Rhosarian 2019

The Rhosarian 1/19
OPERATION URIC
marking / close air support to ground forces. We
could be airborne for anything up to 10 hours at a
time.
All the aircraft took off from Chiredzi (Buffalo
Range airfield) at the appointed time. Following
the 5 Lynxes were Daks with paratroops, and
helicopters with other support troops. Hunter and
Canberra jets were already on the way .
We then put in the first white phosphorous
rocket strikes, closely followed by the Hunter
strikes and the Canberra bombers. The Daks were
already dropping the paratroopers and the
helicopters their officers and troops, and the combat
began. Other targets were similarly being attacked.
Major Pat Armstrong then took over the tactical
control of the ground forces by means of
instructions radioed to the callsigns on the ground.
It never failed to amaze me on ops like this how
the airborne commander managed to handle radio
transmissions back and forth using two radios to
move, relocate and take reports from the ground
callsigns and give them new instructions in the
battle. Like handling a gigantic chessboard with
deadly pieces. But they did it very effectively.
So the battle continued for three days. However
not quite how it was planned with the very effective
defences at Mapai, with their Russian designed
zigzag trench system and some 20 AA guns, 37
mm anti aircraft airburst shelling, 23 mm ZPU 4,
12.7 mm as I seem to recall.
A major setback to the operation and shock to
us all were the major disasters; the loss of Rhodesian
Bell 6098 and flight engineer LAC Alex Wesson,
and SAAF Puma 164 with aircrew Capt Paul
Velleman, Lt Nigel Osborne and Sgt Dirk Retief,
together with the 14 Rhodesian officers and troops.
Major Armstrong controlled the ground
callsigns flying for some 6 hours each of the first
two days before leaving for debriefing. The Lynxes
and helicopters continued to provide close air
support, and the jets their heavy bombardment of
the targets.
After the third day of the operation General
Walls and the senior officers in the command
Dakota decided to curtail the assault on Mapai and
make a strategic withdrawal. So ended Operation
Uric; all that remained was for the helicopters to
pick up all the ground troops and return to the
forward bases.
October 2019
27
Interestingly, a captive FPLM soldier
subsequently revealed that they were extremely
tired, demoralized and short of supplies. Had we
continued for another two days they would have
been completely defeated.
To complete this short resumé of Op Uric, not
many people know of the extent of the South
African involvement. Of course because of the
Puma tragedy, the support of a good number of
helicopters is well documented. But to supplement
the Rhodesian air effort, they also supplied
paradrop Dakotas and Canberra bombers. Also
elements of 1 Recce Commando were parachuted
into the frays to support the Rhodesian troops. All
this was secret at the time, and code named
Operation Bootlace by the South Africans.
As the Air Force strike leader with Major
Armstrong, I was fully involved in the operation
and have written a couple of accounts when so
requested. But the memories dim with advancing
age, so I hope that this address reflects events
accurately, but all here who were there at the time
will remember.
God Bless you all.
Editor’s Note
Although Op Uric failed to achieve all the
tactical objectives, it was a strategic success in
that the operation led to Samora Machel, the
President of Mozambique, putting pressure on
Robert Mugabe to take part in the Lancaster House
conference talks. He wanted to prevent
Mozambique from being dragged further into the
war with Rhodesia, which had already seriously
damaged its economy.
This is the background to Op Uric; tactical
details of the operation itself can be found on
the Internet at the following link:
http://www.rhodesia.nl/uric1.htm