Life after Doha: Some reflections in the run up to the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference on Bali

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particularly USTR Robert Zoellick were caught so off-‐guard <strong>in</strong> Cancun when this issue threatened <strong>to</strong> take centre stage and became a cause célèbre around which many develop<strong>in</strong>g countries could rally. 17 Know<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> political sensitivities, particularly <strong>the</strong> positions of key members of Congress on this issue, <strong>the</strong>re was little Zoellick could concede <strong>in</strong> Cancun, which put <strong>the</strong> US delegation <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> unenviable position of fight<strong>in</strong>g a rear-‐guard action <strong>in</strong> defence of a collection of subsidies that were manifestly <strong>in</strong>defensible given <strong>the</strong>ir obvious and demonstrated impact on cot<strong>to</strong>n growers <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> affected African countries. This caused <strong>the</strong> US delegation <strong>to</strong> look <strong>in</strong>sensitive and made <strong>the</strong> DDA's stated goal of improv<strong>in</strong>g development outcomes for <strong>the</strong> world's poor seem like a cruel and cynical joke. It is no wonder develop<strong>in</strong>g countries <strong>to</strong>ok <strong>the</strong> combative stance that <strong>the</strong>y did on what seemed <strong>to</strong> be <strong>the</strong> most important issue <strong>to</strong> developed countries at <strong>the</strong> talks, namely <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues. 18 The "explicit consensus" language that hung over <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues was <strong>the</strong> result of <strong>in</strong>transigence on <strong>the</strong> part of India as <strong>the</strong> last holdout at <strong>the</strong> <strong>Doha</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> agree <strong>to</strong> negotiations on <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues, so that <strong>the</strong> Indian representative <strong>in</strong> <strong>Doha</strong> (Maran) could reportedly only be prevailed <strong>up</strong>on <strong>to</strong> accept this concession if <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>to</strong> start negotiations on <strong>the</strong>se issues was <strong>to</strong> be taken by "explicit consensus" at <strong>the</strong> Fifth M<strong>in</strong>isterial <strong>Conference</strong> (i.e. <strong>the</strong> one <strong>after</strong> <strong>Doha</strong>). 19 Although noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>'s charter (<strong>the</strong> Marrakesh Agreement) suggests that such a th<strong>in</strong>g as explicit consensus exists, over <strong>the</strong> months lead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>up</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cancun meet<strong>in</strong>g, Geneva-‐based representatives, and <strong>the</strong>n at <strong>the</strong> Cancun meet<strong>in</strong>g itself, trade m<strong>in</strong>isters from develop<strong>in</strong>g ______________________________________________ The "explicit consensus" language that had been <strong>in</strong>sisted <strong>up</strong>on by a s<strong>in</strong>gle develop<strong>in</strong>g country at <strong>Doha</strong> was presumably a tactical move <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>to</strong> pre-‐empt any attempt <strong>to</strong> isolate a small gro<strong>up</strong> or even a s<strong>in</strong>gle Member <strong>in</strong> its opposition <strong>to</strong> start launch negotiations on <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues. ______________________________________________ countries had actively worked <strong>to</strong> cultivate <strong>the</strong> narrative that a decision allow<strong>in</strong>g negotiations on <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues <strong>to</strong> start would only be taken if <strong>the</strong> entire membership was <strong>in</strong> agreement (which is what <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>'s pr<strong>in</strong>ciple of consensus means anyway). This was presumably a tactical move <strong>in</strong>tended <strong>to</strong> pre-‐empt any attempt <strong>to</strong> isolate a small gro<strong>up</strong> or even a s<strong>in</strong>gle Member <strong>in</strong> its opposition <strong>to</strong> start <strong>the</strong>se negotiations, s<strong>in</strong>ce under <strong>the</strong> normal modus operandi of <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> it is 17 For an <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g expose on how <strong>the</strong> issue emerged and how it was handled <strong>in</strong> Cancun and <strong>the</strong>re<strong>after</strong> see <strong>the</strong> film documentary The Cot<strong>to</strong>n War, by TVEAPfilms available for download and view<strong>in</strong>g at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l673CWNdGLc (visited on 26 July 2013). 18 This is particularly true for <strong>the</strong> EU and Japan, who were perceived as be<strong>in</strong>g some of <strong>the</strong> most <strong>in</strong>transigent members <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> agriculture talks, which develop<strong>in</strong>g countries cared about very passionately. 19 See <strong>the</strong> account <strong>to</strong>ld <strong>in</strong> Bluste<strong>in</strong>, op cit., at <strong>the</strong> bot<strong>to</strong>m of p. 128. 10
<strong>Life</strong> <strong>after</strong> <strong>Doha</strong> | considered very poor form for one Member <strong>in</strong> particular <strong>to</strong> dig <strong>in</strong> its heels and impede progress when everybody else has agreed <strong>to</strong> move forward. The explicit consensus language obviated <strong>the</strong> need for a s<strong>in</strong>gle Member <strong>to</strong> feel embarrassed about be<strong>in</strong>g obstructionist and <strong>to</strong> allow itself <strong>to</strong> be strong-‐armed <strong>in</strong><strong>to</strong> go<strong>in</strong>g along. As it turns out, India was not alone <strong>in</strong> its opposition <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues, s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> representative for Malaysia (Rafidah Aziz) also <strong>to</strong>ok a strong stand at Cancun. 20 Thus it was that, <strong>after</strong> <strong>the</strong> tempers of develop<strong>in</strong>g country delegates had been <strong>in</strong>flamed over cot<strong>to</strong>n and <strong>the</strong> impasse over agriculture, many of <strong>the</strong>m chose <strong>to</strong> vent <strong>the</strong>ir anger on <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues. The Cancun M<strong>in</strong>isterial ultimately collapsed when <strong>the</strong> Mexican Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister Luis Ernes<strong>to</strong> Derbez (<strong>in</strong> his capacity as chairman of <strong>the</strong> conference), see<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> lack of progress on <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues gavelled <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> an unexpected and some would say premature end <strong>in</strong> a green room meet<strong>in</strong>g on 14 September, <strong>after</strong> 4 days of conflict-‐ridden and ultimately fruitless talks. Many blamed <strong>the</strong> US for its unwill<strong>in</strong>gness <strong>to</strong> come <strong>up</strong> with any k<strong>in</strong>d of compromise on cot<strong>to</strong>n besides tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Cot<strong>to</strong>n 4 <strong>to</strong> diversify <strong>the</strong>ir economies. O<strong>the</strong>rs blamed <strong>the</strong> EU for wait<strong>in</strong>g until <strong>the</strong> last day <strong>to</strong> concede on <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues, while yet o<strong>the</strong>rs blamed <strong>the</strong> militancy of develop<strong>in</strong>g countries. <strong>Some</strong> even saw Derbez's sudden desire <strong>to</strong> end <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tractable stance of develop<strong>in</strong>g countries vis-‐à-‐vis <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore issues as a way <strong>to</strong> do so without allow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> talks <strong>to</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>ue and <strong>the</strong>reby risk <strong>the</strong> prospect of <strong>the</strong> US becom<strong>in</strong>g isolated on <strong>the</strong> cot<strong>to</strong>n issue. Ei<strong>the</strong>r way, it wasn't until <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g summer (2004), that <strong>the</strong> negotiations got back on track, largely thanks <strong>to</strong> US and EU leadership. The Cancun talks, if <strong>the</strong>y had provided anyth<strong>in</strong>g positive (discount<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> accession of <strong>the</strong> first two LDCs <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> Nepal and Cambodia), it was <strong>the</strong> opportunity for develop<strong>in</strong>g countries <strong>to</strong> vent <strong>the</strong>ir wrath, and <strong>to</strong> subsequently return <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g table <strong>in</strong> Geneva with a chance for cooler heads <strong>to</strong> prevail. The July 2004 meet<strong>in</strong>g, which put <strong>the</strong> <strong>Doha</strong> Round decidedly back on track -‐ if only temporarily -‐ arguably owed its success more than perhaps any o<strong>the</strong>r fac<strong>to</strong>r <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> ambitions and tenacity of USTR Bob Zoellick, who -‐ work<strong>in</strong>g closely with <strong>the</strong> EU chief trade negotia<strong>to</strong>r at <strong>the</strong> time Pascal Lamy -‐ managed <strong>to</strong> achieve a level of productive and constructive progress <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> early months of 2004 concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>se two countries' positions on agriculture, that it <strong>in</strong>fected <strong>the</strong> broader <strong>WTO</strong> membership and allowed for a sense of momentum <strong>to</strong> take hold. Thus it was that by <strong>the</strong> end of July 2004, <strong>WTO</strong> Members had coalesced around a framework document -‐ <strong>the</strong> July package -‐ that conta<strong>in</strong>ed a little bit of someth<strong>in</strong>g for everyone. 21 Consensus on <strong>the</strong> key 20 See Bridges Daily Update, 14 September 2003, at: http://ictsd.org/i/w<strong>to</strong>/w<strong>to</strong>-‐mc5-‐cancun-‐2003/bridges-‐daily-‐<strong>up</strong>dates-mc5/161118/ (visited on 26 July 2013). 21 See http://www.w<strong>to</strong>.org/english/tra<strong>to</strong>p_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm. 11
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Life after Doha: Some reflections in the run up to the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference on Bali

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