assumptions about nuclear energy.
A regulator that can facilitate innovation
is essential to the future of nuclear
technology.
NuScale’s progress is a major
win for advanced nuclear and
the climate
There are a lot of good ideas emerging
from new reactor developers, and
NuScale’s SMR is poised to be the first
radical rethinking of reactor design
approved by the Commission in many
years. It is a positive sign for NuScale,
for UAMPS and the advanced reactor
industry as a whole.
As this innovative design moves from
concept to reality, it signals a new era
of advanced nuclear technology that
will be essential in meeting carbonfree
energy goals across the country
and making electricity more accessible
for all.
| www.nei.org (202621431)
Company News
Framatome partners
with ADAGOS to bring
artificial intelligence to the
nuclear energy industry
(fraatome) Framatome signed an
exclusive partnership agreement with
Adagos to bring advanced, parsimonious
artificial intelligence technology
to the nuclear energy industry. Adagos’
NeurEco architecture introduces a
third-generation neural network to
solve large and complex problems
using fewer computational and data
resources compared to pre vious
generations.
“Artificial intelligence is a game
changer for advancing technologies
and increasing the competitiveness
and efficiency of the nuclear energy
industry now and in the decades to
come,” said Catherine Cornand,
senior executive vice president of the
Installed Base Business Unit at
Framatome. “This partnership will
allow us to provide new digital solutions
for our customers worldwide,
contributing to reliable, economical,
low-carbon electricity.”.
Neural networks analyze data and
information in a way that mimics the
human brain. NeurEco addresses
common challenges to artificial intelligence
and deep-learning technology.
Its new neural network approach
based on parsimony reduces resources
such as the amount of learning data,
energy consumption, size of neural
network, requested memory and
computing time required to implement
deep-learning methods. It
generates new types of parsimonious
neural networks that provide answers
to non- linear questions while minimizing
resource size and complexity.
The NeurEco technology provides
robust solutions to historical challenges
to applying artificial intelligence
in the nuclear energy industry.
News

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
Uranium
Prize range: Spot market [USD*/lb(US) U 3O 8]
140.00
) 1
Uranium prize range: Spot market [USD*/lb(US) U 3O 8]
140.00
) 1
120.00
120.00
529
100.00
100.00
80.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
Yearly average prices in real USD, base: US prices (1982 to1984) *
60.00
40.00
20.00
NEWS
0.00
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Year
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year
Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020
| Uranium spot market prices from 1980 to 2020 and from 2009 to 2020. The price range is shown.
In years with U.S. trade restrictions the unrestricted uranium spot market price is shown.
Separative work: Spot market price range [USD*/kg UTA]
Conversion: Spot conversion price range [USD*/kgU]
180.00
26.00
) 1 ) 1
160.00
140.00
0.00
24.00
22.00
20.00
Jan. 2009
Jan. 2010
Jan. 2011
Jan. 2012
Jan. 2013
Jan. 2014
Jan. 2015
Jan. 2016
Jan. 2017
Jan. 2018
Jan. 2019
Jan. 2020
Jan. 2021
120.00
18.00
16.00
100.00
14.00
80.00
12.00
10.00
60.00
8.00
40.00
6.00
20.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
Jan. 2009
Jan. 2010
Jan. 2011
Jan. 2012
Jan. 2013
Jan. 2014
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year
Jan. 2015
Jan. 2016
Jan. 2017
Jan. 2018
Jan. 2019
Jan. 2020
Jan. 2021
Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020
Jan. 2009
Jan. 2010
Jan. 2011
Jan. 2012
Jan. 2013
Jan. 2014
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year
Jan. 2015
Jan. 2016
Jan. 2017
Jan. 2018
Jan. 2019
Jan. 2020
Jan. 2021
Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2020
| Separative work and conversion market price ranges from 2009 to 2020. The price range is shown.
)1
In December 2009 Energy Intelligence changed the method of calculation for spot market prices. The change results in virtual price leaps.
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bilder/Figures: atw 2020
Calculation times for non-linear fields
such as neutronics and computational
fluid designs can be reduced from
days to a few minutes, and the generated
metamodel provides more
information on the output. Sensitivity
studies are raised to the next level
with extensive results verses one for
consideration. Calculation files are
several hundred times smaller and can
be compressed and decompressed
infinitely, saving time and money for
operators.
“This partnership combines
Framatome’s engineering expertise
and Adagos’ cutting-edge technology
to automate and resolve complex
issues,” said Alexis Marincic, senior
executive vice president of the Engineering
and Design Authority at Framatome.
“Together, we share a commitment
to provide the nuclear industry
with an unprecedented, high-quality,
innovative solution that transforms
data and drives performance for our
customers’ daily operations.”
Located in Toulouse, France, Adagos
is a computer software provider that
specializes in neural network advancements
for the health, automotive and
energy industries. The Silicon Review
recognized Adagos as one of the 50 best
companies to watch in 2020.
| www.framatome.com (202621437)
Market data
(All information is supplied without
guarantee.)
Nuclear Fuel Supply
Market Data
Information in current (nominal)
U.S.-$. No inflation adjustment of
prices on a base year. Separative work
data for the formerly “secondary
market”. Uranium prices [US-$/lb
U 3 O 8 ; 1 lb = 453.53 g; 1 lb U 3 O 8 =
0.385 kg U]. Conversion prices [US-$/
kg U], Separative work [US-$/SWU
(Separative work unit)].
2017
p Uranium: 19.25–26.50
p Conversion: 4.50–6.75
p Separative work: 39.00–50.00
2018
p Uranium: 21.75–29.20
p Conversion: 6.00–14.50
p Separative work: 34.00–42.00
2019
January to June 2019
p Uranium: 23.90–29.10
p Conversion: 13.50–18.00
p Separative work: 41.00–49.00
July to December 2019
p Uranium: 24.50–26.25
p Conversion: 18.00–23.00
p Separative work: 47.00–52.00
2020
January 2020
p Uranium: 24.10–24.90
p Conversion: 22.00–23.00
p Separative work: 48.00–51.00
February 2020
p Uranium: 24.25–25.00
p Conversion: 22.00–23.00
p Separative work: 45.00–53.00
March 2020
p Uranium: 23.05–27.40
p Conversion: 21.50–23.50
p Separative work: 45.00–52.00
April 2020
p Uranium: 27.50–34.00
p Conversion: 21.50–23.50
p Separative work: 45.00–52.00
May 2020
p Uranium: 33.50–34.50
p Conversion: 21.50–23.50
p Separative work: 48.00–52.00
June 2020
p Uranium: 33.00–33.50
p Conversion: 21.50–23.50
p Separative work: 49.00–52.00
July 2020
p Uranium: 32.50–33.20
p Conversion: 21.50–23.50
p Separative work: 50.50–53.50
| Source: Energy Intelligence
www.energyintel.com
News

atw Vol. 65 (2020) | Issue 10 ı October
530
NUCLEAR TODAY
John Shepherd is
editor-in-chief of
New Energy 360 and
WorldBatteryNews.com.
Sources:
NASA report on China:
https://bbc.in/2F5nhzc
Launch of Natrium:
https://bit.ly/3i1DUtP
IEA analysis:
https://bit.ly/326yU1n
Nuclear has a Clear Advantage
on the Post-Pandemic Climate Agenda
As we all start out on the road to what is now referred to as the ‘new normal’ – a world that will have to get on with life
in the shadow of Covid-19 for some time to come – what better opportunity to take stock of how we have been caring for
ourselves and our environment and to think about what we could do better.
It’s hard to talk about ‘emerging from the pandemic’ when
so many countries still have a major public health battle on
their hands’. However, prolonged hibernation is not an
option. The world must collectively pick itself up from the
awful impact of what has happened and move on.
But it cannot mean a return to ‘business as usual’
and that is to be welcomed. Our industrial activities in
particular are under greater scrutiny now more than ever,
as a result of the pandemic.
The lockdowns much of the world experienced in
recent months saw cars disappear from the roads, public
transportation halted and major industries reduced to a
flicker of activity or idled completely. However, while
economies suffered, ecology flourished – most noticeably
in terms of the reduction in carbon emissions and the
positive impact on air quality across the developing and
developed nations.
In India, data published in the journal ‘Joule’ showed
an increase in output of more than 8% from solar installations
in Delhi after that country’s first mandatory
lockdown in March. That might not sound like much,
but experts point out that if a solar company expected to
get a 2 % profit margin out of their planned 100 % panel
output, and suddenly they are getting an output of 108 %,
that means their margin has increased fivefold, from 2 %
to 10 %.
In the UK, at one point during the spring lockdown,
renewable electricity sources were providing almost 70 %
of Britain’s electricity, according to ‘Drax Electric Insight’.
In late May, nuclear power and renewables together
produced 90 % of Britain’s electricity, leaving just 2.8 GW
to come from fossil fuels, Drax reported.
Satellite images of China, published by the US space
agency NASA, showed what the agency said was a dramatic
decline in pollution levels that was “at least partly” due to
the economic slowdown prompted by the pandemic.
So, despite the deadly consequences of the pandemic,
the ‘positive impact’ of Covid-19 on the environment
should be regarded as an environmental wake-up call.
Nuclear power generation is among industrialised
activities that can thrive without choking our atmosphere.
The nuclear industry now has an opportunity to seize the
moment and burnish its environmental credentials further.
Now is the time to reach out directly to the general public
and restate nuclear’s ability to flourish as part of an
increasingly renewables-rich energy landscape.
There is everything to play for and the logic,
evidence – and most importantly the science – are on the
side of nuclear energy.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA),
while the existing nuclear fleet remains the world’s second
most important low-carbon source of electricity, new
nuclear construction is not on track with the agency’s
Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS).
The IEA projected in 2019 that, according to current
trends, nuclear capacity in 2040 would amount to
455 GW – “well below the SDS level of 601 GW”. The IEA
said additional lifetime extensions and a doubling of the
annual rate of capacity additions was required.
IEA executive director Fatih Birol was unambiguous:
“Alongside renewables, energy efficiency and other
innovative technologies, nuclear can make a significant
contribution to achieving sustainable energy goals and
enhancing energy security.”
The IEA is not an organisation that might be classed as
a ‘typical suspect’ when it comes to support for nuclear.
The agency simply points out the obvious, guided by the
science, and urges countries to “keep their options open”.
The IEA also recognises the value of supporting innovative
new reactor designs, such as small modular reactors.
In turn, as the IEA correctly points out, these advances in
technology can actually help the integration of more wind
and solar capacity into electricity systems.
And as readers of this journal will know, there are
advances in nuclear technology that can support the clean
energy transition that are attracting investment.
One example is the ‘Natrium’ concept, launched in the
US recently by TerraPower and GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy.
The concept features a sodium fast reactor combined with
a molten salt energy storage system that the partners say
will allow more than five hours of energy storage. The
hope is that the technology could be commercialised by
the end of this decade.
In the UK, EDF is looking into the prospects for
low- carbon hydrogen production by electrolysis using
nuclear-generated electricity. Hydrogen is widely seen as a
potential contributor to a future, cleaner fuel mix, for
transport.
Returning to my earlier point, encouraging a new public
relations offensive by the nuclear industry, how might this
be achieved?
A grassroots approach would be a great start. Nuclear
energy associations and utilities could look at reviving
the popular ‘town twinning’ schemes that were so active in
the 1980s and 1990s, but focusing on cities or regions
that host nuclear power plants or research facilities.
These communities could be encouraged to exchange
experiences of the beneficial impact the plants have had on
the respective communities – and to eventually be able,
pandemic restrictions permitting, to organise reciprocal
visits.
I recollect such a scheme was launched some time ago
in Europe by mayors of cities that hosted nuclear facilities.
What better time to breathe new life into that initiative?
The people who work within, or live alongside nuclear
facilities, understand the benefits of the technology and
are among the best ‘ambassadors’ for the industry in our
new, more climate-conscious world. Let their voices be
heard.
Author
John Shepherd
Nuclear Today
Nuclear has a Clear Advantage on the Post-Pandemic Climate Agenda ı John Shepherd

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