THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery
THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery
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BATTLES AROUND CHATTANOOGA<br />
V. COMMENTS<br />
<strong>THE</strong> SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA<br />
After the battle of Chicamauga, Bragg, according to the cu!?f'6mof the<br />
times, delayed pursuit for a day, allowing Rosecrans to entrenCh himself in<br />
Chattanooga. Thereafter, Bragg, as Longstreet remarks, attempted to starve<br />
out Rosecrans by investing him on the only side from which he (Rosecrans)<br />
could not get supplies. After a week's delay Bragg sent his cavalry to operate<br />
on Rosecran's line of supplies. In the meantime this cavalry had been scattered<br />
to the four winds, and Bragg, instead of assembling it for a coordinated<br />
operation, ordered it against the Federal communications in three columns.<br />
Two of these columns were defeated in detail by the Union cavalry, while the<br />
third never moved. The chief reasons for the failure to starve out Rosecrans<br />
are therefore obvious.<br />
Bragg's failure to hold Lookout Valley was due to the fact that there was<br />
no road leading from the position of the Confederate main body to Lookout<br />
Valley.<br />
Jenkin's night attack on Geary depended for success on Law's containing a<br />
force three times his strength. It could not be done at this stage of the war.<br />
GEUu~T'S TACTICS<br />
Thomas's attack on November 23 was too strong to serve the purpose of a<br />
reconnaissance in force. If Bragg was really withdrawing he would, in the<br />
twenty-four hours that had elapsed between the time of origin of the deserter's<br />
information and the time of attack, have already cleared his position by several<br />
miles with his main body and a force of 10,000 men would certainly have been<br />
able to puncture his rear guard. The remainder of Grant's army could then<br />
have been set in motion in the decisive direction. In fact, the attack actually<br />
served to cause Bragg to strengthen his forces by the recall of Cleburne, whose<br />
entrainment for Knoxville was under way and had originated the report, and<br />
whose stubborn defense of the right of the line and later rear guard action<br />
probably saved Bragg from annihilation. This attack secured Sherman's river<br />
crossing, however, though not made for that purpose, and was therefore, by<br />
accident, a sound tactical move.<br />
Hooker's attack was forced on Grant but it should have been, according to<br />
the rules of war, postponed until the twenty-fifth. However, its astounding<br />
success actually probably served to lower greatly the morale of the Confederate<br />
forces as the Union flag on Lookout Mountain was a symbol of disaster that<br />
every Confederate on Missionary Ridge could see.<br />
Sherman's river crossing as originally planned by Grant was a hazardous<br />
undertaking. Grant did not originally intend to have Thomas attack until<br />
Sherman had effected his crossing. With Orchard Knob still in their possession<br />
Sherman should have been defeated by the Confederates at the river. It looks<br />
as though Grant was trying to repeat Vicksburg on a small scale. Bragg was<br />
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