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Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak

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Volte-Face<br />

situation became tense when, on 9 September, two suicide bombers<br />

masquerading as journalists assassinated Ahmed Shah Masood, the<br />

leader of the rebel Afghan Northern Alliance. <strong>The</strong> leaders of the<br />

alliance blamed al-Qaeda and the ISI for the murder.<br />

General Mahmood was watching television coverage of the Twin<br />

Tower attacks at Ambassador Lodhi’s office when he received a call at 5<br />

pm inviting him for an emergency meeting with Richard Armitage, the<br />

US Deputy Secretary of State. At 10 am on 12 September, the General,<br />

accompanied by Ambassador Lodhi and Zamir Akram, a senior official<br />

at the Embassy, arrived at the State Department. Armitage was terse as<br />

he began saying that <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> faced a stark choice. ‘We want to know<br />

whether you are with us or not. This is a black and white choice with<br />

no grey, ‘he said. <strong>The</strong> General enquired what his country could do in<br />

that situation. ‘We need your country’s full support and cooperation.<br />

We will tell you tomorrow the specifics about the cooperation that is<br />

required,’ said Armitage and asked the General to meet him the next<br />

day. 4<br />

Returning to the Embassy, General Mahmood telephoned President<br />

Musharraf. Musharraf had been speaking to a group of local government<br />

representatives in Karachi when his Press Secretary had interrupted<br />

to tell him about the World Trade Center attacks. He immediately<br />

perceived the choice that he was about to be faced with. ‘I took a fast<br />

decision,’ he later told me, ‘but I thought about it very carefully.’ 5 Only<br />

afterwards did he consult his aides and senior military commanders.<br />

‘I keep to Napoleon’s view that two-thirds of the decision-making<br />

process is based on analysis and information and one-third is always<br />

a leap in the dark.’ 6<br />

<strong>The</strong> shock and anger in Washington which was relayed to him<br />

by his spy chief did not surprise Musharraf. He had also received a<br />

telephone call from Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had spelled<br />

out the situation in stark terms, telling the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i President: ‘<strong>The</strong><br />

American people would not understand if <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> was not in this<br />

fight with the United States.’ 7 Musharraf assured him of his country’s<br />

full cooperation.<br />

On 13 September, General Mahmood returned to the State Department<br />

for the second meeting. ‘This is not negotiable,’ said Armitage,<br />

as he handed him a single sheet of paper with a list of seven demands<br />

that the Bush administration wanted him to accept. <strong>The</strong> General, who<br />

was known for his hardline pro-Taliban position, glanced through the<br />

paper for a few seconds and passed it on to Ambassador Lodhi. Before

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