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LSB April 2022 LR

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FAMILY LAW CASE NOTES<br />

Family Law Case Notes<br />

CRAIG NICOL AND KELEIGH ROBINSON, THE FAMILY LAW BOOK<br />

CHILDREN – FATHER UNSUCCESSFULLY<br />

APPEALS ORDER AUTHORISING MOTHER<br />

TO VACCINATE CHILD AGAINST COVID-19<br />

In Dacombe & Paddison [2021]<br />

FedCFamC1A 103 (23 December, 2021)<br />

Austin J (sitting in the appellate jurisdiction<br />

of the Federal Circuit and Family Court<br />

of Australia) summarily dismissed a<br />

father’s appeal against a consent order,<br />

which authorised the mother to arrange<br />

vaccinations of the parties’ daughter.<br />

The Court said (from [8]):<br />

“An appeal may be summarily<br />

dismissed if the appellant has no<br />

reasonable prospect of successfully<br />

prosecuting it (s 46(2)) [ed. Of the Federal<br />

Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act<br />

2021 (Cth)], even if it is not hopeless or<br />

bound to fail (s 46(3)) ( … )<br />

[10] The father’s first contention – that<br />

he did not consent to the order – is false. …<br />

[11] While it was the legal practitioners<br />

who confirmed the parties’ agreement, the<br />

father did not demur when the primary<br />

judge was informed of the compromise. …<br />

[12] When the primary judge sought to<br />

formulate an order to properly reflect the<br />

parties’ agreement, the father even helped<br />

with the drafting ( … )<br />

[14] [The father] … only disagreed<br />

with any form of government-imposed<br />

immunisation or treatment for the child,<br />

but the appealed order did not deal with<br />

any form of immunisation or treatment<br />

mandated by government because<br />

the parties agreed the child should be<br />

immunised ( … )<br />

[16] … Ground 1 of the father’s appeal<br />

depends entirely upon his false contention<br />

that he did not consent to the appealed<br />

38 THE BULLETIN <strong>April</strong> <strong>2022</strong><br />

order. He did and now he cannot appeal<br />

the order on merit in the teeth of such<br />

consent. …<br />

[17] … [Section] 51(xxiiiA) of the<br />

Constitution enables the parliament to make<br />

laws about the provision of medical and<br />

dental services (but not so as to authorize<br />

any form of civil conscription) ( … )<br />

[21] … [T]he Constitutional<br />

impediment only affects the validity of<br />

federal legislation which enables the civil<br />

conscription of medical and dental services,<br />

upon which field the Family Law Act does<br />

not play. An order made under the …<br />

Act which ensures a child’s receipt of …<br />

medical treatment is not caught by the<br />

prohibition ( … )”<br />

PROPERTY – APPLICANT’S EQUITABLE<br />

TRUST CLAIM FAILS AS PURCHASES WERE<br />

GIFTS – RESPONDENT’S CLAIM FAILS AS<br />

THERE WAS NO DE FACTO RELATIONSHIP<br />

In H, AW v K, S [2021] SASC 128 (11<br />

November, 2021) Bochner J of the Supreme<br />

Court of South Australia dismissed all<br />

applications after a four year relationship<br />

between a dual citizen of Australia and the<br />

USA (the applicant) and a single mother<br />

who lived in Adelaide (the respondent).<br />

The applicant sought a declaration that<br />

the respondent’s vehicle and bank balances<br />

were held on trust for him ([4]).<br />

The respondent argued the dealings<br />

were gifts and [she] sought a declaration that<br />

the parties were in a de facto relationship.<br />

The Court said (from [52]):<br />

“The applicant agreed that [his] …<br />

communication [to the respondent]<br />

amounted to representations that he<br />

would provide for her … He denied …<br />

that the provision of financial support<br />

… or … any other gifts to her would be<br />

unconditional. ( … )<br />

[59] … [T]he parties did not acquire<br />

any assets together … The respondent<br />

never visited the applicant’s house …, nor<br />

was she invited to do so. ( … )<br />

[151] The applicant came to Adelaide<br />

[where the Respondent lived] between<br />

five and nine times each year during the<br />

relationship. The length of the visits<br />

varied, from less than twenty-four hours,<br />

to seven days ( … )<br />

[193] … I consider that the parties’<br />

relationship was not that of a couple living<br />

together on a genuine domestic basis. The<br />

evidence does not demonstrate ‘the merger<br />

of two individual lives into life as a couple’<br />

… [I]t demonstrates two individuals living<br />

their separate lives and coming together<br />

seven or eight times each year for some<br />

shared time. It my view it is the time that<br />

was shared, rather than the lives.”<br />

As to the trust claim, the Court said<br />

(from [214]):<br />

“ … [T]his evidence leads me to the<br />

conclusion that the moneys given to<br />

the respondent … were a gift. … [A]ny<br />

statements made by the applicant that the<br />

moneys should be used for rent, clothes<br />

and other expenses were no more than<br />

indicative of his motive … They did not<br />

serve to impress the funds with a trust.”<br />

CHILDREN – HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION<br />

CONVENTION – ORDER FOR PRODUCTION<br />

OF SOLICITOR’S FILE SET ASIDE, GIVEN ITS<br />

IRRELEVANCE TO HABITUAL RESIDENCE<br />

In Sterling [<strong>2022</strong>] FedCFamC1A 3 (27<br />

January, <strong>2022</strong>), the Full Court (Austin,

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