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THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery

THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery

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BATTLES AROUND CHATTANOOGA<br />

V. COMMENTS<br />

<strong>THE</strong> SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA<br />

After the battle of Chicamauga, Bragg, according to the cu!?f'6mof the<br />

times, delayed pursuit for a day, allowing Rosecrans to entrenCh himself in<br />

Chattanooga. Thereafter, Bragg, as Longstreet remarks, attempted to starve<br />

out Rosecrans by investing him on the only side from which he (Rosecrans)<br />

could not get supplies. After a week's delay Bragg sent his cavalry to operate<br />

on Rosecran's line of supplies. In the meantime this cavalry had been scattered<br />

to the four winds, and Bragg, instead of assembling it for a coordinated<br />

operation, ordered it against the Federal communications in three columns.<br />

Two of these columns were defeated in detail by the Union cavalry, while the<br />

third never moved. The chief reasons for the failure to starve out Rosecrans<br />

are therefore obvious.<br />

Bragg's failure to hold Lookout Valley was due to the fact that there was<br />

no road leading from the position of the Confederate main body to Lookout<br />

Valley.<br />

Jenkin's night attack on Geary depended for success on Law's containing a<br />

force three times his strength. It could not be done at this stage of the war.<br />

GEUu~T'S TACTICS<br />

Thomas's attack on November 23 was too strong to serve the purpose of a<br />

reconnaissance in force. If Bragg was really withdrawing he would, in the<br />

twenty-four hours that had elapsed between the time of origin of the deserter's<br />

information and the time of attack, have already cleared his position by several<br />

miles with his main body and a force of 10,000 men would certainly have been<br />

able to puncture his rear guard. The remainder of Grant's army could then<br />

have been set in motion in the decisive direction. In fact, the attack actually<br />

served to cause Bragg to strengthen his forces by the recall of Cleburne, whose<br />

entrainment for Knoxville was under way and had originated the report, and<br />

whose stubborn defense of the right of the line and later rear guard action<br />

probably saved Bragg from annihilation. This attack secured Sherman's river<br />

crossing, however, though not made for that purpose, and was therefore, by<br />

accident, a sound tactical move.<br />

Hooker's attack was forced on Grant but it should have been, according to<br />

the rules of war, postponed until the twenty-fifth. However, its astounding<br />

success actually probably served to lower greatly the morale of the Confederate<br />

forces as the Union flag on Lookout Mountain was a symbol of disaster that<br />

every Confederate on Missionary Ridge could see.<br />

Sherman's river crossing as originally planned by Grant was a hazardous<br />

undertaking. Grant did not originally intend to have Thomas attack until<br />

Sherman had effected his crossing. With Orchard Knob still in their possession<br />

Sherman should have been defeated by the Confederates at the river. It looks<br />

as though Grant was trying to repeat Vicksburg on a small scale. Bragg was<br />

239

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