Fishing Vessel Monitoring Systems: Past, Present and Future

VMS: Past, Present and Future 33
When such a requirement is combined with security connectors at both the
terminal and the antenna, it is an effective means of preventing one of the most
primary means of VMS data tampering: removal of the VMS terminal from the
vessel to be tracked.
The issue of security as related to VMS is, of course, a complex one with at least
two, distinct aspects: the reliability of the data gathered and keeping that data,
once it is gathered, totally secure against unauthorised access and use. The first
of these, basically an issue of system and data tampering, is amply covered in
this study’s chapter on vessel equipment security.
5.3 Data access and distribution
Security of access and use is a quite different question. It is based upon the fact
that VMS data is inherently confidential in that data related to the exact positions
where a fishing vessel operates benefits from the concept of commercial
confidentiality. There is even an on-going debate as to whom VMS data belongs,
the vessel operator or the agency operating the VMS. In either case the vessel
operator has a right to expect that VMS data be treated with the care and respect
that it deserves.
The difficulty of maintaining confidentiality of VMS data is closely related to the
use to which it is put. Data that remains in, for example, a FMC that operates in
stand-alone mode, poses far fewer security questions than one that is networked,
providing data to users distributed in different places. Being able to assure this
security is key, as the successful continued operation of a VMS requires at the
very least the tacit cooperation of the fishing industry.
5.3.1 Two aspects of data security
Once again, there are two aspects to this part of the VMS security issue, the
pure, technical aspect and the question of misuse of data by authorised users.
The first aspect is a pure information technology issue, and has to do with
matters like user identification (passwords, readable ID cards, etc.), firewalls to
prevent unauthorised external access, and restricted physical access to system
hardware.
There is no stock solution to this data processing and telecommunications issue
as the adequate arrangement is directly related to the results of a security risk
analysis that should accompany the implementation of any VMS. This
examination should cover everything from the value of the data gathered (i.e.
how much would an unscrupulous vessel operator be prepared to pay for the
position data of a successful vessel) to a security assessment of existing data