Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle With Militant Islam - Arz-e-Pak
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Volte-Face<br />
effort coordinated with the USA to locate and punish those involved in<br />
that horrific act. President Bush responded to Musharraf’s message of<br />
support by saying, ‘Now we’ll find out what that means. Won’t we?’<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s support was important for the USA. Its geographic<br />
proximity and its vast intelligence information on Afghanistan were<br />
seen as crucial for any military action against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> was one of the three countries – the others were the United<br />
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia – which had formally recognized<br />
the conservative Afghan <strong>Islam</strong>ic government and the only country<br />
which had maintained diplomatic relations with Kabul. <strong>The</strong> American<br />
demands, to which General Mahmood had agreed in next to no time,<br />
required <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> to abandon its support for the Taliban regime and<br />
provide logistic support to the American forces. After having spent the<br />
past seven years helping the Taliban consolidate their rule, providing<br />
them with military, political and financial support, <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> was now<br />
being asked by the Bush administration to help the USA dislodge the<br />
<strong>Islam</strong>ic fundamentalist government.<br />
<strong>The</strong> list was clearly only the first step in testing <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>’s resolve.<br />
Washington had also asked for a comprehensive report from the ISI<br />
about every detail it had on bin Laden, including his contacts with<br />
<strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i and other <strong>Islam</strong>ic militant organizations. <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> eventually<br />
negotiated with the USA that no combat missions would be carried out<br />
from its territory and, instead of blanket over-flight rights, an air corridor<br />
was assigned to US planes. <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> was ready to break diplomatic<br />
relations with the Taliban government immediately, but the move<br />
was delayed on American advice. <strong>The</strong> US Assistant Secretary of State,<br />
Christina Rocca, told Ambassador Lodhi that <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> should keep<br />
the diplomatic channel open with the Taliban until the US invasion<br />
was completed. 10 Breaking off diplomatic relations at that point, in<br />
Washington’s view, would have given a clear indication to the Taliban<br />
about the exact timing of an impending US attack.<br />
<strong>The</strong> turnaround was met with astonishment by the military. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
had been actively supporting the Pashtun Taliban regime, which,<br />
according to them, provided <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong> with ‘strategic depth’ against<br />
any aggression from arch rival India. <strong>The</strong> <strong><strong>Pak</strong>istan</strong>i military feared that<br />
they would lose their strategic depth in Kabul if they withdrew support<br />
from the hardline <strong>Islam</strong>ic regime.<br />
Several efforts by the USA prior to 9/11 had failed to elicit <strong>Islam</strong>abad’s<br />
cooperation in the expulsion of bin Laden from Afghanistan. Musharraf‘s<br />
coming to power in October 1999 had reversed a secret mission plan