Valuing Life_ A Plea for Disaggregation

2004] VALUING LIFE 443
asking some question about the aggregate costs of global climate
change by 2050, unless it has some particular point. A far more
sensible question is whether it would make sense for any particular
nation to accept a particular way of responding to the problem of
climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol. 191
At the national level,
an assessment of the costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol is not
much different from an assessment of the costs and benefits of any
other regulation.
For the United States, the likely costs of the Kyoto Protocol
greatly exceed its likely benefits. The anticipated costs are $325
billion, 192
an amount that might be worthwhile if the anticipated
benefits for the United States were in the ballpark of that number.
But the overall benefits of the Kyoto Protocol are small because the
mandatory emissions reduction would make only a slight dent in
global warming. 193
In the United States, the benefits could not
possibly justify the costs. 194
The picture for the world as a whole is
more mixed, with Europe anticipated to be a net gainer. 195 But even
for the world, the Kyoto Protocol appears to impose costs in excess of
benefits—and this is so even if improbable catastrophic risks are
taken into account. The only qualification here is that the science of
global warming is disputed; if this is a realm of uncertainty rather
than risk, and if worst-case scenarios are emphasized, then the Kyoto
Protocol might provide a sensible impetus toward technological
innovation and far more dramatic reductions.
For wealthy nations, of course, the argument for contributing to
the reduction of global warming is strengthened by the fact that the
harms of global warming will be felt disproportionately in poor
nations—and also by the fact that wealthy nations have done by far
the most to produce the situation that makes global warming a
serious problem. Hence it is reasonable to say that the United States
should join international agreements to combat global warming even
if it loses more than it gains. The problem with the Kyoto Protocol is
191. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 168 (2000) (“Finally, the Kyoto Protocol has significant
distributional consequences . . . . The lion’s share of the[] costs are borne by the United States.
Indeed, the United States is a net loser while the rest of the world on balance benefits from the
Kyoto Protocol.”).
192. Id. at 161.
193. Id. at 152.
194. Id. at 130–31 & tbl.7.4.
195. Id. at 162.