Life after Doha: Some reflections in the run up to the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference on Bali

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safe <strong>to</strong> say that <strong>the</strong> consensus is certa<strong>in</strong>ly lean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> favour of preserv<strong>in</strong>g and streng<strong>the</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> dispute settlement function of <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>. Ano<strong>the</strong>r th<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> has proven exceed<strong>in</strong>gly useful for is moni<strong>to</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g how Members are do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> terms of implement<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong>ir commitments. This happens under various <strong>in</strong>struments, <strong>the</strong> most prom<strong>in</strong>ent of which would have <strong>to</strong> be <strong>the</strong> Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which subjects all <strong>WTO</strong> Members <strong>to</strong> a periodic review of <strong>the</strong>ir trade regimes and <strong>the</strong>ir compliance with <strong>WTO</strong> rules. Ano<strong>the</strong>r more recent <strong>in</strong>novation <strong>in</strong> this area has been <strong>the</strong> trade moni<strong>to</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g reports, one of which is performed by <strong>the</strong> Secretariat alone and covers "trade-‐related developments cover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>WTO</strong> membership and observers", <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r of which <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> does <strong>in</strong> collaboration with <strong>the</strong> OECD and UNCTAD, and which focuses on "trade and <strong>in</strong>vestment measures taken by G-‐20 economies". 76 F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> various committee meet<strong>in</strong>gs that take place under <strong>the</strong> specific mandates set forth <strong>in</strong> different <strong>WTO</strong> agreements are also a very useful forum for Members <strong>to</strong> moni<strong>to</strong>r and discuss trade related issues. One example of this (among many) is <strong>the</strong> Committee on Technical Barriers <strong>to</strong> Trade, which meets regularly by virtue of Art. 13 of <strong>the</strong> TBT Agreement. At <strong>the</strong>se meet<strong>in</strong>gs, representatives from <strong>WTO</strong> Members can raise trade-related concerns of activities by o<strong>the</strong>r Members who have enacted or plan <strong>to</strong> enact technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment procedures that threaten <strong>to</strong> have a trade impact on exports of <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. Thus it was that at <strong>the</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> TBT Committee that <strong>to</strong>ok place on 27-‐28 November 2012, Members discussed thirty-‐six different new and recurr<strong>in</strong>g trade concerns, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a proposal <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduce pla<strong>in</strong> packag<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>to</strong>bacco products <strong>in</strong> New Zealand, and import permit regulations for horticultural products from <strong>the</strong> M<strong>in</strong>istries of Agriculture and Trade <strong>in</strong> Indonesia. 77 Thus moni<strong>to</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g is undoubtedly an important function of <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> that nobody would wish <strong>to</strong> see abolished. Boe<strong>in</strong>g vs Airbus; one of <strong>the</strong> costliest and bitterest commercial rivalries that also culm<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> a <strong>WTO</strong> dispute over subsidies. Rules on subsidization are best negotiated multialterally ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>in</strong> PTAs; source: V<strong>in</strong>tage Books Ano<strong>the</strong>r area where <strong>the</strong>re is arguably a large degree of consensus among economists, trade lawyers and policy wonks is that a number of issues exist where negotiations only really make sense when done at <strong>the</strong> multilateral level and thus at <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>, <strong>the</strong> most important of which 76 See: http://www.w<strong>to</strong>.org/english/tra<strong>to</strong>p_e/tpr_e/trade_moni<strong>to</strong>r<strong>in</strong>g_e.htm (visited on 2 August 2013). 77 See Committee on Technical Barriers <strong>to</strong> Trade, M<strong>in</strong>utes of <strong>the</strong> Meet<strong>in</strong>g of 27-‐28 November 2012 (G/TBT/M/58). 26
<strong>Life</strong> <strong>after</strong> <strong>Doha</strong> | would have <strong>to</strong> be subsidies. After all, <strong>the</strong>re's no reason <strong>to</strong> negotiate reductions <strong>in</strong> subsidies vis-à-‐vis a s<strong>in</strong>gle trad<strong>in</strong>g partner and <strong>to</strong> make difficult political-‐economy cuts <strong>to</strong> such programs when <strong>the</strong>y will ultimately do little more than improve <strong>the</strong> market access of ano<strong>the</strong>r subsidiz<strong>in</strong>g country not party <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> same reduction commitments. The same is arguably true for rules on <strong>in</strong>tellectual property rights, prudential regulations, currency manipulation, trade-‐related environmental measures and myriad o<strong>the</strong>r economic policy areas that are susceptible <strong>to</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational arbitrage as economic ac<strong>to</strong>rs seek out jurisdictions with <strong>the</strong> lowest possible compliance costs. On issues such as <strong>the</strong>se, we need an <strong>in</strong>ternational organization that can act as a forum for negotiations that delivers enforceable outcomes, and we are <strong>in</strong> fact lucky <strong>to</strong> already have one <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> form of <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> (at least for some of <strong>the</strong>se issues). F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>the</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> does well is balanc<strong>in</strong>g out (<strong>to</strong> an admittedly limited albeit very real extent) <strong>the</strong> power asymmetries that naturally arise when big, economically powerful and well-‐organized countries come <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> same negotiat<strong>in</strong>g table as small, economically weaker and less well-‐organized countries. Th<strong>in</strong>k of <strong>the</strong> miss-‐match <strong>in</strong> economic strength and trade policy expertise that is at play when a develop<strong>in</strong>g country like <strong>the</strong> Philipp<strong>in</strong>es negotiates an economic partnership agreement with Japan, or Columbia negotiates an FTA with <strong>the</strong> Unites States. It is arguably power imbalances such as <strong>the</strong>se that allow <strong>the</strong> EU <strong>to</strong> get away with conclud<strong>in</strong>g preferential trad<strong>in</strong>g arrangements with many smaller trad<strong>in</strong>g partners that explicitly carve out important areas like cont<strong>in</strong>gency protection from <strong>the</strong> dispute settlement provisions of <strong>the</strong>se agreements. The "vic<strong>to</strong>ry" that develop<strong>in</strong>g countries scored over <strong>the</strong> EU at Cancun, ultimately forc<strong>in</strong>g Pascal Lamy <strong>to</strong> abandon any of <strong>the</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore Issues except <strong>the</strong> one that develop<strong>in</strong>g countries were favourable <strong>to</strong> would be unth<strong>in</strong>kable <strong>in</strong> a more limited sett<strong>in</strong>g where one or a handful of develop<strong>in</strong>g countries face off aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>the</strong> EU as <strong>the</strong> sole hegemon <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> room. The ability of <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> <strong>to</strong> create a more level play<strong>in</strong>g field (an admittedly tired and over-‐used cliché) for developed and develop<strong>in</strong>g countries has been analysed and documented <strong>in</strong> a number of articles <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a very <strong>in</strong>sightful one by Crist<strong>in</strong>a Davis of Pr<strong>in</strong>ce<strong>to</strong>n <strong>in</strong> 2005, that compares <strong>the</strong> differences <strong>in</strong> outcomes between Vietnamese catfish exporters (when Vietnam was not yet <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong>) and Peruvian exporters of sard<strong>in</strong>es when faced with trade barriers <strong>in</strong> rich-‐country export markets. 78 The <strong>WTO</strong> undoubtedly still has its uses <strong>in</strong> this respect and we cannot afford <strong>to</strong> do without it. 78 Christ<strong>in</strong>a l. Davis, Do <strong>WTO</strong> rules create a level play<strong>in</strong>g field? Lessons from <strong>the</strong> experience of Peru and Vietnam, <strong>in</strong>: John S. Odell (ed.), Negotiat<strong>in</strong>g Trade, Develop<strong>in</strong>g Countries <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>WTO</strong> and NAFTA, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 219 -‐ 256. 27
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Life after Doha: Some reflections in the run up to the 9th WTO Ministerial Conference on Bali

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