Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Volte-Face<br />
situation became tense when, on 9 September, two suicide bombers<br />
masquerading as journalists assassinated Ahmed Shah Masood, the<br />
leader of the rebel Afghan Northern Alliance. <strong>The</strong> leaders of the<br />
alliance blamed al-Qaeda and the ISI for the murder.<br />
General Mahmood was watching television coverage of the Twin<br />
Tower attacks at Ambassador Lodhi’s office when he received a call at 5<br />
pm inviting him for an emergency meeting with Richard Armitage, the<br />
US Deputy Secretary of State. At 10 am on 12 September, the General,<br />
accompanied by Ambassador Lodhi and Zamir Akram, a senior official<br />
at the Embassy, arrived at the State Department. Armitage was terse as<br />
he began saying that <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> faced a stark choice. ‘We want to know<br />
whether you are with us or not. This is a black and white choice with<br />
no grey, ‘he said. <strong>The</strong> General enquired what his country could do in<br />
that situation. ‘We need your country’s full support and cooperation.<br />
We will tell you tomorrow the specifics about the cooperation that is<br />
required,’ said Armitage and asked the General to meet him the next<br />
day. 4<br />
Returning to the Embassy, General Mahmood telephoned President<br />
Musharraf. Musharraf had been speaking to a group of local government<br />
representatives in Karachi when his Press Secretary had interrupted<br />
to tell him about the World Trade Center attacks. He immediately<br />
perceived the choice that he was about to be faced with. ‘I took a fast<br />
decision,’ he later told me, ‘but I thought about it very carefully.’ 5 Only<br />
afterwards did he consult his aides and senior military commanders.<br />
‘I keep to Napoleon’s view that two-thirds of the decision-making<br />
process is based on analysis and information and one-third is always<br />
a leap in the dark.’ 6<br />
<strong>The</strong> shock and anger in Washington which was relayed to him<br />
by his spy chief did not surprise Musharraf. He had also received a<br />
telephone call from Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had spelled<br />
out the situation in stark terms, telling the <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i President: ‘<strong>The</strong><br />
American people would not understand if <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> was not in this<br />
fight with the United States.’ 7 Musharraf assured him of his country’s<br />
full cooperation.<br />
On 13 September, General Mahmood returned to the State Department<br />
for the second meeting. ‘This is not negotiable,’ said Armitage,<br />
as he handed him a single sheet of paper with a list of seven demands<br />
that the Bush administration wanted him to accept. <strong>The</strong> General, who<br />
was known for his hardline pro-Taliban position, glanced through the<br />
paper for a few seconds and passed it on to Ambassador Lodhi. Before