THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL - Air Defense Artillery

240 THE COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL
too good a general and too aggressive to try such a scheme on. With Orchard
Knob in Grant's hands the Confederates could not attack Sherman at the river
without exposing themselves to an attack in the flank or rear.
Grant's simplest and best plan would have been to have held Sherman's
pontoons in reserve to secure his river crossings and to have concentrated his
entire force at Chattanooga and then made a coordinated attack on Bragg,
penetrating the Confederate position along the Chattanooga Creek.
Bragg attempted to hold a position which gave the attackers the advantage
of interior lines, which should be a chief advantage of the defense. Grant tried
his best to give the interior lines back to Bragg but providence intervened.
BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
The defeat of the Confederates at Lookout Mountain appears to have been
due entirely to poor leadership. It is hard to know where to place the blame
because it rests on Bragg, Stevenson, Jackson, Moore, and Walthall, and also
on Hardee who was in command of Bragg's left until shortly before the battle.
Walthall's breastworks were so sited that a flank attack took them from the
rear from higher ground. The "new" line was so close to the Summertown road
that, with an active enemy in its immediate front, the plateau was untenable.
The pickets were too far away from the main bodies to be effectively supported.
They should have been instructed to fall back at once by a pre-arranged route
in case of a general attack, should have been fewer in number, and should have
been better sited. During the battle Stevenson passed the buck to Jackson,
Jackson passed it to Walthall, and Walthall tried to fight 10,000 men with
1000. Neither Stevenson, Jackson, Moore, nor Walthall appears to have known
what the plan of defense was, although they were the men who had to execute
it. When they finally formed a line to oppose the advancing Federals, the
Confederate soldiers, although outnumbered at the point of contact by about
two to one, stopped the attack in about a half hour or hour and within a few
hundred yards.
SHERMAN'S RIVER CROSSING
As this crossing was unopposed it reduced itself merely to an excellent piece
of engineering.
After the crossing was effected Sherman was too timid. With nearly 18,000
men he marched up to Bragg's flank and waited for Bragg to try to drive him
out. An hour's fighting on November 24 would have put him in control of
one of Bragg's main lines of retreat. Consequently, he fought all the next day
trying to cut off Bragg and was entirely unsuccessful. His failure to seize the
complete hill mass north of the tunnel seems to have been due to his astonishment
at finding that his map was inaccurate and to a lack (perhaps momentary)
of a ready eye for the ground, together with a disposition to let well enough
alone.
In this operation Bragg had more success than he deserved. Although he
probably did not know Sherman's exact strength he either did or should have