Life after Doha: Some reflections in the run up to the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference on Bali

<strong>Life</strong> <strong>after</strong> <strong>Doha</strong> |
countries -­‐ <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g large develop<strong>in</strong>g countries -­‐ are just much better resourced and thus
better able <strong>to</strong> consistently field strong teams. 74 Do we blame FIFA for this "<strong>in</strong>justice"? Of course
not. Despite <strong>the</strong>ir resource constra<strong>in</strong>ts, and <strong>the</strong> myriad of more press<strong>in</strong>g policy priorities that
develop<strong>in</strong>g countries and LDCs face, <strong>the</strong>re are arguably many ways for <strong>the</strong>m <strong>to</strong> be more
effective at <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> than <strong>the</strong>y have been before and dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> <strong>Doha</strong> Round. The haphazard
way <strong>in</strong> which <strong>the</strong> Cot<strong>to</strong>n 4 approached this issue is a glar<strong>in</strong>g example: If <strong>the</strong>y had pursued a dual
track of litigation AND negotiation, <strong>the</strong>y would arguably at least be hundreds of millions of
dollars richer by now, ra<strong>the</strong>r than just disg<strong>run</strong>tled. 75
Hav<strong>in</strong>g said this, it is important not <strong>to</strong> conclude that <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> is an organization that cannot
achieve development outcomes, s<strong>in</strong>ce it can and often does. But it should be borne <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d
that development is only likely <strong>to</strong> become <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>'s primary focus once develop<strong>in</strong>g countries
start writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> work programs for future negotiat<strong>in</strong>g rounds, ra<strong>the</strong>r than lett<strong>in</strong>g developed
countries do this for <strong>the</strong>m (which is what happened at <strong>Doha</strong>). Whe<strong>the</strong>r developed countries will
let develop<strong>in</strong>g countries do this is ano<strong>the</strong>r matter entirely, and will of course depend on what
develop<strong>in</strong>g countries are prepared <strong>to</strong> give developed countries <strong>in</strong> return. After all, <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> is
noth<strong>in</strong>g if not a tit-­‐for-­‐tat organization, a negotiat<strong>in</strong>g forum, a place where countries exchange
concessions.
3.3 Th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> Does Well
It should be relatively clear <strong>to</strong> most observers that as <strong>the</strong> former Direc<strong>to</strong>r General Mike Moore
liked <strong>to</strong> repeat, <strong>the</strong> dispute settlement system is undoubtedly <strong>the</strong> jewel <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> Organization's
crown. Compared <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> gridlock that <strong>the</strong> GATT system of dispute settlement succumbed <strong>to</strong>
when <strong>the</strong> US tried (unsuccessfully) <strong>to</strong> use it <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1980s <strong>to</strong> pry open European agricultural
markets that had been closed by <strong>the</strong> Common Agricultural Policy, <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>'s dispute settlement
system is a remarkable piece of <strong>in</strong>ternational treaty mak<strong>in</strong>g and has served its purpose
surpris<strong>in</strong>gly well. Only a limited number of disg<strong>run</strong>tled elements would probably argue that <strong>the</strong>
dispute settlement system needs a radical shake<strong>up</strong> beyond a bit of t<strong>in</strong>ker<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>the</strong> marg<strong>in</strong>s, as
is currently go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> negotiations on DSU reform. Although <strong>the</strong>re have been a small
number of cases that have shown what <strong>the</strong> limits of <strong>the</strong> dispute settlement system are <strong>in</strong>
forc<strong>in</strong>g countries <strong>to</strong> make changes that are politically difficult for <strong>the</strong>m, overall, it is probably
74 The FIFA World C<strong>up</strong> has only ever been won by <strong>the</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g eight national teams: Brazil, Italy, Germany, Argent<strong>in</strong>a, Uruguay,
France, Spa<strong>in</strong>, England; LDCs appear <strong>to</strong> qualify quite <strong>in</strong>frequently, but have started <strong>to</strong> do so more commonly over <strong>the</strong> last 2
decades; see: David Arscott , The World C<strong>up</strong>, A Very Peculiar His<strong>to</strong>ry, Salariya, 2012.
75 Brazil doggedly litigated aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> US cot<strong>to</strong>n subsidies and refused <strong>to</strong> simply let <strong>the</strong> US off <strong>the</strong> hook, so that <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> end, <strong>the</strong>
US ended <strong>up</strong> agree<strong>in</strong>g <strong>to</strong> pay USD 147.3 million <strong>to</strong> Brazilian cot<strong>to</strong>n farmers, a most unusual remedy for <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>; see: Randy
Schnepf, Brazil's <strong>WTO</strong> Case Aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> U. S. Cot<strong>to</strong>n Program, Congressional Research Service, 2010, at:
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32571.pdf (visited on 2 August 2013).
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