Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

1 Frontline Pakistan
and Jamiat Ulema Pakistan, regrouped themselves in the form of the
MMA. Their shared perception of the post-9/11 world and their anti-
US position impelled them to unite on one platform. One common
objective was to resist Musharraf’s policy turnaround.
Musharraf was bound by the Supreme Court ruling to hold
parliamentary elections and transfer power to an elected government
by October 2002. He, however, made his intentions very clear: there
was going to be no complete transfer to an elected Parliament or to a
civilian government. On the eve of the elections, he made sweeping
changes in the constitution ensuring that he would continue to hold
sway in the new order. The controversial redrafting of the constitution
exposed Musharraf’s plan to establish a ‘controlled democracy’ in
which the military would continue to cast its heavy shadow. It removed
all illusions about the country’s return to democracy. 4
The changes gave the President extensive powers, including the
right to dismiss an elected Parliament. A military-dominated National
Security Council, with overriding powers over Parliament, was
to monitor the future civilian government. It was an entirely new
constitution in which the source of power was outside the Parliament.
Musharraf described the new order as the transition from ‘democratic
dictatorship to an elected essence of democracy’.
And it was not enough that the military government tried to micromanage
the outcome of the elections and manipulate a ‘favourable result’.
For several weeks before the nomination papers were filed, Tariq
Aziz, the President’s powerful principal secretary, had camped out in
Lahore, wheeling and dealing with politicians. The country’s most
influential bureaucrat had an important task assigned to him by his
military leader. His job was to knock together a pro-military alliance.
Aided by Major-General Ehtesham Zamir, the head of the the ISI’s
internal wing, Tariq Aziz manoeuvred a list of ‘loyal’ candidates. Most
of them belonged to the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) faction, but
there were several others who the military government believed were
willing to cooperate. 5 They included some of Pakistan’s most corrupt
politicians, raising questions about Musharraf’s pledge to fight corruption.
State machinery was blatantly used to get a ‘favourable result’.
Tariq Aziz, a close pal of Musharraf’s from his student days, has
been his key political strategist and had earlier engineered a split in the
Pakistan Muslim League. However, it was not just Tariq Aziz’s dexterity,
but also heavy arm-twisting by the ISI, as well as the administration,
which forced many to switch their loyalties. Never before had the